BHAMO, THE SOUTHERN TOWNSHIPS, AND MÖNG MIT
South of Bhamo when we took the country was a Shan State known as Möng
Leng, and adjacent to it and separating it from the district of the
Ruby Mines was another Shan State named Möng Mit. The two together
covered a large area, including the lower valley of the Shwèli and
stretching from the southern boundary of Bhamo to the northern and
north-western limits of the Northern Shan States of Tawngpeng and North
Hsenwi. Neither of them was included in the list of Shan States proper.
They were much mixed up with the adjacent British districts Bhamo Katha
and the Ruby Mines. They were little interested in the politics of
the Shan States; and being more easily accessible to the Burmese and
very open to Kachin raids, they had not much cohesion or independence.
For these reasons they were not placed under the jurisdiction of the
Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, but were dealt with by the
Commissioner of the Northern Division.
At the time of the annexation the Sawbwa of Möng Mit had died. His
heir, a minor, was under the tutelage of the _Amats_, or ministers, who
formed a council to rule the State; which, as well as its neighbour,
Möng Leng, was in great disorder. The diverse races which people this
country, Kachins and Palaungs[52] in the hills, Burmans and Shans in
the more open parts, make it hard to govern. In Möng Leng there was
in 1886-7 no central authority. In Möng Mit the administration was
very feeble. The Kachins were in the ascendancy. They were ousting
the Palaungs, and trampled on the more peaceful villagers of the
plains. But even the Kachins had no cohesion and obeyed no central
authority. Each chief did what seemed best in his own eyes; he raided
and blackmailed every village that lay within reach of his hills.
The formation of the country, a jumble of hills covered with dense
jungle, through which the drainage of the higher ranges forces its way
naturally, produced an unruly race. The only open tract of any extent
is the valley of the Lower Shwèli from Myitson to the Irrawaddy at
Pyinlebin.
[Illustration: GETTING A DHOOLIE UP AN AWKWARD BIT.]
[Illustration: CLIMBING UP THE STEEP CHIN HILLS.
Chin Campaign.]
Early in 1886 one Hkam Leng came to the Deputy Commissioner of the
Bhamo district which touches Möng Leng on the south, and claimed to be
recognized as the chief of both Möng Leng and Möng Mit. He was told
that his claim would be inquired into, and that meanwhile he should
remain quietly in Katha. Towards the end of the year, however, growing
impatient, he went to Möng Mit and presented himself to the people as
their Sawbwa. But they rejected him without ceremony. He applied to the
Deputy Commissioner for assistance without success, and then became
irreconcilable and a centre of disturbance.
The ministers of Möng Mit, on the other hand, were loyal and helpful.
To the extent of their power--not much, it is true--they gave active
assistance to the British force which occupied the Ruby Mines in
1886-7. In April, 1887, the Chief Commissioner being at Mogok, the
headquarters of the Ruby Mines district, received the ministers of
Möng Mit there and inquired into the facts. Finding that the title of
the young Sawbwa was good, he confirmed him in his position. It was
decided to appoint a regent, assisted by the ministers, to govern the
State until the young chief should come of age. The boundaries of Möng
Mit territory were defined, and Hkam Leng was formally warned against
overstepping them, while at the same time he was assured that if he
came in and made submission to the Government he should be recognized
as chief of Möng Leng. In despite of this he attacked villages in Möng
Mit and endeavoured to establish himself by force of arms.
During 1887 he continued in open hostility. Several small expeditions
had to be made against him; and the southern border of the Bhamo
district, as well as the Möng Leng country and the Kachins in all the
hills about, were kept in a restless state. As it was found impossible
to reconcile him, Hkam Leng was outlawed and the Möng Leng country
partitioned. The northern part was added to the Bhamo district as the
Upper Sinkan township; the remainder was made over to Möng Mit, to
which it had at one time been subject.
Hkam Leng, however, was by no means disposed of. He lurked for the most
part in the Kachin Hills to the east of the Möng Leng country, and was
frequently in the villages along the upper reaches of the Sinkan. To
him another restless spirit was soon allied. In 1886 the two sons of
the Hmethaya Prince, one of King Mindon's numerous progeny, had made
themselves prominent in resisting the British Government. Their cause
was taken up by a notable guerilla leader, Shwè Yan, who raised their
standard in the Ava district. Driven out of Ava at the end of 1886,
they took hiding in Mandalay, where a plot was hatched for supporting
their claims. The conspiracy was discovered and the leaders arrested.
The younger Prince was captured and sent to school in Rangoon. The
elder, Saw Yan Naing, escaped to Hsenwi, and failing to get help there
retired to the mountainous and very difficult country on the borders of
Tawnpeng and Möng Mit. There he made his quarters in a strong position
not easy to approach, and gathered round him a band of discontented and
desperate characters. No attempt was made during 1887-8 to dislodge
him, and he contented himself with threatening Möng Mit. He was invited
to surrender, and favourable terms were offered to him. The only wish
was to relieve the country from his presence. But he would have no
truck with us.
Early in 1889 reports came in from Bhamo and other sources that Saw Yan
Naing and Hkam Leng had agreed to unite forces and make simultaneous
attacks on various points in the north. They were reported to be
enlisting the aid of Kachin tribesmen, Chinese bandits from across
the border, and Burmese outlaws. Risings were to be organized in the
Upper Sinkan township and a descent made on Möng Mit. Even the date
for the rising was fixed. Whether there was any systematic concert or
not was never ascertained, but a good many outbreaks occurred without
any visible connection and of no great magnitude, but enough, taken
all together, to harass both soldiers and police, as well as those
responsible for the administration. From the Ruby Mines district as
early as the last week in December had come reports of a gathering,
headed by Saw Yan Naing, at Manpun, in the hills, three marches from
the town of Möng Mit. A detachment from the Hampshire Regiment was sent
from Bernard Myo, the Cantonment of the Ruby Mines, to Möng Mit, to
garrison the town, while the State levies went out to act against the
body of rebels at Manpun.
Meanwhile Lieutenant Nugent, who was in command at Möng Mit, hearing
that there were some dacoits a few miles off, went with sixteen men
of the Hampshires to attack them. The dacoits were strongly posted.
Lieutenant Nugent and one private were killed and six men wounded. The
remaining nine men, encumbered with the wounded, had to retire. This
disaster happened on the 14th of January. Lieutenant Nugent was a young
officer without experience of the country, and he ought not to have
been left without some one capable of advising him.
It was promptly retrieved. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Archibald
Colquhoun, getting together troops and police, renewed the attack on
the enemy's position and drove them out with much loss. On the 20th of
January the village or town of Twingé, on the Irrawaddy, was taken and
burnt by one of Hkam Leng's adherents. No attempt was made on Möng Mit
after that date, and no formidable bands were encountered, although the
Ruby Mines districts and the adjacent parts of Möng Mit were harassed
by small gangs of robbers. A feeling of anxiety, however, prevailed
and begat alarming rumours. The imagination of Shans, Burmans, and
perhaps of other nervous persons, is fertile in the matter of numbers,
and loves to deal in large figures. At the end of January hostile
gatherings at different points, amounting to nearly two thousand men--a
quite impossible number--were reported from Mogok, the headquarters of
the Ruby Mines district. With a view to allaying these apprehensions
the garrisons there and at Möng Mit were strengthened.
The Chief Commissioner thought it best, under the circumstances, to
place the control in the hands of one man, and at his request Sir
George White appointed Colonel Cockran, of the Hampshires, to command
all the troops and military police in the disturbed area, with orders
to take the measures necessary for the peace of the country and for the
destruction of such gangs as might be found. Up to the end of March,
however, no important action was taken, as no large body of the enemy
had been located.
On the 30th of March a column under Major Garfit, of the Hampshire
Regiment, was dispatched against Saw Yan Naing, who was still at
Binbong, near Manpun. Four stockades were taken without loss on our
side, and Saw Yan Naing and his following fell back for the time. The
Chief Commissioner intended, and had arranged with the Major-General
commanding, that this column should remain in Binbong and the
neighbourhood at least till the middle of April, in order to make our
influence felt in these wild parts and to co-operate with a police
force which had been sent through Mönglong, a sub-State of Hsipaw,
lying south-west of Möng Mit, and also to join hands with Lieutenant
Daly, the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, who was ordered
to come with military police through Tawnpeng. Unfortunately the
officer commanding misunderstood his instructions, and leaving Binbong
on the 6th of April returned to Möng Mit. The expedition consequently
was not very fruitful of results, and Saw Yan Naing returned to the
neighbourhood and took up his quarters at Manton a little farther north.
Unluckily, Lieutenant Daly was unable to leave his headquarters at
Lashio until the 7th of April. He then proceeded to Tawnpeng in
accordance with the orders he had received from the Chief Commissioner,
directing him to co-operate if possible with the force acting against
Saw Yan Naing. Lieutenant Daly had been instructed also to get into
communication with the Prince, and to renew the offer of terms if he
would surrender.
In January, when at Hsipaw, Lieutenant Daly had met a Shan who had been
with Saw Yan Naing in July and August of the year preceding (1888);
this man undertook to take letters to the pretender. He arrived at Möng
Mit soon after the defeat of the band which had gathered near that
place, and heard that the Prince had left Manpun after that encounter,
in which one of his chief followers, besides many others, had fallen.
The messenger, therefore, was unable to deliver the letters. However,
in March Lieutenant Daly, being at Hsipaw, again met this man, and sent
him off with fresh letters to the Prince. Again fortune was adverse.
Major Garfit delivered his attack just before Lieutenant Daly's man
reached Manpun, and the Prince had gone. However, he had not gone far,
and was found by the messenger in Möng Mit territory, in a Palaung
village. He had a following of one hundred men, more or less, of whom
twenty were Burmans, the rest Shans and Kachins; none of them men of
note. As Saw Yan Naing had been attacked only two or three days before
by the column from Möng Mit, he was not disposed to trust the promises
made to induce his surrender. Nevertheless, he behaved as a Prince
should. The messengers were allowed to stay four days in his camp, and
were hospitably treated.
They were then dismissed with a polite letter, to the effect that "he
had not plotted against the Government, but that on account of his
past offences he feared to come in, that he had no wish for Government
alms" (an allowance had been offered to him); "and that he would take
to flight if Lieutenant Daly came near his camp." He had married the
daughter of a Kachin chief. It may be that beyond allowing himself
to be made the centre of disturbance he had taken no active part in
the movements made in his name. None the less his presence in British
territory was the cause of trouble.
While these events were passing in Möng Mit a watchful eye had to be
kept on other parts of the district. Towards the end of December,
1888, the Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo received news of the appearance
of a Mintha, or prince of some kind, on the Molè River, north-east
of Bhamo. This Prince gave out that he was in concert with Saw Yan
Naing, and his plans may have been conceived with the design of acting
with Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng. The rising appeared to be somewhat
formidable. It was promptly met. Mr. Segrave, the Superintendent of
Police, was sent out at once with a strong detachment of military
police. He encountered the band, which was made up mainly of Chinese
brigands and deserters from the Chinese army, on the 9th of January,
1889, and punished it severely, killing more than fifty men. The rest
dispersed and escaped, probably over the Chinese border. The peace of
the district north of Bhamo was not disturbed again during the year.
The connection of this band with Saw Yan Naing was not established. In
their camp were found papers showing that they were in communication
with the leaders of the Mogaung malcontents, namely, the Sawbwa of
Thama and Po Saw.
Hitherto it had been found impossible to post military police in the
Upper Sinkan township. The difficulty of communication, especially in
the rains, was great, and the climate very hurtful. The best possible
arrangement was made by appointing a Kachin of much influence to act as
magistrate and executive officer, and this man had been able to keep
order, at least on the surface. His headquarters were at Sikaw. In
December, 1888, Mr. Shaw, the Deputy Commissioner, visited Sikaw and
also Si-u, an important village near the head of the Sinkan stream.
He learnt that Hkam Leng, who was allied by marriage to the Kachin
chiefs of the Lweseng and Tonhon range in the east of the township, was
harboured by them, and from time to time came down to Si-u and levied
contributions from the peasants. The Kachin magistrate had followed
the Burman plan of shutting his eyes to that which it was inconvenient
to see, and, lest he should incur his superior's displeasure, he said
nothing about it. He was warned against permitting Hkam Leng to enter
his township, and ordered to send speedy information to Bhamo if he
should reappear. This warning had a good effect. Early in January,
1889, he reported that Hkam Leng had returned to Si-u, and was
corresponding with a pretended Prince at Hpon Kan, a hill range thirty
miles from Bhamo, a very nest of hornets. At the same time information
was received from other sources that a large gathering of Chinese and
Burmese, said to number five hundred men, were at Hpon Kan.
The Chief Commissioner was at Bhamo at the end of January. He arranged
that a patrol of troops should visit Sikaw and Si-u at least once a
month. Unfortunately something prevented the despatch of the military
patrol, and on the 3rd of February the duty was entrusted to a party
of fifty military police. On the 4th of February, at Malin, a village
on the Sinkan River, about twenty miles from Si-u, the police came on
a large body of rebels strongly stockaded. They attacked the stockade,
but were repulsed, losing two men killed and ten wounded and all their
baggage.
A strong column, consisting of 60 rifles of the Hampshire Regiment,
150 of the 17th Bengal Infantry, and two guns, left Bhamo as soon as
news of this disaster came in. On the 7th of February, after driving
in their outposts, this force engaged the enemy at Malin, where they
were holding a strong position. They stood their ground with more than
usual courage, and were not dislodged without some severe fighting,
which cost us the loss of one officer and four men killed and eighteen
wounded. The pursuit was carried for some distance, but they did not
rally, and dispersed over the country. It was ascertained that this
rising had been organized by Hkam Leng and Saw Yan Naing. In fact,
the nucleus of the gang was a body of eighty or ninety men from the
Prince's headquarters at Manpun joined by large numbers of villagers,
some of their own free will, some under compulsion. The villages that
furnished contingents were fined, the police force increased at the
cost of the township, and the population as far as possible disarmed.
No attempt was made to punish the individuals who had taken part in the
business. Hkam Leng retired to his Kachin wife and allies in the hills.
