Though such is Kant’s own method of form_A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'

exaggerates the difference of his procedure in the two _Critiques_, and

is very misleading as a statement of his real position. In one passage,

in the _Critique of Practical Reason_,[1722] Kant does, indeed, assert

that the moral law requires no deduction. It is, he claims, a _fact_ of

which we are _a priori_ conscious: so far from itself requiring proof,

it enables us to prove the reality of freedom. Yet in the very same

section he argues that the deduction of freedom from the moral law is a

credential of the latter, and is a sufficient substitute for all _a

priori_ justification. According to the first statement we have an

immediate consciousness of the validity of the moral law; according to

the second statement the moral law proves itself indirectly, by serving

as a principle for the deduction of freedom. The second form of

statement alone harmonises with the argument developed in the third

section of the _Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals_, and more

correctly expresses the intention of Kant’s central argument in the

_Critique of Practical Reason_. For the difference between the two

transcendental proofs in the two _Critiques_ does not really consist in

any diversity of method, but solely in the differing character of the

premisses from which each starts. The ambiguity of Kant’s argument in

the second _Critique_ seems chiefly to be caused by his failure clearly

to recognise that the moral law, though a form of pure Reason,

exercises, in the process of its transcendental proof, a function which

exactly corresponds to that which is discharged by possible experience

in the first _Critique_. Our consciousness of the moral law is, like

sense-experience, a given fact. It is _de facto_, and cannot be deduced

from anything more ultimate than itself.[1723] But as given, it enables

us to deduce its transcendental conditions. This does not mean that our

immediate consciousness of it _as given_ guarantees its validity. The

nature of its validity is established only in the process whereby it

reveals its necessary implications. The objects of sense-experience are

assumed by ordinary consciousness to be absolutely real; in the process

of establishing the transcendental conditions of such experience they

are discovered to be merely phenomenal. The pure principles of

understanding thus gain objective validity as the conditions of a given

experience which reveals only appearances. Ordinary consciousness

similarly starts from the assumption of the absolute validity of the

moral law. But in this case the consciousness of the law is discovered

on examination to be explicable, _even as a possibility_, only on the

assumption that it is due to the autonomous activity of a noumenal

being. By its existence it proves the conditions through which alone it

is explicable. Its mere existence suffices to prove that its validity is

objective in a deeper and truer sense than the principles of

understanding. _The notion of freedom, and therefore all the connected

Ideas of pure Reason, gain noumenal reality as the conditions of a moral

consciousness which is incapable of explanation as illusory or even

phenomenal._ Since the consciousness of the moral law is thus noumenally

grounded, it has a validity with which nothing in the phenomenal world

can possibly compare. It is the one form in which noumenal reality

directly discloses itself to the human mind.[1724]

Obviously the essential crux of Kant’s argument lies in the proof that

the moral consciousness _is_ only explicable in this manner, as the

self-legislation of a noumenal being. Into the merits of his argument we

cannot, however, here enter; and I need only draw attention to the

manner in which it conflicts with the statement of the preceding

section, that the possibility of transcendental freedom is a purely

speculative question with which practical Reason is not concerned. The

reality of freedom, as a form of noumenal activity, is the cardinal fact

of Kant’s metaphysics of morals. For though our consciousness of the

moral law is the _ratio cognoscendi_ of freedom, transcendental freedom

is the _ratio essendi_ of the moral law.[1725]

“With this faculty [of practical Reason], transcendental freedom is

also established; freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which

speculative Reason required it, in its use of the concept of

causality, in order to escape the antinomy into which it inevitably

falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries to think the

_unconditioned_.... Freedom is the only one of all the Ideas of the

speculative Reason of which we _know_ the possibility _a priori_

(without, however, understanding it), because it is the condition

of the moral law which we know.”[1726] ”[Freedom] is the only one

of all the Ideas of pure Reason whose object is a thing of fact and

to be reckoned among the _scibilia_.”[1727] “It is thus very

remarkable that of the three pure rational Ideas, God, freedom, and

immortality, that of freedom is the only concept of the

supersensible which (by means of the causality that is thought in

it) proves its objective reality in nature by means of the effects

it can produce there; and thus renders possible the connection of

both the others with nature, and of all three with one another so

as to form a Religion.... The concept of freedom (as fundamental

concept of all unconditioned practical laws) can extend Reason

beyond those bounds within which every natural (theoretical)

concept must inevitably remain confined.”[1728]

Thus freedom is for Kant a demonstrated fact, and in that respect

differs from the Ideas of God and immortality, which are merely

problematic conceptions, and which can be postulated only as articles of

“practical faith.”

This brings us to the final question, upon what grounds Kant ascribes

validity to the Ideas of God and immortality. At this point in his

argument Kant introduces the conception of the _Summum Bonum_. Reason,

in prescribing the moral law, prescribes, as the final and complete end

of all our actions, the _Summum Bonum_, _i.e._ happiness proportioned to

moral worth. _Owing to the limitations of our faculties_, the complete

attainment of this supreme end is conceivable by us only on the

assumption of a future life wherein perfect worthiness may be attained,

and of an omnipotent Divine Being who will apportion happiness in

accordance with merit.

”[This Divine Being] must be omnipotent, in order that the whole of

nature and its relation to morality ... may be subject to his will;

omniscient, that he may know our innermost sentiments and their

moral worth; omnipresent, that he may be immediately present for

the satisfying of every need which the highest good demands;

eternal, that this harmony of nature and freedom may never fail,

etc.”[1729]

The moral ideal thus supplies us with a ground[1730] for regarding the

universe as systematically ordered according to moral purposes, and also

with a principle that enables us to infer the nature and properties of

its Supreme Cause. In place of a demonology, which is all that physical

theology can establish, we construct upon moral grounds a genuine

theology.

The concepts thus obtained are, however, anthropomorphic; and for that

reason alone must be denied all speculative value. This is especially

evident in regard to the Idea of God. Owing to our incapacity to

comprehend how moral merit can condition happiness, we conceive them as

_externally_ combined through the intervention of a supreme Judge and

Ruler. As Kant indicates,[1731] we must not assert that this represents

the actual situation. He himself seems to have inclined to a more

mystical interpretation of the universe, conceiving the relation of

happiness to virtue as being grounded in a supersensuous but necessary

order that may, indeed, be bodied forth in the inadequate symbols of the

deistic creed, but which in its true nature transcends our powers of

understanding. So far as the Ideas of God and immortality are necessary

to define the moral standpoint, they have genuine validity for all moral

beings; but if developed on their own account as speculative dogmas,

they acquire a definiteness of formulation which is not essential to

their moral function, and which lays them open to suspicion even in

their legitimate use.

These considerations also indicate Kant’s further reason for entitling

the _Summum Bonum_, God and immortality, Ideas of _faith_. Though they

can be established as presuppositions of the moral situation in which we

find ourselves, such demonstration itself rests upon the acceptance of

the moral consciousness as possessing a supersensuous sanction; and that

in turn is determined by features in the moral situation not deducible

from any higher order of considerations.

“Belief in matters of faith is a belief in a pure practical point

of view, _i.e._ a moral faith, which proves nothing for

theoretical, pure, rational cognition, but only for that which is

practical and directed to the fulfilment of its duties; it in no

way extends speculation.... If the supreme principle of all moral

laws is a postulate, the possibility of its highest Object ... is

thereby postulated along with it.”[1732] “So far, as practical

Reason has the right to yield us guidance, we shall not look upon

actions as obligatory because they are the commands of God, but

shall regard them as divine commands because we have an inward

obligation to them.... Moral theology is thus of immanent use only.

It enables us to fulfil our vocation in this present world by

showing us how to adapt ourselves to the system of all ends, and by

warning us against the fanaticism and indeed the impiety of

abandoning the guidance of a morally legislative Reason in the

right conduct of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly

from the Idea of the Supreme Being. For we should then be making a

transcendent employment of moral theology; and that, like a

transcendent use of pure speculation, must pervert and frustrate

the ultimate ends of Reason.”[1733]

SECTION III

OPINING, KNOWING, AND BELIEVING[1734]

Kant first distinguishes between conviction (_Ueberzeugung_) and

persuasion (_Ueberredung_). A judgment which is objectively grounded,

and which is therefore valid for all other rational beings, is affirmed

with conviction. When the affirmation is due only to the peculiar

character of the subject, the manner in which it is asserted may be

entitled persuasion. Persuasion is therefore “a mere illusion.”[1735]

Conviction exists in three degrees, opinion, belief, and knowledge. In

opinion we are conscious that the judgment is insufficiently grounded,

and that our conviction is subjectively incomplete. In belief the

subjective conviction is complete, but is recognised as lacking in

objective justification. In knowledge the objective grounds and the

subjective conviction are alike complete.

After pointing out that opinion is not permissible in judgments of pure

Reason,[1736] Kant develops the further distinction between _pragmatic

or doctrinal belief_ and _moral belief_. When a belief is contingent

(_i.e._ is affirmed with the consciousness that on fuller knowledge it

may turn out to be false), and yet nevertheless supplies a ground for

the employment of means to certain desired ends, it may be called

_pragmatic_ belief. Such belief admits of degree, and can be tested by

wager or by oath.[1737] What may be called _doctrinal_ belief is

analogous in character, and is taken by Kant, in somewhat misleading

fashion, as describing our mode of accepting such doctrines as the

existence of God and the immortality of the soul.[1738] They are adopted

as helpful towards a contingent but important end, the discovery of

order in the system of nature. This account of the nature of Ideas is in

line with Kant’s early view of them as _merely_ regulative. Taken in

connection with his repeated employment of the term ‘moral sentiments’

(_moralische Gesinnungen_), it tends to prove that this section is early

in date of writing.

In _moral belief_ the end, the _Summum Bonum_, is absolutely necessary,

and as there is only one condition under which we can conceive it as

being realised, namely, on the assumption of the existence of God and of

a future life, the belief in God and immortality possesses the same

certainty as the moral sentiments.

“The belief in a God and another world is so interwoven with my

moral sentiment that as there is little danger of my losing the

latter, there is equally little cause for fear that the former can

ever be taken from me.”[1739]

As I have just suggested, this basing of moral belief upon subjective

sentiments, which, as Kant very inconsistently proceeds to suggest, may

possibly be lacking in certain men, marks this section as being of early

origin. But in concluding the section, in reply to the objection that,

in thus tracing such articles of faith to our “natural interest” in

morality, philosophy admits its powerlessness to advance beyond the

ordinary understanding, Kant propounds one of his abiding convictions,

namely, that in matters which concern all men without distinction nature

is not guilty of any partial distribution of her gifts, and that in

regard to the essential ends of human nature the highest philosophy

cannot advance beyond what is revealed to the common

understanding.[1740] The reverence which Kant ever cherished for the

memory of his parents, and for the religion which was so natural to

them, must have predisposed him to a recognition of the widespread

sources of the spiritual life. But Kant has himself placed on record his

sense of the great debt which in this connection he also owed to the

teaching of Rousseau.

“I am by disposition an enquirer. I feel the consuming thirst for

knowledge, the eager unrest to advance ever further, and the

delights of discovery. There was a time when I believed that this

is what confers real dignity upon human life, and I despised the

common people who know nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This

imagined advantage vanishes. I learn to honor men, and should

regard myself as of much less use than the common labourer, if I

did not believe that my philosophy will restore to all men the

common rights of humanity.”[1741]

The sublimity of the starry heavens and the imperative of the moral law

are ever present influences on the life of man; and they require for

their apprehension no previous initiation through science and

philosophy. The naked eye reveals the former; of the latter all men are

immediately aware.[1742] In their universal appeal they are of the very

substance of human existence. Philosophy may avail to counteract the

hindrances which prevent them from exercising their native influence; it

cannot be a substitute for the inspiration which they alone can yield.

