The proposals made as the basis of a peace were the same as had been

contemplated in the event of a victory on the part of the allies--the

French were to evacuate Germany and Italy. When Napoleon sent Savary

(afterwards duke of Rovigo), the head of his gendarmerie police, under

pretence of complimenting the emperor Alexander, it was indisputably a

great part of this envoy’s object, as appears from the 30th bulletin, to

make himself thoroughly acquainted with the prevailing opinions and the

leading characters during the three days of his sojourn in the emperor’s

camp. Savary was very well received, and sent away with every courtly

attention by Alexander; but it was intimated that it was intended to make

common cause with Prussia, and that it was expected that Novosiltzov,

whom the emperor Alexander wished to send to Napoleon, would meet

Haugwitz in Brünn. The hint was sufficient to induce Savary to decline

the company of Novosiltzov.

When Savary informed the emperor of the illusion of the Russian generals,

and of their belief that fears were entertained of the Russians, and that

on this account embassies were sent to seek for peace--Napoleon very

cunningly took care to strengthen the fools in their folly. Savary was

sent again to the enemy’s camp to propose an interview between Napoleon

and the emperor of Russia. The interview was declined; but Prince

Dolgoruki was sent to propose conditions to Napoleon. The latter did not

allow him to come into his camp, but received him at the outposts.

If it be asked why the Russians, with whom there were only some twenty

thousand Austrians, did not wait for their third army, under Bennigsen,

or reduce Bonaparte to the greatest perplexity, by taking up a strong

position in Hungary or Upper Silesia, or remaining quietly upon the

heights of Pratzen, the reply is, that the whole system of supplies was

bad, and that want had reached so great a pitch, that it would have

been impossible for them to remain. Certain it is that they suffered

themselves to be drawn down from the heights, and away from Austerlitz,

near Brünn, where the talents of their generals were unable to devise any

plan of battle which Napoleon could not immediately oversee; it would

have been otherwise in the mountains. The French allege, that Napoleon

had long before fixed upon the very place in which the Russians offered

him battle at Austerlitz, on the 2nd of December, as his battle-field,

and laid all his plans accordingly. The possession of the heights of

Pratzen was regarded by those skilled in strategy as the key of this

battle-field. The Russians were in full possession of these heights, with

all their force, on the 1st of December; on the 2nd they descended from

them, when Bonaparte drew back one of the wings of his army. He had long

calculated on gaining the victory by the possession of these heights,

and thus rendering the retreat of the Russians impossible. He did not,

therefore, fail, in the very opening of the battle, to seize upon them.

A column of the third Russian army, under Bennigsen, commanded by

Michelson, just arrived at the decisive moment when Napoleon had also

called to his aid Bernadotte’s corps, and when the Bavarians were on

their march from Budweis to Moravia; but none of their leaders could

lay any claim to the reputation of a commander of genius. Napoleon’s

proclamation to his army shows his full confidence in his own

superiority, as well as in that of his generals and soldiers; and this

confidence was fully realised on the bloody field of Austerlitz on the

2nd of December.

THE CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND (1806-1807 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1806 A.D.]]

After the defeat at Austerlitz the emperor made an attempt, whether

sincere or not is uncertain, for a reconciliation with Napoleon. He sent

D’Oubril to Paris, who, after a negotiation of ten days, concluded a

treaty with the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke (July 20th, 1806).

But Alexander refused to ratify the treaty, upon the very questionable

allegation that his ambassador had exceeded his powers.

Prussia now suffered the just consequences of her policy. Disappointed

in her hopes of acquiring Hanover, the reward for which she crouched to

Napoleon, she imprudently provoked him to war without waiting for the

arrival of the aid due to her by Russia. The campaign was decided in one

day by the two terrific defeats of Jena and Auerstadt (October 14th,

1806). Prussia was hopelessly ruined before the Russian armies, ninety

thousand strong, under Bennigsen and Buxhövden, could arrive to save her.

The Russians entered Prussia in November, and on the 26th of December

the battle of Pultusk was fought with great obstinacy and loss of blood

on both sides. The French spent the whole of a December night without

covering; rain and snow fell incessantly; they waded up to their knees

in marshes, spent twelve hours in making an advance of eight miles, and

were obliged to pay dearly for their passage over the Narev. During the

battle, Marshal Lannes and other generals were several times obliged to

put themselves at the head of single regiments and battalions, and yet

no decisive advantage was gained. The French, indeed, boasted of the

victory; because the Russians, after having maintained their ground on a

part of the field, retreated the next day.

If the victory at Pultusk, of which Bennigsen boasted, and on account

of which he was afterwards rewarded by his emperor, and appointed

commander-in-chief, was very doubtful, on the other hand, Prince Galitzin

completely defeated the French at Golymin, on the very day on which

they were to attack Buxhövden, at Ostrolenka. This victory, too, was

the more glorious, inasmuch as the Russians were less numerous than

their opponents. The French, however, had not been able to bring up

their artillery; and the superiority of the Russians in this particular

decided the event. The weather and the time of the year rendered

active operations impossible for some weeks. Bennigsen retired to

Ostrolenka, and afterwards still farther; whilst the French, under Ney

and Bernadotte, were scattered in the country on the farther side of the

Vistula, in which Ney at length pushed forward as far as Heilsberg.

[Sidenote: [1807 A.D.]]

In January, 1807, Bennigsen and Napoleon came, almost simultaneously,

upon the idea of changing the seat of war from the extreme east to

the west. In the east, the struggle was afterwards carried on by two

particular corps--a Russian, under Essen, and a French, first under

Lannes, and then under Savary. This bloody struggle, however, had no

influence on the issue of the war. Bennigsen no sooner learned that Ney

had scattered his troops widely over the country on the farther side

of the Vistula, than he broke up his quarters, and resolved to attack

him, before Bernadotte, who was near, could come to his relief; but he

was too late. Ney had already retreated when Bennigsen arrived; whether

it was as the French allege, because Napoleon, who had seen the danger

with which he was threatened, sent him orders to retreat, which arrived

on the very day on which he was to be attacked by the Russians, or that

General Markov was at first too eager, and Bennigsen afterwards too

irresolute. Ney luckily marched from Heilsberg, nearer to the Vistula,

and Bennigsen followed him hesitatingly, so that Bernadotte was able to

keep him employed for some days till Napoleon came up. On receiving news

of Bennigsen’s march, the French emperor had sent orders to all his corps

to renew the campaign on the 27th, and he had so taken his measures, that

before the Russians had any suspicion of an attack, the main army of

the French would fall upon their left flank, whilst they were on their

march. For this purpose, Bernadotte was to allure Bennigsen quite to the

Vistula; and then to advance again as soon as Napoleon had outflanked the

left of the Russians.

The despatch containing these orders for Bernadotte fell into the hands

of the Russians, through the inexperience of the officer entrusted with

it, who failed to destroy the document at the right time. Thus warned

of the impending danger, and finding themselves pressed on all sides,

they allowed their stores and heavy baggage, at various places, to fall

into the hands of the enemy, and thereby escaped being surrounded. After

considerable sacrifices, they succeeded, on the 6th of February, in

reaching the Prussian town of Eylau, which is only nine hours’ distance

from Königsberg. Soult attacked their rear, on the low hills behind the

town, on the 7th, and drove them in; on the following day a general

engagement took place. The honour of the victory is probably due to the

Russians, as even Savary admits, who shared in the battle. It is not less

certain, however, that the whole advantage accrued to the French, who,

indeed, admit that the battle was one of the most dreadful recorded in

history. The French accuse Bernadotte of having, by his delay, prevented

the victory from being complete; whilst the Russians are just enough

to admit that Lestocq, with his Prussians, saved their wing from utter

defeat. The number of deaths in the battle, and on the day preceding it,

was immense. Great numbers fell, not by the sword, but by cold, want, and

excessive exertion. Whole battalions and regiments of the French--as,

for example, that of Colonel Sémelé--were literally annihilated. Few

prisoners were made, because the whole battle was fought with the bayonet.

The royal family of Prussia was placed in a very melancholy position by

the issue of the battle, for they were obliged, in the middle of winter,

to flee to Menel, where they found themselves among Russians, of whom

their own emperor alleged, that, notwithstanding his despotic power,

he was not able to restrain their barbarity, or to put a stop to their

rapacity. Here, in the farthest corner of Prussia, they received news

every month of the fall of one fortress after another, or of forced

contributions levied upon their people.

The French army also retired after the battle of Eylau as well as the

Russians. Bennigsen marched towards Königsberg, and although Berthier,

on the morning of the 7th, wrote to the empress that they would be

in Königsberg with their army on the following day, the French,

nevertheless, drew off nearer to the Vistula. Nothing important was

undertaken by either party for some months, but vigorous preparations

were made for a new struggle; whilst new means were tried to prevent

Prussia from taking any energetic measures--that is, from forming a close

union with England and Russia. The king hesitated between the bold advice

of Hardenberg and his friends, and the unconditional submission to the

will of Napoleon, which was recommended by von Zastrov. The Russians were

thoroughly dissatisfied with the English, and complained of being very

badly supported by them; they suffered want of all kinds, were worse

treated in many places in Prussia than the French, and even borrowed

660,000 dollars in coin from the king of Prussia.

Hardenberg, who accompanied his master to Tilsit, succeeded in having

a new treaty entered into at Bartenstein between Russia and Prussia.

