[42] That Kant has not developed a terminology really adequate to the
statement of his meaning, is shown by a parenthesis which I have omitted
from the above quotation.
[43] This interpretation of Kant appears in a very crude form in James’s
references to Kant in his _Principles of Psychology_. It appears in a
more subtle form in Lotze and Green. Caird and Watson, on the other
hand, have carefully guarded themselves against this view of Kant’s
teaching, and as I have maintained (pp. xliii-v), lie open to criticism
only in so far as they tend to ignore those aspects of Kant’s teaching
which cannot be stated in terms of logical implication.
[44] It may be objected that this is virtually what Kant is doing when
he postulates synthetic activities as the source of the categories. Kant
would probably have replied that he has not attempted to define these
activities save to the extent that is absolutely demanded by the known
character of their products, and that he is willing to admit that many
different explanations of their nature are possible. They _may_ be due
to some kind of personal or spiritual agency, but also they may not. On
the whole question of the legitimacy of Kant’s general method of
procedure, cf. below, pp. 235-9, 263 ff., 273-4, 277 ff., 461-2, 473-7.
[45] Cf. _Concerning the Advances made by Metaphysics since Leibniz and
Wolff_ (_Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. 530-1): “I am conscious to myself
of myself--this is a thought which contains a twofold I, the I as
subject and the I as object. How it should be possible that I, the I
that thinks, should be an object ... to myself, and so should be able to
distinguish myself from myself, it is altogether beyond our powers to
explain. It is, however, an undoubted fact ... and has as a consequence
the complete distinguishing of us off from the whole animal kingdom,
since we have no ground for ascribing to animals the power to say I to
themselves.”
[46] Cf. above, p. xxxiv; below, pp. 250-3, 260-3, 285-6.
[47] Cf. A 651 = B 679: “The law of Reason, which requires us to seek
for this unity, is a necessary law, as without it we should have no
Reason at all, and without Reason no coherent employment of the
understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of
empirical truth.” Cf. also below, pp. 390-1, 414-17, 429-31, 519-21,
558-61.
[48] Regarding a further complication, due to the fact that the
_Dialectic_ was written before the teaching of the _Analytic_ was
properly matured, cf. above, p. xxiv.
[49] Cf. below, pp. 331, 390-1, 414-17.
[50] Cf. below, pp. 22, 33, 56, 66 ff.
[51] _Reflexionen_ (B. Erdmann’s edition) ii. 204.
[52] For an alternative and perhaps more adequate method of describing
Kant’s general position, cf. below, p. 571 ff.
[53] Above, pp. xxxviii-ix, xlii, xliv.
[54] Cf. below, p. 577.
[55] _Critique of Practical Reason_, W. v. p. 32; Abbott’s trans. pp.
120-1.
[56] _Op. cit._ p. 86; Abbott’s trans. p. 180.
[57] _Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse (Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 624).
Cf. below, pp. 577-8. Kant claims for all men equality of political
rights, and in his treatise on _Perpetual Peace_ maintains that wars are
not likely to cease until the republican form of government is
universally adopted. He distinguishes, however, between republicanism
and democracy. By the former he means a genuinely representative system;
the latter he interprets as being the (in principle) unlimited despotism
of majority rule. Kant accordingly contends that the smaller the staff
of the executive, and the more effective the representation of
minorities, the more complete will be the approximation to the ideal
constitution. In other words, the less government we can get along with,
the better.
[58] _On the Radical Evil in Human Nature, W._ vi. p. 20; Abbott’s
trans. p. 326. “This opinion [that the world is constantly advancing
from worse to better] is certainly not founded on experience if what is
meant is _moral_ good or evil (not civilisation), for the history of all
times speaks too powerfully against it. Probably it is merely a
good-natured hypothesis ... designed to encourage us in the unwearied
cultivation of the germ of good that perhaps lies in us....”
[59] _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, W._ iv. p. 407; Abbott’s
trans. p. 24.
[60] _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. pp. 84-5; Abbott’s trans. pp.
178-9.
[61] Cf. _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, W._ iv. p. 463;
Abbott’s trans. p. 84: “While we do not comprehend the practical
unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its
_incomprehensibility_, and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a
philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the very limit of
human reason.”
[62] _On the Radical Evil in Human Nature, W._ vi. pp. 49-50; Abbott’s
trans. pp. 357-8.
[63] Cf. Pringle-Pattison: _The Idea of God in the Light of Recent
Philosophy_, p. 25 ff.
[64] _Einleitung_, i.
[65] Henry Home, Lord Kames, published his _Elements of Criticism_ in
1762.
[66] _W._ ii. p. 311. In referring to his course in logic, Kant states
that he will consider the training of the power of sound judgment in
ordinary life, and adds that “in the _Kritik der Vernunft_ the close
kinship of subject-matter gives occasion for casting some glances upon
the _Kritik des Geschmacks, i.e._ upon _Aesthetics_.” This passage
serves to confirm the conjecture that the term _Kritik_ was borrowed
from the title of Home’s work.
[67] For Kant’s other uses of the term _pure_, cf. below, p. 55.
[68] _Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, i. pp. 117-20.
[69] For a definition, less exclusively titular, and more adequate to
the actual scope of the _Critique_, cf. below, p. 56. Reason, when
distinguished from understanding, I shall hereafter print with a capital
letter, to mark the very special sense in which it is being employed.
[70] _Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon_ (edited by J. M. Robertson,
1905), p. 247.
[71] For Zedlitz’s severe strictures (Dec. 1775) upon the teaching in
Königsberg University, and his incidental appreciative reference to
Kant, cf. Schubert’s edition of Kant’s _Werke_, xi. pt. ii. pp. 59-61.
[72] Cf. _W._ x. p. 207.
[73] _Op. cit._ pp. 212-13.
[74] Cf. _op. cit._ pp. 208-9.
[75] _Op. cit._ p. 219.
[76] A v.-vi.
[77] A v. _n._
[78] Cf. above on title, pp. 2-3.
[79] Cf. below, pp. 543, 576-7.
[80] A vii.-viii.
[81] A xiv.
[82] Cf. below, pp. 543 ff.
[83] Cf. A 86 = B 118-19.
[84] Morgenstunden; _Gesammelte Schriften_, 1863 edition, ii. pp. 246,
288. Cf. below, pp. 160-1.
[85] Cited by R. A. Sigsbee, _Philosophisches System Joseph Priestleys_
(1912), p. 33.
[86] A v. _n._
[87] A viii.
[88] _Prolegomena_, _Anhang_, Trans. of Mahaffy and Bernard, p. 147.
[89] A 1.
[90] B 21. Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 60 ff., and below, pp. 427-9, 552.
[91] A 297-8 = B 353-5. Cf. below, pp. 427-9.
[92] A iii.
[93] i. p. 50.
[94] P. 9.
[95] This statement, as we shall find, calls for modification. Kant’s
Critical position is more correctly described as phenomenalism than as
subjectivism. Cf. above, pp. xlv-vii; below, p. 270 ff.
[96] A 769 = B 797.
[97] A 761 = B 789-90. Cf. Sections I.-III. in the _Methodology_.
[98] A iii.
[99] A v. _n._
[100] A v. _n._
[101] Cf. Kant’s _Beantwortung der Frage: Was heist Aufklärung?_ 1784.
[102] A v.
[103] Cf. above, pp. 2-3.
[104] Cf. above, pp. xliv-v; below, pp. 19, 33, 56, 66 ff.
[105] A ix.
[106] A x.-xi.
[107] A xii.-xiii.
[108] A xv.
[109] A xv. Cf. below, pp. 66-7.
[110] B xiv.
[111] B ix.
[112] B xi.
[113] Cf. below, pp. 22-5.
[114] Cf. above, p. lvi; below, p. 571 ff.
[115] _Dissertation_, § 7.
[116] All these assertions call for later modification and restatement.
[117] B xxx.
[118] B xxxii.
[119] B xxxvii.
[120] B xxxviii.
[121] B vii.
[122] B viii.
[123] B xvi.
[124] Cf. above, pp. xxvi-vii; below, pp. 594-5.
[125] Cf. “Malebranche’s Theory of the Perception of Distance and
Magnitude,” in _British Journal of Psychology_ (1905), i. pp. 191-204.
[126] Cf. below, pp. 143 ff., 604.
[127] B xviii.-xix.
[128] Cf. below, pp. 33, 56, 66 ff.
[129] B xx.
[130] B xxii.
[131] B xvi.; B xxii. _n._
[132] Watson’s _The Philosophy of Kant Explained_ (p. 37) is the only
work in which I have found correct and unambiguous indication of the
true interpretation of Kant’s analogy.
[133] _Prolegomena to Ethics_, bk i. ch. i. § 11.
[134] _Text-Book to Kant_ (1881), p. 29.
[135] _History of Materialism_, Eng. transl., ii. pp. 156, 158, 237.
[136] _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_ (1896), ii. p. 64.
[137] _Hibbert Journal_, October 1910, p. 49.
[138] _De Revolutionibus_, I. v.
[139] _Ibid._ I. x.
[140] B xxii. _n._
[141] Cf. below, p. 543 ff.
[142] B xxvi. Cf. above, pp. lv-vi, 20; below, pp. 290-1, 331, 342, 404
ff.
[143] This restatement will continue up to p. 33. In pp. 33-43 I shall
then give general comment on the _Introduction_ as a whole. In p. 43 ff.
I add the necessary detailed treatment of special points.
[144] Cf. below, p. 219 ff.
[145] Cf. above, p. xxv ff.; below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.
[146] This statement is first made in the _Introduction_ to the second
edition. It is really out of keeping with the argument of the
_Introduction_ in either edition. Cf. below, pp. 39-40, 57, 85, 168,
222, 245 ff. (especially pp. 278, 288).
[147] This is the argument of the _Introduction_ to the second edition.
In the first edition Kant assumes without question the existence of the
_a priori_. He enquires only whether it is also valid in its
metaphysical employment beyond the field of possible experience.
[148] The argument of the first edition, though briefer, is
substantially the same.
[149] Quoted below, pp. 219-20.
[150] Cf. below, pp. 114, 290, 590.
[151] A 6 = B 10. I here follow the wording of the second edition.
