be considered whether any other objective world is necessary to its
existence. It is sometimes alleged that consciousness could not exist
without an objective, exterior to its physical basis. If, however,
consciousness is a necessary attribute of free energy, the latter purely
metaphysical speculation has no foundation. The “intuition of Being”
(Rosmini) would exist, albeit not much specialised, in the absence of
multifarious objects; but the forms of logic would characterise it
nevertheless.
It is alleged that we can never know matter as it is, because our
observation is restricted to the mutual relations of its component
parts. In this assertion our intelligence necessarily concurs, but this
need not cause us to relax our exertions in the pursuit of knowledge.
The practical philosophy is, as already remarked, the knowledge of the
relations subsisting between mind and matter, so that our most valuable
acquisition will be in the end the laws of a relation. We may well
postpone our endeavors after the absolute, even if we can ever attain a
knowledge of it. The realist is content to believe that if we do not know
“things as they are in themselves,” it is because, of the imperfection of
our senses. But we are constantly discovering new aids to research, and
we can put no limit to our power in this direction.
The research into the relations of subject and object, means to theology,
an investigation as to the existence and nature of Deity, and as to an
existence for conscious beings in other than terrestrial life. The pure
idealist reaches an affirmative answer to these problems by a short and
easy route, based on a study of the intrinsic nature of mind alone. The
pure realist reaches a negative conclusion by an equally short cut, by
considering the properties of matter alone. Not a few thinkers entertain
both doctrines at one and the same time, although they are mutually
exclusive and contradictory. No wonder that they reach what Montgomery
well terms “the puzzle of puzzles.” But the rational conclusion from this
deadlock must be, that there is something wrong with the methods of both
sides. To the practical mind it seems that the vice in both methods is
the failure to harmonise properly with their own, the facts adduced by
the opposite side in the discussion. And it is indeed evident that that
cannot be the final philosophy which restricts itself to a consideration
of mind alone; or that which restricts itself to a consideration of
matter alone. That men should pursue different lines of research is
natural. Those whose minds are capable in the fields of conception
naturally prefer idealistic studies; while those whose especial genius
lies in the direction of mechanics, easily pursue-materialistic research.
What is needed is a combination of the two fields of ability in the same
mind.
A considerable class of serious people, observing the diversities between
the schools of philosophy, regard such studies as useless. Since they
have not the disposition or ability to solve the question for themselves,
they find it best to rest in uncertainty, which has optimistic or
pessimistic tendencies according to temperament and education. The
optimist has faith that all is, and all will be, well; while the
pessimist takes the opposite view. Both are sustained in their position
by those teachers who teach the impotence of our faculties and the
uselessness of knowledge. Such appeal in support of their position to the
facts already cited; the imperfection of our senses; the relativity of
knowledge; the inscrutable nature of mind and matter, etc. This position
is, however, a plea of avoidance, and it will be time enough to listen to
it when the avenues of the increase of human knowledge are permanently
closed. This they are not at present.
The key to the position is the doctrine of evolution. Here we behold
the interaction of subject and object, both in our own persons and in
the inferior beings which are with us, and which have preceded us on
earth. That mind has not sprung full-fledged upon this planet, is clear;
and that it has made wonderful progress in power, is equally clear. Why
did it not appear with all its powers “in the beginning”? The answer
obviously is, “the intractability of matter.” Why has it progressed in
face of this obstacle? The answer is, the tractability of matter. Mind,
through its intrinsic quality, has coërced matter, in ever increasing
degree, and the limit of its capacity in this direction plainly has not
yet been reached. Its most important conquest has been that of its own
physical basis, and next to it is the conquest of the world of objects by
which it is surrounded. Its last conquest will be the knowledge of its
destiny, as a projection of its known past. To this end the knowledge
of its own constitution is essential, but this is not all, as the pure
idealist would have us believe. The knowledge of external relations is
also essential, for we can in no state of being escape them. Psychic life
is an “internal adjustment to external relations,” quite as much as is
the physical life, as it is defined by Spencer in the phrase just quoted.
The Deity of evolution indicated in the first section of this paper,
will not satisfy the pure idealist. He is not an absolute, since He
is compelled to respect relations. But we find Him to be just, which
he evidently is not if absolute. He is anthropomorphic, and not an
abstraction of the human mind. And yet as the seat of rationality, and
as the director of free energy, He possesses the function of creator
of whatever is possible. The evolution of independent human minds has
been only possible through education, and here as elsewhere, teachable
students have met with greater success than the stolid.
