BHAMO AND MOGAUNG
When Upper Burma was annexed the first step towards the constitution of
a well-ordered province was to parcel out the country into districts of
such a size and with such boundaries that they could be conveniently
administered. The wise course was followed of preserving the old
native divisions, which had probably resulted from the teaching of
experience and the nature of the country and differences of race. For
few innovations vex a people more than changes in the boundaries of
the units of jurisdiction which touch their daily life. Hence it came
to pass that all the country between 23° 37' N. and the undefined line
dividing Upper Burma from China and Thibet, somewhere about 28° N.,
was constituted the charge of a single Deputy Commissioner, with the
China frontier as its eastern boundary, and as its western limit the
Hukawng Valley, the Upper Chindwin district, and further south the
Katha district. The headquarters of the Deputy Commissioner and of the
military garrison were placed at the town of Bhamo, from which the
district took its name.
The Irrawaddy cuts the district in two from north to south. The town
of Bhamo lies in a plain along the left bank of the river, midway
between two defiles, usually spoken of as the first and second defile,
through which the waters rushing down from the region of mountains in
the north have cut their way. The river is open all the year round, as
far as Bhamo to large river-steamers. But the first or northern defile
is always difficult, and when the river is in flood, impassable. Hence
Bhamo is the gate of Upper Burma, and the port for the trade which has
existed for centuries with Western Yunnan. In a very small way it is
the Peshawur of Burma, and for the purpose of raids and such like the
Kachin tribes play the part of the Pathans on the north-west frontier
of India. The greater part of the district is hilly and covered with
forest; and the Kachins, who form quite a third of the population, live
in the hills.
[Illustration: BHAMO MONGMIT ETC.]
It is said that trade follows the Flag. In this case the reverse is
true. The Irrawaddy Flotilla Company had prepared the way for us here.
Bhamo had been the northern terminus of their steamers since 1869,
and for some time the Government of India had kept a Resident there
to protect the trade. But no attempt had been made to navigate beyond
Bhamo.
In December, 1885, a force was sent up by river to occupy the town,
and an officer of the Burma Commission, Captain Cooke, accompanied it,
and began to establish a civil administration. No opposition was met
with. The population of the town was not in a position to resist us.
Mixed with the indigenous Burmans and Shans was a considerable colony
of Chinese traders--some of them Cantonese who had filtered up from the
coast, others hardy and adventurous men from Yunnan, engaged in the
jade and amber and rubber trades in the northern part of the district.
These foreigners, although they disliked exceedingly our interference
with the opium and liquor traffic, and even more our attempts in the
interests of the troops to improve their methods of sanitation, were
not actively hostile. The peasantry of a mixed Shan-Burman race, who
cultivated the level country round and below the town, were peacefully
inclined, though shy and timorous. But the Kachin tribes soon began
to show their teeth and to do their best to make things unpleasant.
The policy laid down from the first for the guidance of the local
officers in their dealings with the Kachins was one of patience and
conciliation. Perhaps too much stress was laid on this. In one case,
certainly, the Deputy Commissioner's anxiety to adhere to this policy
was carried to an extreme, and caused mischief.
It will be convenient to take the northern portion of the district
first--that part, namely, which begins from 24° 37' N. and goes right
up to the Chinese boundary. It now forms a separate charge, known
as the Myitkyina district, but at the time we are writing of, was
the Mogaung subdivision of the Bhamo district, and contained about
10,000 square miles of country, of which two-thirds were, and still
are, forest. The level and valley lands along the Irrawaddy and its
tributaries, mostly on the right bank, are fertile, yielding rice as
the main crop; but even now, after twenty years of peace, the area
cultivated is very small. It is given in the _Burma Gazetteer_ (vol.
ii., p. 123) as twenty-eight square miles. The area in the hills
tilled, after a primitive method, has not been estimated, but as there
are between twenty and thirty thousand Kachins who live on its produce,
it is probably larger.
Of the wide forest area, part is in the low hill ranges, part in the
plains. Twenty-five years ago, when there was not a road, the dense
undergrowth and bamboo jungle, and in the lower lands the wide seas
of elephant-grass, made the passage of men and transport animals most
difficult and laborious.
From a fiscal point of view Mogaung was supposed to be the most
important part of the Bhamo district. The collection of a royalty on
jade was farmed in the King's time for about Rs. 50,000, and there
was also an income from the rubber-trees, mostly wild, but to a small
extent cultivated.
In March, 1886, a force accompanied by Captain Cooke, the Deputy
Commissioner, made its way to Mogaung. The Deputy Commissioner reported
that the "country was then, for the most part, brought under control
and settled administration." This was a figurative and official way of
saying that a person of local influence, by name Maung Kala, had been
recognized and put in charge as a magistrate in the British service.
After a very brief visit the Deputy Commissioner with the troops went
back to Bhamo, and left Maung Kala to carry on the government as he
best could, without police and with no military support nearer than
Bhamo, which is at the least 150 miles from Mogaung, whether the
journey is made by water or land. Even a handful of troops, lightly
equipped, could not have been sent up in less than a fortnight. There
was no telegraph to Mogaung. Maung Kala belonged to a family of great
local influence, which had held office for several generations, and
was reputed to be of Chinese descent. But whatever his influence, he
was sure to make enemies in his endeavours to keep order and to collect
revenues, and there was no visible force behind him. His reign was
short, and he was soon assassinated.[41]
A Burman official was sent up from Bhamo by the Deputy Commissioner
to succeed the murdered man. He soon found that he was not wanted
at Mogaung and he retired to Sinbo, whence he could at least make a
show of controlling the river-side villages. Po Saw, the son of Maung
Kala, was then appointed by the people to his father's post, and
whatever order or show of government there was in the country was due
to him. Subsequently, in consequence of his having summarily executed
a pretender who had endeavoured to impose himself on the people, the
Deputy Commissioner recognised Po Saw's authority and withdrew the
Burman. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the British Government
had jurisdiction in Mogaung. No revenue was collected--at least, none
was paid into the Bhamo treasury. In this respect, however, Mogaung
was little worse than the southern portion of the district which was
administered by the Deputy Commissioner himself, supported by the
garrison at Bhamo. In September, 1886, Major Cooke reported: "This
district has, I believe, been one of the quietest districts in Upper
Burma. The tranquillity of the district is in a great measure due to
the fact that no real attempt was made to collect the revenue until
July or August." Even the tranquillity so purchased was, however, only
comparative, and the soldiers had quite enough to do. In the open
season of 1886-7 it was not found possible to give men for an effective
expedition to the north. Things had to be allowed to take their own
course for the time. The Administration had no choice.
Early in 1887, however, the military police began to arrive from
India, and in the spring of that year five companies, mainly Gurkhas,
under the command of Lieutenant O'Donnell, were posted to Bhamo. This
strengthened the hands of the civil administration. It was then too
late to start an expedition to Mogaung. But Lieutenant O'Donnell was
sent up to Sinbo, a village of some importance on the right bank of
the Irrawaddy, just above the first defile. Here a strong stockade was
built and a Gurkha garrison posted in it. An Assistant Commissioner
also, Mr. Twomey, was sent to watch the course of events in the north.
There were three routes by which Mogaung could be reached from Bhamo.
One was by going up the Irrawaddy and turning into the Mogaung River,
on which lies the town. This was quite possible for a very small force
which had not to carry all its supplies and transport. The object,
however, was not merely to reach Mogaung, but to go to the jade-mines
and explore the country. Since an explorer (Lieutenant Bayfield) made
his way to the mines in 1838, no European had visited them. Nothing
was accurately known of the nature of the country, of the supplies
it afforded, or of the numbers and temper of the Kachin tribes which
dominated it. All that could be gathered from the Chinese and others
showed that there would be much difficulty in all these matters. It was
suspected that the Chinese were disposed to magnify the difficulties.
