UNION WITH MEXICO.
1821-1822.
FIRST ACTS OF GUATEMALAN RULERS—INTRIGUES OF PARTIES—THEIR
EVIL CONSEQUENCES—GAINZA'S INTRIGUES—INDEPENDENCE
IN THE OTHER PROVINCES—REWARDS TO GAINZA—TROUBLES
IN SALVADOR—DISSENSIONS IN HONDURAS—LOCAL SQUABBLES
IN NICARAGUA—PREDILECTION FOR IMPERIALISM—COSTA RICA
NEUTRAL—CONDITION OF VARIOUS SECTIONS—SECEDING DISTRICTS OF
GUATEMALA—PERPLEXITIES OF THE JUNTA CONSULTIVA—ITURBIDE'S
DEVICES—MILITARY PRESSURE—HIS PROPOSALS ACCEPTED—ILLEGAL
ANNEXATION—PROTESTS AND RESISTANCE—WAR BEGINS.
Among the first acts of the junta at Guatemala was the promotion of
two officers who were supposed to be reliable supporters of the late
movement.[III-1] Both proved themselves afterward recreant to their
pledges, by their hostility to the republican cause.
[Sidenote: PARTY STRIFE.]
The cacos were republicans. They strove to rid the country of
the antiquated errors and practices, including in their plans the
abolishment of the privileges of the clergy, and the restriction of
their power, which had been a constant source of injury to the people
at large. They wanted the adoption of democratic institutions, in order
to place the masses on the level heretofore occupied only by the ruling
class. They succeeded in prevailing on the people to take an interest
and a direct intervention in public affairs. Barrundia, Molina, and
Córdoba led them to the galleries of the junta chamber to witness its
acts, and even take part in its deliberations.[III-2] They attacked
Valle for the clause he inserted in the acta of the 15th, to which I
have alluded in the preceding chapter. On that point they certainly had
a well-founded grievance, but their manner of presenting it resulted
in a loss of confidence in the junta, the organization of new parties,
and general distraction. The point taken by them, however, was decided
in their favor by the junta. But the latter held secret sessions after
the 29th of September, significant of sinister purposes.
The other party—formerly constituting the ruling class—scouted the idea
of equality. Most of the churchmen had the same feeling; for in joining
the movement for separation from Spain their motive had been to shield
their menaced prerogatives, rather than love for America or freedom.
On the 18th of September Gainza wrote Iturbide, generalissimo of the
so-called empire of Mexico, that his course had been hailed with joy,
and that political parties had consolidated on the proposition of
independence from Spain; hence he had proclaimed it. And that, since
then, amid the transition from one system to another, the minds of the
people of Guatemala had been fixed on Iturbide, and they had desired to
tender him their congratulations as the liberator of New Spain.[III-3]
The junta consultiva passed a number of decrees, which were sanctioned
by Gainza. Urrutia, the ex-captain-general, was tendered his salary
and the considerations due his rank and former office if he would
formally recognize the independence.[III-4] He declined with thanks,
departing for Habana soon after. At the time of the adoption of the
acta, peaceable persons were assured of protection to their persons
and property, which pledge was faithfully fulfilled. No opponent of
independence was molested. Officials desirous of returning to their
country were allowed to do so.[III-5]
The junta, which bore the compellation of excelentísima, unanimously
appointed Gainza captain-general, with the salary of $10,000 a year,
decorating him also with a three-colored scarf, commemorative of
the three guarantees. A gold medal was voted to the members of the
ayuntamiento, who made the solemn declaration of independence on
the 23d of September.[III-6] Committees were next appointed to study
and report to the junta on public instruction, safety and defences,
statistics, industry, and finances. José del Valle was instructed to
form a plan of government.[III-7]
Several financial measures engaged the attention of the junta. One
of them proposed to levy a duty of ten per centum on gold and silver
exported to Spain. This was never strictly enforced. Restrictions to
foreign commerce, and monopolies existing under the Spanish government,
were abolished. Liberal principles were introduced, including freedom
of the press, which had been guaranteed by the Spanish constitution,
and was now continued in force.[III-8]
* * * * *
[Sidenote: SALVADOR INDEPENDENT.]