[152] Kant’s view of the _a priori_ differs from that of Leibniz in
_two_ respects. For Kant _a priori_ concepts are merely logical
functions, _i.e._ empty; and secondly, are always synthetic. Cf. above,
pp. xxxiii-vi, 186, 195-6, 257-8, 290-1, 404 ff.
[153] Cf. above, pp. xxv-vii; below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.
[154] B 24.
[155] Cf. above, pp. xliv-xlv, 22; below, pp. 52-3, 55-6, 66 ff.
[156] Needless to say, this “Aristotelian” logic, in the traditional
form in which alone Kant was acquainted with it, diverges very widely
from Aristotle’s actual teaching.
[157] Cf. above, pp. xxxvi-ix; below, pp. 36, 181, 184-6.
[158] A vii.
[159] B xxiii-iv.
[160] Above, pp. xxv-vii, 26; below, p. 593 ff.
[161] Cf. above, p. xxxvi ff.
[162] Cf. above, pp. xxxvii-viii; below, pp. 238-42.
[163] Cf. below, pp. 176 ff., 181, 191, 257.
[164] A 6 = B 10.
[165] Leibniz’s interpretation of the judgment seems to result in an
atomism which is the conceptual counterpart of his metaphysical monadism
(cf. Adamson, _Development of Modern Philosophy_, i. p. 77 ff.; and my
_Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy_, p. 160 ff.; also below, p. 603).
Each concept is regarded as having exclusive jurisdiction, so to speak,
over a content wholly internal to itself. The various concepts are like
sovereign states with no mediating tribunals capable of prescribing to
them their mutual dealings. Cf. below, pp. 394-400, 418 ff.
[166] A 9 = B 13.
[167] _Erste Betrachtung_, §§ 2, 3; _dritte Betrachtung_, § 1.
[168] Cf. below, p. 162.
[169] § 12, 15 C.
[170] Cf. B 15-16.
[171] Cf. below, p. 128 ff., on Kant’s views regarding arithmetical
science.
[172] Cf. below, p. 117 ff., on Kant and modern geometry, and p. 128
ff., on Kant’s views regarding arithmetical science.
[173] Cf. below, pp. 131-3, 338-9, 418 ff.
[174] That certain parts of the _Introduction_ were written at different
dates is shown below, pp. 71-2. That other parts may be of similarly
composite origin is always possible. There is, however, no sufficient
evidence to establish this conclusion. Adickes’ attempt to do so (_K._
pp. 35-7 _n._) is not convincing.
[175] Cf. above, pp. xxxiii ff., 1-2, 26 ff.
[176] i. pp. 317 and 450 ff.
[177] i. p. 412 ff.; cf. p. 388 ff.
[178] Cf. below, pp. 219-20.
[179] Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 394. Cf. above, p. 28.
[180] Cf. Vaihinger, i. pp. 415-17.
[181] Paulsen objects that if synthetic _a priori_ judgments are valid
without explanation, they do not need it. For two reasons the objection
does not hold. (_a_) Without this explanation it would be impossible to
repel the pretensions of transcendent metaphysics (cf. A 209 = B 254-5;
A 283 = B 285). (_b_) This solution of the theoretical problem has also,
as above stated, its own intrinsic interest and value. Without such
explanation the validity of these judgments might be granted, but could
not be understood. (Cf. _Prolegomena_, §§ 4-5 and § 12 at the end. Cf.
Vaihinger, i. p. 394.)
[182] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 336. The argument of the _Analytic_, which
is still more complicated, will be considered later.
[183] Cf. A 46-9 = B 64-6. The corresponding sections of the
_Prolegomena_, Vaihinger contends, were developed from this first
edition passage, and the transcendental exposition of space in the
second edition from the argument of the _Prolegomena_.
[184] The synthetic method of argument is, as we shall see later,
further extended in the _Analytic_ by being connected with the problem
of the validity of ordinary experience. But as the mathematical sciences
are proved to have the same conditions as--neither more nor less
than--the consciousness of time, this also allows of a corresponding
extension of the analytic method. The mathematical sciences can be
substituted for the _de facto_ premiss by which these conditions are
proved.
[185] Cf. above, p. 43.
[186] What follows should be read along with p. 235 ff. below, in which
this distinction between the “subjective” and “objective” deductions is
discussed in greater detail.
[187] A x-xi.
[188] This is a criticism to which Cohen, Caird, and Riehl lay
themselves open.
[189] Cf. below, pp. 219-20.
[190] Cf. above, pp. 49-50.
[191] Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 405. The existing sciences can, as Vaihinger
says, be treated _en bloc_, whereas each of the principles of the new
philosophy must be separately established.
[192] A 1.
[193] A 1-2.
[194] B 6 = A 2.
[195] A 2.
[196] Cf. above, pp. xxxv, 36 ff.; below, pp. 565-7.
[197] A 2.
[198] A 2.
[199] B 1.
[200] Cf. below, p. 55.
[201] B 1.
[202] Cf. below, p. 54.
[203] B 2-3.
[204] Cf. below, p. 55.
[205] B 1.
[206] B 1.
[207] B 1.
[208] Cf. below, p. 88 ff.
[209] Cf. below, p. 237 ff.
[210] B 1.
[211] Cf. below, pp. 55-6.
[212] B 2.
[213] Cf. above, p. 27 _n._
[214] B 2.
[215] Cf. above, pp. 39 ff., 53; below, pp. 57-8, 222 ff., 241, 286-9.
[216] B 2-3.
[217] Cf. above, p. 53.
[218] A 9-10 = B 13.
[219] Cf. above, p. 39 ff., and below, pp. 286-9.
[220] P. 53; cf. also pp. 1-2.
[221] Cf. also above, pp. 2-3.
[222] B 3.
[223] Cf. _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe_, Hauptstück ii. Lehrs. 8, Zus.
2, in which elasticity and gravity are spoken of as the only universal
properties of matter which can be apprehended _a priori_.
[224] B 3-4.
[225] Cf. above, p. 27 ff.
[226] B 4.
[227] Cf. above, pp. xxxiii-iv, 27, 599 ff.
[228] Cf. above, pp. xxxv-vi, 30; below, pp. 185-6, 257-9.
[229] _Loc. cit._
[230] B 5.
[231] Cf. above, pp. xxx, 599 ff.
[232] Cf. above, pp. 39, 54.
[233] A 2 = B 6.
[234] B 7.
[235] Cf. _Kritik der Urtheilskraft_, § 91, _W._ v. p. 473.
_Fortschritte_, _Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. pp. 572-3.
[236] Cf. above, pp. 22, 49-50, 52.
[237] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 40; _Fortschritte_, pp. 577-8.
[238] i. p. 238.
[239] P. 579.
[240] A 712 ff. = B 740 ff.; cf. also _Fortschritte_, p. 522.
[241] A 4 = B 8; cf. below, p. 563 ff.
[242] A 4 = B 8.
[243] A 5 = B 9.
[244] Cf. B 18.
[245] Cf. above, p. 29.
[246] A 6 ff. = B 10 ff.
[247] _Prolegomena_, § 2, _b_, _c_; Eng. trans, pp. 15-16. On the
connection of mathematical reasoning with the principle of
contradiction, cf. below, pp. 64-5.
[248] P. 582; cf. _Logik_, § 37.
[249] ii. p. 257.
[250] _Prolegomena_, § 4.
[251] Cf. B 290.
[252] § 2, _c_.
[253] B 161.
[254] B 218.
[255] A 9 = B 13.
[256] Cf. above, pp. xxv ff., 26; below, p. 593 ff.; cf. Vaihinger, i.
p. 340 ff.
[257] A 9 = B 13, B 11, B 19.
[258] In A 9 = B 13, B 11, B 19.
[259] Cf. Borowski’s _Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Im. Kants_
(Hoffmann’s edition, 1902), p. 252. The German translation of Hume’s
_Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding_ appeared in 1755, and Kant
probably made his first acquaintance with Hume through it. Cf. above, p.
xxviii; below, p. 156.
[260] Cf. below, _Appendix B_, p. 593 ff.
[261] A 9 = B 13.
[262] A 733 = B 761.
[263] A 737 = B 764.
[264] i. p. 291.
[265] B 14.
[266] B 14. Cf. above, pp. 59-60.
[267] i. p. 294.
[268] B 15.
[269] B 15. Cf. above, p. 41.
[270] Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 296.
[271] A 164.
[272] A 164.
[273] In _Prolegomena_ and in second edition.
[274] B 15.
[275] § 2 _c_.
[276] Cf. below, p. 128 ff.
[277] Cf. A 713 = B 741.
[278] A 140 = B 179. Cf. below, p. 337 ff.
[279] B 15.
[280] B 17.
[281] i. p. 304 ff.
[282] § 15.
[283] This latter Kant developed in his _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe_
(1786).
[284] Cf. A 840 = B 869. “Nature” means, in the Kantian terminology,
“all that is.”
[285] Cf. above, pp. xliv-v, 19, 22, 33, 52-3, 55-6.
[286] § 4.
[287] The propositions of pure natural science are not separately
treated in § 4 of the _Prolegomena_, though the subsequent argument
implies that this has been done. Vaihinger’s inference (i. p. 310) that
a paragraph, present in Kant’s manuscript, has been dropped out in the
process of printing the fourth section (the section which contains the
paragraphs transposed from the end of § 2) seems unavoidable. The
missing paragraph was very probably that which is here given in B 17.
[288] B 18.
[289] In § 4 (at end of paragraphs transposed from § 2).
[290] B 19.
[291] B 19.
[292] B 20.
[293] B 20.
[294] Cf. B 17.
[295] B 20.
[296] B 21.
[297] B 22.
[298] Vaihinger’s analysis (i. p. 371 ff.) is invaluable. I follow it
throughout.
[299] When corrected as above, pp. 51-2, 66-7.
[300] Cf. above, p. 38 ff.
[301] By J. Erdmann (cited by Vaihinger, i. p. 371).
[302] By B. Erdmann, _Kriticismus_, p. 183.
[303] As above noted, pp. 66-7.
[304] Above, p. 66.
[305] A 11.
[306] A 11 = B 24.
[307] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 23: _usus logicus_--_usus realis_.
[308] Cf. above, p. 2.
[309] A 11 = B 24.
[310] i. p. 459 ff.
[311] _Entwickelungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie_, p.
113.
[312] Cf. A 795 = B 823. Cf. below, pp. 170, 174.
[313] Cf. A 796 = B 824.