Nevertheless it was necessary that the force should be prepared for all
emergencies, and should be in every respect self-sufficing. Hence the
river route was considered impracticable.
Another way was to land the force at Katha and march up through
Mohnyin. Our knowledge of the route between Mohnyin and Mogaung also
was imperfect. It was not under our control, and a force passing up
would have to take everything with it. The third route was by the
left bank of the Irrawaddy. It had this advantage, that although the
marching would be difficult, boats could follow the force up the river,
could meet it at fixed points, and could carry a large quantity of the
supplies, certainly as far as Sinbo and probably in the smaller craft
as far as Mogaung. After much consideration it was decided to send the
expedition by this route. A fortified post was to be established at
Mogaung, to be held by the military police, to serve as a base for the
advance of the force to the jade-mines and other parts.
Much care was given to the composition and equipment of the force[42]
by the General commanding in Upper Burma, Sir George White. It was
necessary that it should be prepared for all emergencies; that it
should carry with it supplies for the whole time of its absence from
Bhamo; that it should be able to move, as occasion required, either by
land or water, and be ready to make its own roads and bridges. It must
be strong enough to fight its own way and repel attacks; and at the
same time the numbers of the force were limited by the necessity of
carrying its own food and of keeping the transport train from becoming
too large.
The Chief Commissioner selected Major Adamson, the Deputy Commissioner
at Bhamo, to go with the force. To him was entrusted the task of
dealing with the Kachins and of establishing the authority of the
British Government. He had served for thirteen years in Lower Burma,
and was known as one of the best officers in the Commission. He fully
justified the confidence placed in him.
Some time before the expedition started, Major Adamson summoned Po Saw
from Mogaung to meet him at Sinbo. He came accompanied by many of the
chief Shan residents and Chinese merchants. He promised to obey the
Deputy Commissioner's orders. The Deputy Commissioner then formally
appointed him to be magistrate of Mogaung in his father's room and from
the date of his father's death, and paid him a large sum as arrears
of salary. He was then dismissed, with orders to clear the roads of
jungle and collect supplies for the troops. He was instructed also to
summon all the Kachin chiefs connected with the jade-mines to meet the
representatives of the British Government at Mogaung. All this Po Saw
readily promised to perform. Major Adamson went back to Bhamo well
pleased with his willingness to help and believing in the loyalty of
his intentions.
All preparations having been completed, the expedition marched from
Bhamo on the 27th, by the north gate of the town. It was for these
parts an unusually large and well-found force, and impressed the
townspeople who crowded to witness its departure. It consisted of
the following troops: Cheshire Regiment, 50 rifles, under Captain
Armstrong; Kelati-Ghilzai Regiment, 101 rifles, under Lieutenant
Morton; Mounted Infantry, 25 rifles; Bhamo Military Police (Gurkhas),
500 rifles, under Lieutenant O'Donnell;[43] Mountain Battery (Bengal),
2 guns, under Captain Triscott,[44] R.A. Captain Clements was in charge
of the commissariat.
The land transport consisted of 350 pack-mules with drivers and two
elephants, who were sent back after a few marches, as they proved to be
useless. A fleet of three steam launches and thirty-three large country
boats, with supplies, was sent up by river, with a force of sixty-six
Native Infantry, under a native officer, on the launches.
Captain Triscott, R.A., with Lieutenant Williams, R.A., as his staff
officer, was in command of the whole force.
A Roman Catholic missionary who spoke Shan and Kachin accompanied the
expedition as interpreter. A survey party to map the country, a forest
officer to report on the forests, and Mr. Warry, the Chinese adviser to
the Chief Commissioner, made the staff complete.
The march up the left bank of the Irrawaddy was difficult. There were
two considerable streams, the Taeping and the Molé, affluents of the
Irrawaddy, to be crossed in the first few marches. These rivers,
however, caused comparatively little delay. The track kept as near as
possible to the course of the Irrawaddy. Sometimes it crept along close
to the river-bank, across numerous spurs separated by small streams
flowing into the main river. The ascents and descents were very steep,
and to make them passable for laden animals much jungle-cutting and
road-making had to be done. Sometimes the gradients were so steep as to
necessitate the cutting of zigzag paths. At times the animals had to be
taken up the steep banks and into the forests in order to find a road.
On the 2nd of January the camping-ground was on a sandy spit by the
river-bank, at a village called Nanti. Here the steam-launches and
the thirty-three boats met the land columns. On the 4th the march lay
along the side of the first defile, where the river flows between
rocky banks. The laden animals found easier going here, as there was
no rank vegetation; but it was slow work, as paths had to be cut for
them on the steep sides of the beds of dry streams which had frequently
to be crossed. On the 4th, after leaving the defile behind, the force
debouched on sandy level ground close to the stream, and halted at the
village of Manhé, where the column had to cross the Irrawaddy. The
headman of Sinbo, with some fourscore men and half as many boats which
he had brought down by the Deputy Commissioner's orders, to help in
the work, was waiting. Next day was devoted to the crossing. At 7 a.m.
it began, and by half-past 3 p.m. the last man was landed on the right
bank.
The Irrawaddy at this place and at this time of the year is three
hundred yards wide, with a current of about two miles an hour. The
formation of the river-bed, the broad sloping banks of sand and gravel,
and at places the depth of water close to the side, made the work
simple enough, however laborious. The two launches could come alongside
the bank, and the artillery and infantry, with arms and ammunition,
were taken over in them. Then came the baggage animals, who were made
to swim the river in batches of four or five at a time. A canoe, with
one Burman boatman in the bow, was drawn up alongside the bank, with
the bow against the stream. Then four or five men, each leading an
animal, passed round to the stern of the boat and seated themselves in
the canoe holding the animals by their leading-ropes. As soon as they
were seated a second boatman took his stand in the stern. The bow was
shoved off and the canoe punted across the river by the two boatmen.
Thus the animals were swimming up-stream astern of the canoe, and were
not in danger of being forced by the current against it. Three hundred
and fifty animals swam the river in this manner, and not one was
drowned or hurt.
The column was now on the right bank of the Irrawaddy. The next march
brought them to Sinbo, where a garrison of military police was already
established in a stockade, near to which a large camping-ground had
been cleared for the troops. Supplies from Bhamo had been landed and
stored, and the commissariat staff was busied in arranging for their
transport to Mogaung. The fleet had also arrived before the column. The
launches being unable, owing to the shallowness of the river, to get up
beyond Sinbo, were sent back to Bhamo.
The next two marches, partly through forests partly across plains
cropped here and there with rice, brought the force to the bank of the
Mogaung stream. The water was deep and the current ran very strong.
The crossing of this little river gave more trouble than the passage
of the Irrawaddy. For Po Saw's promises proved false. He had made no
preparations and sent down neither men nor boats. However, three or
four boats were found at a village higher up the stream. Teak logs were
lying about. Rafts were made; and the guns and commissariat stores
taken over. There were not enough boats to tow the large number of
pack-animals across. Mules and ponies were driven into the water in
herds and forced to make their way to the other bank, which unluckily
was very steep with a muddy bottom. Nevertheless they all got over
except one, but many were very spent and were brought up the bank with
difficulty.
The road now lay on the left, or east, bank of the river, and entered
a country of which nothing was known. It was dominated by the Kachin
chief of the neighbouring hills, from whom the inhabitants had to
purchase protection--in plain English, immunity, to some small extent,
from murder and robbery. As they had been forced at the same time to
pay taxes to the Burmese officials, they had suffered much, and many
of the villages were deserted.
The failure of Po Saw to carry out Major Adamson's instructions gave
rise to some anxiety. Treachery was feared, and precautions were taken
against surprise. The road was now in parts very difficult, over steep
forest-covered hills running down close to the Mogaung River, and
intersected by many steep ravines. Progress was slow, as the way had
to be cleared of bamboo and other undergrowth before the pack-animals
could pass. In places on reaching the proposed halting-place it was
found to be a small, confined spot, and the ground had to be cleared
before the camp could be pitched. A party of Chinese Shans on their way
to Mogaung joined the camp at night, and were engaged to accompany the
force and help to clear the road, for which they were well paid.