In Salvador absolute independence had been declared by the ayuntamiento
on the 21st of September, and proclaimed eight days after. Pedro
Barriere, who as teniente letrado was temporarily acting as chief
civil authority, together with the ayuntamiento of San Salvador,
decreed the election of seven persons to form a "junta subalterna
económica y consultiva." There was great commotion stirred on the one
hand by the vicar Ignacio Saldaña, and on the other by the liberals,
Arce, Ramirez, and others. The next day, the people being assembled
to effect the election, Barriere, pretending that his friends, the
so-called serviles, were in peril, retracted his former action. His
words enraged the populace. Then he called out the troops to disperse
the crowds, and arrested the republican leaders Arce, Rodriguez, and
Domingo Lara.[III-9] But on the news of his course reaching Guatemala,
Delgado was despatched to Salvador as a peace-maker, clothed with ample
powers. On his way to the capital he liberated prisoners, all of whom
joined his following and entered the city with him. Barriere was sent
out of the province; the troops were disarmed; peace was restored; a
subordinate junta consultiva was installed, and Delgado continued at
the head of the government.[III-10]
In Honduras, on the receipt at Comayagua of the news that Guatemala
had seceded from the Spanish crown, the governor-intendente, Brigadier
José Tinoco de Contreras, and the diputacion[III-11] refused to
recognize the government constituted in that city, and took an oath to
support the plan of Iguala. This was a virtual annexation of Honduras
to the Mexican empire. The partidos of Tegucigalpa and Gracias, and
the ports of Omoa and Trujillo, would not accept as valid the act of
the authorities at Comayagua, and maintained relations with those in
Guatemala. The independence from Spain had been declared on the 16th of
October.
Tinoco took the two ports above named, which were treacherously
surrendered to him.[III-12] He also fitted out a force to march on
Tegucigalpa. A counter-revolution, however, on the 1st of December,
supported by an approaching Guatemalan liberal force, set aside
Tinoco's control and restored that of the junta consultiva.[III-13]
[Sidenote: LIBERTY IN NICARAGUA.]
Nicaragua had, since 1813, a diputacion provincial, under the decree of
the Spanish córtes of May 24, 1812. Its jurisdiction extended over the
districts of Leon, Granada, Segovia, Nicaragua, and Matagalpa. Under
the new system, established in 1821, and since Urrutia's retirement,
constant questions of jurisdiction arose between the intendente and the
superior jefe político.[III-14]
On the 3d of October Colonel Crisanto Sacasa, commandant at Granada,
issued a general order to the officers to report with their troops
next morning, and take the oath to support national independence,
pursuant to the instructions he had received from Captain-general
Gainza. Intendente Saravia had been at enmity with Gainza, and when
the first steps were taken in Guatemala for independence, he threw
off his authority. In this he had the aid of Bishop Jerez and Colonel
Joaquin Arechavala, commander of the militia, all three being natives
of old Spain. They induced the diputacion and the ayuntamiento, by
an act of the 11th of October, to declare Nicaragua seceded from
Guatemala.[III-15] This action occurred in Leon. But Granada refused
to concur, and sent its representatives to the congress called to meet
in Guatemala. Later, October 21st, the authorities in Leon formally
accepted the Iguala plan, thereby annexing the whole province to
the Mexican empire. The country was accordingly divided into two
antagonistic parties, the imperialist and the republican.[III-16]
Gainza said to the diputacion at Leon, on the 22d of October, that
neither they nor the junta consultiva, nor any other body of men
then existing, could decide upon the future of the country; none had
a legal right to declare for or against annexation to Mexico. This
could be arrived at only by the representatives of the people in
the general congress.[III-17] He appointed Colonel Sacasa comandante
general of the forces in Nicaragua, and directed him to install in
Granada a subordinate junta gubernativa of five members, clothed with
the functions of a jefe político, and which was to continue in power
till the status of the country should be fixed.[III-18] Sacasa frankly
notified the rulers in Leon of what he was to do, and took steps to
carry his orders into execution. But Saravia, with the bishop and
the diputacion, determined that no such junta should be installed.
The diputacion, on the 1st of December, by a special act, forbade its
organization, declaring all attempts toward it subversive of good order
and hostile to the Mexican empire, to which they owed allegiance; and
warning all citizens to abstain from such efforts.