Its principle was the same as that of the agreement made on the 12th of

October, of the preceding year, at Grodno, by virtue of which the emperor

bound himself to support the cause of the king with all his forces. In

this treaty, it was not only promised, just as if they were before Paris,

that Prussia should receive back all that had been lost, but it was

formally determined what was to be done with the conquests wrested from

France, and how even the left bank of the Rhine was to be partitioned

among the allies.

About this time Bennigsen was appointed commander-in-chief of the

Russian armies; but he is generally accused of incapacity, and fearful

descriptions are given of the disorders, fraud, and embezzlement which

prevailed, and of the plunder and barbarity which they practised against

unfortunate Prussia. The emperor Alexander, as soon as he arrived at

the army, did everything in his power to restore order; he was able,

however, only to remedy single abuses; even Nicholas, who manifests a

degree of severity from which Alexander shrank back, is not able to

reach the source of the evil. Towards the end of May, Bennigsen thought

his troops already sufficiently reinforced to make an attack upon the

French, and drive them across the Vistula; whilst the combined army of

English, Swedes, and Prussians, were to make an attack from Pomerania.

The French army, lying from Dantzic to the Narev, was brought, before the

beginning of June, when the campaign commenced, to 150,000 men, whose

pay and sustenance were drawn from the requisitions and contributions

imposed on Prussia. In April, 1807, the French senate passed a decree

levying 80,000 conscripts, 60,000 of whom were to be immediately sent to

the army; and the Poles, too, deceived by the hope of the restoration of

their nationality, raised a body of between 25,000 and 30,000 men, among

whom were whole regiments recruited by the Polish nobility, or formed

exclusively of nobles who volunteered their service, although Napoleon

limited all the expectations of the Poles to the country on this side of

the Vistula.

As soon as Bennigsen, in the beginning of June, made a serious movement

in advance towards the Vistula, a series of murderous engagements began,

similar to those which preceded the battle of Eylau; on the 9th, the

main body of both armies came in sight of each other at Heilsberg, and

on the 10th the French made an attempt to drive the Russians from their

position. The united corps of Soult and Lannes, supported by the cavalry

under Murat, made repeated attempts to force the Russians to give way;

they, however, kept their ground.

Bennigsen afterwards heard, at Wehlau, that the French had separated into

two divisions, and he resolved on the 13th, instead of continuing his

route on the farther side of the Alle, to wheel about before Wehlau, and

attack the French. By this step, as all writers admit, he gave himself

into the hands of his great opponent, who never suffered his enemy to

commit a fault with impunity. The position taken up by Bennigsen was

such as to leave him no alternative between victory and destruction, for

he had the Alle in his rear, and a marsh on one flank. Napoleon took

advantage of this mistake, as usual; and the orders which he issued

before the battle prove that he was sure of the victory. About five

o’clock in the evening of the 14th of June, a battery of twenty guns

gave the signal for the fight; it was bravely maintained on both sides,

and both armies suffered great loss. The French accounts exaggerate the

number of the Russians who were led into the battle of Friedland, as

well as the number of prisoners: certain it is, however, that seventeen

thousand Russians were either killed or wounded.

After the battle of Friedland, there was no longer any account to be

taken of the Prussians: and it was a piece of great good fortune that

such a sovereign as Alexander reigned in Russia, otherwise Prussia would

have been wholly lost. Lestocq, with his Prussians, was obliged hastily

to cross the Haff to Memel; and their magazines, considerable stores of

powder and ammunition, together with one hundred thousand muskets, which

the English had sent by sea to Königsberg, fell, with the town, into the

hands of the French. Bennigsen was not very closely pursued on the other

side of the Alle; he passed the Niemen on the 19th, and burned down the

bridge behind him; immediately afterwards, Bonaparte arrived in Tilsit.

Of all the Prussian fortresses, Colberg alone might have been able to

maintain itself for some weeks, and Graudenz was saved merely by the

peace. The treaty with England, which the Prussian minister signed in

London on the 17th of June, and by which £1,000,000 sterling was promised

in subsidies, came too late.

Schladen informs us that all those who were about the king of Prussia had

so completely lost courage, that Von Hardenberg, Von Stein, Von Schladen

himself, and many others who recommended perseverance, found none upon

whom they could reckon. With respect to the Russians, he informs us that

there was a party who assumed a threatening aspect--that the army was

dissatisfied with the war--that the grand duke Constantine behaved often

very rudely towards the Prussians, and allowed himself to be used as an

instrument for working on the fears of his brother Alexander. On the 7th

of June, the emperor manifested a disposition altogether contrary to

the agreements and partition-projects of the convention of Bartenstein.

He was dissatisfied with England, and perceived that the Austrians had

no other object than to fish in troubled water, and he was, therefore,

desirous, as much as possible, to withdraw from the whole affair. He

proposed a truce for himself, with a clause that the Prussians also

should obtain a cessation of hostilities; but the Russians and Prussians

were to negotiate each for themselves respecting the conditions.

Napoleon having entertained the proposal, Russia agreed, that during the

continuance of the truce, the French should retain possession of the

whole of Poland, except the circle of Bielostok. The agreement was signed

on the 21st, and a four weeks’ notice of the renewal of hostilities

was reserved. By the terms of the truce granted to Prussia, the French

remained in possession of the whole kingdom; and the few fortresses which

were not yet reduced were not to be supplied either with new works,

ammunition, or provisions. Blücher, who commanded the Prussian auxiliary

forces in Pomerania, was to leave the king of Sweden to his fate. The

peace was to be negotiated at Tilsit, and for that purpose one half of

the town was to be declared neutral.[k]

_Meeting of Alexander and Napoleon at Tilsit (1807 A.D.)_

Napoleon desired, as far as means and powers would allow, to give all

possible pomp and solemnity to the interview with his mighty adversary.

With this object, in the middle of the Niemen, opposite Tilsit, a raft

was constructed, on which were two pavilions, covered in white cloth. The

one which was destined for the two monarchs was of vaster dimensions and

was adorned with all possible luxury; the other and smaller one was for

their suites. On the frontals of the pavilions were painted in green, on

the Russian side, an enormous A, and on the side turned towards Tilsit

an N of equal size. To the annoyance of the Prussians, the monogram of

Frederick William III was absent from the decorations of the Niemen raft.

The French guards were ranged in lines, fronting the river. “All this

army,” writes an eye-witness, “awaited the appearance of their invincible

leader, their thunder-bearing semi-divinity, in order to greet him at the

moment of his swift passage to the wharf.” Thousands of the inhabitants

of Tilsit and French soldiers covered the high left bank of the Niemen.

The emperors got into the boats simultaneously. When both boats put off,

the grandeur of the spectacle, the expectation of an event of world-wide

importance took the ascendency over all other feelings. Universal

attention was concentrated upon the boat that carried that wonderful man,

that leader of armies, the like of whom had never been seen or heard

of since the times of Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar. Napoleon

stood on the boat in front of his suite, solitary and silent, his arms

folded on his breast as he is represented in pictures. He wore the

uniform of the Old Guard and the ribbon of the Legion of Honour across

his shoulder, and on his head that little historical hat, the form of

which has become famous throughout the world. Reaching the raft somewhat

sooner than Alexander, Napoleon rapidly got onto it, and hastened to

meet the emperor. The rivals embraced and silently entered the pavilion,

accompanied by the joyful acclamations of the troops and the inhabitants,

who were witnesses of a world-wide event--the reconciliation of Russia

and France. At that moment a large boat put off from the left bank of the

Niemen, having on it about twenty armed soldiers--and remained between

the raft and the Russian shore. Evidently Napoleon did not hesitate

to take open measures of safeguarding against any possible unforeseen

occurrences.

That day the king of Prussia did not assist at the interview: Napoleon

did not wish to see him, and Frederick William remained on the right bank

of the Niemen. “In that fateful hour, whilst the destiny of his monarchy

was being decided, his gaze was constantly fixed and his ear directed

towards the raft, as though he desired to listen to the conversation

between the two emperors. Once he went down to the edge of the river and

only stopped when the water was up to his horse’s middle.” The first

interview between Alexander and Napoleon lasted an hour and fifteen

minutes. “I detest the English no less than you do,” were the first words

of the emperor Alexander, “and I am ready to support you in everything

that you undertake against them.” “If such is the case,” answered

Napoleon, “then everything can be arranged and peace secured.”

Taking advantage of Alexander’s inimical disposition towards Great

Britain, Napoleon entered upon a terrible philippic against the perfidy

of Albion, representing it as a greedy, extortionate nation ever ready to

sacrifice everyone, even its most faithful allies, for its own profit.

In further conversation Napoleon strove to instil into Alexander that

he was victimised by his allies, that he was mistaken in protecting the

Germans, those ungrateful and envious neighbours, and in supporting the

interests of a set of greedy merchants who showed themselves to be the

representatives of England; all this was occasioned, according to him, by

a feeling of generosity carried to excess, and by doubts which arose from

the incapacity or corruption of ministers. After this Napoleon began to

praise the valour and bravery of the Russian troops, with which he had

been much struck at Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland; he considered that

the soldiers on both sides had fought like veritable Titans and was of

the opinion that the united armies of Russia and France might dominate

the world, and give to it prosperity and tranquillity. Up till now Russia

had squandered her forces, without having any recompense in view; by

an alliance with France she would acquire glory, and in any case reap

substantial advantages. Of course Russia was bound by certain obligations

to Prussia, and in that respect it was indispensable that the honour of

the emperor Alexander should be carefully guarded. In conclusion Napoleon

expressed his intention of restoring to Prussia sufficient territory

honourably to rid the emperor of his ally; after that, he affirmed, the

Russian cabinet would be in a position to pursue a fresh line of policy

similar in everything to that of the great Catherine. Only such a policy,

in Napoleon’s opinion, could be possible and advantageous for Russia.