CHAPTER III

THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON[1743]

Adickes[1744] very justly remarks that “this is a section after Kant’s

own heart, in which there is presented, almost unsought, the

opportunity, which he elsewhere so frequently creates for himself, of

indulging in his favourite hobby.” The section is of slight scientific

importance, and is chiefly of interest for the light which it casts upon

Kant’s personality. Moreover the distinctions which Kant here draws are

for the most part not his own philosophical property, but are taken over

from the Wolffian system.

The distinctions may be exhibited in tabular form as follows:[1745]

KNOWLEDGE

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| Historical| |

| or | |

| empirical | Rational (_cognitio ex principiis_) |

| (_cognitio_ | |

| _ex datis_) |-------------------------------------------------------------|

|-----------|Mathe- |Philosophical[1746] (based on pure concepts):--meta- |

|Empi-|Empi-|based |-------------------------------------------------------|

|iolo-|ropo-|uction |tic: |------------------------------------------------|

| | | | |of mor-|----------------------------------------|

| | | | |of all |cend- |--------------------------------|

| | | | |to be. |phil- |------------+-------------------|

| | | | | |reason:|phy- |psych-| -----|----- |

| | | | | |ogy.[1748]| most limited sense.|

+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+

Kant further distinguishes between the “scholastic” and the “universal”

or traditional meaning of the term philosophy.[1749] In the former sense

philosophy is viewed from the point of view of its _logical_ perfection,

and the philosopher appears as an _artist_ of Reason.[1750] Philosophy

in the broader and higher sense is “the science of the relation of all

knowledge to the essential ends of human Reason.”[1751] The philosopher

then appears as the _lawgiver_ of human Reason. Of the essential ends,

the _ultimate_ end is man’s moral destiny; to this the other essential

ends of human Reason are subordinate means. For though the legislation

of human Reason concerns nature as well as freedom, and has therefore to

be dealt with by a philosophy of nature, _i.e._ of _all that is_, as

well as by a philosophy of morals, _i.e._ of _that which ought to be_,

the former is subordinate to the latter in the same degree in which in

human life knowledge is subordinate to moral action. Whereas speculative

metaphysics serves rather to ward off errors than to extend

knowledge,[1752] in the metaphysics of morals “all culture [_Kultur_] of

human Reason”[1753] finds its indispensable completion.

Empirical psychology is excluded from the domain of metaphysics. It is

destined to form part of a complete system of anthropology, the pendant

to the empirical doctrine of nature.[1754]

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON[1755]

This title, as Kant states, is inserted only to mark the place of the

present chapter in a complete system of pure reason. The very cursory

outline, which alone Kant here attempts to give, merely repeats the main

historical distinctions of which the _Critique_ has made use. The

contrast between the sensationalism of Epicurus and the intellectualism

of Plato has been developed in A 465 ff. = B 493 ff.[1756] The contrast

between Locke and Leibniz is dwelt upon in A 43 ff. = B 60 ff. and A 270

ff. = B 326 ff. Under the title ‘naturalist of pure Reason’ Kant is

referring to the ‘common sense’ school, which is typically represented

by Beattie.[1757] In his _Logic_[1758] Kant gives a fuller account of

his interpretation of the history of philosophy.

APPENDIX B

A MORE DETAILED STATEMENT OF KANT’S RELATIONS TO HIS PHILOSOPHICAL

PREDECESSORS[1759]

The development of philosophy, prior to Kant, had rendered two problems

especially prominent--the problem of sense-perception and the problem of

judgment. The one raises the question of the interrelation of mind

knowing and objects known; the other treats of the connection holding

between subject and predicate in the various forms of judgment. The one

enquires how it is possible to know reality; the other seeks to

determine the criterion of truth. These two problems are, as Kant

discovered, inseparable from one another; and the logical is the more

fundamental of the two. Indeed it was Hume’s analysis of the judgment

involved in the causal principle that enabled Kant to formulate his

Critical solution of the problem of perception. In this Appendix I

propose to follow these problems as they rise into view in the systems

of Descartes and his successors.

Galileo’s revolutionary teaching regarding the nature of motion was the

immediate occasion of Descartes’ restatement of the problem of

perception. That teaching necessitated an entirely new view of the

nature of matter, and consequently of the interrelation of mind and

body. Questions never before seriously entertained now became pressing.

The solutions had to be as novel as the situation which they were

designed to meet.

These new problems arose in the following manner. According to the

medieval view, motion may properly be conceived on the analogy of human

activity. It comes into being, exhausts itself in exercise, and ceases

to be. It is a fleeting activity; only its “material” and “formal”

conditions have any permanence of existence. According to Galileo’s

teaching, on the other hand, motion is as different from human activity

as matter is from mind. It is ingenerable and indestructible. We know it

only through the effect which in some incomprehensible fashion it

produces in those bodies into which it enters, namely, their translation

from one part of space to another. That this translatory motion is

called by the same name as the power which generates it, doubtless in

some degree accounts for the fact that our understanding of the one

tends to conceal from us our entire ignorance of the other.[1760] We

have only to reflect, however, in order to realise that motion is

completely mysterious in its intrinsic dynamical nature. We cannot, for

instance, profess to comprehend, even in the least degree, how motion,

though incapable of existing apart from matter, should yet be

sufficiently independent to be able to pass from one body to another.

Descartes, following out some of the chief consequences of this new

teaching, concluded that matter is passive and inert, that it is

distinguished neither by positive nor by negative properties from the

space which it fills, and that it is to motion that all the articulated

organisation of animate and inanimate nature is due. Descartes failed,

indeed, to appreciate the dynamical character of motion, and by

constantly speaking as if it were reducible to the translatory motion,

in which it manifests itself, he represented it as known in all its

essential features. None the less, the rôles previously assigned to

matter and motion are, in Descartes’ system, completely reversed. Matter

is subordinated to motion as the instrument to the agency by which it is

directed and shaped. On the older view, material bodies had, through the

possession of formative and vital forces, all manner of intrinsic

powers. By the new view these composite and nondescript existences are

resolved into two elements, all the properties of which can be

quantitatively defined--into a matter which is uniform and homogeneous,

and into motion whose sole effect is the translation of bodies in space.

Matter is the passive and inert substance out of which motion, by its

mere mechanical powers, can produce the whole range of material forms.

This revolutionary change in the physical standpoint involved

restatement of the philosophical issues. But the resulting difficulties

were found thoroughly baffling. Though Descartes and his successors were

willing to adopt any hypothesis, however paradoxical, which the facts

might seem to demand, their theories, however modified and restated, led

only deeper into a hopeless _impasse_. The unsolved problems of the

Cartesian systems formed the discouraging heritage to which Kant fell

heir. If matter is always purely material, and motion is its sole

organising power, there can be no real kinship between body and mind.

The formative and vital forces, which in the Scholastic philosophy and

in popular thought serve to maintain the appearance of continuity

between matter and mind, can no longer be credited. Motion, which alone

is left to mediate between the opposites, is purely mechanical, and (on

Descartes’ view) is entirely lacking in inner or hidden powers. The

animal body is exclusively material, and is therefore as incapable of

feeling or consciousness as any machine made by human hands. The bodily

senses are not ‘sensitive’; the brain cannot think. Mental experiences

do, of course, accompany the brain-motions. But why a sensation should

thus arise when a particular motion is caused in the brain, or how a

mental resolution can be followed by a brain state, are questions to

which no satisfactory answer can be given. The mental and the material,

the spiritual and the mechanical, fall entirely apart.

The difficulties arising out of this incomprehensibility of the causal

interrelations of mind and body are not, however, in themselves a valid

argument against a dualistic interpretation of the real. The

difficulties of accounting for the causal relation are, in essential

respects, equally great even when the interaction is between homogeneous

existences. The difficulties are due to the nature of causal action as

such, not to the character of the bodies between which it holds. This,

indeed, was clearly recognised by Descartes, and was insisted upon by

his immediate successors. The transference of motion by impact is no

less incomprehensible than the interaction of soul and body. If motion

can exist only in matter, there is no possible method of conceiving how

it can make the transition from one discrete portion of matter to

another. Causal action is thus a problem which no philosophy can pretend

to solve, and which every philosophy, whether monistic or dualistic,

must recognise as transcending the scope of our present knowledge.

It is in another and more special form that Descartes’ dualism first

reveals its fatal defects, namely, in its bearing upon the problem of

sense-perception. Descartes can solve the problem of knowledge only by

first postulating the doctrine of representative perception. That

doctrine is rendered necessary by the dualism of mind and body. Objects

can be known only mediately by means of their action upon the

sense-organs, and through the sense-organs upon the brain. The resulting

brain states are in themselves merely forms of motion. They lead,

however, in a manner which Descartes never professes to explain,[1761]

to the appearance of sensations in the mental field. Out of these

sensations the mind then constructs mental images of the distant bodies;

and it is these mental images alone which are directly apprehended.

Material bodies are invisible and intangible; they are knowable only

through their mental duplicates. Thus, according to the doctrine of

representative perception, each mind is segregated in a world apart. It

looks out upon a landscape which is as mental and as truly inward as are

its feelings and desires. The apparently ultimate relation of mind

knowing and object known is rendered complex and problematic through the

distinction between mental objects and real things. Mental objects are

in all cases images merely. They exist only so long as they are

apprehended; and they are numerically and existentially distinct in each

individual mind. Real things are not immediately perceived; they are

hypothetically inferred. To ordinary consciousness the body which acts

on the sense-organ is the object known; when reflective consciousness is

philosophically enlightened, the object immediately known is recognised

as a merely mental image, and the external object sinks to the level of

an assumed cause.

The paradoxical character of this doctrine is accentuated by Galileo’s

distinction between primary and secondary qualities.[1762] Those

physical processes, which are entitled light and heat, bear no

resemblance to the sensations through which they become known. The

many-coloured world of ordinary consciousness is an illusory appearance

which can exist only in the human mind. We must distinguish between the

sensible world which, though purely mental, appears, through an

unavoidable illusion, to be externally real, and that very different

world of matter and motion which reveals its independent nature only to

reflective thinking. In the latter world the rich variety of sensuous

appearance can find no place. There remain only the quantitative,

mechanical properties of extension, figure and motion; and even these

have to be interpreted in the revolutionary fashion of physical science.

The doctrine of representative perception cannot, however, defend

successfully the positions which it thus involves. It wavers in unstable

equilibrium. The facts, physical and physiological, upon which it is

based, are in conflict with the conclusions in which it results. This

has been very clearly demonstrated by many writers in recent

times.[1763] The conflict manifested itself in the period between

Descartes and Kant only through the uneasy questionings of Locke and

Berkeley. The problem, fundamental though it be, is almost completely

ignored by Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff.