[Sidenote: COSTA RICA NEUTRAL.]
Sacasa had every right to expect that Gainza would support him against
attacks from Leon, but he was disappointed. The captain-general wrote
him, on the 22d of December, that it was doubtful if Central America
could maintain a government separate from Mexico, many towns having
already attached themselves to the empire; and that he had expressed
the same opinion to Saravia. Whereupon Sacasa, though a republican,
made no further opposition to the powers at Leon.
* * * * *
Costa Rica was privileged by distance to keep aloof from political
troubles threatening the other provinces. She had seceded from Spain
on the 27th of October, and set aside the governor, Juan Cañas; but
when called upon to adopt the plan of the capital or that of Leon,
she declined both, preferring a neutral attitude.[III-19] A meeting
of notables confirmed the act of secession, and set up a provisional
government entirely detached from that at Leon, which was to reside
alternately in Cartago, San José, Heredia, and Alajuela. But this was
found inconvenient, owing to rivalries between the two first-named
towns; and finally it was decided, on the 27th of November, to place
public affairs in the hands of Manuel Peralta, Rafael Osejo, and
Hermenegildo Bonilla, who were to reside at the provincial capital,
Cartago. Under this arrangement peace was preserved, and the province
never was really under the imperial rule.[III-20]
Dissensions had now brought the country to the brink of civil war,
and no time was to be lost in averting it. Measures were adopted
to hasten the meeting of congress. With the view of restoring peace
between the sections, and of rendering harmless disturbing elements
without resort to arms, the junta at Guatemala concluded to despatch
trusty commissioners to the provinces where secession was rife, who
were to prevail on them to send deputies to the general congress.
Other agents were to be despatched to Mexico to watch the turn of
events at the capital.[III-21] What good results those agents might
have accomplished, it is impossible now to say. They had no occasion
to try their efforts. Events in Mexico succeeded one another with such
rapidity, and their influence on Central America was so powerful, that,
even among the best patriots, many made up their minds to coöperate
toward the union, carried away by the idea that only under the ægis of
the northern empire could peace, safety, and stability be secured.
Costa Rica, we have seen, was in fact out of the field; at any rate,
it had no share in the political strife. The provinces of Guatemala
proper and Salvador were the only ones, at present, which together
with Granada, in Nicaragua, and some portions of Honduras, attempted to
preserve an independence from Mexico under whatever form of government
might be adopted in that country. The idea of annexation to Mexico
had been, however, growing popular from day to day in Guatemala. The
important section of Quezaltenango adhered to the scheme, on the 13th
of November, inviting Suchitepequez, Sololá, and Antigua Guatemala to
follow the example, which they did soon after. And Cirilo Flores and
Antonio Corzo, who in later years figured as most prominent champions
of democracy and suffered martyrdom for their cause, then supported the
action of Quezaltenango.
It was contended that Central America, after throwing off the
Spanish yoke, acquired, with independence, the right of forming such
associations as might be mutually beneficial. This doctrine was warmly
advocated by a large portion of the reflecting class. Under such
circumstances, Guatemala and Salvador, hemmed in as they were between
provinces that had already become annexed to Mexico, could not maintain
an absolute independence.
[Sidenote: ITURBIDE'S EFFORTS.]
Iturbide had large ideas of imperial sway, and was bent on the
acquisition of entire Central America, aided efficiently, as he was
on this side, by the aristocrats and other dissentient elements, who,
perceiving the insignificance they would come to if the nation finally
became constituted under a democratic government, which their opponents
were aiming at, labored with might and main to defeat the plan.[III-22]
They won over with money and fair promises a part of the people, and
with Gainza, who expected high rank and offices from the new empire,
bound Central America hand and foot, as will hereafter be seen.