Having flattered Alexander as emperor, Napoleon in order to complete the

charm proceeded to flatter him as a man. “We shall come to an agreement

sooner,” said he, “if we enter upon negotiations without intermediaries,

setting aside ministers, who frequently deceive or do not understand us;

we two together shall advance matters more in a single hour than our

intermediaries in several days. Nobody must come between you and me; I

will be your secretary and you shall be mine,” added Napoleon. Upon this

basis he proposed to the emperor Alexander for convenience’s sake to

transfer the negotiations to Tilsit, declaring the position of the town

to be a central one. The emperor gladly accepted Napoleon’s invitation,

and it was settled that negotiations should at once be entered upon in

order to come to a definitive agreement[55] on the matter.[g]

RUSSIA DECLARES WAR AGAINST ENGLAND (1807 A.D.)

The English government, alleging that in the secret articles of the

treaty of Tilsit, of which they had possessed themselves, they had proof

of Napoleon’s design to seize the Danish fleet, fitted out an expedition

against Denmark with extraordinary celerity. Copenhagen was bombarded

for three days, and a great part of the city destroyed. The Danes then

capitulated (September 7), and surrendered their fleet to the English,

with all their naval stores in their arsenals and dockyards.

The expedition against Copenhagen was soon followed by a declaration of

war on the part of Russia against England. In the manifesto published

on this occasion (September 16th), Alexander complained bitterly of the

bad faith of England, as manifested especially in the little aid she had

afforded to the allies who had taken up arms in a cause in which she was

more directly interested than any other power, and in the robber-like

act of aggression she had committed against Denmark. He annulled all

former conventions between Russia and England, especially that of 1801;

proclaimed anew the principle of the armed neutrality; and declared that

there should be no communication between the two powers until Denmark had

received just compensation, and peace was concluded between France and

England. In consequence of this declaration, an embargo was laid on all

the English vessels in Russian ports, and Prussia was compelled to follow

this example.

THE CONQUEST OF FINLAND (1807 A.D.)

It was not till the 6th of October that a formal demand was made upon

Sweden to close the ports of the Baltic against English ships and trade.

The king persevered in his alliance with England; and finally, because

the emperor of Russia had conferred upon Napoleon the order of St.

Andrew, he sent back his insignia; whereupon Alexander not only returned

his Swedish order, but quietly adopted measures to take possession of

Finland, whilst the Danes were preparing, in concert with the French,

to invade the western provinces of Sweden. Although in the months of

November and December, Gustavus repeatedly declined the proposals of the

Russians for a union against England, everything went on in Sweden as in

times of the most profound peace; and even when the Russian forces were

collected on the very frontiers of Finland, the unfortunate king adopted

no measures of defence whatever. On the 21st of January he was, for the

last time, called upon to declare war against England; he replied by

concluding a new alliance with her on the 8th of February. On the 21st,

the Russians invaded Finland, without any specific declaration of war,

and on the 14th of March, 1808, Denmark declared war against Sweden.

The whole of Finland as far as Vasa, the island of Åland, and even the

islands of Gotland, Åbo, Sveaborg, and all the fortresses, were taken

possession of by the Russians even before the Swedish army and fleet were

prepared. It was not till the end of April and beginning of May that a

Swedish army under Klingspor and Aldercreutz, supported by a Swedish

fleet, appeared in the field, and fought with various success.

We have lately seen Alexander take military possession of the Danubian

provinces as a “material guarantee,” whilst affecting not to be at war

with Turkey. This was in exact conformity with Russian precedents.

Finland, as we have said, was occupied without a declaration of war; but

manifestoes were issued by General Buxhövden, one of which contained the

following passage: “Good neighbours, it is with the greatest regret that

my most gracious master, the emperor of all the Russias, sees himself

forced to send into your country the troops under my orders. But his

majesty the king of Sweden, whilst withdrawing more and more from the

happy alliance of the two greatest empires in the world, draws closer

his connections with the common enemy, whose oppressive system and

unparalleled conduct towards the most intimate allies of Russia and of

Sweden herself cannot be coolly endured by his imperial majesty. These

motives, as well as the regard which his imperial majesty owes to the

safety of his own states, oblige him to place your country under his

protection, and to take possession of it in order to procure by these

means a sufficient guarantee in case his Swedish majesty should persevere

in the resolution not to accept the equitable conditions of peace that

have been proposed to him, etc.”

When the Russians took possession of Finland, the king gave them a

pretence for incorporating it with their empire, which, however, they

would no doubt have done in any case. He caused Alopeus, the Russian

ambassador, to be arrested. This took place on the 3rd of March, and

on the 25th a declaration was published on the part of the emperor of

Russia, announcing to all the powers that “from that moment he regards

the part of Finland hitherto reputed Swedish, and which his troops had

only been able to occupy after divers battles, as a province conquered by

his arms, and that he unites it forever to his empire.”

It was easy to anticipate that the superior force of the Russians must in

the end prevail; although the Russian garrison in Gotland, and that in

the island of Åland, were at first taken prisoners, the island occupied,

and the Russians beaten by land at Vasa on the 26th of July, and by sea

at Roggerwick on the 26th of August. The Swedes lost all the advantages

they had thus gained by the bloody battle fought at Ormais on the 14th

of September, and by the defeat at Lokalar on the 18th. The Russian

generals, probably in order to give courage to the malcontents, who were

very numerous in Sweden, issued orders not to receive any letters or

any flags of truce which were sent in the king’s name, and carried on

negotiations with the Swedish generals alone, for a suspension of arms,

which was concluded for an indefinite time, on the 20th of September,

but only continued till the 27th of October, when the Russians resumed

hostilities, and the Swedes were driven to the north, across the

Kemistrom. On the 20th of November a new truce was agreed upon between

the Swedish general Adlercreutz and the Russian general Kamenskoi, with

the reserve of fourteen days’ notice before renewal of operations. By the

conditions of this agreement the Swedes were to evacuate the whole of

Uleåborg, and to retire completely behind the Kemistrom, with all their

artillery, arms, and stores.

On the 13th of March in the following year a revolution was effected

in Sweden, by which Gustavus was deposed; his uncle, the duke of

Södermanland, became regent, and was afterwards proclaimed king (June 5,

1809) under the title of Charles XIII. At Stockholm the people flattered

themselves that the dethronement of Gustavus would speedily bring

peace to Sweden; but it was not so. Alexander refused to treat with a

government so insecure as a regency, and hostilities continued. General

Knorring who had passed the Gulf of Bothnia on the ice with twenty-five

thousand Russians, took possession of the Åland islands, and granted the

Swedes a cessation of hostilities, to allow them time to make overtures

of peace. Apprised of this arrangement, Barclay de Tolly, who had crossed

the gulf with another body of Russians towards Vasa, and taken possession

of Umeå, evacuated west Bothnia, and returned to Finland. A third Russian

army, under Shuvalov penetrated into west Bothnia by the Torneå route,

and compelled the Swedish army of the north under Gripenberg to lay down

their arms (March 25th). This sanguinary affair occurred entirely through

ignorance; because in that country, lying under the 66th degree of north

latitude, they were not aware of the armistice granted by Knorring. On

the expiry of the truce, hostilities began again in May, and the Russians

took possession of the part of west Bothnia lying north of Umeå.

The peace between Russia and Sweden was signed at Frederikshamm on the

17th of September. The latter power adhered to the continental system,

reserving to herself the importation of salt and such colonial produce as

she could not do without. She surrendered Finland, with the whole of east

Bothnia, and a part of west Bothnia lying eastward of the river Torneå.

The cession of these provinces, which formed the granary of Sweden and

contained a population of 900,000 souls, was an irreparable loss to that

kingdom which had only 2,344,000 inhabitants left. In the following year

Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo, was elected crown prince of Sweden,

and eventual successor to the throne, under the name of Charles John.

The loss of Finland had been but slightly retarded by some advantages

gained over the Russian fleet by the combined squadrons of England and

Sweden. The Russian vessels remained blockaded on the coast of Esthonia,

but in an unassailable position, from which they were at last delivered

by the weather and the exigencies of navigation in those dangerous seas.

Another Russian fleet under Admiral Siniavin, which sailed to Portugal to

co-operate with the French against the English, was obliged to surrender

to Admiral Cotton after the convention of Cintra. It was afterwards

restored to Russia. The war declared by that power against England in

1807, was little more than nominal, and was marked by no events of

importance.

WAR WITH PERSIA AND WITH TURKEY

The annexation of Georgia to Russia, effected as we have seen, in the

beginning of Alexander’s reign, drew him into a war with Persia, which

did not terminate until 1813. The principal events of that war were the

defeat of the Persians at Etchmiadzin by Prince Zitzianov (June 20,

1804); the conquest of the province of Shirvan by the same commander

(January, 1806); the taking of Derbent by the Russians (July 3rd); and

the defeat of the Persians by Paulucci, at Alkolwalaki (September 1st,

1810).

About 1805 the condition of the Ottoman Empire, badly organised and worse

governed, was such that everything presaged its approaching dissolution.