Late in May an attempt was made to capture him, but it was frustrated
by his Kachin supporters, who afterwards came down in force and
occupied Si-u. On the 2nd of June they were attacked by troops and
police and driven out, losing twenty-one killed. The police force in
the Upper Sinkan was reinforced again. The rains being now at hand,
further action had to be postponed.
Everything united to obstruct the work of bringing this part of the
country into order. The hills and forests, the neighbourhood of the
Chinese frontier, the character of the people, Kachins and Palaungs,
who had to be dealt with piecemeal hill by hill, and had never
submitted to any central control, all combined to make it a very hard
task. The Burmese officials may have had some control over the tribes.
But probably so long as they did not make too much disturbance the
hill-men were left to do as they liked. When there is no government
things arrange themselves, and a limit is automatically fixed which the
raiding tribes cannot exceed without exhausting their preserves. The
advent of the British cut the weak bonds by which the hill people had
been held, and the appearance of Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng as active
opponents of the foreign invaders gave them a rallying-point.
The first step towards peace was the capture or expulsion of these
two leaders, both of whom, it may be noted, following the example of
more enlightened princes, had cemented their alliances by marriage
with Kachin ladies of rank. It was decided, therefore, so far as the
northern part of the province was concerned, to devote the open season
of 1889-90 to the complete subjugation of this tract of country. If
possible, the two leaders were to be got rid of. In any case the
recalcitrant Kachins and others were to be reduced to obedience and
the authority of the Möng Mit State over its outlying parts affirmed.
In the district north of Bhamo nothing called for immediate action. A
strong body of seasoned Gurkhas from the Mogaung Levy under Captain
O'Donnell could be detached to strengthen the column of troops provided
from the Bhamo garrison.
It was arranged accordingly that one column should go to Si-u and move
early in December against the Lwèseng and Ton Hon Kachins and then move
on to Manpun; and that a second, starting from Möng Mit, should join
the first at Manpun, while at the same time the Superintendent of the
Northern Shan States (Lieutenant Hugh Daly) should move with some of
the Shan Levy (Indian military police) through Hsenwi and act with the
first two columns; and a fourth column, also of military police under
Mr. H. F. Hertz, Assistant Superintendent of Police, should work up
from the south-east through Möng Löng and along the Tawnpeng Möng Mit
boundary.
[Illustration: BARGAINING WITH HAKA CHINS.]
Instructions were given to the Sawbwas of Tawnpeng and North Hsenwi to
take measures to stop the passage of fugitives through their States.
There was a reasonable hope that these measures, although they might
not effect the capture of the leaders, would establish the authority of
the British Government and bring home to the people of this difficult
tract the inconvenience of resistance.
The Bhamo column, commanded by Major Blundell, accompanied by Mr. G.
W. Shaw, the Deputy Commissioner, left Bhamo on the 15th of December,
1889, for Sikaw. The tribes began to take in the situation. Twelve
hills or groups of the Lakun tribe came to Sikaw to make formal
submission, and one of their leading men volunteered to guide the force
against Lwèseng. This was a good beginning. Major Blundell, sending
forward a detachment to Si-u to keep the road open, left Sikaw on the
20th of December and marched on Lwèseng. A party of Gurkhas under
Captain O'Donnell was ordered to take up a position at the ferries in
the rear of the Lwèseng Range, which were said to be the only places
where the Shwèli River could be crossed. Several other such points,
however, were found, and at one of them were signs that the fugitives
had already crossed over. While making this reconnaissance Captain
O'Donnell's men were exposed to Kachin fire from the hills, and a very
distinguished Gurkha officer (Kala Thapa Sing) fell.
The main body reached Lwèseng on the 22nd of December. A stockade
across the road a mile from the village was defended by Kachins, and in
taking it a native officer was killed and five men wounded. The village
was found deserted, and was occupied by our men. There was some sniping
from the hill-slope afterwards, and two were wounded. Next day the
force advanced to Ton Hon. Two stockades erected across the road were
defended, but were turned, with the loss of two men wounded, and Ton
Hon was occupied without further fighting. But again the Kachins fired
from the hills into the village, and one Gurkha was killed and another
wounded. A halt was made at Ton Hon for some days in order to open
communications with the Kachins, in the hope of bringing them to terms.
The elders of Lwèseng and Ton Hon and other neighbouring villages came
in. The Deputy Commissioner selected seven villages which had opposed
the troops and harboured rebels, and imposed on them a fine of money
(Rs. 2,500) and guns (50). By the 30th of December all the villages
belonging to these tribes had submitted and part of the fine had been
paid. The chiefs, however, still held aloof.
On the 3rd of January, 1890, the column left for Manton, leaving a
Burmese civil officer, supported by a detachment of the 17th Bengal
Infantry, to collect the balance of the fine. Manton was reached
without any fighting on the 11th of January; and the column from Möng
Mit marched in on the same day. The village was found deserted, and Saw
Yan Naing had fled. He made his escape, it was said, into the Chinese
territory of Chefan. On his road through Northern Hsenwi he just missed
falling into the hands of Mr. Daly, who arrived at Manton on the 16th
of January. Thus the three parties met and were able to exchange
information. After a few days' halt Mr. Daly continued his tour through
Hsenwi territory, while the Möng Mit and Bhamo columns waited at Manton
for supplies. Some villages which had been hostile were visited; and
as a large body of Kachins and Palaungs was reported to have gathered
at Lanchein, a few miles south of Manton, where Saw Yan Naing had
stayed on his flight, two detachments were sent out to disperse them.
Stockades had been built across the road and were stubbornly defended
by the enemy. Here Major Forrest, in leading one of the detachments,
was severely wounded. The village was taken and destroyed, while the
troops returned to Manton.
It was now decided that the Möng Mit party under Major Greenaway, with
Mr. Daniell as civil officer, should move south to Manpun, while the
Bhamo column remained at Manton. On the way Mr. Daniell was met by
the headmen of the villages between Manton and Manpun who had come to
tender their submission to the British Government. They were told that
if Saw Yan Naing was with them he must be given up, and fines were
imposed on those groups or circles of villages which were known to have
given the rebel leaders active help.
By the 25th of January all the headmen of the five hills or circles
comprised in the south-western quarter of the Möng Mit State had made
formal submission. On the 26th of January Mr. Hertz, who had marched
from the south-east through Möng Löng with his military police,
arrived in Manton. The rough country along the Taungbaing border had
been entrusted to him to search--a duty he performed well, while as
a by-work he constructed a very useful map of the ground. The Möng
Mit column moved to Yabon, a village nearer to Möng Mit, and from its
position a better base for operations. News was now received that
Hkam Leng was in hiding in Sumput, a village north of the Shwèli.
Major Greenaway, accompanied by Mr. Shaw, marched with a part of his
force for Sumput by way of Molo, which ferry was reached on the 1st
of February. Hkam Leng, however, had left Sumput, and Major Greenaway
moved across the Shwèli to Kyungyaung.
Convinced by the experience of these operations that the mere movement
of troops through the country was ineffectual, the Chief Commissioner
decided to take rougher measures to bring home to the people of this
tract the power of the Government, and to convince them that they could
not support these disturbers of the peace with impunity. Orders were
issued, therefore, to arrest and deport the headmen of the villages
which aided and sheltered the two leaders. These orders reached Mr.
Shaw at Kyungyaung and were executed at once. The headmen of twelve
villages who had been most active were arrested and sent into Bhamo,
and at the same time monthly fines were imposed on their villages.
Similar measures were adopted under Mr. Daniell and Mr. Hertz's
supervision in the circles which had befriended Saw Yan Naing. But in
spite of the efforts of the civil and military officers, who spared
neither themselves nor their men, the capture of Saw Yan Naing and Hkam
Leng was not effected.
The open season was now drawing to a close. It seemed unlikely that
further action on the lines followed hitherto would have much more
success. The Chief Commissioner asked Brigadier-General Gatacre to
visit the country with Mr. Shaw and see if they could advise any other
measures more adapted to the nature of the case. Early in March, with a
strong force, General Gatacre visited Si-u Ton Hon and Lwèseng, north
of the Shwèli, and then went southward through Molo to Manton. He
reported the country through which he passed to be quiet and the people
to be submissive. Leaving a party of one hundred rifles, including
forty Mounted Infantry, at Sipein with Mr. Shaw, to work the circles
north of the Shwèli, and Mr. Daniell with one hundred rifles at Manton
to work south of that river, he withdrew the remainder of the troops.
Proclamations were issued, with the Chief Commissioner's approval,
warning the people of the consequences of opposing the troops and
promising reduction or remission of the fines that had been imposed
if the leaders of the revolt were surrendered. On the 28th of March
the headmen gave Mr. Shaw a formal engagement to observe the terms of
the proclamation, and he was able to withdraw the troops and return to
Bhamo.
Before the close of the operations the headman of Manton, who was one
of the most obstinate adherents of Hkam Leng and had hitherto evaded
arrest, was captured by the Kachins of the neighbouring circles and
delivered to Mr. Daniell. He was deported to Mogok, the headquarters
of the Ruby Mines district. All this country, it should be remembered,
known as the Myauk-Kodaung (the northern nine hills), estimated to
contain 2,500 square miles, belongs to the Möng Mit State. On the
withdrawal of the troops an official of that State was left in charge
with a force of the Sawbwa's militia to keep order. Before the British
troops left the Kachin Sawbwas entered into solemn engagements to keep
the peace, to shut their hills against Saw Yan Naing, and to obey the
Möng Mit Sawbwa to whom they are subject.
Some progress had been made by the middle of 1889 towards the
establishment of order. The root of the trouble, however, lay in the
weakness of the Möng Mit administration. The most effectual measure
undoubtedly would have been to place the State directly under the
administration of a British officer. This method of meeting the
difficulty was considered and set aside by the Chief Commissioner.
In the earlier years of our rule there were strong reasons against
absorbing any of these quasi-independent territories. It was our
settled policy to maintain the Shan States in the position they enjoyed
under the Burmese Government. The absorption of one of them would have
alarmed the others just when we were striving to win their confidence
and to bring them peacefully into the fold. For this reason mainly the
Chief Commissioner refused to wipe out the Kalè State, although in that
case there were much stronger reasons for adopting this course (_vide_
Chapter XXI., pp. 291, 292), and a desire not to depart from this line
of policy led him to treat Wuntho with forbearance. In the present
instance, moreover, the Möng Mit chief was a minor; his ministers might
be accused of incapacity but not of dishonesty or hostility.
It was sought by other means to improve the administration of Möng
Mit. Saw Möng, who had been ejected by his enemies from his hereditary
State of Yawnghè (_vide_ pp. 142-143), at the time of the annexation
was selected as a man of some power and of known loyalty and placed as
regent in Möng Mit. The experiment did not succeed. Whether from want
of sufficient governing power or because, not being their hereditary
chief, he met with little support from the people, Saw Möng[53] failed,
and in 1892 it was found necessary to place the State temporarily under
the Deputy Commissioner of the Ruby Mines, who governed it as part of
his district until the year 1906, when the young Sawbwa came of age,
and was entrusted with the administration of his State. He is doing
well. Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng did not appear on the scene again.
What has become of them is not known, and it is hardly necessary to
inquire. It is hard to see what use they served except to try the
endurance of our people and to harass the souls of their compatriots.
The narrative as regards Möng Mit and the territory once called Möng
Leng, now known as the Upper Sinkan township of Bhamo, has been brought
down to the year 1889-90.
It is now necessary to go back a year or two and deal with the range
of hills known as Hpon Kan, lying about thirty miles to the south-east
of Bhamo. The Kachins in these hills began to harass us from the
first. Early in 1886 they attacked Sawadi on the Irrawaddy and exacted
tribute from the Sinkan villages. They raided the open country near
Bhamo several times, and on one occasion even made their way within our
lines, killed some Indian soldiers and burnt some of the barracks.
They were in reality not of great account. But the first attempts to
deal with them were unfortunate, and after a time they began to be
regarded with a seriousness quite unmerited. Two military expeditions
went from Bhamo in 1886, the objective being Karwan, the village of
the most important chief of the tribe. The first expedition failed to
reach the village and returned without doing anything. The second in
the same year was well managed from a military point of view, and had
forced its way against some opposition to a point close to Karwan,
when the civil officer with the column, under some misunderstanding of
the orders he had received from the Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles
Bernard, stopped the advance, and the column retired without effecting
the object for which it had been sent. The result was that the Karwan
chieftain and his tribe were persuaded that the British were afraid to
meet them. The chief would neither submit nor deign to visit the Deputy
Commissioner, and his hill became a rendezvous for the restless and
evil spirits around. Gatherings of Burmese and Chinese were reported,
and it was apprehended at one time that they would join the rising in
Upper Sinkan. They confined their action, however, to some small raids
on insignificant villages below the hills. In the beginning of March,
1889, they again descended to the plains and stockaded themselves at a
place named Kyawgaung, killed the headman and carried off his family.
Some troops, sent out to cover a fatigue party building a post for the
police at Mansi, about fifteen miles from Bhamo, were fired at from the
jungle, and the village of Mansi, consisting of a few houses, was burnt
by the Kachins, and two of the military police killed.
[Illustration: MARCHING INTO THE KLANG KLANG COUNTRY.
Chin-Lushai Campaign.]
The necessity of punishing the Hpon Kan Kachins for all their misdeeds
had long been admitted. The country round Bhamo was kept by them in
constant alarm, and the failure to deal with them led to excitement and
want of confidence in the Bhamo bazaar, peculiarly ready to believe
absurd rumours and subject to panic. More urgent matters had hitherto
delayed action, and the garrison of Bhamo had been so weakened by the
despatch of troops to Mogaung, that it could not afford men for other
work. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, was compelled to wait. Towards
the end of March the return of troops from the north made it easier to
find a force for the Hpon Kan business; and the opportunity was at once
taken of destroying this nest of hornets, or, to describe them more
accurately, mosquitoes. Sir George White arranged a plan of operations
at the Chief Commissioner's request, and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Madras Army, being at the time in Upper Burma, gave his approval at
once.
