When on the 2nd of September Napoleon reached the Dragomilovski barriers,

he expected to find there a deputation, begging that the city might be

spared; but instead of that he received the news that Moscow had been

abandoned by its inhabitants. “Moscow deserted! What an improbable event!

We must make sure of it. Go and bring the boyars to me,” said he to Count

Darn, whom he sent into the town. Instead of the boyars a few foreigners

were collected who confirmed the news that Moscow had been abandoned by

nearly all its inhabitants. Having passed the night on the outskirts of

the city, on the morning of the 3rd of September Napoleon transferred his

headquarters to the Kremlin. But here a still more unexpected occurrence

awaited him. The fires, which had already commenced the eve, had not

ceased burning; and on the night between the 3rd and the 4th of September

the flames, driven along by a strong wind, had enveloped the greater

part of the town. At midday the flames reached the Kremlin, and Napoleon

was forced to seek a refuge in the Petrovski palace, where he remained

until the 6th of September, when the fire began to abate.[56] Nine tenths

of the city became the prey of the flames, and pillage completed the

calamities that overtook the inhabitants who had remained in it.

It was only on the 7th of September that the emperor Alexander received

through Iaroslav a short despatch from Count Rostoptchin to the effect

that Kutuzov had decided to abandon Moscow. The next day, the 8th of

September, the fatal news of Napoleon’s occupation of the capital of the

empire was confirmed by a despatch from the field-marshal dated the 4th

of September and brought in by Colonel Michaud. Kutuzov wrote from the

village of Jilin (on the march to the Borovsk bridge) as follows:

“After the battle of the 26th of August, which in spite of so much

bloodshed resulted in a victory for our side, I was obliged to abandon

the position near Borodino for reasons of which I had the honour to

inform your imperial majesty. The army was completely exhausted after the

combat. In this condition we drew nearer to Moscow, having daily greatly

to do with the advance guard of the enemy; besides this there was no near

prospect of a position presenting itself from which I could successfully

engage the enemy. The troops which we had hoped to join could not yet

come; the enemy had set two fresh columns, one upon the Borovsk route

and the other on the Zvenigorod route, striving to act upon my rear from

Moscow: therefore I could not venture to risk a battle, the disadvantages

of which might have as consequences not only the destruction of the army

but the most sanguinary losses and the conversion of Moscow itself to

ashes.

“In this most uncertain position, after taking counsel with our first

generals, of whom some were of contrary opinion, I was forced to

decide to allow the enemy to enter Moscow, whence all the treasures,

the arsenal, and nearly all property belonging to the state or private

individuals had been removed, and in which hardly a single inhabitant

remained. I venture most humbly to submit to your most gracious majesty

that the entry of the enemy into Moscow is not the subjection of Russia.

On the contrary, I am now moving with the army on the route to Tula,

which will place me in a position to avail myself of the help abundantly

prepared in our governments. Although I do not deny that the occupation

of the capital is a most painful wound, yet I could not waver in my

decision.

“I am now entering upon operations with all the strength of the line, by

means of which, beginning with the Tula and Kaluga routes, my detachments

will cut off the whole line of the enemy, stretching from Smolensk to

Moscow, and thus avert any assistance which the enemy’s army might

possibly receive from its rear; by turning the attention of the enemy

upon us, I hope to force him to leave Moscow and change the whole line of

his operations. I have enjoined General Vinzengerode to hold himself on

the Tver route, having meanwhile a regiment of Cossacks on the Iaroslav

route in order to protect the inhabitants against attacks from the

enemy’s detachments. Having now assembled my forces at no great distance

from Moscow I can await the enemy with a firm front, and as long as the

army of your imperial majesty is whole and animated by its known bravery

and our zeal, the yet retrievable loss of Moscow cannot be regarded

as the loss of the fatherland. Besides this, your imperial majesty

will graciously deign to agree that these consequences are indivisibly

connected with the loss of Smolensk and with the condition of complete

disorder in which I found the troops.”

This despatch from Prince Kutuzov was printed in the _Northern Post_ of

the 18th of September, with the exception of the concluding words of the

report: “and with the condition of complete disorder in which I found the

troops.” The sorrowful news brought by Colonel Michaud did not, however,

shake the emperor Alexander in his decision to continue the war and not

to enter into negotiations with the enemy. When he had finished listening

to Michaud’s report, he turned to him with the following memorable words:

“Go back to the army, and tell our brave soldiers, tell all my faithful

subjects, wherever you pass by, that even if I have not one soldier left,

I will put myself at the head of my dear nobles, of my good peasants,

and will thus employ the last resources of my empire; it offers more to

me than my enemies think for, but if ever it were written in the decrees

of divine providence that my dynasty should cease to reign upon the

throne of my ancestors, then, after having exhausted every means in my

power, I would let my beard grow and go to eat potatoes with the last of

my peasants, rather than sign the shame of my country and of my beloved

people whose sacrifices I know how to prize. Napoleon or I--I or he; for

he and I can no longer reign together. I have learned to know him; he

will no longer deceive me.”

“The loss of Moscow,” wrote Alexander to the crown prince of Sweden on

the 19th of September, “gives me at least the opportunity of presenting

to the whole of Europe the greatest proof I can offer of my perseverance

in continuing the struggle against her oppressor, for after such a wound

all the rest are but scratches. Now more than ever I and the nation at

the head of which I have the honour to be, are decided to persevere. We

should rather be buried beneath the ruins of the empire than make terms

with the modern Attila.”

The letter that Napoleon addressed to the emperor from Moscow, dated

the 8th of September, in which he disclaimed the responsibility of the

burning of the capital, was left unanswered. In informing the crown

prince of it, the emperor Alexander added: “It contains, however, nothing

but bragging.”

_The Retreat of the Grand Army_

At length the sorrowful days which the emperor Alexander had lived

through passed by, and the hope of better things in the future manifested

itself. On the 15th of October Colonel Michaud arrived in St. Petersburg

from the army, for the second time; but on this occasion he was the

bearer of the joyful intelligence of the victory of Tarontin, which had

taken place on the 6th of October. The envoy also informed the emperor of

the army’s desire that he should take the command of it in person. The

emperor replied as follows:

“All men are ambitious, and I frankly acknowledge that I am no less

ambitious than others; were I to listen to this feeling alone, I should

get into a carriage with you and set off to the army. Taking into

consideration the disadvantageous position into which we have induced

the enemy, the excellent spirit by which the army is animated, the

inexhaustible resources of the empire, the numerous troops in reserve,

which I have lying in readiness, and the orders that I have despatched to

the army of Moldavia--I feel undoubtingly sure that the victory must be

inalienably ours, and that it only remains for us, as you say, to gather

the laurels. I know that if I were with the army all the glory would be

attributed to me, and that I should occupy a place in history; but when I

think how little experience I have in the art of war in comparison with

my adversary, and that in spite of my good will I might make a mistake,

through which the precious blood of my children might be shed, then

setting aside my ambition, I am ready willingly to sacrifice my glory

for the good of the army. Let those gather the laurels who are worthier

of them than I; go back to headquarters, congratulate Prince Michael

Larionovitch with his victory, and tell him to drive the enemy out of

Russia and then I will come to meet him and will lead him triumphantly

into the capital.”

[Illustration: RETREAT OF NAPOLEON FROM THE BURNING CITY OF MOSCOW

(Painted for THE HISTORIANS’ HISTORY OF THE WORLD by Thure de Thulstrup)]

At that time the fate of the _grande armée_ was already definitively

decided. Having lost all hope of the peace he so desired, Napoleon began

to prepare for retreat. The defeat of his vanguard at Tarontin on the

6th of October hastened the departure of the French from Moscow; it began

in the evening of the same day. Napoleon’s intention was first to move

along the old Kaluga road, to join Murat’s vanguard, and then go on to

the new Kaluga road; the emperor thus hoped to go round the Russian army

and open a free access for himself to Kaluga. But the partisan Seslavin,

who had boldly made his way through on to the Borovsk route discovered

Napoleon’s movements. Standing behind a tree in the road, he saw the

carriage in which was the emperor himself, surrounded by his marshals and

his guards. Not satisfied with this exploit, Seslavin besides caught a

non-commissioned officer of the Old Guard, who had got separated from the

others in the thickness of the wood, bound him, and throwing him across

his saddle, galloped off with him.

The intelligence obtained by Seslavin had for consequences the

immediate move of Dokhtorov’s corps to Malo-Iaroslavetz; at the same

time Kutuzov decided to follow from Tarontin with the whole army, and

these arrangements led, on the 12th of October, to the battle near

Malo-Iaroslavetz. The town passed from the hands of one side to the

other eight times, and although after a conflict of eighteen hours it

was finally given up to the French, yet Kutuzov succeeded in opportunely

concentrating the whole army to the south of it, at a distance of two and

one-half versts.

Here, as Ségur justly remarks, was stopped the conquest of the

universe, here vanished the fruits of twenty years of victory and

began the destruction of all that Napoleon had hoped to create. The

author of this success, Seslavin, writes: “The enemy was forestalled at

Malo-Iaroslavetz; the French were exterminated, Russia was saved, Europe

set free, and universal peace established: such are the consequences of

this great discovery.”

