Perhaps no sovereign since the days of the Antonines ever
was called to higher destinies, or more worthily filled an
important place in the theatre of the world, than the emperor
Alexander I. Placed at the head of the most powerful and
rising empire in existence, stationed midway between ancient
civilisation and barbaric vigour, he was called to take the
lead in the great struggle for European freedom; to combat
with the energy and enthusiasm of the desert the superiority
of advanced information, and meet the condensed military force
of a revolution, which had beaten down all the strength of
continental power, with the dauntless resolution and enduring
fortitude which arise in the earlier ages of social existence.
Well and nobly he fulfilled his destiny. Repeatedly defeated,
never subdued, he took counsel, like his great predecessor
Peter, from misfortune, and prepared in silence those
invincible bands which, in the day of trial, hurled back the
most terrible array which ambition had ever marshalled against
the liberties of mankind.--ALISON.[f]
EARLY MEASURES OF THE REIGN OF PAUL I
[Sidenote: [1796-1815 A.D.]]
The emperor Paul I, Catherine’s successor, had been long known for
his singularities, his great dislike of the French, and to everything
which Catherine had done. He appeared desirous of proceeding directly
on the very opposite course to that which she had followed. She had
chiefly directed her attention to foreign relations and affairs, whilst
he appeared to occupy his mind solely with the internal state of his
dominions. His very first act was a proof that he was quite ready to
go in opposition to all the ordinary rules of political prudence, and
when under the influence of his humour to follow his views, reckless
of consequences. He caused splendid funeral honours and services to be
performed for his murdered father, and forced the audacious and godless,
though clever criminals, who had helped to place his mother on the
throne, to be publicly exposed to the gaze of the people. Notwithstanding
this, he suffered them to remain in possession of their honours and
estates, whilst he designated them as murderers, and reminded the people
that his mother had taken part in the murder of his father. The body of
Peter III, which had been deposited in the convent of Alexander Nevski,
was by his orders placed beside that of his wife; and it was notified by
an inscription in the Russian language that, though separated in life, in
death they were united.
[Sidenote: [1796 A.D.]]
Alexis Orlov and Prince Baratinski, two of the murderous band, were
compelled to come to St. Petersburg to accompany the funeral procession
on foot, but they were not so treated as to prevent them afterwards from
doing further mischief. Alexis obtained permission to travel in foreign
countries. Baratinski was ordered never again to show himself at court;
which, under existing circumstances, could not to him be otherwise than
an agreeable command. Single proofs of tender feeling, of a noble heart,
and touching goodness, nay even the emperor’s magnanimous conduct towards
Kosciuszko and his brethren in arms, combined with his sympathy with the
fate of Poland, could not reconcile a court, such as that of Russia under
Catherine II had become, and a city like that of St. Petersburg, to the
change of the court into a guard-room, and to the daily varying humours
of a man of eccentric and half-deranged mind. Even the improvements in
the financial affairs of the country were regarded as ruinous innovations
by those who in times past had profited by the confusion. The whole of
Russia, and even the imperial family, were alarmed and terrified; a
complete flood of decrees, often contradictory, and mutually abrogatory,
followed one another in quick succession; and the mad schemes of the
emperor, who was, nevertheless, by no means wicked or insensible to what
was good and true, reminded all observers of the most unhappy times of
declining Rome.[b]
_Imperial Eccentricities_
The guards, that dangerous body of men who had overturned the throne of
the father, and who had long considered the accession of the son as the
term of their military existence, were rendered incapable of injuring him
by a bold and vigourous step, and treated without the least deference
from the first day. Paul incorporated in the different regiments of
guards his battalions that arrived from Gatshina, the officers of which
he distributed among the various companies, promoting them at the same
time two or three steps; so that simple lieutenants or captains in
the army found themselves at once captains in the guards, a place so
important and hitherto so honoured, and which gave the rank of colonel,
or even of brigadier. Some of the old captains of the first families in
the kingdom found themselves under the command of officers of no birth,
who but a few years before had left their companies, as sergeants or
corporals, to enter into the battalions of the grand duke. This bold
and hasty change, which at any other time would have been fatal to its
author, had only the effect of inducing a few hundreds of officers,
subalterns and others, to retire.
Paul, alarmed and enraged at this general desertion, went to the
barracks, flattered the soldiers, appeased the officers, and endeavoured
to retain them by excluding from all employ, civil and military, those
who should retire in future. He afterwards issued an order that every
officer or subaltern who had resigned, or should give in his resignation,
should quit the capital within four-and-twenty hours, and return to
his own home. It did not enter into the head of the person who drew up
the ukase that it contained an absurdity; for several of the officers
were natives of St. Petersburg, and had families residing in the city.
Accordingly, some of them retired to their homes without quitting the
capital, not obeying the first part of the order, lest they should be
found guilty of disobedience to the second. Arkarov, who was to see
it put in force, having informed the emperor of this contradiction,
directed that the injunction to quit St. Petersburg should alone be
obeyed. A number of young men were consequently taken out of their houses
as criminals, put out of the city, with orders not to re-enter it, and
left in the road without shelter, and without any furred garments, in
very severe weather. Those who belonged to very remote provinces, for
the most part wanting money to carry them thither, wandered about the
neighbourhood of St. Petersburg, where several perished from cold and
want.
The finances of the empire, exhausted by the prodigalities and still more
by the waste of Catherine’s reign, required a prompt remedy; and to this
Paul seemed at first to turn his thoughts. Partly from hope, partly from
fear, the paper money of the crown rose a little in value. It was to be
supposed that the grand duke of all the Russias, who for thirty years had
been obliged to live on an income of a hundred thousand rubles (£10,000)
per annum, would at least have learned economy per force; but he was soon
seen to rush into the most unmeasured sumptuosity, heap wealth upon some,
and lavish favours upon others, with as much profusion as his mother, and
with still less discernment. The spoils of Poland continued to add to
the riches of men already too wealthy. All he could do towards restoring
a sort of equilibrium between his receipts and disbursements was to lay
an exorbitant tax on all the classes of his slaves. The poll-tax of the
wretched serfs was doubled, and a new tax was imposed upon the nobles,
which, however, the serfs would ultimately have to pay. After the first
impressions which his accession caused in the heart of Paul, punishments
and disgraces succeeded with the same rapidity and profusion with which
he had lavished his favours. Several experienced the two extremes in a
few days. It is true that most of these punishments at first appeared
just; but then it must be allowed that Paul could scarcely strike any but
the guilty, so corrupt had been all who were about the throne.
[Illustration: PAUL I
(1754-1801)]
A whim which caused no little surprise was the imperial prohibition of
wearing round hats, or rather the sudden order to take them away or
tear them to pieces on the heads of those who appeared in them. This
occasioned some disgraceful scenes in the streets, and particularly
near the palace. The Cossacks and soldiers of the police fell on the
passengers to uncover their heads, and beat those who, not knowing the
reason, attempted to defend themselves. An English merchant, going
through the street in a sledge, was thus stopped, and his hat snatched
off. Supposing it to be a robbery, he leaped out of his sledge, knocked
down the soldier, and called the guard. Instead of the guard, arrived an
officer, who overpowered and bound him; but as they were carrying him
before the police, he was fortunate enough to meet the coach of the
English minister, who was going to court, and claimed his protection. Sir
Charles Whitworth made his complaint to the emperor; who, conjecturing
that a round hat might be the national dress of the English as it was
of the Swedes, said that his order had been misconceived, and he would
explain himself more fully to Arkarov. The next day it was published
in the streets and houses that strangers who were not in the emperor’s
service, or naturalised, were not comprised in the prohibition. Round
hats were now no longer pulled off; but those who were met with this
unlucky headdress were conducted to the police to ascertain their
country. If they were found to be Russians, they were sent for soldiers;
and woe to a Frenchman who had been met with in this dress, for he would
have been condemned as a Jacobin.
A regulation equally incomprehensible was the sudden prohibition of
harnessing horses after the Russian mode. A fortnight was allowed for
procuring harness in the German fashion; after the expiration of which,
the police were ordered to cut the traces of every carriage the horses of
which were harnessed in the ancient manner. As soon as this regulation
was made public, several persons dared not venture abroad, still less
appear in their carriages near the palace, for fear of being insulted.
The harness-markers availed themselves of the occasion to charge
exorbitant prices. To dress the _ishvoshtshki_, or Russian coachmen, in
the German fashion, was attended with another inconvenience. Most of them
would neither part with their long beards, their kaftans, nor their round
hats; still less would they tie a false tail to their short hair, which
produced the most ridiculous scenes and figures in the world. At length
the emperor had the vexation to be obliged to change his rigorous order
into a simple invitation to his subjects gradually to adopt the German
fashion of dress, if they wished to merit his favour. Another reform with
respect to carriages: the great number of splendid equipages that swarmed
in the streets of St. Petersburg disappeared in an instant. The officers,
even the generals, came to the parade on foot, or in little sledges,
which also was not without its dangers.
It was anciently a point of etiquette for every person who met a Russian
autocrat, his wife, or son, to stop his horse or coach, alight, and
prostrate himself in the snow or in the mud. This barbarous homage,
difficult to be paid in a large city where carriages pass in great
numbers, and always on the gallop, had been completely abolished under
the reign of the polished Catherine. One of the first cares of Paul was
to re-establish it in all its rigour. A general officer, who passed on
without his coachmen’s observing the emperor riding by on horseback,
was stopped, and immediately put under arrest. The same unpleasant
circumstance occurred to several others, so that nothing was so much
dreaded, either on foot or in a carriage, as the meeting of the emperor.