[314] Cf. Vaihinger, i. pp. 461-2 for the very varied meanings in which
Kant “capriciously” employs the terms _Organon_, _Canon_, _Doctrine_,
and _Discipline_.
[315] A 11 = B 25.
[316] _Erklärung in Beziehung auf Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre_ (1799),
_Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 600.
[317] B 25.
[318] Cf. A xv.
[319] Cf. B xxiv.
[320] A 11 = B 25.
[321] _De vera religione_, 72; _De civitate Dei_, viii. 6. Cited by
Eisler, _Wörterbuch_, p. 1521.
[322] Cf. Prantl, _Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande_, iii. pp. 114,
244-5.
[323] _Ethica_ (Vloten and Land), ii. prop. xl. schol. 1.
[324] _Principles of Human Knowledge_, cxviii. The above citations are
from Eisler, _loc. cit._ pp. 1524-5. I have also myself come upon the
term in Swift’s _Gulliver’s Travels_ (Dent, 1897, p. 166): “And as to
‘ideas, entities, abstractions, and transcendentals,’ I could never
drive the least conception into their heads.”
[325] _Organon_, i. 484, cited by Eucken in _Geschichte der
philosophischer Terminologie_, p. 205.
[326] A 11 = B 25, A 56 = B 80.
[327] Cited by Vaihinger, i. p. 468.
[328] Cf. _Text-Book to Kant_, p. 13.
[329] Cf. _Kant Explained_, p. 89.
[330] Cf. below, p. 238.
[331] Cf. below, pp. 116-17, 302.
[332] Adickes has taken the liberty in his edition of the _Critique_ of
substituting in A 297 = B 354 transcendental for transcendent. The
Berlin edition very rightly retains the original reading.
[333] B 27.
[334] A vi.
[335] A 14-15 = B 28. Cf. below, p. 570_n._
[336] This alteration is not given in Max Müller’s translation.
[337] Cf. the corresponding alteration made in the second edition at end
of note to A 21 = B 35.
[338] A 15 = B 29.
[339] _Loc. cit._
[340] _Loc. cit._ Cf. A 835 = B 863.
[341] Cf. A 124, B 151-2, and below, pp. 225, 265.
[342] Cf. A 141 = B 180-1. Cf. _Critique of Judgment_, § 57: “Thus here
[in the _Critique of Aesthetic Judgment_], as also in the _Critique of
Practical Reason_, the antinomies force us against our will to look
beyond the sensible and to seek in the supersensible the point of union
for all our _a priori_ faculties; because no other expedient is left to
make our Reason harmonious with itself.” Cf. also below, p. 473 ff., in
comment on A 649 = B 677.
[343] A 16 = B 30.
[344] Introduction (_W._ v. p. 16). Cf. below, p. 438.
[345] Cf. also above, p. 25.
[346] Cf. A 51 = B 75.
[347] That thought finds in intuition its sole possible content is, of
course, a conclusion first established in the _Analytic_. Kant is here
defining his terms in the light of his later results.
[348] A 51 = B 75.
[349] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 12, Remark ii. at the beginning.
[350] Cf. below, p. 88 ff.; B 146-7.
[351] _Prolegomena_, § 8 (Eng. trans. p. 33).
[352] Quoted by Vaihinger, ii. p. 4.
[353] Cf. _Ueber das Organ der Seele_ (1796) and _Anthropologie_, § 22.
[354] § 3.
[355] A 27 = B 43, A 34 = B 51, A 42 = B 59, A 51 = B 75.
[356] Cf. B 72.
[357] In the second paragraph, A 20 = B 34.
[358] _Dissertation_, § 4.
[359] A 320 = B 376.
[360] _Dissertation_, § 4.
[361] A 50 = B 74.
[362] This view, as I shall endeavour to show, is only semi-Critical,
and is profoundly modified by the more revolutionary conclusions to
which Kant finally worked his way. Cf. below, p. 274 ff.
[363] In this he was anticipated by Tetens, _Philosophische Versuche
über die menschliche Natur_, Bd. i. (1777), _Versuch_ X. v. Cf. below,
p. 294.
[364] _Critique of Judgment_, § 3 (Eng. trans, p. 49). Kant was the
first to adopt the threefold division of mental powers--“the faculty of
knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire.”
This threefold division is first given in his _Ueber Philosophie
überhaupt_ (Hartenstein, vi. p. 379), which was written some time
between 1780 and 1790, being originally designed as an Introduction to
the _Critique of Judgment_.
[365] A 248 (occurs in a lengthy section omitted in B).
[366] This distinction between intuition and appearance practically
coincides with that above noted between intuition and its object.
[367] For statement of the precise meaning in which these terms are here
employed, cf. above, pp. xlv-vii; below, pp. 270 ff., 312 ff.
[368] This would harmonise with the view developed in A 166 (in its
formulation of the principle of the _Anticipations_), A 374 ff., B 274
ff., A 723 = B 751.
[369] Cf. A 50 = B 74: “We may name sensation the matter of sensuous
knowledge.” Similarly in A 42 = B 59; _Prolegomena_, § 11;
_Fortschritte_, (Hartenstein, viii. p. 527).
[370] Cf. below, p. 274 ff.
[371] Cf. below, pp. 366-7, 370-2, 377.
[372] ii. p. 59.
[373] A 42 = B 60.
[374] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. note to 469; also note to 357.
[375] Cf. above, p. xxxiii ff.
[376] A 266 = B 322.
[377] In discussing _a_ and _b_ we may for the present identify form
with space. The problem has special complications in reference to time.
[378] Cf. B 207.
[379] Herbart’s doctrine of space, Lotze’s local sign theory, also the
empiricist theories of the Mills and Bain, all rest upon this same
assumption. It was first effectively called in question by William
James. Cf. Bergson: _Les Données immédiates_, pp. 70-71, Eng. trans. pp.
92-3: “The solution given by Kant does not seem to have been seriously
disputed since his time: indeed, it has forced itself, sometimes without
their knowledge, on the majority of those who have approached the
problem anew, whether nativists or empiricists. Psychologists agree in
assigning a Kantian origin to the nativistic explanation of Johann
Müller; but Lotze’s hypothesis of local signs, Bain’s theory, and the
more comprehensive explanation suggested by Wundt, may seem at first
sight quite independent of the _Transcendental Aesthetic_. The authors
of these theories seem indeed to have put aside the problem of the
nature of space, in order to investigate simply by what process our
sensations come to be situated in space and to be set, so to speak,
alongside one another: but this very question shows that they regard
sensations as inextensive, and make a radical distinction, just as Kant
did, between the matter of representation and its form. The conclusion
to be drawn from the theories of Lotze and Bain, and from Wundt’s
attempt to reconcile them, is that the sensations by means of which we
come to form the notion of space are themselves unextended and simply
qualitative: extensity is supposed to result from their synthesis, as
water from the combination of two gases. The empirical or genetic
explanations have thus taken up the problem of space at the very point
where Kant left it: Kant separated space from its contents: the
empiricists ask how these contents, which are taken out of space by our
thought, manage to get back again.” Bergson proceeds to argue that the
analogy of chemical combination is quite inapplicable, and that some
“unique act very like what Kant calls an _a priori_ form” must still be
appealed to. With the Kantian standpoint in this matter Bergson does
not, of course, agree. He is merely pointing out what the consequences
must be of this initial assumption of inextensive sensations.
[380] Cf. _Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im
Raume_, in its penultimate paragraph.
[381] Cf. _Dissertation_, last sentence of § 4, quoted below, p. 87.
[382] A 291 = B 347; A 429 = B 457.
[383] _Reflexionen_, ii. 334.
[384] ii. p. 73.
[385] Cf. Stout: _Manual of Psychology_ (3rd edition), pp. 465-6. “We
find that the definite apprehension of an order of coexistence, as such,
arises and develops only in connection with that peculiar aspect of
sense-experience which we have called _extensity_, and more especially
the extensity of sight and touch. Two sounds or a sound and a smell may
be presented as coexistent in the sense of being simultaneous; but taken
by themselves apart from association with experiences of touch and
sight, they are not apprehended as spatially juxtaposed or separated by
a perceived spatial interval or as having perceived spatial direction
and distance relatively to each other. Such relations can only be
perceived or imagined, except perhaps in a very rudimentary way, when
the external object is determined for us as an extensive whole by the
extensity of the same presentation through which we apprehend it.”
[386] _Principles of Psychology_, § 399, cited by Vaihinger.
[387] § 4.
[388] _Sich ordnen_ has here, in line with common German usage, the
force of a passive verb.
[389] Riehl: _Kriticismus_ (1876-1879) ii. _Erster Theil_, p. 104. As
already noted, Kant tacitly admits this in regard to time relations of
coexistence and sequence. He continues, however, to deny it in regard to
space relations.
[390] Cf. below, pp. 101-2, 105.
[391] A 20 = B 34.
[392] A 20 = B 34.
[393] A 42 = B 60. Cf. _Dissertation_, § 12: [“Space and time, the
objects of pure mathematics,] are not only formal principles of all
intuition, but themselves original intuitions.”
[394] A 196 = B 241; A 293 = B 349.
[395] That is to say, in his published writings. It finds expression in
one, and only one, of the _Reflexionen_ (ii. 410: “Both space and time
are nothing but combinations of sensuous impressions”).
[396] § 15, Coroll. at the end.
[397] Cf. § 12, quoted above, p. 89 _n._ 2.
[398] There also Kant teaches that the representation of space is gained
from the space-endowed objects of experience.
[399] Cf. B 1.
[400] § 43.
[401] _Ueber eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Kritik
durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll._
[402] _Op. cit. W._ viii. pp. 221-2.
[403] _Loc. cit._ p. 222.
[404] Especially those which he had offered in support of the contention
that pure mathematical science is intuitive, not merely conceptual.
[405] Cf. below, p. 291 ff., on Kant’s reasons for developing his
doctrine of inner sense.
[406] As no one passage can be regarded as quite decisively proving
Kant’s belief in a pure manifold of intuition, the question can only be
decided by a collation of all the relevant statements in the light of
the general tendencies of Kant’s thinking.
[407] This at least would seem to be implied in the wording of his later
positions; it is not explicitly avowed.
[408] Cf. A 76-7 = B 102.
[409] Cf. above, pp. xlii, 38-42; below, pp. 118-20, 128-34.