The force was of such a strength as to ensure the complete reduction
of the refractory tribes, it was hoped, without fighting. It consisted
of two guns of a mountain battery, fifty sappers, two hundred and
fifty British, two hundred and fifty Native Infantry, of whom one
hundred were Gurkhas, and was commanded by Brigadier-General George
Wolseley,[54] C.B. The civil officers with the force were Mr. Shaw,
Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo, and Mr. Warry, of the Chinese Consular
service, with whose name the reader is acquainted already (_vide_
Chapter VII.). Regarding the work of the expedition and the manner
in which it should be carried out, the Chief Commissioner gave full
instructions. The punishment of the Sawbwa of Hpon Kan and of his
people, unless they made timely submission, was the duty imposed on
the force. Notice was to be given to the Kachins that villages which
helped the advance of the force would be protected; villages from
or near which any opposition was offered would be destroyed; and on
those Kachins who would not submit as much damage as possible would be
inflicted by destruction of their houses and property. In any case, the
village where the Sawbwa had his residence was to be occupied; and a
fine in money and guns was to be exacted from him. The amount of the
fine was to be fixed by Mr. Shaw with reference to the Sawbwa's means
and to the amount of damage done in his raids. All captives held by
the Kachins were to be surrendered. If this was impossible the fines
payable by the custom of the country in such cases were to be exacted.
In the event of the Sawbwa rejecting the terms his village was to be
destroyed.
In view of the former failures, strict orders were given that
negotiations with the Sawbwa were not to be opened until Karwan,
his capital village, was occupied by the British force. There, and
nowhere else, were the terms of surrender to be settled. And it was
added that "under no circumstances should Mr. Shaw advise the return
of the force or the suspension of operations until the objects of the
expedition should have been accomplished and the Sawbwa's village
occupied." The Chief Commissioner added that "if it were possible the
force should remain in the Sawbwa's village for some days so as to
make his humiliation apparent to his people and to the neighbouring
tribes." Orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief of Madras, Sir
Charles Arbuthnot, at the Chief Commissioner's request, for the troops
to remain at Hpon Kan until the Chief Commissioner should be satisfied
that they could be withdrawn without bad results.
The troops were divided into two columns, and, avoiding the direct road
where the Kachins might be prepared to oppose us, they took different
routes, and after very slight opposition Karwan was occupied. Our
loss was two killed and three wounded. The Sawbwa did not make his
appearance. Karwan and several other villages were therefore destroyed.
On the 23rd of April the Sawbwa of Washa, a neighbouring village of
another tribe, and the elders of Neinsin, one of the Hpon Kan villages,
the headman of which was detained as a hostage in Bhamo, came forward
and volunteered to bring in the headmen of Hpon Kan. They were given
two days to make good their offer.
[Illustration: HAKA SLAVE WOMAN.
Smoking a pipe.]
[Illustration: HAKA BRAVES.]
On the 25th of April they came back with two of the Karwan elders, who
accepted the terms imposed by the Deputy Commissioner, and promised
to bring in the Sawbwa and other elders. The terms imposed were that
fines for various murders and for the burning of Mansi should be paid
and fifty guns surrendered and captives restored. The money fine was
paid in full and the guns delivered. The Chief Commissioner thereupon
sanctioned the withdrawal of the troops, and the main body left Karwan
on the 15th of May. Before the evacuation of the place the headmen of
the Hpon Kan villages entered into a solemn agreement to cease from
raiding. This promise has been kept.
The objects of the expedition were thus accomplished, and these tribes
did not give trouble again.
While General Wolseley was at Karwan, Mr. Daly, the Superintendent of
the Northern Shan States, accompanied by Mr. Sherriff, a representative
of the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, came to Nam Kham, on the left bank
of the Shwèli, the chief town of a small State subordinate to North
Hsenwi. It was a good opportunity of joining hands and examining the
road between Hpon Kan and Nam Kham.[55] Taking a sufficient escort,
General Wolseley went by a circuitous route, to avoid a neck of Chinese
territory which runs down between the Bhamo district and North Hsenwi.
Leaving Karwan on the 2nd of May, Wolseley made Nam Kham on the 8th.
After two days he returned to Bhamo with the troops.
It may be added, before closing this chapter, that the Kachin tribes,
whom it was necessary to subdue with such severity, have been for many
years furnishing excellent recruits to the military police; and Kachin
detachments, officered by men of their own race, can now be entrusted
with the charge of frontier outposts.
FOOTNOTES:
[52] Palaungs are a Mon-Anam tribe, found mostly in the uplands of the
Northern Shan States (_Upper Burma Gazetteer_, vol. iv., p. 179).
[53] In justice to Saw Möng it should be noted that he has
been restored to his own State of Yawnghwè, and has shown much
administrative power.
[54] General Sir George Wolseley, G.C.B.
[55] Nam Kham is the place where Mrs. Leslie Milne resided for fifteen
months to gather materials for her charming book, "Shans at Home."
Writing of the Northern Shans States she says (page 186): "Before the
country was annexed to Great Britain, in 1886, each chief governed
his own State, and the King of Burma was his overlord, to whom he was
obliged to pay a heavy tribute. Burman officials terrorized over the
Shans, and, owing to heavy and unjust taxation, the people were in a
perpetual state of rebellion against their chiefs. The chiefs were
constantly fighting amongst themselves, and were also trying to free
themselves from the Burman rule." The condition of the country under
Burma has been described in the historical chapter of her book, written
by the Rev. Wilbur Willis Cochrane, of the American Baptist Mission.
She goes on: "I should like to draw attention to the unhappy state
of the people under the invasion of the Kachins, who were slowly but
surely taking possession of the hill country." Then Mrs. Milne quotes
from "Parliamentary papers for 1859-76." It is sufficient to give here
only a part of the quotation: "They (the Kachins) have ousted many
Shan tribes, and wherever they appear they assume the same character
of 'lords of all they can reach,' only to be appeased by some form
of 'blackmail.'... They inspire such terror that in the neighbouring
plains no Burman or Shan will venture alone, or even in company,
unarmed along the roads within their reach." "This state of affairs,"
Mrs. Milne concludes, "lasted until the British annexation, and our
Government have worked what one might almost call a miracle; for, the
first time since the beginning of Shan history, peace prevails all over
the country."
CHAPTER XXI
THE CHINS
GENERAL FAUNCE'S EXPEDITION
The seventeenth chapter told the story of the Sawlapaw expedition,
which covered the time from the spring 1888 to the second month of
1889. The western frontier of the province was the scene of equally
interesting and much more difficult operations during the same period.
When Upper Burma was annexed it is doubtful whether the difficulties,
that might arise from the wild tribes which would become our
neighbours, received much consideration. The Burmese Government thought
very little of raids and disturbances on their frontiers. A British
Administration could not show the same indifference.
Along the west of the Upper Burma districts of the Upper and the Lower
Chindwin, of Pakokku, and of Minbu, lies a wild region of hills,
inhabited by semi-savage tribes known to us as Chins. This mountainous
region forms a wedge very long in comparison to its width. The broad
end marches with the south of Manipur, the Naga Cachar, and east Sylet
hills, and the point rests on Cape Negrais. It is formed of high,
narrow ridges and deep valleys, all running from north to south,
and the people are split up into numerous tribes and clans speaking
many different dialects. The only system of government was that of
headmen of villages, or at the most of a small group of villages, and
consequently negotiations with the Chins as a people were impossible.
The principal tribes, with which the present narrative is concerned
are, on the north, the Siyins, including the Sagyilains, and the Sokte
tribe, including the Kanhows; in the centre of the country the Tashons
and Hakas (nicknamed by the Burmese Baungshès); and, southward of them,
a number of tribes, Chin-boks among others, who are less formidable as
border neighbours.
Between the hills and the Chindwin, and forming an enclosure in the
Upper Chindwin district, was the little Shan State of Kalè. Like the
States on the Shan plateau, it was governed by a Sawbwa who had a
measure of independence. Owing to its position, practically, on the
Chindwin, Kalè was much more in subjection to the Government of Burma
than the more distant Shan chiefships. It was, moreover, exposed to
raids from the hill-men, and for a long time past had suffered much
from the Siyin group, who were the most frequent and barbarous raiders,
burning villages, slaughtering the peasants, and carrying off many as
slaves into the mountains.
At the time of the annexation the Sawbwa of Kalè was an old man, by
name Maung Ket, incapable of administering his country. On the 1st of
January, 1887, the Chief Commissioner, finding that he could neither
keep order within his territory nor protect it against enemies from
without, caused him to be removed with some of his officials to
Mandalay, and appointed his nephew to rule in his stead. In November,
1887, Maung Ket escaped from Mandalay with his followers and took
refuge with the Tashon Chins, who in former years were on friendly
terms with the Kalè State.
In March, 1887, the Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Chindwin (Captain
Raikes) met representatives of the Tashon tribes at Indin and explained
to them that raiding must be stopped. His warnings seem to have
influenced them; for a whole year few villages were attacked. Several
circumstances, however, had tended to unsettle the minds of these wild
tribes.
The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè had a disturbing influence and endeavoured no
doubt to persuade them to help him to regain his position. In the open
season of 1887-8 a project for opening up the Chin country from the
Bengal boundary in the west to the frontier of Burma proper on the east
was started in India, prematurely so far as we were concerned. It was
proposed that roads should be made through the hills, communications
established, and the hill people subjugated. The phrase "from the
Salween to the sea" was invented and had some effect.
[Illustration: ON THE CHIN HILLS--ARRANGING A PLAN OF ATTACK.
Chin-Liushai Campaign.]
In the winter of 1887 Captain Raikes with another officer went up the
Myittha River and arranged a meeting with the Tashon chiefs. Sonpek,
the principal man of the tribe, came down from the mountains and met
Captain Raikes on the 3rd of January, 1888. He was courteous, even
friendly in his manner, but guarded in his speech. His fears were
excited by the close questioning (concerning the routes through his
country eastward) to which he was subjected, so much so that he would
hardly accept the presents offered to him by Captain Raikes. The
meeting, however, ended in outward friendliness on both sides. No
action was taken by the Government towards entering or approaching the
Tashon country, and nothing indicated that the Chins had been seriously
alarmed.
Other events followed which added to their uneasiness. Captain Raikes
had visited Indin in March, 1887, and had found two persons in the
ruling Sawbwa's service whose intrigues were causing trouble in the
Kalè State. One was Maung Tok San, the other Maung Tha Dun, styled
"Chingeh," or "Minister for the Chins." These two men were removed by
Captain Raikes from Kalè and confined at Alôn. After some months they
were released on security. They made use of their freedom to escape to
the Chin Hills, where they joined the old Sawbwa who had preceded them,
and helped him to excite the tribes.
It happened at the same time that part of the Pakokku district on the
Lower Chindwin was very much disturbed. The guerilla leader, known
as the Shwègyobyu Prince, had been able to collect a considerable
following and to raise a small revolt (see Chapter VIII., pp. 84, 85).
Expelled from the low country, he also sought safety with the Tashons.
The arrival of a Burman Prince, whether genuine or pretender, did not
matter, a man with a certain amount of prestige, a good deal of energy,
and a bitter hatred of the foreigners, gave the Tashons heart, and they
determined to take action. On the 4th and 5th of May a body of Sonpek's
Tashons, numbering some hundreds, descended on Indin, made the Sawbwa
prisoner, and took him to Chingaing (a village near the foot of the
hills), where he had interviews with Sonpek and the Shwègyobyu Prince.
He promised to join them in their resistance to the British, and on
that condition was allowed to return to Indin. The Sawbwa, however,
kept faith with us. Getting some men together, he sent them to attack
the Shwègyobyu Prince in Chingaing, and despatched urgent messengers to
the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Ross) asking for assistance.
This sudden raid by the Chins on the Kalè State, and their readiness to
assist a pretender like the Shwègyobyu Prince, had not been foreseen,
and took the authorities by surprise. The messages received at
headquarters were alarming. Eleven hundred Tashon Chins were reported
to have surrounded Indin and carried off the Sawbwa. Several thousands
were said to be on the warpath; five hundred had occupied Indin, three
hundred were marching on Taungdwin, three hundred on Kalewa--all
these of the Tashon tribe. Of the Siyins, five hundred were making
for Kalemyo, six hundred threatening the Kabaw Valley, and so on. The
numbers were obviously much exaggerated. Nevertheless, as the men on
the spot thought the situation serious, measures of precaution had to
be taken. A force under Major Gleig, consisting of 100 rifles, Cheshire
Regiment, 250 Madras Infantry (15th) and two guns, were sent up the
Chindwin River in steamers to Kalemyo. At the same time 150 Mounted
Infantry (100 British, 50 Native), accompanied by Captain Eyre, the
Deputy Commissioner of the district, were despatched from Pakokku, viâ
Pauk and Gangaw, to take the raiders in the rear. A party of military
police from the Kabaw Valley Battalion, with two guns, were moved down
to Kalewa.
These dispositions sufficed to restore order for the time. Major
Gleig's force disembarked at Indin on the 24th of May; Captain Eyre
with the Mounted Infantry was at Chingaing, a few miles from Indin, on
the 26th, the rifles and guns from the Kabaw Valley arrived at Kalemyo
about the same date. The party, accompanied by Captain Eyre, marched
up through the Yaw country without meeting with any opposition. They
covered 152 miles in eight days and hoped to surprise the Shwègyobyu,
who, with a mixed following of Burmans and Chins, had continued to
hold Chingaing; but as soon as the alarm was given by his scouts
he fired the village and escaped into the hills. The enemy were
encountered only on one occasion. On the 17th of May a police officer
making a night march with 60 rifles of the military police (Indians)
was attacked by a body of men under Bo Saga, a noted dacoit leader. The
men lately enrolled were unsteady and fell back, and the party retired,
losing two men wounded. The officer reported that he had found the
villages on his march deserted and that the insurgents were collecting
men and arms. Several Burman villages had been burnt; men, women, and
children had been killed, and many carried off into the hills. The
measures taken may seem in the recital out of proportion to the danger.
But it was by no means a false alarm.
The rains had now set in, and the Kalè and Yaw country in that season
does not tempt the hill-men to raid. They returned to their mountains.
The disturbances ceased almost as suddenly as they had begun. The
troops returned to their quarters, a guard of military police being
left at Indin to protect the Sawbwa.
Although order had been restored for the present, it was evident to the
Chief Commissioner that the Chins had yielded to the climate rather
than to fear. They had escaped punishment; and as they had burnt
villages and returned home with many captives the campaign in their
eyes must have seemed successful.