The ceremony established within the palace became equally strict, and
equally dreaded. Woe betide him who, when permitted to kiss the hand of
Paul, did not make the floor resound by striking it with his knee as
loud as a soldier with the butt-end of his firelock. It was requisite,
too, that the salute of the lips on his hand should be heard, to
certify the reality of the kiss, as well as of the genuflection. Prince
George Galitzin, the chamberlain, was put under arrest on the spot by
his majesty himself, for having made the bow and kissed the hand too
negligently.
If this new reign was fatal to the army and to the poor gentry, it was
still more so to the unhappy peasantry. A report being spread that Paul
was about to restrict the power of masters over their slaves, and give
the peasants of the lords the same advantages as those of the crown, the
people of the capital were much pleased with the hopes of this change. At
this juncture an officer set off for his regiment, which lay at Orenberg.
On the road he was asked about the new emperor, and what new regulations
he was making. He related what he had seen, and what he had heard; among
the rest, mentioning the ukase which was soon to appear in favour of
the peasants. At this news, those of Tver and Novgorod indulged in some
tumultuous actions, which were considered as symptoms of rebellion. Their
masters were violently enraged with them; and the cause that had led them
into error was discovered. Marshal Repnin was immediately despatched at
the head of some troops against the insurgents; and the officer who had
unwittingly given rise to this false hope, by retailing the news of the
city on his road, was soon brought back in confinement. The senate of
St. Petersburg judged him deserving of death, and condemned him to be
broken, to undergo the punishment of the knout, and if he survived this,
to labour in the mines. The emperor confirmed the sentence. This was
the first criminal trial that was laid before the public; and assuredly
it justified but too well those remains of shame which had before kept
secret similar outrages.
The most prominent of Paul’s eccentricities was that mania which, from
his childhood, he displayed for the military dress and exercise. This
passion in a prince no more indicates the general or the hero than a
girl’s fondness for dressing and undressing her doll foretokens that
she will be a good mother. Frederick the Great, the most accomplished
soldier of his time, is well known to have had from his boyhood the
most insuperable repugnance to all those minutiæ of a corporal to which
his father would have subjected him; this was even the first source of
that disagreement which ever subsisted between the father and the son.
Frederick, however, became a hero; his father was never anything more
than a corporal. Peter III pushed his soldato-mania to a ridiculous
point, fancying he made Frederick his model. He loved soldiers and arms,
as a man loves horses and dogs. He knew nothing but how to exercise a
regiment, and never went abroad but in a captain’s uniform.
Paul, in his mode of life when grand duke, and his conduct after his
accession, so strongly resembled his father that, changing names and
dates, the history of the one might be taken for that of the other.
Both were educated in a perfect ignorance of business, and resided at a
distance from court, where they were treated as prisoners of state rather
than heirs to the crown; and whenever they presented themselves appeared
as aliens and strangers, having no concern with the royal family. The
aunt of the father (Elizabeth) acted precisely as did the mother of the
son. The endeavours of each were directed to prolong the infancy of their
heirs, and to perpetuate the feebleness of their minds. The young princes
were both distinguished by personal vivacity and mental insensibility, by
an activity which, untrained and neglected, degenerated into turbulence;
the father was sunk in debauchery, the son lost in the most insignificant
trifles. An unconquerable aversion to study and reflection gave to both
that infatuated taste for military parade, which would probably have
displayed itself less forcibly in Paul had he been a witness of the
ridicule they attached to Peter. The education of Paul, however, was much
more attended to than that of his father. He was surrounded in infancy by
persons of merit, and his youth promised a capacity of no ordinary kind.
It must also be allowed that he was exempt from many of the vices which
disgraced Peter; temperance and regularity of manners were prominent
features of his character--features the more commendable, as before his
mother and himself they were rarely to be found in a Russian autocrat.
To the same cause, education, and his knowledge of the language and
character of the nation, it was owing that he differed from his father in
other valuable qualities.
The similarity which, in some instances, marked their conduct towards
their wives, is still more striking; and in their amours, a singular
coincidence of taste is observable. Catherine and Marie were the most
beautiful women of the court, yet both failed to gain the affections
of their husbands. Catherine had an ambitious soul, a cultivated mind,
and the most amiable and polished manners. In a man, however, whose
attachments were confined to soldiers, to the pleasures of the bottle,
and the fumes of tobacco, she excited no other sentiment than disgust
and aversion. He was smitten with an object less respectable, and less
difficult to please. The countess Vorontzov, fat, ugly in her person
and vulgar in her manners, was more suitable to his depraved military
taste, and she became his mistress. In like manner, the regular beauty
of Marie, the unalterable sweetness of her disposition, her unwearied
complaisance, her docility as a wife, and her tenderness as a mother were
not sufficient to prevent Paul from attaching himself to Mademoiselle
Nelidov, whose disposition and qualities better accorded with his own,
and afterwards to a young lady of the name of Lopukhin, who, it is
believed, rejected his suit. To the honour of Paul it is related that he
submitted to that mortifying repulse with the most chivalric patience and
generosity. Nelidov was ugly and diminutive, but seemed desirous, by her
wit and address, to compensate for the disadvantages of her person; for a
woman to be in love with Paul it was necessary she should resemble him.
On their accession to the throne, neither the father nor the son were
favourites with the court or the nation, yet both acquired immediate
popularity and favour. The first steps of Paul appeared to be directed,
but improved, by those of Peter. The liberation of Kosciuszko and other
prisoners brought to public recollection the recall of Biron, Munich,
and Lestocq, with this difference--that Peter III did not disgrace these
acts of clemency and justice by ridiculous violences, or by odious and
groundless persecutions. Both issued ukases extremely favourable to the
nobility, but from motives essentially different, and little to the
honour of the son. The father granted to the Russian gentry those natural
rights which every man ought to enjoy; while the son attempted the folly
of creating a heraldic nobility in Russia, where that Gothic institution
had never been known. In the conduct which he observed towards the
clergy, Paul, however, showed himself a superior politician. Instead
of insulting the priests, and obliging them to shave their beards, he
bestowed the orders of the empire on the bishops, to put them on a
footing with the nobility, and flattered the populace and the priesthood
by founding churches, in obedience to pretended inspiration.
In his military operations, however, his policy appears to have abandoned
him, because here he gave the reins to his ruling passion. The quick and
total change of discipline he introduced in his armies created him nearly
as many enemies as there were officers and soldiers. In the distrust and
suspicions which incessantly haunted him, his inferiority to his father
is also evident. One of the first acts of Peter III was to abolish the
political inquisition established by Elizabeth; whereas Paul prosecuted
no scheme with greater alacrity than that of establishing a system of
spies, and devising means for the encouragement of informers. The blind
confidence of the father was his ruin, but it flowed from a humanity
of disposition always worthy of respect. The distrust of the son did
not save him; it was the offspring of a timorous mind, which by its
suspicions was more apt to provoke than to elude treason.[k]
_Paul’s Foreign Policy_
In regard to foreign matters Paul’s initial policy was one of peace. He
put a stop to the levying of recruits after the manner adopted by his
mother--that is, in the proportion of three men to every five hundred
souls--recalled his army from Persia, and left Georgia to take care of
itself. He showed compassion for the Poles, recalled the prisoners from
Siberia, transferred King Stanislaus from Grodno to St. Petersburg,
visited Kosciuszko at Schlüsselburg and released him in company with the
other prisoners. He bade Kolitchev, envoy extraordinary at Berlin, inform
the king that he, Paul, wished neither conquest nor aggrandisement. He
dictated to Ostermann a circular directed to the foreign powers, in
which he declared that of all the countries of the world Russia alone
had been constantly engaged in war since 1756; that forty years of
warfare had reduced the population; that the emperor’s humanity would
not allow him to withhold from his beloved subjects the peace for which
they longed; that though on account of these considerations Russia could
take no active part in the struggle against France, the emperor would
“nevertheless remain closely united with his allies, and would use every
means to oppose the rise of the mad French Republic which threatened
all Europe with upheaval by the destruction of its laws, privileges,
property, religion, and customs.” He refused all armed assistance to
Austria, which was alarmed at Napoleon’s victories in Italy, and recalled
the fleet that Catherine had adjoined to the English fleet for the
purpose of blockading the coasts of France and Holland. He even received
overtures made by Caillard, the French envoy to Prussia, and caused him
to be informed that the emperor “did not consider himself at war with
the French, that he had never done anything to harm them, but was rather
disposed to keep peace with them, and would induce his allies to hasten
the conclusion of war, to which end he offered the mediation of Russia.”