Stated in modern terms, the inherently contradictory character of the

doctrine consists in its unavoidable alternation between the realist

attitude to which it owes its origin, and the idealist conclusion in

which it issues. Such oscillation is due to the twofold simultaneous

relation in which it regards ideas as standing to the objects that they

are supposed to represent. The function of sensations is cognitive;

their origin is mechanical. As cognitive they stand to objects in a

relation of inclusion; they reveal the objects, reduplicating them in

image before the mind. Yet in their origin they are effects,

mechanically generated by the action of material bodies upon the

sense-organs and brain. As they are effects mechanically generated,

there is no guarantee that they resemble their causes; and if we may

argue from other forms of mechanical causation, there is little

likelihood that they do. They stand to their first causes in a relation

of exclusion, separated from them by a large number of varying

intermediate processes. There is thus a conflict between the function of

sensations and their origin. Their origin in the external objects is

supposed to confer upon them a representative power; and yet the very

nature of this origin invalidates any such claim.

This irreconcilability of the subjectivist consequences of the doctrine

with its realist basis was seized upon by Berkeley. To remove the

contradiction, he denied the facts from which the doctrine had been

developed. That is to say, starting from its results he disproved its

premisses. Arguing from the physical and physiological conditions of

perception Descartes had concluded that only sensations can be directly

apprehended by the mind. Berkeley starts from this conclusion, and

virtually adopts it as an assumption which cannot be questioned, and

which does not call for proof. Since, he contends, we know only

sensations, the assertion that they are due to material causes is mere

hypothesis, and is one for which there may be no valid grounds. As

Descartes himself had already suggested, there is a second possible

method of interpreting the relevant facts. There may exist an

all-powerful Being who produces the sensations in our minds from moment

to moment; and provided that they are produced in the same order as now,

the whole material world might be annihilated without our being in the

least aware that so important an event had taken place. Since we can

experience only sensations, any hypothesis which will account for the

order of their happening is equally legitimate. The whole question

becomes one of relative simplicity in the explanation given. The simpler

analysis, other things being equal, must hold the field.

Berkeley reinforces this argument by pointing to the many embarrassing

consequences to which Descartes’ dualism must lead. We postulate bodies

in order to account for the origin of our sensations, and yet are unable

to do so by their means. The dualistic theory creates more difficulties

than it solves, without a single counter-advantage, save perhaps--so

Berkeley argues--that it seems to harmonise better with the traditional

prejudices of the philosophic consciousness.

If we grant Berkeley his premisses, the main lines of his argument are

fairly cogent, however unconvincing may be his own positive views. The

crux, however, of the Berkeleian idealism lies almost exclusively in the

establishment of its fundamental assumption, that only ideas (_i.e._

images) can be known by the mind. This assumption Berkeley, almost

without argument, takes over from his predecessors. It was currently

accepted, and from it, therefore, he believed that he could safely

argue. It rests, however, upon the assumption of facts which he himself

questions. In rejecting the Cartesian dualism he casts down the ladder

by which alone it is possible to climb into his position. For save

through the facts of physics and physiology there seems to be no

possible method of disproving the belief of ordinary consciousness, that

in perception we apprehend independent material bodies. And until that

belief can be shown to be false and ungrounded, the Berkeleian idealism

is without support. It cannot establish the fundamental assumption upon

which its entire argument proceeds. Thus, though Berkeley convincingly

demonstrates the internal incoherence of the doctrine of representative

perception--the inconsistency of its conclusions with the physical and

physiological facts upon which alone it can be based--he cannot himself

solve the problem in answer to which that doctrine was propounded. His

services, like those of so many other reformers, were such as he did not

himself foresee. In simplifying the problem, he prepared the way for the

more sceptical treatment of its difficult issues by Hume.

At this point, in the philosophy of Hume, the problem of perception

comes into the closest possible connection with the logical problem,

referred to above. The question, how mind knowing is related to the

objects known, is found to depend upon the question, how in certain

crucial cases predicates may legitimately be referred to their subject.

This logical problem arises in two forms, a narrower and a wider. The

narrower issue concerns only the principle of causality. With what right

do we assert that every event must have a cause? What is the ground

which justifies us in thus predicating of events a causal character?

Obviously, this logical question is fundamental, and must be answered

before we can hope to solve the more special problem, as to our right to

interpret sensations as effects of material bodies. Hume was the first

to emphasise the vital interconnection of these two lines of enquiry.

The wider issue is the generating problem of Kant’s _Critique_: How in a

judgment can a predicate be asserted of a subject in which it is not

already involved? In other words, what is it that in such a case

justifies us in connecting the predicate with the subject? Though this

problem was never directly raised by any pre-Kantian thinker, not even

by Hume, it is absolutely vital to all the pre-Kantian systems. Thus

Descartes’ philosophy is based upon a distinction, nowhere explicitly

drawn but everywhere silently assumed, between abstract and fruitful

ideas. The former contain just so much content and no more; this content

may be explicitly unfolded in a series of judgments, but no addition is

thereby made to our knowledge. The latter, on the other hand, are

endowed with an extraordinary power of inner growth. To the attentive

mind they disclose a marvellous variety of inner meaning. The chief

problem of scientific method consists, according to Descartes, in the

discovery of these fruitful ideas, and in the separation of them from

the irrelevant accompaniments which prevent them from unfolding their

inner content. Once they are discovered, the steady progress of

knowledge is assured. They are the springs of knowledge, and from them

we have only to follow down the widening river of truth.

Descartes professed to give a complete list of the possible fruitful

ideas. They are, he claimed, better known than any other concepts. They

lie at the basis of all experience, and no one can possibly be ignorant

of them; though, owing to their simplicity and omnipresence, their

philosophical importance has been overlooked. When, however, Descartes

proceeded to classify them, he found that while such ideas as space,

triangle, number, motion, contain an inexhaustible content that is

progressively unfolded in the mathematical sciences, those ideas, on the

other hand, through which we conceive mental existences,--the notions of

mind, thought, self--do not by any means prove fruitful upon attentive

enquiry. As Malebranche later insisted, we can define mind only in

negative terms; its whole meaning is determined through its opposition

to the space-world, which alone is truly known. Though it is the

function of mind to know, it cannot know itself. And when we remove from

our list of ideas those which are not really fruitful, we find that only

mathematical concepts remain.[1764] They alone have this apparently

miraculous property of inexhaustibly developing before the mind.

Scientific knowledge is limited to the material world; and even there,

the limits of our mathematical insight are the limits of our knowledge.

Malebranche believed no less thoroughly than Descartes in the asserted

power and fruitfulness of mathematical concepts. Under the influence of

this belief, he developed, as so many other thinkers from Plato onwards

have done, a highly mystical theory of scientific knowledge. It is a

revelation of eternal truth, and yet is acquired by inner reflection,

not laboriously built up by external observation. It comes by searching

of the mind, not by exploration of the outer world. But Malebranche was

not content, like Descartes, merely to accept this type of knowledge. He

proceeded to account for it in metaphysical terms. The fruitfulness of

mathematical ideas is due, he claimed, to the fundamental concept of

extension in which they all share. This idea, representing, as it does,

an infinite existence, is too great to be contained within the finite

mind. Through it the mind is widened to the apprehension of something

beyond itself; we know it through consciousness of its archetype in the

mind of God. It is the one point at which consciousness transcends its

subjective limits. Its fruitfulness is due to, and is the manifestation

of, this divine source. The reason why we are condemned to remain

ignorant of everything beyond the sphere of quantity is that extension

alone holds this unique position. It is the only fruitful idea which the

mind possesses, and other concepts, such as triangle, circle, or number,

are fruitful only in proportion as they share in it. We can acquire no

genuine knowledge even of the nature of the self. Being ignorant of

mind, we cannot comprehend the self which is one of its modes. It is as

if we sought to comprehend the nature of a triangle, in the absence of

any conception of space. Were we in possession of the archetypal idea of

mind, we should not only be able to deduce from it those various

feelings and emotions which we have already experienced, and those

sensations of the secondary qualities which we falsely ascribe to the

influence of external objects, but we should also be able to discover by

pure contemplation innumerable other emotions and qualities, which

entirely transcend our present powers. And all of these would then be

experienced in their ideal nature, and not, as now, merely through

feeble and confused feeling. If mathematicians destroy their bodily

health through absorption in the progressive clarification of the

mysteries of space, what might not happen if the archetypal idea of mind

were revealed to us? Could we attend to the preservation of a body which

would incessantly distract us from the infinite and overwhelming

experiences of our divine destiny?

This romantic conception of the possibilities of rational science

reveals more clearly than any other Cartesian doctrine the real bearing

and perverse character of the rationalistic preconceptions which

underlie the Cartesian systems. The Cartesians would fain make rational

science, conceived on the analogy of the mathematical disciplines,

coextensive with the entire realm of the real. This grotesque enterprise

is conceived as abstractly possible even by so cautious a thinker as

John Locke. His reason for condemning the physical sciences as logically

imperfect is that they fail to conform to this rationalistic ideal.

Hence those sentences which sound so strangely in the mouth of Locke,

the sensationalist.

“It is the contemplation of our abstract ideas that alone is able

to afford us general knowledge.”[1765] “The true method of

advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract ideas.”[1766]

”[Did we know the real essence of gold] it would be no more

necessary that gold should exist, and that we should make

experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing of the

properties of a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any

matter: the idea in our minds would serve for the one as well as

for the other.”[1767] “In the knowledge of bodies, we must be

content to glean what we can from particular experiments, since we

cannot, from a discovery of their real essences, grasp at a time

whole sheaves, and in bundles comprehend the nature and the

properties of whole species together.”[4]

Locke’s empirical doctrine of knowledge is thus based upon a

rationalistic theory of the real. It is not, he holds, the constitution

of reality, but the _de facto_ limitations of our human faculties which

make empirical induction the only practicable mode of discovery in

natural science. Indeed, Locke gives more extreme expression than even

Descartes does, to the mystically conceived mathematical method. Being

ignorant of mathematics, and not over well-informed even in the physical

sciences, Locke was not checked by any too close acquaintance with the

real character and necessary limits of this method; and he accordingly

makes statements in that unqualified fashion which seldom fails to

betray the writer who is expounding views which he has not developed for

himself by first-hand study of the relevant facts.

But though the unique character of mathematical knowledge thus forced

itself upon the attention of all the Cartesian thinkers, and in the

above manner led even the most level-headed of Descartes’ successors to

dream strange dreams, no real attempt was made (save in the neglected

writings of Leibniz) to examine, in a sober spirit, the grounds and

conditions of its possibility. In the English School, Locke’s eulogy of

abstract ideas served only to drive his immediate successors to an

opposite extreme. Both Berkeley and Hume attempted to explain away, in

an impossible manner, those fundamental differences, which, beyond all

questioning, profoundly differentiate mathematical from empirical

judgments.[1768] It is not surprising that Kant, who had no direct

acquaintance with Hume’s _Treatise_, should have asserted that had Hume

realised the bearing of his main teaching upon the theory of

mathematical science, he would have hesitated to draw his sceptical

conclusions. Such, however, was not the case. Hume’s theory of

mathematical reasoning undoubtedly forms the least satisfactory part of

his philosophy. He did, however, perceive the general bearing of his

central teaching. It was in large degree his ignorance of the

mathematical disciplines that concealed from him the thorough

unsatisfactoriness of his general position, and which prevented him from

formulating the logical problem in its full scope--the problem, namely,

how judgments which make additions to our previous knowledge, and yet do

not rest upon mere sensation, are possible. He treated it only as it

presents itself in those judgments which involve the concept of

causality.[1769] But this analysis of causal judgments awoke Kant from

his dogmatic slumber, and so ultimately led to the raising of the

logical problem in its widest form:--how synthetic _a priori_ judgments,

whether mathematical, physical, or metaphysical, are possible.