It has been already pointed out that the process of evolution may be
either progressive (Anagenesis) or retrogressive (Catagenesis). This is
well known to be the case with organic types, where degenerate phyla are
common. It seems, indeed, that in the order of things degeneracy has
occurred wherever it has been possible; that is, under circumstances
which permitted vegetative life through lack of stimuli to energetic
motion. There has always been “room at the top”; but only when all
the lower fields of existence have been for the time being filled,
has there been room at the top only. The history of mental evolution
has accompanied that of general structural evolution, and for similar
reasons. It is well illustrated in human society to-day. These facts
suggest that this has been the history of all evolution, since they
harmonise with the order of evolution observed in our solar system, in
which the inorganic has preceded the organic, or Catagenesis has preceded
Anagenesis. If the forms of non-vital energy represent a result of
Catagenesis, we are not bound to look on minerals as in any sense living,
as has been suggested by Haeckel and others. Most, if not all, forms
of chemical energy have sunk below the vital level, and certainly far
below the possibility of displaying consciousness. We are here looking
over unexplored territory, and one whose elucidation is entirely in the
future, but we may put our ideas in order, if we do nothing more.
Besides his relations to the impersonal materials that surround him, man
has essential relations to his fellow-man. The laws of these relations
are ethics. Much is written and spoken against the utilitarian or
evolutionary theory of ethics. I cannot, however, escape the conviction
that this theory offers the true explanation of the rise of the ethical
sentiment in mankind. But to understand it aright, we must include
the growth of the social sentiment, as well as that of the rational
element, in the evolution of justice or right. The opponents of this view
sometimes commit the error common to all those who do not understand the
nature of mental evolution. Some of them imagine that it is necessary to
suppose that, in harmony with this theory, every man decides his every
act solely in accordance with what appears to him at the time to subserve
the lowest form of selfishness of which he is capable. The doctrine,
on the contrary, maintains that habits of honesty and justice are the
result of the education of the ages, and that men obey such motives
according to their developmental status; that is, in accordance with the
evolution of the habit of preferring the higher to the lower forms of
utility. The further question of what it is that has raised the standard
of utility, is answered by what we see going on around us. The fear of
the law; the love of the approbation of our fellows; the sympathy with
our fellow-men; the fear of their indignation; all these are educators of
great potency, which have always been active. These motives, organised as
character, are compulsory, and it would be strange if they have not been
effective in producing results.
Practical ethics has to do with material beings and their material
possessions, i. e. with person and property. Without the objective,
the content of ethics is purely ideal, consisting of love and hate,
and the justice and injustice of opinion which might be the outcome of
those sentiments. These sentiments are realities of the subjective,
representing the affections, as the form of thought constitutes the
rational faculties. But if we endeavor in thought to deprive love
and hate, justice and injustice, of all material consequences and
implications, we deprive those sentiments of much of their value if we
do not abolish their occasions altogether. It appears to me at least
doubtful whether hate and injustice could exist in a society consisting
of disembodied minds, if such beings could be imagined; a supposition
which I cannot entertain.
If ethics cannot exist without material expression, it is clear that,
on the other hand, they cannot exist without a subjective foundation.
Thus ethics is the highest expression of the relation between mind and
matter. Ethics is the practical application of the mental powers to
human relations, and the more complete the evolution of mind, the more
perfect is the ethical practice. Thus the evolution of the mind is the
guarantee of ethical progress, and the more intelligent the mind, the
more easy will the evolution be. As in all education, the laggards
experience the severities of compulsion, while pains and penalties are
avoided by those who perceive their approach and do not await their
arrival. Here we have the utilitarian ground of our numerous ethical
and religious organisations. They invite men to _a priori_ subjective
theory, and objective practice, so as to preserve society from the evils
of inferior and painful methods of compulsion, which lie at the basis of
ethical evolution. It is the dread of this method which rouses a natural
repugnance in the minds of many men to the doctrine which teaches of it.
But it must be remembered that the instruments of evolution change with
the thing that is evolving, and the conditions of progressive ethics are
the stages of progress of the mind. What is necessary for the education
of the lower mind is no longer necessary for the higher. This is not only
a truth of philosophy, but the fact may be discerned in the religions
which men have made for themselves. They describe the ethical state of
their authors, and prescribe the treatment appropriate to it.