Everywhere the sultan’s authority was disregarded. Paswan Oglu, pasha of

Widdin, was in open revolt. Ali Pasha of Janina was obedient only when it

suited his convenience. Djezzar, the pasha of Syria, without declaring

himself an enemy to the Porte, enjoyed an absolute independence. The

sect of the Wahhabees was in possession of Arabia. After the departure

of the English from Egypt, first the beys, and afterwards Muhammed Ali

reigned over that country, and only paid their yearly tribute to the

sultan when they pleased. In Servia, Czerni George was making himself

independent prince of the Slavonians of the Danube. Ipsilanti and Morusi,

both Greeks, by the permission, or rather by the command of Russia,

were appointed hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, for seven years at

least, and were therefore rather subjects of the Russians than of the

Turks. Selim III, who had reigned since 1789, convinced that the Porte

could never re-establish its authority except by better organising the

army, had endeavoured to model it on the European system. This attempt

afterwards cost him his throne.

The English and Russian ambassadors ruled either alternately or together

in Constantinople. But for their interference the old friendship between

France and the Porte would most likely have been restored in July,

1802. At the time of the foundation of the empire in France, the sultan

hesitated long whether he would lean upon the English and Russian, or

upon the French influence, for he felt a great want of confidence in

Napoleon, since he had been informed by the English of the language

which fell from the emperor in conversation with Lord Whitworth. He

was reported to have taken the partition of Turkey for granted--as a

thing unavoidable; and that on such partition the province of Egypt

ought necessarily to fall to the share of France. This conversation was

printed, in 1803, among the documents connected with the renewal of the

war between England and France, and was communicated to the sultan. The

French, indeed, in their official journals, contradicted the allegation;

but who ever put any faith in their official journals?

On this ground we must explain the fact that the Turks favoured the

Russians in the war which they were carrying on with the Persians;

suffered them to sail up the Rion (ancient Phasis), and even to build

a fort at its mouth. They were even desirous of renewing the friendly

alliance formed with Russia in 1798, which renewal, indeed, the emperor

of Russia was afterwards unwilling to confirm, because the English had

taken care to have the inviolability of the Turkish Empire incorporated

in the treaty of 1798. Had, therefore, the emperor of Russia ratified

the alliance, he would have guaranteed to the Turks the actual condition

of their empire in Europe, which he did not wish to do. This excited the

suspicion of the Turks, who inclined more and more towards the French,

and did not suffer themselves to be frightened by the threats of the

English and Russians. Immediately after the Peace of Presburg, the Turks,

who had previously acknowledged Napoleon’s empire, sent a new ambassador

to Paris. In return, Napoleon sent engineers, officers, artillerymen,

workmen, and materials, in order to enable the sultan to improve his

army, artillery, and the bulwarks of his empire; whilst, on the other

hand, the Russian ambassador, Italinski, and the English ambassador,

Arbuthnot, threatened war if the alliance with the French was not

relinquished; and Italinski’s threats fell with a double weight because a

corps of Russians were ready for action on the Bug.

About the time at which Napoleon adopted the resolution of attacking

Prussia also, and therefore foresaw a war with Russia, a Turkish army

was assembled to take the field against the Russians on the Turkish

frontiers, and Napoleon clearly saw how advantageous to him a war between

the Russians and the Turks would be. He therefore sent General Sébastiani

as ambassador extraordinary to Constantinople. Sébastiani arrived there

in August, 1806; and soon gained so great an influence that for some time

the Divan was entirely under his direction. At his instance it refused

to renew the treaty of alliance with England, which was on the point of

expiring; and it dismissed Ipsilanti and Morusi, as creatures of Russia,

from their offices. In consequence of the threatening language held by

Arbuthnot, the English ambassador, they were reinstated; but when this

took place hostilities had already begun. The emperor Alexander had

ordered General Michelson to enter Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte then

declared war against Russia (December 30th); but deviating for the first

time from a barbarous custom, it allowed Italinski, the Russian minister,

to depart unmolested.

A few days afterwards, Arbuthnot quitted Constantinople, after having

repeatedly demanded the renewal of the alliance and the expulsion of

Sébastiani. On the 19th of February, 1807, an English fleet, commanded

by Vice-Admiral Duckworth, forced the passage of the Dardanelles, and

appeared before Constantinople. Duckworth demanded of the Divan that the

forts of the Dardanelles and the Turkish fleet should be surrendered

to him; that the Porte should cede Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia,

and break off alliance with Napoleon. But instead of profiting by the

sudden panic which his appearance had excited, he allowed the Turks time

to put themselves in a posture of defence. Encouraged and instructed by

Sébastiani, they made their preparations with such energy and success

that in the course of eight days the English vice-admiral found that he

could not do better than weigh anchor and repass the Dardanelles.

Shortly afterwards Admiral Siniavin appeared in the Archipelago, and

incited the Greek islanders to throw off the Turkish yoke; whilst

Duckworth sailed to Egypt upon a fruitless expedition in favour of the

mameluke beys against Muhammed Ali. Siniavin defeated the Turkish fleet

on the 4th of April, captured several ships, and took possession of some

islands. The bad condition of his ships, however, compelled him to give

up the blockade of the Dardanelles, and to retire, in order to refit,

after having another time defeated the Turkish fleet. Meanwhile, Selim

had been deposed. His successor, Mustapha IV, declared that he would

continue to prosecute the war with England and Russia. But Siniavin,

before he retired to refit, met the Turkish fleet off Lemnos, on the 1st

of July: the Turks were beaten, lost several ships, and a great many men.

The campaign of the Russians on the Danube, in 1807, was not productive

of any decisive result, as General Michelson received orders to detach

the third army corps to oppose the French in Poland, Czerni George,

the leader of the revolted Servians, took Belgrade, Shabatz, and Nish,

penetrated into Bulgaria, where he was reinforced by some Russian troops,

and gained divers signal advantages. The war was conducted with more

success on the frontiers of the two empires in Asia. The seraskier of

Erzerum was entirely defeated by General Gudovitch (June 18); and that

victory was the more important, as it prevented the Persians from making

a bold diversion in favour of the Turks.

The emperor Alexander had agreed by the public articles of the Treaty

of Tilsit (July, 1807) to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia; but this was

only a collusion between the two contracting parties. The Russians not

only aimed at the permanent possession of the two provinces, but regarded

all the Slavonians of the Danube as allies or subjects of the czar. When

the Turks, on the 14th of July, concluded a peace with Czerni George,

whereby Servia became in some measure independent--and Czerni George

afterwards called himself prince of Servia--a Russian general guaranteed

the treaty by his signature, as one of the parties to the agreement. In

the following year Radovinikin, a Russian envoy, repaired to Belgrade

to establish the new principality; called an assembly of the nobles;

drew up a sketch of a constitution for Servia, and tried to organise the

administration.

The French general, Guilleminot, was sent to the Turkish camp to

negotiate a truce on the terms ostensibly laid down in the Treaty of

Tilsit: namely, that the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia,

but that the Turks should not occupy the two provinces until after

the conclusion of a definitive peace. But Guilleminot’s instructions

contained a direct command to use the whole weight of the French

influence in favour of the Russians and against the Turks; even one of

Napoleon’s greatest admirers, although owning occasional republican

scruples, admits that their tone was very equivocal. In fact, it very

soon became obvious that the whole mission of the general was a mere

piece of diplomatic imposture and treachery. A congress was held at

Slobozia, in the neighbourhood of Giurgevo, on the 24th of August, 1807,

and a truce was signed, which, it was said, was to continue till the 30th

of April, 1808. The Russians were to withdraw; the fortresses of Ismail,

Braila, and Giurgevo to be given up to the Turks, whose troops, however,

were to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia in thirty-five days. Everything,

however, which afterwards took place in consultation between the French

and Russians, in reference to Turkey, bore upon a scheme of partition.

The Russians at length, on the 7th of August, had left Cattaro and the

other strong places in Dalmatia to the French; their emperor, on the

9th, had ceded all his rights as protector of the republic of the seven

united islands to Napoleon, and the latter was busy making preparations

thence to extend his operations and his dominion further to the east.

Marmont, who administered the province of Dalmatia, received orders to

fortify Ragusa more strongly, and to make a report on the best plan to

be adopted in case it should be desirable to send an army quickly from

Corfu, through Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace. The Russians continued

to be quiet observers of all this, and in the mean time made firm their

footing in the provinces on the Danube. They made a pretence of the

conduct of the Turks on the occupation of Galatz, and their ill-treatment

of the inhabitants of Moldavia, for not fulfilling the agreement entered

into at Slobozia. The Russian troops, who, according to the terms of the

treaty, were already retiring, received contrary orders; and the Turks,

again driven out of the two provinces, occupied Galatz anew.

The conduct of the negotiation respecting the division of the Turkish

booty, was committed to the chief of Napoleon’s secret police, who had

been actively engaged in the murder of the duke d’Enghien. He now held

a princely rank as the duke of Rovigo, and was sent to St. Petersburg

with this and similar commissions. In the Russian capital the emperor

Alexander and the duke acted as rivals in the art of dissimulation; the

emperor loaded him with civilities of all kinds, as some compensation

for the coolness and contempt with which he was at first treated, to a

surprising extent, by the empress-mother and the Russian nobility. He

was, indeed, soon consoled, for the slaves of the czar were as zealous

in showing respect in the presence of their master, as they were gross

in their insolence when not under his observation. The accounts which

Savary gives us of the political principles of the pious emperor and his

chancellor, and their complete agreement with Napoleon’s morality and

his own, would be quite incredible to us, did he not literally quote

their words. Savary’s secret report to the emperor Napoleon, partly

written in the form of a dialogue, is to be found among the fragments of

Napoleon’s unprinted correspondence. A contempt for public agreements,

and the plunder of Sweden, even before the declaration of war, astonish

us less than Romanzov’s audacious contempt of the opinion of all Europe;

he thought it not worth a moment’s consideration; and this was quite

in accordance with the language held by his master in speaking on the

subject of Turkey. Thibaudeau has given so correct an opinion of both the

emperors--of the nature of their consultations--of Savary and Romanzov

that we cannot do better than refer the reader to the words of that

writer.