After some sixteen miles of difficult ground, which was covered in two
marches, the column struck the river again near Tapaw. Here the headman
advised Major Adamson to cross to the right bank again, as the land
road to Mogaung was only five or six miles, whereas the river made
a detour of double that distance, first going north and then coming
back to the south-east. There were no boats to be had here. After some
consideration Captain Triscott and Major Adamson decided that it was
advisable to send to Mogaung and summon Po Saw. They had heard from a
Kachin Sawbwa whom they met on the road that the Chinaman who farmed
the jade-mine revenue had been murdered, and they were now told at
Tapaw that an Englishman had passed down-stream in urgent haste.
Here we must go back to Mr. Warry's movements. It has been said above
that Mr. Warry, the adviser on Chinese affairs, had been appointed to
go with the expedition. He belonged to the Chinese Consular Service,
spoke Chinese well, and understood that difficult people as well as
an Englishman can. He was on most friendly terms with the Chinese in
Burma, and could trust himself to them without fear. It appears that
instead of marching with Major Adamson, as it was intended, he had
gone by himself with some Chinamen by the river. When the expedition
arrived at Sinbo it was found that Warry had gone on in his boat,
meaning to travel up the Mogaung stream. His attempt to go ahead of the
expedition, if that had been his purpose, was foiled by the refusal of
his Chinamen to attempt the ascent of the Mogaung until they had learnt
that the column had preceded them.
Hence on the 12th of January he was in his boat on the Mogaung, some
seven or eight miles in rear of the marching column, when he met Mr.
Rimmer, a commander in the Irrawaddy flotilla's service, coming down
the stream as fast as his men could paddle. Rimmer had in his boat
a Chinaman very badly wounded in the head. It was Lon Pein, who had
been at one time the farmer of the jade-mine taxes under the King's
Government. Rimmer's story was that he had pushed on to the town of
Mogaung alone, for the purpose of examining the waterway. He reached
the town on the 19th of January, and having accomplished his object was
about to return at once when Lon Pein came to him and told him that
he feared an attack by Po Saw's men, who sought his life. He implored
Rimmer to stay and help to defend him until the troops should arrive.
The people of the town appeared to be friendly enough. But believing
that Lon Pein's life was in danger, he chivalrously agreed to stay. He
took up his quarters in the Chinaman's house, and they made ready in
such manner as they could to resist an attack. Rimmer was armed with a
rifle, and Lon Pein, it may be presumed, had fire-arms of some sort.
They had not long to wait.
At midnight of the 10th a body of ruffians besieged the house with
more vigour even than the police led by the Home Secretary against the
house in Sidney Street. The house was of the kind usual in the country,
raised on piles with a floor none too closely fitted. The assailants
got underneath and fired through the floor, and thrust spears wherever
they could find an opening. Early in the fight Lon Pein fell wounded in
the head, and never recovered consciousness. Rimmer's rifle was shot in
two, and his knee was grazed by a ball. However, he continued to hold
out until dawn, when the assailants made off. Next day he managed to
find his boat and, with the assistance of some town's-people, to carry
Lon Pein to it. The inhabitants expressed their sympathy and regret,
but did not explain their failure to help him. Po Saw, it appeared, had
left Mogaung the day before, but Rimmer believed that Lon Pein had good
cause for holding him responsible for the attack.
[Illustration: KACHIN WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF THE UPPER IRRAWADDY.]
Warry persuaded Rimmer to return with him to the protection of the
troops, and they joined the column on the 13th, before it left Tapaw,
and entered Mogaung with it on the 14th of January. Evidently there was
mischief on foot. The leaders of the expedition, on hearing the story,
decided that before advancing further it would be wise to make Po Saw
show his hand. The difficulty was to get a trustworthy man to carry a
message to Mogaung. There was a Mussulman, a native of India, who had
come up as an interpreter, with the force, Safdar Ali by name. He might
have been a descendant of Sinbad the Sailor, for he had led a life of
travel and adventure. He had traded in jade, and was familiar with many
parts of the country. He spoke Burmese, Shan, and Kachin, in addition
to his native Hindustani, and he had taken wives of the daughters of
Heth in most of the bigger places. In consequence, or in spite, of
these alliances he was on good terms with the people about, and could
obtain intelligence of local affairs. Safdar Ali volunteered to take a
letter to Po Saw, and with a native to show him the shortest road, he
departed.
Meanwhile Captain Triscott and Major Adamson, with some Mounted
Infantry, had gone out to examine the track, and found that for four
or five miles it crossed a rice plain cut up by numerous muddy ditches
which the baggage animals could not get over. Beyond this rice-ground
rose some hills, at the foot of which was a morass, which the column
would find very difficult to pass. They turned back to the camp,
therefore, to collect labour to make the road passable. Safdar Ali, on
his way back from Mogaung, overtook them, and reported that Po Saw had
disappeared after the Chinaman's murder, and had gone, it was said, to
raise the Kachins nearest to Mogaung. This was not cheering news, as Po
Saw's influence with the Kachins had been relied upon as the means of
establishing peaceable relations with them.
However, the other officials of the town had been helpful; boats had
been sent down to Tapaw, and before the day ended, the _nakan_, or
deputy magistrate, attended by the Kyaung Tagas and Payatagas (builders
of monasteries and pagodas), arrived to pay their respects. They were
reprimanded by Major Adamson for their neglect, and were directed
to take steps at once to make the road passable. The poor men were
evidently in fear and trembling, dreading the vengeance of Po Saw on
the one hand and the wrath of the British Government on the other.
However, the march next day was made without great difficulty: the
ditches were filled up or bridged. The swamp proved a greater obstacle.
Luckily there was an abundance of elephant-grass hard by. This was cut,
and being spread thickly on the surface of the swamp, made a passable
road.
After climbing the hill, the pagodas and monasteries of Mogaung became
visible; and when the level ground round the town was reached, a number
of the chief people were seen, who had come out to meet the British
force and make their submission. On reaching the gates a conference was
held with these, while the town was reconnoitred by the soldiers for a
suitable camping-place.
The burgesses were evidently suffering from great fears. They dreaded
the Kachins, to raise whom was the design of Po Saw. Under these
circumstances it comforted them to learn that the British had come to
stay, and that their town would not be left again without an English
officer and a sufficient garrison. Major Adamson then proclaimed the
offer of a reward of 1,000 rupees for the discovery and arrest of the
murderer of Lon Pein, the Chinaman. He told them to have no fear of
the British soldiers, and assured them that if the Myo-ôk Po Saw would
return to his duty even now, he would be forgiven and restored to
office. By this time, a good site having been found on a sand-bank at
the upper end of the town, the whole column marched through the main
street, that all might see its strength, and established the camp there.
Mogaung[45] was once the capital of a considerable Shan principality.
In 1888 it could count only about three hundred houses. Standing on the
bank at the confluence of two streams, it is washed by water on two
sides. On the other two sides it was defended by a teak palisade in bad
repair. The town is well planned, being, like Rangoon and Mandalay,
laid out in squares, with brick-paved roads at right angles to each
other, one main road, likewise paved, running through the middle.
Many pagodas, substantial structures of brick, and large and handsome
monasteries of teak, ornament the inside of the town and also the
spaces outside the walls. A Buddhist bishop, with jurisdiction over the
whole of the north part of the Bhamo district, had his seat at Mogaung
in 1887-8.