Our knowledge of some parts of evolutionary history is meagre, and on
some of its chapters we are absolutely in the dark. This is especially
true of the causes of the appearance of life and consciousness on the
earth. Spontaneous generation has not been proven, and the immediate
source of sensation is unknown. The conclusions enumerated in the
preceding pages are derived from evidence presented in more or less
complete fragments. But the thesis remains true that mind possesses a
limited control over its physical basis, but one which is sufficient to
account for the main direction of the evolution of those organic forms
which possess it. And it is also true that the essential forms of the
rational mind are not due to corresponding qualities of the physical
basis. These forms are: the principles of identity, of abstraction, and
of generalisation or conception. These characteristics constitute the
idealistic essence of Theism. But we look to the realistic element of
Theism for the demonstration of the distinct personality of God.
E. D. COPE.
FOOTNOTES:
[140] _Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society_, 1889, p. 495
[141] Recent experiments conducted in the laboratory of the Johns Hopkins
University show that the cytoplasm of cells, which are exhausted by
labor, is vacuolated.
LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.
GERMANY.
The name of Cesare Lombroso is now more and more mentioned in Germany,
not only in psychiatrical, juridical, and sociological works, written
for the learned public, but also in the newspapers and magazines. By the
side of occasional recognition of his doctrine of the born criminal and
genius, we meet—and these are the majority of the cases—with violent
attacks on it, which not seldom exhibit real ignorance of the views of
the celebrated Italian investigator. Lombroso himself is partly to blame
for this unfortunate circumstance, for his writings, with their mountains
of undigested material, are so lacking in unity and perspicuity that
misconceptions are very apt to arise.
The German translator of Lombroso, DR. H. KURELLA, psychiatrist in
Kreuzburg, in Silesia, has recently given to the world a synoptical
exposition of Lombroso’s theory of the born criminal, under the title
_Cesare Lombroso und die Naturgeschichte des Verbrechers_, Hamburg, 1892,
Richter. The author not only expounds the doctrines of Lombroso, but also
deals critically with them, and, although upon the whole his sympathies
are with the views of the Italian scientist, he nevertheless believes
that the existence of a fixed type of the _delinquente nato_, embracing
all special forms of criminality, is yet a question of doubt. On the
other hand, MAX NORDAU, a widely-read author of ours, gives unqualified
recognition to the theories of Lombroso, fully accepting the idea of
“degeneration,” first introduced by Morel into science and further
developed by Lombroso, and, in completion of the work of his master,
extending this idea to art and literature. In his work, _Entartung_, the
first volume of which was recently published by Carl Duncker, of Berlin,
and is dedicated to Lombroso, “his dear, admired master,” he says:
“Degenerate types are not always criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, and
idiots. They are often writers and artists, and these exhibit the same
mental, and frequently also the same physical, traits as those members of
the same anthropological family that satisfy their diseased instincts by
means of the murderer’s knife or the cartridge of the dynamitard, instead
of with pen and pencil.”
People who are acquainted with Nordau’s previous works will perhaps
imagine that this latest book of his is simply a mass of journalistic
ebullitions which can lay no claim to _scientific_ value. This, however,
is wrong. Nordau is not only well acquainted with the patho-psychological
literature of this province—especially with the French—but he also
turns his knowledge to scientific account, which psychiatrists like
Pelman and others have publicly admitted. Taking it as a whole, Nordau
has presented in this first volume of his work a good psychology of
mysticism—good, that is, for all who accept the association psychology.
Nordau’s expositions embrace all the psychological theories which belong
in this province, with their applications to individuals and to the
tendencies of modern literature and art. With respect to the first point,
the author is right in saying that he does not offer here anything new
to the professional psychologist, but he is wrong in his theory that
psychologists will read this chapter with impatience, for his exposition
is unquestioniably elegantly written. Of much greater interest is the
second part, in which a diagnosis of imbecility is rendered upon the
English pre-Raphaelites, the French symbolists, the Tolstois, and
Richard Wagners. The chapter on Richard Wagner will especially attract
attention for its severity. Nordau closes it with the words, “of all the
aberrations of the present time, Wagnerism is the most widely diffused
and the most important. The playhouse at Bayreuth, the _Bayreuther
Blätter_, the Parisian _Revue Wagnerienne_, are lasting monuments by
which the future will measure in wonderment the dimensions of this
degeneration and hysteria of our day.”
Nordau throws light upon numerous mooted phenomena of modern art and
literature, pointing out their diseased features. One is really surprised
at the extent of his work. All in all, it may be foreseen that Koch’s
doctrine of the “psychopathical minor factors”—or those psychical factors
which constitute the border-line between mental health and disease—will
clear up much more extensive fields than they have, when applied in the
direction indicated by Nordau. KOCH has now published the third part of
his work, (which I have repeatedly mentioned in _The Monist_) and thus
completed it. He concludes his last volume with these words: “The domain
of the ‘psychopathical minor factors’ is a wide and very interesting one.
