appears from his readiness to explain Jewish customs. He knows Judaism,
and is familiar with Jerusalem as it appeared after the destruction of
the temple. The probability is that he wrote his gospel between 120 and
140. He is comparable to Matthew in so far as both are greatly interested
in the controversy between Gentiles _versus_ Jews, yet Matthew’s
Israel has grown into the world-wide cosmos. The frequent occurrence
of the very word “cosmos” in the fourth gospel is remarkable. In the
same way the Greek term γιγνώσκειν (to know) appears besides the older
term πιστεύειν (to believe), which latter is a translation of a Jewish
conception, still employed so vigorously by St. Paul. The author of the
fourth gospel is not familiar with Galilee and does not seem to care for
consistency in the details of his accounts, for he frequently contradicts
his own statements. The most important differences between his and the
three synoptic gospels are the accounts as to the main field of Jesus’s
activity, which according to St. John was Judea, according to the
synoptic gospels Galilee, and the day of Jesus’s death, which according
to St. John is the 14th of Nisan, according to the synoptic gospels the
15th of Nisan, so that if we follow the latter, Jesus would have been
tried and condemned, against all Jewish customs, on one of the greatest
festival days. Holtzmann rightly warns the reader, that whatever may
speak in favor of the synoptic gospels as being, in general, historically
more correct, the author of the fourth gospel might have had some special
source for this particular fact.—
The Revelation of St. John has given more trouble to the Christian
exegesis than any other book, and light was not shed upon its plan and
construction, until it was found to be one instance only of a whole class
of literary productions. When we consider the Revelation of St. John in
the same line with other apocalyptic works, and when we understand the
mental disposition of the pious Jews shortly before and after Christ, we
have a clew to the enigmatic visions which are unrolled before our eyes.
The expectations of the Jews in the times of the Maccabees were
disappointed again and again. The great events of the world did not
justify the national hopes, and God did not seem to care about fulfilling
his promises. The last prophet, who called himself Malachi, or “the
messenger of God,” proclaimed the message of the Lord, “Yet I loved
Jacob,” and he comforts the faithful who still endure in all their
tribulations, that “a book of remembrance is written before him for them
that feared the Lord and that thought upon His name.” After Malachi,
a number of revelations appeared, which, to the satisfaction of the
Messianic expectations, explained the events of the world, and prophesied
that those only who should persevere until the end would be called upon
to rule, together with the “Son of Man,” who is to come to smite the
heathens and to rule them with an iron rod. The first apocalyptic author,
who wrote in 164 B. C., impersonated Daniel, the prophet, who had lived
about 400 B. C. The powerful nations of the world are represented as
beasts, the fourth and last beast being the Macedonian empire. It has
ten horns, that is, rulers, the last one being Antiochus Epiphanes. As
soon as his power is broken, the power over the earth will be given to
Israel, which is called the Son of Man. The power of the tenth horn was
broken, indeed, yet the Messianic hopes remained unfulfilled, and thus
new prophecies were wanted, which should again explain the plans of
the Almighty, so that the faithful would still endure and hope. Thus,
Henoch was written, and after Henoch the Assumption of Moses, the book of
Baruch, and other revelations.
The apocalyptic literature is characterised by Messianic expectations and
eschatological reflections. The end of the present course of affairs is
said to be near at hand and a new order will be established in which the
faithful shall rule for a whole millennium and the wicked be tormented.
The Revelation of St. John represents this spirit of apocalyptic hopes
among the early Christians of Asia Minor. It throws much light upon the
conditions and the conceptions of a period concerning which we have
very little information. We here see Christianity in its beginnings.
The coloring of the Revelation is still Jewish. Its author stands in
a conscious contrast to the Greek spirit which is about to change the
properly Jewish character of the new doctrine. The author of the St. John
revelation is a Jew to the backbone still; he denounces the antinomistic
Christianity of the Gentiles as represented by Nocolaitanes whom, we are
told, God hateth. He does not directly mention the apostle St. Paul, but
there is little doubt that he is alluded to in Chap. II, 2, as one of
them “which say they are apostles and are not.”