[410] The last statement may be more freely translated: “Only in this
way can I get the intuition before me in visible form.” Cf. below, pp.
135-6, 347-8, 359.
[411] B 202-3.
[412] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 393, 409, 465, 630, 649.
[413] This, indeed, is Kant’s reason for describing space as an Idea of
reason. Cf. below, pp. 97-8.
[414] Geometry is for Kant the fundamental and chief mathematical
science (cf. A 39 = B 56 and _Dissertation_, § 15 _c_). In this respect
he is a disciple of Newton, not a follower of Leibniz. His neglect to
take adequate account of arithmetic and algebra is due to this cause.
Just as in speaking of the manifold of sense he almost invariably has
sight alone in view, so in speaking of mathematical science he usually
refers only to geometry and the kindred discipline of pure mechanics.
[415] A 76-7 = B 102. Cf. B 160-1 _n._
[416] Cf. above, pp. 90, 92 ff.; below, pp. 171, 226-9, 267-70, 337.
[417] Cf. B 160.
[418] _Metaphysical First Principles_, _W._ iv. p. 559, cf. p. 481.
[419] _Op. cit._ p. 560.
[420] _Critique of Judgment_, §§ 26-7, Eng. trans. pp. 115-16 and 121.
[421] Cf. below, pp. 102 _n._, 165-6, 390-1.
[422] The title of this section, and the points raised in the opening
paragraph, are commented upon below. Cf. pp. 110, 114-15, 134 ff. I pass
at once to the first space argument.
[423] Added in second edition.
[424] This argument is an almost verbal repetition of the first argument
on space in the _Dissertation_, § 15.
[425] Cf. below, pp. 106-7, 126, 132-3, 177-84, 338-9.
[426] Cf. above, p. 37 ff.; below, p. 178 ff.
[427] That is particularly obvious in Kant’s formulation of his problem
in the _Introduction_. For that is the assumption which underlies his
mode of distinguishing between analytic and synthetic judgments. Cf.
above, p. 37.
[428] Cf. above, p. xxii.
[429] Cf. especially, pp. 184, 332-6, 419, 474, 479.
[430] I here use the more modern terms. Kant, in _Anthropologie_, § 14,
distinguishes between them as _Organenempfindungen_ and
_Vitalempfindungen_.
[431] ii. p. 165.
[432] Cf. above, pp. 85-8.
[433] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 D: “Space is not anything objective and
real. It is neither substance, nor accident, nor relation, but is
subjective and ideal, proceeding by a fixed law from the nature of the
mind, and being, as it were, a schema for co-ordinating, in the manner
which it prescribes, all external sensations whatsoever.” And § 15,
corollary at end: “Action of the mind co-ordinating its sensations in
accordance with abiding laws.”
[434] Especially in view of the third and fourth arguments on space, and
of Kant’s teaching in the transcendental exposition.
[435] _E.g._ Cohen, Riehl, Caird, Watson.
[436] Cf. Watson, _The Philosophy of Kant explained_, p. 83: “Kant,
therefore, concludes from the logical priority of space that it is _a
priori_.”
[437] Upon it Kant bases the assertion that space is an Idea of reason;
cf. above, pp. 96-8, and below, pp. 165-6, 390-1.
[438] This second argument is not in the _Dissertation_.
[439] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. pp. 196-7. The corresponding argument on time,
in the form in which it is given in the second edition, is, as we shall
find, seriously misleading. It has caused Herbart and others to
misinterpret the connection in which this corollary stands to the main
thesis. Herbart’s interpretation is considered below, p. 124.
[440] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 220.
[441] _Reflexionen_, ii. 403.
[442] “That in space there are no more than three dimensions, that
between two points there can be but one straight line, that in a plane
surface from a given point with a given straight line a circle is
describable, cannot be inferred from any universal notion of space, but
can only be discerned in space as in the concrete.” Cf. also
_Prolegomena_, § 12.
[443] In the second edition, the third.
[444] For a different view cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 233.
[445] Cf. above, pp. 99-100; below, pp. 126, 180-1, 184, 338-9.
[446] Cf. below, p. 180.
[447] Cf. above, p. xxxvi; below, pp. 176 ff., 191, 195-6, 257, 290-1,
404 ff., 413.
[448] This statement occurs in a parenthesis; it has already been dwelt
upon in the fourth (third) argument.
[449] It has led Kant to substitute _erörtern_ for _betrachten_ in A 23
= B 38.
[450] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 151.
[451] § 1 (Eng. trans, p. 13). Cf. above, p. 64.
[452] This is, no doubt, one reason why Kant employs, in reference to
space, the unfortunate and confusing term concept (_Begriff_) in place
of the wider term representation (_Vorstellung_). Cf. B 37, and above,
p. 64.
[453] Cf. A 729 = B 757: “In place of the term _definition_ I should
prefer to employ the term exposition. For that is a more guarded
expression, the claims of which the critic may allow as being in a
certain degree valid even though he entertain doubts as to the
completeness of the analysis.” Cf. _Logic_, §§ 99 ff., 105. Cf. also
_Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze, W._ ii. pp. 183-4:
“Augustine has said, ‘I know well what time is, but if any one asks me,
I cannot tell.’”
[454] For explanation of the phrase “construction of concepts” cf.
below, pp. 132-3.
[455] Cf. below, p. 117. ff.
[456] Cf. conclusion of fourth argument on space.
[457] _A priori_ is here employed in its ambiguous double sense, as _a
priori_ in so far as it precedes experience (as a _representation_), and
in so far as it is valid independently of experience (as a
_proposition_). Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 268.
[458] Cf. below, p. 114 ff.
[459] Cf. below, pp. 115-16.
[460] Cf. _Lose Blätter_, i. p. 18: “This is a proof (_Beweis_) that
space is a subjective condition. For its propositions are synthetic and
through them objects can be known _a priori_. This would be impossible
if space were not a subjective condition of the representation of these
objects.” Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. p. 396, in which this _direct_ proof of
the ideality of space is distinguished from the _indirect_ proof by
means of the antinomies.
[461] By “concepts” Kant seems to mean the five arguments, though as a
matter of fact other conclusions and presuppositions are taken into
account, and quite new points are raised.
[462] This, according to Vaihinger (ii. p. 287), is the first occurrence
of the phrase _Dinge an sich_ in Kant’s writings.
[463] Cf. Vaihinger’s analysis of this discussion, ii. pp. 290-313.
[464] ii. pp. 289-90.
[465] Cf. below, pp. 415 ff., 515 ff., 558 ff.
[466] In B 166 ff.
[467] This is likewise true of the references in the letter to Herz,
21st Feb. 1772. Cf. below, pp. 219-20.
[468] _The Critical Philosophy of Kant_, i. pp. 306-9.
[469] Cf. letter to Herz, _W._ x. p. 126. It is, Kant there says, the
most absurd explanation which can be offered of the origin and validity
of our knowledge, involving an illegitimate _circulus in probando_, and
also throwing open the door to the wildest speculations. Cf. above, p.
28; below, pp. 141-2, 290, 590.
[470] Cf. B 167-8.
[471] That is, in the first edition. Cf. above, p. 85 ff.; and below, p.
116.
[472] Above, pp. 111-12.
[473] ii. p. 335.
[474] §§ 6-11.
[475] This identification of the two is especially clear in A 39 = B 56.
[476] A 27 = B 43.
[477] Cf. above, p. xxxv; below, pp. 117-20, 142, 185-6, 241-2, 257,
290-1.
[478] A 28 = B 44, cf. A 35 = B 52.
[479] Cf. Vaihinger, i. pp. 351-4; and above, p. 76; below, p. 302. Cf.
Caird, _The Critical Philosophy_, i. pp. 298-9, 301; and Watson, _Kant
Explained_, p. 91.
[480] _Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte_ (1747),
§ 10.
[481] This important and far-reaching assertion we cannot at this point
discuss. Kant’s reasoning is really circular in the bad sense. Kant may
legitimately argue from the _a priori_ character of space to the
apodictic character of _pure_ mathematical science; but when he proceeds
similarly to infer the apodictic character of _applied_ mathematics, he
is constrained to make the further assumption that space is a fixed and
absolutely uniform mode in which alone members of the human species can
intuit objects. That, as we point out below (p. 120), is an assumption
which Kant does not really succeed in proving. In any case the
requirements of the strict synthetic method preclude him from arguing,
as he does both in the _Dissertation_ (§ 15) and in the third space
argument of the first edition, that the _a priori_ certitude of applied
mathematics affords proof of the necessary uniformity of all space.
[482] § 15 D.
[483] Cf. above, p. 111.
[484] Cf. above, pp. 40-2, 93-4; below, pp. 131-3, 338-9, 418 ff.
[485] A 99-100.
[486] A 78 = B 104. Cf. A 159 = B 198, B 147.
[487] § 38, Eng. trans, p. 81.
[488] Cf. p. 241 ff.
[489] A 28-9. Cf. B 1; _Prolegomena_, § 13, Remark II. at the end:
“Cinnabar excites the sensation of red in me.” Cf. above, pp. 80-8;
below, pp. 146 ff., 274 ff.
[490] Kant continues the discussion of this general problem in A 45 ff.
= B 62 ff.
[491] Kant himself again uses the confusing term conception.
[492] § 14, 1.
[493] Herbart, _Werke_, ii. 30. Quoted by Vaihinger, iii. p. 198.
[494] The third argument on time will be considered below in its
connection with the transcendental exposition.
[495] The chief omission goes, as we shall see, to form the concluding
argument on time.
[496] In the second edition, the third.
[497] In the second edition, the third.
[498] In the second edition, the fourth.
[499] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. pp. 380-1.
[500] Cf. second part of fourth (third) argument on space.
[501] Kant’s _Logik, Einleitung_, § 8, Eng. trans, p. 49.
[502] Cf. above, pp. 99-100.
[503] These axioms are: (1) time has only one dimension; (2) different
times are not simultaneous but successive. In the fourth argument the
synthetic character of these axioms is taken as further evidence of the
intuitive nature of time. This passage also is really part of the
transcendental exposition. That exposition has to account for the
synthetic character of the axioms as well as for their apodictic
character; and as a matter of fact the intuitive and consequent
synthetic character of the _a priori_ knowledge which arises from time
is much more emphasised in the transcendental exposition than its
apodictic nature.
[504] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 374 ff.