Whosoever enters profoundly into it will learn to look at much in life
with different eyes from those with which he began, will understand many
men and many human acts, which before he did not understand. There are
yet many scientific treasures to be unearthed in this field, and I hope
that I shall win many a coadjutor. I hope, also, that qualified men will
make this theory of the psychopathical minor factors fruitful in wider
fields and for greater problems.”
It is a common belief that it is pre-eminently in our time that psychical
disorders and psychical minor factors play so great a rôle. But that in
the sense of Nordau they are not of so recent origin a careful reader
will learn from a new work of LUDWIG GEIGER, the well-known historian
of literature and civilisation (Paetel, Berlin). Its title is: _Berlin,
1688-1840: Geschichte des geistigen Lebens der preussischen Hauptstadt_.
As yet, only the first volume has appeared, which extends to the death of
Frederick the Great. The reader, however, would obtain an entirely wrong
impression of the work if he were to believe that psychiatrical points
of view are expressly dwelt upon in this book. To find them he must read
between the lines. The book is an extraordinarily painstaking history of
the civilisation of Berlin, taken from the sources, and giving especial
prominence to intellectual factors. We shall reserve the detailed
discussion of this important work for another occasion, perhaps until it
is fully completed.
CHRISTIAN UFER.
BOOK REVIEWS.
HAND-COMMENTAR ZUM NEUEN TESTAMENT. IV. EVANGELIUM, BRIEFL UND
OFFENBARUNG DES JOHANNES. Bearbeitet von _H. J. Holtzmann_. Zweite
verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. (Freiburg I. B. and Leipsic: 1893. J.
C. B. Mohr.)
The fourth gospel, of all the sacred writings of the New Testament, has
always been the reviewer’s favorite book. Its profundity, its wealth of
philosophical ideas, the fervor of its author’s religious sentiment,
and the spiritual grace that pervades the whole book, exercised an
unspeakable charm on my mind. This gospel was the first to rouse my
doubts in the belief of literal inspiration, and it was again the one,
which, after the severest storms of infidelity had blown over, reconciled
me to the spirit of Christianity. Thus the perusal of Professor
Holtzmann’s commentary again arouses the recollections of former
struggles, and I find that even to-day the first chapter of the fourth
gospel has lost none of its fascination. It is a wonderful book, and its
author is a man whom I always longed to meet and shake hands with, over
a span of almost two millenniums and a world-wide abyss of difference of
opinion.
Only those who are familiar with the difficulties of the St. John
literature of the New Testament can really appreciate this latest work
of Prof. H. J. Holtzmann. He presents in a most clear and concise manner
the problems involved, together with their various solutions, critically
arranged. He carefully avoids obtruding on the reader his own views.
He stands before us as a faithful compiler only. I say “only,” but
this “only” means a great deal. It does not mean that he suppresses or
conceals his own views, it means that he states the facts with scrupulous
impartiality. If there is any partiality apparent in his treatment of
the sacred writings, it is the reverent attitude he preserves whenever
love of truth obliges him to accept the negative result of critical
investigations. And where is there a theological scholar to-day, who
is orthodox enough to dare to accept the theory that the gospel of St.
John was written by the apostle? Holtzmann carries his impartiality
to the extent of not rejecting this old traditional idea, concerning
the authorship of the fourth gospel, but the evidence against it is
overwhelmingly sufficient to satisfy the most narrowminded believer.
Holtzmann teaches us at the same time to understand the spirit of
the first and second century of our era, and thus excludes from the
beginning the old prejudice, that if the author were not the man whom
he impersonated his work must be regarded as a fraud. The historical
value of the book lies in the revelations it gives us concerning the
religious demands of the times in which it was written. The fourth
gospel originated when the Jewish religiosity of growing Christianity
began to expand into cosmic universality. The author was undoubtedly a
Jew-Christian, whose home most likely was Ephesus. Ephesus was the place
where we find the first beginnings of Christian Alexandrianism. Here the
Logos-idea was introduced into Christian thought. Philo, the Alexandrian
Jew, had already represented Moses as the incarnation of the divine
Logos. Should not now a Christian familiar with Philo’s philosophy apply
the same method to Jesus of Nazareth? Some work adapted to satisfy the
wants of the time and especially the religious yearnings for knowledge as
a means of edification was needed. The Christ-idea had taken a definite
shape in the imagination of the Christian congregations of Asia Minor,
consisting of diaspora Jews and Gentiles, and their Christ-idea found a
worthy expression in the picture of Jesus of Nazareth as we have it in
the fourth gospel.