The field-marshal had now to decide the question whether a general

battle should be attempted for the annihilation of the French army, or

whether endeavours should be made to attain this object by more cautious

means. The leader stopped at the latter decision. “It will all fall

through without me,” said Kutuzov, in reply to the impatient partisans of

decisive action. He expressed his idea more definitely on this occasion

to the English general Wilson, who was then at the Russian headquarters:

“I prefer to build a ‘golden bridge,’ as you call it, for my adversary,

than to put myself in such a position that I might receive a ‘blow on

the neck’ from him. Besides this, I again repeat to you what I have

already several times told you--I am not at all sure that the complete

annihilation of the emperor Napoleon and his army would be such a great

benefit to the universe. His inheritance would give the continent not to

Russia or any other power, but to that power which now already rules the

seas; and then her predominance would be unbearable.” Wilson replied: “Do

what you ought, come what may.” The Russian army began to depart on the

night between the 13th and 14th of October for Detchina.[g]

_Napoleon on the Road to Smolensk_

When, on the 14th of October, Kutuzov and his army approached Detchina,

Napoleon turned again from Gorodni in the direction of Malo-Iaroslavetz.

Half-way there, a report was brought to him which announced that the

Russian outposts had quitted this latter town. Napoleon stopped, and,

seating himself near a fire which had been lighted in the open: “What

design,” he said, “had Kutuzov in abandoning Malo-Iaroslavetz?” He was

silent for a moment and then added: “He wants to stop our road to the

south.” And, determined as he was not to fight, Napoleon ordered the

army to return along the Smolensk road, preferring to contend with want

of provisions rather than find himself on the other track, under the

necessity of using force in order to pursue the direction he had intended

to take when he quitted Moscow. Thus the whole plan of campaign was

thwarted and the fortune of Napoleon compromised. From Malo-Iaroslavetz

to Waterloo Napoleon’s career presents nothing but a series of defeats,

rarely interrupted by a few victories. It was in profound silence

and with dejection painted on every visage that the French army, as

though under the presentiment of its fatal destiny, retraced the way

to Smolensk. Napoleon marched pensive in the midst of his downcast

regiments, reckoning with Marshal Berthier the enormous distances to be

traversed and the time it must take him to reach Smolensk and Minsk, the

only towns on the Vilna road where food and ammunition had been prepared.

Kutuzov, learning on the 14th of October that Napoleon had left

Malo-Iaroslavetz, immediately advanced his army on the Miadin road in

the direction of some linen factories, and detached Platov with fifteen

Cossack regiments and some flying squadrons, that they might inform him

of Napoleon’s movements. The next day he received from these squadrons

the assurance that the latter was indeed effecting his retreat by the

Smolensk route. Thus the manœuvres of Kutuzov were crowned with complete

success. Thus it happened that just two months after the 17th of August,

the day on which he had assumed command of the armies, the conqueror’s

eagles were flying with all speed towards the place whence they had

taken flight. The movement carried out on the enemy’s left flank as far

as Malo-Iaroslavetz, and thence to the linen factories, disconcerted

all Napoleon’s plans, closed to him the road to Kaluga and Iukhnov, and

forced him to follow a route which two months before had been ruined

from end to end, and which led across deserts that Napoleon seemed to

have prepared for himself. The enemy’s army, which still amounted to one

hundred thousand men, continued to bear a threatening aspect, but the

want of provisions and the attacks it had to repulse must diminish its

forces and hasten its disorganisation. Hunger, like a gnawing worm, was

exhausting the enemy, while Russian steel completed his destruction.

The nearest French magazines were at Smolensk, eight hundred versts

away. To cross this distance with the little food he possessed, to

suffer an immense loss, and, in addition, to be continually exposed to

attacks--such were the exploits now before Napoleon and such was the

position in which Kutuzov had placed him.

The question was: How is Napoleon to be pursued? What direction shall the

army take in order to derive all the advantage possible from the retreat

of the French? To follow the enemy’s steps in columns was impossible

without exposing the army to the pangs of hunger. “I think,” said

Kutuzov, “that I shall do Napoleon most harm by marching parallel with

him and acting on the way according to the movements he may execute.”

This happy idea seemed to be a basis for the manœuvres which Kutuzov

subsequently effected. He gave orders to the army to march on Viazmabi

Kussov, Suleïka, Dubrova, and Bikov; to Miloradovitch to direct his way,

with two corps of infantry and two of cavalry, between the army and the

route to Smolensk, and to approach this route in the neighbourhood of

Gzhatsk, and then, proceeding in the direction of Viazma, along the same

road, to take advantage of every favourable opportunity of attacking

the enemy; to Platov, who had been reinforced by Paskevitch’s division,

to follow the French in the rear; and finally to the guerilla corps

to fall on the enemy’s columns in front and in flank. In ordering

these dispositions Kutuzov addressed the following order of the day

to the army: “Napoleon, who thought only of ardently pursuing a war

which has become national, without foreseeing that it might in one

moment annihilate his whole army, now finding in every inhabitant a

soldier ready to repulse his perfidious seductions, and seeing the firm

resolution of the whole population to present, if need be, their breasts

to the sword directed against their beloved country--Napoleon, in fine,

after having attained the object of his vain and foolhardy thoughts,

namely that of shaking all Russia by rendering himself master of Moscow,

has suddenly made up his mind to beat a retreat. We are at this moment in

pursuit of him, whilst other Russian armies occupy Lithuania anew and are

ready to act in concert with us to complete the ruin of the enemy who has

ventured to menace Russia. In his flight he abandons his caissons, blows

up his projectiles, and covers the ground with the treasures carried off

from our churches. Already Napoleon hears murmurs raised by all ranks

of his army; already hunger is making itself felt, while desertion and

disorder of every kind are manifested amongst the soldiers. Already the

voice of our august monarch rings out, crying to us, ‘Extinguish the fire

of Moscow in the blood of the enemy. Warriors, let us accomplish that

task, and Russia will be content with us--a solid peace will be again

established within the circle of her immense frontiers! Brave soldiers of

Russia, God will aid us in so righteous an achievement!’”

Immediately, as Kutuzov had ordered, a general movement of the army began

in the enemy’s rear. The French left on the road sick, wounded--all

this might delay the march of the retiring troops. The cavalry began

no longer to show themselves in the rearguard. For lack of food and

shoeing the horses became so enfeebled that the cavalry were outdistanced

by the infantry, who continued to hasten their retreat. Speed was the

enemy’s only means of escaping from the deserts in which no nourishment

could be procured, and of reaching the Dnieper, where the French

counted on finding some corn magazines, and forming a junction with

the corps of Victor and St. Cyr and the battalions on the march, the

various columns which were there at the moment, the depots, and a great

number of soldiers who had fallen off from the army and were following

it. Convinced of the necessity of hurrying their steps, all, from the

marshals down to the meanest soldiers, went forward at full speed.

But the temperature grew daily more rigorous. The cold wind of autumn

rendered bivouacs insupportable to the enemy, and drove him thence in

the morning long before daybreak. He struck camp in the darkness, and

lighted his way along the road by means of lanterns. Each corps tried to

pass the other. The passage of the rivers, on rafts or bridges, was made

in the greatest disorder, and the baggage accumulated so as to arrest

the movements of the army. The provisions which the soldiers had laid in

at Moscow, and which they carried on their backs, were quickly consumed,

and they began to eat horseflesh. The prices of food and of warm clothes

and footgear became exorbitant. To stray from the road for the purpose of

procuring food was an impossibility, for the Cossacks who were prowling

right and left killed or made prisoners all who fell into their hands.

The peasants from the villages bordering on the route, dressed in cloaks,

shakos, plumed helmets, and steel cuirasses which they had taken from the

French, often joined the Don Cossacks or Miloradovitch’s advance guard.

Some were armed with scythes, others with thick, iron-shod staves, or

halberds, and a few carried firearms. They came out of the forests in

which they had taken refuge with their families, greeted the Russian

army on its appearance, congratulated it on the flight of the enemy, and

by way of farewells to the latter took a just vengeance upon it. With the

enemy the fear of falling into the hands of the Cossacks and peasants

triumphed over the sense of hunger and deterred them from plundering.

The French began to throw away their arms. The first to set the example

were the regiments of light cavalry, to whom infantry muskets had been

distributed at Moscow. The regiments being mixed together, they shook

off all discipline. The disarmed men were at first few in number, and as

they trailed along in the wake of the army they agglomerated them like

snowballs.

The sick and those overcome by fatigue were abandoned on the road without

the least pity. In fear of losing their flags the leaders of regiments

removed them from their staves and gave them in keeping to the strongest

and most tried soldiers, who hid them in their haversacks or under their

uniforms, or wrapped them round their bodies. When Napoleon had passed

Gzhatsk, he no longer rode on horseback in the midst of his troops, but

drove in a carriage, wrapped himself in a green velvet cloak lined with

sable furs, and put on warm boots and a fur cap.

_The Battle of Viazma; Smolensk is Found Evacuated_

The retreat was performed so rapidly, that Miloradovitch could not begin

the pursuit of the enemy till he had arrived at Viazma. On the 22nd of

October, he attacked the French near this town and beat them. Three guns

and two flags were taken from them and two thousand of them were made

prisoners. When Viazma had been passed, Kutuzov ordered Miloradovitch

to follow in the enemy’s track and to press him as much as possible,

and Platov to get ahead of his right, and attack it in front, as Orlov

Denissov was to do on his left; the guerillas had orders to march quickly

on Smolensk. He exhorted the whole army to harass the French day and

night. Kutuzov with the main body proceeded on the left, on a level

with Miloradovitch, to be able to reach Orscha by the shortest road, in

case Napoleon should effect his retreat on that town; but, if he took

the direction of Mohilev, to stop his way and cover the district whence

the Russian army drew its provisions. Kutuzov was inflexible in the

resolution he had taken to keep Napoleon on the Smolensk road, which was

so completely wasted, and to force him to die of hunger there rather than

allow him to penetrate into the southern governments, where he might

have obtained provisions. Anxious to know if Napoleon would not bear to

the left towards Ielna and Mstislavl, and thence to Mohilev, Kutuzov did

not confine himself to insisting on personally directing his army on the

road, whence he could prevent this movement, but he ordered the Kaluga

militia, reinforced by Cossacks and some regular cavalry regiments, to

advance rapidly from Kaluga and Roslavl on Ielna; that of Tula to march

on Roslavl, that of Smolensk on Ielna, and that of Little Russia to do

its utmost promptly to occupy Mohilev.