Hume discussed the causal problem both in regard to the general

principle of causality and in its bearing upon our particular judgments

of causal relation. The problems concerned in these two discussions are

essentially distinct. The first involves immensely wider issues, and so

far as can be judged from the existing circumstantial evidence,[1770] it

was this first discussion, not as has been so often assumed by Kant’s

commentators the second and more limited problem, which exercised so

profound an influence upon Kant at the turning-point of his

speculations. In stating it, it will be best to take Hume’s own words.

“To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a

cause: ‘Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that _whatever begins to

exist_, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for

granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded.

‘Tis supposed to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those

maxims, which though they may be deny’d with the lips, ‘tis

impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of. But if we

examine this maxim by the idea of knowledge above explain’d we

shall discover in it no mark of any such intuitive certainty; but

on the contrary shall find, that ‘tis of a nature quite foreign to

that species of conviction.”[1771]

The principle that every event must have a cause, is neither intuitively

nor demonstratively certain. So far from there existing a _necessary_

connection between the idea of an event as something happening in time

and the idea of a cause, no connection of any kind is discoverable by

us. We can conceive an object to be non-existent at this moment, and

existent the next, without requiring to conjoin with it the altogether

different idea of a productive source.

This had been implicitly recognised by those few philosophers who had

attempted to give demonstrations of the principle. By so doing, however,

they only reinforce Hume’s contention that it possesses no rational

basis. When Hobbes argues that as all the points of time and place in

which we can suppose an object to begin to exist, are in themselves

equal, there must be some cause determining an event to happen at one

moment rather than at another, he is assuming the very principle which

he professes to prove. There is no greater difficulty in supposing the

time and place to be fixed without a cause, than in supposing the

existence to be so determined. If the denial of a cause is not

intuitively absurd in the one case, it cannot be so in the other. If the

first demands a proof, so likewise must the second. Similarly with the

arguments advanced by Locke and Clarke. Locke argues that if anything is

produced without a cause, it is produced by nothing, and that that is

impossible, since nothing can never be a cause any more than it can be

something, or equal to two right angles. Clarke’s contention that if

anything were without a cause, it would produce _itself_, _i.e._ exist

before it existed, is of the same character. These arguments assume the

only point which is in question.

“When we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither

suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the

existence, and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity

of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that

exclusion.”[1772]

The remaining argument, that every effect must have a cause, since this

is implied in the very idea of an effect, is “still more frivolous.”

“Every effect necessarily presupposes a cause; effect being a

relative term, of which cause is the correlative. But this does not

prove that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it

follows, because every husband must have a wife, that therefore

every man must be married.”[1773]

The far-reaching conclusion, that the principle of causality has no

possible rational basis, Hume extends and reinforces through his other

doctrines, viz. that synthetic reason[1774] is merely generalised

belief, and that belief is in all cases due to the ultimate instincts

and propensities which _de facto_ constitute our human nature. The

synthetic principles which lie at the basis of our experience are

non-rational in character. Each is due to a ‘blind and powerful

instinct,’ which, demanding no evidence, and ignoring theoretical

inconsistency for the sake of practical convenience, necessitates

belief.

“Nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined

us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.”[1775] “All these

operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning

or process of the thought and understanding is able either to

produce or to prevent.”[1776]

Reason is “nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our

souls.”[1777] It justifies itself by its practical uses, but can afford

no standard to which objective reality must conform.

It is from this point of view that Hume states his answer to the problem

of perception. Our natural belief in the permanence and identity of

objects, as expressed through the principle of substance and attribute,

leads us to interpret the objects of sense-perception as independent

realities. We interpret our subjective sensations as being qualities of

independent substances. Our other natural belief, in the dynamical

interdependence of events, as expressed through the principle of

causality, leads, however, to the opposite conclusion, that the known

objects are merely mental. For by it we are constrained to interpret

sensations, not as objective qualities, but only as subjective effects,

expressive of the reactions of our psycho-physical organism. The

Cartesian problems owe their origin to the mistaken attempt to

harmonise, in a theoretical fashion, these two conflicting principles.

The conflict is inevitable and the antinomy is insoluble, so long as the

two principles are regarded as objectively valid. The only satisfactory

solution comes through recognition that reason is unable to account,

save in reference to practical ends, even for its own inevitable

demands. The principle of substance and attribute and the principle of

causality co-operate in rendering possible such organisation of our

sense-experience as is required for practical life. But when we carry

this organisation further than practical life itself demands, the two

principles at once conflict.

Kant shows no interest in this constructive part of Hume’s philosophy;

and must, indeed, have been almost entirely ignorant of it, since it

finds only very imperfect expression in the _Enquiry_, and is ignored in

Beattie’s _Nature of Truth_. Accordingly, Kant does not regard Hume as

offering a positive explanation of knowledge, but rather as representing

the point of view of thoroughgoing scepticism. But even had he been

acquainted at first hand with Hume’s _Treatise_, he would undoubtedly

have felt little sympathy with Hume’s naturalistic view of the function

of reason. His training in the mathematical sciences would have enabled

him to detect the inadequacy of Hume’s treatment of mathematical

knowledge, and his strong moral convictions would have led him to rebel

against the naturalistic assumptions which underlie Hume’s entire

position. The Berkeley-Hume comedy is thus repeated with reversed rôles.

Just as Berkeley’s anti-materialistic philosophy was mainly influential

as a step towards the naturalism of Hume, and as such still survives in

the philosophies of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Mach and

Karl Pearson, so in turn Hume’s anti-metaphysical theory of knowledge

was destined to be one of the chief contributory sources of the German

speculative movement.

We may now turn to Hume’s treatment of the narrower problem--that of

justifying our _particular_ causal judgments. Hume’s attitude towards

this question is predetermined by the more fundamental argument, above

stated, which precedes it in the _Treatise_, but which is entirely

omitted from the corresponding chapters of the _Enquiry_. As the general

principle of causality is of an irrational character, the same must be

true of those particular judgments which are based upon it. Much of

Hume’s argument on this question is, indeed, merely a restatement of

what had already been pointed out by his predecessors. There is no

necessary connection discoverable between _any_ cause and its effect.

This is especially evident as regards the connection between brain

states and mental experiences. No explanation can be given why a motion

in the brain should produce sensations in the mind, or why a mental

resolution should produce movements in the body. Such sequences may be

empirically verified; they cannot be rationally understood. That this

likewise holds, though in less obvious fashion, of the causal

interrelations of material bodies, had been emphasised by Geulincx,

Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley. The fact that one billiard ball should

communicate motion to another by impact is, when examined, found to be

no less incomprehensible than the interaction of mind and body. Hume, in

the following passage, is only reinforcing this admitted fact, in terms

of his own philosophy.

“We fancy that were we brought on a sudden into this world we could

at first have inferred that one billiard ball would communicate

motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have

waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty upon it.

Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it

not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself,

and seems not to take place merely because it is found in the

highest degree.”[1778]

Nor are we conscious of any causal power within the self. When Berkeley

claims that mind has the faculty of producing images at will, he is

really ascribing to it creative agency. And such creation, as

Malebranche had already pointed out, is not even conceivable.

“I deny that my will produces in me my ideas, for I cannot even

conceive how it could produce them, since my will, not being able

to act or will without knowledge, presupposes my ideas and does not

make them.”[1779] “Is there not here,” Hume asks, “either in a

spiritual or material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or

structure of parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being

entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will

equally unknown and incomprehensible?”[1780]

But the fact that Hume thus restates conclusions already emphasised by

his predecessors will not justify us in contending (as certain

historians of philosophy seem inclined to do) that in his treatment of

the causal problem he failed to make any important advance upon the

teaching of the Occasionalists. Hume was the first to perceive the

essential falsity of the Cartesian, rationalistic view of the causal

nexus. For Descartes, an effect is that which can be deduced with

logical necessity from the concept of its cause. The Occasionalists

similarly argued that because natural events can never be deduced from

one another they must in all cases be due to supernatural agency; like

Descartes, they one and all failed to comprehend that since by an effect

we mean that which follows _in time_ upon its cause, and since,

therefore, the principle of causality is the law of _change_, the nature

of causality cannot be expressed in logical terms. Hume was the first to

appreciate the significance of this fundamental fact; and an entirely

new set of problems at once came into view. If causal connection is not,

as previous thinkers had believed, logical in character, if it does not

signify logical dependence of the so-called effect upon its cause, its

true connotation must lie elsewhere; and until this has been traced to

its hidden source, any attempted solution of metaphysical problems is

certain to involve many false assumptions. The answer that is given to

the problem of the origin and content of the causal concept must

determine our interpretation alike of sense-experience and of pure

thought.

The problem presents on examination, however, a most paradoxical aspect.

As Hume has already shown, every effect is an event distinct from its

cause, and there is never any connection, beyond that of mere sequence,

discoverable between them. We observe only sequence; we assert necessary

connection. What, then, is in our minds when this latter assertion is

made? And how, if the notion of necessitated connection cannot be gained

through observation of the external events, is it acquired by us? Hume

again propounds a naturalistic solution. Causation, _i.e._

_necessitated_ sequence in time, is not in any sense a conception; it is

not a comprehended relation between events, but a misunderstood feeling

in our minds. We cannot form any, even the most remote, conception of

how one event can produce another. Neither imagination nor pure thought,

however freely they may act, are capable of inventing any such notion.

But nature, by the manner in which it has constituted our minds, deludes

us into the belief that we are in actual possession of this idea. The

repeated sequence of events, in fixed order, generates in us the feeling

of a tendency to pass from the perception or idea of the one to the idea

of the other. This feeling, thus generated by custom, and often in

somewhat confused fashion combined with the feeling of ‘animal nisus,’

which is experienced in bodily effort, is mistaken by the mind for a

definite concept of force, causality, necessary connection. As mere

feeling it can afford no insight into the relation holding between

events, and as merely subjective can justify no inference in regard to

that relation. The terms force, causality, necessitated sequence in

time, have a practical value, as names for our instinctive, natural

expectations; but when employed as instruments for the _theoretical_

interpretation of experience, they lead us off on a false trail.

This is one of the fundamental points upon which Hume reveals a deeper

speculative insight than either Malebranche, Geulincx, or Locke. Though

these latter insist upon our ignorance of the relation holding between

events, they still assume that causation and natural necessity are

concepts which have a quite intelligible meaning; and in consequence

they fail to draw the all-important conclusion, that the general

principle of causality has neither intuitive nor demonstrative validity.

For that is the revolutionary outcome of Hume’s analysis of the notion

of necessitated connection. The principle of causality is a synthetic

judgment in which no connection is discoverable between its subject and

its predicate. That is the reason why it is neither self-evident nor

capable of being established upon more ultimate grounds.

As has already been stated, the wider problem concerning the _principle_

of causality is developed only in the _Treatise_; the problem regarding

the _concept_ of causality is discussed both in the _Treatise_ and in

the _Enquiry_. An appreciation of the wider problem is required,

however, in order to set this second problem in its true light, for it

is only through its connection with the wider issue that Hume’s

reduction of the concept of causality to a merely instinctive,

non-rational expectation acquires its full significance. Hume’s analysis

then amounts, as Kant was the first to realise, to an attack upon the

objective validity of all constructive thinking. Not only rationalism,

but even such metaphysics as may claim to base its conclusions upon the

teaching of experience, is thereby rendered altogether impossible. The

issue is crucial, and must be honestly faced, before metaphysical

conclusions, no matter what their specific character may be, whether _a

priori_ or empirical, can legitimately be drawn. If we may not assert

that an event must have some cause, even the right to enquire for a

cause must first be justified. And if so fundamental a principle as that

of causality is not self-evident, are there any principles which can

make this claim?

