After the meeting at Kherson the two imperial allies prepared to direct

their forces against the whole extent of the Turkish frontier, from the

Adriatic to the Black Sea. Care was taken, however, to furnish an excuse

for the participation of Austria, by inciting the Turks to make the first

attack; for only in such a case was Austria bound to furnish auxiliaries

to the Russians. To this end Bulgakov, Catherine’s ambassador at

Constantinople, was ordered by every means to excite commotions among the

Greeks, Bulgarians, Wallachians, and Slavonians, as well as in Egypt and

in Asia Minor. The Turks, justly incensed at these intrigues, insisted

upon a distinct declaration of their views on the part of the Russians;

and when they received for answer only the usual diplomatic subterfuge

that the ambassador must wait for instructions from St. Petersburg, they

immediately declared war, sent Bulgakov to the state prison of the Seven

Towers, and nothing but the threatening interference of the English

minister could have prevented them from inflicting summary vengeance

upon him, to show their righteous displeasure at the conduct of his

government. Catherine and Joseph had now gained their wishes. The Turks

were the first to declare war, and a pretence was thus afforded to the

Russians to call upon the Austrians for that aid which they were bound by

treaty to render in case of an attack on the part of the Turks.

Catherine published a manifesto, in which after a long enumeration of the

pretended wrongs ascribed to the Porte, she added that, provoked by a

conduct, in itself so offensive, she had, very unwillingly, been obliged

to have recourse to arms, as the only means left her for the support

of those rights which she had acquired at the price of so much blood,

and to avenge her wounded dignity, suffering from the violence that had

been used towards her minister at Constantinople; that entirely innocent

of all the calamities inevitably engendered by war, she relied with

confidence, not only on the Almighty protection and the assistance of her

allies, but on the prayers of the Christian world, for triumph in a cause

so just as that which she was obliged to defend. This manifesto was soon

followed up by a second, which declared that the Porte had arrogantly

presumed to insist on a categorical answer to its absurd demands; and

that the empress, forced to repel the aggression of the enemy of the

Christian name, armed herself with confidence, under the protection of

that just God who had so long and so powerfully shielded the Russian

Empire.

Had Potemkin been as great a general as he was capable of devising

magnificent plans and playing the Russian tyrant, great things would have

been accomplished in 1787, for all the preparations for the war had been

made long beforehand. Field-Marshal Romanzov was to share the command of

the army with Potemkin; that is to say, he was to do all the work, and

the other was to engross all the merit. Romanzov declined this thankless

office, and Potemkin stood alone at the head of the army; but he did not

succeed in deceiving posterity, for no one has ever ascribed to him what

was effected by the officers under his command--by Repnin, Paul Potemkin,

Suvarov, Kamenskoi, Galitzin, and Kutusov, all of whom became more or

less renowned in later wars. Potemkin found in Suvarov precisely such an

instrument as he needed: for to that general the will of the empress or

her favourite was in all cases a law paramount to all moral obligations,

or any feelings of humanity. He was sent to Kinburn, the chief object of

the campaign being apparently the siege of Otchakov, by the main body

under Potemkin, whilst other divisions were despatched to observe the

movements of the Tatars in the Kuban.

[Sidenote: [1787-1788 A.D.]]

Kinburn was a small fortress occupied by the Russians, and situated

upon a promontory directly opposite to Otchakov, in and around which

the Turkish army was stationed. The object of Suvarov’s mission was to

frustrate the efforts of the Turkish fleet to land a division on the

promontory of Kinburn; and he executed the task in a masterly manner. At

first he remained perfectly quiet in the fortress, after having erected

a battery at the extremity of the promontory, in order to cannonade the

Turkish ships from the land, at the same moment in which they might be

attacked by the Russian fleet. He allowed the Turks to proceed without

molestation till they had disembarked from six thousand to seven thousand

men; he then sent a few regiments of Cossacks against them, and at

the same time charged them at the head of two battalions of infantry

with fixed bayonets, and exterminated them all. Immediately afterwards

he employed his battery against the Turkish fleet. The prince of

Nassau-Siegen, who had the command of the Russian gunboats of Nikolaiev,

attacked the Turkish ships at the very entrance of what is called the

Liman, and within range of Suvarov’s guns, to whose well-directed fire he

was indebted for a great share of the advantages which he gained.

The whole remaining part of the year 1787, as well as the spring and a

great part of the summer of 1788, elapsed without anything important

having been undertaken; the whole of the Russian land-forces were,

however, directed towards the Bug, in order to push forward with the

greatest expedition to the Danube. The Turks had already suffered defeats

at sea and in the Caucasus. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea, which was

almost wholly commanded by foreigners, nearly annihilated the Turkish

navy; generals Tallitzin and Tekeli massacred the Tatars of the Kuban,

and Tamara reduced Georgia and Lesghistan. In August, Potemkin at length

marched against Otchakov, but very wisely left the whole conduct of

the military operations to Suvarov, the victor of Kinburn. The Russian

operations were delayed in expectation of an Austrian army, which, in

connection with a Russian force under Soltikov, was to make an incursion

into Moldavia. This delay was protracted till King Gustavus began to

exhibit symptoms of making an attack on the provinces contiguous to

Sweden, which were now deprived of means of defence. He had to revenge

on Russia a long series of wrongs, crowned by the intolerable conduct of

Catherine’s ambassador Razumovski, whom she had sent to form conspiracies

against him, and to persecute and insult him in his own capital.

THE SWEDISH WAR (1788-1790 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1788 A.D.]]

Gustavus III would also willingly have induced Denmark to take part in

the movement against Russia; in this, however, he was unsuccessful,

although supported by England and Prussia. Razumovski, the Russian

ambassador, was ordered to leave Stockholm on the 23rd of June, and went

to the army in Finland. The king appeared as if he designed immediately

to march against St. Petersburg, which excited no small concern in the

minds of the government, because, in confident reliance on the king’s

misunderstanding with the Swedish nobles, the whole of their good troops

had been despatched to the frontiers of Turkey.

The king of Sweden was acquainted with the feelings of his nobles,

consequently with those of the generals and officers of his army; he

therefore endeavoured to deprive the malcontents of the apparently legal

point of a refusal to serve, by changing the offensive war which he

contemplated into a defensive one, and for this purpose had recourse to a

very childish subterfuge. There had been a long-existing dispute between

the two countries respecting the bridge over the small river Kimmene,

the boundary between the two states, whether it should be painted in

Swedish or Russian colours; he provoked the Russians to maintain this

disputed right by force of arms, and then proclaimed that he had been

attacked by them, and was therefore justified in carrying on a defensive

war without consulting the estates. We leave it undecided whether he took

possession of the bridge by force, and thereby compelled the Russians to

resist force by force; or whether, as the best accounts allege, he caused

some Swedes to be clothed in Russian uniforms in order to attack his own

soldiers, and in this way to justify an offensive war.

The distance from the river Kimmene to St. Petersburg is less than

150 miles. There would have been no difficulty in storming the small

fortresses of Viborg and Friedrichsham, which lay upon the route, and an

unexpected attack from the sea might probably have led to the surprise

and capture of Kronstadt and Kronslot, the former of which is less than

twenty miles from the open waters, and the latter is situated on a

sand-bank in the sea.[54] The favourable moment, however, for an attack

by sea had been already allowed to pass by the king’s brother Charles,

duke of Södermanland, who commanded the Swedish fleet, and by land the

king was precipitate when he ought to have delayed, and hesitated when

everything depended on rapidity.

On the 22nd of June Duke Charles, with fifteen ships of the line and

five frigates, had fallen in with three sail of Russian ships, to the

north of the island of Gothland, which he ought to have captured, but was

restrained by a feeling of reluctance to begin the war (which was then

actually commenced), and immediately a superior Russian fleet appeared.

Admiral Greig, an Englishman, commanded it; his fleet outnumbered the

Swedish by two ships of the line and two frigates, and therefore the

issue of the engagement between the two fleets which took place on the

17th of July was the less inglorious for the Swedes. They fell in with

the Russians off the island of Hogland, and fought with great skill and

courage; they lost, it is true, one of their line-of-battle ships, but

took one of the Russian fleet in its stead; at length, however, they

were compelled to seek for safety in the harbour of Sveaborg, where

they were kept in a state of blockade by the Russians during the whole

of the campaign. The secretary of the king’s embassy in St. Petersburg

delivered such an extremely absurd ultimatum that no other answer was

given than an order from the commandant to take his departure from the

capital. Gustavus commanded armaments to be prepared and a commissariat

to be provided, but left the whole superintendence to others, who

neglected everything, and instead of preparing means to oppose entered

into secret correspondence with the Russians. All this immediately

appeared when the king at length resolved to storm the fortress of

Friedrichsham. He found himself destitute of heavy artillery and other

materials of war, which he supposed were all in readiness, and whilst the

artillery was being slowly brought up by land, the nobles were devising

the most shameful treason.

[Sidenote: [1789 A.D.]]

It was arranged that Friedrichsham should be at once attacked both by sea

and by land; and Siegeroth had actually landed his troops and commenced

operations when he suddenly received counter orders, because the troops

which were with the king refused obedience. In these circumstances,

Gustavus had no other alternative than to return to Stockholm, in

order there to recover his royal dignity and power which he had lost

at Friedrichsham. He entered Stockholm in September, and thenceforth

occupied himself in preparing a _coup d’état_, which he accomplished on

the 17th of February in the following year. Meanwhile, his traitorous

nobles had concluded a truce with Russia, which was so far advantageous

to Gustavus that it liberated his fleet from its captivity in the bay of

Sveaborg. He was now dictator and autocrat; he had at command the means

of prosecuting the war with Russia: but the favourable moment was past,

and the Russians had already completed all their preparations by land and

sea for the defence of their provinces bordering upon Sweden. Gustavus’

project of burning the Russian fleet in the harbour of Copenhagen was

discovered beforehand, and brought him nothing but disgrace. When he

again joined the army in Finland, his Swedes gave evidence of their

attachment and courage; but he himself again contrived to injure the

success of the war by his interference in its conduct. In the murderous

fights which ensued from the middle of June till the end of July, both

the Russians and Swedes lost great numbers of men, without any other gain

on either side than military renown. The Swedes in the meantime were

unfortunate at sea, and could not have profited by their success had they

been victorious by land.