The more powerful the Greek spirit grew in the church, the weaker became
these original features inherited from the diaspora Jews until they
were dropped forever through the efforts of Origenes who made a decided
and successful opposition to the belief in the millennium. Yet it took
some time for the traditional view of the Messiah to change into the
purer and more spiritual Christ-ideal There were two parties in the
early church who spoke two radically different idioms; the one still
cherished the old chiliasm, dreaming of the establishment of a millennium
on earth. Their terminology moved always in the same allegories: they
spoke of green and fat fields and of sulphurous abysses, of white horses
and terrible beasts, of trees of life, of golden cities and of war and
bloodshed, while the other party spoke of Logos, of the eternal Son
through whom the world had been made, of “the dispensation of the fulness
of the times in which God might gather together in one all things in
Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth,” of the pleroma
and of aeons.
The Revelation of St. John is an expression of the former party and it
was natural that after a complete victory of the latter party, Christian
teachers knew not what to make of this book which shows Christian views
by the side of an irreconcilable Judaism, and a worldly empire in
Jerusalem, the beloved city with twenty-four Jewish elders representing
the twelve tribes of Israel. The rest of Jerusalem is to be finally
converted while there is no hope for paganism. The difference between
Israelites and Gentiles remains a radical one even in the Holy City when
the new heaven and the new earth has been created. The Gentile-Christians
appear as citizens of a lower order. The Israelites alone live in the
city while the Gentiles only walk in the light thereof, and they shall
bring the glory and honor of the nations into it.
We have given a few glimpses of the problems of the St. John literature
only. It is impossible to go over the whole field. Nor is it necessary to
do so. Professor Holtzmann has given us so complete a presentation that
we need but refer to his work which is indispensable to all interested
in the literature of the New Testament. It will be the more valuable
and welcome as it is furnished with an index, a feature rarely found in
German books.
P. C.
DIE WILLENSFREIHEIT UND IHRE GEGNER. By _Dr. Constantin Gutberlet_.
Fulda: Fuldaer Actiendruckerei. 1893.
Dr. Constantin Gutberlet regards the doctrine of free-will as a cardinal
doctrine of Christianity. In the present booklet he endeavors to show
that all attacks made upon it by unchristian savants have failed. He
criticises Höffding, Lombroso, Wundt, Münsterberg, Lotze, P. Ree, and
Schopenhauer, and establishes as his own view a theory of free-will which
he calls “freedom of choice.” He says: “There is no decision without
_sufficient_ reason, but there may be without _rational_ reason. The
sufficient reason is that a greater good may be recognised as possessing
‘blind’ sides, that we can do without it and even reject it for the sake
of these ‘blind’ sides. On the other hand, a lesser good may be given as
an object of willing, and our willing by its own energy conditions the
free decision of the will” (p. 25). Freedom of will is not a reversal
of causation, which latter, according to Gutberlet, is “an absolutely
necessary law” (p. 8 and _passim_).
It is difficult to understand how Gutberlet, taking this view, can class
himself among the indeterminists. From his premises, we should expect
him to take the view which we have defended, that freedom of will is not
contradictory to determinism. If freedom of will means freedom of choice,
in which “we ourselves, as the contents of our ideas, feelings, and
dispositions, are the cause not only of our activities, but also of our
free decision” (p. 19), then our decisions are most certainly determined
by our character. Gutberlet’s criticism of Wundt (pp. 167-171), who
defends freedom of will and determinism, is wide of the mark, and it
seems that Gutberlet is either not clear on this point himself or he does
not draw the consequences of his own standpoint. Says Gutberlet: “Only
on the supposition that there is no other than ‘mechanical’ causation of
natural forces, can the determinist maintain that freedom abolishes the
principle of causation. In the application of the principle of Causation
‘what happens has a cause’ to natural forces, the principle can be
inverted thus: ‘when all sufficient causes are given, the effect follows
with necessity.’ Yet if there are spiritual agents which stand above the
mechanical causation of nature and natural forces, we cannot _a priori_
declare that their effects follow with the same necessity from their
character as is the case with nature. Accordingly, unless we assume the
questionable theory that free causation is impossible, we cannot invert
here the principle of causation and use it against free decision” (p.
168).
How does this sentence agree with Mr. Gutberlet’s statements that
causation is an absolutely necessary law and that “we ourselves ...
are the cause of our free decision.” Our decisions are determined by
“our ideas, feelings, and dispositions,” and yet a sufficient cause
determines its effect only if the causation is mechanical, not if it is
spiritual. Gutberlet explains the difficulty as follows: “Certainly, if
we did not reduce the free decision _once made_ (die _eingetretene_ freie
Entscheidung), to an adequate cause, we should sin against logic and
psychology. But we understand by ‘adequate cause of a decision’ not only
the influence of motives, but also the energy of a free will.” Very well
then, Mr. Gutberlet would be a determinist as much as Wundt. Decisions
are determined by two factors: (1) by the motives (i. e. the objects
which act as stimuli upon the will) and (2) by the character of the
agent. Not everybody is affected by the same stimulus in the same way.