It was not long, however, before relations again became strained between
France and Russia. By the Treaty of Campo Formio the Ionian Isles had
been given to the French, who thus acquired a threatening position in
the East and increased power over the Divan. The Directory authorised
Dombrowski to organise Polish legions in Italy. Panin, at Berlin,
intercepted a letter from the Directory to the French envoy, which
spoke of a restoration of Poland under a prince of Brandenburg. Paul,
on his side, took into his pay the troops of the prince of Condé, and
established ten thousand émigrés in Volhinia and Podolia. He offered an
asylum to Louis XVIII after his flight from Brunswick, and installed
him in the ducal palace at Mitau with a pension of 200,000 rubles. The
news that a French expedition was being secretly organised at Toulon
made him fear for the security of the coasts of the Black Sea, which
were immediately put in a state of defence. The abduction of Zagurski,
the Russian consul at Corfu, the capture of Malta by Napoleon, the
arrival at St. Petersburg of the banished knights who offered Paul the
protectorate of their order and the title of grand master, the invasion
of Helvetian territory by the Directory, the expulsion of the pope and
the proclamation of the Roman Republic--all were events that precipitated
the rupture.
Paul concluded an alliance with Turkey which had been disturbed by
an Egyptian invasion, also with England, Austria, and the kingdom of
Naples. Thus, by the double aggression of Bonaparte against Malta and
Egypt, Russia and Turkey were led, contrary to all traditions, to make
common cause. Paul pledged himself to unite his fleet with the Turkish
and English squadron, and to furnish one body of troops for a descent
on Holland, another for the conquest of the Ionian Isles, and a grand
auxiliary army for the campaigns in Italy and Switzerland.
In the autumn of 1798 a Turkish-Russian fleet captured the French
garrisons in the Ionian Isles. The king of Naples invaded the territory
of the Roman Republic, but Championnet brought the Neapolitan troops back
on to their own ground, and after making a triumphal entry into Naples
proclaimed the Parthenopean Republic.
THE CAMPAIGNS OF KORSAKOV AND SUVAROV (1798-1799)
[Sidenote: [1798-1799 A.D.]]
The Russian army in Switzerland was placed under the command of
Rimski-Korsakov, that of Holland under the orders of Hermann; while
Austria, at the suggestion of England, requested that the victor
of Fokshani and of the Rimnik should receive the command of the
Austro-Russian army. Flattered by this mark of deference, Paul I recalled
Suvarov from exile in his village. “Suvarov has no need of laurels,”
wrote the czar, “but the country has need of Suvarov.”[c]
A few days after the battle of Magnano, Suvarov arrived on the Mincio
with the first division of his forces, twenty thousand strong, and took
the command of all the allied troops in Italy. The jealousy of the
Austrian generals was naturally excited and they called a council of war,
in order to examine his plans. The members of the council, beginning at
the youngest, proposed their several schemes. Suvarov quietly heard them
all, and when they had done, took a slate, drew two lines, and said,
“Here, gentleman, are the French, and here the Russians; the latter will
march against the former and beat them.” So saying, he rubbed out the
French line, and added, “This is all my plan; the council is concluded.”
Suvarov kept his word, and in less than three months swept the French
entirely out of Lombardy and Piedmont. Thrusting himself between the
three French armies of Switzerland, northern Italy, and the Parthenopean
Republic, it was his purpose, in concert with the archduke Charles of
Austria, to penetrate into France on its most defenceless side, by the
Vosges and the Jura, the same quarter on which the great invasion of 1814
was afterwards effected. The campaign opened on the 25th of April, on the
steep banks of the Adda, behind which Moreau had posted his diminished
force of twenty-eight thousand men in three divisions. The passage was
forced with immense loss to the French, who were compelled to abandon
Milan, which Suvarov entered in triumph on the 29th.
After a week’s delay, during which all the principal places of Lombardy
surrendered to the allies, Suvarov followed Moreau’s retreat, and
endeavoured to dislodge him from his advantageous position on the Po. Not
succeeding in this attempt as rapidly as suited his impetuous habits, the
Russian general suddenly changed his purpose, and advanced against Turin,
whilst Moreau at the same moment had resolved to retire to Turin and the
crests of the Apennines, in order to preserve his communications with
France. On the 27th of May, Vukassovitch, who commanded the advance guard
of the Russians, surprised Turin, and forced the French to take refuge
in the citadel, leaving in the hands of the victors nearly three hundred
pieces of artillery, sixty thousand muskets, and an enormous quantity of
ammunition and military stores. Moreau’s army, thus deprived of all its
resources, was saved from destruction only by the extraordinary ability
of its commander, who led it safely towards Genoa by a mountain path,
which was rendered practicable for artillery, in four days. With the
exception of a few fortresses, nothing now remained to the French of all
Napoleon’s conquests in northern Italy; they had been lost in less time
than it had taken to make them.
[Sidenote: [1799 A.D.]]
Exulting in the brilliant success of his arms, Paul bestowed another
surname, Italienski, or the Italian, on his victorious general, and
ordered by an express ukase that Suvarov should be universally regarded
as the greatest commander that had ever appeared. Meanwhile the results
of his skill and vigour were neutralised by the selfish policy of the
Austrian court, which had become by the Treaty of Campo Formio, and the
acquisition of Venice, in some degree an actual accomplice with the
aggressors against whom it was in arms. Suvarov was compelled to submit
to the dictation of the emperor Francis I, and deeply disgusted he
declared that he was no longer of any use in Italy, and that he desired
nothing so ardently as to be recalled.
The disasters of the French in upper Italy were fatal to their ascendancy
in the south, and Macdonald received orders to abandon the Parthenopean
Republic, and unite his forces with those of Moreau. His retreat was
exposed to great dangers by the universal insurrection of the peasants;
but he accomplished it with great rapidity and skill. The two French
commanders then concerted measures to dislodge the allies from their
conquests--a project which seemed not unlikely to be fulfilled, so
obstinately had the Aulic council adhered to the old system of dispersing
the troops all over the territory which they occupied. Though the
allies had above a hundred thousand men in the field, they could hardly
assemble thirty thousand at any one point; and Macdonald might easily
have destroyed them in detail could he have fallen upon them at once;
but the time he spent in reorganising his army in Tuscany, and in
concerting measures with Moreau, was well employed by Suvarov in promptly
concentrating his forces. Macdonald advanced against him with an army
of thirty-seven thousand men, taking Modena on his way, and driving
Hohenzollern out of it after a bloody engagement. The two armies met on
the Trebbia, where a first and indecisive action took place on the 17th
of June; it was renewed on each of the two following days, and victory
finally remained with the Russians. In this terrible battle of three
days, the most obstinately contested and bloody that had occurred since
the beginning of the war, the loss on both sides was excessive; that of
the French was above twelve thousand in killed and wounded, and that of
the allies not much less. But nearly equal losses told with very unequal
severity on the respective combatants; those of the allies would speedily
be retrieved by large reinforcements, but the republicans had expended
their last resources, were cut off from Moreau, and had no second army to
fall back upon. Macdonald with infinite difficulty regained the positions
he had occupied before the advance to the Trebbia, after losing an
immense number of prisoners.
The fall of the citadel of Turin on the 20th of June was of great
importance to the allies; for besides disengaging their besieging force
it put into their hands one of the strongest fortresses in Piedmont,
and an immense quantity of artillery and ammunition. This event, and
Suvarov’s victory on the Trebbia, checked the successful operations of
Moreau, and compelled him to fall back to his former defensive position
on the Apennines. Again, contrary to Suvarov’s wishes, the allied forces
were divided for the purpose of reducing Mantua and Alexandria, and
occupying Tuscany. After the fall of those two fortresses, Suvarov laid
siege to Tortona, when Joubert, who had meanwhile superseded Moreau,
marched against him at the head of the combined forces of the French. On
the 15th of August, another desperate battle was fought at Novi, in which
Joubert was killed, but from which neither side derived any particular
advantage. The French returned to their former positions, and the Italian
campaign was ended.
Suvarov now received orders to join his forces with those under Korsakov,
who was on the Upper Rhine with thirty thousand men. The archduke Charles
might, even without this fresh reinforcement, have already annihilated
Massena had he not remained for three months, from June to August, in
complete inactivity; at the very moment of Suvarov’s expected arrival,
he allowed the important passes of the St. Gotthard to be again carried
by a coup-de-main by the French, under General Lecourbe, who drove the
Austrians from the Simplon, the Furka, the Grimsel, and the Devil’s
Bridge. The archduke, after an unsuccessful attempt to push across the
Aar at Dettingen, suddenly quitted the scene of war and advanced down
the Rhine for the purpose of supporting the English expedition under the
duke of York against Holland. This unexpected turn in affairs proceeded
from Vienna. The Viennese cabinet was jealous of Russia. Suvarov played
the master in Italy, favoured Sardinia at the expense of the house of
Habsburg, and deprived the Austrians of the laurels and the advantages
they had won. The archduke, accordingly, received orders to remain
inactive, to abandon the Russians, and finally to withdraw to the
north; by this movement Suvarov’s triumphant progress was checked, he
was compelled to cross the Alps to the aid of Korsakov, and to involve
himself in a mountain warfare ill-suited to the habits of his soldiery.
Korsakov, whom Bavaria had been bribed with Russian gold to furnish with
a corps one thousand strong, was supported solely by Kray and Hotze with
twenty thousand men. Massena, taking advantage of the departure of the
archduke and the non-arrival of Suvarov, crossed the Limmat at Dietikon
and shut Korsakov, who had imprudently stationed himself with his whole
army in Zurich, so closely in that, after an engagement that lasted two
days, from the 15th to the 17th of September, the Russian general was
compelled to abandon his artillery and to force his way through the
enemy. Ten thousand men were all that escaped. Hotze, who had advanced
from the Grisons to Schwyz to Suvarov’s rencontre, was, at the same time,
defeated and killed at Schanis. Suvarov, although aware that the road
across the St. Gotthard was blocked by the Lake of Lucerne, on which
there were no boats, had the temerity to attempt the passage. In Airolo,
he was obstinately opposed by the French under Lecourbe, and, although
Shveikovski contrived to turn this strong position by scaling the
pathless rocks, numbers of the men were, owing to Suvarov’s impatience,
sacrificed before it.