It was necessary to protect the Yaw Valley which was our territory,
and the Kalè country, the Sawbwa of which was our dependent and too
weak to help himself. A proposal was made by the local officer to
simplify matters by taking the Kalè State under direct administration.
It was argued that as we were obliged to defend Kalè, we might as
well administer the country and receive the revenues. Looking,
however, to its effect on the minds of the people, this appeared to
be a mistaken policy. Every Sawbwa in the Shan States might have been
degraded on similar grounds. The Kalè man, so far as was known, had
not been disloyal. In the early part of 1887 he had acted well, and in
the present affair he had not acted badly. If he had not been well
informed regarding the movements of the Chins, he was no worse than
the British officers in the district. He was suddenly surrounded and
seized. In procuring his liberty by consenting to join the insurgents
he took the best course, or what he thought the best course, for
himself. He lost no time in sending information to the nearest officer,
and he attacked the rebel gathering with his own men. To remove him
under such circumstances would have been unfair, and might have alarmed
others whose fears it was not good policy to arouse.
It was decided, therefore, by the Chief Commissioner not to absorb
Kalè, but to leave a military or police guard at or near Indin, with
supports at Kalewa. An ultimatum was sent to the Tashons, ordering them
to deliver up the Shwègyobyu Prince and other leading rebels, as well
as the leaders of the Chins who captured the Sawbwa of Kalè and raided
his villages. On the 21st of July, 1888, the Chief Commissioner (in a
minute submitted to the Government of India) recounted the events which
have been narrated, and gave his opinion that there could be no peace
until the Chin tribes had been subdued. He asked permission to take the
matter in hand as soon as the dry weather set in, and to subjugate the
Chins once for all.
The first step in the plan of campaign was to occupy in force and
permanently the difficult country lying below the Chin Hills, and to
bring it under efficient administrative control.
For this purpose the Chief Commissioner in June, 1887, asked the
Government of India to raise a frontier battalion in India for the Yaw
Valley. It was assumed, in framing the plan of campaign, that this
battalion would have been ready before the rains ended, and that it
would have been possible to hold this district firmly. To have attacked
the Chins and to have withdrawn the troops would have been to leave the
villages in the plains exposed to the vengeance of the hill-men.
The next step was to march an expedition into the Chin Hills. The force
was to be divided into three parts. The Siyin and Sagyilain tribe was
to be invaded from the Kalè Valley by a force of the Kabaw Valley
military police, brought down for the duty. The Tashon country was to
be entered simultaneously by a column of regular troops with two guns,
having its base at Sihaung on the Myittha River, to which place the
men, their baggage, and supplies, could be brought by water. At the
same time a force collected at Gangaw was to threaten the Yokwa Haka
and Thatta Chins, to prevent them from helping the Tashons.
[Illustration: HAKA CHINS.]
[Illustration: A CHIN "ZU" DRINK.]
The subjugation of the Tashons was judged to be the most formidable
task. The object was to reach and, if necessary, to destroy their
chief village in Burmese Ywama. There were no roads, only difficult
hill-paths. Hill-coolies and mules were necessary for transport. There
were no supplies in the country. The work, therefore, would have to
be taken in hand leisurely, the road cleared and made practicable for
mules, supply-stations established, and nothing left to chance. A slow,
determined advance, it was held, would have a greater moral effect than
an attempt by forced marches to surprise the enemy. If it were possible
a simultaneous attack should be made from the Arakan or Chittagong
Hills on the west to take the Tashons in the rear.
In reply to the ultimatum sent to them (see above), the Tashons
released the captives taken in the raids on the 18th and 19th of May,
but declined to give up the Shwègyobu Prince and other Burman rebels.
They put forward counter-claims on their own part, and threatened
further raids if their demands were not complied with.
In August an order was sent to the chief of the Siyin and Sagyilain
tribes to surrender the captives taken by them from several villages in
the preceding April and July, and they were warned that if they did not
comply with this demand punishment would follow.
Early in September raiding began again. While the Government of India
were considering the Chief Commissioner's proposals the Chins acted.
They put their threats into execution. A village near Sihaung was
raided by the Tashons on the 17th of September, and an alliance was
formed by a large number of subdivisions of the Haka tribe. On the 18th
of September a village in the Gangaw circle of the Pakokku district
was attacked, it was reported, by Tashons. It was clear to the local
officers that the anticipation of serious trouble would be realized.
The Government of India were pressed, therefore, to allow the immediate
enlistment of the military police levy for the protection of the Chin
frontier, which had been asked for early in June. In October the reply
of the Governor-General in Council to the Chief Commissioner's minute
of July 21st was received. It was a refusal to sanction the proposed
expeditions.
About this time the local officers reported that Sonpek, the Tashon
leader, was inclined to give up the Burman refugees, but that he
would not surrender the old Sawbwa of Kalè. It was just possible that
through the latter's influence Sonpek's inclination might be translated
into action. The old Sawbwa, therefore, was informed that he would
be pardoned for his part in the disturbances if he brought about the
surrender of the Burman rebels by the Tashons. At the same time, as
a precaution against the attacks which were anticipated, Kalewa and
Sihaung were garrisoned, and endeavours made to prevent the Chins from
getting their usual supplies of salt and other necessaries from the
plains.
The country lying between the Chin mountains and the Chindwin and
Irrawaddy Rivers is, speaking generally, what would be called in India
"terai"; covered with large stretches of forest and intersected by
numerous watercourses and streams, with a heavy rainfall and intense
heat. It is very unhealthy and a difficult country for troops to work
in. The main river in this track is the Myittha, which rises from
the southern part of the Chin mountains; it runs almost due north
for a hundred miles or more, and then turning suddenly to the east
for fifteen or twenty miles joins the Chindwin at Kalewa. During its
course northward it receives by many affluents the drainage of the
eastern slopes of the Chindwin. Three ranges of thickly wooded hills,
called the Pondaung Ranges, run parallel to the Myittha on the east,
with intervening valleys which are fertile and cultivated. East of the
third range of hills lies the Pagyi township of the Lower Chindwin
district. In the west of this township, bordering on the hills above
mentioned, is the country known as Shitywagyaung--"the valley of the
eight villages"--of which the most important is Thitkyidaing. West of
this village lie Saga and Kyaw. The country lying between the Myittha
River and the range of hills on the east is known as the Yaw country,
in the southern part of which is the Yaw River, which rises in the same
hills as the Myittha, but, turning in a south-easterly direction, makes
its way to the Irrawaddy below Pakokku, the river-port of the district
in which the Yaw country lies. Gangaw is the chief village in the Yaw
country, and is more than 100 miles from Pakokku. The road to it passes
through Pauk at about the twentieth mile, and the Yaw River, which has
to be crossed, is unfordable when in flood.
In 1888 the country about Thitkyidaing had not been thoroughly reduced,
chiefly on account of its unhealthiness and the scarcity of civil
officers. Mr. Carter and Colonel Symons worked this tract in 1887-8,
and brought it to order after the disturbances raised by the Shwègyobyu
Prince, in which Major Kennedy and Captain Beville, Assistant
Commissioner, met their deaths. Many of the dacoit leaders were
captured or killed at that time, but the country was not thoroughly
controlled.
There was so much to do in the early years of the annexation and so
few to do it, that outlying tracts like the Yaw country were neglected
for a time. This tract had, it is believed, even in the King's time,
been left very much to itself. In 1887 the Deputy Commissioner of
Pakokku (Captain Eyre) visited it. The people received him well. An
arrangement--the best possible at the time--was made with the local
officials, who undertook to pay the revenue and to be responsible for
the order and protection of the territory. Hitherto the people had
defended themselves against the Chins; and, to encourage them, five or
six hundred muskets were distributed to villagers who in the opinion
of the Burman officials would make good use of them. In some cases
a subsidy was given to pay for the maintenance of a rude militia or
irregular police. This arrangement had worked well until the time of
the events now to be told, and it had the recommendation of economy in
money and men when economy was more than usually imperative.
The refusal of the Government of India to allow an expedition into
the Chin country in no way absolved the Chief Commissioner from the
duty of protecting the people against these savages, for which purpose
he had sufficient means at his disposal. He therefore took counsel
with the Major-General commanding in Upper Burma (Sir George White) as
to the measures necessary. It was resolved to move a body of troops
up from Pakokku through Gangaw along the whole line of the frontier
subject to raids, and to establish a chain of posts, Tilin, Gangaw,
Kan, Sihaung, Kambalè, and Indin. General Faunce, who commanded the
military district in which the disturbed tracts were situated, was
given the control of the operations. Major Raikes, who was at the time
in charge of the Lower Chindwin, and had had more intercourse with the
Chins than any other of the civil officers, was associated with General
Faunce and entrusted with the political duties. A force about 500
strong was ordered to move up along the frontier with General Faunce,
while three companies of Gurkhas were to be sent by river to Kalewa. No
preparations were made for attacking the Chin strongholds in the hills,
as the Government in India had forbidden it. Raiding parties were to be
followed up and punished whenever and so far as it might be possible.
The Chins began to act before these arrangements had been completed.
Reports of raiding came tumbling in fast. On the 14th of October
Homalin was attacked by followers of the Shwègyobyu, assisted by Chins
from the Tashon country. On the 17th Chitpauk, in the Kabaw Valley,
was raided by Siyins, who killed seven and carried off forty-five
villagers. On the 20th of October Kambalè was surrounded, two villagers
were murdered and six kidnapped. On the 22nd of October the Siyins
attacked Kantha, north of Kan, and made off with thirty-two villagers.
On the 29th of October a large body of the hill-men came down on
Kalémyo, the principal village in Kalè. They burnt part of it, killed
three of the villagers, wounded four, and carried forty into slavery.
On the same day Khampat, in the Kabaw Valley, was raided by a party of
Kanhows, seven men were killed and twenty-seven taken away.
These occurrences gave the Chief Commissioner a text for again
preaching the need of punishing these unruly mountaineers; and,
meanwhile, such measures as were possible and within his powers were
taken. On the 9th of November the Government of India intimated
that they were inclined to reconsider the proposal of the Burman
Administration. On the 16th their orders came, giving the Chief
Commissioner a free hand to do what he could with the troops at his
disposal, and with the transport to be had within the province.
General Faunce had left Pakokku on the 14th of November. Captain Eyre,
the Deputy Commissioner of Pakokku, went with him. His orders were to
give all the help possible to the General, especially in procuring
transport. He was to retain charge of the Pakokku district, and was
not to go beyond its limits. The force accompanying General Faunce
consisted of 356 men of the 10th Madras Infantry, 49 Mounted Infantry
of the 10th Bengal Infantry, and 50 lances of the 1st Madras Lancers.
As they went forward posts were established at Chaungu, 7-1/2 miles
north of Pauk, at Tilin, at Gangaw, and at Kan on the Myittha, 20 miles
north of Gangaw, and at Sihaung, between Kan and Indin.
The garrisons at Gangaw and at Kan were strong, 170 rifles at each
place, all of the 10th Regiment Madras Infantry. At Sihaung the
strength was 250 rifles. Hitherto, as has been explained before, the
task confided to General Faunce was to protect the frontier, to stop
raids, and, if possible, to pursue and account for the raiding parties.
The sanction given by the Government of India on the 16th of November
completely altered the character of the movement. It became primarily a
punitive expedition against the Chins. The 1st Bengal Mountain Battery,
77 strong, with 6 guns, 58 Madras sappers, and three companies of the
44th Gurkhas, were sent up by steamer to Kalewa; and by the time the
General arrived at Kambalè, which he made his headquarters and the base
of his expedition, he had a force of twelve hundred men (650 being
Gurkhas) under his orders, besides between 200 and 300 military police
(Indians), who held Indin and Kalewa, and were placed at his disposal.
As a consequence of the change of policy, transport became an urgent
question--in fact the main question. The military authorities asked
for two thousand coolies, men that could carry loads in the hills. The
Deputy Commissioner, Captain Eyre, believed that he could get the men,
and at the instance of the General commanding, the Chief Commissioner
consented to allow Captain Eyre to go with this large body of coolies
if he could enlist them, and an officer was ordered up to Pakokku to
take charge of the district and to set Captain Eyre free for this
purpose. This fact is mentioned, as it explains in a measure how the
Deputy Commissioner's attention was somewhat distracted from his
immediate duty--the administration of the district for which he was
responsible.
Captain Eyre accompanied General Faunce as far as Kan, near the
northern boundary of the Pakokku district. He then left him, meaning
to return to Gangaw for the purpose of collecting coolies. He had
information of several gatherings of dacoits, under known leaders, in
the hills north-east of Gangaw, and at Mozo, north of Kan, and some
time was spent in looking after them. He heard of a body of dacoits
in position in the bed of a stream, between two thickly wooded banks
in a strongly stockaded camp. The dacoits were taken by surprise, and
their camp was rushed and destroyed. Pursuit was impossible, owing to
the nature of the country, and there was nothing to be done except to
return to Kan. The enemy harassed the retiring party all the way, and
our men had continually to turn and drive them off.
Next day reports came in that the villagers were joining the dacoits,
and that a body of some hundreds were collected at Chaungzon. After
arranging with the officer commanding at Kan that a party should be
sent to attack this gathering, Captain Eyre returned to Gangaw to
collect the coolies wanted by General Faunce. He reached Gangaw on
the 11th, and busied himself with this duty. On the 16th of December,
hearing that three of the dacoit leaders were in considerable strength
at Kunze, north-east of Gangaw, a force of 105 rifles, 10th Madras
Infantry, attacked and dispersed them, but without inflicting serious
loss. From that date the garrison of Gangaw may be said to have done
nothing. They sat still and allowed the rising to gather strength.
Seeing the dacoit bands active and gathering strength, while the
British officers and the garrison were apparently helpless, the
villagers, to whom guns had been given, the quasi-militia men amongst
the foremost, joined the insurgents. It was another object-lesson in
the folly of arming the Burmese peasantry, and the still greater folly
of allowing an Asiatic foe to think you are afraid to attack him.