Such were, in outline, the directions which Kutuzov gave to the army

after the battle of Viazma, when the enemy found itself under the

stern necessity of struggling with a new calamity which it had not yet

experienced--namely, severe cold. The winds raged and thick snow fell for

five days; it blinded the soldiers and lay so thick as to arrest their

march. The French horses, not being rough-shod, fell under the guns,

under the carts, and under their riders; men were lying on the route,

dead or dying, dragging themselves along like reptiles, in villages

reduced to ashes and round overturned wagons and caissons which the

powder had blown to pieces. Many among them were seized with madness. It

was in this state that, on the 31st of October, Napoleon led his army

back to Smolensk, which he hastened to reach as the promised land, never

doubting that he would be able to halt there. The thought of wintering

in Smolensk supported soldiers exhausted by fatigue and warmed those

overcome by the cold; each one collected his remaining strength to reach

the town where their misfortunes were to end. On catching sight of the

distant summits of Smolensk, the enemy rejoiced and forgot hunger and

thirst. Arrived at the town they rushed into it by thousands, stifling

and killing each other in its narrow gates, ran for the provisions they

believed themselves sure of finding, and seeking for warm habitations;

but it was in vain; for soon like a thunderclap the news was echoed that

there was in Smolensk neither food nor refuge; that it was impossible to

stay there; that they must go on. Twenty degrees of cold came to crown

their misfortunes, but this suddenly ceased--the next day it thawed;

otherwise the sudden extinction of the enemy would have been inevitable.

Smolensk presented a horrible spectacle. From the Moscow gate to the

line of the Dnieper, the ground was strewn with corpses and dead horses.

Fire had turned the Moscow suburb into a desert; in it and on the snow

which covered the ice on the Dnieper were to be seen wagons, caissons of

ammunition, ambulances, cannon, pontoons, muskets, pistols, bayonets,

drums, cuirasses, shakos, bearskins, musical instruments, ramrods,

swords, and sabres. Amongst the corpses on the banks appeared a long file

of wagons, not yet unharnessed but whose horses had fallen down and whose

drivers lay half dead in their seats. In other places horses were lying

with the entrails protruding from their bodies. Their bellies were split

open, for the soldiers had tried to warm their frozen limbs there, or to

appease their hunger. Where the river banks ended, along the road which

skirted the walls of the town, were seen five versts away six or more

ranks of caissons of ammunition and projectiles, calashes from Moscow,

carriages, droshkies, travelling forges. The French, frozen with cold,

ran hither and thither, wrapped in priests’ cassocks, in surplices, in

women’s cloaks, with straw wound about their legs, and hoods, Jews’ caps,

or mats on their heads; nearly all cursed Napoleon, emitted volleys

of blasphemies, and, calling upon Death in their despair, bared their

breasts and fell under his inexorable scythe.

_Kutuzov’s Policy_

Kutuzov, who had reduced Napoleon to this horrible situation, and who,

by means of his flying squadrons, was kept aware of his every step, had

succeeded in hiding all his own movements. Napoleon believed, as we

see by the orders he gave his marshals, that Kutuzov was not marching

parallel with the French army, but behind it; and yet Kutuzov continued

his side movement round Smolensk, daily receiving reports of defeats of

the enemy.

Already, between Moscow and Smolensk, one hundred pieces of cannon

had been taken from the French and 10,000 men made prisoners. In

congratulating the army on its successes, Kutuzov said in an order of

the day: “After the brilliant success which we obtain every day and

everywhere over the enemy, it only remains for us to pursue him speedily,

and perhaps the soil of that Russia which he sought to subjugate

will enclose all his bones within her breast; let us then pursue him

without pause. Winter declares itself, the frost increases, the snow is

blinding. Is it for you, children of the North, to fear all these harsh

inclemencies? Your iron breasts resist them as they resist the rage of

enemies. They are the ramparts, the hope of our country, against which

everything is broken. If momentary privations should make themselves

felt, you will know how to support them. True soldiers are distinguished

by patience and courage. The old will set an example to the young. Let

all remember Suvarov; he taught us to endure hunger and cold where

victory and the honour of the Russian people were concerned. Forward,

march! God is with us! The beaten enemy precedes us; may calm and

tranquillity be restored behind us.”[i]

Kutuzov did not allow himself to be tempted by the disastrous position

of his adversary and remained faithful to the cautious policy he had

adopted, sparing as far as possible the troops entrusted to him. He never

once altered his ruling idea, and remained true to it until the very end

of the campaign. To those who were in favour of more energetic measures

he replied: “Our young folks are angry with me for restraining their

outbursts. They should take into consideration that circumstances will

do far more for us by themselves than our arms.” Kutuzov’s indecision

at Viazma and Krasnoi, Tchitchagov’s mistakes, and Count Wittgenstein’s

caution, however, gave Napoleon’s genius the possibility of triumphing

with fresh brilliancy over the unprecedented misfortunes that pursued

him: on the 14th of November began the passage of the French across the

Beresina at Stondianka, and then the pitiful remains of the _grande

armée_, amounting to nine thousand men, hurriedly moved, or it would be

more correct to say fled to Vilna, closely pursued by the Russian forces.

The frost, which had reached thirty degrees, completed the destruction of

the enemy; the whole route was strewn with the bodies of those who had

perished from cold and hunger. Seeing the destruction of his troops and

the necessity of creating a fresh army in order to continue the struggle,

Napoleon wrote from Molodechno on the 21st of November his twenty-ninth

bulletin, by which he informed Europe of the lamentable issue of the war,

begun six months previously, and after transferring the command of the

army to the king of Naples, Murat, he left Smorgoni for Paris on the 23rd

of November.

As the remains of Napoleon’s army approached the frontiers of Russia,

the complicated question presented itself to the emperor Alexander as

to whether the Russian forces should stop at the Vistula and complete

the triumph of Russia by a glorious peace or continue the struggle with

Napoleon in order to re-establish the political independence of Germany

and the exaltation of Austria. The emperor inclined to the latter

decision--that is, to the prolongation of the war; such an intention was

in complete accordance with the conviction he had previously expressed:

“Napoleon or I--I or he; but together we cannot reign.” At the end

of the year 1812 the final object of the war was already marked out

by the emperor Alexander. This is evident from his conversation with

Mademoiselle Sturdza not long before his departure for Vilna, in which

the sovereign shared with her his feelings of joy at the happy results of

the war. Alexander referred in their colloquy to the extraordinary man

who, blinded by fortune, had occasioned so many calamities to mankind.

Speaking of the enigmatical character of Napoleon, he called to mind

how he had studied him during the negotiations at Tilsit; in reference

to this the emperor said: “The present time reminds me of all that I

heard from that extraordinary man at Tilsit. Then we talked a long while

together, for he liked to show me his superiority and lavishly displayed

before me all the brilliancy of his imagination. ‘War,’ said he to me

once, ‘is not at all such a difficult art as people think, and to speak

frankly it is sometimes hard to explain exactly how one has succeeded in

winning a battle. In reality it would seem that he is vanquished who is

afraid of his adversary and that the whole secret lies in that. There is

no leader who does not dread the issue of a battle; the whole thing is to

hide this fear for the longest time possible. It is only thus that he can

frighten his opponent, and then there is no doubt of ultimate success.’ I

listened,” continued the emperor, “with the deepest attention to all that

he was pleased to communicate to me on the subject, firmly resolving to

profit by it when the occasion presented itself, and in fact I hope that

I have since acquired some experience in order to solve the question as

to what there remains for us to do.” “Surely, Sire, we are forever secure

against such an invasion?” replied Mademoiselle Sturdza. “Would the enemy

dare again to cross our frontiers?” “It is possible,” answered Alexander,

“but if a lasting and solid peace is desired it must be signed in Paris;

of that I am firmly convinced.”

Kutuzov was of an entirely opposite opinion; he considered that Napoleon

was no longer dangerous to Russia, and that he must be spared on account

of the English, who would endeavour to seize upon his inheritance to the

detriment of Russia and other continental powers. All the thoughts of the

field-marshal were directed to the salvation of the fatherland, and not

that of Europe, as those English and German patriots would have desired,

who were already accustomed to look upon Russia as a convenient tool

for the attainment and consolidation of their political aims. Kutuzov’s

opinions, as might have been expected, were strongly censured by those

around Alexander and in general by persons who judged of military

movements from the depths of their studies.

The frame of mind of such persons is best described in the correspondence

of Baron Ampheldt, who devoted the following witty lines to this burning

question: “Our affairs might even go still better if Kutuzov had not

taken upon himself the form of a tortoise, and Tchitchagov that of

a weather-cock, which does not follow any plan: the latter sins by

a superfluity of intellect and a want of experience, the former by

excessive caution. I suppose, however, that after his passage across the

Niemen Bonaparte has not a very large company left; cold, hunger, and

Cossack spears must have occasioned him some difficulties. Meanwhile,

as long as the man lives, we shall never be in a condition to count on

any rest; and therefore war to the death is necessary. Our good emperor

shares these views, in spite of the opinion of those contemptible

creatures who would have wished to stop at the Vistula. But this is not

the desire of the people, who, however, alone bear the burden of the war

and in whom are to be found more healthy good sense and feeling than in

powdered heads ornamented with orders and embroideries.”