On the 24th of September, 1799, he at length climbed the St. Gotthard,
and a bloody engagement, in which the French were worsted, took place
on the Oberalpsee. Lecourbe blew up the Devil’s Bridge, but, leaving
the Urnerloch open, the Russians pushed through that rocky gorge, and,
dashing through the foaming Reuss, scaled the opposite rocks and drove
the French from their position behind the Devil’s Bridge. Altorf on the
lake was reached in safety by the Russian general, who was compelled,
owing to the want of boats, to seek his way through the valleys of
Schächen and Muotta, across the almost impassable rocks, to Schwyz. The
heavy rains rendered the undertaking still more arduous; the Russians,
owing to the badness of the road, were speedily barefoot; the provisions
were also exhausted. In this wretched state they reached Muotta on the
29th of September and learned the discouraging news of Korsakov’s defeat.
Massena had already set off in the hope of cutting off Suvarov, but had
missed his way. He reached Altorr, where he joined Lecourbe on the 29th,
when Suvarov was already at Muotta, whence Massena found on his arrival
that he had again retired across the Bragelburg, through the Klönthal. He
was opposed on the lake of Klönthal by Molitor, who was, however, forced
to retire by Auffenberg, who had joined Suvarov at Altorf and formed his
advanced guard, Rosen, at the same time, beating off Massena with the
rearguard, taking five cannon and one thousand of his men prisoners. On
the 1st of October, Suvarov entered Glarus, where he rested until the
4th, when he crossed the Panixer Mountains through snow two feet deep
to the valley of the Rhine, which he reached on the 10th, after losing
the whole of his beasts of burden and two hundred of his men down the
precipices; and here ended his extraordinary march, which had cost him
the whole of his artillery, almost all his horses, and a third of his men.
The archduke had, meanwhile, tarried on the Rhine, where he had taken
Philippsburg and Mannheim, but had been unable to prevent the defeat of
the English expedition under the duke of York by General Brune at Bergen,
on the 19th of September. The archduke now, for the first time, made a
retrograde movement, and approached Korsakov and Suvarov. The different
leaders, however, did nothing but find fault with each other, and the
czar, perceiving his project frustrated, suddenly recalled his troops,
and the campaign came to a close.
Paul’s anger fell without measure or reason on his armies and their
chiefs. All the officers who were missing, that is to say who were
prisoners in France, were broken as deserters, and Suvarov, instead
of being well received with well merited honours, was deprived of
his command and not suffered to see the emperor’s face. This unjust
severity broke the veteran’s heart. He died soon after his return to St.
Petersburg; and no Russian courtier, nor any member of the diplomatic
body except the English ambassador, followed his remains to the grave.
PAUL RECONCILED WITH FRANCE (1800 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1800 A.D.]]
Frustrated in the objects for which he had engaged in war, Paul was now
in a mood easily to be moved to turn his arms against the allies who had
deceived his hopes. He had fought for the re-establishment of monarchy in
France, and of the old _status quo_ in Europe; and the only result had
been the aggrandisement of Austria, his own immediate neighbour, of whom
he had much more reason to be jealous than of the remote power of France.
The rapid steps, too, which Bonaparte was taking for the restoration
of monarchical forms in that country were especially calculated to
conciliate Paul’s good-will towards the first consul. The latter and his
able ministers promptly availed themselves of this favourable disposition
through the connections they had made in St. Petersburg. Fouché had such
confidential correspondence even with ladies in the Russian capital, that
he afterwards received the earliest and most correct intelligence of the
emperor’s murder. Two persons at the court of St. Petersburg were next
gained over to France, or rather to Bonaparte’s rising empire; these were
the minister Rostoptchin, and the emperor’s favourite, the Turk Kutaisov,
who had risen with unusual rapidity from the situation of the emperor’s
barber to the rank of one of the first Russian nobles. He was also nearly
connected by relationship with Rostoptchin.
Rostoptchin first found means to send away General Dumourier from St.
Petersburg, whither he had come for the purpose of carrying on his
intrigues in favour of the Bourbons. He next sought to bring Louis
Cobenzl also into discredit with the emperor, and he succeeded in this,
shortly before the opening of the campaign in Italy in 1800, when the
cabinet of Vienna was called upon to give a plain and direct answer to
the questions peremptorily put by the emperor of Russia. Paul required
that the cabinet should answer, without if or but, without circumlocution
or reserve, whether or not Austria would, according to the terms of the
treaty, restore the pope and the king to their dominions and sovereignty.
Cobenzl was obliged to reply that if Austria were to give back Piedmont
to the king of Sardinia it must still retain Tortona and Alessandria; and
that it never would restore the three legations and Ancona. The measure
of the emperor’s indignation was now full; he forbade Count Cobenzl the
court, and at a later period not only ordered him to leave the country,
but would not even allow an embassy or chargé-d’affaires to remain.
The emperor proceeded more deliberately with regard to the English. At
first he acted as if he had no desire to break with them; and he even
allowed the Russians, whom they had hired for the expedition against
Holland, to remain in Guernsey under Viomesnil’s command, in order to
assist their employers in an expedition against Brittany. The English
government, however, at length provoked him to extremities. They refused
to redeem the Russians who had been made prisoners in their service,
by giving in exchange for them an equal number of French, of whom
their prisons were full; they refused to listen to any arrangements
respecting the grand mastership of the knights of Malta, or even as to
the protectorate of the order, and gave the clearest intimations that
they meant to keep the island for themselves. Bonaparte seized upon this
favourable moment for flattering the emperor, by acting as if he had
really more respect for Paul than the two powers for whom he had made
such magnanimous sacrifices. Whilst the English refused to redeem the
Russians made prisoners in their service by exchange, Bonaparte set them
free without either exchange or ransom.
The emperor of Germany had broken his word, and neither restored the pope
nor the king of Sardinia, whilst Bonaparte voluntarily offered to restore
the one and give compensation to the other. He assailed the emperor in
a masterly manner on his weak side, causing the six or seven thousand
Russians, whom the English refused to exchange, to be provided with new
clothing and arms, and he wrote a letter to Panin, the Russian minister,
in which he said that he was unwilling to suffer such brave soldiers
as these Russians were to remain longer away from their native land on
account of the English. In the same letter he paid another compliment
to the emperor, and threw an apple of mortal strife between him and
England. Knowing as he did that his garrison in Malta could not hold out
much longer, he offered to place the island in the hands of the emperor
Paul, as a third party. This was precisely what the emperor desired; and
Sprengporten, who was sent to France to bring away the Russians, and to
thank the first consul, was to occupy Malta with them. The Russians were
either to be conveyed thither by Nelson, who up to this time had kept the
island closely blockaded, and was daily expecting its surrender, or at
least he was to be ordered to let them pass; but both he and the English
haughtily rejected the Russian mediation.
Paul now came to a complete breach with England. First of all he recalled
his Russian troops from Guernsey, but on this occasion he was again
baffled. It was of great importance to the English cabinet that Bonaparte
should not immediately hear of the decided breach which had taken
place between them and the emperor, and they therefore prevailed upon
Viomesnil, an émigré, who had the command of the Russians in Guernsey,
to remain some weeks longer, in opposition to the emperor’s will. Paul
was vehemently indignant at this conduct; Viomesnil, however, entered
the English service, and was provided for by the English government in
Portugal.
Lord Whitworth was next obliged to leave Russia, as Count Cobenzl
had previously been. Paul recalled his ambassadors from the courts
of Vienna and London, and forthwith sent Count Kalitchev to Paris to
enter into friendly negotiations with Bonaparte. In the meantime, the
English had recourse to some new subterfuges, and promised, that in
case Malta capitulated, they would consent to allow the island to be
administered, till the conclusion of a peace, by commissioners appointed
by Russia, England, and Naples. Paul had already named Bailli de la
Ferrette for this purpose; but the English refused to acknowledge his
nominee, and even to receive the Neapolitans in Malta. Before this took
place, however, the emperor had come to issue with England on a totally
different question.
The idea of a union among the neutral powers, in opposition to the right
alleged by England, when at war with any power whatsoever, to subject
the ships of all neutral powers to search, had been relinquished by
the empress Catherine in 1781, to please the English ambassador at her
court; Paul now resumed the idea. Bonaparte intimated his concurrence,
and Paul followed up the matter with great energy and zeal, as in this
way he had an opportunity of exhibiting himself in the character of an
imperial protector of the weak, a defender of justice and right, and as
the head of a general alliance of the European powers. Prussia also now
appeared to do homage to him, for the weak king was made to believe,
that by a close alliance between Russia and France, he might be helped
to an extension of territory and an increase of subjects, without danger
or cost to himself, or without war, which he abhorred beyond everything
else. The first foundation, therefore, for an alliance between Russia and
France, was laid in Berlin, where Beurnonville, the French ambassador,
was commissioned to enter into negotiations with the Russian minister Von
Krüderer. Beurnonville promised, in Bonaparte’s name, that the Russian
mediation in favour of Naples and Sardinia would be accepted, and that,
in the question of compensations for the German princes particular regard
would be had to the cases of Baden and Würtemberg.