[505] Vaihinger, ii. p. 387.
[506] Cf. A 41 = B 58: “Motion which combines both [space and time]
presupposes something empirical.”
[507] _W._ iv. p. 471.
[508] _Ueber Philosophie überhaupt_ (Hartenstein, vi. p. 395).
[509] § 12.
[510] _Loc. cit._
[511] A 78 = B 104.
[512] A 142-3 = B 182. It should be observed that in Kant’s view
schemata “exist nowhere but in thought” (A 141 = B 180). It may also be
noted that time is taken as conditioning the schemata of _all_ the
categories.
[513] A 717 ff. = B 745 ff.
[514] § 10.
[515] _Erläuterungen über des Herrn Professor Kant Critik der reinen
Vernunft_ (Königsberg, 1784), p. 24. Johann Schulze (or Schultz) was
professor of mathematics in Königsberg. He was also _Hofprediger_, and
is frequently referred to as Pastor Schulze. Kant has eulogised him
(_W._ x. p. 128) as “the best philosophical head that I am acquainted
with in our part of the world.” In preparing the _Erläuterungen_, which
is a paraphrase or simplified statement of the argument of the
_Critique_, with appended comment, Schulze had the advantage of Kant’s
advice in all difficulties. Kant also read his manuscript, and suggested
a few modifications (_op. cit._ pp. 329, 343).
[516] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. pp. 388-9.
[517] _Werke_ (Frauenstädt’s ed., 1873), i. p. 133.
[518] P. 129.
[519] _W._ x. p. 530. Italics not in Kant.
[520] _Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze: Erste
Betrachtung_, §§ 2, 3; _dritte Betrachtung_, § 1; _Dissertation_, §§ 12,
15 C.
[521] P. 128.
[522] _Dissertation_, § 15 C.
[523] Cf. above, pp. 40-2, 118-20; below, pp. 338-9.
[524] _Kant und die moderne Mathematik in Kant-Studien_, xii. (1907) p.
34 _n._
[525] Cf. A 713 ff. = B 741 ff.; A 4 = B 8; B 15-16; A 24; A 47-8 = B
64-5.
[526] Cf. below, pp. 337-8.
[527] Cf. above, pp. 112 n. 4.
[528] The content of the second _Conclusion_ in regard to space.
[529] This expresses the matter a little more clearly than Kant himself
does. The term representation is ambiguous. In the first paragraph it is
made to cover the appearances as well as their representation.
[530] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 Coroll.: “Space properly concerns the
intuition of the _object_; time the _state_, especially the
_representative_ state.”
[531] Cf. below, pp. 309 ff., 347-8, 359.
[532] Cf. _Reflexionem_, ii. 365 ff.
[533] § 14, 5 and note to 5.
[534] The opposite is, however, asserted in B 67.
[535] Cf. A 427-8 _n._ = B 456 _n._
[536] A 99. Cf. A 162 = B 203: “I cannot represent to myself a line,
however small, without drawing it in thought, _i.e._ generating from a
point all its parts one after another.” Cf. pp. 94, 347-8.
[537] Cf. _Lose Blätter_, i. 54: “Without space time itself would not be
represented as quantity (_Grösse_), and in general this conception would
have no object.” Cf. _Dissertation_, § 14. 5.
[538] Cf. below, p. 365 ff.
[539] In the _Dissertation_ time is treated before space.
[540] Cf. above, pp. xxxiv, 120; below, pp. 241-2, 365, 367-70, 390-1.
[541] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 C.
[542] Cf. below, pp. 272 ff., 294-5, 308 ff., 365 ff.
[543] A 23 = B 37.
[544] They correspond to the third paragraph dealing with space. Cf.
above, p. 116.
[545] Cf. above, pp. 116-17.
[546] Cf. _W._ x. p. 102. Mendelssohn had also protested; cf. _op. cit._
x. p. 110.
[547] _W._ x. pp. 128-9. Italics not in Kant. Kant is entirely justified
in protesting against the view that in denying things in themselves to
be in time he is asserting that they remain eternally the same with
themselves. To make a dancer preserve one and the same posture is not to
take him out of time, but to bring home to him the reality of time in an
extremely unpleasant manner. Duration is one of the modes of time.
[548] This is Kant’s reply to Mendelssohn’s objection (December 1770,
_W._ x. p. 110): “Succession is at least a necessary condition of the
representations of finite spirits. Now the finite spirits are not only
subjects but also objects of representations, both for God and for our
fellow-men. The succession must therefore be regarded as something
objective.”
[549] Cf. A 277 = B 333: “It is not given to us to observe even our own
mind with any intuition but that of our inner sense.”
[550] Quoted by Vaihinger, ii. p. 406.
[551] In the fourth _Paralogism_, A 366, and in the _Refutation of
Idealism_, B 274.
[552] Cf. A 42 = B 59.
[553] Above, pp. 113-14.
[554] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 114.
[555] The date of Kant’s _Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der
Gegenden im Raume_.
[556] Cf. below, p. 161 ff.
[557] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 D: “Those who defend the reality of space
conceive it either as an absolute and immense _receptacle_ of possible
things--a view which appeals not only to the English [thinkers] but to
most geometricians--or they contend that it is _nothing but a relation_
holding between existing things, which must vanish when the things are
removed, and which is thinkable only in actual things. This latter is
the teaching of Leibniz and of most of our countrymen.” That the account
of Leibniz’s teaching given in the paragraphs under consideration is not
altogether accurate, need hardly be pointed out. Kant, following his
usual method in the discussion of opposing systems, is stating what he
regards as being the logical consequences of certain of Leibniz’s
tenets, rather than his avowed positions.
[558] Cf. A 275-6 = B 331-2: “Leibniz conceived space as a certain order
in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of
their states. But that which both seem to possess as proper to
themselves, in independence of things, he ascribed to the confused
character of their concepts, asserting this confusion to be the reason
why what is a mere form of dynamical relations has come to be regarded
as a special intuition, self-subsistent and antecedent to the things
themselves. Thus space and time were [for Leibniz] the intelligible form
of the connection of things (substances and their states) in
themselves.” Cf. also _Prolegomena_, § 13, _Anm._ i.
[559] Kant has stated that both views conflict with “the principles of
experience.” But his criticisms are not altogether on that line. The
statement strictly applies only to his criticism of the Leibnizian view.
Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 D: “That first inane invention of reason,
assuming as it does the existence of true infinite relations in the
absence of all interrelated entities, belongs to the realm of fable. But
those who adopt the other view fall into a much worse error. For whereas
the former place an obstacle in the way only of certain rational
concepts, _i.e._ concepts that concern noumena, and which also in
themselves are extremely obscure bearing upon questions as to the
spiritual world, omnipresence, etc., the latter set themselves in direct
antagonism to the phenomena themselves and to geometry, the most
faithful interpreter of all phenomena. For--not to dwell upon the
obvious circle in which they necessarily become involved in defining
space--they cast geometry down from its position at the highest point of
certitude, and throw it back into the class of those sciences the
principles of which are empirical. For if all modifications of space are
derived only through experience from external relations, geometrical
axioms can have only comparative universality, like that acquired
through induction, in other words, such as extends only as far as
observation has gone. They cannot lay claim to any necessity save that
of being in accordance with the established laws of nature, nor to any
precision except of the artificial sort, resting upon assumptions. And
as happens in matters empirical, the possibility is not excluded that a
space endowed with other original modifications, and perhaps even a
rectilineal figure enclosed by two lines, may sometime be discovered.”
Cf. above, p. 114; below, p. 290.
[560] In B 155 _n._ Kant distinguishes between motion of an object in
space, and motion as generation of a geometrical figure. The former
alone involves experience; the latter is a pure act of the productive
imagination, and belongs not only to geometry but also to transcendental
philosophy. This note, as Erdmann has pointed out (_Kriticismus_, pp.
115, 168), was introduced by Kant into the second edition as a reply to
a criticism of Schütz. The distinction as thus drawn is only tenable on
the assumption of a pure manifold distinct from the manifold of sense.
[561] A 230 = B 283. Cf. above, pp. 57, 118; below, pp. 185-6, 257.
[562] A 41 = B 58.
[563] Cf. below, pp. 359-60.
[564] _Les Données Immédiates_, p. 75.
[565] ii. p. 446.
[566] §§ 4 and 27.
[567] Cf. _Ueber eine Entdeckung_, etc.: _W._ viii. p. 220.
[568] A 44 = B 61.
[569] A 277 = B 334. Cf. A 278-9 = B 335-6.
[570] When Kant says that the distinction is not logical (that of
relative clearness and obscurity) but transcendental, the latter term is
taken as practically equivalent to epistemological. It does not mean
‘relating to the _a priori_,’ but relating to transcendental philosophy,
just as logical here means relating to logic. Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 452.
[571] Cf. A 270 ff. = B 326 ff.
[572] § 7 (I read _autem_ for _autor_). Cf. below, p. 187.
[573] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 13, Remark II.
[574] Cf. above, pp. 120-1.
[575] Cf. A 257 = B 313.
[576] A 46 = B 63. This is the first occurrence in the _Critique_ of the
phrase transcendental object. Transcendental is employed as synonymous
with transcendent. Cf. below, p. 204 ff.
[577] Cf. above, pp. 120-2.
[578] A 271 = B 327.
[579] A 46-9 = B 63-6.
[580] A 48 = B 65-6. Vaihinger (ii. pp. 470-2) gives what appears to be
a sufficient explanation of what Kant had in mind in its employment.
[581] A 46 = B 64. Cf. _Dissertation_, § 15 C. In the concluding
sentence of the first edition’s _Aesthetic_, Kant for the first time
uses the singular _Ding an sich_ in place of the more usual _Dinge an
sich_ and also refers to it in problematic terms as what _may_ underlie
appearances.
[582] B 66-73.
[583] _a_ does not contain anything not to be found elsewhere in the
first edition. It is a restatement of A 265 ff. = B 321 ff., A 274 = B
330, A 277 ff. = B 333 ff., A 283-5 = B 339-41.
[584] An assertion, it may be noted, which conflicts with Kant’s view of
it as a pure manifold.
[585] Kant was probably influenced by Tetens. Cp. below, p. 294.
[586] Cf. below, p. 291 ff. _b_ together with B 152-8 is a more explicit
statement of the doctrine of inner sense than Kant had given in the
first edition.