Admiral Ehrenswerd commanded the Swedish flotilla of flat-bottomed

boats, constructed for navigating the rocky shallows of the coast,

whilst the similar Russian fleet was under the orders of the prince of

Nassau-Siegen, who had shortly before been commander of the Russian fleet

in the Black Sea, and had fallen into disputes with Potemkin, which led

to his being sent to the Baltic. The Russian ships of the line were under

the command of Admiral Tchitchakov, and had on board a considerable

number of British naval officers of experience. This fleet had on the

26th of June fallen in with that of the Swedes, which was so injured in

an engagement between Bornholm and Gothland as to be obliged to return to

Karlskrona. The unfortunate issue of the battle was generally ascribed to

disloyalty on the part of some of the naval officers.

The king still persisted in his determination of opening up a way for

himself to St. Petersburg, and therefore of storming Friedrichsham. He

himself directed the execution of the project, although he was, properly

speaking, merely a volunteer with his army. By his interference he

exposed the Swedish army to considerable loss, on the same day (August

24th) on which the Russian flotilla gained an important victory over the

Swedes at Rogensalm. Friedrichsham, according to the king’s command,

was to be stormed by the three generals, Siegroth, Kaulbart, and Platen;

the assault, however, failed of success, and the Swedes were obliged

to retire: their flotilla was twice beaten. The first victory of the

Russians at Rogensalm was attributed to the prince of Nassau-Siegen,

who, however, was accompanied by three or four persons who rendered him

the same service which the British officers did to Admiral Tchitchakov.

On the 1st of September the Swedish flotilla experienced a defeat at

Högfors, and the land army, commanded by the king, was there also

compelled to retreat. The loss in human life was indeed great, but the

real injury small, for the Swedish army continued till the beginning of

winter to occupy its quarters on the frontiers of Russia.

_The Campaign of 1790; the Treaty of Varela_

[Sidenote: [1790 A.D.]]

During the winter, Gustavus withdrew from his army, but he resumed his

duties as commander in March, 1790, and was now careful to supply all the

deficiencies of the two previous years. On the 15th of April, in Finland,

he reduced the two important posts of Kärnakoski and Pardakovski near

Vilmanstrand; his Swedes were victorious at Valkiala; and on the 30th

repulsed the Russians in their attempt to recover the two posts just

mentioned. On the 4th and 5th of May the Swedes were afterwards beaten at

Aberfors by the Russian general Numsen, and lost twelve pieces of cannon.

The king having again taken Pardakovski, the key of Savolax, immediately

caused a portion of his land forces to embark in the flotilla, of which

he himself assumed the command, and ordered the remainder of the army

to press forward by the shore towards St. Petersburg, relying on the

assistance of the fleet, which was to receive them on board in case of

a defeat. The fleet consisted of nineteen large ships, twenty-seven

galleys, and a number of gunboats, which in all mounted about two

thousand guns. It was absolutely necessary to the execution of this

adventurous undertaking that Friedrichsham should in all haste be

reduced by storm. The king, having been successful on the 15th in a

naval engagement, made his third attempt at storming the fortress on the

17th and 18th of May, and notwithstanding a great loss in men failed in

effecting his object. Although the way by land thus remained barred, he

nevertheless persisted in his design of terrifying the empress in her

capital.

Gustavus, having now embarked a greater number of Swedish troops than

before, reached Viborg, and on the 2nd of June, 1790, disembarked a

division of his army at Blörke, about forty miles from St. Petersburg.

The whole success of this rash enterprise depended on his remaining

master of the sea. In order to maintain this superiority, Duke Charles

was to prevent the junction of the two Russian fleets, one of which was

lying in Kronstadt and the other in Revel, and on the 3rd of June he

was ordered to engage the division of the fleet in the former harbour.

The Swedish fleet was no sooner thus withdrawn from its position than

an opportunity was afforded to the Russians to form a junction between

their two fleets, which actually took place on the day the duke entered

the sound of Viborg (June 6th). The Swedish fleet was blockaded by the

Russian squadrons, consisting, when united, of thirty ships of the line

and eighteen frigates; the former, however, continued to keep up its

connection with the flotilla. It appears that both the Swedish fleets

would have been entirely lost had the two Russian admirals been qualified

for such a command. Captain Pélissier, who had served in Holland, is

said to have given Admiral Tchitchakov advice which he ought to have

followed, had he not been too obstinately attached to his own opinions;

Pélissier even pointed out to generals Suchtelen and Soltikov the places

where they ought to have erected their batteries in order effectually to

bar the egress of the Swedish fleet from the bay; no attention, however,

was paid to his advice. The prince of Nassau-Siegen proved himself to be

in no respect superior as a commander to Tchitchakov. On the other hand,

if the advice of Duke Charles had been adopted, the Russians would have

been victorious without a battle; King Gustavus and Stedingk, however,

rescued the honour of the Swedish name.

The Swedes had now been closely shut up in the bay of Viborg for three

weeks, and at the end of June were reduced to extremities; in the

beginning of July a grand council of war was held. Duke Charles and many

other members of the council recommended a capitulation, but the king

and Stedingk were in favour of making a desperate effort to force their

way through the enemy’s line. The attempt was accordingly made on the

3rd of July, and through Tchitchakov’s neglect it was so far successful,

as it enabled the Swedish fleet to bring the blockading squadron to an

engagement. But the Swedes lost in it not only seven ships of the line,

three frigates, and more than thirty galleys and gunboats, but almost

the whole of the royal guards, the queen’s regiment, and that of Upland,

amounting to six thousand or seven thousand men, which had been put on

board the fleet. Whilst the larger Swedish ships thus endeavoured to

gain the open sea, the flotilla had withdrawn for safety into an arm

of the gulf, which runs parallel to the shore and stretches towards

Friedrichsham. This inlet, called the sound of Suenske, is extremely

difficult of access on the side towards Friedrichsham, in consequence

of a group of rocky islands at its mouth, but it may be safely reached

through the open harbour of Asph. By this way the prince of Nassau-Siegen

determined to pass into the sound with the Russian flotilla, and attack

the Swedes in their place of refuge.

The latter were well protected from the attack of the Russian fleet by

rocks, and when the prince gave orders for the assault, on the 9th, the

sailors were so exhausted and his orders for battle were so unskilful

that the king of Sweden gained a splendid victory on that and the

following day. The loss of the Russians was so great as to have surpassed

any which they had suffered since the Seven Years’ War. Fifty-five

vessels were captured, a number of others destroyed, and fourteen

thousand Russians either taken prisoners or slain. In spite of this

signal victory, the king of Sweden now awoke from his dream of humbling

the pride and glory of Russia; already he began to cast his eyes towards

France, and in the following year he dreamed his monarchical dream in

favour of the French émigrés. The idea of becoming the Godefroy de

Bouillon of the aristocratic and monarchical crusade, which Burke at that

time proclaimed in the English parliament and in his work on the French

Revolution, had been awakened in his mind in 1790, and the empress of

Russia found means of confirming him in his visionary projects. Moreover

his means were exhausted, and he therefore lent a favourable ear to the

proposal of Galvez, the Spanish ambassador, who began to mediate for a

peace between Sweden and Russia.

This peace, concluded at Varela on the Kimmene on the 14th of August,

1790, served to show how empty all Gustavus’ splendour was, and how

unreal and inefficient were all the efforts he had made. It was now seen

that all the blood had been shed to no purpose, and all the treasures of

his very poor kingdom mischievously squandered, for everything remained

on the footing on which it had been in the spring of 1788.

PROGRESS OF THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN WAR WITH TURKEY

We now return to the war in which Austria and Russia were jointly engaged

against Turkey. The whole Austrian army was ready to take the field at

the end of the year 1787: it formed an immense cordon stretching from

the mountains on the coast of the Adriatic Sea to the Carpathians, and

consisted of a main body and five divisions. Unhappily, the emperor

Joseph was desirous of commanding the main army in person, under the

unskilful direction of Lacy, his military Mentor, who, like his pupil

Mack, was a good drill-sergeant, but no general. The main body consisted

of 25,000 infantry and 22,000 horse, and the whole of the troops together

amounted to 86,000 cavalry and 245,000 foot, accompanied by 898 pieces of

artillery.

In February, 1788, Russia and Austria had simultaneously declared war

against the Turks; but in August of that year England and Prussia

entered into an alliance, the main object of which was to place Prussia

in a situation to prevent the aggrandisement of Austria, if necessary,

by force of arms. This, however, was superfluous in 1788, because the

diversion effected by the king of Sweden prevented the Russians from

proceeding with their usual rapidity, and the emperor Joseph by his

presence with the army frustrated the effect of his immense armaments.

The dissatisfaction with the whole conduct of the war became so general

that Joseph was at length obliged earnestly to entreat Laudon, who had

been the popular hero of the Austrians since the time of the Seven Years’

War, and whom the emperor had hitherto neither employed nor consulted, to

assume the command of the army in Croatia.

_Successes of Laudon (1788 A.D.)_

Laudon, having made an express stipulation that the emperor was not to

interfere with his plans marched against the Turks, defeated them under

the walls of Dubitza the very day after he joined the army, and reduced

that fortress; then, pushing into the heart of Bosnia, he compelled

Novi to surrender, whilst the emperor himself was obliged to hasten to

the aid of the army in the Bannat, which was very hard pressed by the

Turks. The division under Wartensleben, which should have supported it,

had been driven back by the Turks, who succeeded, in consequence of

an incomprehensible neglect on the part of the Austrians, in getting

complete possession of the rocky bed through which the Danube has forced

a passage at a distance of six-and-twenty miles above New Orsova. The

pass, which is not more than a pistol-shot in width, is commanded by a

fortified cleft in the rock, called Veterani’s Hole, and this post the

Austrians should and could have maintained when the main body of the

Turks appeared at Old Orsova on the 7th of August; this, however, they

neglected to do. The Austrian general suffered himself to be defeated and

lost thirteen pieces of cannon, and as his communications with the main

army were cut off, he was obliged to retreat so far that the garrison

of this important post was left to its fate. The Turks sacrificed great

numbers of men in order to seize this fastness, by the possession of

which they immediately became masters of the whole navigation of the

Danube as far down as Belgrade. As soon as the Danube was lost, the

imperial army found itself threatened in the rear.