On the 28th of November the Russian forces occupied Vilna, after having

taken 140 guns, more than 14,000 prisoners, and vast quantities of

stores. Prince Kutuzov arrived on the 30th of November; he came to a

place with which he was already well acquainted, having formerly filled

the position of Lithuanian military governor. The population, forgetting

Napoleon and their vanished dreams of the re-establishment of the kingdom

of Poland, welcomed the triumphant leader with odes and speeches, and

on the stage of the theatre Kutuzov’s image was represented with the

inscription: “The saviour of the country.”

After the evacuation of Vilna the enemy fled, without stopping to Kovno;

but on the 2nd of December Platov’s Cossacks made their appearance in

the town, which was quickly cleared of the French. The piteous remainder

of that once brilliant army crossed the Niemen; only 1,000 men with nine

guns and about 20,000 unarmed men were left of it. “God punished the

foolish,” wrote the emperor Nicholas twenty-seven years later in his

order of the day to the troops, on the occasion of the unveiling of the

Borodino monument; “the bones of the audacious foreigners were scattered

from Moscow to the Niemen--and we entered Paris.”[g]

CAMPAIGNS OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE (1813-1814 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1813 A.D.]]

Rallying with amazing promptitude from the tremendous blow he had

suffered in Russia, Napoleon raised a fresh army of 300,000 men in

the beginning of 1813, in order to crush the insurrection in which

all northern Germany had joined, with the exception of Saxony, after

Prussia had openly adhered to the Russian alliance. By the Treaty of

Kalish, which established that alliance, Alexander engaged not to lay

down his arms until Prussia had recovered the territory it possessed

before the war of 1800. Great efforts were now made by the cabinets

of St. Petersburg and Berlin to detach Austria from France; and so

strongly were the national feelings declared in favour of that policy,

that Metternich had the utmost difficulty in withstanding the torrent,

and evading the hazard of committing his government prematurely.

Temporising with consummate art, he offered the mediation of his

government between the hostile parties, and at the same time prosecuted

his military preparations on such a scale as would enable Austria to act

no subordinate part on the one side or the other in the coming struggle.

Meanwhile, hostilities began; the Russians and Prussians were defeated by

Napoleon at Lützen and at Bautzen, where Alexander commanded the allied

armies in person; and they were fortunate in concluding an armistice with

him at Pleisswitz on the 4th of June, 1813. They availed themselves of

this truce to reinforce their armies, and more than sixty thousand fresh

troops reached the seat of war from the south and the middle of Russia.

On the 27th, Austria signed a treaty at Reichenbach, in Silesia,

with Russia and Prussia, by which she bound herself to declare war

with France, in case Napoleon had not, before the termination of the

armistice, accepted the terms of peace about to be proposed to him. A

pretended congress for the arrangement of the treaty was again agreed

to by both sides; but Napoleon delayed to grant full powers to his

envoy, and the allies, who had meanwhile heard of Wellington’s victory

at Vittoria and the expulsion of the French from Spain, gladly seized

this pretext to break off the negotiations. Meanwhile, Metternich, whose

voice was virtually to decide Napoleon’s fate, met him at Dresden with

an offer of peace, on condition of the surrender of the French conquests

in Germany. Napoleon, with an infatuation only equalled by his attempts

to negotiate at Moscow, spurned the proposal, and even went the length

of charging Count Metternich with taking bribes from England. The

conference, which was conducted on Napoleon’s part in so insulting a

manner, and at times in tones of passion so violent as to be overheard

by the attendants, lasted till near midnight on the 10th of August, the

day with which the armistice was to expire. The fatal hour passed by,

and that night Count Metternich drew up the declaration of war, on the

part of his government, against France. Austria coalesced with Russia and

Prussia, and the Austrian general, Prince Schwarzenberg, was appointed

generalissimo of the whole of the allied armies.

The plan of the allies was to advance with the main body under

Schwarzenberg, 190,000 strong, through the Hartz mountains to Napoleon’s

rear. Blücher, with 95,000 men, was meanwhile to cover Silesia, or in

case of an attack by Napoleon’s main body to retire before it and draw

it further eastward. Bernadotte, crown prince of Sweden, was to cover

Berlin with 90,000 men, and in case of a victory was to form a junction,

rearward of Napoleon, with the main body of the allied army. A mixed

division under Wallmoden, 30,000 strong, was destined to watch Davout

in Hamburg, whilst the Bavarian and Italian frontiers were respectively

guarded by 25,000 Austrians under Prince Reuss, and 40,000 Austrians

under Hiller. Napoleon’s main body, consisting of 250,000 men, was

concentrated in and around Dresden.

The campaign opened with the march of a French force under Oudinot

against Berlin. This attack having completely failed, Napoleon marched

in person against Blücher, who cautiously retired before him. Dresden

being thus left uncovered, the allies changed their plan of operations,

and marched straight upon the Saxon capital. But they arrived too late,

Napoleon having already returned thither, after despatching Vandamme’s

corps to Bohemia, to seize the passes and cut off Schwarzenberg’s

retreat. The allies attempted to storm Dresden, on the 26th of August,

but were repulsed after suffering a frightful loss. On the following day

Napoleon assumed the offensive, cut off the left wing of the allies, and

made an immense number of prisoners, chiefly Austrians. The main body

fled in all directions; part of the troops disbanded, and the whole must

have been annihilated but for the misfortune of Vandamme, who was taken

prisoner, with his whole corps, on the 29th. It was at the battle of

Dresden that Moreau, who had come from his exile in America to aid the

allies against his old rival Napoleon, was killed by a cannon ball whilst

he was speaking to the emperor Alexander.

At the same time (August 26th) a splendid victory was gained by

Blücher, on the Katzbach, over Macdonald, who reached Dresden almost

alone, to say to Napoleon, “Your army of the Bober is no longer in

existence.” This disaster to the French arms was followed by the

defeat of Ney at Dennewitz by the Prussians and Swedes on the 6th of

September. Napoleon’s generals were thrown back in every quarter, with

immense loss, on Dresden, towards which the allies now advanced again,

threatening to enclose it on every side. Napoleon manœuvred until the

beginning of October, with the view of executing a _coup de main_ against

Schwarzenberg and Blücher, but their caution foiled him, and at length

he found himself compelled to retreat, lest he should be cut off from

the Rhine, for Blücher had crossed the Elbe, joined Bernadotte, and

approached the head of the main army under Schwarzenberg. Moreover, the

Bavarian army under Wrede declared against the French on the 8th of

October, and was sent to the Main to cut off their retreat. Marching

to Leipsic, the emperor there encountered the allies on the 16th of

October, and fought an indecisive action, which, however, was in his

case equivalent to a defeat. He strove to negotiate a separate peace

with the emperor of Austria, as he had before done with regard to the

emperor of Russia, but no answer was returned to his proposals. After

some partial engagements on the 17th, the main battle was renewed on the

18th; it raged with prodigious violence all day, and ended in the defeat

of Napoleon; Leipsic was stormed on the following day, and the French

emperor narrowly escaped being taken prisoner. He had lost 60,000 men in

the four days’ battle; with the remainder of his troops he made a hasty

and disorderly retreat, and after losing many more in his disastrous

flight, he crossed the Rhine on the 20th of October with 70,000 men. The

garrisons he had left behind gradually surrendered, and by November all

Germany, as far as the Rhine, was freed from the presence of the French.

In the following month the allies simultaneously invaded France in

three directions: Bülow from Holland, Blücher from Coblentz, and

Schwarzenberg, with the allied sovereigns, by Switzerland and the Jura;

whilst Wellington also was advancing from the Pyrenees, at the head of

the army which had liberated the peninsula. In twenty-five days after

their passage of the Rhine the allied armies had succeeded, almost

without firing a shot, in wresting a third of France from the grasp of

Napoleon. Their united forces stretched diagonally across France in a

line three hundred miles long, from the frontiers of Flanders to the

banks of the Rhone. On the other hand, the French emperor, though his

force was little more than a third of that which was at the command

of the allies, had the advantage of an incomparably more concentrated

position, his troops being all stationed within the limits of a narrow

triangle, of which Paris, Laon, and Troyes formed the angles. Besides

this, there was no perfect unanimity among his enemies. Austria,

leaning on the matrimonial alliance, was reluctant to push matters to

extremities, if it could possibly be avoided; Russia and Prussia were

resolute to overthrow Napoleon’s dynasty; whilst the councils of England,

which in this diversity held the balance, were as yet divided as to the

final issue. There was a prospect, therefore, that the want of concert

between the allies would afford profitable opportunities to the military

genius of the French emperor.

[Sidenote: [1814 A.D.]]