In the centre of the town were some very good houses belonging to the
wealthier residents, and at the upper end the Chinese--who formed, as
they do now, a large and important class of the inhabitants--had their
quarters and their temple. Most of the trade in jade and rubber was
in their hands, and their houses were as uncleanly here as in other
towns of Burma. One of their chief employments was the manufacture
of arrack, which they sold to the town's-people. The shops in their
quarter reeked of it. Whatever the Indian Temperance Society may think,
we cannot be accused of introducing alcohol or the vice of drunkenness
into these regions. Orders were at once issued against selling liquor
to the British soldiers. These orders were treated with indifference
until a Chinaman was caught in the act. He was promptly flogged, and
there were no more cases of the kind. Another race found at Mogaung was
the cross-breeds between Chinese and Shans. "We noticed," says Major
Adamson (short account, p. 27), "very many Chinese Shans.... They are
strange, wild-looking people, as a rule rather short in size, but often
strong and wiry. They are invariably dressed in a blue cotton jacket
and loose blue Chinese trousers, and they wear their hair in a sort
of long tail behind, more or less after the fashion of Chinese. They
are each armed with a long sword, and as a rule each carries a bag, in
which he keeps his eating utensils, food, and blanket."
In the river in front of Mogaung is an island, where the boats which
bring jade and rubber from the north, and all sorts of miscellaneous
merchandise from Bhamo, were moored. A small bamboo bridge gave
connection with the mainland. "The island is looked upon as a place
of safety in the event of the Kachins attacking the town. Many of the
villagers keep their valuables in boats for protection, and some women
and children go nightly to sleep in the boats, where they consider they
are safer than in their houses (_ibid._, p. 28)."
It was Major Adamson's duty to get into touch with the people, and
procure the necessary intelligence concerning local politics and
conditions. There was a man of influence in the town called Shwè Gya,
who had been appointed by Major Cooke to be the _nakan_, or deputy,
when Maung Kala was recognized as Myo-ôk. He could not get on with Po
Saw when that person succeeded to power, and retired into private life.
Shwè Gya was a man of some note and of strong individuality. He was a
cross-breed between a Kachin father and an Assamese mother. But he had
adopted the dress, habits, and religion of the Burmese Shans. He had
been a soldier at one time, and understood Kachin tactics well. Being
able to appreciate the power of the English, he threw in his lot with
them. This man Major Adamson took into his confidence, and found him
most useful and most loyal.
It was necessary for Adamson to be open to all comers and at all
times. As this was not possible within the camp, he moved his quarters
to a rest-house in the town, taking a small British guard for his
protection. On Sunday, the 15th, his mind was relieved by learning that
Po Saw had returned. A Durbar was arranged, to which all the notables
were summoned. The officers of the force being present, Major Adamson
received Po Saw formally, and after explaining the objects of the
expedition and the general policy of the British Government, namely
the establishment of peace and the encouragement of trade, he censured
the Myo-ôk for his conduct, and called on him to explain it. Po Saw
alleged that fear of being called to account for Lon Pein's murder had
been the reason of his flight. Major Adamson accepted the excuse, and
restored him to office. At the same time he assured the people that no
one should be prosecuted for offences against the British Government
committed before the arrival of the expedition, except those who had
been parties to the murder of the Chinaman.
O'Donnell and his police, who had fallen behind the column owing to
the boats with their supplies having been delayed, had now arrived,
and the work of building a fort for their occupation was begun. A site
was chosen on a piece of ground in the middle of the town, bounded on
one side by the river, of which the banks were very steep and formed a
natural defence, leaving the other sides to be protected by palisades.
The mornings now were very cold and foggy, the thermometer falling to
45° or 50°. About nine o'clock the fog cleared off, and the climate
was delightful. The soldiers were naturally eager to move. They
were eating up their stores, and if the Kachins meant mischief the
less time they had to prepare it, the better. A council of war was
held. Major Adamson wished to wait until the Kachins had had time to
arrive. His instructions were to avoid hostilities with the Kachin
chiefs if possible. Po Saw had not summoned them to meet him as he
had been ordered; the letters from the British Representative were
only now reaching them. The Chinese, through Mr. Warry, also strongly
urged delay. Moreover, nothing was yet known about the road to the
jade-mines; and as it was found that, contrary to expectation, paddy
for the transport animals could be procured from the villages in the
neighbourhood, the arguments against delay lost some of their force.
The council decided, after discussion, to halt for ten days.
During the next few days the chief work was the collection of materials
for the fort and its construction, which was rapidly pushed on by
Captain O'Donnell. Houses were also put in hand for the officers who
were to remain in Mogaung, namely the Commandant of military police,
the Assistant Commissioner, and a surgeon. Surveys were made of
the neighbouring country, information about the roads and villages
collected, and in short every preparation made for the advance.
On the 22nd of January, Shwè Gya reported to Major Adamson that
the Myo-ôk Po Saw had disappeared once more. His conduct since his
reinstatement had not been good. It was decided to capture him if
possible, and keep him a prisoner. He was reported to be in a village
about five miles away. Taking fifty men and some mounted police, under
the command of Captain Armstrong, of the Cheshire Regiment, Adamson
descended on the village, surrounded it, and searched every house.
There was no trace of Po Saw; but a man known to be in his service, and
another who was recognized to be Bo Ti, his right-hand man, were made
prisoners.
The final disappearance of Po Saw upset Major Adamson's plans. It was
idle to expect that the influential Kachin chiefs would now come in. It
was necessary to appoint a man to carry on the duties of the Myo-ôk.
Shwè Gya was the best man, but he was not a Shan and the people would
not have accepted him. With the consent of the townsfolk another member
of Maung Kala's family was chosen and placed in authority, with Shwè
Gya as the deputy and real working man. All this was done in public,
and explained to the people. At this time some letters of a friendly
tone came in, with presents from some Kachin chiefs whose hills were on
the road to the jade-mines.
The time had come now for an advance. The fort was ready for
occupation, and was defended by a substantial bamboo palisade, Captain
O'Donnell, with all his police except a detachment of seventy-five, who
formed part of the expeditionary force, were left to garrison it. Mr.
Twomey, Assistant Commissioner, was placed in administrative charge,
and orders were left for the despatch of Bo Ti and the other prisoner
to Bhamo. On the 26th of January the march began. The troops forming
the column under Captain Triscott's command were:--
Khelati Ghilzai Regiment 100 rifles
Gurkha Military Police 75 "
Cheshire Regiment 50 "
Bengal Mountain Battery 2 guns.
[Illustration: YAWGIN WITH CROSSBOW.
(Mountains north of Myit Kyina.)]
[Illustration: KACHIN WOMEN.
(Northern Irrawaddy.)]
A field-hospital, under Surgeon-Major Barron, and a train of transport
animals with provisions and commissariat stores for seven days,
completed his equipment. Mr. Warry, a survey party, a forest officer,
the Roman Catholic priest who acted as interpreter, Safdar Ali, and
the new Myo-ôk, Poh Myah, with Shwè Gya, the deputy, and some armed
followers, accompanied Major Adamson. Supplies were forwarded up by
river to Kamaing, the first principal halting-place, thirty-three miles
from Mogaung.
Before the force left a reconnoitring party had been sent up to
Kamaing, and had reported the road to be very difficult. The report
was not found to be exaggerated. Marching through elephant-grass
and thick forest, which hid everything except the immediate
neighbourhood, a hardly visible path, obstructed often by huge
fallen trees; camping-grounds which had to be laboriously cleared of
elephant-grass[46] and undergrowth, before standing-room could be found
for the animals or resting-place for the men, with sometimes heavy rain
which drenched every one, made the march anything but pleasant. All
hardships, however, were born with cheerfulness; and as the country was
new and unexplored, and there was a chance of a fight at any time, the
men were full of spirit. They and their officers were true soldiers.