Nothing but disaster attended the operations of Joseph and Wartensleben.

The army under the prince of Coburg was somewhat less unfortunate.

Khotin, which the Russians had captured in the last war without firing a

shot, was reduced by it after a most heroic resistance of three months;

and this was the last exploit of a campaign in which thirty thousand

Austrians fell in desultory skirmishes, and forty thousand were swept off

by pestilence--losses but poorly compensated by the capture of Szabatch,

Khotin, Dubitza, and Novi. Circumstances, however, afterwards proved more

favourable. Jassy was taken; in October, the Russians were in possession

of five districts of Moldavia and of several passes in Wallachia, and

the main army was again able to extend the limits of its operations.

Wartensleben sat down with a part of the army before Mahadia; and the

emperor kept possession of the country from Pantchova to Semlin.

_Victories of Suvarov (1788-1789 A.D.)_

After the massacre perpetrated by Suvarov upon the Turks on the

promontory of Kinburn, the Russians had remained for a long time quiet;

but by their possession of the coasts they effectually prevented the

Turks from landing any troops, and by the capture of the island of

Beresam wholly excluded them from the mouth of the Dnieper. It was not

till late in the year 1788 that Potemkin summoned Suvarov from Kinburn

to conduct the siege of Otchakov, where, however, he was wounded, and

after his return to Kinburn the siege made very little progress. The

avarice of Potemkin deprived the soldiers of the necessary supplies; and

the dreadful cold and disease proved far more injurious to them than the

attacks of their enemies.

At length the frost became so intense that the men were obliged to

excavate pits for dwellings, but the same frost also opened up a means of

attacking the fortress and reducing it after the Russian fashion, that

is, without regard to the sacrifice of thousands of men, a few weeks

earlier than they could otherwise have done. The city is completely

protected on the side towards the Black Sea by a marshy lake called

Liman; and now that the lake was frozen, Potemkin issued orders to storm

the fortress from the sea side, where it was weakest. The Russians were

cruelly sacrificed: one regiment was no sooner mowed down than another

was compelled to advance, and above four thousand men were slain before

the storming of Otchakov was effected (December 16th), an exploit which

was afterwards extolled to heaven. The Russians, having at length borne

down all resistance and forced their way into the city, were compensated

for their losses and sufferings during the siege by three days’ murder

and pillage; they put citizens and soldiers, men, women, and children to

the sword without mercy or distinction. It is said that twenty thousand

Turks perished in this massacre; but this piece of Russian heroism, which

was not performed by Potemkin himself but by others at his command, was

also rewarded after the Russian fashion. Every soldier who had taken

part in the siege received a medal of honour, whilst Potemkin, who had

contributed nothing to its success, derived the only real advantage. The

empress had previously deprived Razumovski of the office of hetman, which

she now conferred upon Potemkin, who received in addition a present of

100,000 rubles, besides what he had appropriated to himself out of the

moneys destined for the besieging army, and what he had seized out of the

rich booty which fell into his hands after the capture of the city.

The death of the sultan Abd-el-Habed in April, 1789, made no change in

the relations between the Turks and Russians. His successor, Selim,

continued to prosecute the war, and Suvarov having recovered from the

effects of his wound again joined Potemkin’s army, and was put at the

head of the division which was to co-operate with the Austrians. Laudon

had now the command of the whole Austrian army; the prince of Coburg,

however, retained that of the division which was to keep open the

communications with the Russians; and again he gave such numerous proofs

of his incapacity to conduct any great undertakings, or even to help

himself out of trifling difficulties, that the history of the campaign of

1789 alone ought to have prevented the emperor Leopold from entrusting

him with the command against the French, who possessed generals and

soldiers of a very different kind from those of the Turks. Selim III

had succeeded in getting on foot a very considerable force which was

destined to operate on the extreme point of Moldavia, where that country

touches upon Transylvania, and is separated from Wallachia by a small

river, which also divides the little town of Fokshani into two parts, one

belonging to Moldavia, and the other to Wallachia. Coburg was advancing

thither slowly and methodically, when the Turkish army encamped in the

neighbourhood of the town turned suddenly upon him, and filled him with

such apprehensions of being completely shut in that, instead of boldly

doing what Suvarov afterwards did, he anxiously besought that general’s

speedy assistance.

Suvarov’s army was lying at Belat in Moldavia; when the news reached him

he at once began a march of between forty and fifty miles in a direct

line over mountains, across ravines and pathless wilds, and in less than

thirty-six hours reached the Austrians on the 30th of July, at five

o’clock in the evening. At eleven that night he sent the plan of the

attack upon the Turks, which was to commence at two in the morning, to

the astonished prince, who had never heard of such rapidity of movement,

or seen it equalled even on parade. The bewildered prince went three

times to Suvarov’s quarters without having seen him; in the battle he

made no claim to the supreme command, which should have belonged to

him as the eldest general, but submitted as a subordinate to Suvarov’s

orders. The Turks, to the number of between fifty and sixty thousand men,

were in position at Fokshani when the Russians and Austrians with forty

thousand men passed the river Purna and stormed their fortified camp,

mounting the ramparts and driving them in at the point of the bayonet,

as if they were assaulting ordinary field-works. The camp was taken in

an hour, with the loss of about eight hundred men; the whole body of the

Turkish infantry fell into disorder, their cavalry galloped off, were

scattered in all directions, and pursued for some miles with the greatest

impetuosity and vehement zeal. The whole of the baggage and artillery,

all the stores collected in Fokshani, a hundred standards and seventy

pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors; the Austrians

exhibited the same zeal, perseverance, and courage as the Russians, and

had they possessed such a commander as Suvarov, they would have reaped

immense fruits from the victory, but they became sensible, as early as

August, that they were in want of a proper leader.

Suvarov returned to Moldavia; Coburg looked quietly on whilst the Turks

were collecting a new army, and suffered the grand vizir to advance

without obstruction in Wallachia. The Turks directed Hassan Pasha, who

lay in Ismail, to make an expedition against Repnin, whilst the grand

vizir was to march against Prince Coburg, who had taken up a position at

Martinesti, on the river Rimnik. The news of this fresh attack no sooner

reached the Austrian camp than Coburg, instead of attempting to help

himself, again had recourse to Suvarov, who had already drawn nearer to

Coburg from Belat. The grand vizir’s army, which had been estimated at

one hundred thousand men, pushed forward rapidly by Braila (Ibrahil),

and compelled the advanced posts of the prince to retire into their

camp. Suvarov received the prince’s letter on the 16th of September,

immediately gave orders to march, and two days afterwards succeeded in

forming a junction with the Austrians, at the very moment in which they

were to have been attacked by the Turks.

_Austrian and Russian Valour; Austria’s Withdrawal (1789-1790 A.D.)_

The Austrians then proved anew that they were not to be surpassed when

not commanded as usual by princes and privileged persons, who become

generals whilst they sleep. Coburg, as he had previously done at

Fokshani, totally relinquished the command at Martinesti to Suvarov,

who immediately availed himself of the oversight of the Turks in not

fortifying their camp before they offered battle, and attacked them by

storm in their unfinished trenches. The issue was as glorious as it had

been on the 31st of July at Fokshani; the contest, however, was more

obstinately maintained. On this occasion the Russians formed the left

wing, whilst the centre and right were occupied by the Austrians, whose

admirably served artillery scattered the Turkish cavalry, which had made

an attempt to surround and cut off the small body of the Russians. The

victory in this dangerous and hard-fought battle was gained not merely by

the courage, activity, and bayonets of the Austrian and Russian infantry,

but especially by the great military skill of the commander. His orders

to avoid the village of Bochsa, and first to drive the Turks out of the

woods by which they were covered before commencing the main attack, have

been greatly admired, and above all his prudence in not sacrificing the

infantry in a blind storm, which was the more remarkable in a general

accustomed to bring everything to a rapid determination.

The victory was splendid, the booty immense, the Turkish army a second

time utterly dispersed--a necessary consequence of the nature of its

composition--and the number of killed and wounded much greater than at

Fokshani. Prince Coburg, on account of this victory, in which he was

entitled to little share, was created a field-marshal; Suvarov received

the dignity of a count of the empire from the emperor Joseph, and the

empress of Russia for once gave an honourable surname to a man who had

really earned it by his personal services; she raised him to a level with

her Tchesmian Orlov and her Taurian Potemkin, and called him Rimnikski,

from the name of the river on the banks of which he had been victorious.

The victory of Rimnik and the capture of Belgrade by Laudon on the 9th

of October were the harbingers of greater success. Hassan Pasha, the

Turkish high-admiral and celebrated conqueror of Egypt, whose confidence

in his good fortune had encouraged him to assume the command of an army,

was totally defeated at Tobak, in Bessarabia, by Prince Potemkin, and

his discomfiture was followed by the surrender of Bender, Akerman, Kilia

Nova, and Isatza, and by the investment of Ismail. At the same time

the prince of Coburg took Bucharest and Hohenlohe, forcing the passes

which lead into Wallachia, made himself master of Rimnik and Krajova.

Laudon also reduced Semendria and Kladova, and blockaded Orsova, which,

being situated in an island of the Danube, was inaccessible to regular

attacks. By these conquests the allies became masters of the whole line

of fortresses which covered the Turkish frontier; the three grand armies,

originally separated by a vast extent of country, were rapidly converging

to the same point, and threatened, by their united force, to overbear all

opposition, and in another campaign to complete the subversion of the

Ottoman empire in Europe.