One chooses this and another that motive, and his character determines
the choice; and a man of a certain character, under definitely given
conditions, will freely and yet necessarily choose a certain motive. Dr.
Gutberlet, it appears to us, says yes and no in one breath.
Dr. Gutberlet is the editor of the _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_, a Roman
Catholic periodical. He belongs to that class of men who by partisans of
free thought are regarded as especially dangerous. He is not as narrow
as the common type of _defensores fidei_. He studies the works of modern
savants “whose intellectual superiority,” as he confesses, he “admires
in many respects.” He is broader than most of his _confreres_, and thus
he makes the creed of his church appear broader than it practically is.
We can see no danger in the appearance of such men. It is true, he will
make converts among the educated, or at least, he will keep some wavering
elements within the pale of the church; for the Roman church is, upon the
whole, still very hostile to progress. But, on the other hand, such a man
is in his circles a missionary of science; he will help to broaden the
views of his brethren. He is learning, and they will learn from him.
P. C.
GRUNDZÜGE DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE. By _Wilhelm Wundt_. Leipsic:
Wilhelm Engelmann. 1893.
Wundt’s “Physiological Psychology” is perhaps justly regarded as his
best and most valuable work. We have just received the first part of the
fourth edition and may expect that the second part will soon appear. We
intend to review the whole work as soon as completed, and will state
here only that this new edition contains, among many emendations and
additions, an explicit account of the modern methods of psychological
investigations, with descriptions and illustrations of the most important
instruments invented for that purpose.
κρς.
VERGLEICHEND-ENTWICKELUNGSGESCHICHTLICHE UND ANATOMISCHE STUDIEN IM
BEREICHE DER HIRNANATOMIE. 3. RIECHAPPARAT UND AMMONSHORN. Abdruck
aus _Anatomischer Anzeiger_. By _Dr. L. Edinger_. (Jena: 1893. Gustav
Fischer.)
Dr. Edinger proves in this essay that in the cerebral evolution of
animals the cortex makes its first appearance in the formation of the
cornu ammonis. This convolution being the centre of smell, it is more
than merely probable that smell sensations, or something analogous to
smell sensations, were phylogenetically the first psychical functions.
κρς.
ÉTAT MENTAL DES HYSTÉRIQUES LES STIGMATES MENTAUX. By _Pierre Janet_.
Paris: Rueff & Co. 1892.
M. Pierre Janet, one of the most prominent disciples of Professor
Charcot, presents in this little volume of two hundred and thirty-three
pages a summary of the results of modern psychical research as it is
understood at the Salpétrière. Charcot himself recommends the book to the
medical profession. Janet investigates anæsthesia (Chap. I), amnesia,
abulia, the diseases of motion, and the modifications of character. The
author proposes to “describe the phenomena and endeavors to establish a
rigorous determinism of their relations. The moral view of a diseased
person,” he says, “ought to constitute a part of the clinical diagnosis
while the psychical state must be closely investigated in its connection
with physiological facts. This is the only way in which the physician
can gain a knowledge of the entire man and understand the diseases which
affect his organism.”
Professor Charcot states that Professor Janet’s researches on the mental
state of hysterical persons were begun long ago and completed under his
supervision; that they were expounded by M. Janet in the Spring of 1892
in a few lectures at the Salpétrière; that they tend to confirm the
idea, often expressed in his own teachings, that hysteria is upon the
whole a mental disease.
Hypnotism has long enough been regarded not only as harmless but even as
a panacea for almost all the ailments of mankind. It would be well to
heed Charcot’s warning, as hysterical diseases may be treated with better
success, if the mystery that still surrounds them disappears before calm
and scientific investigation.
ς.