On the 29th of January, 1814, Napoleon made an unexpected attack on

Blücher’s corps at Brienne, in which the Prussian marshal narrowly

escaped being made prisoner. But not being pursued with sufficient

vigour, and having procured reinforcements, Blücher had his revenge at

La Rothière, where he attacked Napoleon with superior forces and routed

him. Still Schwarzenberg delayed his advance and divided his troops,

whilst Blücher, pushing rapidly forward on Paris, was again unexpectedly

attacked by the main body of the French army, and all his corps, as

they severally advanced, were defeated with terrible loss, between the

10th and 14th of February. On the 17th, Napoleon routed the advanced

guard of the main army at Nangis, and again on the 18th he inflicted a

heavy defeat on them at Montereau. Augereau, meanwhile, with an army

levied in the south of France, had driven the Austrians under Bubna into

Switzerland, and had posted himself at Geneva, in the rear of the allies,

who became so alarmed as to resolve on a general retreat, and proposed an

armistice. Negotiations for peace had been in progress for several weeks

at Châtillon, and the allies were now more than ever desirous that the

terms they offered should be accepted. But so confident was Napoleon in

the returning good fortune of his arms, that he would not even consent to

a suspension of hostilities while the conferences for an armistice were

going on. As for the conference at Châtillon, he used it only as a means

to gain time, fully resolved not to purchase peace by the reduction of

his empire within the ancient limits of the French monarchy.

Blücher became furious on being informed of the intention to retreat, and

with the approval of the emperor Alexander, he resolved to separate from

the main army, and push on for Paris. Being reinforced on the Marne by

Winzingerode and Bülow, he encountered Napoleon at Craon on the 7th of

March. The battle was one of the most obstinately contested of the whole

revolutionary war; the loss on both sides was enormous, but neither could

claim a victory. Two days afterwards the emperor was defeated at Laon;

but Blücher’s army was reduced to inactivity by fatigue and want of food.

Napoleon now turned upon the grand army, which he encountered at

Arcis-sur-Aube; but after an indecisive action, he deliberately

retreated, not towards Paris but in the direction of the Rhine. His plan

was to occupy the fortresses in the rear of the allies, form a junction

with Augereau, who was then defending Lyons, and, with the aid of a

general rising of the peasantry in Alsace and Lorraine, surround and

cut off the invaders, or, at least, compel them to retreat to the Rhine.

But this plan being made known to the allies by an intercepted letter

from Napoleon to the empress, they frustrated it by at once marching with

flying banners upon Paris, leaving behind only ten thousand men, under

Winzingerode, to amuse Napoleon, and mask their movement. After repulsing

Mortier and Marmont, and capturing the forces under Pacthod and Amey, the

allies defiled within sight of Paris on the 29th. On the 30th they met

with a spirited resistance on the heights of Belleville and Montmartre;

but the city, in order to escape bombardment, capitulated during the

night; and on the 31st, the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia made a

peaceful entry. The emperor of Austria had remained at Lyons.[k]

ALEXANDER I AT THE CAPITULATION OF PARIS (1814 A.D.)

The success at Paris was dearly bought; on the day of the battle the

allies lost 8,400 men, of whom 6,000 were Russians. The magnitude of

the losses is explained by the absence of unity in the operations of

the allies and the consequent want of simultaneousness in the attacks

from all parts of the allied army. However, the success of the day dealt

a direct and decisive blow at the very strongest part of the enemy’s

position. While negotiations were being carried on with the French

marshals for the surrender of Paris, the emperor Alexander made the tour

of the troops, which were disposed near Belleville and Chaumont, and

congratulated them on the victory; he then raised Count Barclay de Tolly

to the rank of field-marshal. After that he returned to Bondy.

Meanwhile negotiations for the capitulation of Paris were being carried

on in a house occupied by Marshal Marmont. There a large company had

assembled anxiously awaiting the decision of the fate of Paris. At the

head of those present was Talleyrand. An agreement between the French and

the representatives of the allied armies was at last arrived at, and at

the third hour after midnight the capitulation of Paris, composed by M.

F. Orlov, was signed; the victors, however, had to give up their original

stipulation that the French troops which had defended Paris should retire

by the Brittany route. In the concluding 8th article of the capitulation,

specially referring to the approaching occupation of Paris by the allies,

it was said that the town of Paris was recommended to the generosity of

the allied powers.

Orlov told Marshal Marmont that the representatives of the town of

Paris could unrestrainedly express their desires in person to the

emperor Alexander. A deputation from the town was therefore assembled

which should proceed without delay to the headquarters of the allies;

it consisted of the prefect of police Pasquier, the prefect of the

Seine Chabrolles, and a few members of the municipal council and

representatives of the garde nationale. At dawn the deputies set off in

carriages for Bondy accompanied by Colonel Orlov, who led them through

the Russian bivouacs.

On their arrival at headquarters the French were taken into a large

room in the castle. Orlov ordered that his arrival should be announced

to Count Nesselrode, who went to meet the deputies whilst Orlov went

straight to the emperor, who received him lying in bed. “What news do you

bring?” asked the emperor. “Your majesty, here is the capitulation of

Paris,” answered Orlov. Alexander took the capitulation, read it, folded

the paper, and putting it under his pillow, said, “I congratulate you;

your name is linked with a great event.”

At the time when the above described events were taking place before

Paris, Napoleon had made the following arrangements. When Winzingerode’s

division reached Saint-Dizier Napoleon moved from Doulevant to

Bar-sur-Aube. In order to ascertain the real intentions of the allies

he ordered increased reconnoitering, which led to the combat at

Saint-Dizier, and Winzingerode was thrown back on Bar-le-Duc. From the

questions addressed to prisoners Napoleon was convinced that only the

cavalry division was left against him and that the chief forces of

the allies were directed towards Paris. “This is a fine chess move! I

should never have thought that a general of the coalition would have

been capable of it!” exclaimed Napoleon. Without delaying, on the 27th

of March, Napoleon directed the forces he had at his disposal towards

Paris by a circuitous route through Troyes and Fontainebleau. On the

30th of March, at daybreak, when the allies were already before Paris

and were preparing to attack the capital, Napoleon and his vanguard had

hardly reached Troyes (150 versts from Paris). In the hope that at least

by his presence he might amend matters in Paris, the emperor left the

troops behind and galloped off to Fontainebleau; arriving there at night,

he continued his journey without stopping to Paris. But it was already

late, and on the night of the 31st of March, at twenty versts from Paris,

Napoleon met the fore ranks of the already departing French troops, from

whom he learned of the capitulation concluded by Marmont. At six in the

morning Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau.

It was about the same time, on the morning of the 31st of March, that

the deputation from Paris was received by the emperor Alexander at

Bondy. Count Nesselrode presented the members by name to the emperor;

after which Alexander addressed to them a discourse which Pasquier has

reproduced in his Mémoires in the following manner: “I have but one enemy

in France, and that enemy is the man who has deceived me in the most

shameless manner, who has abused my trust, who has broken every vow to

me, and who has carried into my dominions the most iniquitous and odious

of wars. All reconciliation between him and me is henceforth impossible,

but I repeat I have no other enemy in France. All other Frenchmen are

favourably regarded by me. I esteem France and the French, and I trust

that they will enable me to help them. I honour the courage and glory

of all the brave men against who I have been fighting for two years and

whom I have learned to respect in every position in which they have found

themselves. I shall always be ready to render to them the justice and the

honour which are their due. Say then, gentlemen, to the Parisians, that I

do not enter their walls as an enemy, and that it only depends on them to

have me for a friend, but say also that I have one sole enemy in France,

and that with him I am irreconcilable.” Pasquier adds that this thought

was repeated in twenty different tones and always with the expression of

the utmost vehemence, the emperor meanwhile pacing up and down the room.

THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF PARIS

Then entering into details as to the occupation of Paris, the emperor

Alexander consented to leave the preservation of tranquillity in the

capital to the national guard, and gave his word that he would require

nothing from the inhabitants, beyond provisions for the army; it was

decided that the troops should be bivouacked. Having dismissed the

deputation, the emperor Alexander ordered Count Nesselrode to set off

immediately for Paris to Talleyrand and concert with him as to the

measures to be taken in the commencement; the count entered the town

accompanied by a single Cossack.

“The boulevards were covered with well-dressed crowds of people,”

writes Count Nesselrode in his Mémoires. “It seemed as if the people

had assembled for a holiday rather than to assist at the entry of the

enemy’s troops. Talleyrand was at his toilet; his hair only half-done;

he rushed to meet me, threw himself into my arms and bestrewed me with

powder. When he was somewhat tranquillised he ordered certain persons

with whom he was conspiring to be called. They were the duke of Dalberg,

the abbe de Pradt, and Baron Louis. I transmitted the desires of the

emperor Alexander to my companions, telling them that he remained firmly

determined upon one point--not to leave Napoleon on the throne of

France; that later on the question as to what order of things must from

henceforth reign would be decided by his majesty, not otherwise than

after consultation with the prominent personages with whom he would be

brought into relations.”[57]

The emperor Alexander had intended to stop at the Élysée palace (Élysée

Bourbon), but, having received information that mines had been laid

under the palace, he sent the communication on to Count Nesselrode; when

Talleyrand heard of it he would not believe the truth of the information,

but, from excess of caution, he proposed that the emperor should stay

with him until the necessary investigations should be made. In all

probability the alarm raised had been prepared by the dexterity of Prince

Bénévent himself, who thus made sure of the presence of the head of the

coalition in his house.