[Illustration: AUSTRIANS ENTERING BELGRADE

(From the painting by Karl von Blaas in the Ruhmeshalle of the Arsenal in

Vienna)]

But in the midst of this successful career, the increasing ferment in

the hereditary states of Austria, the rebellion in the Netherlands,

and, still more, the interposition of the maritime powers and Prussia,

checked the hopes of Joseph at the very moment when his projects of

aggrandisement seemed hastening to their completion. Justly alarmed at

the successes of the two imperial courts, the three combined powers

incited Poland to throw off the yoke of Russia, delivered the king

of Sweden from Danish invasion, and laid the foundation of a general

alliance for reducing the overgrown power of Austria and Russia. The king

of Prussia even encouraged the rising discontents in Hungary, fomented

the troubles which the impolitic innovations of Joseph had excited in the

Netherlands, and, in the beginning of 1790, opened a negotiation with

the Porte for the conclusion of an offensive alliance, intended not only

to effect the restoration of the dominions conquered during the existing

war, but even of the Crimea, and the territories dismembered by the two

imperial courts from Poland.

The only power to which Joseph might have turned as a counterpoise to

this combination was France, from whose recent change of system he had

flattered himself with hopes of a cordial support, and from which he had

even received private largesses to a considerable amount. But now France

was in the throes of her great revolution, and Joseph was left without

a resource. Worn down by innumerable calamities and disease, he died

in February, 1790; and his successor, Leopold, was fortunate enough to

conclude a separate peace with the Porte.

_Russia Prosecutes the War; the Storm of Ismail (1790 A.D.)_

Russia continued to prosecute the war against the Turks without the aid

of Austria. Ismail still held out, and Potemkin, who had been besieging

it for seven months, began to grow impatient. Living in his camp like

one of those satraps whom he even surpassed in luxury, he was surrounded

by a crowd of courtiers and ladies, who exerted every effort to amuse

him. One of these ladies, pretending to read the decrees of fate in the

arrangement of a pack of cards, predicted that he would take the town

at the end of three weeks. Potemkin answered, with a smile, that he had

a method of divination far more infallible. He instantly sent orders

to Suvarov to come from Galatz and take Ismail in three days. Suvarov

arrived and took such measures as would seem to indicate that he designed

a renewal of the regular siege; he drew together the scattered divisions

of the troops, formed them into a large besieging army of about forty

thousand men, and ordered the small Russian fleet to come into the

neighbourhood of the city; but his real design was to follow the course

he had successfully pursued before Otchakov, take advantage of the frost,

and reduce the fortress by storm.

Had not Ismail, according to ancient usage, been built without advanced

works, even a general like Suvarov would scarcely have ventured on such

an attack, which in the actual condition of the defences was attended

by such murderous consequences. On the 21st of September the city was

twice summoned, and on both occasions the garrison and inhabitants were

threatened with the fate of Otchakov. The Turks, however, did not suffer

themselves to be terrified into submission, and the fearful storm was

commenced on the 22nd, at four o’clock in the morning. The wall was not

mounted till eight o’clock, after an unexampled slaughter; but still the

hottest part of the struggle took place in the city itself. Every street

was converted into a fortress, every house became a redoubt, and it was

twelve o’clock before the Russians, advancing through scenes of carnage

and desperate resistance, reached the market-place, where the Tatars of

the Crimea were collected. The Tatars fought for two hours with all the

energy of despair, and after they had been all cut to pieces the struggle

was still carried on by the Turks in the streets. Suvarov at length

opened a passage for his cavalry through the gates into the devoted city;

they charged through the streets, and continued to cut down and massacre

the people till four o’clock in the afternoon. At the conclusion of

this dreadful butchery the Russians received the reward which had been

promised them when they were led to the storm and to certain death,--the

city was given up for three days to the mercy of the victorious troops.

[Sidenote: [1791 A.D.]]

Suvarov himself, in his official report of this murderous enterprise,

states that in the course of four days 33,000 Turks were either slain

or mortally wounded, and 10,000 taken prisoners. He rates the loss of

the Russians at 2000 killed and 2500 wounded: a number which seems

to us as improbably small as the usual accounts, which assign 15,000

as the Russian loss, seem exaggerated. There were two French émigrés

present at this storm, one of whom afterwards became celebrated as a

Russian governor-general and French minister, and the other as a Russian

general in the war against his countrymen. The first was the duke de

Richelieu, or as he was then called de Fronsac, and the second the count

de Langeron. Kutusov also served in this affair under Suvarov and led the

sixth line of attack.

_European Intervention; the Treaty of Jassy (1792 A.D.)_

About this time the whole diplomacy and aristocracy of Europe were

busily employed in endeavouring to rescue the Turks, in order to check

the dangerously rapid progress of the French and Polish revolutionists.

There speedily grew up such a general desire as the English wished to

promote--of two evils to choose the least--to secure and uphold the

empire of the Turks and to let the nationality of Poland perish. Russia,

however, declined the proffered mediation of England in the war with the

Turks, as she had resolved for this time to give up her conquests in

Turkey in order to indemnify herself in Poland: she accepted merely the

intervention of the friendly Danes.

Potemkin and the empress were not unthankful for Suvarov’s servility,

since he threw himself and all his services at their feet, and ascribed

everything to them alone. Repnin, whom Potemkin left at the head of the

army when he went to St. Petersburg in October, 1790, pursued a very

different course, doing more in two months than Potemkin had done in

three years. He crossed the Danube with his army, pushed forward into

Bulgaria, and caused the whole Turkish army to be attacked and beaten

near Badadagh by Kutusov, after Gudovitch, the brother of him who had

been the faithful aide-de-camp of Peter III, had completely put down

the Tatars in the Kuban in January, 1791. At the head of forty thousand

Russians, Repnin then advanced against one hundred thousand Turks, under

the command of the same vizir, Yussuf, who had fought with such success

against the emperor Joseph in the Bannat.

Potemkin eager to appropriate the impending victory, started with great

expeditiousness from St. Petersburg when both armies were ready for

battle (July, 1791). He took it for granted that Repnin would certainly

await his arrival at the army; but he did no such thing. He offered

battle before the arrival of Potemkin, whose custom it was to enjoy the

fruits in the gathering of which he had no share. The victory which

Repnin gained over the great Turkish army in July at Matchin led to a

violent altercation between him and Potemkin, who came too late to have

any participation in the honours of the day; Repnin, however, still

remained in command of the army. Potemkin afterwards did everything

in his power to prevent the peace for which Repnin was to negotiate,

although he clearly saw that the course of events required the Russians

to give up this wholesale conquest of Turkish provinces. Happily, his

death left Repnin’s hands free, and a treaty was concluded at Jassy

on the 9th of January, 1792, between Russia and the Porte, by which

the former acquired nothing more than the fortress of Otchakov, the

surrounding territory from the Dniester to the Bug, and the protectorate

of Georgia.

THE DEATH OF POTEMKIN (1792 A.D.); SÉGUR’S CHARACTERISATION

[Sidenote: [1792 A.D.]]

Not long after Potemkin’s arrival at Jassy, where his headquarters or,

to speak more properly, his capital and his court were established, he

was seized with a malignant fever, and presumed to treat it with the same

haughty contempt with which he had long been used to treat his fellow

men: he laughed at his physicians, and ate salt meat and raw turnips. His

disease growing worse, he desired to be conveyed to Otchakov, his beloved

conquest, but had not travelled more than a few miles before the air of

his carriage seemed to stifle him. His cloak was spread by the road-side;

he was laid on it, and there expired in the arms of his favourite niece

Branicka. Catherine fainted three times when she heard of his death: it

was necessary to bleed her; she was thought to be dying. She expressed

almost as much grief as at the death of Lanskoi; but it was not the lover

she regretted: it was the friend whose genius assimilated with her own,

whom she considered as the support of her throne and the executor of her

vast projects. Catherine, holding her usurped sceptre, was a woman and

timid: she was accustomed to behold in Potemkin a protector whose fortune

and glory were intimately connected with her own. The character of this

Russian vizir has been thus sketched by Count Ségur, who, as ambassador

to St. Petersburg, lived long in habits of intimacy with him:

“Prince Gregory Alexandrovitch Potemkin was one of the most extraordinary

men of his times; but in order to have played so conspicuous a part, he

must have been born in Russia and have lived in the reign of Catherine

II. In any other country, in any other time, with any sovereign, he would

have been misplaced; and it was a singular stroke of chance that created

this man for the period that tallied with him, and brought together and

combined all the circumstances with which he could tally.

“In his person were collected the most opposite defects and advantages

of every kind. He was avaricious and ostentatious, despotic and

popular, inflexible and beneficent, haughty and obliging, politic and

confiding, licentious and superstitious, bold and timid, ambitious and

indiscreet. Lavish of his bounties to his relations, his mistresses,

and his favourites, yet frequently paying neither his household nor

his creditors. His consequence always depended on a woman, and he was

always unfaithful to her. Nothing could equal the activity of his mind

or the indolence of his body. No dangers could appal his courage; no

difficulties force him to abandon his projects. But the success of an

enterprise always brought with it disgust. He wearied the empire by the

number of his posts and the extent of his power. He was himself fatigued

with the burden of his existence; envious of all that he did not do, and

sick of all that he did. Rest was not grateful to him, nor occupation

pleasing. Everything with him was desultory--business, pleasure, temper,

carriage. In every company he had an embarrassed air, and his presence

was a restraint on every company. He was morose to all that stood in awe

of him, and caressed all such as accosted him with familiarity.

“Ever promising, seldom keeping his word, and never forgetting anything,

none had read less than he--few people were better informed. He had

talked with the skilful in all professions, in all the sciences, in every

art. None better knew how to draw forth and appropriate to himself the

knowledge of others. In conversation he would have astonished a scholar,

an artist, an artisan, or a divine. His information was not deep, but it

was very extensive. He never dived into a subject, but he spoke well on

all subjects.

“The inequality of his temper was productive of an inconceivable oddity

in his desires, his conduct, and his manner of life. One while he formed

the project of becoming duke of Courland; at another he thought of

bestowing on himself the crown of Poland. He frequently gave intimations

of an intention to make himself a bishop or even a simple monk. He built

a superb palace, and wanted to sell it before it was finished. One day he

would dream of nothing but war; and only officers, Tatars, and Cossacks

were admitted to him: the next day he was busied only with politics; he

would partition the Ottoman Empire, and put in agitation all the cabinets

of Europe. At other times, with nothing in his head but the court,

dressed in a magnificent suit, covered with ribbons presented to him

by every potentate, displaying diamonds of extraordinary magnitude and

brilliance, he was giving superb entertainments without any cause.