The account which we have so far given of Hume’s argument covers only

that part of it which is directed against the rationalist position, and

which was therefore so influential in turning Kant on to the line of his

Critical speculations. But Hume attacked with equal vigour the

empiricist standpoint; and as this aspect of his teaching, constituting

as it did an integral part of Kant’s own philosophy, must undoubtedly

have helped to confirm Kant in his early rationalist convictions, we may

profitably dwell upon it at some length. In opposition to the

empiricists, Hume argues that experience is incapable of justifying any

inference in regard to matters of fact. It cannot serve as a basis from

which we can inductively extend our knowledge of facts beyond what the

senses and memory reveal. Inductive inference, when so employed,

necessarily involves a _petitio principii_; we assume the very point we

profess to have proved.

The argument by which Hume establishes this important contention is as

follows. All inductive reasoning from experience presupposes the

validity of belief in causal connection. For when we have no knowledge

of causes, we have no justification for asserting the continuance of

uniformities. Now it has been shown that we have no experience of any

necessary relation between so-called causes and their effects. The most

that experience can supply are sequences which repeat themselves. In

regarding the sequences as causal, and so as universally constant, we

make an assertion for which experience gives no support, and to which no

amount of repeated experience, recalled in memory, can add one jot of

real evidence. To argue that because the sequences have remained

constant in a great number of repeated experiences, they are therefore

more likely to remain constant, is to assume that constancy in the past

is a ground for inferring it in the future; and that is the very point

which demands proof. In drawing the conclusion we virtually assume that

there is a necessary connection, _i.e._ an absolutely constant

relation, between events. But since no _single_ experience of causal

sequence affords ground for inferring that the sequence will continue in

the future, no number of repeated experiences, recalled in memory, can

contribute to the strengthening of the inference. It is meaningless to

talk even of likelihood or probability. The fact that the sun has

without a single known exception arisen each day in the past does not

(if we accept the argument disproving all knowledge of necessary

connection) constitute _proof_ that it will rise to-morrow.

“None but a fool or a madman will be unaffected in his expectations

or natural beliefs by this constancy, but he is no philosopher who

accepts this as in the nature of evidence.”[1781]

Since, for all that we know to the contrary, bodies may change their

nature and mode of action at any moment, it is vain to pretend that we

are scientifically assured of the future because of the past.

“My practice, you say, refutes my doubts.[1782] But you mistake the

purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the

point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I

will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this

inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my

difficulty or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance.

Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even

though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We

shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we

do not augment our knowledge.”[1783]

Kant was the first, after thirty years, to take up this challenge.

Experience is no source of evidence until the causal postulate has been

_independently_ proved. Only if the principle of causality can be

established prior to all specific experience, only if we can

predetermine experience as necessarily conforming to it, are empirical

arguments valid at all. Hume’s enquiry thus directly leads to the later,

no less than to the earlier form of Kant’s epoch-making question.[1784]

In its earlier formulation it referred only to _a priori_ judgments; in

its wider application it was found to arise with equal cogency in

connection with empirical judgments. And as thus extended, it generated

the problem: How is sense-experience, regarded as a form of _knowledge_,

possible at all?[1785] By showing that the principle of causality has

neither intuitive nor demonstrative validity, Hume cuts the ground from

under the rationalists; by showing that sense-experience cannot by

itself yield conclusions which are objectively valid, he at the same

time destroys the empiricist position. In this latter contention Kant

stands in complete agreement with Hume. That the sensuously given is

incapable of grounding even probable inferences, is a fundamental

presupposition (never discussed, but always explicitly assumed) of the

Critical philosophy. It was by challenging the sufficiency of Hume’s

other line of argument, that which is directed against the rationalists,

that Kant discovered a way of escape from the sceptical dilemma. The

conditions of experience can be proved by a transcendental method,

which, though _a priori_ in character, does not lie open to Hume’s

sceptical objections. Each single experience involves rational

principles, and consequently even a single empirical observation may

suffice to justify an inductive inference. Experience conforms to the

demands of pure _a priori_ thought; and can legitimately be construed in

accordance with them.

We may now pass to the philosophy in which Kant was educated. It gave to

his thinking that rationalist trend, to which, in spite of all

counter-influences, he never ceased to remain true.[1786] It also

contributed to his philosophy several of its constructive principles.

Only two rationalist systems need be considered, those of Leibniz and of

Wolff. Kant, by his own admission,[1787] had been baffled in his

attempts (probably not very persevering) to master Spinoza’s philosophy.

It was with Wolff’s system that he was most familiar; but both directly

and indirectly, both in his early years and in the ’seventies, the

incomparably deeper teaching of Leibniz must have exercised upon him a

profoundly formative influence. In defining the points of agreement and

of difference between Hume and Leibniz,[1788] we have already outlined

Leibniz’s general view of the nature and powers of pure thought, and may

therefore at once proceed to the relevant detail of his main tenets.

Upon two fundamental points Leibniz stands in opposition to Spinoza. He

seeks to maintain the reality of the contingent or accidental. These

terms are indeed, as he conceives them, synonymous with the actual.

Necessity rules only in the sphere of the possible. Contingency or

freedom is the differentiating characteristic of the real. This point of

view is bound up with his second contention, namely, that the real is a

kingdom of ends. It is through divine choice of the best among the

possible worlds that the actual present order has arisen. There are thus

two principles which determine the real: the principle of contradiction

which legislates with absolute universality, and the principle of the

best, or, otherwise formulated, of sufficient reason, which

differentiates reality from truth, limiting thought, in order that,

without violating logic, it may freely satisfy the moral needs. Leibniz

thus vindicates against Spinoza the reality of freedom and the existence

of ends.

Though Leibniz agrees with Spinoza that the philosophically perfect

method would be to start from an adequate concept of the Divine Being,

and to deduce from His attributes the whole nature of finite reality, he

regards our concept of God as being too imperfect to allow of such

procedure. We are compelled to resort to experience, and by analysis to

search out the various concepts which it involves. By the study of these

concepts and their interrelations, we determine, in obedience to the law

of contradiction, the nature of the possible. The real, in

contradistinction from the possible, involves, however, the notion of

ends. The existence of these ends can never be determined by logical,

but only by moral considerations. The chief problem of philosophical

method is, therefore, to discover the exact relation in which the

logical and the teleological, the necessary and the contingent, stand to

one another.

The absence of contradiction is in itself a sufficient guarantee of

possibility, _i.e._ even of the possibility of real existence. How very

far Leibniz is willing to go on this line is shown by his acceptance of

the ontological argument. The whole weight of his system rests, indeed,

upon this proof. The notion of God is, he maintains, the sole concept

which can determine itself in a purely logical manner not only as

possible but also as real. If we are to avoid violating the principle of

contradiction, the _Ens perfectissimum_ must be regarded as possessing

the perfection of real existence. And since God is perfect in moral as

in all other attributes, His actions must be in conformity with moral

demands. In creating the natural order God must therefore have chosen

that combination of possibilities which constitutes the best of all

possible worlds. By means of this conceptual bridge we are enabled to

pass by pure _a priori_ thinking from the logically possible to the

factually real.

Pure logical thinking is thus an instrument whereby ultimate reality can

be defined in a valid manner. _Pure thought is speculative and

metaphysical in its very essence._ It uncovers to us what no experience

can reveal, the wider universe which exists eternally in the mind of

God. Every concept (whether mathematical, dynamical, or moral), provided

only that it is not self-contradictory, is an eternal essence, with the

intrinsic nature of which even God must reckon in the creation of

things. When, therefore, we are determining the unchanging nature of the

eternally possible, there is no necessary reference to Divine existence.

The purely logical criterion suffices as a test of truth. Every judgment

which is made in regard to such concepts must express only what their

content involves. All such judgments must be analytic in order to be

true.

When, however, we proceed from the possible to the real, that is to say,

from the necessary to the contingent, the logical test is no longer

sufficient; and only by appeal to the second principle, that of

sufficient reason, can judgments about reality be logically justified.

Whether or not the principle of sufficient reason is deducible, as Wolff

sought to maintain, from the principle of contradiction, is a point of

quite secondary importance. That is a question which does not deserve

the emphasis which has been laid upon it. What is chiefly important is

that for Leibniz, as for Wolff, both principles are principles of

analysis. The principle of sufficient reason is not an instrument for

determining necessary relations between independent substances. The

sufficient ground of a valid predicate must in all cases be found in the

concept of the subject to which it is referred. The difference between

the two principles lies elsewhere, namely, in the character of the

connection established between subject and predicate. In the one case

the denial of the proposition involves a direct self-contradiction. In

the other the opposite of the judgment is perfectly conceivable; our

reason for asserting it is a moral (employing the term in the

eighteenth-century sense), not a logical ground. The subject is so

constituted, that in the choice of ends, in pursuit of the good, it must

by its very nature so behave. The principle of sufficient reason, which

represents in our finite knowledge the divine principle of the best,

compels us to recognise the predicate as involved in the subject--as

involved through a ground which inclines without necessitating. Often

the analysis cannot be carried sufficiently far to enable us thus to

transform a judgment empirically given into one which is adequately

grounded. None the less, in recognising it as true, we postulate that

the predicate is related to the subject in this way. There are not for

Leibniz two methods of establishing truth, sense-perception to reveal

contingent fact, and general reasoning to establish necessary truth. A

proposition can be accepted as true only in so far as we can at least

_postulate_, through absence of contradiction and through sufficient

reason, its analytic character. It must express some form of identity.

The proposition, Caesar crossed the Rubicon, is given us as historical

fact. The more complete our knowledge of Caesar and of his time, the

further we can carry the analysis; and that analysis if completely

executed would displace the merely factual validity of the judgment by

insight into its metaphysical truth. Thus experience, with its

assertions of the here and now about particulars inexhaustibly concrete,

sets to rational science an inexhaustible task. We can proceed in our

analysis indefinitely, pushing out the frontiers of thought further and

further into the empirical realm. Only by the Divine Mind can the task

be completed, and all things seen as ordered in complete obedience to

the two principles of thought.

Leibniz, in propounding this view, develops a genuinely original

conception of the relation holding between appearance and reality. Only

monads, that is, spiritual beings, exist. Apart from the representative

activity of the monads there are no such existences as space and time,

as matter and motion. The mathematical and physical sciences, in their

present forms, therefore, cannot be interpreted as revealing absolute

existences. But, if ideally developed, they would emancipate themselves

from mechanical and sensuous notions; and would consist of a body of

truths, which, as thus perfected, would be discovered to constitute the

very being of thought. Pure thought or reason consists in the

apprehension of such truths. To discover and to prove them thought does

not require to issue out beyond itself. It creates this conceptual world

in the very act of apprehending it; and as this realm of truth thus

expresses the necessary character of all thought, whether divine or

human, it is universal and unchanging. Each mind apprehends the same

eternal truth; but owing to imperfection each finite being apprehends it

with some degree of obscurity and confusion, fragmentarily, in terms of

sense, and so falls prey to the illusion that the self stands in

mechanical relations to a spatial and temporal world of matter and

motion.