The town of Gangaw was defended by a stockade of teak. The military
post had been so placed as to rest on this stockade, and would have
become untenable if the enemy had succeeded in occupying the town. The
garrison of 170 men had therefore to defend the town stockade, nearly
a mile in extent. It was not considered strong enough to hold the town
and at the same time to move against the hostile bands, who had now
gathered in considerable numbers, and were occupying a village called
Shonshé on the south, and three villages on the north-west. On the 24th
of December a convoy with supplies left Gangaw for Kan, which was the
next post to the north. It was fired upon soon after leaving Gangaw,
and lost two men killed and two wounded. From Kan this party went on
to Sihaung, from which place it returned. It was again attacked on the
march back, between Sihaung and Kan, and lost heavily. Meanwhile the
enemy, who had been strengthened from the peasantry around, attacked
Gangaw on the 30th of December, and again on the 31st. They were
reckoned to number 500 men, but their attacks inflicted no loss on the
garrison.
Some sort of council of war, in which both civil and military officers
joined, now took place, and it was held that if a determined attack
were made on Gangaw or Kan it must succeed. The garrison of Kan,
therefore, was ordered into Gangaw, and they obeyed the order, to say
the least, without reluctance. They met with no opposition on the
way, but they brought with them reports of the loss suffered by the
detachment which went to Sihaung, which helped further to depress the
dispirited garrison.
In Gangaw itself, although it was assaulted daily until the 6th of
January, when a relieving force arrived, there were no casualties. The
enemy was contemptible, and even his numbers were, it is believed,
exaggerated. The danger was created by the inaction of the defence
rather than by the number or the enterprise of the assailants.
The Chief Commissioner was in Rangoon during the early days of
December. The first news of the trouble came to him in a telegram
from Major Raikes, who was on special duty on the Chin frontier; it
was dated the 14th of December, from Gaungu on the Myittha, and was
received in Rangoon on the 17th. It reported the attack made on the
dacoit camp by Captain Eyre on the 9th of December, and recommended
that troops should be sent against this gang. In reply, Major Raikes
was reminded that all the troops and military police on the frontier
were under the General's orders and were close to the scene of action,
while it would take a fortnight or more to send troops up from
Pakokku. On the 20th of December a second telegram came from Major
Raikes, reporting the affair at Chaungzon on the 13th of December. He
explained that General Faunce had ordered the officer commanding at
Gangaw to deal effectively with these gatherings; that two attempts,
both unsuccessful, had been made to disperse the band near Chaungzon;
that a third attack was about to be made, but the force ordered to
make it could only be spared for a few days, as the General wanted all
his men for frontier patrols and for the expedition into the hills. He
therefore pressed for reinforcements as necessary for the destruction
of these gangs.
Orders were then given for a small column of military police and troops
to march up at once from Pakokku. The Deputy Commissioner of the Lower
Chindwin was told to send all the police he could spare across from
Alôn to the disturbed area. The state of things was communicated by
telegram to Sir George White, who was on the Chindwin on his way to
Kalewa, and the despatch of reinforcements from Pakokku was suggested.
On Christmas Day the first reports from Captain Eyre himself came in.
He described the insurgents as increasing in numbers rapidly, and
begged for more troops. This was the first intimation received by the
Chief Commissioner that the local officers were unable to cope with the
rising and that it was of a serious character. The Commissioner was
thereupon ordered to Pakokku to hasten the dispatch of the small column
previously mentioned; and lest there should be difficulty in finding
Sir George White, the officer commanding at Myingan was asked to get a
force ready for immediate despatch. On the 26th a message came from Sir
George White, dated from Mingin on the Chindwin, that he had ordered
the despatch of a force 200 strong from Pakokku _via_ Pauk, and Major
Kingston with 250 rifles, troops and military police, from Alôn, to
hasten to Gangaw. At the same time Colonel Macgregor, with 150 rifles
of the 44th Gurkhas, who were with General Faunce, was ordered down
from Sihaung to Gangaw. Meanwhile the Chief Commissioner had sent up
125 rifles of the Pakokku military police, under Lieutenant Phillips,
by forced marches by the Kyaw Valley route. Major Kingston and
Lieutenant Phillips joined hands at Kyaw on the 2nd of January. On the
6th they attacked the insurgents in Shonshé, south of Gangaw, and drove
them out with considerable loss. At the same moment Colonel Macgregor
with his Gurkhas fell upon the bands who were occupying a village north
of Gangaw, and handled them roughly. No stand was made by these people,
who had kept nearly 350 Madras Infantry shut up in Gangaw.
The duty of restoring order in the Yaw country was entrusted to Colonel
W. P. Symons, who had displayed great ability in dealing with dacoit
gangs in Sagaing. He was assisted by Mr. D. Ross, as civil officer in
charge of the district. The country was cleared of dacoits, partially
disarmed, and reduced to order. The rank and file of the insurgents
were allowed to return to their homes, the guilty villages being
punished collectively by fines. The Yaw country has been peaceful ever
since.
The Gangaw episode was, in the language of the Boer War, "a regrettable
incident." The garrison at the outset may have been unable to face
the insurgents in the field, but, after the Kan detachment had been
called in, it numbered 340 rifles--a sufficient number of disciplined
troops to deal with a much larger number of dacoits, a mere rabble,
armed, when they were armed at all, with old muzzle-loading rifles, or
still more ancient muskets. The incident was not, however, barren of
good results. It sufficed to convince even the most devoted admirer
of "the old coast army" that a portion of the Madras troops was unfit
for active service--a fact which had more than once been brought to
notice by the Chief Commissioner. The disbanding of the regiment
responsible for the failure was the beginning of a large measure of
army reform that had been too long delayed. Hence these events, trivial
in themselves, may be worth recording.
The narrative may now return to the central business, namely, the
expedition against the Chins.
General Faunce arrived at Kambalè and assumed command of the operations
on the 3rd of December. On the 7th the fighting began. A working-party
sent to establish a post between Kambalè and the foot of the hills
was fired on, and Lieutenant Palmer, R.E., who commanded the Madras
Sappers, was killed. On the 10th of December a strong body of Chins of
the Tashon tribe suddenly issued from the hills, and attacked the camp
of the 42nd Gurkhas at Sihaung, and a simultaneous attack was made on
the village. They paid dearly for their audacity. The Gurkhas drove
them off, followed them up, and inflicted heavy loss on them. On the
same date Indin, the capital of the Kalè Sawbwa, was fired into, and
the military police post of Kangyi, twenty miles north of Kalemyo, was
attacked.
It had been intended to limit the operations of the season 1888-9 to
the Siyin and Sagyilaing tribes. In dealing with savage people it is
not possible to lay down a line beyond which you will not step. In
view, therefore, of the probable necessity of taking action against
the Tashons, 200 rifles of the Norfolk Regiment, 50 Madras sappers,
and the remaining companies of the 42nd Gurkhas from their quarters
at Bernardmyo, were ordered to the front. Sir George White himself
arrived at Kalewa on the 29th of December, but left to General Faunce
the immediate command of the force in the field. Matters were further
complicated by the appearance of another section of the Chins. In
October, a village in the Kubo Valley had suffered from a raid by
Kanhows. A large body of this tribe came down in December and attacked
Kangyi, north of Kalemyo. It was held by military police, who repulsed
them. Further investigations made it clear that these Kanhows were
so closely related by position and ties of kindred to the Siyins and
Sagyilains as to make them indistinguishable. A proposal, therefore, to
include them in the operations against the latter was sanctioned. It
was proposed also to send at the same time a column to Minlèdaung, on
the borders of the Tashon country, but this was not found convenient
and was dropped.
[Illustration: KACHIN HILLS, BHAMO, KATHA.]
An ultimatum was now sent to the Siyins and Sagyilains, demanding the
restoration of all their captives, the surrender of a certain number
of fire-arms, and the payment of a fine. In default of the acceptance
of these terms, General Faunce was told to destroy the villages of
the tribes and by a rigorous blockade to prevent food supplies from
reaching the hills. During December and January preparations for the
advance occupied the attention of the General and his staff. Transport
coolies were obtained from Manipur. A road was begun, and step by step
the base of operations advanced towards the goal of the expedition, the
main village of the Siyins, called Koset by them.
On the 23rd of January, 1889, Sir George White and General Faunce made
a reconnaissance to the summit of the Letha Range, to an altitude of
8,200 feet above sea-level. The force then advanced steadily up the
hills in the face of a continued but unsuccessful opposition; the
sappers, assisted by coolies, making a road as the men climbed up, and
constructing rough stockades in which the men slept and rations were
stored. The advance was obstructed by formidable stockades, generally
held by the enemy, but not firmly defended. Day and night the Chins
ambushed our men, taking advantage of every suitable position. The
following telegram from Sir George White to the Chief Commissioner,
dated the 28th of January, 1889, describes one of the skirmishes:
"Enemy yesterday attacked our working-party on road above this, and
held our covering-party, 40 British and 100 Gurkhas, from 9 till 2,
when I arrived and ordered their positions to be charged. We carried
all, driving them entirely away, getting off ourselves wonderfully
cheaply--only one Norfolk dangerously wounded. Enemy in considerable
numbers, using many rifles and plenty of ammunition. They fired at
least 1,000 rounds, standing resolutely until actually charged, even
trying to outflank us. Their loss probably about eight or ten, but they
were carried down the Khuds at once. Most difficult enemy to see or hit
I ever fought."
On the 4th of February the village of Koset was reached, and after a
slight resistance, occupied. It was fired by the Siyins before they
retreated, and was reduced to ashes before our men reached it. The
enemy harassed the camp every night, firing into it from the higher
ground, and at several villages they ineffectually opposed us. They
opened communications at one time with the political officer, but
as they continued ambushing and firing on the troops and refused to
surrender the Burman captives, it was evident that they were fooling
us. Step by step, therefore, the advance was made good, until the Siyin
territory had been overrun, and by the 5th of March all their villages
were in our hands. The site of the village of Tôklaing was chosen as
the headquarters of the Chin expeditionary force, and its name was
changed to "Fort White," and a post was built there with materials
taken from the village.
The chastisement inflicted on the Siyins had some little effect on
the Kanhows, who had made similarly insincere overtures. On the
24th of February a deputation of them came to Fort White, bringing
presents and asking that their villages might be spared. With the
Chief Commissioner's approval, terms were offered to them, namely:
to surrender all the captives in their hands, and a portion of their
fire-arms; to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees, and to engage to pay a light
annual tribute as a token of submission. Ten days were given them to
consider and accept these terms. On the 6th of March they returned,
bringing six of the captives and presents, but failed to comply with
the other conditions. Their presents, therefore, were refused, and
on the 8th of March General Faunce moved against them. The force was
actively engaged against them until the 20th of March, when it returned
to Fort White. The operations were well planned and executed, and
imposed great labour on the troops, as the mountain tracks were most
precipitous and difficult. Most of the villages were destroyed, in many
cases by the Chins themselves, and large stores of grain and other
food-supplies were taken. April was occupied in negotiations with the
Tashons, and the troops rested.
[Illustration: IN THE SECOND DEFILE OF THE IRRAWADDY BELOW BHAMO.]
As it was ascertained that the Siyins had built a new Gurkha village
at Tartan, which had been taken in the earlier operations, a force
consisting of 65 rifles of the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment and 60
rifles of the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry was sent to drive the Chins
out. The village was strongly stockaded and obstinately defended. One
of the two stockades was taken. The loss on our side was one officer
(Second-Lieutenant Michel) and two men of the Norfolk Regiment killed,
one Gurkha killed, and two officers and six men wounded. In this action
Captain Le Quesne, of the Army Medical Corps, showed conspicuous
courage in attending to Lieutenant Michel, and was awarded the Victoria
Cross. The troops retired to Fort White without completing their work.
A few days later they returned and destroyed the village and stockades
unopposed.
The rains, which begin early in this region, had now set in, and active
operations ceased. In this business, from first to last, including
the engagements of Gangaw and Kan, our loss amounted to 26 killed and
54 wounded; the enemy's loss can only be conjectured--it was probably
light. The main object now was to secure the peaceful submission of
the Tashons. Towards the end of March they showed an inclination to
parley, and sent letters purporting to come from six of their chiefs.
It was decided to give them as much time as possible to consider the
terms offered to them, and in the meanwhile no movement was to be made
against their villages or certain settlements of the Kanhows which were
within, or close to, the borders of the Tashon tribe. One of the Kalè
officials, Maung Nwa, was selected to take a letter to the chiefs,
giving them twenty-one days to decide on their course of action.
Maung Nwa succeeded in reaching Falam, the Ywama, or mother-village, of
the Tashons. On the 18th of April he returned to Fort White, bringing
letters from the chiefs and from the ex-Sawbwa of Kalè. A minor chief
accompanied him, and on a subsequent day another Tashon chief came in
with messages to Major Raikes. This beginning of personal intercourse
was encouraging, and on our part concessions were made in respect
of the surrender of the Burmese refugees, while the release of the
captives was insisted on. Later on some overtures were made on the part
of the Siyins and a few captives delivered to our officers. On the 2nd
of May men from the Kanhow tribe came in; they brought the fine of Rs.
1,000, which had been imposed on them, and the tribute, and tendered
the submission of their tribe, but no captives. They clung to their
captives as to life. Later on, however, they released some and brought
them to Fort White. It was believed at the time that they had given up
all; it was discovered later that they had held back a considerable
number. The Siyins surrendered seven captives; but they made no further
steps towards submission. At the end of the open season of 1888-9
the situation was this: Severe punishment had been inflicted on the
offending tribes, and 114 of the Burmans carried off by raiding parties
had been recovered. The Siyins and Sagyilains, notwithstanding the
destruction of their villages, had not given in; the Kanhows had made a
show of submission, and had partly complied with our terms; the Tashons
had exchanged messages, but had given no proof of penitence.
It was necessary to show the Chins that the arm of the British
Government was long enough to reach them even in their mountain
fortresses, and that our soldiers could remain in their country. It was
decided, therefore, to keep the troops at Fort White during the rains
and to prevent the Chins, who had not submitted, from rebuilding their
villages or cultivating their fields. A rigorous blockade of the routes
from their hills to the plains was ordered, in the hope that it would
help to overcome their obstinacy. Nothing more could be done until the
season for taking the field again came round.
General Faunce's column had done all that men could do in a very
difficult and unknown country against a very difficult enemy,
pronounced by a man who had seen some fighting to be "the most
difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought." The expedition was late
in starting. The reason has been explained. That the next season's
operations were more successful with less severity is no reproach
to the General commanding the first expedition or to the political
officer. Their work had made our power felt, and had given us some
knowledge of the people. If a garrison had not been established at Fort
White in 1888-9, it would have been scarcely possible to have acted
against the Tashons on the plan which ensured success in 1889-90.