On the 30th the stream on the opposite bank of which lay Kamaing was
reached. It ran deep, and the banks were precipitous. Fortunately, it
was only about the width of a cricket pitch. Trees were felled and
elephant-grass cut, and with the aid of a big trunk found sticking
up in the bed of the river, a bridge was made, over which the whole
force, laden animals and all, safely crossed. "Kamaing," writes Major
Adamson, "is splendidly situated on a small hill, close to the river,
at the point where its two main branches unite, the larger branch, the
Nampoung, coming from the Indawgyi Lake in the south-west" (ibid., p.
40). It had been a flourishing town, as the still remaining monasteries
and pagodas proved. These religious buildings were, however, deserted,
the last monk having died a year before. Of the whole town only a few
houses remained. The place had shared the fate of all this country in
the Kachin rebellion of 1883. There were still a few shops, however,
where Manchester goods could be bought, and articles of food for daily
use were to be had. Country spirits and opium were also on sale.
Here letters came in from the two brothers who ruled the hills in
which the jade-mines are situated. They were called Kansi Naung and
Kansi Hla. Their tone was friendly, though they wrote with the hope of
preventing the advance of our people from Mogaung. Answers were sent
by mounted messengers, saying that the force was already at Kamaing
and would continue its march next day, and assuring the Sawbwas of our
peaceable intentions.
Starting from Kamaing on the 31st of January, the bank of the Indaw
River was reached after some of the most difficult marches made during
the expedition. The path was passable for men but not for a long line
of laden animals. It was very swampy, with tall elephant-grass on each
side, which had been set on fire to make the track passable. The men
had to force their way through the charred stalks, and as there was
a heavy fog at the time "the faces and clothes of the whole column
were speedily as black as if they had been down a coal-mine." (Short
account, p. 36.) For some distance every yard of the road had to be
made by cutting down the tall, coarse grass and spreading it on the
surface of the swamp until it would bear the weight of the animals. So
they made their way, always through the tall grass, until the Indaw
River was struck. Here it was decided to form a defensible camp, in
which all superfluous animals, stores, and tents should be left,
with a sufficient garrison to guard them, while the main body pushed
on to the jade-mines. After their experience of the country, it was
held to be dangerous to move with the whole train if there was any
likelihood of fighting. Two days were occupied in preparing this camp,
in getting some portion of the road cleared in advance, and in holding
communication with a neighbouring Kachin Sawbwa.
On the 3rd of February the reduced column, in light fighting order,
left Kamaing with seven days' provisions, loaded on some hundred
and twenty-five mules. Each man carried two days' rations besides.
Everything that could be done without, including tents, was left in the
camp. It was as well, for the road continued difficult, and every bit
of ground at the halting-places for the night had to be cleared. The
march was sometimes in the bed of a stream sometimes through dense cane
jungle growing in swamp. Hard work in deep mud, from which all sorts of
noxious vapours rose, caused the men to sweat profusely, and exhausted
the animals. Fortunately, through the medium of Shwè Gya, Major Adamson
persuaded some of the Kachin villagers to approach him, and their
services were hired for road clearing.
[Illustration: BHAMO BATTALION DRAWN UP FOR INSPECTION.] [Blank Page]
[Illustration: CHIN HILLS ETC.]
On the 6th messengers from the jade-mine Sawbwas, Kansi Naung and
Kansi Hla, were met, carrying letters for the Deputy Commissioner. The
letters were quite friendly in tone, and invited the British force to
halt on the bank of the Uyu River, where there were grass and water in
plenty. Major Adamson was much relieved to get this communication, as
it seemed to give promise of a peaceable visit to the mines.
The road ascended now through forest and thick bamboo undergrowth, and
was very fatiguing. For the first time men were met carrying down loads
of jade stone. The watershed between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy
was crossed, and the road then descended into an open plateau, out of
the dense and dismal forest through which our march of seven miles had
been. From 7 a.m. till 2 p.m. we had been steadily marching, but we had
only been able to accomplish seven miles. Heavy rain fell that night
and turned the camping-ground into a bog, and made the road for next
day (February 6th) very heavy. The mud and water reached to the bellies
of the mules, and in places the column was forced to leave the path and
cut a new way through the forest. The Namthein, an affluent of the Uyu,
had to be crossed several times, the water being up to a man's knee and
the bed of the stream 50 yards broad.
At midday the weary force encamped on a tongue of land at the junction
of the Namthein and Uyu Rivers. The camp was on a lovely spot. It faced
southwards, and commanded a view of the junction of the two streams. On
the right was the Uyu, a beautiful stream of from 75 to 100 yards from
bank to bank, "as clear as crystal, and alive with fish, which kept
rising to the surface in the evening, like trout in an English stream.
The bed was generally rocky, full of large water-worn boulders; but
for a short distance above our camp there was a very deep pool under
the opposite bank, while the shore on our side was sandy and gravelly,
and sloped very gradually towards the deep part.... The spot which we
selected for a camp was a beautiful triangular piece of ground, covered
with short grass and a few bushes on the northern portion, and with
a long tongue of shingle and sand stretching southwards to the place
where the streams met."
In this pleasant place came a further letter to the leaders of the
expedition from Kansi Naung, saying that he had given orders that the
English should be treated well, and promising to come himself with
presents.
Next day, however, brought only disappointment. A letter came from
Kansi Naung saying that illness prevented him from keeping his promise.
Other signs indicated that all was not right, and Shwè Gya, who had
been hopeful hitherto, lost heart. The military leaders were for good
reasons in favour of immediate action. Major Adamson, however, took
the responsibility of giving Kansi Naung more time, and wrote to him
peremptorily, saying that they could not wait, and that he must come
in. On the 8th of February news came that Kansi Naung was at a village
on the opposite side of the river, not a mile off. Shwè Gya was asked
to go across to see him. But he declined, saying that he knew Kachins
were on his track to murder him.[47] From two men who came across from
the Sawbwa's camp, one of whom Major Adamson had met in Mogaung, it was
learnt that emissaries from Po Saw had arrived, and were urging the
Kachin chief not to visit the British.
The right course was now clear. Adamson told the men publicly to go
back to Kansi Naung and tell him that if he did not appear before ten
o'clock next day the column would advance to the jade-mines by force if
necessary. Later in the day the polyglot and polygamous interpreter,
Safdar Ali, volunteered to go to the Kachin camp to see if he could
influence the Kachins, or at any rate find out what was in their minds.
His offer was accepted. At the same time all was made ready for a
fight. Next day (February 9th) Safdar Ali returned with a message from
Kansi Naung that the Sawbwa would come, but that ten o'clock was too
early for him.
Captain Triscott fixed the advancing or attacking force at one hundred
rifles and one gun; the rest were not more than sufficient to defend
the camp. The numbers of possible enemies might be large, and if the
advance was opposed the camp also would probably be assailed. By nine
o'clock the men had fallen in and were waiting for the order to march,
when a large party appeared on the opposite side of the river. The
leading man carried a fine pair of elephant tusks. It was evidently a
friendly visit, and proved to be Kansi Naung with twelve other chiefs.
The troops drawn up for a hostile advance were at once turned into
a guard of honour. The military and civil leaders sat in chairs in
front of the hut in which they had sheltered, and the Kachin Sawbwas
on their arrival were seated on the ground in front of them. The tusks
were presented and all the chiefs made their submission. Major Adamson
assured them, Shwè Gya interpreting, that the British Government would
respect their rights in the mines. They were warned against listening
to Po Saw, who had been dismissed from the British service. Presents
were given to each of them, and they were dismissed.
On their departure the troops immediately fell in and started for the
jade-mines, which were reached after an uneventful march on a rough
forest path, which rose to an altitude of fifteen hundred feet. There
was not much to see. "A collection of about fifty houses and what
appeared to be a large quarry, while all over the place were blocks of
white stone of all sizes, some of which were tinged or streaked with
green." The main object of the expedition, to obtain the submission of
the Kachin chiefs and assert the authority of the Government and its
right to the revenue from the mines, had been attained. As no water was
to be had, and there were no rations for the men, the force, after a
short rest, marched back to camp. Everything had gone well during their
absence from the camp. But disquieting letters had come from Mogaung,
telling of a Kachin assault on the stockade.