Leibniz supports this doctrine by his theory of sense-experience as

originating spontaneously from within the individual mind. Thereby he is

only repeating that pure thought generates its whole content from within

itself. Sense-experience, in its intrinsic nature, is nothing but pure

thought. Such thought, owing to the inexhaustible wealth of its

conceptual significance, so confuses the mind which thus generates it,

that only by prolonged analysis can larger and larger portions of it be

construed into the conceptual judgments which have all along constituted

its sole content. And in the process, space, time, and motion lose all

sensuous character, appearing in their true nature as orders of relation

which can be adequately apprehended only in conceptual terms. They

remain absolutely real as objects of thought, though as sensible

existences they are reduced to the level of mere appearance. Such is the

view of thought which is unfolded in Leibniz’s writings, in startling

contrast to the naturalistic teaching of his Scotch antagonist.

As already indicated, Kant’s first-hand knowledge of Leibniz’s teaching

was very limited. He was acquainted with it chiefly through the

inadequate channel of Wolff’s somewhat commonplace exposition of its

principles. But even from such a source he could derive what was most

essential, namely, Leibniz’s view of thought as absolute in its powers

and unlimited in its claims. How closely Wolff holds to the main tenet

of Leibniz’s system appears from his definition of philosophy as “the

science of possible things, so far as they are possible.” He thus

retains, though without the deeper suggestiveness of Leibniz’s

speculative insight, the view that thought precedes reality and

legislates for it. By the possible is not meant the existentially or

psychologically possible, but the conceptually necessary, that which,

prior to all existence, has objective validity, sharing in the universal

and necessary character of thought itself.

As Riehl has very justly pointed out,[1789] Wolff’s philosophy had,

prior even to the period of Kant’s earliest writings, been displaced by

empirical, psychological enquiries and by eclectic, popular philosophy.

Owing to the prevailing lack of thoroughness in philosophical thinking,

“Problemlosigkeit” characterised the whole period. The two exclusively

alternative views of the function of thought stood alongside one another

within each of the competing systems, quite unreconciled and in their

mutual conflict absolutely destructive of all real consistency and

thoroughness of thought. It was Kant who restored rationalism to its

rightful place. He reinvigorated the flaccid tone of his day by adopting

in his writings, both early and late, the strict method of rational

science, and by insisting that the really crucial issues be boldly

faced. In essentials Kant holds to Wolff’s definition of philosophy as

“the science of possible things, so far as they are possible.” As I have

just remarked, the possible is taken in an objective sense, and the

definition consequently gives expression to the view of philosophy upon

which Kant so frequently insists, as lying wholly in the sphere of pure

_a priori_ thought. Its function is to determine prior to specific

experience what experience must be; and obviously that is only possible

by means of an _a priori_, purely conceptual method. His _Critique_, as

its title indicates, is a criticism of pure reason by pure reason.

Nothing which escapes definition through pure _a priori_ thinking can

come within its sphere. The problem of the “possibility of experience”

is the problem of discovering the conditions which _necessarily_

determine experience to be what it is. Kant, of course, radically

transforms the whole problem, in method of treatment as well as in

results, when in defining the subject-matter of enquiry he substitutes

experience for things absolutely existent. This modification is

primarily due to the influence of Hume. But the constant occurrence in

Kant’s philosophy of the term “possibility” marks his continued belief

in the Idealist view of thought. Though pure thought never by itself

amounts to knowledge--therein Kant departs from the extreme rationalist

position--only through it is any knowledge, empirical or _a priori_,

possible at all. Philosophy, in order to exist, must be a system of _a

priori_ rational principles. Nothing empirical or hypothetical can find

any place in it.[1790] Yet at the same time it is the system of the _a

priori_ conditions only of experience, not of ultimate reality. Such is

the twofold relation of agreement and difference in which Kant stands to

his rationalist predecessors.

INDEX

Absolute. _See_ Unconditioned

Absolutist aspect of human consciousness, xxx-xxxiii, liii, liv-lv, lvi-lvii,

270-1, 274, 282, 285-7, 331 _n._, 423 _n._

Actuality, 391 ff.

Adamson, R., 38, 311, 314

Addison, 156

Adickes, E., xx-xxi, 76, 166, 200, 215 _n._, 233 _n._, 234, 304, 363,

376, 397, 406 _n._, 423, 439-40, 441, 464 _n._, 466, 479,

579 _n._, 601 _n._

Affinity, objective, 224, 253-7, 266-7

“_Als ob_” doctrine, 524, 553 ff.

Analogy, Kant’s use of the term, 356-8

Analytic and synthetic judgment, xxv ff., xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii,

28 ff., 37 ff., 59-60, 65;

existential judgment, 530-1;

distinction perhaps suggested by examination of ontological argument, 531.

_See_ Judgment

Analytic and synthetic methods, 44 ff., 111, 117 _n._

_See_ Transcendental method

_Analytic_, distinguished from the _Dialectic_, 172-4, 438-42

_Anthropologie_, Kant’s, 81 _n._, 100 _n._

Antinomies, lii, liii, 432, 478 ff., 519-20

Appearance, Kant’s views regarding, xxxvii, xlvi-xlvii, liii-liv, 18-22, 83-5,

120-2, 147 ff., 205 ff., 215 ff., 279-284, 293 ff., 301 ff., 312 ff., 321

ff., 330-1, 372-3, 404 ff., 427 ff.;

criticism of Leibnizian view of, 143-6;

criticism of Locke’s view of, 146-7;

ideality of, 147 ff.;

outer and inner appearances reduce to relations, 147-8;

appearance and illusion, 148 ff.;

causal efficacy of appearances, 216, 217-18, 351, 373-4;

distinction between appearance and reality based not on

categories of understanding but on Ideas of Reason,

liii-liv, 217-18, 326 _n._, 331, 390-1, 414-17, 426-31,

473-7, 511-12, 519-21, 541-2, 558-61

Apperception, and memory, 251;

in what sense original, xxxiv, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 260-3, 461-2, 472-7;

transcendental unity of, l-lii, 207 ff., 212, 250-3, 260-3, 270, 277-9, 322

ff., 455 ff., 473-7;

absent from the animal mind, xlvii-l;

objective unity of, 270-1, 274, 282, 285-7;

and inner sense, 295-8, 321 ff., 512 _n._

_See_ Self

_A priori_, Kant’s views regarding the, xxvi-xxviii, xxxiii-xxxvi,

lii-lv, 1-2, 39-40, 42, 54 ff.;

problem of _a priori_ synthetic judgment, 26 ff., 39-40, 43 ff.;

its validity merely _de facto_, xxxv-xxxvi, xliv, 30, 57, 118, 142, 185-6,

257-9, 291, 391-2, 393, 400-1, 411;

the faculties in which it originates, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 1-2, 50-1, 237-8,

263 ff., 391-2, 393, 398, 563-5;

semi-Critical view of the, 188-9, 232, 263-4.

_See_ Understanding, Reason

Aquinas, 73

Architectonic, xxii, 100, 184, 332-6, 340-1, 342, 343, 345, 347, 390, 392, 394,

419 ff., 434, 437, 440, 439-40, 454, 463, 464, 474, 479-80, 496, 498, 542,

563, 579

Aristotle, xlv, 196, 198, 390. _See_ Logic

Arithmetic, 32, 40-1, 65-6, 128 ff., 337-8, 347, 566

Association, and judgment, xxxiv-xxxv, xlviii-l;

and consciousness, xli-xlii; rests on objective affinity, 253-7, 266-7

Attributive judgment, Kant’s exclusive emphasis upon, 37-8, 180-1, 197

Augustine, St., 73, 110, 565

Avenarius, 587 _n._

Axioms, Kant’s view of, 50, 127, 348, 565-7

Bacon, Francis, 4-5, 74

Bain, A., 86 _n._

Balfour, A. J., 314

Baumgarten, 192-3, 441, 522

_Beantwortung der Frage: Was heisst Aufklärung?_ Kant’s, 15

Beattie, James, xxviii-xxix, xxxi _n._, 207, 582, 595, 600 _n._

Beck, 80

Belief, Kant’s view of, lv ff., 576-7

Beloselsky, Fürst von, xlix

Bergson, 86, 142, 359-60 _n._, 587 _n._

Berkeley, xxxii, xl, xlvi, 112, 153-4, 155 ff., 272, 298 ff., 587-8, 592, 595,

596

Borowski, 63, 156

Bosanquet, B., 36, 181, 197

Bradley, F. G., 36, 181, 197

Bruno, Giordano, 74

Bülffinger, 155

Caird, E., xx, 1 _n._, 23, 51, 102 _n._, 114, 117, 183, 194,

195, 262, 296, 314, 328, 340, 357 _n._, 359 _n._, 373, 378, 399, 462, 468

Campanella, 74

Canon, 72, 169-70, 174, 332-3, 438, 569 ff.

Cassirer, E., 132

Categorical imperative, xxxvi, lvi-lviii, 571 ff.

Categories, distinction from generic concept, 178 ff.;

_de facto_ nature of the, xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii, xliv, 30, 57, 185-6, 257-8,

291, 391-2, 398, 400-1, 411;

definition of the, 195-6, 198, 339-42, 404-5;

semi-Critical view of the, 188-9, 217-18, 232, 263-4;

merely logical forms, xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii, 30 _n._, 32, 39, 108, 176 ff.,

185-6, 191, 195-196, 257-8, 290-1, 325 ff., 339-40, 398, 404-5, 409-10,

413-14, 467;

valid only for appearances, 259-60;

and schemata, 195-6, 311, 333, 339-342, 467 _n._;

metaphysical deduction of the, 183 ff., 192 ff., 287-8;

transcendental deduction of the, 234 ff., 287-8;

all categories involved in every act of consciousness, xli-xlv, liii-liv

199-200, 356, 368, 370, 377, 387-91;

have wider scope than the forms of sense, lv-lvi, 20, 25, 290-1,

331, 404 ff.;

restricted by time and space, 342, 357;

in relation to outer and inner experience, 311-12;

how far predicable of the ‘I think,’ 325 ff.;

how far applicable to sensations, desires, etc., xlvi _n._, 275-6, 279 ff.,

312 ff., 384-5, 476;

proof of specific, 242-3, 252-3, 258-9, 287-8, 333, 343-4;

determinate and indeterminate application of the, 325 ff., 405 ff.;

may be intrinsically inapplicable to things in themselves, 290,

409-10, 413-14;

category of existence, 322, 415 _n._;

category of totality and Idea of the unconditioned, 199-200, 433, 451, 480,

529;

mathematical and dynamical, 198, 345-7, 510-11.

See _A priori_, Understanding

Catharticon, 169, 174

Causality, Kant influenced by Hume’s teaching regarding, xxv ff.,

61-4, 364 ff., 593-600;

Kant’s treatment of the principle of, 363 ff.;

Kant’s subjectivist and phenomenalist views of, 216, 217-18,

318-21, 351, 373-4;

sensations, feelings, etc. subject to principle of, xlvi _n._, 275, 279-82,

312, 384-5;

category of, involved in consciousness of time, liii-liv, 365 ff., 377 ff.,

387;

and freedom, 492 ff.