CHAPTER XXII
THE CHIN-LUSHAI CAMPAIGN
General Faunce and his men had worked hard and well. By May, 1888,
the advance had been made good as far as Tôklaing, called Fort White.
But although that place was only a short distance (thirty miles) from
Falam, the main settlement of the Tashons, we had not been able to
reach it. This tribe was known to be the most numerous and the most
influential of the Chins in these parts, and their subjugation was
essential.
The character of the country which was the scene of operations has been
described in the preceding chapter. For a successful effort to conquer
it much and timely preparation was necessary. Several circumstances had
made this impossible. It will be remembered, in the first place, the
Government of India had viewed the enterprise askance. The head of an
Indian province looks mainly to his own affairs; and not having a free
hand, and being without direct responsibility for the financing of a
military expedition, he presses hard for what he wants. To the Supreme
Government, far from the scene of raids and disorder, and less directly
concerned with the causes and consequences of them, the financial
aspect looms largest. The Government of India were beginning to take
alarm at the heavy burden with which the annexation of the new province
was loading them. They were aware of the very wide extent of territory
under the nominal sway of the dethroned King, and of the distant
boundaries, ill-defined and seemingly endless, marching not only with
China and Siam, but with savage peoples of whom hardly the names were
known. They feared, naturally enough, that the local authorities might
allow their zeal to push them on too hastily if not too far. Little
was known about the relations of the King's Government to the wide
region lying between the Irrawaddy Valley and the Mekong. The northern
and north-eastern boundaries were very indistinctly defined, and no
thought had been given to the great wedge of mountainous country
between Burma proper and Bengal.
The end of 1888 found us engaged in all these outlying regions. Active
operations were going on in the Shan States, in the difficult hills
east of Bhamo, and in the rugged country about the Ruby Mines. In
the far north there were disturbances all around Mogaung, which was
inadequately garrisoned and difficult to get at. Added to this, there
were still districts of Upper Burma which were harassed by gangs of
guerillas. There was more than enough work for every soldier and every
civilian in the country and for every penny that the Treasury could
afford. Facts, however, had proved strong, and the Chins themselves
forced us to act. But General Faunce's force started too late, and
therefore without adequate preparation for a big campaign. Added to
this came the unfortunate Gangaw affair, which interrupted his supplies
and called off some of his best troops.
In the summer of 1889 the position at Fort White was hardly
encouraging. The place had proved very unhealthy, and the garrison had
few men fit for service. Not only had we failed to touch the Tashons,
who had been chiefly responsible for the troubles of the past year, but
we were far from having come to terms with the Siyins and Kanhows, on
which tribes our hand had been heavy. The political officer, indeed,
still believed that hunger would bring them in. The Kanhows had made
a partial and half-hearted submission, retaining, however, most of
their Burman captives. The others would have no truck with us, and
treated our demands, as well as our advances, with obstinate silence.
Their courage was higher, and the pressure on them less than had
been thought. The Baungshès, moreover, to the south of the Tashons,
including the Yokwa Haka and Thetta clans, had been continuously on
the warpath, and had had no communication with our officers since the
winter of 1887.
There were only two courses open--either to make a well-prepared
systematic advance into the Chin Hills and bring these people under
British rule, not necessarily administration in the full meaning; or to
retire altogether and leave an _enclave_ of savagery between Burma and
Bengal, trusting for the protection of the Burman villages to frontier
posts and spasmodic expeditions. The long history of the dealings of
the Bengal Government with the Lushais and Nagas, very similar people,
had proved the futility of the latter course. The inclination in Burma
was all for the former, and this met with the thorough approval of the
Supreme Government. The work was to be undertaken in a whole-hearted
manner that would ensure success.
During the inactive season of 1889, the scheme of operations was
carefully worked out. The plan of campaign approved by the Supreme
Government was very much on the lines sketched in the Chief
Commissioner's minute of the 21st of July, 1888. The central object
was the Tashon tribe. On their north we already had in Fort White a
footing in the hills with communications secured to Kalewa, on the
Chindwin. It was decided to make the attack from the Burma side in two
strong columns. The Northern Column was to gather at Fort White, and
was to deal in the first instance with the still refractory tribes
in its immediate neighbourhood. The Southern Column was to muster at
Pakokku and, making its base at Kan in the Myittha Valley, to move up
deliberately into the hills to Yokwa and Haka, subjugating the villages
as the force advanced and securing the release of the captives.
Then, leaving a garrison in Haka, it was to move northward and, in
combination with the Fort White Column, to make a simultaneous attack
on Falam, the Tashon capital, from both sides. Meanwhile, a third force
was to enter the hills from Bengal territory and open communications
or, if necessary, join hands with the Burma columns. For the operations
of this last force the Burma Administration had no responsibility.
To protect the villages in the plains from raids and to keep open
communications while the expeditions were in progress, it was decided
to establish ten posts along the more northern portion of the
Chin-Burman frontier. The force to be employed from Burma was to be
nearly four thousand fighting men, besides some military police. The
number of transport animals and of coolies necessary for such a body
would be very great. Carts were useless after the first few marches
from the Irrawaddy. Some fodder for ponies and bullocks might be
procurable, but it was certain that once in the hills almost every
ounce of food for man and beast would have to be sent up from the
Irrawaddy Valley.
The success of the campaign, therefore, was a question of transport
and supply. Kan, which was to be the base of the Southern Column, was
to be fed from Pakokku on the Irrawaddy, distant 165 miles through
difficult and sparsely inhabited country. Work had been begun in 1888
on the road; but labour was scarce and the cart-track was not open
for more than half the distance. Provisions for Fort White and its
communications, as well as for the frontier posts, could be sent up
by steamer to Kalewa on the Chindwin. The difficulty was to move them
thence to Kalemyo within reach of the troops. If the Myittha were
navigable, it would be invaluable; all the frontier posts from Kalemyo
to Kan were on that river, but its waters were unknown. Mules and
coolies in large numbers, men from Assam and from the Northern Punjab
able to carry loads on hill paths, were promised by India. Arrangements
for collecting some eight or nine hundred carts at Pakokku were put in
train; and contracts for the hire of country boats, of which Pakokku is
the great building centre, were given.
In August I went up the Chindwin to Kalewa to meet Major Raikes,
who had been stationed at Fort White since the close of the active
operations, and had been busy acquiring information of the people
and country and endeavouring to induce the Chins to come to terms. I
brought with me two naval officers--Captain Wilson, R.N., then Port
Officer at Rangoon, and Commander Holland, of the Royal Indian Marine
Service. These officers were deputed to ascertain how far the Myittha
could be navigated; and, as their inquiries gave reason for hoping that
the river might be navigable, the task of exploring it was entrusted to
Commander Holland. The results of his work were encouraging, and he
was directed to organize a transport service of boats.
But to return to Kalewa. The Chief Commissioner, after discussing
matters closely with Major Raikes, resolved to inform the Tashons
that the British Representative, with an armed force, would proceed
to Falam, their head village, and there receive the submission of the
tribe, and if necessary enforce it. A proclamation to that effect was
sent to the chiefs in the following terms:--
"A British army will march to the Tashon Ywama. The British Government
wishes to preserve your tribe, and does not desire to punish you as
it has punished the Kanhows and Siyins who have resisted the British
forces.
"The British Government desires from you only two things: First, that
the captives taken from Burman villages shall be released. Secondly,
that you shall in the future behave peacefully, and cease to attack the
subjects of the Government.
"Therefore the Chief Commissioner hereby declares and promises that you
will be excused from punishment for the past if you comply with the
following terms:--
"(i) That you shall assist the British troops in their march through
your country to your Ywama, and that you will neither attack nor
oppose them;
"(ii) That you shall to the utmost of your power compel the Siyin and
Kanhow tribes to surrender their captives.
"(iii) That the chiefs shall meet the officer in command of the
British forces at the Ywama, and deliver up to him all the captives in
the possession of your tribe and pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.
"(iv) That you shall render annually a tribute of two elephant tusks
and ten silk pieces to the British Government.
"If you comply with these terms your lives and property will be spared,
and the former orders requiring you to deliver up the Shwègyobyu and
other rebels will not be enforced.
"On the other hand, if you will not comply with these conditions the
Chief Commissioner will direct the troops to punish you severely."
Up to this time the surrender of the Burman outlaws had been made a
condition of peace with the Tashons. It was now said by those who knew
them best that the surrender of the refugees was repugnant to Chin
honour; and in the hope of making it easier for them to yield, the
Chief Commissioner consented to waive this demand. Permission was also
given to Major Raikes to reduce the fine, if it would make negotiations
more hopeful. But on the other points, especially the condition that
the troops should march to Falam, their capital, and there receive the
formal and public submission of the chiefs to the British Government,
no concession whatever was to be made. Negotiations on this basis
continued between the political officer and the Tashons without result.
In the beginning of December the chiefs agreed to meet Major Raikes at
Sihaung. The terms of the proclamation were explained to them, and they
were made to understand that they were final and would be enforced. The
chiefs were impracticable. They affirmed that if our men advanced they
could not control their tribesmen. The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè was present
at this meeting, having come down with the Chins. He wisely took the
opportunity of surrendering to Major Raikes, and was sent to Pakokku,
where he lived afterwards in receipt of a pension from the Government.
His surrender exploded a theory which had been started, that the
Tashons were holding out in order to procure his reinstatement in Kalè.
A proclamation in similar terms was sent to the Haka and Yokwa Chins.
Meanwhile the work of collecting transport and forwarding stores was
pushed on; the boat service on the Myittha was organized, and was
worked by Commander Holland with great energy and success.
Brigadier-General Faunce had left Burma. He was succeeded in command of
the brigade by Colonel W. P. Symons (well known as General Sir W. Penn
Symons), who met his death in the first action of the Boer War. Colonel
Symons had made his reputation already as an active and able soldier.
He was much more. He was peculiarly fitted by temper, tact, and
administrative ability to conduct a difficult business like that now in
hand. The command of the Chin-Lushai expedition was given to him by the
Chief Commissioner's request. The question arose whether he should have
also the control of the negotiations and arrangements with the Chins.
For some time the feeling in India had been, as it still is, against
the division of authority in expeditions of this kind. No doubt, as
a rule, the man who holds the military command should have control
of the negotiations also. At the same time the circumstances of each
case and the qualifications of the man must be taken into account. In
Burma hitherto it had been found more convenient, if not necessary, to
divide the duties and to give what is called the political business to
a civil officer acquainted with the language and customs of the people
to be dealt with. In the present instance it happened that Major Raikes
had from the beginning dealt, under the Chief Commissioner's orders,
with the Chin tribes. He had had more opportunities than any one of
acquiring a knowledge of their character and politics. It was somewhat
difficult to ask him now to work in subordination to the military
commander who had had no part in the business.
The Chief Commissioner was ready to brush aside this personal
difficulty and to allow Major Raikes to resign his post if he preferred
to go. He would willingly have placed the chief authority unreservedly
in General Symons's hands. The question was carefully considered and
discussed. Finally, by General Symons's desire it was arranged to
leave to the civil officer the negotiations with the Chins and the
arrangements to be made with them when they submitted. It happened,
however, that before the advance into the hills had well begun,
Major Raikes was compelled by illness to go away. General Symons was
then put in undivided control of the whole business, under the Chief
Commissioner's orders. Two civil officers were selected to serve as
his assistants, absolutely in subordination to him. Mr. D. Ross was
posted to the Southern Column and Mr. B. S. Carey to the Northern. This
arrangement worked admirably.
The rains of 1889 were unfortunately late. The Southern Column,
1,869[56] strong, was concentrated at Pakokku. From Pakokku to Kan,
which was to be the base for the operations, was one hundred and
sixty-five miles. Shelters had been erected at the halting-places,
and such provisions as could be procured were gathered and stored by
the civil district officers. The troops began to move on the 23rd of
November, and the march was successfully carried out in fifteen days,
by detachments of one hundred fighting men with followers marching in
succession daily. The first detachment left Pakokku on the 23rd of
November, and the leading columns were only just able to get through
the falling rivers and the drying country. The ground was heavy and the
heat great. Nevertheless, troops and followers arrived at Kan in good
condition, with only a nominal sick list.
By the middle of November the Northern Column, 1,622[57] strong, was
ready at Fort White and was waiting for the hill-coolies who were to
form the transport, before it should move out.
The garrisons for the ten posts which were to protect the frontier
were sent up the Chindwin to Kalewa, and had to march down the Myittha
Valley. Late rains had flooded the Kalè Valley, and as late as the end
of November the country was impassable to anything but an elephant.
On the 24th of October it took fifteen hours to get one hundred and
seventy fresh mules, with elephants to carry their saddles and gear,
through the bogs and swamps on the last five and a half miles of the
road into Kalemyo, which was the distributing base for supplies for
Fort White and for the posts in the Kalè Valley. By the end of December
these ten posts were built, occupied, and rationed--a testimony to the
qualities of the officers and men who overcame such difficulties.
By the end of January, 1890, five hundred and fifty-one tons of stores
had been sent by road to Kan, and six hundred and thirty-eight tons
landed at Kalemyo by water. The river transport service not only did
this, but also provided, as a by-work, carriage for many men joining
their corps and for sick sent down to the rear. From the beginning
of February, when the country had become dry, all supplies for the
Southern Column were brought in carts from Pakokku to Kan and on to
Haka on hired pack-bullocks and Government transport animals. To add to
the difficulties, virulent cattle disease broke out in the Myittha and
Kalè Valleys, and caused enormous loss.
One-third of the pack-bullocks had died. The sickness was not confined
to the transport animals. It was said that the villagers in the Kalè
State lost 90 per cent. of their buffaloes.
The first troops of the Southern Column reached Kan on the 7th of
December. On the 9th the sappers, with a covering escort, commenced
work on the road to Haka, which was sixty-four miles distant. Every one
thought that our men would be in Haka in ten or twelve days, and all
calculations were based on this estimate. It was sixty-six days before
the leading files entered Haka, and the mule-road did not reach that
place until the seventy-seventh day. This, although the whole strength
of the force was devoted to road work: every man who could dig was set
to it. The country opposed to the engineers a tumbled network of steep
hills and deep ravines. The climate proved deadly. Soldiers and coolies
were ill with fever. Out of seven Royal Engineer officers, at the end
of December six were lying ill. In comparison with the difficulties
caused by the nature of the country and the climate, the fiercest
opposition of the Chins was insignificant.