[587] Vaihinger (ii. p. 486 ff.), who has done more than any other
commentator to clear up the ambiguities of this passage, distinguishes
only two views.
[588] A 38 = B 55.
[589] Cf. _Prolegomena_, _W._ iv. p. 376 _n._, Eng. trans. p. 149: “The
reviewer often fights his own shadow. When I oppose the truth of
experience to dreaming, he never suspects that I am only concerned with
the _somnium objective sumtum_ of Wolff’s philosophy, which is merely
formal, and has nothing to do with the distinction of dreaming and
waking, which indeed has no place in any transcendental philosophy.”
[590] Cf. below, p. 270 ff.
[591] B 69. For explanation of the references to time and
self-consciousness, cf. below, pp. 308, 323.
[592] This view of illusion likewise appears in A 293 = B 349, A 377-8,
A 396, and _Prolegomena_, § 13, III., at the beginning.
[593] _Prolegomena_, _loc. cit._
[594] Cf. in the 1863 edition, Bd. ii. 267 ff. The examples of illusion
employed by Mendelssohn are reflection in a mirror and the rainbow.
[595] _W._ x. p. 405.
[596] _Schein_ is so used by Kant himself (_W._ x. p. 105) in a letter
to Lambert in 1770.
[597] A 38.
[598] Cf. above, A 39 = B 57. This is, however, merely asserted by
implication; it is not proved. As already noted, Kant does not really
show that space and time, viewed as absolute realities, are
“inconsistent with the principles of experience.” Nor does Kant here
supply sufficient grounds for his description of space and time as
_Undinge_. Kant, it must be observed, does not regard the conception of
the actual infinite as in itself self-contradictory. Cf. below, p. 486.
[599] B 275.
[600] Cf. below, p. 298 ff., on Kant’s _Refutations of Idealism_. This
is also the meaning in which Kant employs the term in his pre-Critical
writings. Cf. _Dilucidatio_ (1755), prop. xii. _usus_; _Träume eines
Geistersehers_ (1766), ii. 2, _W._ ii. p. 364. These citations are given
by Janitsch (_Kant’s Urtheile über Berkeley_, 1879, p. 20), who also
points out that the term is already used in this sense by Bülffinger as
early as 1725, _Dilucidationes philos._ This is also the meaning in
which the term is employed in B xxxiv. Cf. A 28 = B 44.
[601] _Prolegomena_; _Anhang. W._ iv. pp. 374-5.
[602] In his _Kleine Aufsätze_ (3. _Refutation of Problematic Idealism_,
Hartenstein, v. p. 502) Kant would seem very inconsistently to accuse
Berkeley of maintaining a solipsistic position. “Berkeley denies the
existence of all things save that of the being who asserts them.” This
is probably, however, merely a careless formulation of the statement
that thinking beings alone exist. Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 13, Anm. ii.
[603] _Prolegomena_, _W._ iv. p. 375; Eng. trans. p. 148.
[604] Borowski (_Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kant_,
in Hoffman’s ed. 1902, p. 248 ff.) gives a list of English writers with
whom Kant was acquainted. They were, according to Janitsch (_loc. cit._
p. 35), accessible in translation. Cf. above, pp. xxviii _n._ 3, 63 _n._
1.
[605] Cf. _W._ i. pp. 318, 322. When Kant cites Hume in the
_Prolegomena_ (Introduction), the reference is to the German
translation.
[606] This was the first of Berkeley’s writings to appear in German. The
translation was published in Leipzig in 1781.
[607] Cf. below, pp. 307-8. The opposite view has, however, been
defended by Vaihinger: _Philos. Monatshefte_, 1883, p. 501 ff.
[608] _Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding_ (sec. xii. pt. ii. at
the end).
[609] Sixth edition, pp. 132, 214, 243 ff.
[610] A 38.
[611] A 377.
[612] A 377-8. Though Kant here distinguishes between perceptions and
their “outer objects,” the latter are none the less identified with
mental representations.
[613] Cf. below, p. 305 ff.
[614] _Prolegomena_, § 13, _Remark_ III.; and _Anhang_ (_W._ iv. p.
374).
[615] Kant’s description of Berkeley’s idealism as visionary and
mystical is doubtless partly due to the old-time association of idealism
in Kant’s mind with the spiritualistic teaching of Swedenborg (_W._ ii.
p. 372). This association of ideas was further reinforced owing to his
having classed Berkeley along with Plato.
[616] _Prolegomena_, _Anhang_, _W._ iv. p. 374; Eng. trans. p. 147.
[617] Cf. above, pp. 140-1.
[618] § 27. In translating Kant’s somewhat difficult Latin I have found
helpful the English translation of the _Dissertation_ by W. J. Eckoff
(New York, 1894).
[619] Besides the internal evidence of the passage before us, we also
have Kant’s own mention of Mendelssohn in this connection in notes (to A
43 and A 66) in his private copy of the first edition of the _Critique_.
Cf. Erdmann’s _Nachträge zu Kant’s Kritik_, xx. and xxxii.; and above,
p. 11.
[620] Cf. _Morgenstunden_, Bd. ii. of _Gesammelte Schriften_ (1863), pp.
246, 288.
[621] Cf. above, p. 116.
[622] B 72.
[623] Upon this subject cf. Vaihinger’s exhaustive discussion in ii. p.
518 ff.
[624] _Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte_ (1747).
[625] _Op. cit._ § 10. Cf. above, p. 117 ff.
[626] _Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume._
[627] Euler, _Réflexions sur l’espace et le temps_ (1748). Vaihinger
(ii. p. 530) points out that Kant may also have been here influenced by
certain passages in the controversy between Leibniz and Clarke.
[628] _Loc. cit._, at the end.
[629] In the Dorpater manuscript, quoted by Erdmann in his edition of
the _Prolegomena_, p. xcvii _n._
[630] § 15 C.
[631] So also in the _Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science_
(1786), _Erstes Hauptstück_, _Erklärung 2_, _Anmerkung 3_.
[632] Cf. above, p. 105.
[633] A 289 = B 345.
[634] More exactly between the writing of the _Metaphysical First
Principles_ (in which as above noted the argument of the _Prolegomena_
is endorsed) and 1787.
[635] Cf. A 260 ff. = B 316 ff. on the _Amphiboly of Reflective
Concepts_.
[636] The _Dissertation_ cites the argument only with this purpose in
view. And yet it is only from the _Dissertation_ standpoint that the
wider argument of the _Prolegomena_ can be legitimately propounded.
[637] Above, pp. 96-8, 102 _n._ 4; below, pp. 390-1.
[638] B 73.
[639] A 50 = B 74.
[640] Cf. below, p. 176 _n._ 1.
[641] K. p. 99 _n._
[642] A 64 = B 89.
[643] The definition of intuition given in A 19 = B 33 also applies only
to empirical intuition.
[644] For discussion of Kant’s view of sensation as the matter of
sensuous intuition, cf. above, p. 80 ff.
[645] Second paragraph, A 51 = B 75.
[646] Object (_Gegenstand_) is here used in the strict sense and no
longer as merely equivalent to content (_Inhalt_).
[647] Cf. above, p. 79 ff.
[648] P. 85.
[649] Third paragraph, A 52 = B 77.
[650] K. p. 100.
[651] Kant’s _Logik: Einleitung_, i. (Abbott’s trans. p. 4).
[652] Cf. A 796 = B 824; A 130 = B 169; also above, pp. 71-2.
[653] A 709 = B 737.
[654] Logik: _Einleitung_, i. (Eng. trans. p. 3).
[655] Cf. below, p. 194.
[656] _Einleitung_, i. (Eng. trans. p. 4).
[657] Cf. A 796 = B 824.
[658] _Logik_: _Einleitung_, i. (Eng. trans. p. 5).
[659] A 57 = B 81.
[660] _Einleitung_, vii. (Eng. trans. p. 40 ff.).
[661] Kant might have added that transcendental logic defines further
conditions, those of possible experience, and that by implication it
refers us to coherence as the ultimate test even of material truth.
[662] A 60-2 = B 84-6.
[663] _Einleitung_, ii. (Eng. trans. pp. 6-7).
[664] Cf. above, pp. 71-2, 170; below, pp. 438, 563.
[665] Cf. below, p. 425 ff.
[666] Kant employs _Gegenstand_ and _Object_ as synonymous terms.
[667] Cf. below, p. 426.
[668] A 64 = B 89.
[669] A 65 = B 90.
[670] The opening statement, A 67 = B 92, that hitherto understanding
has been defined only negatively, is not correct, and would seem to
prove that this section was written prior to the introduction to the
_Analytic_, cf. above, p. 167.
[671] See above, pp. 170-1.
[672] A 79 = B 105. ‘Element’ translates the misleading term ‘Inhalt.’
[673] Kant’s definition of transcendental logic as differing from
general logic in that it does not abstract from _a priori_ content must
not be taken as implying that the categories of understanding are
contents, though of _a priori_ nature. As we shall find, though that is
Kant’s view of the forms of sense, it is by no means his view of the
categories. They are, he repeatedly insists, merely functions, and are
quite indeterminate in meaning save in so far as a content is yielded to
them by sense. In A 76-7 = B 102, in distinguishing between the two
logics, Kant is careful to make clear that the _a priori_ content of
transcendental logic consists exclusively of the _a priori_ manifolds of
sense.
[674] § 20, Eng. trans. p. 58.
[675] The view of the two as co-ordinate reappears in the _Prolegomena_
(§ 20) in a section the general tendency of which runs directly counter
to any such standpoint.
[676] A 78 = B 103.
[677] Cf. below, pp. 196, 204, 226.
[678] _Einleitung_, viii., Eng. trans. p. 48.
[679] Cf. above, pp. 37-8.
[680] _The Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures_ (1762).
_W._ ii. p. 47, Eng. trans. p. 79.
[681] Cf. above, pp. 99-100, 106-7.
[682] _W._ ii. pp. 58-9, Eng. trans. pp. 92-3.
[683] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 599.
[684] Below, pp. 185-6.
[685] The same indefiniteness of statement is discernible in Caird’s (i.
p. 322 ff.) and Watson’s (_Kant Explained_, pp. 121-2) discussions of
the principle supposed to be involved.
[686] Cf. A 80 = B 106.
[687] § 39.
[688] P. 176 ff.