L’ÉCOLE D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _l’Abbé Maurice de Baets_. Gand:
P. van Fleteren. 1893.
Dr. de Baets, Professor of Philosophy of the Gregorian University
of Rome, Italy, and Secretary to the Bishop of Ghent, criticises in
this elegantly printed little volume the modern school of criminal
anthropology. He believes with Herbert Spencer that, if a great number
of people accept certain errors, these errors must contain a kernel of
truth. Professor de Baets says that he does not deny crime to be an
outgrowth of the organism, to be inherited, to be closely connected with
insanity, etc., but he cannot approve of criminal unaccountableness. The
denial of responsibility, he says, is the denial of the wrong, and the
denial of the wrong is the denial of morality. He sums up his view in
italics on page 48: “Man is responsible for his acts in the measure that
his acts depend on a free will.”
κρς.
AGAINST DOGMA AND FREE-WILL. By _H. Croft Hiller_. London: Williams and
NORGATE. 1892.
The author has much to say against ecclesiasticism and sacerdotalism, and
while he repudiates such men as Wundt and Ribot, he “begs to thank Drs.
Weismann, Luys, and Ferrier from whose labors the views expressed in this
treatise derive that scientific authentication without which they would
be worthless.” The book is apparently a first venture into the stormy
ocean of literary pursuits.
ς.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUALITY, OR THE ONE AND THE MANY. By _Antoinette
Brown Blackwell_. New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1893.
The author trusts that she has “_demonstrated_ a conscious immortality.”
In a former book of hers entitled “The Physical Basis of Immortality,”
1876, she propounded “the theory of persistent mind-matter individuals”
which are to be conceived as ultimate atoms. The present volume of five
hundred and nineteen pages is written to show that “this conception of
the ultimate atoms could consistently explain and harmonise mental and
material phenomena and by coördinated interpretations of the most diverse
processes simplify and unify nature and her manifestations.” The theory
of the correlation of matter and mind is accepted; “Nature,” the author
says, “is nothing if not mathematical,” and there are many passages to
which no monistic thinker would take exception. Along with them we find
statements, e. g. on the rhythmic motion of atoms, etc., which it will be
difficult to prove. Her peculiar view is characterised in the following
sentence: “All ultimate individualities _may_ be identical in kind, but
no obvious necessity decides that they _must_ be, and in an order of
things where other varieties are prevalent, the weight of evidence for
the present is on the side of varieties, even in the ultimate units.”
The author’s theory (if we rightly understand her) has been tried
before. Some suggestions of Goethe’s seem to indicate that he believed
in soul-monads, and the German psychologist Herbart erected on the
assumption of material soul-atoms his system of a mathematical psychology
in which sound science was curiously mingled with improbable vagaries.
The author of “The Philosophy of Individuality,” although apparently
quite well informed otherwise, has, strange enough, not taken notice
either of Goethe or of Herbart. Perhaps she would have abandoned her
theory if she had been fully familiar with Herbartism and the critique
which it has received; for Herbart’s soul-atoms are to-day regarded as a
thing of the past.
κρς.
DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER GEGENWART. By _Prof. Rudolf Eucken_. Leipsic: Veit
& Co. 1893.
Prof. Rudolf Eucken discusses in this volume such topics as
“Subjective—Objective”; “A priori—A posteriori”; “Monism—Dualism”;
“Idealism, Realism, and Naturalism”; “Theoretical—Practical,” and
so forth. It seems to us that Eucken has not yet fully succeeded in
reconciling his philosophy with natural science. We are glad to notice
that he has a critical eye for the shortcomings of naturalists under
whose methods of classification and mechanical conceptions the properly
spiritual of man would be eliminated. He is judicious in his exposition
of the various problems, but we miss a final solution, such as would
clearly state and recognise the truth in both. Nevertheless the book is
sound, full of valuable information, and its perusal is to be recommended
to every student of philosophy.
κρς.
THE ÆSTHETIC ELEMENT IN MORALITY. By _Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph.D._ New
York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.
The book contains chapters on: (1) the theory of altruism; (2) the
intrinsic worth of character; (3) an analysis of moral beauty; (4)
an examination of the æsthetic method of ethics; and (5) the idea of
obligation in æsthetics and ethics. The author’s knowledge of ethical
theories appears to be limited. Duns Scotus, the Realist, is called a
thoroughgoing Nominalist. In spite of such defects, we find much that
is good in the book. In the end of his discussion the author says with
truth: “When the element of the _good_, or that which is capable of
clothing itself in the form of an ideal, is taken out of the conception
of obligation, this latter degenerates into what is nothing more than
mere submission to an arbitrary imperative....Prometheus, chained to the
rocks for bringing the gift of fire to the wretched barbarous inhabitants
of the earth, in defiance of the will of the ‘Father of gods and men,’ is
one of the grandest productions of the human imagination, and were the
Supreme Being such a one as Augustine and Calvin imagined him, we should
despise the wretched slaves that licked the dust at his feet.”