"This disappointing delay," wrote General Symons, "was not without
its compensating advantages in dealing with the Chins. They expected
us to make a quick advance, do some damage, and retire. The steady,
persistent advance, together with the pains that were taken to get into
touch with them and to explain our objects and intentions, paralysed
their spirits and efforts for resistance, and thus tribe after tribe
submitted and yielded to our terms."
This is, no doubt, the true way of dealing with savages. They are
like children. They are terrified if they see a person approaching
them steadily, with measured steps and outstretched arms. But it is
much more difficult and requires more resources in money and men
and transport to advance into a difficult country, making each step
good and permanent, than to rush in, burn, slay, and retire. The
latter method of warfare the savage understands. His enemies appear
suddenly, set fire to his village, kill those they come across, and
are away again. He flees into the jungle at the first alarm, and comes
back little the worse as soon as the other side retires. That the
better method was not followed in 1887-8, and that the more barbarous
system was adopted, was not voluntary. Circumstances forced it upon
the authorities in Burma, as the only means at their disposal for
protecting the peaceful population in the plains. Besides, it is only
fair to say that the tribes dealt with the former year, the Siyins and
Kanhows, were by far the most warlike and bloodthirsty of the Chins.
The severe chastisement inflicted on them, and the maintenance of the
garrison in Fort White during the year, had brought home to all the
folly of trying conclusions with disciplined and well-armed troops.
On the 17th of December the advance-guard of the Southern Column
occupied Taungtek on the road to Haka. From that date to the 28th of
December the Chins from time to time made feeble attempts to resist,
harassing the troops by firing into camp. On the 28th, near Taungtek,
they had a considerable number of men in action; according to their
own account five hundred men, of whom three hundred had fire-arms. But
they could do nothing. From that day they gave up the fight and made no
further opposition.
On the 8th of January two Yokwa Chins came into camp. The objects
of our coming and the conditions of peace were explained to these
two men, and they were sent back to repeat them to their chiefs. But
therein lay the difficulty. Who were the real chiefs? There were
numbers of chiefs, each with his own following, each bitterly jealous
of his fellows. To negotiate under such conditions required the tact
and patience which General Symons fortunately possessed. The most
intelligent and influential of the rivals had to be discovered, and his
position strengthened by dealing through him.
Henceforth affairs progressed well, and there was no combined
opposition to the advance. One unfortunate incident, however, occurred.
Some Chins lying in ambush shot Lieutenant Foster, of the King's
Own Scottish Borderers. The tribes had been fully warned that acts
of treachery would meet with punishment. The nearest village was
destroyed. This, happily, was the sole occasion on which the Southern
Column was compelled to use violence.
A few days afterwards Yokwa was occupied, and this section of the
Baungshès yielded. The terms imposed on them were the surrender of
the captives, the payment of a fine and of an annual tribute, and an
engagement to keep the peace in future. The mule-path, meanwhile, was
being pushed forward on to Haka, the headquarters of an important
section. The same tactics soon led to their submission. The subjugation
of the whole Baungshè clan was now complete, for the minor sections
followed the lead of the premier communities. The headquarters of the
expedition were fixed henceforward at Haka, and negotiations for the
surrender of the captives were begun.
This was not an easy or speedy business. Nominal rolls of the persons
held in durance by the Chins had been prepared, and it was known by
which tribe and by which village the captives had been taken. But some
of the raids had been committed months before. Slaves were current coin
in the hills, and passed from hand to hand as easily as a bank-note in
more civilized regions. Their value was fixed with reference to the
customary ransom paid by their Burmese relatives, and seems to have
averaged ten or twelve pounds sterling. In barter, according to Mr.
Carey, a slave would exchange for three or four head of cattle, a good
gun, a dozen pigs, or a wife. However willing the tribe or the village,
or even the original captor, might be to keep faith, it was often
difficult to trace the slave and obtain his release from the present
holder, who had bought him with a price and did not see why he should
be at a loss. A view not unreasonable from a Chin point of view, but
quite inadmissible from our side.
While these negotiations were proceeding at Haka, and the mule-road was
being completed to that place, reconnaissance parties were sent out to
the west, the country was explored, the submission of a western tribe,
the Klanklangs, was secured, and communication with the Chittagong
Column, under Brigadier-General Tregear,[58] was opened. The advance
parties of General Symons and General Tregear's forces met on the 26th
of February, at Tao village, fifty-two miles west of Haka. This meeting
was notable for the recovery of the heads of Lieutenant John Stewart,
of the Leinster Regiment, and the soldiers (two British and one Indian)
who had been killed by Hoswata Shendoos on the 3rd of February,
1888, when surveying in the Chittagong Hill tracts. Their skulls had
decorated the village of some Chin chief at Haka ever since. As to
how they came to Haka nothing is known. The chief may have taken them
himself, or he may have purchased the trophies from the real heroes. No
inquiry was made, and no retaliation was inflicted on the accomplices
in the murder of our fellow-countrymen.
The Southern Column being thus engaged, the Northern Column, under
Colonel Skene, with Mr. Bertram Carey as civil officer, had not been
idle. Mr. Carey had to do with a very difficult position. The tribes
with whom he was immediately concerned were as defiant in December,
1889, as they had been a year before; and he had no medium of
communication with them. Gradually, by patience and skilful handling,
the Sagyilain Chins living in the nearest villages were induced to
bring supplies of eggs and fowls to market. Trading led to closer
intercourse. Mr. Carey established himself at Yawlu on the road from
Fort White to Falam, the chief Tashon village, and very soon Tashons
as well as Sagyilains came to Yawlu daily to sell their produce, and
the situation became less strained, while the troops procured better
food. After a little Manglön, the chief of the Sagyilains, came to see
Mr. Carey, and made his submission to the British Government. This was
a most welcome event. Manglön became a medium in all negotiations with
the Siyins, and remained loyal and trustworthy in subsequent troubles.
No progress, however, was made with the Siyins, who promised to
surrender if the Tashons made peace. The best months for active
operations were passing. But it was thought inexpedient to adopt
rough methods against them until a settlement had been made with the
Tashons.[59] After some negotiations with the chief of Mwebingyi (an
important village), who promised to surrender and invited a visit, Mr.
Carey, with Colonel Skene and a small force, guided by Sagyilain men,
marched to Mwebingyi. Three miles from the village they were fired on
by Chins from all sides. A sharp skirmish followed. The Chins, driven
back to their village, set it on fire and took to the hillsides. We
lost two men severely wounded owing to this treacherous attack.
The time had now come when the much-delayed advance of the Southern
Column made the combined movements of the Northern and Southern Columns
upon the Tashon Ywama possible. The reduction of this tribe was the
main object of the campaign, to which all the other operations were
leading. It was important to avoid a hostile collision with it. It
would have been easy enough to harass and punish the tribe village
by village, but at the cost of life, destruction of property, and
misery. General Symons's instructions were to accept no surrender and
to conclude no negotiations except at Falam, the Tashon head village;
and his purpose was to make resistance hopeless by placing the forces
from Haka and Fort White simultaneously on the north and south of
the Ywama. Accordingly, on the 8th of March a force 350 strong, with
one gun, under Colonel Skene, left Fort White. On the 9th General
Symons, with 290 rifles and two mountain-guns, marched from Haka. The
Southern Column had suffered so much from sickness that its strength in
fighting-men and transport coolies had been seriously reduced. Without
the aid of the Northern Column, it could not have given enough men to
garrison Haka and at the same time to deal with the Tashons. It was a
matter of moment, therefore, that the two columns should operate in
concert. A successful and rapid reconnaissance to within eight miles
of the Ywama was affected, and the two forces arrived on the opposite
banks of the Manipur, or Nankathe River, within an hour of each other
on the 11th of March.
The Tashons had not intended to yield without a fight.
"Innumerable stockades, breastworks, and obstructions, extending over
some nine miles of country, but chiefly intended against an enemy
advancing from the north, had been freshly erected at every commanding
point. Large numbers of armed men watched both columns as they
advanced, but there was no collision. It is difficult to estimate their
numbers; but on the south of Manipur River near the Ywama there were
not less than 5,000 men, of whom two-thirds were armed with guns, the
rest with spears."[60]
Disregarding the protests of some of the chiefs who came out to meet
him, General Symons marched his men to a spot within one thousand yards
of the Ywama, and fixed his camp there. The chiefs were assembled and
asked if they agreed to our terms. With the inconsequence of savages,
after allowing us to advance unopposed, they rejected our conditions,
refusing firmly to pay tribute and demurring even to the fine. General
Symons warned them of the risk they were incurring and dismissed them.
The scene on this occasion was dramatic, and is thus described by Mr.
Bertram Carey, who was present:--
"The whole valley, in which formerly lay the original village of
Falam, was full of armed Chins, numbering not less than 3,000 men,
gathered from all sides; the host seemed to settle itself in groups
of from 10 to 100 men. They were quiet in demeanour, but held their
heads high and seemed quite prepared for whatever might be the result
of the negotiations. The crowd was a motley one, the Tashon chiefs
dressed in the gaudy tartan of the tribe, well armed with bright guns,
vermilion and black parti-coloured dah scabbards, and beautifully
inlaid powder-horns. The Whenohs were conspicuous by their chignons,
which contrasted with the lofty head-dress of their neighbours, the
Yahows, who were present carrying the strange _shendu_, chopper-shaped
dahs in basketwork scabbards. Scattered around in bunches were the
scowling Siyins, the half-breeds from Tawyan and Mintèdaung, the
semi-independent clique of Kwungli, and the trans-Nankathè tribesmen
of Sokte and 'Poi' origin. The congregation was armed with a variety
of weapons; spears and flint-lock guns predominated, but bows and
quivers of barbed arrows were carried by not a few. Each man bore his
food-supply for a few days on his back."[61]
The next two days were spent in wearisome negotiations which might have
driven a less patient man to the use of force. His forbearance was
rewarded, and the chiefs gave way. The tribute for 1889 was delivered,
and five thousand rupees, the amount to which he had thought right to
reduce the fine, was paid.
The Tashons admitted that until a few days before the forces reached
Falam they had intended to fight. Their position as head of the Chin
tribes and the fear of losing prestige impelled them to resist. When
they found their enemies coming from two sides, they began to lose
heart. All their outlying villages, who knew they must suffer first and
most, prayed them to make peace.
It is evident that the rough handling of the Siyins by General Faunce
had given a salutary lesson to these people. The event proved also
the wisdom of marching to the headquarters of the tribe, and there
compelling the public submission of their leaders.
The object of the combined march having been attained, the columns
separated, the Southern returning to Haka and the Northern to Fort
White. During the remaining months of open weather General Symons was
occupied in gathering in the captives, improving his relations with
the Chins, and in exploring the country. In April, accompanied by the
Haka chief, he visited many villages to the South and was everywhere
well received. On the 15th of April General Tregear met him at Haka,
now linked up with Fort Tregear by a mule-track, which was brought
into Haka, a distance of eighty-one miles, on the 13th of April. The
Chittagong Column had met with no opposition. Their work was mainly
road-making, reconnoitring, and surveying--work of the first importance
in securing permanent peace. The Lushai country was as difficult as any
on the Burma side.
"There is the dense jungle, which prevents one seeing a dozen yards
ahead; rocks extending over large portions of the hillside are
constantly met with, and when it was found impossible to avoid them
much time was taken up in blasting operations. Range upon range of
precipitous hills, running at right angles to the line of advance, had
to be crossed, and the question of a sufficient supply of water at the
different camps had to be considered in determining the trace of the
road."[62]
Two large rivers had to be bridged.
It is not within the scope of the present narrative to describe the
work done by the Chittagong Column. Its approach from the west had
beyond doubt made General Symons's task easier, and success more
certain.
On returning to Fort White, Mr. Carey resumed his immediate duty of
bringing the Siyins within the fold. They had promised to submit if
the Tashons made peace. He called upon them now to keep their word.
Only one chief came in, and, as he brought no captives, Mr. Carey
sent him away. So far from submitting, they cut the telegraph wires
daily and annoyed our people. A policy of waiting and conciliation had
failed. Several of the worst villages were therefore singled out and
destroyed, not without some fighting, in which several sepoys were
killed. Unfortunately, in two cases, in which some troops from Kalemyo
were engaged, the bodies were allowed to fall into the enemies' hands.
The Chin braves were able to return with two heads, more expressive of
victory than guns or standards, and no doubt published in their fashion
jubilant bulletins. The triumph was short-lived. A month afterwards a
detachment of the 42nd Gurkhas, marching down on their way to India,
destroyed the villages concerned. Before the end of April all the
Siyins had made outward submission and had accepted our terms, which
were that a yearly tribute should be paid and that the captives should
be surrendered. Each clan was to be allowed to rebuild its villages
when the captives held by it had been released, and not before. The cut
telegraph wire and the two heads were brought in, and the captives were
being gradually surrendered.
The results of the campaign were good and permanent. The foundation
was laid for an effective control over these troublesome hill-men, and
peace with security was given to the Burmans in the plains and to the
Chins themselves. Raiding and slavery as institutions were condemned,
and were soon to disappear altogether. Before the troops left the field
one hundred and thirty-eight captives were liberated. There were a
few raids made after General Symons finished his task, but they were
promptly punished. There were some disturbances among the Chin tribes.
They were easily checked, and systematic disarmament here, as in Burma
proper, changed the temper and habits of the people.
This success had been achieved almost without bloodshed, but at a
great cost to our men of suffering and loss of life from disease. The
sickness among troops and followers was appalling, and the transport
animals perished by hundreds. Nine men, of whom two were officers,
were killed in action; two hundred and seven, of whom seventy-two
were fighting-men, perished of disease. And two thousand one hundred
and twenty-two were invalided, of whose seven hundred and nine were
fighting-men--one-fifth of the whole force.
A permanent post was built at Haka, which was found to be a healthy
place; and the headquarters of a civil officer, with control over the
Baungshès and Tashons, was established there.