[689] B 145-6. Cf. above, pp. xxxv-vi, xliv, 57, 142; below, pp. 257,
291.
[690] §§ 5-6.
[691] §§ 7-8. Cf. above, pp. 144-5.
[692] W. x. p. 126. Italics not in Kant.
[693] The relevant _Reflexionen_ have been carefully discussed by
Adickes (_Kant’s Systematik_, p. 21 ff.). In what follows I have made
extensive use of his results, though not always arriving at quite the
same conclusions.
[694] § 15, Coroll.
[695] In his later writings Kant recognises that the representations of
space and time involve an Idea of Reason. Cf. above, pp. 97-8; below,
pp. 390-1.
[696] § 39.
[697] _Reflexionen_, ii. 513, cf. 502, 525-7.
[698] _Op. cit._ ii. 513.
[699] Cf. _op. cit._ ii. 537.
[700] Cf. above, p. 90 ff.
[701] Only in one passage, _Rechtslehre_, i., Anhang 3, 2, cited by
Adickes, _op. cit._ p. 13, does Kant so far depart from his own
orthodoxy as to speak of the possibility of an _a priori_ tetrachotomy.
But he never wavers in the view that the completeness of a division
cannot be guaranteed on empirical grounds.
[702] Introduction, § 9 _n._ Eng. trans. p. 41.
[703] §§ 4-6, 9.
[704] A 70-6 = B 95-101.
[705] Cf. Adickes, Kant’s _Systematik_, p. 36 ff.
[706] Cf. Adickes, _op. cit._ p. 89 ff.
[707] _Organon_, § 137. Cited by Adickes.
[708] i. p. 343 ff.
[709] Cf. below, p. 391 ff.
[710] A 76-79 = B 102-5.
[711] Cf. above, p. 171.
[712] A 55.
[713] Cf. also B 160.
[714] _Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung_, 2nd ed. p. 257 ff.
[715] _The Critical Philosophy of Kant_, i. p. 327 ff.
[716] _Philosophischer Kriticismus_, 2nd ed. i. p. 484 ff.
[717] _Kant explained_, p. 124 ff.
[718] Cf. below, p. 198.
[719] P. 226.
[720] A 79 = B 105.
[721] Cf. above, p. 177 ff.
[722] A 79-80.
[723] Cf. above, p. 192.
[724] Cf. B 111.
[725] Cf. Adickes, _Systematik_, pp. 42-3.
[726] _Kant Explained_, p. 128.
[727] Cf. above, p. 37.
[728] Cf. _Dissertation_, §§ 16 to 28, and below, p. 381 ff.
[729] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 795.
[730] B 111-13.
[731] _World as Will and Idea, Werke_ (Frauenstädt), ii. p. 544; Eng.
trans. ii. p. 61.
[732] Cf. Stadler, _Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntnisstheorie_(1876), p.
122. Cf. also below, pp. 387-9.
[733] Cf. below, p. 391 ff.
[734] A 81.
[735] Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 39.
[736] Cf. above, p. 186 ff.
[737] _Kant Explained_, p. 120.
[738] A 81.
[739] A 82.
[740] A 82.
[741] B 110.
[742] B 110-11.
[743] Cf. below, pp. 199-200.
[744] _W._ x. p. 344-5.
[745] Cf. below, p. 382 ff.
[746] Cf. below, pp. 433-4, 451, 480, 529, 559-60.
[747] B 114.
[748] Cf. 904-5.
[749] Cf. 907-10.
[750] Cf. B. Erdmann, _Mittheilungen_ in _Phil. Monatshefte_, 1884, p.
80, and Adickes, _Systematik_, pp. 55-9.
[751] _Reflexionen_, ii. p. 252 _n._
[752] “Die transcendentale Deduktion der Kategorien” in the
_Gedenkschrift für Rudolf Haym_. Published separately in 1902.
[753] Readers who are not immediately interested in the analysis of the
text or in the history of Kant’s earlier semi-Critical views may omit
pp. 203-34, with exception of pp. 204-19, on Kant’s doctrine of the
transcendental object, which should be read.
[754] The reader is recommended to mark off the passages in a copy of
the _Critique_.
[755] Its first occurrence in the _Critique_ is in the _Aesthetic_ A 46
= B 63. It there signifies the thing in itself.
[756] A 104.
[757] A 109.
[758] A 109.
[759] A 104.
[760] Cf. above, p. 28; below, pp. 219-20.
[761] _W._ x. pp. 124-5.
[762] Cf. below, pp. 209-10.
[763] Hume’s view of the self is not developed in the _Enquiry_, and is
not mentioned by Beattie.
[764] A 107.
[765] Cf. _Reflexionen_, ii. 952 (belonging, as Erdmann notes, to the
earliest Critical period): “Appearances are representations whereby we
are affected. The representation of our free self-activity
(_Selbsttätigkeit_) does not involve affection, and accordingly is not
appearance, but apperception.” Cf. below, p. 296.
[766] § 8. Cf. above, pp. l-ii; below, pp. 243, 260-3, 272-3, 327-8,
473-7, 515.
[767] A 107. It is significant that Kant in A 107 uses, in reference to
apperception, the very unusual phrase, “_unwandelbares Bewusstsein_.”
[768] A 108.
[769] A 107.
[770] Reicke, _Lose Blätter_, p. 19. The bearing and date of this
passage is discussed below, p. 233.
[771] _Op. cit._ p. 20.
[772] _Op. cit._ p. 22 (written on a letter dated May 20, 1775).
[773] This last statement cannot possibly be taken literally. In view of
the manner in which the transcendental object is spoken of elsewhere in
this section, and also in the _Dialectic_, we must regard it as standing
for an independent existence, and the relation of representations to it
as being, therefore, something else than simply the unity of
consciousness.
[774] It may be observed that when Kant in A 107, quoted above, refers
to “_a priori_ concepts,” he adds in explanation, and within brackets,
“space and time.”
[775] A 105-6.
[776] The actual nature of Kant’s teaching as to the origin and
constitution of the notion of the transcendental object is largely
masked by the fact that he places this proof of its validity so
prominently in the foreground. The general nature of this proof is, of
course, identical with that of his later positions.
[777] A 109.
[778] As in the _Lose Blätter_. Cf. below, p. 233.
[779] Cf. below, pp. 227, 233-4, 268-9.
[780] Cf. below, pp. 322-8; also pp. 260-3.
[781] As above noted (p. 204 _n._) it also occurs in the _Aesthetic_ (A
46 = B 63), as signifying the thing in itself.
[782] A 238 = B 298.
[783] Cf. below, p. 238.
[784] A 238 ff. = B 298 ff.
[785] A 250-1.
[786] Cf. below, p. 407 ff.
[787] A 253.
[788] A 191 = B 236.
[789] A 277-8 = B 333-4; A 288 = B 344.
[790] Cf. _mundus phaenomenon_ in A 272 = B 328.
[791] It is so dated by Adickes (K. p. 272 _n._), owing to a single
reference to schemata in A 286 = B 342.
[792] A 358 and A 361 (cf. A 355); A 366; A 372 and A 379-80; A 390-1, A
393, and A 394.
[793] A 366.
[794] “Transcendental” here means “transcendent.” Cf. A 379.
[795] A 372; so also in A 613-14 = B 641-2.
[796] The passage in A 393 is given below, p. 464.
[797] A 494 = B 522. Cf. A 492 = B 521: “The true self (_das eigentliche
Selbst_) as it exists in itself, _i.e._ the transcendental subject.”
[798] A 495 = B 523.
[799] A 496 = B 524.
[800] _Loc. cit._
[801] Cf. also A 538 = B 566; A 540 = B 568; A 557 = B 585; A 564 = B
592; A 565-6 = B 593-4; A 613 = B 641-2.
[802] Above, p. 206.
[803] Cf. above, pp. liii-v; below, pp. 280, 331, 373-4, 390-1, 414-17,
429-31, 558-61.
[804] Viz. the first layer of the deduction of the first edition, the
relevant sections in the chapter on phenomena and noumena (A 250 ff.),
and the _Paralogisms_ with the subsequent _Reflection_.
[805] Viz. the _Note on Amphiboly_, the chapter on the _Antinomies_, and
the chapter on the _Ideal_.
[806] To the statement that the alterations in the second edition cease
at the close of the chapter on the _Paralogisms_, there is only one
single exception, namely, the very brief note appended to A 491 = B 519.
This exception, however, supports our general thesis. It is of polemical
origin, referring to the nature of the distinction between
transcendental and subjective idealism, and was demanded by the new
_Refutation of Idealism_ which in the second edition he had attached to
the _Postulates_.
[807] It follows immediately upon the passage quoted above, p. 206.
[808] _W._ x. pp. 125-6.
[809] A 89 = B 121. I adopt B. Erdmann’s reading of _auf_ for _als_.
[810] A 88 = B 120.
[811] A 90.
[812] As we have already found (above, p. 27 _n._ 1), it had not been
attained at the time when the _Introduction_ to the first edition was
written.
[813] A 95-96.
[814] A 97.
[815] A. 95; cf. A 96.
[816] A 111.
[817] _Loc. cit._
[818] A 112.
[819] A 111.
[820] A 112-14.
[821] A 110-14.
[822] I. § 14 C Vaihinger regards as intermediate in date, but it is a
comparatively unimportant paragraph, and may for the present be left out
of account. Cf. below, pp. 225-6.
[823] A 118-19.
[824] A 124.
[825] _Loc. cit._
[826] A 115.
[827] A 76-9 = B 102-4. Not yet commented upon.
[828] Cf. Vaihinger, _loc. cit._ p. 63.
[829] A 77 = B 102. Cf. above, pp. 96-7.
[830] _Loc. cit._
[831] For explanation of the exact meaning in which these terms are
employed and for discussion of the complicated issues involved, cf.
below, p. 270 ff.
[832] Cf. A 118.
[833] A 102.
[834] A 99-100.
[835] A 102.
[836] A 100.
[837] A 101. Cf. below, p. 255.
[838] Pp. 238, 263 ff.
[839] Cf. above, p. 211.
[840] For Vaihinger’s own statement of it, cf. _op. cit._ pp. 79-98.
[841] Nos. 64-5, 117, 140-5.
[842] No. 146.
[843] Nos. 41, 81.
[844] No. 104.
[845] Cf. Nos. 964-5.
[846] No. 947.
[847] No. 948.