After Count Nesselrode’s departure for Paris, Colencourt made his

appearance at Bondy, being sent to the emperor Alexander by Napoleon

with proposals for the conclusion of immediate peace on conditions

similar to those exacted by the allied powers at Châtillon. The emperor

told the duke of Vicenza that he considered himself bound to secure the

tranquillity of Europe, and that therefore neither he nor his allies

intended to carry on negotiations with Napoleon. It was in vain that

Colencourt endeavoured to shake Alexander’s decision, representing to

him that the allied monarchs, by deposing from the throne a sovereign

whom they had all acknowledged, would show themselves upholders of the

destructive ideas of the revolution. “The allied monarchs do not desire

the overthrow of thrones,” replied Alexander, “they will support not any

particular party of those dissatisfied with the present government but

the general voice of the most estimable men of France. We have decided

to continue the struggle to the end, in order that it may not have to be

renewed under less favourable circumstances, and we shall combat until we

attain a solid and durable peace, which it is impossible to look for from

the man who has devastated Europe from Moscow to Cadiz.” In conclusion

Alexander promised to receive Colencourt at any time in Paris.

“The subjection of Paris has shown itself to be an indispensable

inheritance for our chroniclers. Russians could not open the glorious

book of their history without shame if after the page on which Napoleon

is represented standing amidst Moscow in flames did not follow that where

Alexander appears in the midst of Paris.”

As he left Bondy, Napoleon’s envoy saw the horse prepared for Alexander

to ride on his approaching entry into Paris; it was a light-grey horse

called Eclipse which had formerly been presented to the emperor when

Colencourt was ambassador in St. Petersburg. About eight o’clock in the

morning Alexander left Bondy. “All were prepared to meet a day unexampled

in history,” writes an eye-witness.

After he had ridden about a verst, the emperor met the king of Prussia

and the guards; letting the Russian guard and his own guard’s light

cavalry pass in front, as they were to head the troops entering Paris,

Alexander followed after them with the king of Prussia and Prince

Schwarzenberg, accompanied by a suite of more than a thousand generals

and officers of various nationalities. After them came the Austrian

grenadiers, the Russian grenadier corps, the foot-guards, and three

divisions of cuirassiers with artillery. The most superb weather favoured

the triumph of this memorable day.

What were the feelings which then filled the soul of Alexander? Of what

was the sovereign thinking that had lived through the painful experiences

of Austerlitz, the glitter of Tilsit, changing to the defeat of Friedland

and the burning of Moscow? In entire humility he was prepared to repay

the evil and mortification he had endured by a magnanimity unheard of

in history. Actually there appeared in the midst of Paris a victor who

sought for no other triumph but the happiness of the vanquished. Even

at Vilna, in December, 1812, the emperor Alexander had said: “Napoleon

might have given peace to Europe. He might have--but he did not! Now

the enchantment has vanished. Let us see which is best: to make oneself

feared or beloved.” In Paris a noble field awaited the emperor for

changing into action these generous thoughts and aspirations after the

ideal.

The streets were crowded with people, and even the roofs of the houses

were covered with curious spectators. White draperies hung from the

windows and the women at the windows and on the balconies waved white

handkerchiefs. Henri Houssaye has very justly defined the frame of mind

of the Parisian population on the day of the 31st of March: “They did

not reason, they breathed.” Answering graciously to the greetings of the

populace, the emperor said in a loud voice: “I do not come as an enemy.

I come to bring you peace and commerce.” The emperor’s words called

forth acclamations and exclamations of “_Vive la paix!_” A Frenchman who

had managed to push his way right up to the emperor said: “We have been

waiting for you a long time.” “It is the fault of the bravery of your

troops if I have not come sooner,” answered Alexander. “How handsome the

emperor Alexander is, how graciously he bows. He must stay in Paris or

give us a sovereign like himself,” said the French to each other.

The allied troops were met with joyful exclamations of “Long live

Alexander! Long live the Russians! Long live the allies!” As the allies

approached the Champs-Élysées, the enthusiasm grew and began to assume

the character of a demonstration against the government of Napoleon;

white cockades made their appearance on hats and the exclamations

resounded: “Long live the Bourbons! Down with the tyrant!” All these

manifestations did not, however, arouse the least sympathy among the

people for the Bourbons, who were unknown to it; the movement was purely

superficial and partly artificial. The French, seeing the white bands

on the Russian uniforms, imagined that Europe had taken up arms for the

Bourbons, and in their turn showed the colour for which in their hearts

they had no sympathy.

ALEXANDER I AND THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1815 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1815 A.D.]]

The restoration of the French Empire hastened the settlement of the

disputed points at the congress of Vienna. On the 3rd of May, 1815,

treaties were signed between Russia, Austria, and Prussia which

determined the fate of the duchy of Warsaw; it was forever united to the

Russian Empire, with the exception of Posen, Bromberg, and Thorn, which

were given to Prussia; Cracow was declared a free town, and the salt

mines of Weliczka were returned to Austria, together with the province

of Tarnopol, which had belonged to Russia since 1809. Alexander took

the title King of Poland and reserved to himself the right of giving

to this kingdom, which was destined to have a social government, that

“interior extension” which he judged right. In general it was proposed

to give to the Russian as well as the Austrian and Prussian subjects the

right of national representation and national government institutions

in conformity with the form of political states which each government

would consider most advantageous and most fitted to the sphere of

its possessions. On the same day a treaty was concluded between the

plenipotentiaries of Prussia and Saxony, according to the conditions of

which the king of Saxony ceded to Prussia almost all Lusatia and a part

of Saxony. Finally, more than a month later, on the 8th of June, 1815,

the act of the German alliance was signed, and on the following day, the

9th of June, the chief act of the congress of Vienna.

Upon the basis of the conditions of the treaty of 1815, Russia increased

her territory to the extent of about 2,100 square miles with a population

of more than three millions; Austria acquired 2,300 square miles with

the million inhabitants, and Prussia 2,217 square miles with 5,362,000

inhabitants. Thus Russia, who had borne all the three years’ war with

Napoleon, and made the greatest sacrifices for the triumph of the

interests of Europe, received the smallest reward.

A few days before the signing of the treaties that determined the fate

of the duchy of Warsaw, which had so long remained in an indefinite

position, the emperor Alexander informed the president of the Polish

senate, Count Ostrovski, of the approaching union of the kingdom of

Poland to the Russian empire. In this letter, amongst other things, it

was said: “If in the great interest of general tranquillity it could not

be permitted that all the Poles should become united under one sceptre,

I have at least endeavoured as far as possible to soften the hardships

of their separation and to obtain for them everywhere all possible

enjoyment of their nationality.” Following upon this came the manifesto

to the inhabitants of the kingdom of Poland granting them a constitution,

self-government, an army of their own, and freedom of the press.

On the 21st of May, 1815, the solemnity of the restoration of the

kingdom of Poland was celebrated in Warsaw. In his letter to the emperor

Alexander, Prince Adam Czartoriski expressed the conviction that the

remembrance of that day would be for the generous heart of the sovereign

a reward for his labours for the good of humanity. All the functionaries

of the state assembled in the Catholic cathedral church, where, after

divine service had been celebrated, were read the act of renunciation

of the king of Saxony, the manifesto of the emperor of all the Russias,

king of Poland, and the basis of the future constitution. The council

of the empire, the senate, the officials, and the inhabitants then took

the oath of allegiance to the sovereign and the constitution. Then the

Polish standard with the white eagle was raised over the royal castle

and on all government buildings, whilst in all the churches thanksgiving

services were celebrated, accompanied by the pealing of bells and firing

of cannon. After this all the state dignitaries set off to wait on the

czarevitch, Constantine Pavlovitch. The troops were assembled in the

plain near Wola, where an altar had been erected; there, in the presence

of the august commander-in-chief of the Polish army, the soldiers took

the oath in battalions. The cannonades and salvoes of artillery which

concluded the solemnity were interrupted by the loud exclamations of the

people: “Long live our king Alexander!”

Prince Adam Czartoriski, who had been sent by the emperor from Vienna,

occupied a place in the council. On the 25th of May Alexander wrote to

him as follows: “You have had occasion to become acquainted with my

intentions as to the institutions that I wish to establish in Poland,

and the improvements that I desire to carry on in that country. You

will endeavour never to lose sight of them during the deliberations of

the council and to direct the attention of your colleagues to them in

order that the course of government and the reforms, which are confided

to them to bring into execution, may be in accordance with my views.”

A committee was formed for the framing of a constitution, composed of

Polish dignitaries under the presidency of Count Ostrovski.

But this benign condition of affairs in the newly created kingdom was

not of long duration, and on the 29th of July, 1815, Prince Czartoriski

had to complain to the emperor of the czarevitch, and expressed his

conviction that no enemy could occasion greater injuries to Alexander.

It was, he said, as though he wished to bring matters to a rupture. “No

zeal, no submission can soften him,” wrote Prince Adam to the emperor.

“Neither the army, nor the nation, nor private individuals can find

favour in his sight. The constitution in particular gives him occasion

for ceaseless, bitter derision; everything of rule, form, or law is

made the object of mockery and laughter, and unfortunately deeds have

already followed upon words. The grand duke does not even observe the

military laws which he himself has established. He absolutely wishes

to bring in corporal punishments and gave orders yesterday that they

should be brought into force, in spite of the unanimous representations

of the committee. Desertion, which is already now considerable, will

become general; in September most of the officers will ask for their

discharge. In fact, it is as if a plan were laid to oppose the views

of your majesty, in order to render the benefits you have conferred

void, in order to frustrate from the very beginning the success of your

enterprise. His imperial highness in such a case would be, without

himself knowing it, the blind instrument of this destructive design,

of which the first effect would be to exasperate equally both Russians

and Poles and to take away all power from your majesty’s most solemn

declarations. What would I not give for it to be possible to here satisfy

the grand duke and fulfil the desires of your majesty in this respect!

But this is decidedly impossible, and if he remains here I on the

contrary foresee the most lamentable consequences!”