_See_ Hume

Clarke, 140, 539, 594

Cohen, H., 51, 102 _n._, 195, 262, 340

Coherence theory of truth, xxxvi-xxxix, 36 ff., 173 _n._;

criterion of truth bound up with the Ideas of Reason, 217-18, 326 _n._, 331,

390-1, 414-17, 426-31, 473-7, 511-12, 519-21, 541-2, 558-61

Concept, Kant’s generic or class view of the, 99-100, 105-7, 118-19, 126, 132-3

, 177-84, 338-9, 370-1, 377-84, 390-1;

intuition and conception, 38-42, 93-4, 105-9, 118-20, 126, 128-134, 165-6,

167-8, 194, 370, 390-1, 564-6;

construction of concepts, 41, 131-3, 338-9, 418 ff., 564-6;

concepts and images, 337-9;

Kant’s doctrine of the pure concept, xxxix, 394-400, 418 ff.

_See_ Understanding

_Concerning the Advances, made, etc._

See _Fortschritte_

Consciousness, Kant’s views regarding, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxix-xlv,

xliii-xlvii, l-lii;

and the animal mind, xlvii-l;

may be a resultant, xxxiv, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 261-3, 277-9, 327,

459-62, 473-7;

no immediate consciousness of mind’s own activities, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 263

ff., 273 ff., 293, 295 ff., 322 ff.;

consciousness of time Kant’s datum, xxxiv, 120, 241 ff., 365 ff., 381 ff.;

absolutist aspect of, xxx-xxxiii, liii, lvi-lvii, 270-1, 274,

282, 285-7, 331 _n._

See Apperception, Judgment

Contingency, assertion of, 39 ff., 55, 286-9

Continuity, Kant’s views regarding, 352-355, 488 ff., 509;

principle of, 380-1;

transcendental principle of, 551

Copernicus, 18-19, 22-5

Cosmological Argument, 531 ff.

Criterion of truth. _See_ Coherence theory of truth

Criticism, Kant’s use of term, 1, 9, 13-14, 21;

Age of, 15

_Critique of Practical Reason_, lvi, lvii, lx, 77-8, 569 ff., 572

_Critique of Judgment_, lxi, 77, 83, 97-8, 191, 265, 537, 539, 561, 569 _n._,

574, 575 _n._, 576, 577 _n._

Crusius, xxviii, xxxii, 47

Curtius, E., 336

Deduction of categories, distinction between subjective and objective,

xliv _n._, 235 ff.;

subjective, 245 ff., 263 ff.; objective, 248 ff.;

metaphysical, 175 ff., 192 ff.;

stages in Kant’s development of metaphysical, 186 ff.

_See_ Transcendental method of proof

Deduction of Ideas, metaphysical, 426, 433 ff., 450-4, 478-80, 522-3;

transcendental, 426, 430, 436, 454, 552-4, 572 ff.

_See_ Ideas of Reason

Definition, Kant’s view of, 564-5

Deist, as contrasted with Theist, 541;

Kant’s deistic interpretation of the Ideas of Reason, 418, 436, 439-40, 454,

473-7, 520-1, 537, 542, 575.

_See_ Idealist view of Reason.

Democritus, 354 _n._

Demonstration, Kant’s view of, 566-7

Descartes, xxxi, xxxix-xliii, xlvi, 155, 157, 272-3, 279 ff., 298 ff.,

354 _n._, 421, 449, 583-7, 589-90, 597

Desires, Kant’s view of the, xlvi _n._, 276, 279-82, 312, 384-5

Dewey, J., 36

_Dialectic_, distinguished from the _Analytic_, 172-4, 438-42;

the problems of the, 425 ff.;

development of Kant’s views regarding the, 431 ff.

_Dilucidatio Principiorum primorum_, etc., Kant’s, 155, 299

Discipline, 170, 174, 438, 563 ff.

_Dissertation_, Kant’s Inaugural, xx, 26, 40, 46, 81, 86, 87, 89 ff., 96, 99,

101, 117, 123, 128, 131, 135, 137, 140-1, 144-5, 147, 159-60, 163-5, 185,

186-9, 208, 260, 263, 299, 382, 419, 427, 432, 482, 486, 489 _n._, 548

Divine Existence, in relation to space and time, 159-61;

and intuitive understanding, 160;

Idea of, 434-7;

how far can be concretely pictured, 536-7, 541-2, 556 ff.

_See_ God

Dogmatism, as distinguished from Criticism, 9, 13-14, 21

_Dreams of a Visionseer_, Kant’s, 155 _n._, 299

Duns Scotus, 73-4

Eberhard, Kant’s reply to, 90 ff., 143 _n._

Ego, transcendental. _See_ Apperception

Eleatics, the, 159

Emotions, Kant’s view of the, xlvi _n._, 276, 279-82, 312, 384-5

Empirical, relation to the _a priori_, 36 ff.;

problem of empirical knowledge, 39-40, 53;

empirical object intermediate between subjective representations and thing

in itself, 206 ff., 223, 270 ff., 308 ff.

_See_ Experience

_Enquiry into the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals_,

Kant’s, 15, 40, 563 ff.

_Ens realissimum_, 522 ff., 529-30, 532, 534, 541-2, 556

Epicurus, lix, 436, 499, 582

Erdmann, B., xx, xxviii _n._, 46, 142 _n._, 158, 161, 163, 200-1,

208 _n._, 294 _n._, 314, 373, 382 _n._, 412, 431-2, 471, 601 _n._

Erhardt, F., 484 _n._, 494

Error, _See_ Appearance, Illusion

Euler, 162

Existence, and the “I think,” 322 ff.;

judgment of, always synthetic, 527 ff.;

necessary existence, 533-7

Experience, proof by reference to the possibility of, xxxvi, xxxvii-xxxviii,

45, 238-9, 241-3, 259-60, 344, 426, 430, 454, 552-4, 572 ff.;

meaning of term, 52; problem of, 57-8;

as datum is equivalent to consciousness of time, xxxiv, 120,

241 ff., 365 ff., 381 ff.

Exposition, Kant’s use of term, 109-10

Faith, Kant’s view of, lv-lvi, lxi, 571 ff., 575-6

Feeling, Kant’s use of term, 82-3;

Kant’s view of, xlvi _n._, 276, 279-82, 312, 384-5

Fichte, l

Fischer, K., 46, 75, 113-14, 140, 601 _n._

Form and matter, importance of distinction between, xxxiii-xxxiv, xxxvi, 85 ff.

Forms of the understanding. _See_ Categories

_Fortschritte, Welches sind die wirklichen_, etc., Kant’s, li _n._, 59, 60, 84,

578 _n._, 580 _n._

_Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals_, Kant’s, lviii, lix, 569, 572

_Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse_, Kant’s, lvii, 578

Freedom of the will, problem of, 20-1, 435, 512 ff., 569-70;

and causality, 492 ff.;

transcendental and practical freedom, 497, 512-13, 517-18, 569-70, 573-4

Galileo, 18, 583-4, 586

Garve, xix, 150; Garve-Feder review, 158

_Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte_, Kant’s, 117, 161-2

Geometry, the fundamental mathematical science, 96 _n._;

pure and applied, 111-12, 147, 349, 565-6;

Kant’s attitude to modern, 117 ff.

Geulincx, 596, 598

God, ontological proof of existence of, 527 ff.;

cosmological proof, 531 ff.;

physico-theological proof, 538 ff.;

problem of God’s existence, 569 ff.;

how far an indispensable Idea of Reason, 439-40, 536-7, 541-2, 556 ff.

Green, T. H., l _n._, 23, 36

Groos, K., xxviii _n._

Hamann, 157, 539-40 _n._;

describes Kant as “a Prussian Hume,” 305

Hegel, xxxvii, xlv, l, 36, 190, 194, 274, 554 _n._

Herbart, 86 _n._, 124

Herz, Marcus, xxii-xxiii, xxix, xlix, 6, 26, 28, 46, 51, 114 _n._, 138, 187,

189, 198, 206-7, 219-22, 432

Hicks, G. Dawes, 415 _n._

Hobbes, 593

Höffding, H., 23

Home, Henry, 1

Homogeneity, transcendental principle of, 550-1

Hume, date of first influence on Kant, xx, xxviii;

Kant’s relation to, xxv-xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvii, xlvi;

his view of consciousness, xl-xliii;

anticipates Kant’s phenomenalism, 21-2;

maintains that experience cannot prove universality or necessity, 27, 57-8;

shows causal axiom to be synthetic, 30-1;

Hume’s problem a deepening of Kant’s earlier problem, 46;

Kant’s relation to, 61-4;

on the self, 207 _n._;

his subjectivism, 272-3, 284, 300;

Kant “a Prussian Hume,” 305;

much of Hume’s teaching in regard to causality accepted by Kant, 364;

Kant’s reply to Hume, 369-71;

Hume’s philosophy the perfected expression of the empirical

and sceptical position, 421;

influence on Kant, 432;

on existential judgment, 528;

influence on Kant of Hume’s _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, 539-540, 557,

567 _n._;

influence on Kant, 583;

the philosophical teaching of, 588-601;

influence on Kant, 606

Humility, lvi, lviii-lix, 554 _n._

Hypotheses, and postulates, xxxvii-xxxviii, 541, 543 ff., 571 ff.;

how far valid in metaphysics, lxi, 9-12, 543 ff.

Hypothetical employment of Reason, 549-50

Idealism, objective or Critical, 274;

Kant’s refutations of subjective idealism. 298 ff., 462-3;

transcendental idealism as key to solution of the antinomies, 503 ff.

_See_ Phenomenalism and subjectivism

Ideal of Reason, 522 ff., 536-7, 541-2, 554 _n._, 556-61

Idealist view of Reason, xxxviii-xxxix, xliv, liii, 97-8, 102, 331-2, 390-1,

414-17, 426 ff., 433 ff., 447 ff., 473-7, 478 ff., 500-6, 511-12,

519-21, 547 ff., 552 ff., 558-61

Ideality, of space and time, 76, 111, 116-17, 138, 147, 154, 308

Ideas of Reason, Kant’s sceptical and Idealist views of the, xxxviii-xxxix,

xliii, xliv, lii-lv, lvi ff., 330-1, 390-1, 414-17. 426 ff., 433 ff.,

446 ff., 473-7, 478 ff., 500-6, 511-12, 520-1, 547 ff., 558-61;

involved in consciousness of space and time, liii-liv, 96-8, 102 _n._, 165-6,

390-1;

Kant’s deistic interpretation of the, 418, 436, 439-40, 454, 473-477, 520-1,

537, 575;

as limiting concepts, 408, 413-17, 426 ff.;

as regulative, xxxviii-xxxix, xliii, liii, 473-7, 500 ff., 547 ff.;

and categories of relation, 451-2;

distinction between mathematical and dynamical, 510-11;

Kant’s criticism of Idea of unconditioned necessity, 527 ff., 533-7, 541-2;

metaphysical and practical validity of the Ideas, 570-6;

concluding comments on Kant’s views of the, 558-61;

condition distinction between appearance and reality, liii-liv, 217-18, 326

_n._, 331, 391, 414-17, 426-31, 473-7, 511-12, 519-21, 541-2, 558-61.

_See_ Deduction of Ideas

Illusion, and appearance, 148 ff.;

Berkeley regards objects of outer sense as, 157, 307-8;

inner experience not illusory, 323-4;

transcendental, 13, 427-9, 437, 456 ff., 480, 552, 555

Imagination, may be the common root of sensibility and understanding, 77, 225,

265;

productive, 224 ff., 264 ff., 337, 348, 375-6

Immanent and transcendent metaphysics. _See_ Metaphysics

Immortality, problem of, 569 ff.