[848] No. 949.
[849] No. 952.
[850] This is Erdmann’s reading. Vaihinger substitutes _allgemein_ for
_allein_, but without reason given.
[851] No. 935. The translation is literal. Kant in the last sentence
changes from singular to plural.
[852] No. 964.
[853] Cf. also Nos. 957, 961. The latter shows how Kant already
connected the categories of relation with the logical functions of
judgment.
[854] Reicke, Nos. 7, 8, 10-18 (pp. 16-26, 29-49).
[855] The chief relevant passages have been quoted above, p. 209.
[856] The letter is given in _W._ x. p. 173.
[857] Reicke, pp. 113-16.
[858] According to Adickes the _Critique_ was “brought to completion” in
the first half of 1780; in Vaihinger’s view, on the other hand, Kant was
occupied with it from April to September. Cf. above, p. xx.
[859] In two respects, however, fragment B 12 anticipates the teaching
of the fourth stage: (_a_) in suggesting (p. 114) the necessity of a
pure synthesis of pure intuition, and (_b_) in equating (p. 115)
synthesis of apprehension with synthesis of imagination.
[860] Pp. 231-3.
[861] Cf. below, pp. 268-9.
[862] In B 160 Kant states that the synthesis of apprehension is only
empirical; and in B 152 we find the following emphatic sentence: “In so
far as the faculty of imagination is spontaneously active I sometimes
also name it [i.e. in addition to entitling it transcendental and
figurative] _productive_, and thereby distinguish it from the
_reproductive_ imagination whose synthesis is subject only to empirical
laws, i.e. those of association, and which therefore contributes nothing
in explanation of the possibility of _a priori_ knowledge. Hence it
belongs, not to transcendental philosophy, but to psychology.” Cf. the
directly counter statement in A 102: “The reproductive synthesis of the
faculty of imagination must be counted among the transcendental actions
of the mind.”
[863] Though, as we shall find, the deduction of the second edition is
in certain respects more mature, it is in other respects less complete.
[864] A 314 = B 370.
[865] A x-xi. Cf. above, pp. 50-1.
[866] Cf. below, pp. 543 ff., 576-7.
[867] Whether it was the chief reason is decidedly open to question. The
un-Critical character of its teaching as regards the function of
empirical concepts and of the transcendental object, and the
unsatisfactoriness of its doctrine of a threefold synthesis, would of
themselves account for the omission. The passage in the chapter on
phenomena and noumena (A 250 ff.) in which the doctrine of the
transcendental object is again developed was likewise omitted in the
second edition.
[868] Cf. below, pp. 238, 263 ff.
[869] Cf. also in _Methodology_, below, p. 543 ff.
[870] Cf. above, pp. xxxvi, xxxvii-viii, 36; below, pp. 241-3.
[871] Cf. below, p. 543 ff.
[872] A xi.
[873] A 100-1.
[874] Kant’s failure either to distinguish or to connect the two
deductions in any really clear and consistent manner is a defect which
is accentuated rather than diminished in the second edition. Though the
sections devoted to the subjective enquiry are omitted, and the argument
of the objective deduction is so recast as to increase the emphasis laid
upon its more strictly logical aspects, the teaching of the subjective
deduction is retained and influences the argument at every point. For
the new deduction, no less than that of the first edition, rests
throughout upon the initial assumption that though connection or
synthesis can never be given, it is yet the generative source of all
consciousness of order and relation.
[875] It appears most clearly in Kant’s proof of the category of
causality in the second _Analogy_. Cf. below, p. 364 ff.
[876] Cf. below, pp. 252-3, 258, 287, 333, 343.
[877] Cf. above, p. 208 ff.
[878] Cf. above, pp. l-ii, 207-12; below, pp. 260-3, 272-3, 327-8,
473-7, 515.
[879] P. 239.
[880] A 99.
[881] A 102.
[882] A 103.
[883] _Loc. cit._
[884] _Loc. cit._
[885] A 100-1.
[886] A 106.
[887] A 101.
[888] Such statements are in direct conflict with his own repeated
assertions in other passages that reproduction and recognition are
always merely empirical. Cf. above, pp. 227-31, and below, pp. 264,
268-9.
[889] B 139-40.
[890] In the first edition the subjective and objective deductions shade
into one another; and this question is raised in the section on
synthesis of recognition (A 104), where, as above noted (p. 204 ff.),
Kant’s argument is largely pre-Critical, empirical concepts exercising
the functions which Kant later ascribed to the categories. But as we
have already considered the resulting doctrine of the transcendental
object both in its earlier and in its subsequent form, we may at once
pass to the more mature teaching of the other sections.
[891] Cf. above, p. 204 ff.
[892] Memory is only one particular mode in which recognition presents
itself in our experience; Kant’s purpose is to show that it is not more
fundamental, nor more truly constitutive of apperception, than is
recognition in any of its other manifestations. Indeed the central
contention of the objective deduction is that it is through
consciousness of _objects_, _i.e._ through consciousness of _objective_
meanings, that self-consciousness comes to be actualised at all. Only in
contrast with, and through relation to, an objective system is
consciousness of inner experience, past or present, and therefore
self-consciousness in its contingent empirical forms, possible to the
mind. Cf. above, pp. li-ii; below, pp. 260-3.
[893] B 134.
[894] A 116.
[895] Cf. above, p. 242; below, pp. 258, 332-3.
[896] Cf. A 111.
[897] A 117 _n._
[898] This transcendental psychology is considered below (p. 263 ff.),
in its connection with the later stages of the subjective deduction. Cf.
above, p. 238.
[899] A 113-14.
[900] Cf. above, p. 229.
[901] Cf. A 100-1.
[902] A 122-3.
[903] Cf. B 140-3; B 151-2; B 164-5 5 and below, p. 286.
[904] Here again the second edition text is more explicit than the
first: “This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce _a
priori_ unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and
only by such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as
why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or why space
and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition.”--B 145-6. Cf.
above, pp. xxxiii-vi, xliv, 57, 142, 186; below, pp. 291, 411.
[905] Cf. above, pp. 252-3.
[906] The second _Analogy_ embodies the argument which is implied in,
and necessary to, the establishment of the assertions dogmatically made
in A 111-12.
[907] A 119.
[908] Cf. A 128. On this whole question cf. above, p. 242; below, pp.
287-8.
[909] Cf. A 113, 125-9.
[910] A 107, 111.
[911] The explanation given in the second edition (B 132) is artificial,
and does not reveal Kant’s real reasons. It is also obscure owing to its
employment of dynamical terms to denote the relation of apperception to
self-consciousness.
[912] Cf. above, pp. 251-3.
[913] Cf. A 112, 113, 128.
[914] A 114.
[915] A 94, 115, 118. Cf. also end of note to B 134.
[916] Cf. above, pp. lii, 207-12, 243; below, pp. 327-8, 473-7, 515.
[917] This is shown, not only by Kant’s ethical writings, but also by
his less formal utterances, especially in his _Lectures on Metaphysics_
and on _Religion_, in his _Reflexionen_, and in his _Lose Blätter_.
[918] Cf. below, pp. 277-8.
[919] Cf. above, pp. l-lii; below, pp. 277 ff., 461-2, 473-7.
[920] In note to B 162 they are indeed identified.
[921] Kant’s vacillating attitude appears in the added phrase “of whose
activity we are _hardly ever_ conscious.” Cf. A 78: it is a “blind”
power.
[922] Cf. above, p. 225; below, p. 337.
[923] A 138 = B 177.
[924] A 118.
[925] Cf. above, p. 253 ff.
[926] A 123.
[927] A 121-3.
[928] A 125-6.
[929] Above, pp. 74 ff., 238, 252.
[930] Cf. above, pp. 96-7.
[931] Cf. below, pp. 367, 371-2.
[932] Cf. above, pp. 211, 227, 233-4.
[933] In direct contradiction of his previous view of transcendental
imagination as purely productive, it is now stated that it is
reproductive. Cf. A 102.
[934] Cf. above, pp. 225 ff., 264.
[935] It must be remembered that this was also rendered necessary by the
archaic character of their teaching in regard to the transcendental
object and the function of empirical concepts.
[936] Cf. B 151-2. There is no mention, however, of objective affinity.
[937] B 160-1. Cf. above, pp. 226-9.
[938] In what follows I make use of an article, entitled “The Problem of
Knowledge,” which I have contributed to the _Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology, and Scientific Methods_ (1912), vol. ix. pp. 113-28.
[939] The same wide sense in which Kant employs “empirical idealism.”
[940] Cf. above, pp. xliii-v, 208; below, pp. 295-6, 298 ff. Hume and
Spinoza are the only pre-Kantian thinkers of whose position the last
statement is not strictly descriptive, but even they failed to escape
its entangling influence.
[941] Cf. A 28-9; also _Lectures on Metaphysics_ (Pölitz’s edition,
1821), p. 188 ff. In Kant’s posthumously published work, his _Transition
from the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science to Physics_,
it is asserted in at least twenty-six distinct passages that sensations
are due to the action of “the moving forces of matter” upon the
sense-organs. Cf. below, p. 283 _n_. 2. In his _Ueber das Organ der
Seele_ (1796) (Hartenstein, vi. p. 457 ff.), Kant agrees with Sömmerring
in holding that the soul has virtual, _i.e._ dynamical, though not
local, presence in the fluid contained in the cavity of the brain.
[942] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason_, Bk. i. ch. i. § iii.
[943] Cf. below, pp. 279 ff., 293-6, 312 ff., 321, 361 _n._ 3, 384-5,
464-5, 476.
[944] Cf. below, pp. 279-80, and pp. 293-4, on inner sense.
[945] i. p. 339: “Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought,
dies away and is replaced by another.... Each later Thought, knowing and
including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the final
receptacle--and appropriating them is the final owner--of all that they
contain and own. Each Thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned,
transmitting whatever it realized as its Self to its own later
proprietor. As Kant says [cf. below, pp. 461-2], it is as if elastic
balls were to have not only motion but knowledge of it, and a first ball
were to transmit both its motion and its consciousness to a second,
which took both up into _its_ consciousness and passed them to a third,
until the last ball held all that the other balls had held, and realized
it as its own.”
[946] I here use “objective” in its modern meaning: I am not concerned
with the special meaning which Descartes himself attached to the terms
_objective_ and _formaliter_.