“He was sometimes known for a month, and in the face of all the town, to

pass whole evenings at the apartments of a young woman, seeming to have

alike forgotten all business and all decorum. Sometimes also, for several

weeks successively, shut up in his room with his nieces and several men

whom he honoured with his intimacy, he would lounge on a sofa, without

speaking, playing at chess, or at cards, with his legs bare, his shirt

collar unbuttoned, in a morning gown, with a thoughtful front, his

eyebrows knit, and presenting to the view of strangers, who came to see

him, the figure of a rough and squalid Cossack. These singularities often

put the empress out of humour, but rendered him more interesting to her.

In his youth he had pleased her by the ardour of his passion, his valour,

and his masculine beauty. Being arrived at maturity, he charmed her

still by flattering her pride, calming her apprehensions, confirming her

power, and caressing her fancies of oriental empire, the expulsion of the

barbarians, and the restoration of the Grecian republics.

“Potemkin began everything, completed nothing, disordered the finances,

disorganised the army, depopulated his country, and enriched it with

other deserts. The fame of the empress was increased by his conquests.

The admiration they excited was for her; and the hatred they raised, for

her minister. Posterity, more equitable, will perhaps divide between them

both the glory of the successes and the severity of the reproaches. It

will not bestow on Potemkin the title of a great man; but it will mention

him as an extraordinary person; and, to draw his picture with accuracy,

he might be represented as the real emblem, as the living image of the

Russian Empire. For, in fact, he was colossal like Russia. In his mind,

as in that country, were cultivated districts and desert plains. It also

partook of the Asiatic, the European, the Tatar, and the Cossack; the

rudeness of the eleventh century, and the corruption of the eighteenth;

the surface of the arts, and the ignorance of the cloisters; an outside

of civilisation, and many traces of barbarism.”[j]

THE QUESTION OF THE IMPERIAL SUCCESSION

Some time before the death of Potemkin, Catherine had begun proceedings

intended to bar the czarevitch Paul from the imperial succession.[a]

She was by no means the cruel, heartless mother that many writers

are inclined to represent; but she knew her son thoroughly well, and

foreseeing how destructive of all good his reign would be she could not

think without fear of how the empire, which under her rule had made

such rapid strides in the path of prosperity, glory, and civilisation,

would after her remain without any guarantee for the stability and

durability of its existence. With the intention of preserving the country

from such a misfortune, Catherine wished to make over the throne to

the grand duke Alexander Pavlovitch and therefore the setting aside of

the czarevitch appeared in her eyes a state necessity. Meanwhile it is

sufficiently well known that Catherine had long been accustomed to place

the interests of the state above everything and to sacrifice to them

all other considerations and feelings; therefore the difficulties with

which so daring an administrative step was doubtless accompanied could

not stop the creator of the changes of the year 1762. “Obstacles are

created in this world,” Catherine once wrote, “in order that persons of

merit may set them aside and thus add to their reputation; that is the

meaning of obstacles.” Circumstances were also favourable to this new

change contemplated by Catherine, for at that time no law existed that

exactly established the order of succession to the throne. The statute

of Peter the Great of the year 1722 was still maintained in full power,

and by this statute the reigning Russian sovereigns had the right of

naming anyone they liked as their successors to the throne according to

their own judgment, without being restrained by any ancient right of

primogeniture; and in cases where the heir already designated showed

himself incapable, he could be removed from the throne.

The diary of Krapovitski can serve as a proof that in the year 1787,

after Catherine’s return from her travels in the south of Russia, the

question as to the necessity of changing the succession to the throne

had already matured in the mind of the empress; she entered upon the

historical study of the matter and read “the right of will of monarchs.”

On the 20th of August, in connection with this same question, Catherine

discussed with her secretary the extent to which the misfortunes of the

czarevitch Paul Petrovitch had been caused by the false opinion that as

eldest son the throne must belong to him. Further, on the 25th of August,

Krapovitski writes: “Ukases as to the heirs to the throne, named since

the time of Catherine I, have been asked for, and in the explanations a

sort of displeasure was manifested.” To what conclusions the historical

study of the measures taken by Peter the Great led Catherine may be seen

from the context of the following remarks, written by the empress’ own

hand:

“It must be acknowledged that the parent is unhappy who sees himself

obliged for the safeguard of the public good to remove his offspring.

This is a condition which accompanies or is joined to the autocratic and

parental power. And thus I esteem that the most wise monarch Peter I had

doubtlessly the strongest reasons for the removal of his ungrateful,

disobedient, and incapable son, who was filled with hatred, malice, and

viperous envy against him. He sought to find some particle of evil in his

father’s deeds and actions which were conceived in the spirit of good, he

listened to flatterers, shut his ears to the truth, and nothing was so

pleasing to him as to hear his most glorious father defamed and spoken

evil of. He himself was a sluggard, a coward, double-faced, unstable,

gloomy, timid, drunken, passionate, obstinate, bigoted, ignorant man, of

most mediocre intelligence and of weak health.”

Independent of these remarks, Catherine’s ideas are even more clearly

expressed in other rough draughts concerning the Greek project and

written in her own hand. She writes as follows: “Should the successes

of the war give Russia the means and occasion to drive out completely

the enemies of the name of Christ from the European frontiers, then

Russia, in return for such an entirely Christian service rendered to the

human race, would reserve to herself the restoration on the ruins of

the barbaric power, of the ancient Greek Empire. Russia would promise

to leave such an empire incomplete independence, to entrust and give

it up to the young Russian grand duke Constantine Pavlovitch, who must

then give his promise not to make in any case any hereditary or other

pretensions to the succession of all the Russias, as equally his brother

must do in regard to the Greek succession.” All these writings clearly

testify that at the time of the second Turkish war the empress Catherine

had definitively come to the conclusion that the welfare of the state

required the setting aside from the succession of the czarevitch Paul

Petrovitch and his replacement by the grand duke Alexander Pavlovitch.

Meanwhile the czarevitch on his part did all that was possible to

justify in the eyes of Russia Catherine’s intentions to exclude him

from the throne. A contemporary who was in close relations with him,

T. V. Rostopschin writes as follows: “It is impossible to see without

shuddering and pity what the grand duke’s father does; it is as if he

sought for every means of inspiring hatred and disgust. He has taken it

into his head that disrespect and neglect are shown to him; therefore for

this reason, he catches and cavils at everything and punishes without

distinction. Every day one only hears of violence, of quarrels about

trifles of which any private individual would be ashamed. He sees a

revolution everywhere; he sees Jacobite in everything.”

Catherine’s correspondence shows that already in the year 1791 the plan

of excluding the czarevitch Paul from the throne was no secret to those

who were in her intimacy. On the 1st of September, 1791, the empress in

a letter to Grimm expresses herself quite definitely on the matter; in

relating her supposition as to the consequences of the French Revolution,

she writes: “But this will not be in my time and, I hope, not in the

time of Alexander.” Finally on the 14th of August, 1792, Catherine

communicates to Grimm considerations which allow the nomination of

Alexander as heir to be regarded as a matter settled. “Why should the

coronation be hurried on?” writes she; “in the words of Solomon there

is a time for everything. First we will marry Alexander, and then we

will crown him with all possible ceremonies, solemnities, and popular

festivities. Oh, how happy he will be himself, and how happy others will

be with him!” The following letter addressed by Catherine to Count V. P.

Mussin-Pushkin on the 14th of September, 1792, written by the empress’

own hand, is characteristic of the relations which subsisted at that time

between the czarevitch Paul Petrovitch and his mother:

COUNT VALENTINE PLATONOVITCH:

I herewith enclose a copy of Kushilev’s letter to the governor

of this town in which he says that the czarevitch has been

pleased to order that more than half of the Alexandrovski

square, as the plan sent by him to the governor indicates,

should be given up to a certain merchant. The order itself is a

mad one and of the greatest insolence. Tell Kushilev to come to

you and tell him in my name that if he again dares to send such

letters anywhere I will send him where the ravens will not have

to seek for his bones; and tell the grand duke that in future

he is not to send any orders by you at anyone’s request.

September 17th, 1793.

CATHERINE.

Find out beforehand if this was certainly written by the grand

duke.

In the year 1794 the empress had recourse to decisive measures for the

accomplishment of the projected change and notified to the council her

intention of setting aside her son Paul as her successor giving as

reasons his character and his incapacity. The entire council was ready to

submit to this decision, but was stopped by Count V. P. Mussin-Pushkin,

who said that the character and instincts of the heir might change when

he became emperor; these remarks put a stop to Catherine’s intention of

declaring her grandson Alexander as her successor, and for a time the

matter rested there. But the opposition that Catherine met with in the

council naturally did not stop her in the pursuit of the aim she had in

view. As has already been observed, obstacles, in her opinion, are only

created in order that they may be set aside by persons of merit; guided

by such principles, the empress remained true to herself and to the

matter that was so close to her heart and continued to seek for fresh

ways of carrying through her intentions.[k] Nevertheless all her efforts

failed in the end, and, as we shall see, Catherine’s son succeeded her in

due course.[a]

THE LAST OF THE FAVOURITES

Plato Zubov, the twelfth and last of Catherine’s avowed favourites,

succeeded in some degree to the position which Potemkin had held as a

sort of vice-emperor. Zubov had superseded Momonov, who, soon wearying of

the faded charms of a mistress of sixty, became enamoured of the young

princess Sherbatov, and had the courage to avow it and ask permission to

marry her. Catherine had pride and generosity enough to grant his request

without any reproaches. She saw him married at court to the object of

his affection, and sent him to Moscow loaded with presents. But it was

currently reported that Momonov was so imprudent as to mention to his

wife some particulars of his interviews with the empress, and that she

divulged them with a levity which Catherine could not forgive. One night,

when the husband and wife were gone to rest, the master of the police at

Moscow entered their chamber; and, after showing them an order from her

majesty, left them in the hands of six women, and retired to an adjoining

room. Then the six women, or rather the six men dressed as women, seized

the babbling lady, and having completely stripped her, flogged her

with rods in the presence of Momonov, whom they forced to kneel down

during the ceremony. When the chastisement was over, the police-master

re-entered the room and said: “This is the way the empress punishes a

first indiscretion. For the second, people are sent to Siberia.”