The junta consultiva was much perplexed in view of the situation. The
imperialists daily became more insolent and exacting. At this critical
time—November 28th—Gainza laid before it a letter[III-23] from the
generalissimo, making allusion to the much abused second article
of the acta de independencia, and declaring that Guatemala was not
able to occupy as yet a place in the family of nations, and should
therefore link her fate with Mexico.[III-24] Whereupon the junta,
at the suggestion of the marqués de Aycinena, hastily answered that
the popular wishes must be ascertained before adopting any action;
promising to send the proposal at once to the ayuntamientos and local
authorities, with instructions to call on the people to give a formal
expression of their will on the subject. This promise was kept in a
measure—the ayuntamientos, not the people, were given one month's time
to manifest their preference.[III-25]
Soon after the arrival of Iturbide's messenger, the persecution of
republicans was begun. The rough element of the population, instigated
by their adversaries, during the night insulted them at their
homes.[III-26] Any one who either by word or writing opposed the plan
of annexation was treated as seditious. At last the opposing parties
had a scuffle in the streets, on the night of November 30th, which
ended in the discomfiture of the republicans engaged in it.[III-27]
Barrundia and Molina were present and exhibited much energy. The latter
was in great peril of losing his life.
[Sidenote: VOTE OF THE AYUNTAMIENTOS.]
On the day appointed for the receipt of the returns from the several
ayuntamientos—namely, the 31st of December—the junta provisional
consultiva proceeded to the count. The result was as follows: 21
ayuntamientos declared that none but the general congress had authority
to decide for or against the union with Mexico; 104 favored the
annexation at once and unconditionally; 11 approved of the union,
provided certain terms, which they appended, were stipulated in the
act of incorporation; 32 left the matter wholly to the provisional
government; and two declined the connection in toto.[III-28] Many
others had not, for some reason, returned any answers; or if they had,
the government in Guatemala failed to receive them on the appointed
day. The result was made known to the regency in Mexico on the 3d of
January, 1822, and on the 5th the subject was discussed in all its
bearings. Valle moved that the decision should be postponed until the
receipt of the returns of the 67 ayuntamientos not yet heard from.
Rivera, Calderon, and Alvarado objected to any action. Gainza advocated
the acceptance of the aid and protection tendered by Mexico.[III-29]
The junta, disregarding all objections adduced, and the marked
differences in the opinions of the ayuntamientos, decreed on the same
day, January 5, 1822, that the whole of Central America should be
annexed to the empire of Mexico, without other conditions than the
fulfilment of the plan of Iguala and the treaties of Córdoba.[III-30]
In a manifesto of that date, it assured the people that, after
obtaining the votes of all the authorities, corporations, and prominent
persons, and in view of the census of population formed in September
1821, it was evident that the vote for the union with Mexico had
reached a majority in Guatemala proper; and including the votes of
Nicaragua, Comayagua, Ciudad Real de Chiapas, Quezaltenango, Sololá,
and other towns which had a few days previously declared themselves
for annexation, it would be found that almost the whole population had
expressed itself in favor of connection.[III-31] No member failed to
record his name in favor of the loss of nationality, though some had,
as before stated, suggested that certain guarantees should be required
previous to the completion of the surrender.
[Sidenote: GAINZA'S EDICT.]
Gainza issued a manifesto full of generalities, declared there was no
further need of electing deputies to congress, and assured the people
of a liberal government, and future peace and prosperity.[III-32]
Erelong events came to show how delusive were the promises thus held
out by the incoming régime. It was preposterous on the part of an
unconstituted country, as Mexico then was, with a government whose
existence was precarious, to undertake the task of affording protection
to the people of Central America—to a people that had been brought
under the yoke of the so-called empire in such an unprecedented manner.
Forgetting, after a few days, the honeyed words of his manifesto,
Gainza,[III-33] on January 9th, issued a stringent edict, countersigned
by José María Celaya as secretary, giving renewed force to his former
edicts of September 17th and December 1st, and forbidding, under the
penalties provided by the laws against sedition, that any one should,
either by tongue or pen, censure or refute the action adopted as the
will of the majority. Conversations on the subject in the streets or
public places were prohibited, and citizens were enjoined to report
at once to the authorities any attempted conspiracy against the new
government which might come to their knowledge. Constitutional alcaldes
and other local authorities were charged with the execution of this
decree.