It remained now to explore the Indaw country. Taking only a small party
from the camp, Adamson went in boats up the Indaw River to the lake, a
very fine piece of water, about sixteen miles long from north to south
by six broad. He found the country round it to be naturally fertile
and bearing marks of much former prosperity. But it had been the scene
of the Kachin rebellion of 1883, which had its rising here, and here
also the rebels had made their last stand. It had been devastated with
all the ruthlessness of an Asiatic conqueror. It bore the marks of
recent prosperity and a thick population. Good roads still united the
ruined villages; nearly every little stream was crossed by solid teak
bridges; sites of old villages still showed gardens of mango, jack,
tamarind, and other fruit trees growing amongst monasteries and pagodas
all absolutely deserted, amidst great stretches of splendid rice plains
showing signs of recent cultivation. Yet only one small patch of land,
about ten acres under tillage, and only in a few places some poor huts
which, surrounded by double and treble stockades, showed the conditions
under which the few surviving peasants lived.
It was hoped that with unlimited rice plains, a magnificent lake
swarming with fish, a Government that would enforce peace, with open
water communications and in the near future a railroad, this beautiful
country would recover prosperity. All that can be said after a
generation has passed is that "it is only beginning to recover from the
devastation caused by the Kachin rising of 1883" (_Burma Gazetteer_,
vol ii., p. 120, edit. 1908). So much easier is it to destroy than to
restore.
The Indawgyi country being now explored, the party rejoined the main
body at the Sakaw camp, and the force set out on its return march to
Mogaung. They had left Mogaung on the 27th of January, and had marched
for four weeks through jungles and marshes most favourable to a savage
enemy skilled in ambuscade. Yet not a shot had been fired. Po Saw,
however, had been busy with the Kachins. Mogaung had been attacked on
the 3rd of February, and the report of this had reached Major Adamson.
They were prepared, therefore, for hostilities, and before they reached
Mogaung, on the 24th of February, they were attacked and lost several
men.
The state of affairs at Mogaung was not very reassuring. The people
were in much alarm. Women and children were sleeping in the boats. The
road was unsafe, and communication with the Irrawaddy was interrupted.
The last boats, four in number, which left the town with the mails
and some prisoners under a guard, had been fired on by Kachins; and
a boatman and one of the Gurkha police were hit. No Chinese boat had
ventured up the river for three weeks. The resident Chinese were
putting their temple in order of defence, and every one expected that
there would be fighting.
The expeditionary force had, however, to return to Bhamo. They had
accomplished the work for which they had been detached. Major Adamson
also was obliged to resume the charge of his district, which had been
left more or less during his absence to a subordinate officer.[48]
Mogaung, the town and the subdivision, were placed in the hands of Mr.
Twomey, the Assistant Commissioner, supported by Captain O'Donnell and
the military police, who were quite able to defend the stockade and the
town, but were not strong enough to keep the country around in order,
if the Kachins came down.
The arrangement was that Captain Triscott should march back by the land
route through Mohnyin to Katha and open up the country which had not
been explored. It had been intended originally to send a small force
up from Katha to meet him. This proved impracticable, but a party of
military police had occupied Mohnyin. Accordingly the expeditionary
force marched back by this route. They were opposed several times by
bodies of Kachins, who had fortified themselves in positions across the
road. These enemies, however, were easily dislodged by the guns, and a
junction with the military police was effected at Mohnyin. The rest of
the return march was made without incident.
It was hardly to be expected in any case that Major Adamson's
expedition should result in the immediate establishment of peace in
the Mogaung country and in placing our relations with the Kachins on
a friendly footing. To secure the submission of a wild people divided
into as many tribes as there are hills in their country, and to bring
them under a civilized system of government, is not the work of a few
weeks. But it was hoped that more than a beginning had been made, and
that time and the residence of British officers at Mogaung would do the
rest.
Some untoward events had occurred to render this hope vain. The conduct
of Po Saw in leaving Mogaung and taking refuge with the Kachins was the
main cause of the difficulties which began to be felt early in 1888.
If Major Adamson had been successful in capturing Po Saw when he made
Bo Ti a prisoner, and if Bo Ti had been securely detained, much of
the trouble which followed during the subsequent years 1888 and 1889,
and even later, would have been avoided. Unfortunately the advantage
accruing from Bo Ti's capture was soon to be lost. He was sent down to
Bhamo and confined in the jail there. The jail, like other buildings
in Upper Burma, was made of wood. It had a stout teak palisade round
it, secure enough if the guard had been trustworthy. It happened that
just at that time an attempt had been made to assassinate the Colonel
commanding in Bhamo. While he was dressing for mess his body-servant
crept up behind him as he stood at the glass and stabbed him in the
back. The servant, a native of India, was arrested at once and locked
up, pending trial, in the same jail with Bo Ti. These two conspired to
escape. They scooped away the ground from the base of some of the big
teak posts which formed the palisade and contrived to loosen them. The
guard being either asleep or in collusion with them, they got away.
Bo Ti soon made his escape felt by our people at Mogaung. He joined
Po Saw somewhere in the Kachin Hills, probably at Thama, and helped
to raise the tribes. The influence of both these men over the Kachins
was very great. In Po Saw's case it was probably more hereditary than
personal. He was descended from the former ruling family, and with the
Kachins as well as with the Burmans a drop of royal blood counts for
much. Personally Po Saw seems to have been a treacherous and cowardly
character. Bo Ti, on the contrary, was a bold leader and had some
military capacity. The two together were powerful for mischief; and it
would have saved much hard work to our men and many lives if they had
been shot in the beginning. However, there they were, and they had to
be reckoned with. The assault on Mogaung and the attack on the column
returning from the jade-mines (_vide_ p. 256) were, in fact, the work
of Po Saw.
For a short time after Major Adamson left with the expeditionary force
there were no disturbances. But signs and rumours of Po Saw's activity
were frequent. The attempts to stop the column on its way from Mogaung
to Mohnyin were organized or instigated by him. In the latter half of
April the rumours began to take shape, and the Kachins were said to be
on the warpath. In the third week of April the headman of a group of
villages in the rice plain south of Mogaung reported to the Assistant
Commissioner that Bo Ti and three chiefs of the Ithi Kachin tribe had
ordered him to join a party which they were organizing for an assault
on Mogaung. If he refused, they threatened to destroy the village
of Taungbaw in which he lived. They required him to meet them at a
given place to settle details. At this time Mr. Twomey, owing to an
accidental wound, had taken leave, and Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, a young
soldier who had been appointed to the Commission, held his place. The
headman proposed that a strong party should be sent from Mogaung to
ambush Bo Ti and his friends when they came to the trysting-place. This
proposal seemed to Lieutenant Eliott to be treacherous dealing which
a British officer ought not to countenance, and he refused to join
in it; a piece of high-minded chivalry somewhat misplaced under the
circumstances. The headman having been advised by Lieutenant Eliott not
to keep the appointment with Bo Ti lest treachery should be intended,
left the fort.
Early next morning he ran in to report that before dawn Bo Ti, with
some hundreds of men, had come to Taungbaw and were stockading
themselves in the village. Taungbaw is four or five miles from Mogaung.
Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, taking the mounted men
and a company of Gurkhas, started at once for the scene of action,
ordering reinforcements to follow. They met fugitives who confirmed
the headman's report, and said that Bo Ti was in strong force and was
fortifying his position. Taungbaw is on a small hill rising abruptly
from the plain, detached and about 400 yards distant from the main
ridge, and about the same distance from a village called Zédi, which
was occupied by friendlies, Burmese and Shan peasants, from the plain.
Bo Ti had been too busy in strengthening his position to pay attention
to the movements of these people.