It was in the spring of 1789, when the empress was at Tsarskoi Selo,

that Momonov was married and dismissed. Lieutenant Zubov commanded the

detachment of horse-guards in attendance, and being the only young

officer in sight he owed his preferment to that fortunate circumstance.

Nicholas Soltikov, to whom he was distantly related, and who was at that

time in high credit, took pains to promote his interest, hoping to find

in him a protector against Potemkin, whom he heartily disliked. After

some secret conferences in presence of the Mentor, Zubov was approved,

and sent for more ample information to Mademoiselle Protasov and the

empress’ physician. The account they gave must have been favourable, for

he was named aide-de-camp to the empress, received a present of a hundred

thousand roubles (£10,000) to furnish him with linen, and was installed

in the apartment of the favourites with all the customary advantages.

The next day this young man was seen familiarly offering his arm to his

sovereign, equipped in his new uniform, with a large hat and feather

on his head, attended by his patron and the great men of the empire,

who walked behind him with their hats off, though the day before he had

danced attendance in their ante-chambers. His own were now filled with

aged generals and ministers of long service, all of whom bent the knee

before him. He was a genius discerned by the piercing eye of Catherine;

the treasures of the empire were lavished on him, and the conduct of the

empress was sanctioned by the meanness and the shameful assiduities of

her courtiers.

_Debaucheries at Catherine’s Court_

The new favourite was not quite five-and-twenty years old, the empress

was upwards of sixty. Yet even at this advanced period of her life she

revived the orgies and lupercalia which she had formerly celebrated with

the brothers Orlov. Valerian, a younger brother of Zubov, and Peter

Soltikov, their friend, were associated in office with the favourite.

With these three young libertines did the aged Catherine spend her days,

while her armies were slaughtering the Turks, fighting the Swedes, and

ravaging Poland; while her people were groaning in wretchedness and

famine, and devoured by extortioners and tyrants.

It was at this time she formed a more intimate society, composed of her

favourites and most trusty ladies and courtiers. This society met two or

three times a week, under the name of the Little Hermitage. The parties

were frequently masqued, and the greatest privacy prevailed. They danced,

played at forfeits, joked, romped and engaged in all sorts of frolics

and gambols. Leov Narishkin acted the same part there as Roquelaure at

the court of Louis XIV; and a fool by title, Matrona Danilovna, seconded

him. This was an old gossip, whose wit consisted only in uttering the

most absurd vulgarities; and as she was allowed the common right of

fools, that of saying anything, she was loaded with presents by the lower

order of courtiers. Such foreign ministers as enjoyed the favour of the

empress were sometimes admitted to the Little Hermitage. Ségur, Cobenzl,

Stedingk, and Nassau chiefly enjoyed this distinction; but Catherine

afterwards formed another assembly, more confined and more mysterious,

which was called the Little Society. The three favourites of whom we have

just been speaking, Branicka, Protasov, and some confidential women and

valets-de-chambre, were its only members. In this the Cybele of the north

celebrated her most secret mysteries. The particulars of these amusements

are not fit to be repeated.

[Sidenote: [1793 A.D.]]

Catherine survived Potemkin but four years. The last ten years of her

reign carried her power, her glory, and her political crimes to their

highest pitch. When the great Frederick, dictator of the kings of Europe,

died, she remained the eldest of the crowned heads of the continent; and

if we except Joseph, all those heads together were unequal to her own.

If Frederick was the dictator of these kings, Catherine became their

tyrant. The immense empire which she had subjected to her sway; the

inexhaustible resources she derived from a country and a people as yet in

a state of infancy; the extreme luxury of her court, the barbarous pomp

of her nobility, the wealth and princely grandeur of her favourites, the

glorious exploits of her armies, and the gigantic views of her ambition

threw Europe into a sort of fascination; and those monarchs who had

been too proud to pay each other even the slightest deference felt no

abasement in making a woman the arbiter of their interests, the ruling

power of all their measures.

THE SUBJUGATION AND FINAL PARTITION OF POLAND (1796 A.D.)

The annihilation of Poland, long meditated, was now resolved on. The

empress could never forgive that nation either for the act of the diet

in 1788, which abrogated the constitution dictated by violence in 1775,

or the alliance of Prussia accepted in contempt of her own, or, above

all, the constitution decreed at Warsaw on the 3rd of May, 1791. Big with

these ideas of revenge, she gave orders to Bulgakov, her minister at

Warsaw, to declare war against Poland.

The diet being assembled received this declaration with a majestic

calmness, which was rapidly succeeded by the generous enthusiasm of a

nation roused to self-defence. The king himself pretended to share the

feelings that animated his people; and the Poles had the weakness to

believe that, having abandoned his former servility to Russia and his

customary indolence, he was becoming the defender of their freedom. An

army was collected in haste, and the command of it given to the king’s

nephew, Joseph Poniatowski, an inexperienced young man, all of whose

efforts were obstructed or misdirected by his traitorous uncle.

The Poles could have opposed the designs of Catherine with an army of

fifty thousand men; but they never yet could be brought to unite their

forces; and their different corps were soon after pressed between an

army of eighty thousand Russians, who fell back from Bessarabia upon the

territory which extends along the Bug, another of ten thousand collected

in the environs of Kiev, and a third of thirty thousand, which had

penetrated into Lithuania.

We shall not here attempt to draw the picture of the various battles that

drenched the plains of Poland with blood, and which, notwithstanding some

advantages obtained by the Poles, consumed the greater part of their

troops. It was then that the illustrious Kosciuszko, who as yet was

nothing more than one of the lieutenants of young Joseph Poniatowski,

displayed qualities that justly obtained him the confidence of the

nation, the hatred of the Russians, and the esteem of Europe.

During all this time Catherine, not trusting alone to the power of her

own arms, had been negotiating with unremitted assiduity. She proposed

the definitive partition of Poland to Frederick William, who was

undoubtedly no less desirous of it than herself. She secretly won over to

her views the two brothers Kassakovski, the hetman Branicki, Rejevuski,

and particularly Felix Potocki, who, while flattering himself perhaps

with the hopes of mounting the throne of Poland, became only the slave of

Russia. She even insisted that Stanislaus Augustus should make a public

declaration that it was necessary to yield to the superiority of the

Russian arms. He submitted to this indignity; but was not on that account

treated by the empress with greater indulgence.

In 1793 the confederation of the partisans of Russia assembled at Grodno,

where the Russian general proudly seated himself under the canopy of the

throne he was about to overturn. The Russian minister Sievers, at the

same time, published a manifesto (April 9th) in which he declared that

his sovereign would incorporate with her dominions all the territory of

Poland which her arms had conquered. The king of Prussia, in concert with

Catherine, had already marched an army into Poland.

The Russians, dispersed about the provinces of that kingdom, committed

depredations and ravages of which history furnishes but few examples.

Warsaw became likewise the theatre of their excesses. The Russian general

Igelström, who governed that city, connived at the disorders of his

soldiers, and made the wretched inhabitants feel the whole weight of his

arrogance and barbarity. The defenders of Poland had been obliged to

disperse. Their property was confiscated; their families were reduced

to servitude. Goaded by so many calamities, they once more took the

resolution to free their country of the Russians. Some of them assembled,

and sent an invitation to Kosciuszko to come and put himself at their

head. That general had retired to Leipsic, with Hugh Kolonti, Zajonchek,

and Ignatius Potocki, a man of great knowledge and sagacity, a sincere

friend to his country, and in all respects the opposite of his cousin

Felix. These four Poles joined eagerly in the resolution adopted by their

honest countrymen: but they were sensible that, in order to succeed, they

must begin by giving liberty to the peasants, who till then had been

treated in Poland like beasts of burden.

Kosciuszko and Zajonchek repaired, with all expedition, to the frontiers

of Poland. The latter proceeded to Warsaw, where he had conferences

with the chiefs of the conspirators. A banker named Kapustas, a bold

and artful man, made himself responsible for the inhabitants of the

capital. He saw likewise several officers, who declared their detestation

of the Russian yoke. All, in short, was ripe for an insurrection, when

the Russian commanders, to whom Kosciuszko’s presence on the frontiers

had given umbrage, forced him to postpone it for a time. To throw the

Russians off their guard, Kosciuszko went into Italy, and Zajonchek to

Dresden, whither Ignatius Potocki and Kolonti had retired, but all at

once Zajonchek appeared again at Warsaw. The king himself impeached him

to the Russian general Igelström, who had a conference with him, and

ordered him to quit the Polish territory. No alternative now remained for

him but to proceed immediately to action, or to abandon the enterprise

altogether. Zajonchek resolved on the former.

[Sidenote: [1794 A.D.]]

In 1794 Kosciuszko was recalled from Italy, and arrived at Cracow, where

the Poles received him as their deliverer. In spite of the orders of

the Russians, Colonel Madalinski pertinaciously refused to disband his

regiment. Some other officers had joined him. Kosciuszko was proclaimed

general of his little army, amounting to three thousand foot and twelve

hundred horse; and the act of insurrection was almost immediately

published on the 24th of March. Three hundred peasants, armed with

scythes, ranged themselves under the standard of Kosciuszko. That general

soon found himself faced by seven thousand Russians, who were put to

flight after a vigourous resistance.