Indeed, as we look more closely into the state of affairs in Warsaw in

the year 1815, it remains an unsolved enigma how the emperor Alexander,

knowing as he did the indomitable character of his brother, could resolve

to confide the destiny of the kingdom he had newly created to the wilful,

arbitrary hands of the czarevitch, whose personality as the probable

heir to the throne of Russia had disturbed the Poles since the time of

the termination of the war of 1812. Prince Czartoriski’s letter did not

alter Alexander’s determination: the czarevitch remained in Warsaw, and

continued his impolitic course of action, the lamentable results of which

were revealed by subsequent events.

On the 21st of May in Vienna the emperor signed the manifesto calling

upon all the powers who observed the laws of truth and piety to take up

arms against the usurper of the French throne. In the same manifesto the

annexation to Russia of the greater part of the former duchy of Warsaw

was announced: “Security is thus given to our frontiers, a firm defence

is raised, calumnies and inimical attempts are repulsed, and the ties of

brotherhood renewed between races mutually united by a common origin. We

have therefore considered it advantageous to assure the destiny of this

country by basing its interior administration upon special regulations,

peculiar to the speech and customs of the inhabitants and adapted to

their local position. Following the teaching of the Christian law, whose

dominion embraces so vast a number of people of various races, but at the

same time preserves their distinctive qualities and customs unchanged,

we have desired in creating the happiness of our new subjects, to plant

in their hearts the feeling of devotion to our throne and thus for ever

efface the traces of former misfortunes arising from pernicious discord

and protracted struggles.” Without waiting for the termination of the

congress the emperor Alexander left Vienna on the 25th of May; he desired

to be nearer the Rhine until the arrival of the Russian troops and in

closer proximity to the seat of the approaching military action.[g] The

Russians, however, who were to have formed the army of the middle Rhine,

were unable, though making forced marches, to arrive in time to take part

in the brief campaign which terminated Napoleon’s reign of the hundred

days.[k]

ALEXANDER’S RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM; BARONESS KRÜDENER

When he had left Vienna, the emperor Alexander stopped for a short time

at Munich and Stuttgart, and on the 4th of June he arrived at Heilbronn,

which had been chosen for the Russian headquarters. Here took place his

first meeting with Baroness Juliane Krüdener.

Baroness Krüdener (born Vietinghov), the author of the famous novel

_Valérie_, had already long since been converted from a vain woman

of the world, and had entered upon the path of mystical pietism. Her

acquaintance with the Moravian brethren and in particular with Johann

Jung had definitely confirmed her ideas in a pious philanthropic

direction. With the exaltation that was natural to her she became more

and more persuaded that a great work lay before her, that God himself

had entrusted her with a lofty mission, to turn the unbelieving to the

path of truth. As her biographer observes, she was ready to affirm in

imitation of Louis XIV that “_Le ciel c’est moi_” (Heaven is I). In 1814

Baroness Krüdener became intimate with the maid of honour Mlle. R. S.

Sturdza, and through her penetrated to the empress Elizabeth Alexievna.

But, according to her own words, an inward voice told her that the matter

was not to end there; the final aim of her aspiration was a friendship

with the emperor Alexander, whose spiritual condition at that time was

fully known to her from her conversations with Mademoiselle Sturdza as

well as after the emperor’s interviews with Johann Jung which took place

during his majesty’s stay at Bronchsaal. During the congress of Vienna

Juliane Krüdener kept up an active correspondence with Mademoiselle

Sturdza; in it she referred to the emperor Alexander and the great and

beautiful qualities of his soul. “I have already known for some time that

the Lord will grant me the joy of seeing him,” wrote Baroness Krüdener;

“if I live till then, it will be one of the happiest moments of my life.

I have a multitude of things to tell him, for I have investigated much on

his behalf: the Lord alone can prepare his heart to receive them; I am

not uneasy about it; my business is to be without fear and reproach; his,

to bow down before Christ, the truth.” With these spiritual effusions

were artfully mixed mysterious prophecies, such as: “The storm draws

nigh, the lilies have appeared only to vanish.”

Mademoiselle Sturdza was struck by these mysterious prognostications

and showed the letter to the emperor Alexander; he commissioned her

to write to Baroness Krüdener that he would esteem it a happiness to

meet her. The correspondence was further prolonged in the same spirit

and finally the “prince of darkness” appeared on the scene, preventing

her conversing with Alexander, that instrument of mercy, of heavenly

things. “But the Almighty will be stronger than he,” wrote Baroness

Krüdener; “God, who loves to make use of those who in the eyes of the

world serve as objects of humiliation and mockery, has prepared my heart

for that submission which does not seek the approval of men. I am only a

nonentity. He is everything, and earthly kings tremble before Him.” The

emperor Alexander’s first religious transport, in the mystical sense, had

manifested itself in the year 1812, when heavy trials fell upon Russia

and filled his soul with alarm. His religious aspirations could not be

satisfied with the usual forms and ceremonies of the church; in the

matter of religion he sought for something different. Having separated

himself, under the influence of fatal events, from those humanitarian

ideals which to a certain degree had animated him in his youth he had

adopted religious conventions; but here, also, by the nature of his

character, he was governed by aspirations after the ideal, without,

however, departing from the sentimental romanticism that was peculiar

to him. Under such conditions Alexander must necessarily have been

impressionable to the influence of pietists and mystics.

When he came to Heilbronn he was overwhelmed with weariness and sadness

after the pompous receptions at the courts of Munich and Würtemberg,

and his soul thirsted for solitude. During the first interview Baroness

Krüdener lifted the veil of the past before the eyes of Alexander and

represented to him his life with all its errors of ambition and vain

pride; she proved to her listener that the momentary awakening of

conscience, the acknowledgment of weaknesses, and temporary repentance do

not constitute a full expiation of sins, and do not yet lead to spiritual

regeneration. “No, your majesty,” said she to him, “you have not yet

drawn near to the god man, as a criminal begging for mercy. You have not

yet received forgiveness from him, who alone has the power to absolve

sins upon earth. You are still in your sins. You have not yet humbled

yourself before Jesus, you have not yet said, like the publican, from the

depths of your heart: ‘God, I am a great sinner; have mercy upon me!’ And

that is why you do not find spiritual peace. Listen to the words of a

woman, who has also been a great sinner, but who has found pardon of all

her sins at the foot of the cross of Christ.” Baroness Krüdener talked to

Alexander in this strain for nearly three hours. Alexander could only say

a few broken words, and bowing his head on his hands, he shed abundant

tears. All the words he heard, were, as the Scripture expresses it, like

a two-edged sword, piercing to the very depths of the soul and spirit,

and trying the feelings and thoughts of his heart. Finally, Baroness

Krüdener, alarmed by the agitated state into which her words had thrown

Alexander, said to him: “Sire, I beg you to pardon the tone in which I

have spoken. Believe that in all sincerity of heart and before God I have

said to you truths which have never before been said to you. I have only

fulfilled a sacred duty to you.” “Do not be afraid,” answered Alexander,

“all your words have found a place in my heart: you have helped me to

discover in myself what I had never before observed; I thank God for it,

but I must often have such conversations, and I ask you not to go away.”

From that day such conversations became a spiritual necessity to the

emperor Alexander and a moral support in the pathway upon which he

from thenceforth stood. According to the opinion of Prince Galitzin,

Alexander’s conversations with Baroness Krüdener were of a spiritual

tendency, and perhaps only in part touched upon contemporary events.

“There is no doubt,” says Prince Galitzin, “that Baroness Krüdener, who

lived by faith, strengthened the development of faith in the emperor by

her disinterested and experienced counsels; she certainly directed the

will of Alexander to still greater self-sacrifice and prayer, and perhaps

at the same time revealed to him the secret of that spiritual, prayerful

communion which, although designed by God as an inheritance for all

mortals, is unfortunately the portion of a very few chosen ones.” From

that time it only remained for Prince Galitzin to experience a lively

feeling of satisfaction as he observed, “with what giant strides the

emperor advanced in the pathway of religion.”

If the moral sphere in which Alexander began to move awakened the entire

sympathy of Prince Galitzin, others looked upon the matter from another

point of view.

In accordance with the course he had adopted during the campaigns of

1813 and 1814, the emperor desired to remain at the centre of military

operations. This intention was not to the taste of the Austrians, and

from their headquarters at Heidelberg they sent a notification that

it was difficult to find suitable premises in such a small place and

that his majesty would be far more tranquil if he prolonged his stay

at Heilbronn. The emperor ordered an answer to be sent to the effect

that he requested that only one or two houses should be allotted for

his occupation in Heidelberg, and that his headquarters should be

established in the neighbouring villages. After this, on the 6th of June,

Alexander removed to Heidelberg and finally took up his abode outside

the town, upon the banks of the Necker, in the house of an Englishman,

named Pickford, and here remained until the 10th of June, awaiting

the approach of his army to the Rhine. The Baroness Krüdener also did

not delay removing to Heidelberg; she settled not far from the house

occupied by the emperor. He spent most of his evenings with her and,

listening to her instructions, in confidential intercourse he told her

of the griefs and passions which had darkened his sorrowful life. In

these conversations, the fellow traveller and collaborator of Baroness

Krüdener, Empaitaz, also took part. Baroness Krüdener did not flatter

Alexander, she possessed the gift of speaking the truth without giving

offence. According to the opinion of her admirers she might have become a

beneficent genius for Russia, but this was hindered by the hypocrisy of

various unworthy persons, who took advantage of this new frame of mind of

the emperor, using it as a means for the attainment of aims which were

not at all in accordance with Alexander’s lofty sentiments and intentions.