Turkey would at that time undoubtedly have been partitioned, had Austria

been willing to follow the numerous gentle hints to join the alliance of

the emperors, who imagined themselves able to make their will the right

and law of all nations; or if Napoleon had not found it inconsistent with

his plans to bring on at an unfavourable moment a new war with Austria,

which he clearly foresaw in 1808. The Russians, in the mean time,

remained, throughout the whole of the year 1808, in quiet possession of

the provinces which had been previously evacuated by them, and ruled

not only in them, but extended their dominion as far as Belgrade, for

the new prince of Servia was likewise under Russian protection. The

army under the command of the grand vizir, which lay at Adrianople

during the winter of 1807-1808, dwindled, during the continuance of

the truce of Slobozia, to a few thousand men, because, according to

ancient custom, the janissaries returned to their homes in winter; it

again increased, however, in the beginning of summer. Bairaktar’s army,

which was organised on the new European principle, was computed at

from twenty to thirty thousand men; it remained on the Danube till its

leader, at length, resolved to put an end to the anarchy prevailing in

Constantinople. He deposed Mustapha IV, who supported the faction of the

janissaries, and placed his brother, Mahmud, on the throne. Bairaktar

perished, however, in an insurrection (November 14th), and Mahmud, too,

would have been murdered, had he not been the last scion of the imperial

family. But he was compelled entirely to change his ministry, and to

resign the government into the hands of those who enjoyed the favour of

the ulemas and the janissaries.

During the disturbances in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire,

the foreign relations continued the same as they were in the year 1807,

immediately after the truce of Slobozia. When Napoleon’s plan of removing

the negotiations respecting a peace between the Russians and the Turks

to Paris failed of success, he found it advisable, in consequence of

an impending war with Austria, to give the Turks into the hands of the

Russians. One of the chief causes of the war between France and Austria

in 1809 was the close union between the latter power and England in

reference to Turkish affairs, which appeared in the co-operation of

Lord Paget and Baron von Stürmer, the English and Austrian ambassadors

in Constantinople. It was the Austrians who mediated the peace

between England and the Porte of the 5th of January, 1809, after the

conclusion of which the Turks refused to cede Moldavia and Wallachia

to the Russians, at the congress of Jassy, as they had formerly done

at Bucharest. This led to a new war, of which we shall have to speak

hereafter.

CONGRESS OF ERFURT (1808 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1808 A.D.]]

In consequence of the complete stoppage of trade which followed the

declaration of war in 1807, Russia suffered much more severely than

England, and the Russian magnates, supported by the aversion of the

emperor’s mother to Napoleon, were very far from showing that good-will

to the French which their emperor manifested for Napoleon and his

representatives. This was soon experienced by Savary, duke of Rovigo,

who, though overloaded with marks of politeness by the emperor, in

reality proved unable to make any way at the court of St. Petersburg.

Caulaincourt, duke of Vicenza, was afterwards deceived for some years

by appearances, and by Alexander’s masterly art of dissimulation; but

Napoleon soon came to experience in Spain that the personal proofs of

friendship exhibited by the emperor were by no means always in accordance

with the Russian policy. The emperor Alexander himself, for example, on

the urgent request of Caulaincourt, acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte as king

of Spain; whilst Strogonov, the Russian ambassador in Madrid, alleged

that he had no instructions to that effect, and corresponded with the

insurgents. In the same way, Admiral Siniavin, who, on the breaking out

of war with England, had taken refuge in Lisbon with nine ships of the

line and a frigate, not only refused to render any assistance to Marshal

Junot, who was threatened in that city by the English, but even to make a

demonstration as if he were prepared to assist him. The manner in which

he afterwards capitulated, on the 3rd of September, 1808, to Admiral

Cotton, who caused his ships to be taken to England, might indicate a

very different disposition, especially as the ten ships were afterwards

given back.

There was, indeed, no want of interchange of civilities between the two

emperors. Whoever compares the attentions and marks of regard which

have been recorded as shown by the one to the other with the secret

intrigues which they were at the same moment weaving against each other

in Turkey and Spain, and with the open enmity which was shown as early

as 1811, will learn from such a comparison what is the real worth of

diplomatic and princely friendships. The emperor of Russia made presents

to his imperial brother of vessels and ornaments of malachite and other

precious stones, which the latter exhibited in the Salon du Prix in the

Tuileries, in order to be able to boast of the friendship of the emperor

of Russia in presence of the circles of the faubourg St. Germain. Busts

of Alexander were manufactured in the imperial porcelain manufactory

at Sèvres, and were everywhere to be seen in the palace and rooms of

the imperial family. All who had access to the court, or wished to make

themselves agreeable to the emperor, found it necessary to purchase

these ornaments, and place them conspicuously in their houses. The

friendship was so intimate that one of the emperor of Russia’s adjutants

accompanied the emperor of the French when he went to Bayonne to set

aside the whole reigning family of Spain. This adjutant, however, was

the same Tchernitchev who was engaged in constantly travelling backwards

and forwards between St. Petersburg and Paris, who surrounded Napoleon,

in spite of all his police, with a net of Russian espionage, and bribed

all the employés who were venal in order to obtain papers. He intrigued

with ladies to elicit secrets from them; and finally, in 1812, he even

purchased a copy of the plan of operations for the war, when it was too

late to change it.

Napoleon knew that Austria was thinking of taking advantage of the

general discontent and the secret associations in Germany to frustrate

the plans of France and Russia with respect to Poland and Turkey; he

was, therefore, very desirous of assuring himself once more of the

Russian emperor before his journey to Spain. This design was a cause

of great anxiety to the very numerous partisans of the English and

Prussian policy at the Russian court, when the question was raised of

a conference between the two emperors in Erfurt. Von Schladen, the

friend of the minister von Stein, therefore presented a memorial to the

emperor of Russia, shortly before his departure to Erfurt on the 7th of

September, 1808, in which Alexander was forewarned of all that would take

place there. From this it may be seen that the emperor of Russia was

continually receiving secret counsel and warning from the enemies of the

French, and that he played his part in Erfurt more ably than Napoleon,

from whom he separated, as even the French writers report, with all the

outward signs of indescribable friendship and esteem, but inwardly full

of distrust. Von Schladen says very freely to the emperor, that he had

given him the advice laid down in his memorial, “in order that he might

see through the sophisms, falsehoods, and deceptions which were prepared

for him by Napoleon, and awaited him in Erfurt.”

On his way to the congress, the emperor visited the king and queen of

Prussia in Königsberg, and arrived on the 26th of September in Weimar,

where his brother Constantine had been staying since the 24th. On the

27th Napoleon entered Erfurt, and at one o’clock drove out a distance

of several miles from the town to meet the emperor of Russia, who was

coming from Weimar. Our modest object does not permit us to incorporate

in our prose the poetry of the subsequent festivities, nor in glowing

language to extol the skill displayed by the masters of the ceremonies.

That splendour enough was exhibited in Erfurt may be sufficiently

gathered from the fact that the four vassal-kings of the confederation

of the Rhine, thirty-four princes, twenty-four ministers of state, and

thirty generals, were by express command to summon up for the occasion

everything which imagination could suggest in the way of courtly

splendour and extravagance. Talma and the Parisian company of actors had

been sent to Erfurt, to act, as Napoleon said, before a pit of kings.

Two armchairs were placed for the two emperors, whilst the other rulers

sat behind them on common chairs. We know not what truth there was in

the story, which was at that time in every mouth, and related in all

the French works written for effect, that the emperor Alexander, whilst

Talma was being applauded on the stage, played his own part with Napoleon

in the pit in quite as masterly a manner. The latter, amidst applause,

pronounced the following line:

The friendship of a great man is a favour of the gods.

when the emperor seized Napoleon’s hand, made a profound bow, and

feelingly exclaimed: “That I have never more truly felt than at the

present moment.” The festivities continued from the 27th of September

till the 14th of October, and furnished to the Germans the most

melancholy spectacle of their princes and nobles conducting themselves

publicly, not only as slaves of Napoleon, but even as servants and

flatterers of all his generals and courtiers.

In order to flatter the emperor of Russia, Napoleon acted as if he had

been influenced by Alexander’s application in favour of Prussia; but in

reality, oppressed the king and his subjects afterwards just as before.

He profited by Alexander’s admiration and friendship to make a show of

his pretended willingness to conclude a peace with England. Though he

had written three times directly to the king of England, and had always

been referred to the minister, he nevertheless prevailed upon Alexander

to unite with him in signing another letter addressed to King George. The

result was such as might have been foreseen; the object, however, was

attained: the letters and answers were printed, and officially commented

upon in the journals.