κρς.
PERIODICALS.
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.
CONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 1 and 2.
DIE STABILITÄT DER RAUMWERTE AUF DER NETZHAUT. By _Franz
Hillebrand_.
UEBER EIN OPTISCHES PARADOXON. (Second Article.) By _Franz
Brentano_.
LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)
This second article, “On an Optical Paradox,” is a rejoinder of Franz
Brentano of Vienna to Th. Lipps. We gave an account of this interesting
discussion in _The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 153 et seqq. Professor
Brentano insists on explaining the optical illusion concerning distances
between two points, as seen in Fig. 1-3, by an overestimation of
small and an underestimation of large angles. He complains of being
misunderstood by Professor Lipps who substitutes “acute” for “small” and
“obtuse” for “large”; for, says he, in comparisons both angles may be
obtuse or both may be acute. Professor Brentano adds some more puzzling
figures to prove his case; and, as in his first article, his propositions
are ingenious and thought-stimulating; but his arguments do not suffice
to convince us of the validity of his theory. We do not exactly
intend to deny the general rule as to the overestimation of large and
underestimation of small angles, but are inclined to believe that it will
not serve as a sufficient explanation. We reproduce the most important
figures devised by Brentano, and take the liberty of adding a few remarks
and additional figures of our own.
[Illustration: Fig. 1.]
[Illustration: Fig. 2.]
[Illustration: Fig. 3.]
Fig. 4 represents two right angles, one of which is divided into nine
angles of 10° each. Brentano claims that we so overestimate the nine
small angles as to take the undivided right angle as an acute one. I can
only say that however much I have tried, I am not subject to the illusion.
[Illustration: Fig. 4.]
In Fig. 5 we have on the straight line _AB_ a series of stations which
are connected with a common centre. The line _AB_ is not a curve, but
this figure reminds us of a perspective view of the sector of a circle.
The drawing appears as the diagrammatic picture of a shield, the buckle
of which is in _C_. Thus _AB_ is conceived as representing a curve. It
does not seem that a comparison of the angles has anything to do with the
illusion.
How much perspective interferes with the optical illusions under
discussion, impresses itself upon my mind, when I think of figure 5 as
the diagram of a mountain, rising above the plane _AB_. If I imagine I
stand below the plane, which may be a high table-land, the line _AB_
appears to my eye straight. But when I imagine I am looking down upon the
plane, the curvature of _AB_ becomes very strongly marked.
[Illustration: Fig. 5.]
In Fig. 6 we can detect no optical illusion. The line _AB_ appears
straight to us. The drawing reminds us of a sunrise on the ocean.
[Illustration: Fig. 6.]
The same must be said about Figure 7. Brentano, in agreement with Lipps,
claims that we are inclined to regard the distance between the ends of
the two lines as larger than between the points. If there is any illusion
at all, it seems to me, that on the contrary, the distance between the
ends of the lines appears shorter. And why? We measure the distance by
allowing our eyes to run from one point to the other and then comparing
the measurements. This comparison is geometrically effected by combining
the respective starting points, and thus judging as to the parallelism
of these two lines mentally constructed. Whether or not the dots appear
equidistant, depends upon the execution of all these operations. While
directly measuring the distances between the points, we have an easier
measurement where the lines are attached. The lines give to the points
a certain vim; they almost appear to move with a velocity indicated by
the length of the little lines, while the isolated dots present a very
phlegmatic appearance.
[Illustration: Fig. 7.]
In order to see what effects other positions of the lines produce, let
us compare in Fig. 9 the several relations by covering the rest. If
there is any illusion as to _a_ and _b_, we should say that the points
of _a_ appear at a greater distance; as to _b_ and _c_, we see the
greater distance in _c_, as to _c_ and _d_, we feel doubtful, while
any comparison with _e_, tends strongly to convince us of their equal
distance. The reason is obvious. The lines in _e_ assist us in drawing
the parallels, which we consciously or unconsciously construct in order
to compare the distances.
[Illustration: Fig. 8.]
[Illustration: Fig. 9.]