Gainza and his junta thus gave way to the wishes of the would-be
oligarchs and the clergy, ignoring the fact, formerly recognized
by them, that to the representatives of the people in congress
exclusively belonged the decision of the question on the future status
of the country.[III-34] The aristocrats and clericals brought about
difficulties to prevent the election of representatives, and took
advantage of them to carry out their designs. The truth is, that the
device resorted to, of acting upon the opinions of ayuntamientos which
they well knew had no authority in the premises, was illegal. And,
indeed, could a population of upwards of one million, scattered over
75,000 square miles of territory, have duly considered so vital a
matter as the abdication of their national autonomy within the short
period of thirty days? The whole secret of the aristocratic success lay
in the pressure brought to bear on the country with a military force
sent by Iturbide to support his pretensions.[III-35] The following
facts appeared in the imperial gazette of Mexico: The regency announced
on the 12th of November to the junta soberana that Chiapas, as well as
the towns of Guatemala, had signified a wish to be received as a part
of the Mexican empire, asking for military aid to uphold its acts. The
regency added, that the military aid must then be quite near Chiapas,
under the orders issued beforehand by the generalissimo, 5,000 men
having already, under the conde de la Cadena, crossed the Tehuantepec
River. The junta graciously assented to the so-called wishes of the
people of Chiapas and Guatemala, giving them the rights of Mexican
citizens.[III-36]
A division under Brigadier Vicente Filisola, with Colonel Felipe
Codallos as his second in command,[III-37] began its march in November
1821; but a large portion of the men deserted on the way, and the ranks
had to be recruited in Chiapas; and yet Filisola finally arrived in
Guatemala with only 600 men.[III-38]
[Sidenote: TROUBLES IN SALVADOR.]
The junta provisional, after its action of January 5th, had no
further reason for continuing, and so dissolved itself on the 21st of
February. Gainza, retaining the offices of jefe superior político and
captain-general, called into life a diputacion provincial.[III-39] His
authority, however, was not regarded in Chiapas, Honduras, Nicaragua,
nor a great part of Salvador. Costa Rica still remained aloof and was
unmolested.
During Iturbide's occupation of his rickety throne, Central America
had deputies in the imperial congress,[III-40] and the orders of the
emperor's government were generally obeyed. Nevertheless, plucky little
Salvador kept up the struggle against foreign domination. Nearly a
majority of its ayuntamientos, together with the priest Delgado, the
acting political chief, had signified their wish to await the action of
congress; and on hearing of the surrender to Mexico by Gainza and his
junta, entered a protest and seceded, resolving to remain independent
till the representatives of the whole people of Central America should
decide the question of nationality.[III-41]
But even here dissensions fostered from Guatemala had their pernicious
effects. Santa Ana and San Miguel had voted for annexation to Mexico,
and to uphold this action, seceded from their own province, which in
that year led to a war between Salvador and Guatemala. The government
at San Salvador gave the chief command of its forces to Manuel José
Arce, with orders to bring the people of Santa Ana to reason, peaceably
if he could, forcibly if he must.[III-42]
Arce marched on Santa Ana, when Padilla, commanding a portion of the
Sonsonate force which had been stationed in that city, retreated within
its own territory. After compelling the town to revoke its act of
secession, Arce went in pursuit of Padilla, occupied Ahuachapam, then
an annex of Sonsonate, and finally routed that officer in the hacienda
El Espinal.[III-43] This was the first act of a bloody war, which will
be treated in another chapter.
[Illustration: DEFEAT OF PADILLA.]
In Honduras, the districts of Tegucigalpa and Gracias, together
with the ports of Omoa and Trujillo, repudiated the union with
Mexico.[III-44] Brigadier Tinoco, on hearing that a Salvadoran force
had entered Honduras, resigned his office of governor. Comayagua,
however, continued recognizing the authority of Mexico, but not that of
Guatemala.[III-45]
[Sidenote: NICARAGUA AND COSTA RICA.]
In Nicaragua, the city of Granada disregarded the authority at Leon,
and held relations with Gainza, even after Colonel Sacasa had placed
himself under the orders of the former.[III-46] Sacasa had surrendered
his charge in Granada to Cleto Ordoñez,[III-47] who thus became the
leader of the liberal party in Nicaragua. After the act of annexation
to Mexico, and Salvador's act of secession, both Sacasa and Ordoñez
supported the independents.
Ordoñez, finding himself in possession of irresponsible power, soon
gave a loose rein to his bad instincts. He began to seize private
property, not excepting even that of foreigners. Sacasa's person and
property did not escape.[III-48]
Costa Rica did not fail, though maintaining a neutral attitude, to
manifest her discontent with the course of Guatemala.