The negotiations were carried on personally in Erfurt between the two

emperors themselves, and much was agreed upon which neither the one nor

the other intended to observe. A written treaty of alliance was besides

concluded by Romanzov and Champagny, which was calculated with a view

to a new war with Austria. The substance of the agreement consists in

a closer alliance of the two powers against England, and the cession

of Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia. Hitherto Napoleon had only been

willing to concede this last point on conditions which referred to

Silesia. In the fifth article of the Treaty of Erfurt, which was kept

strictly secret, the two emperors agreed to conclude a peace with England

on condition only that that country should acknowledge Moldavia and

Wallachia as a part of the Russian Empire. Then follow several articles

on the cession of those Turkish provinces. In the eleventh article it

is stated, that further negotiations were to be carried on respecting a

further partition. It was agreed, too, that the treaty was to be kept

secret for ten years. Buturlin boasts, with reason, that the emperor

Alexander in Erfurt, by his Greco-Slavonian arts of deception, gained a

victory over the Italo-Gallic talents of Napoleon; and, in fact, the very

highest triumph is to outwit the deceiver.

Even as early as this Napoleon is said to have thrown out the idea of a

marriage with Catherine Pavlovna, Alexander’s sister, which inferred,

of course, a previous separation from the empress Josephine. Alexander,

on his part, is said to have raised difficulties on the question of

religion, and to have referred the matter to his mother, who very

speedily had the princess betrothed to Duke Peter of Oldenburg. Moreover,

the reception of the duke of Oldenburg into the confederation of the

Rhine was one of the results of the meeting in Erfurt.

[Sidenote: [1809-1810 A.D.]]

The war which broke out in April, 1809, between France and Austria, put

the sincerity of the Russo-French alliance to a practical test. Russia

complied with the letter of her engagements to the one belligerent power

by declaring war against the other; but Prince Galitzin, who was to have

made a powerful diversion in Galicia, came so late into the field and

his movements were so dilatory that it was evident he had no desire to

contribute to the success of his sovereign’s ally. There was no longer

any show of cordiality in the diplomatic intercourse between France

and Russia; but both parties found it convenient for the present to

dissemble their mutual alienation. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn, signed

by vanquished Austria (October 14th, 1809), that power ceded, partly to

France and partly to the confederation of the Rhine, several towns in

Germany and Italy, with their dependencies; she was despoiled, in favour

of the duchy of Warsaw, of all western Galicia and the city of Cracow;

and surrendered to Russia a territory whose population was estimated at

400,000 souls. The emperor of Austria, moreover, recognised the rights

which Napoleon arrogated over the monarchies of the south of Europe,

adhered to his continental system, and renounced all the countries

comprised under the name of the Illyrian Provinces. But the house of

Habsburg, true to the adage, _Tu, felix Austria, nube_, retrieved its

fortunes at the expense of its pride, by bestowing a daughter in marriage

on the conqueror.

RENEWED WAR WITH TURKEY (1810 A.D.)

Immediately after Alexander’s return from Erfurt orders were given to

open negotiations with the Turks. The conference took place at Jassy;

but it was immediately broken off after the Russian plenipotentiaries

had demanded, as preliminary conditions, the cession of Moldavia and

Wallachia, and the expulsion of the British minister from Constantinople.

Hostilities were then resumed. The Russians were commanded by Prince

Prosorovski, and after his death by Prince Bagration. With the exception

of Giurgevo, all the fortresses attacked by them fell into their hands,

until they encountered the army of the grand vizir, near Silistria, and

being defeated with a loss of ten thousand men (September 26th), were

compelled to evacuate Bulgaria. The grand vizir, without taking advantage

of his victory, retired to winter quarters.

In May, 1810, the Russian main army, under Kamenskoi, again crossed the

Danube at Hirsova, passed through the Dobrudja, and marched straight

against the Turkish main army to Shumla and Varna. At the same time, the

corps of Generals Langeron and Sacken proceeded to blockade Silistria

and Rustchuk. The Turks could nowhere keep the field. At Kavarna they

were routed; at the storming of Bazardjik they lost ten thousand men; at

the storming of Rasgrad three thousand. Silistria was reduced in seven

days by Langeron. So far everything was favourable for the Russians. If

they had added to their advantages the conquest of Rustchuk, the passes

of Tirnova and of Sophia towards Adrianople would have been open, the

fortress of Shumla would have been avoided, and the main army of the

enemy would have been manœuvred out of it. The taking of Rustchuk, and

above all the sparing of the troops, was consequently the next problem

for General Kamenskoi. Instead of doing this, the Russians attempted to

storm almost simultaneously the fortifications of Varna, Shumla, and

Rustchuk, were repulsed from these three places, the defence of which

was conducted by English officers, and suffered so enormously, that

the Turks felt themselves strong enough to come out from behind their

intrenchments, and attack the Russian camp before Shumla. They failed,

however, in their attempt to storm it.

[Sidenote: [1810-1811 A.D.]]

To relieve Rustchuk, the grand vizir sent Mukhtar Pasha with picked

troops, by way of Tirnova, to the Danube. But if the Turks with their

united forces were too weak to force the Russians to abandon the

intrenchments before Shumla, they could certainly not expect with a part

of their army to rout the enemy near Rustchuk, where he stood with his

united forces between their separate wings. Only in case Mukhtar Pasha,

who had increased his forces to forty thousand men, entered Wallachia at

Turna, and marched against Giurgevo, could the offensive have a meaning,

or any influence, upon the siege of Rustchuk, because here it met with

the weak point of the enemy. But to enter upon the offensive with an

army in Wallachia, whilst the Russians stood before the fortresses of

the Danube in Bulgaria, never came into the heads of the Turks. Mukhtar

Pasha intrenched himself at the mouth of the Yantra to cover the passes

of Tirnova and Sophia. On the 7th of September he was attacked in front,

flank, and rear, held out with his best troops till the next morning,

and then surrendered with five thousand men, and all his artillery.

After this Sistovo and Cladova capitulated, and on the 27th of September

Rustchuk and Giurgevo surrendered.

The road to Adrianople was now open for the Russians, but their enormous

losses, caused by their own folly, would have prevented their assuming

the offensive beyond the Balkan for this year, even if the season had

not been so far advanced. Reinforcements for the next year could not be

expected, as Napoleon was preparing to attack Russia, and therefore they

began to negotiate. Another insurrection of the janissaries interrupted

these negotiations, but did not induce the grand vizir to profit by this

opportunity, and fall with his whole force upon the Russians, who, at

this time, were scattered over the country from Widdin to Sophia and

thence as far as Varna. Not until Czerni George, in February, 1811, had

placed the principality of Servia under the protection of Russia, did

the grand vizir awake from his apathy in Thrace, and cross the Balkan,

with only fifteen thousand men. He, however, proceeded so slowly that

Kamenskoi had time enough to assemble sufficient forces.

They met at Lofteh on the Osma; the Turks were defeated, and lost three

thousand men. Achmed Pasha, however, a violent and sturdy soldier,

without any higher military education, led fifty thousand fresh troops to

Shumla, and insisted upon their taking the offensive. The Russians had

received no reinforcements, but Kutusov had taken the command. Without

any considerable losses, he concentrated his small army at Silistria

and Rustchuk, and abandoned Bulgaria as far as the latter place, after

having rased the fortresses. In the battle before Rustchuk, on the 4th of

July, the Turks were driven back, but on the 7th, they forced the twenty

thousand Russians who stood on the right bank of the Danube to give up

Rustchuk also, though not until its works had been rased.

Instead of crossing the river from the Dobrudja, and operating with a

superior force upon the Russian lines of communication, the grand vizir

allowed himself to be induced, by the retreat of Kutusov, to cross the

Danube at Rustchuk, without a fortress in his rear. Arrived on the

left bank with his main army, a Russian flotilla barred his retreat,

while Russian corps recrossed the Danube above and below Rustchuk, and

took possession of the town (no longer fortified) and of the Turkish

camp (September 7th). The grand vizir fled, but his main army, still

consisting of 25,000 men and 56 pieces of artillery, was forced to

surrender in the vicinity of Giurgevo. A few days afterwards Count St.

Priest took Shirtov, with the whole of the Turkish flotilla on the

Danube. Nicopoli and Widdin next surrendered, so that by the end of the

campaign the Russians were masters of the whole right bank of the Danube.

The Servians, also, aided by a body of Russians, had wrested from the

Turks the last fortresses they held in the principality.

The grand vizir asked for a suspension of arms, with a view to

negotiating a peace; but the terms now demanded by the victorious

Russians were such as the Porte would not accede to. The war was

continued in 1811, but always to the disadvantage of the Turks. Resolved

on a last desperate effort, they assembled a formidable army whilst the

conference at Bucharest was still pending. At last, the rupture between

France and Russia changed the aspect of affairs, and compelled the

latter power to abandon the long-coveted prey when it was already in its

grasp. The Russian minister, Italinski, contented himself with requiring

that the Pruth should for the future form the boundary between the two

empires. The sultan regarded even this concession as disgraceful; but the

Russians carried their point by bribery, and the Treaty of Bucharest was

concluded. Its chief provisions were these:

Article 4. The Pruth, from the point where it enters Moldavia to its

confluence with the Danube, and thence the left bank of the latter to its

embouchure on the Black Sea at Kilia, shall be the boundary between the

two empires. Thus the Porte surrendered to Russia a third of Moldavia,

with the fortresses of Khoczim and Bender, and all Bessarabia, with

Ismail and Kilia. By the same article, the navigation of the Danube is

common to the subjects of Russia and Turkey. The islands enclosed between

the several arms of the river below Ismail are to remain waste. The

rest of Moldavia and Wallachia are to be restored to the Turks in their

actual condition. Article 6. The Asiatic frontier remains the same as

it was before the war. Article 8 relates to the Servians, to whom the

Porte grants an amnesty and some privileges, the interpretation of which

offers a wide field for the exercise of diplomatic subtlety. Article 13.