Becoming more and more convinced of the power of repentance and prayer,

the emperor once said to Empaitaz: “I can assure you that when I find

myself in awkward situations I always come out of them through prayer. I

will tell you something which would greatly astonish everyone if it were

known: when I am in counsel, with ministers, who are far from sharing my

principles, and they show themselves of opposite opinions, instead of

disputing, I lift up an inward prayer, and little by little they come

round to principles of humanity and justice.”

Alexander had adopted the habit of daily reading the Holy Scriptures and

began to seek in them immediate answers to his doubts. “On the 7th of

June,” relates Empaitaz, “he read the 35th psalm; in the evening he told

us that this psalm had dispersed all remaining anxiety in his soul as to

the success of the war; thenceforth he was convinced that he was acting

in accordance with the will of God.”

ALEXANDER’S HOLY ALLIANCE (1815 A.D.)

The conclusion of the Holy Alliance belongs to this period (1815). In

conceiving the idea of it, the emperor Alexander intended, independently

of ordinary political negotiations, to strengthen the common bond

between monarchies by an act based on the immutable truths of the divine

teaching, to create an alliance which should bind together monarchies and

nations by ties of brotherhood, consecrated by religion, and should be

for them, like the Gospel, obligatory by conscience, feeling and duty.

The emperor Alexander said one day to Baroness Krüdener: “I am leaving

France, but before my departure I want by a public act to give due praise

to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, for the protection he

has shown us, and to call upon the nations to stand in obedience to the

Gospel. I have brought you the project of this act and ask you to look

over it attentively, and if you do not approve any of the expressions

used to indicate them to me. I desire that the emperor of Austria and the

king of Prussia should unite with me in this act of adoration, in order

that people may see that we, like the eastern magi, confess the supreme

power of God the Saviour. You will unite with me in prayer to God that my

allies may be disposed to sign it.”

Alexander wrote out the draft of the Act of the Holy Alliance with his

own hand, and Mademoiselle Sturdza and Count Vapadistria took part in the

wording of it. The latter ventured to observe that no such act was to be

met with in the annals of diplomacy and that his majesty might express

the ruling idea of the act in a declaration or manifesto. Alexander

replied that his decision was unchangeable, that he took it upon himself

to obtain the signature to it of his allies, the emperor of Austria and

the king of Prussia. As to France, England, and other courts--“that,”

said the emperor to him, “will already be your concern.”

The treaty of the Christian brotherly alliance, imagined by Alexander and

called the Holy Alliance, consisted of three articles according to which

the allies bound themselves: (1) to remain united by the indissoluble

ties of brotherly friendship, to show each other help and co-operation,

to govern their subjects in the same spirit of fraternity in order

to maintain truth and peace; (2) to esteem themselves members of one

Christian people, placed by providence to rule over three branches of

one and the same family; and (3) to invite all the powers to acknowledge

these rules and to enter the Holy Alliance. The sovereigns who signed

the treaty were bound, “both in ruling over their own subjects and in

political relations with other governments, to be guided by the precepts

of the holy Gospel, which, not being limited in their application to

private life alone, should immediately govern the wills of monarchs and

their actions.”

King Frederick William willingly declared his consent to become a member

of the Holy Alliance, conceived in the same spirit as the scene that

had once taken place at night at the tomb of Frederick the Great in the

garrison church at Potsdam, and appearing to be the realisation of the

thought expressed by the sovereigns after the battle of Bautzen: “If the

Lord blesses our undertakings,” said they, “then will we give praise to

him before the face of the whole world.”

The emperor Francis, however, received with greater reserve the proposal

to join the Holy Alliance; he was in general incapable of letting himself

be carried away by fantastic ideas and romanticism or of being subject

to enthusiastic impulses of any kind. He consented to sign the treaty

only after Metternich had tranquillised him with the assurance that the

project should only be regarded as inoffensive chatter. But although

in his narrative of the formation of the Holy Alliance Metternich

contemptuously calls it “this empty, sonorous monument,” he passes over

one point in silence: by joining this treaty Austria obtained a valuable

instrument for placing Russia at the head of the reactionary movement

in Europe, and Metternich did not hesitate to take advantage of this

circumstance with inimitable art in order to attain the political aims he

had traced out. Only two sovereigns did not receive invitations to join

the Holy Alliance: the pope and the sultan. The prince regent limited

himself to a letter in which he expressed his approval of the context of

the treaty, but on account of parliamentary considerations the English

government did not join the alliance.

The Act of the Holy Alliance concluded in Paris with the emperor of

Austria and the king of Prussia remained secret for some time, as the

emperor Alexander did not desire to make it generally known. Christmas

Day (December 25th, 1815) (January 6th, 1816) was the occasion chosen

for the publication of the treaty. In the manifesto issued, it is said:

“Having learned from experiences and consequences calamitous to the

whole world that the course of former political relations between the

European powers was not based on those principles of truth through which

the wisdom of God, made known in his revelation, assures the peace and

prosperity of nations, we have, conjointly with their majesties, the

Austrian emperor Francis I and the king of Prussia, Frederick William,

entered upon the establishment of an alliance between ourselves (inviting

other Christian powers to take part in the same), by which we are

mutually bound, both between ourselves and in relation to our subjects,

to take for the sole means of attaining our ends the rule drawn from the

words and teaching of our Saviour Jesus Christ, enjoining men to live as

brothers, not in enmity and malice, but in peace and love. We desire and

pray to the most High that he may send down his grace upon us, that he

may confirm this Holy Alliance between all the powers, to their common

welfare, and may no one venture to hinder unanimity by falseness to our

compact. Therefore, adding to this a transcript of the alliance, we

command that it shall be made public and read in all churches.”

The most holy synod, in its turn, ordered that the treaty of the Holy

Alliance should be printed and placed on the walls of churches or affixed

to boards, and also that ideas should be borrowed from it for preaching.

And thus, from the year 1816 Russia entered upon a new political path--an

apocalyptic one; from thenceforth in diplomatic documents relating

to the epoch, instead of clearly defined and political aims, we meet

with obscure commentaries concerning the spirit of evil, vanquished by

Providence, the word of the Most High, the word of life.[58] The ideal of

the government administrators of that period, who stood at the head of

affairs, became a sort of vague theological, patriarchal monarchy. Over

Europe was lowered the dark veil of continuous and close reaction.[g]

The real significance of European history during the next period is best

understood by studying the development of the alliances formed against

the power of Napoleon, like the one under consideration, and which

endured being renewed from time to time as occasion demanded. At first

these were directed towards a definite object, but they gradually assumed

wider scope, and in a spirit quite foreign to the “Holy Alliance,”

endeavoured to arrest and stem the aspirations of the period, whether

legitimate or degenerate. The partly stationary, partly retrograde

attitude of all, or most, of the European governments, which afterward

became general, had its inception at this time. The spirit of absolutism,

in short, found expression in the Holy Alliance. That this mystic

Alliance was not suitable for any practical purpose was proved on the

spot.[59]

It was quite apparent and recognised by all that France could not be left

to herself, for it had been determined to leave an allied army of 150,000

men under the Duke of Wellington in possession of the French fortresses.

For what purpose and under what conditions this was to take place,

naturally had to be decided by some explicit treaty. On the same day on

which peace with France was signed--20th November--the four powers which

had signed the Treaty of Chaumont, England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia

concluded among themselves a new Alliance of real and far-reaching

significance. The new treaty confirmed the compacts made at Chaumont,

and on the 25th of March, of the current year 1815, the allies expressed

their conviction that the peace of Europe depended upon the consolidation

of the restored order of things in France, on the maintenance of

the royal authority and of the constitutional charter; they pledged

themselves to reinforce the garrison troops in France, if necessary

by 60,000 men from each of the four Powers, or if required by their

combined army, in order to exclude Bonaparte and his family for ever

from the French throne, but to support the sovereignty of the Bourbons

and the Constitution. They further agreed, after the time fixed for the

investment of France by the allied troops had elapsed, to adopt measures

for the maintenance of the existing order of things in France and of the

peace of Europe. In order to facilitate the execution of these duties and

to consolidate the friendly relations of the four powers, it was arranged

that from time to time, at certain fixed intervals, meetings of the

sovereigns in person or of their ministers--congresses in fact--should

take place, to consult concerning the great and common interests of the

allies, and the measures that might be considered necessary at the time

to promote the welfare and peace of the nations and of Europe.

It was this treaty which founded and introduced the Congress policy of

the next decade, and it is well to note that France although a member of

the Holy Alliance was excluded from this league, as was to be expected,

and that England which had remained outside the Holy Alliance, here stood

at the head of affairs. The true position and significance of things are

thereby made clear.[j]

FOOTNOTES

[55] [For the terms of the treaty, see volume XII.]

[56] Gazing from the Kremlin on Moscow in flames, Napoleon said,

“This forebodes the greatest calamity for us.” _Journal du Maréchal

Castellane_, Paris, 1895.

[57] From the Russian State Archives.

[58] The letter written by Emperor Alexander on the 18th of March,

1816, to Count Sieven, Ambassador in London, upon the occasion of the

publication of the treaty of the Holy Alliance and preserved in the

Russian State Archives, affords a clear instance of the direction of

politics at that time.

[59] [Skrine[l] says, however: “For nearly half a century the Holy

Alliance was the keystone of the edifice erected at Vienna, the hidden

chain which linked Russia with the other military powers.”]

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