On hearing at Warsaw of the success of Kosciuszko, the Russian general

Igelström caused all those to be arrested whom he suspected to have any

concern in the insurrection; but these measures served only the more to

irritate the conspirators. The insurrection broke out on the 18th of

April. Two thousand Russians were put to the sword. Their general, being

besieged in his house, requested permission to capitulate; and profiting

by the delay that was granted him, he escaped to the Prussian camp, which

lay at a little distance from Warsaw. Vilna, the capital of Lithuania,

followed the example of Warsaw; but the triumph of the insurgents was

there less terrible. Colonel Iazinski, who was at their head, conducted

himself with so much skill, that he took all the Russians prisoners,

without shedding a drop of blood. The inhabitants of the cantons of Chelm

and of Lublin declared themselves also in a state of insurrection, and

were imitated by three Polish regiments who were employed in the service

of the Russians. Some of the principal partisans of Russia, the hetman

Kassakovski, the bishop his brother, Zabiello, Ozarovski, and Ankvitch

were sentenced to be hanged, the first at Vilna, and the others at

Warsaw.

Kosciuszko exerted himself to the utmost to augment his army. He got

recruits among the peasants; and to inspire them with more emulation he

wore their dress, ate with them, and distributed encouragements among

them; but those men too long degraded in Poland were not yet deserving of

the liberty that was offered them. They distrusted the intentions of the

nobles, who, on their side, for the most part lamented the loss of their

absurd prerogatives. Stanislaus Augustus and his partisans augmented

still further the ill-will of the nobles, by representing to them the

intentions of Kosciuszko as disastrous to their order, and by caballing

continually in favour of Russia.

[Sidenote: [1795 A.D.]]

In the mean time, the empress, not satisfied with augmenting the number

of her troops in Poland, had sent her best generals thither. After

several battles, in one of which Frederick William, who had advanced

to support the Russians, fought at the head of his troops against

Kosciuszko, who was striving to prevent the junction of the Russian

generals, Suvarov and Fersen, the Polish commander was attacked by the

latter at Macziewice on the 4th of October. His talents, his valour,

and his desperation were unable to prevent the Poles from yielding to

numbers. Almost the whole of his army were cut to pieces or obliged to

lay down their arms. He himself, covered with wounds, was taken prisoner,

ejaculating, “_Finis Poloniæ!_”

All who were able to escape from the conquerors went and shut themselves

up in Praga, the eastern suburb of Warsaw, where 26,000 Poles and 104

heavy cannon and mortars defended the bridges over the Vistula and the

approach to the capital. Suvarov was soon before the gates with an

effective force of but 22,000 men and 86 field pieces; but even with

such odds against him he resolved to do as he had done at Ismail, and

carry the Polish lines at the point of the bayonet. After cannonading the

defences for two days he gave the order for the assault at daybreak on

the 4th of November. The trenches were carried after a desperate fight of

five hours; the Russians swept into the town, murdering all before them,

old men, women, and children; the wooden houses were speedily on fire;

the bridges were broken down, so that the helpless crowds who attempted

to escape into the city were remorselessly driven into the Vistula.

Besides 10,000 Polish soldiers, 12,000 citizens of every age and sex

perished in this wanton butchery.

Warsaw itself capitulated on the 5th of November, and was delivered up to

the Russians on the 6th. Poland was now annihilated. One division of its

troops after another was disarmed, and all the generals and officers who

could be seized were carried off. The king, however, who could be induced

to do anything if his comforts were spared, was used as an instrument to

give to power the impress of right. He was again set nominally at the

head of the kingdom till the robbers had agreed upon the division of the

spoil, and had no longer need of him. Suvarov held a splendid military

court for a year in Warsaw, far eclipsing the king, till at length the

city was given up to the Prussians.

The whole of the year 1795 was spent in negotiations with Prussia, and

the last treaty for the partition of Poland was not signed till the 24th

of October, 1795. In December, Suvarov travelled from Warsaw to St.

Petersburg, where the empress appropriated the Taurian palace for his

residence, and nominated a special household for his service. On the

1st of January, 1796, Warsaw was first given up to the Prussians, and

negotiations were carried on till the 21st of October, 1796, respecting

the boundaries of the palatinates of Warsaw and Cracow. By virtue of this

partition, first finally arranged in October, 1796, Austria obtained the

chief parts of the waiwodeship of Cracow, the palatinates of Sendomir and

Lublin, together with a portion of the district of Chelm and portions

of the waiwodeships of Brzesc, Podalachia, and Massovia, which lie

along the left bank of the Bug. All these districts contain about 834

German square miles. Prussia received those portions of Massovia and

Podalachia which touch upon the right bank of that river, in Lithuania

those parts of the palatinates of Troki and Samogitia which lie to the

left of the Niemen, and, finally, a district in Little Poland which

belonged to the waiwodeship of Cracow, making in all about one thousand

German square miles. Russia received the whole of what had hitherto

been Polish Lithuania as far as the Niemen, and to the frontiers of the

waiwodeships of Brzesc and Novogrodek, and thence to the Bug, together

with the greater part of Samogitia. In Little Poland she obtained that

part of Chelm which lies on the right bank of the Bug and the remainder

of Volhinia, in all about two thousand German square miles. During the

negotiations for the partition, Russia caused Stanislaus Augustus to lay

down the crown. The three partitioning powers ensured him a yearly income

of 200,000 ducats, and promised to pay his debts.

THE ANNEXATION OF COURLAND (1795 A.D.)

Catherine had now conquered, either by her arms or by her intrigues,

almost one-half of Poland, the Crimea, the Kuban, and a part of the

frontiers of Turkey. But she had no need of armaments and battles for

usurping another rich and well-peopled country. Courland and Semigallia,

where still reigned Duke Peter, the feeble son of the famous Biren, had

long been prepared for that annexation, which was now effected almost

without an effort. The flattering reception given to the Courish nobles

in St. Petersburg by the empress, distinctions, honours, posts, and

pleasures, rendering their abode in the imperial residence far preferable

to continuing in Mittau, and made them desirous of being under the sway

of the sovereign of a vast empire, rather than live in obedience to

a duke the obscurity of whose origin they could not forget, and whom

they regarded as their inferior. To bring the people to the same way of

thinking as the nobles, Catherine artfully embroiled them with their

neighbours, and created for them reasons of alarm.

She began by instigating the inhabitants of Livonia to insist upon the

fulfilment of an ancient convention, by which the Courlanders were

obliged to bring all their merchandises to Riga: certainly a very strange

and hard condition, by which a nation, that had on its coasts excellent

harbours happily situated, should be obliged to go, at a great expense,

to embark the products of its soil in a foreign city. The quarrel between

the Livonians and the Courlanders was not yet terminated, when the

empress sent engineers into Courland, to mark out a canal, to facilitate

the transport of the merchandises of that country into Livonia. The

Courlanders seeing this, and fearing lest they should be soon forced

to make use of this canal, thought it better for them to be protected

than oppressed by the empress, and to be her subjects rather than her

neighbours.

Catherine, being informed of these dispositions, called the duke of

Courland to her, under the pretence of conferring with him on matters of

importance. No sooner was that prince at the foot of the throne of the

autocratrix of the north, than the states of Courland held an assembly,

wherein it was proposed to put the country under the supremacy of Russia.

The principal members of the grand council faintly opposed this motion,

observing, that before they proceeded to a resolution it would be

expedient to wait the return of the duke. The oberburgraf Hoven rose up,

and spoke a long time in favour of Russia. Some councillors expressed

themselves of his opinion; others reproached him with treason. The

dispute grew warm on both sides; challenges were reciprocally given and

swords were about to be drawn, when the Russian general Pahlen appeared

in the assembly. His presence restored tranquillity. No one presumed

to raise his voice against Russia; and the proposal of the nobles was

adopted.

The next day, March 18th, 1795, the act was drawn up, by which

Courland, Semigallia, and the circle of Pilten made a formal surrender

of themselves to the empress of Russia; and it was carried to St.

Petersburg, where the duke of Courland learned, from the mouth of his own

subjects, that they themselves had deprived him of his dominions. The

empress immediately sent a governor thither. Some discontent, however,

remained in Courland; discontent brought on proscription, and the

possessions of the proscribed were given to the courtiers of Catherine.

The favourite, Plato Zubov, and his brother Valerian obtained a great

part of those rich and shameful spoils.[j]

LAST YEARS AND DEATH OF CATHERINE

[Illustration: CATHERINE II

(1729-1796)]

Before the breaking out of the French Revolution the governments of

Louis XVI and Catherine II had entered into active negotiations for

the formation of a quadruple alliance that should include Austria,

Russia, and the two houses of Bourbon, and should have for its object

the checking of England’s maritime pretensions and the encroachments of

Prussia. After the taking of the Bastille Catherine realised that she

could no longer count upon the support of France, since that country

was exclusively occupied with its own interior transformation. She

kept anxious watch, however, upon the course of events in Paris, and

manifested the liveliest antipathy to the new principles, falling ill

at the news of the king’s execution on the 21st of January. Led by fear

into a violent reaction, the correspondent of Voltaire and Diderot set

a close watch upon all Russians suspected of liberalism. She destroyed

a tragedy of Kniaznin and exiled to Siberia Radichtchev, the author of

a curious book entitled _Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow_, in

which were many sharp reflections on serfdom; Novikov was confined at

Schlüsselburg, his printing houses were closed and all his enterprises

ruined. She dismissed Genêt, the French ambassador, refused to recognise

either the constitution of 1791 or the French Republic, issued an ukase

announcing the rupture of diplomatic relations with France, refused to

the tri-colour admission to Russian parts, expelled all French subjects

who refused to swear allegiance to the monarchical principle, extended a

warm welcome to French refugees, and lost no time in acknowledging Louis

XVIII.

In 1792 she published her famous note on the restoration of royal power

and aristocratic privileges in France, asserting that only ten thousand

men would be necessary to effect a counter-revolution. She encouraged

Gustavus III, who was assassinated by his nobles at a masked ball (March

16th, 1792), to place himself at the head of a crusade against democracy.

She further urged England to assist the count d’Artois in a descent he

had planned upon the French coast, and stimulated the zeal of Austria

and Prussia. Notwithstanding this, though she had repeatedly negotiated

treaties for subsidies and promised troops, she took care never to become

involved in a war with the west. “My position is taken,” she said, “my

part assigned; I shall watch the movements of Turkey, Poland, and Sweden.”