Russia accepts the mediation of the Porte for the conclusion of a peace

with Persia, where hostilities had begun anew, at the instigation of the

English ambassador.

WAR WITH NAPOLEON

Notwithstanding all the demonstrations to the contrary made since the

Peace of Tilsit, England, Russia, Prussia, and also Austria partially,

always continued to maintain a certain mutual understanding, which was,

however, kept very secret, and somewhat resembled a conspiracy. The most

distinguished statesmen both in Russia and Prussia felt how unnatural

was an alliance between Napoleon, Alexander, and Frederick William III,

and directed attention to the subject. This was also done on the part of

England, and it is certain that the emperor Alexander, as early as the

meeting in Erfurt in 1808, expressed his doubts respecting the duration

of his alliance with France. The conduct of Russia in the campaign

against Austria, in 1809, first shook Napoleon’s confidence in his ally.

Mutual complaints and recriminations ensued; but neither party thought it

advisable to give any prominence to their disunion, and Napoleon, even

when he had entered, through Thugut, upon the subject of an Austrian

marriage, still continued to carry on negotiations for an alliance with a

Russian princess.

The enlargement of the territory of the duchy of Warsaw, extorted by

Napoleon at the Peace of Schönbrunn, at length led to an exchange of

diplomatic notes, which tended strongly to a war. The Poles naturally

expected from Napoleon and his advisers that he would in some way give

new life and currency to the name of Poland; against this the emperor of

Russia earnestly protested. The whole of the diplomatic correspondence

between Russia and France in the years 1810 and 1811 turns upon the use

of the words Poles and Polish, although Russia had again obtained by the

Peace of Schönbrunn a portion of Austrian Poland, as it had previously

obtained a part of Prussian Poland by the Peace of Tilsit. Seeing that

the whole of western Galicia, Zamoisk, and Cracow had been united to

the duchy of Warsaw by the Peace of Schönbrunn, Russia called upon the

emperor of the French to bind himself expressly by treaty not to revive

the names of Pole and kingdom of Poland.

Before the end of 1809 many notes were exchanged concerning this point,

apparently so insignificant, but in reality so important for the peace

and safety of the Russian Empire. Napoleon agreed to give the assurance

so earnestly desired by Alexander, and Caulaincourt, the French

ambassador in St. Petersburg, signed a regular concession of the Russian

demand in January, 1810. By the first two articles of this agreement it

was laid down that the word Poland, or Polish, was not to be used when

any reference was made to the enlargement of the duchy of Warsaw. By the

third article the two emperors bound themselves not to revive or renew

any of the old Polish orders. In the fifth, the emperor of the French

agreed not further to enlarge the duchy of Warsaw by the addition of

provinces or cities belonging to the former state of Poland.

This agreement, signed by Caulaincourt, still required the confirmation

of the emperor of the French: and Napoleon had given instructions to his

ambassador only to agree to such an arrangement on condition that the

agreement was drawn up in the usual diplomatic manner: that is to say, in

employing words and phrases so chosen as to be capable of any subsequent

interpretation which may best suit the parties. This was not done. The

articles were very brief, the language so clear and definite as to be

incapable of mistake or misrepresentation. Without directly refusing his

sanction to the treaty, Napoleon required that it should be couched in

different language, and caused a new draft of it to be presented in St.

Petersburg. The Russians saw at once through his purpose, and Alexander

expressed his displeasure in terms which plainly indicated to the French

ambassador his belief that Napoleon was really meditating some hostile

measures against him, and was only seeking to gain time by the treaty.

This occurred in February, 1810; in the following months both Romanzov

and Caulaincourt took the greatest possible pains to bring the question

to a favourable issue, and negotiations continued to be carried on

respecting this subject till September. They could not agree; and

after September there was no more talk of the treaty, much less of

its alteration. The relation between the two emperors had undergone a

complete change in the course of the year.

The cupidity of Russia, far from being glutted by the possession of

Finland, great part of Prussian and Austrian Poland, Moldavia, and

Bessarabia, still craved for more. Napoleon was, however, little inclined

to concede Constantinople and the Mediterranean to his Russian ally

(to whose empire he assigned the Danube as a boundary), or to put it

in possession of the duchy of Warsaw. The Austrian marriage, which was

effected in 1809, naturally led Russia to conclude that she would no

longer be permitted to aggrandise herself at the expense of Austria, and

Alexander, seeing that nothing more was to be gained by complaisance to

France, consequently assumed a threatening posture, and condescended to

listen to the complaints of his agricultural and mercantile subjects. No

Russian vessel durst venture out to sea, and a Russian fleet had been

seized by the British in the harbours of Lisbon. At Riga lay immense

stores of grain in want of a foreign market. On the 31st of December,

1810, Alexander published a fresh tariff permitting the importation of

colonial products under a neutral flag (several hundred English ships

arrived under the American flag), and prohibiting the importation of

French manufactured goods. Not many weeks previously, on the 13th of

December, Napoleon had annexed Oldenberg to France. The duke, Peter, was

nearly related to the emperor of Russia, and Napoleon, notwithstanding

his declared readiness to grant a compensation, refused to allow it to

consist of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and proposed a duchy of Erfurt, as

yet uncreated, which Russia scornfully rejected.

[Sidenote: [1811-1812 A.D.]]

The alliance between Russia, Sweden, and England was now speedily

concluded. Sweden, which had vainly demanded from Napoleon the possession

of Norway and a large supply of money, assumed a tone of indignation,

threw open her harbours to the British merchantmen, and so openly carried

on a contraband trade in Pomerania, that Napoleon, in order to maintain

the continental system, was constrained to garrison Swedish Pomerania

and Rügen and to disarm the Swedish inhabitants. Bernadotte, upon this,

ranged himself entirely on the side of his opponents, without, however,

coming to an open rupture, for which he awaited a declaration on the part

of Russia. The expressions made use of by Napoleon on the birth of the

king of Rome at length filled up the measure of provocation. Intoxicated

with success, he boasted, in an address to the mercantile classes, that

he would, in despite of Russia, maintain the continental system, for he

was lord over the whole of continental Europe; and that if Alexander had

not concluded a treaty with him at Tilsit, he would have compelled him

to do so at St. Petersburg. The pride of the haughty Russian was deeply

wounded, and a rupture was nigh at hand.

Russia had, meanwhile, anticipated Napoleon in making preparations for

war. As early as 1811, a great Russian army stood ready for the invasion

of Poland, and might, as there were at that time but few French troops in

Germany, easily have advanced as far as the Elbe. It remained, however,

in a state of inactivity. Napoleon instantly prepared for war and

fortified Dantzic. His continual proposals of peace, ever unsatisfactory

to the ambition of the czar, remaining at length unanswered, he declared

war.[k]

But, to get within reach of Russia, it was necessary for Napoleon to pass

beyond Austria, to cross Prussia, and to conciliate Sweden and Turkey; an

offensive alliance with these four powers was therefore indispensable.

Austria was subject to the ascendency of Napoleon, and Prussia to his

arms: to them, therefore, he had only to declare his intentions; Austria

voluntarily and eagerly entered into his plans, and Prussia he easily

prevailed on to join him.

Austria, however, did not act blindly. Situated between the two giant

powers of the north and the west, she was not displeased to see them

at war: she looked to their mutually weakening each other, and to the

increase of her own strength by their exhaustion. On the 14th of March,

1812, she promised France thirty thousand men, but she prepared prudent

secret instructions for them. She obtained a vague promise of an increase

of territory as an indemnity for her share of the expenses of the war,

and the possession of Galicia was guaranteed to her. She admitted,

however, the future possibility of a cession of part of that province

to the kingdom of Poland, but in exchange for that she would have

received the Illyrian Provinces. The sixth article of the secret treaty

establishes this fact.

The success of the war, therefore, in no degree depended on the cession

of Galicia, or the difficulties arising from the Austrian jealousy

respecting that possession. Napoleon consequently might, on his entrance

into Vilna, have publicly proclaimed the liberation of the whole of

Poland, instead of betraying the expectations of her people, confounding

and rendering them indifferent by expressions of doubtful import. This

was one of those decisive issues which occur in politics as well as in

war, and which determine the future. No consideration ought to have made

Napoleon swerve from his purpose. But whether it was that he reckoned

too much on the ascendency of his genius, or the strength of his army

and the weakness of Alexander; or that, considering what he left behind

him, he felt it too dangerous to carry on so distant a war slowly and

methodically; or whether, as we shall presently be told by himself, he

had doubts of the success of his undertaking, certain it is that he

either neglected or could not yet venture to proclaim the liberation of

that country whose freedom he had come to restore. Yet he had sent an

ambassador to her diet; and when this inconsistency was remarked to him

he replied that that nomination was an act of war, which only bound him

during the war, while by his words he would be bound both in war and

peace. Thus it was that he made no other answer to the enthusiasm of the

Lithuanians than evasive expressions, at the very time he was following

up his attack on Alexander to the very capital of his empire.

He even neglected to clear the southern Polish provinces of the feeble

hostile armies which kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in check,

and to secure, by strongly organising their insurrection, a solid basis

of operation. Accustomed to short methods and to rapid attacks, he wished

to do as he had done before, in spite of the difference of places and

circumstances; for such is the weakness of man that he is always led

by imitation, either of others or of himself, which in the latter case

is habit, for habit is nothing more than the imitation of one’s self.