Fort White continued for some time to be the headquarters of the civil
and military staff in the north. But the garrison was reduced, and as
the site was always sickly, the fort was moved back to the Letha Range,
retaining the name which it had received from Sir George White. Falam,
the chief village of the Tashons, is now the headquarters of the civil
administration of the Chin Hills.
[Illustration: BURMESE LADIES MAKING A CALL.]
It is worth while, perhaps, to give some account of the Chins in these
the first years of British rule.
At the time of General Symons's expedition the Chins were a savage
race. They had arms in abundance, flint-lock guns of English make, and
spears. They were armed not so much against strangers as against each
other. In former times, when they were ill-provided with fire-arms,
the Burmans used to oppress them; but for a long time the position had
been reversed. Intertribal feuds, however, and feuds between villages
and families of the same tribe, were very common and made it unsafe to
move without arms. No man who owned a gun ever left his house without
it. While the fields were worked by women and slaves, armed men stood
guard. So it was even less than a century ago in parts of India. What
caused the feuds was a matter for speculation. Apparently disputes
about debts were the most frequent; commerce, in fact, as among Western
peoples, led to quarrels. As for government, even the most primitive
form of tribal or village organization appears to have been imperfect.
There were many chiefs, and if any one of them, as Jahoota,[63] for
instance, was pre-eminent, he could not count on the obedience or
support of the others. Their jealousies interfered with everything. Of
their manners and customs not much was put on record in the earlier
reports, which were necessarily more concerned with military matters.
They made forays on the Burmans for heads and slaves. They were much
given to sacrifices, and sometimes to human sacrifices. For example, it
was usual to sacrifice slaves at the funerals of persons accidentally
killed. Of their marriage-customs nothing is said in the early reports.
The country was not rich. There were no forests that it would pay to
work, and no minerals had been discovered. The cultivation was of the
primitive kind--"Taungya," or "Jhoom"--that is to say, felling the
trees, burning them when dry, and sowing hill-rice and other crops in
the ash. In the forests they had plenty of game, and much fish--Mahseer
and other kinds--in the rivers; and the jungles were rich in fruits and
roots that would support life if the grain failed. Metal of all kinds
was very scarce. The hills produced none, and the Burmese Government
had forbidden the export of metals from the plains. The trouble the
Chins gave by cutting the telegraph wire was caused by their desire to
procure metal, rather than to cause annoyance. Mr. Carey compared the
attraction felt by the Chin for the unprotected wire to that felt by an
English boy for an unfenced apple-orchard. The insulator spikes were
beaten into hoes and the wire melted to make bullets, or bangles for
the damsels. Their wants were blankets, cottons and other cloths, iron
and steel for tools, lead for bullets, needles and thread and salt. In
exchange they were able to offer honey, beeswax, chillies, mats, and a
little lac.
The reports of 1889 were more concerned with the measures carried
out for their subjugation than with descriptions of the people and
their manners. In the main, what is written in the _Burma Gazetteer_
published in 1908 is true of the Chins of twenty years ago:--
"They are a sturdy, warlike, hospitable people, slow of speech, grave
of habit, paying great regard to rank and to the ties of clan, but
spoilt by their intemperance, their vindictiveness, their treachery,
their greed, their lack of persistence,[64] and their personal
uncleanliness."
There is a quaint humour about this description which is refreshing in
a Gazetteer. A race would have to be good indeed if, with such an array
of vices, there was anything left to spoil.
Their villages are described as built on the hill-slopes, some of them
fortified; and their houses are often solid, elaborate structures.
Their dress is the reverse--a loin-cloth, none too ample, and a blanket
for the men; a short skirt and jacket for the women. Home-woven
check plaids are seen in a good many costumes, and some tribes have
distinctive plaids, as in Scotland. The people are mainly vegetarians,
but they will eat anything, from a dog to an elephant. They smoke
tobacco in pipes, and they make a liquor from fermented grain,
presumably rice, which is called _zu_. They suck up this, in the most
approved fashion, through a hollow reed, out of the original still-pot.
Enormous quantities of _zu_ are consumed at Chin entertainments, which
usually end in disgusting orgies.
THE CHINBÔKS AND CHINBONS.
Tribes called the Chinbôks, claiming to be of the same stock as the
Hakas but speaking a different language, are found at the head-waters
of the Maw and Yaw Rivers. Farther south, at the sources of the Saw and
Salin and on the eastern slopes of the Môn Valley, live the Yendus.
Below them, and southernmost of all the Chins, are the Chinbons, who
from the Môn on the east extend along the border of the Mimbu district
into the Akyab and Kyaukpyu districts of Lower Burma.
These three tribes were less fierce than their kindred to the north,
and possessed only the arms of savage warfare--the bow and arrow and
spear. Some of them, those on the borders of the Tilin township at the
headquarters of the Maw River, were noted for cattle-lifting. But the
Chinbôks on the Yaw and the Yendus on the Saw and Salin Rivers rivalled
the Siyins as slave-raiders. At the commencement of the winter of 1889
there were twenty-one captives in the possession of these tribes. They
had made twelve raids since December, 1888, in which five villagers had
been killed and sixteen carried off. Many had been wounded in resisting
or escaping, and large sums had been extracted as ransom.
It was decided, in making up the account against these savages, not to
go back behind December, 1888. In that month a notable raid had been
committed on Taunggyo in the Pauk township, in which thirty-two persons
were carried off and held to ransom at nine pounds sterling each, which
appears to have settled down as the sum beyond which the ability or
affection of the Burman would not go (see p. 318). After this crime
trade with the plains had been prohibited to the Chinbôks, so far as
lay in our power.
The difficulty in dealing with them lay in their want of cohesion
and the absence of any sort of tribal bond. With the Shans there
were the Sawbwas; with the Chins to the north there were the tribal
divisions, more or less marked, with chiefs who could speak, or at
any rate profess to speak, for their people. But with the people with
whom we were now to come in contact there was an absence of political
organization beyond the village, which was usually very small. It was
necessary to visit as many as possible of the villages concerned in
the raids, to receive the submission of each, and to impose fines for
misconduct; and as an obligatory condition to insist on the surrender
of captives, and the repayment of ransoms, not going back farther than
December, 1888. Substantial guarantees for the future were also to be
exacted.
It had been intended to make the dealings with these three tribes part
of the operations under General Symons's control, and to give to Mr.
Ross, under his orders, the immediate conduct of the negotiations.
When the full proportions of the task assigned to General Symons were
seen, it became plain that he could not undertake the Chinbôks; and
in consequence of Major Raikes's illness, Mr. Ross had to remain with
the Southern Column. Fortunately the Chin Frontier Levy had now been
raised, and had had a little time to fit itself for service. Their
posts at Kalemyo, Kan, and Gangaw were wanted by the regular troops
of the Southern Column. This freed the Levy opportunely, and gave the
Chief Commissioner a sufficient force for the expedition into the
Chinbok country. An admirable officer was at hand to conduct it, in
Lieutenant R. M. Rainey (now Colonel Rainey-Robinson), the Commandant
of the Levy. To him was entrusted the conduct of the business.
Lieutenant Rainey began, on the 16th of December, 1889, by dealing with
twenty-one Chinbok villages, consisting of two hundred and eighty-three
houses, situated on the Maw Chaung, the southernmost affluent of the
Myittha, on which Tilin, the headquarters of the Tilin township, is
situated. The claim against them was for cattle stolen. But cattle
thefts and slaves were mere questions of accounts. They set up and
proved a counterclaim for the price of slaves sold to the plaintiffs
before the British occupation. Lieutenant Rainey thought it best to
admit the counterclaim and let bygones be bygones, but to provide for
the future. He induced the twenty-one villages to appoint a chief as
their spokesman and agent in dealing with us, and to agree to pay a
small tribute in kind leviable from each village as an acknowledgment
of fealty to the British Government.
So far there had been no opposition. Lieutenant Rainey then moved
his headquarters from Tilin to Chaungu or Yawdwin, some twenty miles
south. This village is situated on an affluent of the Yaw River, and
made a good base for the next part of the business. The Chins in the
valley of the Yaw and its tributaries were raiders. They attempted to
harass the force, and Captain Willcocks (now Lieutenant-General Sir
James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.), the Intelligence Officer, who
was surveying and reconnoitring for a further move to the south, was
attacked. This compelled a resort to punitive measures, and several
offending villages were destroyed. A defensible advanced post was
established at Chaungzon, in the heart of their hills. These methods
brought the hostile Chins to reason. From this until the close of the
operations the work progressed, bloodless and unopposed. The villages
submitted, captives were delivered up, headmen were appointed, and
fines exacted from all villages which had raided since December, 1888.
Lieutenant Rainey then returned to Chaungu; and moving his base
still farther south to Laungshe, came into contact with the Yindus
and Chinbons. By the exercise of tact and patience he succeeded in
bringing these sections to submit to the British Government and to
release their captives. As before, headmen were appointed, the payment
of tribute was promised, and guarantees for good conduct given. The
work was thoroughly well done. General Symons, in his despatch on the
Chin-Lushai Campaign, wrote:--
"The Chinbok operations, though in no way under my direction or
command, but ably, even brilliantly, conducted by Lieutenant Rainey,
Commandant of the Chin Levy Military Police Battalion, have squared
well with our work and settled an adjoining belt of country beyond our
capability to touch."
Lieutenant Rainey was another of the young soldiers who aided the civil
administration in difficult times and showed their fitness for affairs.
The country which submitted to him was made a separate civil charge,
known as "The Pakokku Hill Tracts," the headquarters of which were for
some years at Yawdwin and are now at Kanpetlet on Mount Victoria.
It is noticeable that the Chinbôks and their confrères had been
excluded from trading and from all intercourse with the plains since
the beginning of 1889. On making their submission they begged that the
blockade might be raised. It was evidently a useful weapon. If it had
failed in the case of the Tashons and the more northern tribes, it was
because it had not been effective.
We had now made ourselves felt by most of the tribes. There remained
unvisited a stretch of hills separating the Minbu district of Upper
Burma from Arakan. The Chins dwelling in this tract preyed on the
peasantry in the neighbouring districts. During the preceding two
years sixteen villages had been raided in Minbu, twenty-one persons
killed and thirty-nine carried into slavery. Of these captives sixteen
had been ransomed by their friends at a very heavy price. In the
adjoining township of the Pakokku district there had been several
forays, and seventeen persons had been captured and carried off. It was
not possible at this time to find men for a comprehensive expedition
against these Chins. Civil officers from the three districts of Akyab,
Kyaukpyu, and Minbu were deputed, with small bodies of police, to meet
at a central point. They assembled the chiefs and village headmen. The
Chins were peaceful and submissive, but very few of the captives were
restored. These clans belonged to the Akyab district geographically,
and had not yet realized that their eastern borders had come under the
British Government and were no longer to afford a happy hunting-ground
for the pursuit of human game. They were found to be by no means
formidable, badly armed, and little inclined to fight.
The following year (1890-1) saw the beginning of the systematic control
of the Chin tribes. For administrative purposes they were roughly
divided into three parts. The northern tribes were governed from Fort
White, the central tribes from Haka, and the southern from Yawdwin.
Captain F. M. Rundall commanded the garrison at Fort White, and also
held charge of our relations with the Chins when Mr. Carey had to take
leave. Our knowledge of these people was at first far from accurate,
and the then recognized divisions of the tribes controlled from Port
White were roughly as follows:--[65]
1. The Siyins and Sagyilains who lived in five villages, of which
Koset, Sagyilain, and Tôklaing were the chief. The first Port White was
built on the site of Tôklaing, which was afterwards given back to them
when the fort was moved.
2. The Kanhows, inhabiting between thirty and forty villages north of
Fort White, of which Tunzan, on the left bank of the Manipur River, is
the capital.
3. The Mobingyis, as they were called from the Burmese name for their
chief village, Molbem, which lies on a spur overlooking the Manipur
River on the left bank, and was a very large village.
4. The Nwi-tes and other minor tribes akin to the Kukis of Manipur.
It is now known that the right name of the Mobingyis is Sok-te, a very
large tribe, of whom the Kanhows are only a powerful clan.
5. The Ngwite and Late, who occupy the hills between Mwelpi and Manipur.
6. The Haitsi Lope, who live on the eastern slope of the Letha Range
bordering the Kabaw Valley.
At the end of the last season's operations Mr. Carey had reported the
submission of the Siyins and the acceptance of our terms. At the same
time he had little trust in their good faith, and when Captain Rundall
succeeded him at Fort White their attitude was more or less hostile.
They continued to cut the telegraph wire and to give petty annoyance
to the troops. The capture of some of the wire cutters gave some help
to diplomacy. The Siyins submitted in order to get their brethren
released. They surrendered their captives and agreed to pay tribute and
keep the peace. The Kanhows proved more difficult. Captain Rundall took
advantage of a dispute about the succession to the leadership of the
tribe to open communication with one of the claimants.
But before anything came of it the Kanhows raided a Burman village,
killing eight persons and carrying off twelve. They were ordered to
restore all captives, to give up the heads taken in the raid, to pay a
fine of Rs. 4,000, to submit to the Government, and to bind themselves
to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 300. These terms were not complied
with. Captain Rundall, therefore, marched with three hundred rifles
and two guns against the village of Tungzang. The Chins fought, and
lost twelve men killed and twenty-one prisoners, including some of
their chief men. They had now tried conclusions and were satisfied.
Thirty-nine captives were surrendered and the fine and tribute paid
in full. Some of the chiefs were sent to Rangoon, and shown over some
large steamers, mills, and the like, and, it is said, were impressed
by the sight. However that may be, they have not given much trouble
since. Some useful road work was done during this year by the Madras
Pioneers. A road from Fort White to Falam, the Tashon mother-village,
was constructed. As the old site of Fort White still continued to be
very unhealthy, the garrison and headquarters of the civil officer were
moved back to a post hitherto known as No. 5 Stockade on the Letha
Range.
The Chins to be controlled from Haka were found to be divisible into
five tribes:--
1. The Tashons, a large tribe having their headquarters at Falam,
half-way between Haka and Fort White.
2. The Hakas, lying south of the Tashon country and round about Haka.
3. The Klanklangs, to the west of the Haka tribe and between them and
Fort Tregear, on the Chittagong side.
4. The Yokwas, who lie to the south and east of the Hakas; and lastly,