When O'Donnell and his men were about six thousand paces from the hill,
a signal shot was fired by the enemy's outpost. Advancing to within 400
yards, our men delivered several volleys. Each volley was answered by
a Kachin cheer. Evidently they meant to make a stand. At this moment
the reinforcements from Mogaung came up and it was decided to attack
the Kachin position. The hill was steep and covered with thick bamboo
jungle, very difficult to get through. The enemy could not be seen.
Dividing his men into three parties, O'Donnell sent the mounted men
round the left flank to form up in rear of the hills. Part of his
infantry were sent round the right flank and told to get well under the
hill. The remainder, led by the two British officers, then worked round
the right flank, which seemed to offer the best openings for an ascent.
As they crossed a narrow causeway in a paddy-field and a small bridge
they drew the Kachin fire.
On coming into touch with the first party it was told to go farther
on round the hill. The order was then given to advance with fixed
bayonets. The bamboo jungle prevented the men from getting on fast. A
heavy fire was kept up by the Kachins, but owing to the steepness of
the ascent the bullets flew high and there were no casualties. Beyond
the bamboo jungle was the village stockade, which was within 30 yards
of Bo Ti's position. But when the Kachins saw the Gurkhas forcing their
way through this stockade, they did not wait for the bayonet, but after
firing a few shots bolted down the hill, our men chasing them.
At the bottom the mounted men took up the running, and it was a case
of every man for himself, Unfortunately when the firing began some of
the Mounted Infantry ponies were scared and broke away. Owing to this
mischance the pursuit was less effective than it should have been.
Even so the affair was well managed and gave a lesson to the Kachins,
who left eighteen dead near the village and on the line of flight,
and several prisoners were also taken. The friendly villagers lay low
during the fight. When it was all over they came to the front and began
mutilating the dead in a barbarous fashion, and were driven off with
difficulty and not without force.
Some anxiety was felt by Captain O'Donnell and Mr. Eliott lest Po Saw,
learning that the greater part of the garrison had gone out, should
attack the Mogaung stockade. Only sixty-six men, some of them sick, had
been left in the fort--enough, perhaps, to hold it, but not to defend
the town. Fortunately no attempt was made by Po Saw. At the time of
the fight he was on his way to the jade-mines. He had attempted, as it
was learnt afterwards, to come to Bo Ti's assistance, but he could not
reach the scene of the fight in time.
The next month showed constant activity on the part of Po Saw and Bo Ti
and their Kachin allies. Frequent attacks were made on boats going down
or up the Mogaung River. It became necessary to send them in convoys
with police guards. Villages near Mogaung were raided, and early in May
Nanpapa, near Sinbo, was attacked, many villagers killed or carried
away, and the village destroyed. Po Saw himself took up a position
at Kamaing, where he could harass the traders on the route to the
jade-mines and Indawgyi, and from which he could also threaten Mogaung.
It was not possible for Captain O'Donnell to drive him away or to act
on the offensive at any distance from the fort. Hence the enemy became
more daring.
On the 21st of May, under cover of night, a large body of Shans,
under Bo Ti, got into the town and took up positions within the low
brick-wall enclosures of the pagodas, which, as has been described,
were scattered about in and outside the town. The garrison, under
Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, turned out against them. A
really good fight followed, in which the enemy lost forty-nine men
killed and many wounded, and were driven in confusion out of the town.
They were nearly all Shans, some of whom had come from the Uyu country
beyond the jade-mines. The garrison lost twenty-three men killed and
wounded. The Gurkhas were gallantly led, and behaved grandly, and on
that day the Mogaung Levy won a name for itself.
The situation at Mogaung caused some anxiety. The garrison was too
weak. Its strength was now only two hundred and ninety-two men, many
of whom were sick, not enough to allow a force to leave the post for
a day. Two hundred men were ordered up from Bhamo, and with that
addition the garrison would be able to hold their own, but it would not
suffice to enable them to punish the Kachins. Bo Ti was occupying a
place called Nyaungbintha, in the midst of the Ithi tribe of Kachins,
by whom he was strongly backed. At Kamaing on the north was Po Saw,
supported by the Thama Sawbwa of the Lepei tribe, who appeared to be
most hostile. There could be no permanent peace until the strength of
these tribes should be broken.
At the earnest request of the Chief Commissioner two mountain-guns,
with the necessary equipment, were given to the Mogaung Levy. There was
some not unnatural reluctance on the part of the military authorities
in India to trust an irregular force with artillery. But the excellent
conduct of the men in the late fights, and the proved capacity of the
gallant young soldier commanding them, overcame their unwillingness.
It was impossible to allow Captain O'Donnell to attack stockades and
to turn large bodies of the enemy out of strong positions without
artillery. With only one British officer, or at the most two, a chance
shot or a bamboo spike might deprive the force of its commander and
cause a disaster. The Chief Commissioner pressed this argument, and
asked to be allowed to raise the garrison of Mogaung to ten companies.
Sanction was given in October.
It took time, however, to raise and train the additional companies
of Gurkhas; and in any case the expeditions which the conduct of the
Kachins had rendered necessary could not have been undertaken until the
rains had passed. In the meanwhile, until the guns and reinforcements
reached them, the Mogaung officers were instructed to concentrate
their men in Mogaung, not to attempt to occupy outposts; to move about
patrols of fifty men when the weather permitted it; to strike at the
enemy when they saw a good opening and could inflict real punishment;
while leaving always enough men in the fort to defend it and the
town. They were forbidden to make small and hasty expeditions into
the Kachin Hills in order to retaliate on raiders. These restrictions
were galling, no doubt, to Captain O'Donnell and to the Assistant
Commissioner, Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, who was a keen soldier as well
as a promising administrator. The Chief Commissioner, however, could
not risk a catastrophe. Moreover, he held that spasmodic action of
this sort, while exposing small parties of our men to much risk, only
embittered the wild hill-men without impressing them with our strength,
and was transient in its effects. The plan of subsidizing those chiefs
who were not in arms against us, and could help to guard the trade
routes or carry the mails, was recommended.
Present needs having been provided for, a plan of operations to be
undertaken during the coming open season was framed by the Chief
Commissioner, in consultation with Sir George White, and early in
November it was sanctioned by the Government of India. Four separate
operations were to be undertaken.
1. Against the Lepei tribe north of Mogaung, the leading chief being
the Sawbwa of Thama, Po Saw's main supporter.
2. Against the Ithi tribe south of Mogaung, who were under the Sawbwa
of Panga.
3. Against the Sana Kachins of the Lataung tribe, who had raided near
Mogaung in May.
4. Against the Makau and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Sinbo,
who were responsible for the destructive attack on Nanpapa in May, and
for another in August on trading boats at Hlegyomaw on the Mogaung
River.
The control of these operations was taken by Sir George White at the
Chief Commissioner's request, the military police in the subdivision
being placed at his disposal. While the necessary preparations were
being made, letters of the nature of an ultimatum were sent to the
Sawbwas of Thama and Panga and other tribal chiefs, requiring them to
make formal submission to the subdivisional officer at Mogaung, to pay
for the damage done by them to traders, and to surrender Po Saw and Bo
Ti, who had lately added to their crimes the murders of Shwè Gya, the
best friend the British Administration had in Mogaung, and of the loyal
headman of Kamaing who had always helped us.
On the 7th of January, 1889, the force[49] detailed for these
expeditions left Mogaung under command of Captain O'Donnell.[50] The
first step was to occupy Kamaing, after a very slight opposition by
the Thama Sawbwa's men, and to establish a permanent military police
post there. Unfortunately smallpox broke out amongst the Gurkhas of the
Levy, and Captain O'Donnell found it necessary to halt at Kamaing until
the 15th of February, and thus a whole month of the most favourable
season for military operations was lost.