THE ARMED NEUTRALITY (1800 A.D.)
As to the armed neutrality by sea against England, Prussia could easily
consent to join this alliance, because she had in fact no navy; but it
was much more difficult for Sweden and Denmark, whose merchant ships were
always accompanied by frigates. In case, therefore, the neutral powers
came to an understanding that no merchant vessels which were accompanied
by a ship of war should be compelled to submit to a search, this might
at any time involve them in hostilities with England. In addition to
Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, which, under Paul’s protectorate, were to
conclude an alliance for the protection of trading vessels belonging
to neutral powers against the arrogant claims of England, Bonaparte
endeavoured to prevail upon the North Americans to join the alliance.
They were the only parties who, by a specific treaty in 1794, had
acknowledged as a positive right what the others only submitted to as
an unfounded pretension on the part of England. On that occasion the
Americans had broken with the French Republic on the subject of his
treaty, and Barras and Talleyrand had been shameless enough to propose
that the Americans should pay a gratuity, in order to effect a renewal of
their old friendship with France, which proposal, however, the Americans
treated with contempt.
On the 30th of September, 1800, their ambassadors concluded an agreement
at Bonaparte’s country seat of Morfontaine, which referred especially to
the resistance which all the neutral powers under the protectorate of the
emperor of Russia were desirous of making to the pretensions and claims
of England. The Americans first of all declared that neutral flags should
make a neutral cargo, except in cases where the ship was actually laden
with goods contraband of war. It was afterwards precisely defined what
were to be considered goods contraband of war. By the fourth article it
was determined that neutral ships must submit to be detained, but that
the ships of war so detaining a merchantman with a view to search should
remain at least at the distance of a cannon-shot, and only be allowed
to send a boat with three men to examine the ship’s papers and cargo;
and that in all cases in which a merchantman should be under convoy of a
ship of war, no right of search should exist, because the presence of the
convoy should be regarded as a sufficient guarantee against contraband.
Inasmuch as England and Denmark were at open issue concerning this last
point, the Americans would have been inevitably involved in the dispute
had they immediately ratified the treaty of Morfontaine: they were,
however, far too cunning to fall into this difficulty; and they did not
therefore ratify the treaty till the Russian confederation had been
dissolved.
Sweden and Denmark had come to issue with England concerning the right of
search in 1798 and 1799, when four frigates, two Swedish and two Danish,
were captured and brought into English ports. True, they were afterwards
given up, but without any satisfaction, for the English still insisted
upon the right of search. The dispute became most vehement in the case of
the Danish frigate _Freya_, which, together with the merchantmen under
her convoy, were brought into an English port, after a sharp engagement
on the 25th of July, 1800; and the English, aware of the hostile
negotiations which were going on in the north, at once despatched an
expedition against Denmark.
Sixteen English ships of war suddenly appeared before Copenhagen, and
most unexpectedly threatened the harbour and city with a destructive
bombardment, if Denmark did not at once acknowledge England’s right of
search at sea. Had this acknowledgment been made, Bonaparte’s and the
emperor’s plan would have been frustrated in its very origin; but Denmark
had the good fortune to possess, in its minister Bernstorff, the greatest
diplomatist of the whole revolutionary era, who contrived for that time
to save Copenhagen without the surrender of any rights. It was quite
impossible to resist by force, but he refused to enter upon the question
of right or wrong; and in the agreement which he signed with Lord
Whitworth on the 25th of August, 1800, he consented that in the meantime
all occasion for dispute should be avoided, and thus the difficulty
be postponed or removed. Denmark bound herself no longer to send her
merchantmen under convoy--whereupon the _Freya_, and the vessels by which
she was accompanied, were set at liberty. On this occasion the emperor
Paul offered himself as arbitrator; and when Lord Whitworth rejected his
interference or arbitration, he immediately laid an embargo on all the
English ships in Russian ports.
The news of the agreement entered into at Copenhagen, however, no sooner
reached St. Petersburg, than this first embargo was removed, and the
dispute carried on merely in a diplomatic manner. At last the emperor
Paul put an end to this paper war, when Vaubois, who had defended
Malta since July, 1798, against the English, Russians, Neapolitans,
and sometimes also the Portuguese, at length capitulated, on the 5th
of September, 1800. The island was taken military possession of by the
English without any reference whatever to the order, to Naples, to the
promise which they had made to the emperor, or to Bailli de la Ferrette,
whom Paul had named as the representative of the order. As soon as this
news reached St. Petersburg, Paul’s rage and indignation knew no bounds.
On the 7th of November, he not only laid an embargo upon three hundred
English ships then in his ports, but sent the whole of their crews into
the interior of Russia, and allowed them only a few kopecks a day for
their support.
Lord Carysfort, the English ambassador in Berlin, was unable for six
weeks to obtain any answer from the Prussian government with respect to
its connection with the northern confederation, although he insisted
strongly upon it; and yet Stedingk, the Swedish minister, and Rosenkranz,
the Danish minister, had signed the agreement for an armed neutrality
in the form of that of 1780 as early as the 17th of December, 1800, in
St. Petersburg, and the Prussian minister, Von Luft, in the name of his
king, had signified his acceptance of the alliance on the 18th. When
Lord Carysfort at length obtained an answer on the 12th of February to
his demands, so long and repeatedly urged in vain, Haugwitz had drawn it
up equivocally both in form and contents. The emperor of Russia was so
indignant at the ambiguity that he not only expressed his feelings on the
subject warmly, but also took some hostile measures against Prussia.
On the other hand, the emperor invited Gustavus IV to St. Petersburg
where he was received with the greatest splendour. He arrived at St.
Petersburg at Christmas, 1800, and immediately, as if to insult the
English, a grand meeting of the order of Malta was held; the king himself
was loaded with marks of honour of every possible description, and at
the end of December he signed a new agreement, by which the objects
of that of the 16th of the same month were greatly enlarged. In the
former alliance defensive operations alone were contemplated; but now
offensive measures were also agreed upon, with the reservation, indeed,
if they should become necessary. Paul took measures to refit his fleet,
and an army was equipped which was to be placed under the commands of
Soltikov, Pahlen, and Kutusov; the Danish fleet was in good condition;
the Russian minister in Paris appeared to regard the circumstances as
very favourable for gaining Hanover to his master without danger or risk;
and Pitt himself considered the state of affairs so unfavourable, that
he seriously contemplated the propriety of retiring and making way for a
new ministry, in order to render a peace possible. This close confederacy
against England was, however, dissolved at the very moment in which the
first consul appeared to be disposed to favour Naples and Sardinia, in
order to gratify the wishes of the emperor of Russia.
ASSASSINATION OF PAUL (1801 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1801 A.D.]]
The catastrophe in St. Petersburg is easily explained by the continually
changing humours of the emperor, by his mental derangement, which had
been constantly on the increase for several months previous to his
murder, by the acts of violence and injustice which he suffered himself
to commit, and by the dreadful apprehension which prevailed among all
classes of society, from the empress and the grand duke down to the
very lowest citizen. The emperor’s sober and rational intervals became
progressively rarer, so that no man was sure for an instant either of his
place or his life; thousands of persons completely innocent were sent to
Siberia, and yet goodness and mildness alternated with cruel severity.
The emperor one while exhibited the most striking magnanimity, at another
the meanest vindictiveness.
The beautiful and virtuous empress had patiently submitted to her
husband’s preference for the plain Nelidov, who at least treated her
with honour and respect; but she was obliged also to submit to his
attachment to Lopukhin, who continually provoked strife. She endured
these things patiently, lived on good terms with the emperor, slept
immediately under his chambers, and yet neither she nor her sons,
Alexander and Constantine, were able to escape the suspicions of his
morbid mind. It was whispered, by persons in the confidence of the court,
that the emperor had said he would send the empress to Kalamagan, in
the government of Astrakhan, Alexander to Shlüsselburg, and Constantine
to the citadel of St. Petersburg. It is not worth while to inquire what
truth there may have been in these reports; everyone felt that the time
had arrived to have recourse to the only means which can be employed
in despotic kingdoms for effecting a complete change in the measures
of government. This means is the murder of the despot, which in such
circumstances was usually effected in the Roman Empire by the Pretorians,
in Constantinople by the Janizaries, or by a clamorous and infuriated
mob, in St. Petersburg by a number of confederated nobles; and in all
these cases was regarded as a sort of necessary appendage to the existing
constitution.
Rostoptchin, the minister, who had long possessed the emperor’s
confidence, was dismissed and in disgrace; and Count Pahlen, who was at
the head of the emperor’s dreadful police, was suddenly and excessively
favoured. He, too, observed, when he had reached the highest pinnacle,
that he began to be suspected. The count was an Esthonian by birth, a man
of a cold, deep, and faithless disposition, and the instrument of all the
cruelties and severities which had been exercised by the emperor. He was
also commander-in-chief of all the troops in the capital, and since the
10th of March had become a member of the ministry for foreign affairs.