The latter country became reconciled to France after the death of

Gustavus III. The punishment of the Jacobins of Warsaw and Turkey was an

easier and more lucrative piece of work. We should also take into account

an admission that she made to her vice-chancellor Ostermann in 1791: “Am

I wrong? I cannot avow all to the courts of Berlin and Vienna, but I wish

to keep them engaged in these affairs so that I may have freedom to carry

on my unfinished enterprises.” She excused herself for not taking part in

the anti-revolutionary crusade by alleging the war with Turkey; then when

in consequence of the revolution of the 3rd of May she was obliged to

hasten the Peace of Jassy, she made the Polish war her excuse; and when

this was ended she affected to excite Suvarov and his soldiers against

the atheists of the west, but in reality thought only of gaining her own

ends in the east. Muhammed, the new king of Persia, had recently invaded

Georgia and burned Tiflis, the capital of Heraclius, a protégé of the

empress. Catherine summoned to her court an exiled brother of Muhammed’s

and charged Valerian Zubov with the conquest of Persia. [His armies were

actually under way when the death of Catherine led to the abandonment of

the enterprise.]

[Sidenote: [1796 A.D.]]

Without being aware of it Catherine II really performed greater service

to France than to the coalition. By her intervention in Poland and her

projects against the east she had excited the jealousy and suspicion of

Prussia and Austria. She took care to pit them against each other; made

the second partition with Frederick William in spite of Austria, and

effected the third with Francis II to the extreme dissatisfaction of

Prussia. She contributed indirectly to weaken and dissolve the coalition,

being herself prevented from joining it by the Polish insurrection that

received so much encouragement from France. She died on the 17th of

November, 1796, at the age of sixty-seven. Since Ivan the Terrible no

monarch had extended the limits of the empire by such vast conquests.

Catherine made the Niemen, the Dniester, and the Black Sea the boundaries

of Russia.[d]

A RUSSIAN ESTIMATE OF CATHERINE

The personality of the empress was as though created for a throne. We do

not meet in history with any other woman so fitted to rule. On all and

each she produced a profound impression. No one has spoken more harshly

and disadvantageously of the empress’ qualities than Masson, yet this

pamphleteer-writer observes that during the space of ten years, having

had occasion to see Catherine once or twice a week, he was always struck

by her unusually attractive personality, by the dignity with which she

held herself, and by the amiability of her behaviour to everyone.

In her _Memoirs_[g] Catherine herself has left a detailed narrative of

the course of her development, of her aspirations after power, and of her

unscrupulousness in the means she used to attain her aims. The empress’

frankness in this respect amounts almost to cynicism. In maturity she at

last became an autocratic sovereign. After the terrible humiliations, the

bitter trials she had endured in her youth, her delight when she found

herself in the enjoyment of unbounded power was all the greater. The

fact that the fundamental change in her surroundings, the rapid passage

from entire dependency to entire potency, did not in any wise awaken

in her any despotic inclinations testifies to the goodness inherent in

her nature; when her son was subjected in his turn to a like change in

outward circumstances his despotism knew no bounds.

We have seen that the unfavourable circumstances in which Catherine

found herself until the year 1762 exercised a baneful influence upon

her character; whereas the power and preponderance which she later

acquired had an ennobling effect upon her nature. Until then she had been

necessarily obliged often to have resource to mean and trifling measures

to better her position and to revenge herself on her opponents; when she

was able to exert full power, to enjoy the advantages of her position,

the respect of her contemporaries, the adoration of the persons that

surrounded her, she no longer needed to employ those means which are

generally made use of by the weak in their struggle against the strong.

At the time when a sharp watch was kept over her, when she was not

trusted by either Elizabeth or Peter, she understood how to dissemble,

to play the hypocrite, to feign humility and modesty, whilst in her soul

she was filled with arrogance and contempt for mankind. Now that she had

surrounded herself entirely with persons devoted to her she could act

openly and nobly. The grand duchess in her isolation had been remarkable

for her coldness, her mistrust of mankind, her suspiciousness; the

empress on the contrary gave full scope to the development of feelings

of benevolence, condescension, indulgence, and sincere attention to the

interests of the persons that surrounded her. It was not without reason

that Peter and Elizabeth had mistrusted Catherine and been suspicious of

her character; it was not without reason, either, that in after times

many people highly esteemed Catherine’s kindheartedness.

The history of the court under Peter I, under the empress Anna, and under

Elizabeth is full of examples of tyranny, cruelty, and arbitrariness;

all Catherine’s contemporaries were astonished at the mildness of her

behaviour to those around her and rejoiced at the absence of stiff

formalities and hard measures in her intercourse with her subordinates.

In spite of her quick temper and impulsiveness, Catherine had complete

control over herself, and in her intercourse with her fellow creatures

she was governed by principles of humanity. “I like to praise and reward

loudly, to blame quietly,” she once justly remarked in conversation

with Ségur; she sought to avoid occasions of offending anyone, and was

particularly careful in her intercourse with servants; “I will live to

make myself not feared,” she once said, observing that the stove-heater,

who had deserved reproof for some neglect, avoided meeting her. Often

when Catherine had given an order she would make excuses for the trouble

and labour it occasioned. Krapovitski gives instances of such solicitude

on her part; more than once the empress, when impatient or irritated,

having expressed herself somewhat sharply, afterwards acknowledged her

hastiness and endeavoured to repair her fault.

It is said that Catherine, who awoke early and usually rose at six in

the morning, so valued the tranquillity of her servants that without

requiring assistance she dressed herself, lit the fire, and without

disturbing anyone sat down to her books and papers. Various anecdotes

are to be found in the narratives of contemporaries testifying to her

indulgence to her servants and her want of sufficient severity in her

intercourse with them. When she was in a passion she turned up her

sleeves, walked about the room, drank a glass of water, and deferred

judgment. Her capacity for removing any misunderstanding that might

have arisen between herself and others was particularly remarkable. In

her letters to various great lords we meet with frequent exhortations

not to give way to despair but to take courage, to believe in their own

capacities, and to hope for success. In moments of danger she knew how to

raise the spirits of those around her, inspiring them with firmness and

courage.

The distinguishing features of Catherine’s character were gaiety, humour,

and an inclination for fun and amusements. She once remarked: “As to the

gaiety of character of Frederick the Great, it must be observed that

it proceeded from his superiority: was there ever a great man who was

not distinguished by his gaiety and who did not possess in himself an

inexhaustible store of it.” She took the greatest pleasure in going to

masquerades and, while preserving the strictest incognito, talking to

various people; she herself related in detail how she had once gone to a

masquerade in male attire and had made a declaration of love to a young

girl who never suspected that it was the empress talking to her. It must

not be regarded as a matter of chance or an act of complaisance that such

a multitude of anecdotes testifying to the magnanimity of Catherine have

been preserved; many contemporaries who do not unconditionally praise

her maintain however that she was capable of listening to unpleasing

truths, of recognising her faults and deficiencies, and of restraining

her anger. Such assertions are to be met with in Razumovski, Derjavin,

Mussin-Pushkin, and Teplov.

Of course traits are not wanting which show her obstinacy, self-will,

and arrogance. Derjavin cites several circumstances to prove that in

her actions Catherine was often governed by personal considerations and

desires rather than the real good of the state and strict justice. It

is also not without reason that she is reproached with the fact that,

while protesting against the use of tortures and corporal punishment,

she allowed full scope to the cruelties of Sheshkovski who frequently

with his own hand tortured accused persons in the most atrocious manner;

we cannot however determine how far the empress was cognisant of his

barbarous treatment. Referring to some instances of arbitrariness and

infringement of the law, Prince Sherbatov remarks that the empress held

herself above the law and that she thus herself set a pernicious example

to the great noblemen and dignitaries who imitated her in this respect.

As to Catherine’s piety, Frederick II plainly accused her of hypocrisy

and bigotry. We bear in mind that it was not easy for her to adopt the

orthodox faith, but that when she had adopted it she used outward piety

as a means of strengthening her position in Russia. By strictly observing

the rules of the church, and conscientiously fulfilling her religious

duties, she endeavoured to produce a certain impression on her subjects.

At the same time she remained true to the principles of toleration

preached in the literature of enlightenment. When Voltaire reproached

her, saying that she humiliated herself by kissing the priest’s hand,

she justified herself by replying that it was only an outward observance

which would little by little become obsolete. There is no doubt that

Catherine’s piety did not spring from any deep feeling. In her letters to

Grimm, sallies against Luther and the Lutherans are to be met with more

than once; she despised Lutherans for their intolerance and several times

praised the orthodox faith as the best in the world; she compared it to

an oak tree with deep roots.

Side by side with such remarks we meet with bold sallies both from the

lips and in the letters of the empress against excessive piety and

fanaticism; such are certain caustic remarks referring to Maria Theresa

and the queen of Portugal. In certain _jeux d’esprit_ which she allowed

herself in connection with questions of the church and religion in her

letters to Grimm, the same rationalism is to be observed as that which

distinguished the votaries of French literature of the time. Catherine

praised the works of Nicholas Sebaldus Nothanker, especially, because

hypocrisy was condemned in them. Deep religious and philosophical

questions she did not like; her chief characteristic was a certain

worldliness. Her point of view was optimistic and her principal rule

of earthly wisdom, gaiety. She did not like to meditate on sad events,

to give way to grief, to dwell upon gloomy subjects; and this partly

explains her esteem for Voltaire, whom she called the “god of gaiety.”

This playfulness and vivacity, this freshness and gaiety she preserved to

the end of her life.[h]

FOOTNOTES

[54] The Swedes were not aware of the fortuitous advantage then offered

them by a singular incident. Just before the Russian admiral received

orders to weigh, the empress had given the command of a ship to the

famous Paul Jones. As soon as the British officers in the Russian service

heard of this appointment, they repaired in a body to the admiralty, and

announced their determination to quit the squadron to which that pirate

had been attached. By this act on their part seven or eight ships were

left without officers, until the empress, smothering her resentment,

withdrew Paul Jones from the squadron, under pretence of sending him to

the Black Sea; but, fearing a repetition of so unpleasant a scene, she

contrived to get rid of the daring adventurer altogether.

[Illustration]

[Illustration]