On the 15th of February, the men's health having been restored, the
force fell to work with energy, and engagement rapidly followed
engagement. On the 16th of February three villages were taken after
some resistance. On the 17th the Kachins were encountered on a strongly
stockaded position, which was taken and destroyed. On the 19th Thama
itself was taken. The enemy here showed more fight. Three men of the
Hampshires received gunshot wounds, and two officers and eleven men
were injured by bamboo spikes.
Captain O'Donnell's report gives the following account of this
engagement, which shows the nature of the fighting in these
expeditions:--
"My guide, who had done splendidly up to this, lost me four valuable
hours in finding the road. He struck it at last, and after a severe
climb of 4½ miles, we came out near the village of Thama. On arriving
at the crest of the hill Lieutenant Eliott, Assistant Commissioner,
received a letter, stuck in a stick on the road, from Thama Sawbwa, in
which he said we might come and burn his village, he would do nothing
but hide in the jungle, &c. This put us on our guard, and we went on
cautiously over the crest, and then saw what appeared to me through
my glasses, a garden paling. I examined it well, but found nothing
suspicious about it. However, I ordered the advance with all caution.
The Hants were in front, the Gurkhas forming flanking parties in rear.
When about sixty yards from the place we could not make out that it was
more than a paling, when suddenly we were saluted by a volley from many
guns. Three Hants men fell under this badly wounded, but the remainder
walked off the road into the jungle and poured in some very steady
volleys. The Gurkhas were quickly up on the right flank, and the guns
were brought up and two rounds fired at the stockade, and then with a
wild cheer it was rushed and taken, the rebels not waiting....
"Blood was found here. I went on, leaving the rear-guard to bring on
the wounded. We came before a second stockade; we were again saluted,
but no casualties occurred, and one round from a gun and another charge
made us masters of this also. In this charge much damage was done us,
two officers and eleven rank-and-file being spiked by bamboo spikes.
Captain Macdonald and I were both spiked through the foot. After this
no more opposition was met with and Thama was entered and destroyed. A
search in the jungle was made, but nothing found. After the sick had
been attended to I returned to camp, meeting no opposition _en route_."
On the 21st of February a place called Muklon was assaulted and
taken. Here Lieutenant Hawker, of the Hampshire Regiment, fell badly
wounded--spiked in the thigh. He was sent down to Bhamo, where he died
of the wound. By the 9th of March the operations against the Lepei
tribe had been completed, all their villages or stockades taken, and
large quantities of grain captured. Our losses amounted to twenty-one
officers and men killed and wounded. The Kachin loss is not known; it
was probably very small, as they made no firm stand.
After little more than a day's rest Captain O'Donnell moved out
again, this time against the Ithi tribe to the south of Mogaung. He
established a post at Nyaungbintha, in the centre of their territory.
By the 28th of March ten villages of this tribe had been taken with
very little fighting. The village of Waranaung, of which the chief
had been loyal in every respect since the occupation of Mogaung, was
carefully preserved from injury.
On the 4th of April a move was made against Sana, which fell without an
effort.
The column now turned south to Sinbo, and from that base moved out
to punish the villages concerned in the barbarous raids on Nanpapa
and Hlegyomaw. The villages concerned having been taken after some
resistance, the task assigned to Captain O'Donnell was completed on the
4th of May.
In these four expeditions our casualties amounted to one officer
and three men killed, and five officers and thirty men (including
followers) wounded. The column was engaged with Kachins thirty-two
times, and took forty-six stockades. Owing to the loss of a month by
the sickness at Kamaing, the work was more hurried than the Chief
Commissioner had designed. The results, however, were very good,
and had been obtained with more ease and less bloodshed than had
been expected. By the occupation of Kamaing, the trade route to the
jade-mines was opened and made safe. The Marip tribe who dominate the
jade-mines, and the Sassum tribe who adjoin the amber-mines, were
freed from Po Saw's pressure and their loyalty assured. Villages from
the Kachin tribes came in by scores to make formal submission to the
Assistant Commissioner at Mogaung. Of the Thama Sawbwa's villages
only Thama and two others held out; the Ithi tribe, the Kachins round
Sinbo, and the Lakun tribe south of the Ithi country all submitted. In
short, the peace of the district was secured and the authority of the
Government established.
From the number of casualties it might be inferred that the service
was one of little danger. The inference would be wholly wrong. The
column was engaged in bush or jungle fighting with the enemy almost
every day, and if our casualties were not greater it was due as well
to the precautions taken by the leader and to his skilful tactics as
to the failure of the Kachins to defend their stockades. The heaviest
part of the work fell on the Gurkhas of the Mogaung Levy (military
police), who furnished the flanking parties. Without them the force
must have lost heavily. "The flanking done by the Gurkhas was splendid
indeed, and it is entirely owing to their jungle work that I had not
more casualties."[51] The column marched over six hundred and fifty
miles, fighting continually, and the men's clothes and boots were
torn to pieces. It was a fine display of patient endurance, courage,
and persistence, in face of great difficulties, by officers and men.
The Commander, Captain O'Donnell, was one of the soldiers to whom the
Administration of Burma in those days owed so much. And he was greatly
assisted by Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, to whom fell the difficult duty of
providing good guides and correct information.
Captain O'Donnell concluded his report on the results of the operations
with a notice of Lieutenant W. Hawker, of the Hants Regiment. "He was
spiked through the thigh while gallantly leading his men in a charge at
Mukton on the 15th of March, 1889. He was attached to the Mogaung Levy
for these operations. He was senior to Lieutenant Benson, and might
have taken command of the levy from that officer." But he showed "a
sincere spirit in the welfare of the service" in refusing to supersede
Lieutenant Benson, who belonged to the Indian Army and knew the men and
their language. "He volunteered to take charge of the transport on the
line of march, and this he did until Captain Macdonald was wounded. He
was commanding the Hants men when he received his death-wound."
FOOTNOTES:
[41] A lesson enforced by many examples in Upper Burma was that until
a country in the process of annexation can be held permanently, it is
useless and sometimes cruel to occupy it and leave it after a time.
The following is taken from a report on the Ava district: "Myotha
is a large village which had previously welcomed and aided British
detachments, and had as a consequence been plundered by the rebels on
their departure. Most of the inhabitants were in hiding in the jungles;
they came in on hearing of the arrival of the troops, but were much
distressed at their leaving."
[42] _Vide_ a short account of the expedition to the jade mines by
Major C. H. E. Adamson, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo (J. Bell &
Co., Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1889).
[43] Colonel Hugh O'Donnell, D.S.O. He raised the Mogaung Levy, and
served all through the Burma business, 1886-91, and did excellent work.
[44] Colonel Charles Prideaux Triscott, R.A., C.B., D.S.O.
[45] Present population something under 3,000. The Myit Kyina Railway
has a station at Mogaung.
[46] At some places the grass had to be trodden down by marching the
men backwards and forwards.
[47] This was not a mere suspicion. He was marked down and assassinated
soon after this (_vide_ p. 264).
[48] It must be remembered that we had not a spare man in these years;
while the overworked civil staff, especially the best of them, were
often disabled by sickness and compelled to leave.
[49]
{ Capt. Macdonald.
Hants Regiment--51 rifles {
{ Lieut. Richards.
Mountain Battery }
} 2 guns, Capt. Fuller, R.A.
No. 2 Bengal }
320 Mogaung Levy { Lieut. Benson, Munster Fusiliers, Commanding.
(Gurkhas and { Lieut. Hawker, Hants Regiment.
Sikhs) { Lieut. Manning, South Wales Borderers.
Mr. Crowther, Inspector of Police.
Lieut. Clements, Staff Officer.
Lieut. Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, Political Officer.
Col. Cronin, Senior Medical Officer.
Mr. Ogle, India Survey Department.
[50] Under military regulations Captain O'Donnell, being in command
of troops called Military Police, would have been unable to command
regular troops, and thus his experience and ability would have been
lost. This difficulty was easily avoided by Sir George White.
[51] Captain O'Donnell's report.