Up to this period he had been successful in discovering and frustrating
all the real or pretended attempts at dethroning the emperor, but he now
formed a conspiracy against him, because he knew that Paul had called to
his aid two formidable assistants, to use them against himself in case
of necessity. The emperor had previously sent away from St. Petersburg
and now recalled Lindner and Araktcheiev, two of his most dreadful
instruments of violence, the latter of whom played a fearful part in
Russia even during the reign of the mild and clement emperor Alexander.
Pahlen had previously taken his measures in such a manner that a number
of those to whom the murder of an emperor was no novelty were at that
time collected in St. Petersburg, and only waited for a hint, either with
or without Pahlen, to fall upon the emperor, who had personally given
them mortal offence.
Valerian, Nicholas, and Plato Zubov had first been publicly affronted
by the emperor like the Orlovs, and afterwards dismissed; they remained
under compulsory absence in Germany till they found a medium for
securing the favour of the only person who had any influence over the
emperor. This medium was the French actress, Chevalier, who ruled the
Turk Kutaisov (formerly a _valet de chambre_, but now adorned with all
possible titles, honours, and orders, with the broad ribbon and stars of
Europe), and through him ruled the emperor. Chevalier obtained permission
for the Zubovs to return to the court, and Plato held Kutaisov bound
by his expressed intention of marrying the Turk’s daughter. Plato had
been previously commander-in-chief of the army, and could, in case of
need, reckon upon it with the greater certainty, as it had been made
discontented by the gross and ridiculous treatment of the generals of the
whole army, and even of such a man as Suvarov.
Participators in a plan for setting aside the emperor were easily found
among the nobles, as soon as it became certain that there was nothing
to fear. It was necessary, however, to obtain the consent of the two
eldest grand dukes; but not a word was said of the murder, but merely
of the removal of their father from the government. Alexander was not
easily prevailed upon to acquiesce in the deposition of his father, as,
however numerous Alexander’s failings in other respects may have been,
both he and his mother were persons of gentle hearts. Pahlen undertook
the business of persuading the prince, for which he was by far the best
fitted, inasmuch as he knew all the secrets of the court, and combined
all power in himself; he therefore succeeded in convincing the imperial
family of the dangers with which they themselves were threatened, and of
the necessity of deposing the emperor. He appears to have prevailed with
Alexander by showing that he could only guard against a greater evil by
consenting to his father’s dethronement. Certain it is at least, that
Alexander signed the proclamation, announcing his own assumption of the
reins of government, two hours before the execution of the deed by the
conspirators.
The emperor with his family lived in the Mikhailov palace; the 23rd of
March, 1801, was chosen for the accomplishment of the deed, for on that
day the Semenovski battalion of guards was on duty at the palace. The
most distinguished men among the conspirators were the Zubov, General
Count Benningsen, a Hanoverian, who had distinguished himself in the
Polish wars under Catherine, Tchitchakov, Tartarinov, Tolstoi, Iashvel,
Iesselovitch, and Uvarov, together with Count Pahlen himself, who did not
accompany the others into the emperor’s bedchamber, but had taken his
measures so skilfully that, if the enterprise failed, he might appear
as his deliverer. Very shortly before the execution of the deed, Pahlen
communicated the design to General Talitzin, colonel of the regiment of
Preobrajenski guards, to General Deporadevitch, colonel of the Semonovski
guards, together with some fifty other officers whom he entertained on
the night on which the murder was committed.
On the evening before his death Paul received, when sitting at supper
with his mistress, a note from Prince Mechereki, warning him of his
danger, and revealing the names of the conspirators. He handed it
unopened to Kutaisov, saying he would read it on the morrow. Kutaisov put
it in his pocket, and left it there when he changed his dress next day to
dine with the emperor. He turned to get it, but Paul growing impatient
sent for him in a hurry, and the trembling courtier came back without
the letter on which so much depended. On the night of the 3rd Paul went
early to bed; soon afterwards the conspirators repaired to his apartment,
the outer door of which was opened to them in compliance with the demand
of Argamakov, an aide-de-camp, who pretended that he was come to make
his report to the emperor. A Cossack who guarded the door of the bedroom
offered resistance and was cut down. The conspirators rushed in and found
the bed empty. “He has escaped us,” cried some of them. “That he has
not,” said Benningsen. “No weakness, or I will put you all to death.”
Putting his hand on the bed-clothes and feeling them warm, he observed
that the emperor could not be far off, and presently he discovered him
crouching behind a screen. The conspirators required him to sign his
abdication. He refused, a conflict ensued; a sash was passed round his
neck, and he was strangled after a desperate resistance.
Alexander was seized with the most passionate grief when he learned at
what a price he had acquired the crown. He had supped with his father
at nine o’clock, and at eleven he took possession of the empire, by
a document which had been drawn up and signed two hours and a half
previously. The most dreadful thing of all, however, was that he was
obliged not only to suffer the two chief conspirators, Zubov and Pahlen,
to remain about his person, but to allow them to share the administration
of the empire between them. It was a piece of good fortune that those
two thoroughly wicked men were of very different views, by which means
he was first enabled to remove Pahlen, and afterwards Zubov also. Their
associates, however, remained, and at a later period we shall find Count
Benningsen at the head of the army which was to deliver Prussia after the
battle of Jena.
Paul was twice married: by his first wife, Nathalie Alexeievna, princess
of Hesse Darmstadt, who died in 1776, he had no family; by his second,
Marie Feodorovna, princess of Würtemberg, who died in 1828, he had ten
children, the eldest of whom, Alexander by name, now succeeded to the
imperial throne.
THE ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER I (1801 A.D.); HIS EARLY REFORMS
The accession of Alexander was hailed with sincere and universal delight,
not only as an escape from the wretched and extravagant reign of Paul,
but as the opening fulfilment of the expectations which had long been
anxiously fixed on his heir. The new monarch was twenty-five years of
age, of majestic figure and noble countenance, though his features were
not perfectly regular. He possessed an acute mind, a generous heart, and
a most winning grace of manner. “Still,” says M. Thiers, “there might
be discerned in him traces of hereditary infirmity. His mind, lively,
changeable, and susceptible, was continually impressed with the most
contrary ideas. But this remarkable prince was not always led away by
such momentary impulses; he united with his extensive and versatile
comprehension a profound secretiveness which baffled the closest
observation. He was well-meaning, and a dissembler at the same time.”
Napoleon said of him at St. Helena, “The emperor of Russia possesses
abilities, grace, and information; he is fascinating, but one cannot
trust him; he is a true Greek of the Lower Empire; he is, or pretends to
be, a metaphysician; his faults are those of his education, or of his
preceptor. What discussions have I not had with him! He maintained that
hereditary right was an abuse, and I had to expend all my eloquence and
logic during a full hour to prove that hereditary right maintains the
repose and happiness of nations. Perhaps he wished to mystify me; for he
is cunning, false, and skilful.”
In the beginning of Alexander’s reign reform succeeded reform, and all
Europe applauded. He quickly put a stop to the system of terror and
to the absurd vexations which Paul had introduced. He disgraced the
instruments who had worked out the will of that poor maniac; he repaired
the crying injustice which had been committed; he once more abolished
the terrible secret inquisition, but, as we already said, it was again
established by his successor. He instituted a permanent council, and
contemplated the complete reorganisation of the administration of the
interior. He relaxed the rigour of the censorship of the press, and
granted permission to introduce foreign works. He reduced the taxes and
the expenditure of the court; and in the first year of his reign he
abstained from exacting the recruits for his army, an exaction odious
to those whom it affects, and therefore often accompanied with fearful
violences.
He applied himself most diligently to affairs, and laboured almost as
much as his grandmother, who had devoted three hours to the concerns
of the state when her ministers came to confer with her. He required
detailed reports from all the higher officers of state; and having
examined them, caused them to be published, a thing never before heard of
in Russia. He abolished punishment by torture; forbade the confiscation
of hereditary property; solemnly declared that he would not endure the
habit of making grants of peasants, a practice till then common with
the autocrats, and forbade the announcement in public journals of sales
of human beings. He applied himself to the reform of the tribunals;
established pecuniary fines for magistrates convicted of evading or
violating their duties; constituted the senate a high court of justice,
and divided it into seven departments in order to provide against the
slowness of law proceedings; and re-established the commission which had
been appointed by Catherine for the compilation of a code. He applied
himself to the protection of commerce; made regulations for the benefit
of navigation, and extended and improved the communication in the
interior of his empire. He did much to promote general education, and
established several new universities with large numbers of subsidiary
schools. He permitted every subject of his empire to choose his own
avocation in life, regardless of restraints formerly imposed with respect
to rank, and removed the prohibition on foreign travel which had been
enacted in the last reign. He permitted his nobles to sell to their
serfs, along with their personal freedom, portions of land which should
thus become the _bona fide_ property of the serf purchaser--a measure by
which he fondly hoped to lay the basis of a class of free cultivators. It
was under his auspices that his mother, Marie Feodorovna, founded many
hospitals and educational institutes, both for nobles and burghers, which
will immortalise her name.