Accordingly, it is by their strongest side that great men are often

undone![h]

_Napoleon Invades Russia (1812 A.D.)_

[Sidenote: [1812 A.D.]]

On the 24th of June, 1812, Napoleon crossed the Niemen, the Russian

frontier, not far from Kovno. The season was already too far advanced. It

may be that, deceived by the mildness of the winter of 1806 to 1807, he

imagined it possible to protract the campaign without peril to himself

until the winter months. No enemy appeared to oppose his progress.

Barclay de Tolly, the Russian commander-in-chief, pursued the system

followed by the Scythians against Dairus, and perpetually retiring before

the enemy gradually drew him deep into the dreary and deserted steppes.

This plan originated with Scharnhorst, by whom General Lieven was

advised not to hazard an engagement until the winter, and to turn a deaf

ear to every proposal of peace. General Lieven, on reaching Barclay’s

headquarters, took into his confidence Colonel Toll, a German, Barclay’s

right hand, and Lieutenant-Colonel Clausewitz, also a German, afterwards

noted for his strategical works.

General Pfül, another German, at that time high in the emperor’s

confidence, and almost all the Russian generals opposed Scharnhorst’s

plan, and continued to advance with a view of giving battle: but on

Napoleon’s appearance at the head of an army greatly their superior in

number, before the Russians had been able to concentrate their forces,

they were naturally compelled to retire before him; and, on the

prevention, for some weeks, of the junction of a newly levied Russian

army under Prince Bagration with the forces under Barclay, owing to the

rapidity of Napoleon’s advance, Scharnhorst’s plan was adopted as the

only one feasible.

Whilst the French were advancing, a warm and tedious discussion was

carried on so long in the imperial Russian council of war at Vilna,

whether to defend that city, or adopt the plan of Barclay de Tolly, the

minister of war and commander-in-chief, that they were at length obliged

to march precipitately to the Dvina with the sacrifice of considerable

stores, and to take possession of a fortified camp which had been

established at Drissa. As late as the 27th the emperor Alexander and the

whole of his splendid staff and court were assembled at a ball, at the

castle of Zacrest, near Vilna, belonging to General Bennigsen, so that

the French found everything on the 28th just as it had been prepared for

the reception of the emperor of Russia. They plundered the castle, and

carried off the furniture as booty; the Russians were even obliged to

leave behind them considerable quantities of ammunition and provisions.

In this way the line of the Russian defences was broken through; and

even a portion of their army under Platov and Bagration would have been

cut off, had the king of Westphalia obeyed the commands of his brother

with the necessary rapidity. The difficulties of carrying on war in such

an inhospitable country as Lithuania and Russia became apparent even at

Vilna; the carriages and wagons fell behind, the cannon were obliged

to be left, discipline became relaxed, above ten thousand horses had

already fallen, and their carcases poisoned the air. General Balakov

could scarcely be considered serious in the proposals which he then made

for peace in the name of the emperor of Russia, because the Russians

required as a preliminary to all negotiation that the French army should

first retire behind the Niemen. The mission of a general, who had been

minister of police, and had therefore had great experience in obtaining

information, had no doubt a very different object in view from that of

making peace at such a moment.

Napoleon, in the hope of overtaking the Russians, and of compelling them

to give battle, pushed onwards by forced marches; the supplies were

unable to follow, and numbers of the men and horses sank from exhaustion,

owing to over-fatigue, heat, and hunger. On the arrival of Napoleon in

Witepsk, of Schwarzenberg in Volhinia, of the Prussians before Riga, the

army might have halted, reconquered Poland, have been organised, the

men put into winter quarters, the army have again taken the field early

in the spring, and the conquest of Russia have been slowly but surely

completed. But Napoleon had resolved upon terminating the war in one

rapid campaign, upon defeating the Russians, seizing their metropolis,

and dictating terms of peace. He incessantly pursued his retreating

opponent, whose footsteps were marked by the flames of the cities and

villages and by the devastated country to their rear. The first serious

opposition was made at Smolensk, whence the Russians, however, speedily

retreated after setting the city on fire. On the same day, the Bavarians,

who had diverged to one side during their advance, had a furious

encounter at Polotsk with a body of Russian troops under Wittgenstein.

The Bavarians remained stationary in this part of the country for the

purpose of watching the movements of that general, whilst Napoleon,

careless of the peril with which he was threatened by the approach of

winter and by the multitude of enemies gathered to his rear, advanced

with the main body of the grand army from Smolensk across the wasted

country upon Moscow, the ancient metropolis of the Russian empire.

Russia, at that time engaged in a war with Turkey, whose frontiers were

watched by an immense army under Kutusov, used her utmost efforts, in

which she was aided by England, to conciliate the Porte in order to turn

the whole of her forces against Napoleon. By a master-stroke of political

intrigue, the Porte was made to conclude a disadvantageous peace at

Bucharest on the 28th of May, as we have already related. A Russian army

under Tchitchakov was now enabled to drive the Austrians out of Volhinia,

whilst a considerable force under Kutusov joined Barclay. Buturlin, the

Russian historian of the war, states that the national troops opposed

to the invaders numbered 217,000 in the first line, and 35,000 in the

second. Chambray, whose details are very minute, after deducting the men

in hospital, gives the number of those present under arms as 235,000 of

the regular army, without reckoning the garrisons of Riga, etc. This

computation exceeds that of Buturlin, under the same circumstances, by

17,000. M. de Fezensac allows 230,000 for the total of the two armies of

Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, but adds the army of Tormassov on their

extreme left, 68,000, and that defending Courland, on the extreme right,

34,000, to make up the Russian total of 330,000 men.

Had the Russians at this time hazarded an engagement, their defeat was

certain. Moscow could not have been saved. Barclay consequently resolved

not to come to an engagement, but to husband his forces and to attack

the French during the winter. The intended surrender of Moscow without a

blow was, nevertheless, deeply resented as a national disgrace; the army

and the people raised a clamour. Kutuzov, though immeasurably inferior

to Barclay, was nominated commander-in-chief, took up a position on the

little river Moskva near Borodino, about two days’ journey from Moscow.

A bloody engagement took place there on the 7th of September, in which

Napoleon, in order to spare his guards, neglected to follow up his

advantage with his usual energy, and allowed the defeated Russians, whom

he might have totally annihilated, to escape. Napoleon triumphed; but at

what a price!--after a fearful struggle, in which he lost forty thousand

men in killed and wounded, the latter of whom perished, almost to a man,

owing to want and neglect.[k]

_The Abandonment of Moscow_

On his birthday, which was the 30th of August (11th of September of the

Russian calendar), the emperor Alexander received a report from Prince

Kontonzov of the battle that had taken place at Borodino on the 26th of

August, and which as the commander-in-chief wrote, “had terminated by the

enemy not gaining a single step of territory in spite of their superior

forces.” To this Kutuzov added that after having spent the night on the

field of battle, he had, in view of the enormous losses sustained by the

army, retreated to Mozhaisk. The losses on either side amounted to forty

thousand men. As Ermolov very justly expressed it, “the French army was

dashed to pieces against the Russian.” Although the emperor Alexander

was not led into any error as to the real signification of the battle

of Borodino, yet wishing to maintain the hopes of the nation as to the

successful termination of the struggle with Napoleon and their confidence

in Kutuzov, he accepted the report of the conflict of the 26th of August

as the announcement of a victory. Prince Kutuzov was created general

field-marshal and granted a sum of 100,000 rubles. Barclay de Tolly

was rewarded with the order of St. George of the second class, and the

mortally wounded Prince Bagration with a sum of 50,000 rubles. Fourteen

generals received the order of St. George of the third class, and all

the privates who had taken part in the battle were given five rubles each.

Prince Kutuzov’s despatch of the 27th of August to the emperor Alexander

was read by Prince Gortchakov at the Nevski monastery before a

thanksgiving service which took place in the presence of their majesties,

and was printed in the _Northern Post_. But the following lines were

omitted from the report: “Your imperial majesty will deign to agree that

after a most sanguinary battle, which lasted fifteen hours, our army and

that of the enemy could not fail to be in disorder. Moreover, through the

losses sustained this day the position has naturally become incompatible

with the depleted number of our troops--therefore, all our aims being

directed to the destruction of the French army, I have come to the

decision to fall back six versts, that is, beyond Mozhaisk.”

A moment of anxious expectation approached in St. Petersburg. Meanwhile

Kutuzov, retreating step by step, led the army to Moscow, and on the 1st

of September he assembled a council of war at the village of Filiakh.

There was decided the fate of the first capital of the empire. After

prolonged debates Kutuzov concluded the conference by saying: “I know

that I shall have to pay the damage, but I sacrifice myself for the good

of my country. I give the order to retreat.”

It was already towards nightfall when Rostoptchin received the following

letter from Kutuzov: “The fact that the enemy has divided his columns

upon Zvenigorod and Borovsk, together with the disadvantageous position

now occupied by our troops, oblige me to my sorrow to abandon Moscow. The

army is marching on the route to Riazan.” It was thus that Rostoptchin

received the first definite information of Kutuzov’s intention to leave

Moscow a few hours before the French were in sight of the capital; under

these circumstances the Moscow commander-in-chief did all that was

possible on his side and took all measures for setting the town on fire

at the approach of the army. Rostoptchin departed unhindered in a droshky

by the back gates.