One of the first acts of Alexander’s reign was to give orders that
the British sailors who had been taken from the ships laid under
sequestration, and marched into the interior, should be set at liberty
and carefully conducted at the public expense to the ports from which
they had been severally taken. At the same time all prohibitions against
the export of corn were removed--a measure of no small importance to
the famishing population of the British Isles, and hardly less material
to the gorged proprietors of Russian produce. The young emperor shortly
after wrote a letter with his own hand to the king of England, expressing
in the warmest terms his desire to re-establish the amicable relations
of the two empires; a declaration which was received with no less joy
in London than in St. Petersburg. The British cabinet immediately sent
Lord St. Helens to the Russian capital, and on the 17th of June a treaty
was concluded, which limited and defined the right of search, and which
Napoleon denounced as “an ignominious treaty, equivalent to an admission
of the sovereignty of the seas in the British parliament, and the slavery
of all other states.” In the same year (October 4-8) Alexander also
concluded treaties of peace with France and Spain; for between Russia
and the former power there had previously existed only a cessation of
hostilities, without any written convention.
THE INCORPORATION OF GEORGIA
The incorporation of Georgia with the empire, an event long prepared
by the insidious means habitually employed by Russia, was consummated
in this year. The people of Georgia have always had a high reputation
for valour, but at the end of the seventeenth century they suffered
immensely from the Tatars and the Lesghians. Russia supported Georgia,
not sufficiently indeed to prevent the enemy from destroying Tiflis,
but quite enough to prove to the country that, once under the Russian
rule, it would be safe from the Mussulmans. Alexander’s manifesto of
the 12th of September, 1801, says that he accepts the weight of the
Georgian throne, not for the sake of extending the empire, already so
large, but only from humanity! Even in Russia very few could believe
that the Georgians surrendered themselves to the czar from a spontaneous
acknowledgment of the superiority of the Russian rule, and of its ability
to make the people happy; to disabuse themselves of any such notion,
they had but to look at the queen of Georgia, Maria, who was detained at
St. Petersburg, in the Tauric palace--a name that might well remind her
of the treacherous acquisition of another kingdom. She rode through the
streets in one of the court carriages, and her features expressed great
affliction. The covering which she wore on her head, as usual in Georgia,
prevented the people from seeing the scars of the sabre wounds she had
received before she quitted the country. Her consort, George XIII, had
bequeathed the kingdom to the Russians, but she protested against the
act; and when the Russian colonel Lazarev came to carry her away to St.
Petersburg, she refused to go with him. He was about to use violence,
but the queen took out a poniard from her bosom and stabbed him. The
interpreter drew his sabre and gave her several cuts on the head, so that
she fell down insensible.
RUSSIA JOINS THE THIRD COALITION
[Sidenote: [1803 A.D.]]
Concurrently with his domestic reforms, Alexander occupied himself
in an extensive series of negotiations, having for their object the
general settlement of Europe upon such new bases as the results of the
last war had rendered necessary. In particular, he was engaged as joint
arbiter with Bonaparte in the matter of the indemnifications to be made
to those princes who had lost a part or the whole of their possessions
by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine. Alexander was secretly
dissatisfied with the part he was made to play in these transactions,
for the authority which he shared in appearance with Bonaparte, was
in reality monopolised by the latter. He abstained, however, from
remonstrating, contenting himself for the present with the outward show
of respect paid to his empire, and with a precedent which, added to that
of Teschen, established in future the right of Russia to mix itself up in
the affairs of Germany. The Peace of Amiens between France and England
was broken, and a war was declared on the 18th of May, 1803, between
the two powers, which was ultimately to involve the whole of Europe.
Meanwhile, many cases were arising to increase Alexander’s displeasure
against Bonaparte.
[Illustration: ALEXANDER I
(1777-1825)]
The relations between Russia and France were at this time of such a
nature that the Russian chancellor, Vorontzov, said plainly, in a note
of the 18th of July, that if the war were to be prolonged between France
and England, Russia would be compelled finally to take part in it.
Before this declaration on the part of Russia, Bonaparte had a scene
with Markov, which alone might well have caused a rupture. He addressed
the Russian ambassador, in a public audience, so rudely and violently
that even Bignon, who is disposed to worship Bonaparte as a demi-god, is
obliged to confess that his hero entirely lost his dignity, and forgot
his position.
[Sidenote: [1803-1805 A.D.]]
When Markov withdrew in November, he left his secretary of legation,
D’Oubril, as acting ambassador in his place. Everyone, however, foresaw a
breach at no very distant period; and Russia had already, in the autumn
of 1803, when nothing was to be done with Prussia, entered into a closer
connection with England. Negotiations were also commenced with Austria,
and a union with Sweden and Denmark, for the purpose of liberating
Hanover, was spoken of. This was the state of affairs at the beginning of
1804: the murder of the duke d’Enghien brought matters to a crisis. The
mother of the Russian emperor had been all along hostile to everything
proceeding from Bonaparte; and the mild and gentle spirit of the emperor,
like that of all persons of good feeling in Europe, was deeply wounded
by the fate of the duke. From the beginning of 1804, he had no further
political reasons for keeping up a friendly relation with France; he
therefore gave himself up entirely to his natural feelings on hearing of
the catastrophe at Vincennes.
By the declarations interchanged between the courts of St. Petersburg
and Berlin (May 3rd and 24th, 1805), it was agreed that they should not
allow the French troops in Germany to go beyond the frontier of Hanover;
and that should this happen, each of the two powers should employ 40,000
men to repel such an attempt. A convention was also signed between Russia
and Austria before the end of the year, and they agreed to set on foot
an army of 350,000 men. England, under the administration of William
Pitt, added her strength to these combinations, and united the several
powers in a third coalition for the purpose of wresting from France the
countries subdued by it since 1792, reducing that kingdom within its
ancient limits, and finally introducing into Europe a general system of
public right. The plan was the same as that which ten years afterwards
was executed by the Grand Alliance; it failed in 1805, because the
participation of Prussia, on which the allies had reckoned, was, from the
most ignoble motives withheld.
The negotiations of the several treaties connected with the coalition,
occupied the greater part of the year 1805. By the Treaty of St.
Petersburg (August 11th), between Great Britain and Russia, it was agreed
that Alexander should make another attempt for arranging matters with
Bonaparte, so as to prevent the war. The Russian minister Novosiltzov was
sent to Paris by way of Berlin, where he received the passports procured
for him from the French cabinet by that of Prussia; but at the same time,
orders reached him from St. Petersburg, countermanding his journey.
The annexation of the Ligurian Republic to France, at the moment when
the allies were making conciliatory overtures to Napoleon, appeared to
the emperor too serious an outrage to allow of his prosecuting further
negotiations. War was consequently resolved on.
THE CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ (1805 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1805 A.D.]]
Napoleon seemed to be wholly intent on his design of invading England.
Part of his troops had already embarked (August 27th), when on a sudden
the camp of Boulogne was broken up, and the army put in march towards
the Rhine, which river it passed within a month after. Austria had set
on foot three armies. The archduke Charles commanded that of Italy; his
brother John was stationed with the second army on the Tyrol; and the
third was commanded nominally by the archduke Frederick, the emperor’s
cousin, but in reality by General Mack. The first Russian army under
Kutusov had arrived in Galicia, and was continuing its march in all
haste. It was followed by another under Michelson. The Russian troops in
Dalmatia were to attempt a landing in Italy.
Mack having crossed the Inn (September 8th), and entered Swabia,
Napoleon’s plan was to cut him off from the army of Kutusov, which
was marching through Austria. In this he succeeded by a violation of
the Prussian territory. Marmont, who had marched by way of Mainz, and
Bernadotte, who had conducted an army into Franconia, where they were
joined by the Bavarians, traversed the country of Anspach, and thus came
on the rear of the Austrian army (October 6th). From that date, scarcely
a day passed without a battle favourable to the French. Several Austrian
divisions were forced to lay down their arms. Mack, who had thrown
himself into Ulm, lost all resolution, and capitulated with 25,000 men
(October 19th). Mack’s army was thus totally dissipated, except 6000
cavalry, with which the archduke Ferdinand had opened himself a passage
through Franconia, and 20,000 men, with whom Kienmayer had retired to
Braunau, where he was met by the vanguard of Kutusov. The two generals
continued their retreat. The Russians repassed the Danube near Grein
(November 9th), and directed their march towards Moravia. A few days
after (November 13th), Vienna fell into the hands of the French. The
Austrians had renounced the design of defending their capital, but
decided that the passage of the river should be disputed.
Vienna is situated at some distance from the Danube, which flows to
the right of the city between wooded islands. The Austrians had placed
explosive materials under the floorings of the wooden bridge which
crosses the several arms of the river, and were ready to blow it up
the moment the French should show themselves. They kept themselves
in readiness on the left bank, with their artillery pointed, and a
corps of 7000 or 8000 men, commanded by Count Auersberg. The French,
nevertheless, got possession of the bridge by stratagem. Murat, Lannes,
Belliard, and their staff, leaving their troops behind them, crossed the
bridge, told the Austrians that an armistice was agreed on, and asked
to see their general. He was sent for. Meanwhile, the French officers
kept the Austrian gunners in conversation, and gave time for a column
of French grenadiers to come up unseen, under cover of the woods, seize
the cannon, and disarm the artillerymen. The Austrian commander who had
come to the spot just at the critical moment, fell completely into the
trap. He himself led the French column over the bridge, and ordered the
Austrian troops to be drawn up on parade to receive them as friends.
The possession of the bridge afforded the French troops the means of
reaching Znaim sooner than Kutusov, and thus preventing his junction with
Buxhövden.
Meanwhile, Alexander had gone to Berlin, to exert his personal influence
over the timorous king, and prevail on him to abandon his wretched
neutral policy, in which there was neither honour, honesty, nor safety.
Alexander was warmly seconded by the beautiful queen of Prussia, and by
the archduke Anthony, who arrived at the same time on a special mission
from Vienna. French influence rapidly declined in Berlin; Duroc left it
on the 2nd of November, without having been able to obtain an audience,
for some days previously, either from the king or the emperor; and on the
following day a secret convention was signed between the two monarchs for
the regulation of the affairs of Europe, and the erection of a barrier
against the ambition of the French emperor.
The Prussian minister Haugwitz, who had signed this convention only to
gain time, and with a secret determination to elude its provisions, was
to be entrusted with the notification of it to Napoleon, with authority,
in case of its acceptance, to offer a renewal of the former friendship
and alliance of the Prussian nation; but in case of refusal, to declare
war, with an intimation that hostilities would begin on the 15th of
December--when they would be too late. Before that day came, Prussia
relapsed into her old temporising habits; her armies made no forward
movement towards the Danube, and Napoleon was permitted to continue
without interruption his advance to Vienna, while 80,000 disciplined
veterans remained inactive in Silesia; a force amply sufficient to have
thrown him back with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine.
A characteristic scene took place at Potsdam during Alexander’s visit.
The king, the queen, and the emperor went one night by torchlight into
the vault where lay the coffin of Frederick the Great. They knelt before
it. Alexander’s face was bathed in tears; he pressed his friend’s hands,
he clasped him in his arms, and together they swore eternal amity: never
would they separate their cause or their fortunes. Tilsit soon showed
what was the value of this oath, which probably was sincere for the
moment when it was taken.
During the retreat of the Austrians and Russians under Kienmayer and
Kutusov from Passau to Krems, the imprudence of Mortier, who had crossed
to the left bank of the Danube at Linz, gave occasion to engagements at
Stein and Dirnstein, in which the French lost more men than they ever
acknowledged. Mortier’s army of 30,000 men consisted of three divisions,
under Generals Gazan, Dupont, and Dumonceau. This army had positive
orders to keep always near to the main body, which was pursuing its march
along the right bank, and never to advance beyond it. Kutusov had long
retreated on the right bank; but on the 9th of November he crossed to
the left at Grein, as before mentioned, and lay in the neighbourhood of
Krems, when Mortier’s troops advanced. The French divisions maintained
the distance of a whole day’s march one from another, because they
thought they were following a fleeing army; but between Dirnstein and
Stein they fell in with the whole Russian army, 20,000 strong, at a place
where the French were obliged to pass through a frightful ravine. On
the 11th of November, Mortier ventured to make an attack with Gazan’s
division alone; but near Dirnstein (twenty hours from Vienna), he got
into a narrow way, enclosed on both sides by a line of lofty walls, and
there suffered a dreadful loss. When the French, about noon, at length
supposed themselves to have gained some advantage, the Russians received
reinforcements, outflanked the French, cut them off, and would have
annihilated the whole division, had not Dupont’s come up at the decisive
moment. The latter division had also suffered severely on the same day.
Whilst Kutusov was sharply engaged with Mortier, whose numbers were being
rapidly diminished, and his cannon taken, the Austrian general Schmidt
attacked Dupont at Stein, where the contest was as murderous as at
Dirnstein, till Schmidt fell, and the French forced their way out.
Kutusov, on his march to Znaim, was overtaken by the van of the French,
under Belliard, near Hollabrunn; and everything depended on detaining
the latter so long as might enable Kutusov to gain time for getting
in advance. For this purpose, Bagration, with about six thousand men,
took up a position in the rear of the main body. Nostitz served under
Bagration, and had some thousand Austrians and a number of Russians
under his immediate command. He occupied the village of Schöngraben,
in the rear of the Russians, and in the very centre of their line of
march. Belliard ought to have attacked him first; but as his corps was
not superior in number to that of Bagration, he had again recourse to
the expedient which he had already tried, with such signal success, at
the bridge of Vienna. He entered into a parley; declared that peace with
Austria was already concluded, or as good as concluded; assured them
that hostilities henceforth affected the Russians alone; and by such
means induced Nostitz to be guilty of a piece of treachery unparalleled
in war. Nostitz, with his Austrians, forsook the Russians, even those
whom he had under his own command; and they being unable to maintain the
village of Schöngraben, it was taken possession of without a shot; and
Bagration and Kutusov seemed lost, for Murat’s whole army was advancing
upon them.
In the meantime the Russians at Hollabrunn extricated themselves from
their difficulty; for they were not so stupidly credulous as the
Austrians, but knew how to deceive the Gascons, by whom they were
pursued, as Belliard had deceived the Austrians. For this purpose,
they availed themselves of the presence in Kutusov’s camp of Count von
Winzingerode, the adjutant-general of the emperor of Russia, who had been
employed in all the last diplomatic military negotiations in Berlin.
Murat having sent his adjutant to call upon Kutusov, whose line of
march had come into the power of the enemy, in consequence of Nostitz’s
treachery in capitulating, the Russian general assumed the appearance
of being desirous to negotiate, and Winzingerode betook himself to the
French camp. Belliard and Murat, without taking the trouble to inquire
what powers the count and Kutusov had to conclude a treaty which should
be generally binding, came to an agreement with Winzingerode, by virtue
of which all the Russians, within a certain number of days, were to
evacuate every part of the Austrian territory. This capitulation was
to be sent to the emperor Napoleon, at Schönbrunn, for confirmation;
and to this condition there was necessarily attached another, for the
sake of which Kutusov had commenced the whole affair. There was to be a
suspension of hostilities till the arrival of Napoleon’s answer; and it
was agreed that in the meantime both parties should remain in their then
positions.
Bagration, with seven or eight thousand Russians, complied with this
condition, and remained in his position at Hollabrunn, because he
could be observed by the French; but Kutusov, with all the rest of the
army, which lay at a greater distance, quietly continued his route to
Znaim; and this, with a full knowledge of the danger of Bagration being
afterwards overwhelmed by a superior force. On being made acquainted with
the capitulation, Napoleon was enraged, for he immediately perceived how
grievously his brother-in-law had suffered himself to be deceived; and he
ordered an immediate attack. This was indeed made; but eighteen hours had
been irreparably lost, and Kutusov gained two marches on Murat; the whole
French army, above thirty thousand strong, therefore fell upon Bagration.
Bagration, who had still with him the Austrian regiment of hussars of the
crown-prince of Homburg, commanded by Baron von Mohr, offered a vigorous
resistance to the whole French army with his seven or eight thousand
men. The Russian bombs set fire to the village in which was stationed
the corps which was to fall upon Bagration’s flank; the consequence was,
that this corps was thrown into confusion, and the Russians opened up a
way for themselves at the point of the bayonet. The Russian general, it
is true, was obliged to leave his cannon in the hands of his enemy, and
lost the half of his force; it must, however, always be regarded as one
of the most glorious deeds of the whole campaign, that, after three days’
continued fighting, he succeeded in joining the main body under Kutusov,
at his headquarters at Wischau, between Brünn and Olmütz, and, to the
astonishment of all, with one-half of his little army. Even the French
admit that the Russians behaved nobly, that they themselves lost a great
number of men, and that, among others, Oudinot was severely wounded.
On the same day on which Bagration arrived in Wischau, a junction had
been formed by Buxhövden’s army, with which the emperor Alexander was
present, with the troops under Kutusov, who thenceforward assumed the
chief command of the whole. Napoleon himself came to Brünn, and collected
his whole army around him, well knowing that nothing but a decisive
engagement could bring him safely out of the situation in which he then
was, and which was the more dangerous the more splendid and victorious it
outwardly appeared to be. It is beyond a doubt that the precipitation and
haughtiness of the Russians, who were eager for a decisive engagement,
combined with the miserable policy of the Prussian cabinet and the
cowardice of the king, as well as the fears and irresolution of the poor
emperor Francis, and the want of spirit among his advisers, contributed
more to the success of Napoleon’s plans respecting Prussia, Germany, and
Italy, than his victories in the field.
A glance at the situation of affairs at the time of the battle of
Austerlitz will show at once how easily he might have been stopped in his
career. There was nothing Napoleon feared more than that the Russians
should march either to Hungary or to Upper Silesia, and avoid a decisive
engagement; he therefore took means to ascertain the characters and
views of the personal attendants and advisers of the emperor Alexander;
and when he had learned that young men of foolhardy dispositions had
the preponderance in his councils, he formed his plans accordingly. He
first advanced from Brünn to Wischau, and afterwards retired again into
the neighbourhood of Brünn, as if afraid to venture upon an attack. The
emperor of Germany, as well as Napoleon, appeared seriously desirous
of a peace; but the former was obliged to propose conditions which the
latter could not possibly accept; and Napoleon wished first completely
to set the emperor Francis free from the Russians, his allies and from
Prussia, before he came to an agreement with him. As Count Stadion, who
came to the headquarters of the French on the 27th of November, with
Giulay, as ambassadors to treat for peace, was a sworn enemy of Napoleon,
and remained so till 1813, and had, moreover, been very instrumental in
founding the whole coalition, and in maturing their plans, his appearance
on this occasion was of itself no good omen for the favourable issue of
the mission.