Incongruous counterparts, 161 ff.

Infinitude, of space, 105 ff.;

of time, 124 ff.;

Kant’s view of, 483 ff.;

distinction between _in infinitum_ and _in indefinitum_, 507 ff.

Inner Sense, xliii _n._, 148, 291 ff., 360, 464, 468-9;

and apperception, 321 ff.

Intuition, Kant’s doctrine of pure, 40 ff., 79-80, 118-20, 128 ff.,

167-8, 468-9;

intuition and conception, 38-42, 93-98, 105-9, 118-20, 126, 128-34, 165-166,

167-8, 194, 390-1, 564-6;

formal intuition and form of intuition, 109, 114-16

Intuitive understanding, Kant’s view of, 160, 291, 408 ff., 468 _n._ 542

Jacobi, 300

Jakob, xxviii _n._

James, W., 86, 277-8, 459 _n._, 461 _n._

Janitsch, 155, 156

Jones, Sir Henry, 36

Judgment, Kant’s doctrine of the, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxviii, xli-xliv, xlviii-l, 177

ff., 192 ff., 286 ff.;

the fundamental activity of the understanding, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxviii, xli-xlii,

133, 181-2, 288, 332, 370;

_a priori_ and empirical, 27-8;

analytic and synthetic, xxv ff., 28 ff., 37 ff., 59-60;

judgment 7 + 5 = 12, 65;

relational types ignored by Kant, 37 ff.;

Kant’s attributive view of, 37-38, 180-1, 197;

as assertion of contingency, 39 ff., 55, 286-9;

Kant’s distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of

experience, 288-9;

existential, 527-31

Knowing and thinking, distinction between, lv-lvi, 20, 25, 290-1, 331, 404 ff.

_See_ Categories

Knowledge, the narrow meaning assigned to term by Kant, lv-lvi, lxi, 25

Knützen, 161

Lambert, xx, xxviii, xxxii, 74, 138, 150, 193

Lange, F., 23

_Lectures on Metaphysics_, Kant’s, 261, 275 _n._, 299, 448-9, 475 _n._

_Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion_ Kant’s, 261

Leibniz, Kant’s relation to, xxx-xxxiii, xxxv, xxxvii, xlvi, l, lvii;

his absolutist view of thought, xxx-xxxii;

anticipates Kant’s phenomenalism, 21-2;

his rejection of empiricism, 27, 58;

his pre-established harmony, 28;

regards synthetic judgments as always empirical, 30;

his conceptual atomism, 38;

Kant probably influenced by the _Nouveaux Essais_ of, 92, 186;

referred to by Kant, 112;

Kant’s relation to, 140-1;

Kant’s criticism of his interpretation of sensibility and appearance, 143-6;

his view of space, 161 ff.;

Kant influenced by the spiritualism of, 208-9, 243, 260-1, 263;

his subjectivism and doctrine of _petites perceptions_, 272-3, 298-9, 306;

his alternative views of the reality of the material world, 298-9;

continuing influence of his rationalism on Kant, 394-5, 398-9, 418 ff.;

his view of the possible as wider than the actual, 401-2;

antinomies formulated by Kant from the standpoint of the Leibnizian

rationalism, 481 ff.;

Kant’s formulation of the ontological argument Leibnizian, 522 ff., 556;

contrast between Locke and, 146-7, 421, 582;

on mathematical method, 592;

the philosophical teaching of, 601-6;

on the nature of sense-experience, 604-5;

influence on Kant, 605-6

Limiting concepts, Ideas as, 408, 413-17, 426 ff.

_See_ Ideas of Reason

Locke, xxxii, xl, xlvi, 15;

Kant’s criticism of his view of appearance, 146-7;

Kant’s restatement of his distinction between primary and secondary

qualities, 120-2, 146, 149 ff., 306;

subjectivism of, 272, 306;

on inner sense, 148, 292-3;

contrast between Leibniz and, 146-7, 421, 582;

his use of term idea rejected by Kant, 449;

on primary and secondary qualities, 586 _n._;

rationalism of, 591-2;

his proof of causal axiom, 594;

on the causal relation, 596, 598

Logic, Kant’s contribution to the science of, xxxvi-xxxix;

Kant’s view of the traditional, 10, 21, 33-6, 100, 181, 183, 184-6,

259, 332;

the various kinds of, 167 ff.;

distinction between general and transcendental, xxxix, 170 ff.,

176 ff., 178

_n._, 181, 183, 184-5, 194-5, 196, 335

_Logic_, Kant’s, 1, 110, 170 ff., 180-1, 576 _n._, 577 _n._,

580 _n._, 581 _n._, 582

_Lose Blätter aus Kant’s Nachlass_, xx-xxi, 112 _n._, 202-3,

209, 211 _n._, 232-4, 261

Lotze, 1 _n._, 36, 181

Mach, E., 596

Mairan, J. J. Dortous de, 496

Malebranche, xxxi, xxxii, xliii _n._, 15, 28, 47;

Kant’s phenomenalism anticipated by, 21-2;

rationalism of, 590-1;

on the causal relation, 596-8

Manifolds, of appearance, 84-5;

empirical, 267, 274 ff.;

pure _a priori_, 88-90, 92 ff., 95, 96-7, 134, 142 _n._, 148 _n._,

171, 194-5, 226, 228-9, 267, 269-70, 289, 337, 344, 375, 385 _n._

Mathematics, methods of, 17-18;

judgments in, not all synthetic, 64;

principle of contradiction in mathematical reasoning, 60, 64-5, 344;

Kant’s intuitional view of, 40-1, 65-6;

distinction between mathematical and philosophical knowledge, 15, 563 ff.;

pure and applied, 68, 111-12, 114-15, 140, 166, 566;

use of schemata in, 337-9.

_See_ Arithmetic, Geometry

Matter, Kant’s dynamical theory of, 354-5;

principle of conservation of, 361-2

Meier, 441

Mendelssohn, Moses, xix, xxxii, 6, 11, 58, 138 _n._, 139 _n._,

150, 153, 160-1,

458-9 _n._, 467, 470-1

_Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science_, Kant’s, 56 _n._, 66, 97,

127-8, 164-5 _n._, 312 _n._, 354 _n._, 361 _n._, 380-1,

384 _n._, 491, 579 _n._

Metaphysics, distinction between immanent and transcendent,

liv-lv, 15, 19, 22,

26-7, 33, 50, 52, 53, 55-6, 58-9, 66-70, 244-5, 257-8,

545, 580-1; in disrepute, 8-9;

Kant professes to establish a quite final, 10, 35, 543 ff.;

“Copernican hypothesis” and, 18 ff.;

as natural disposition, 12-13, 68 ff.;

as science, 68 ff.;

hypotheses not valid in, 543 ff.;

the problems of, 569-76, 579-81

Method, the sceptical, 545-6;

mathematical, 563-7.

_See_ Analytic and Synthetic Methods

Mill, J. S., 86, 364-5, 377, 596

Mind, Kant’s use of term, 81

_Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures_, Kant’s, 181-2

Modality, 391 ff.

_Monadologia physica_, Kant’s, 354

Moral attitude, the, xxxvi, xlv, lv ff., 515-16, 571 ff.

Moral belief, lvi ff., 577

Moral law, consciousness of the, _de facto_, xxxvi, xlv, 572-3

Motion, doctrine of, 127-9, 133;

Galileo’s revolutionary doctrine of, 583-4

Müller, Max, 75

Natural Science, pure, 66-8;

and immanent metaphysics, 70. _See_ Metaphysics

Nature, means “all that is,” 16

Necessity, and universality, 56-7;

definition of, 391 ff.;

of thought and of existence, 402-3, 527, 533, 536;

limited being may exist by unconditioned, 527, 533, 536;

absolute necessity not purely logical, 528;

unconditioned, Idea of, 527 ff., 533-7, 541-2, 555, 558-61;

and contingency, concepts of, not applicable to things in themselves, 535;

relative, 541, 555, 571 ff.

_Negative Quantity_, Kant’s essay on, 381, 403 _n._

_New Doctrine of Motion and Rest_, Kant’s, 354, 381 _n._

Newton, his influence on Kant, lv-lvi, 96 _n._, 140-2, 161 ff., 354 _n._;

Kant modifies Newton’s cosmology, 539

Noumenon, positive and negative conception of, 408 ff., 413.

_See_ Appearance

Number, schema of, 347-8. _See_ Arithmetic

Object, Kant’s use of term, 79-81, 167 _n._, 174;

transcendental, 203 ff.;

empirical, 206 ff., 223, 270 ff., 308 ff.

Objective, not the opposite of the subjective, 279 ff., 313-14;

validity of Ideas, 558-61

Occasionalism, 465, 596-7, 598

_On the Radical Evil in Human Nature_, Kant’s treatise, lviii, lix

Ontological argument, 527 ff.

Opinion, Kant’s use of term, 543, 576-7

Organon, 71-2, 169-70, 174

Oswald, xxviii _n._

Outer Sense, 147, 276, 293 ff., 360

Paralogisms, 455 ff.;

nature of fallacy of the, 466, 470

Paulsen, 46-7, 64, 373, 601 _n._

Pearson, K., 596

_Perpetual Peace_, Kant’s treatise on, lvii _n._

Phenomenalism and subjectivism, xxxix ff.,

xlv-xlvii, 82-4, 120-2, 136-8, 138-9, 140, 150-4,

155-9, 223, 227, 270 ff., 312 ff., 349-51,

357-8, 373-4, 407 _n._, 414-17

Phenomenon, distinction between appearance and, 83.

_See_ Appearance

Philosophy, causes of failure of, 59;

Kant reinterprets its function and aims, lvi, 571-6, 577-8;

the domains of, 579-81;

Kant’s view of history of, 582

Physico-theological argument, 538 ff.

Physics, method of, 17-18;

Kant’s views regarding, 354-5, 361-2, 379-81

Pistorius, 305, 307-8, 323, 467

Plato, xlv, 47, 158, 301, 390, 436, 496, 582

Pope, 156

Possibility, Kant’s definition of, 391 ff.

Postulates. _See_ Hypotheses

Practical employment of Reason, lvi-lix, 569 ff.

Pragmatic belief, lvi, 577

Prantl, 73

Pre-established harmony, 28, 47, 114, 141-2, 267-8, 290, 465, 590

Priestley, J., xxviii _n._, 11, 567 _n._

Primary and secondary qualities, 82, 120-2, 146, 149 ff., 306

Principles never self-evident, xxvi-xxviii,

xxxv-xxxviii, 36 ff., 53, 185-6, 340.

See _A priori_

Probabilities, inference from. _See_ Hypotheses

_Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics_, Kant’s, xxv,

xxviii _n._, xxix _n._,

12, 13, 46, 47, 49, 59-60, 61-4, 65, 66-7, 68 ff.,

80, 84, 91, 106, 109-11, 116, 121, 129, 146, 149,

152, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163, 165, 178-9,

184, 188, 234, 288-9, 299, 300-1, 305-8, 346,

361 _n._, 376-7

Psychology, Kant’s views regarding, xliii-xlvii, 50-1,

235 ff., 263 ff., 269-270, 311 _n._, 312 _n._, 384-5,

455 ff., 473-7, 580-1

Pure, Kant’s use of term, 1-2, 54-6, 64

Quality, and intensive magnitude, 352.

_See_ Primary and secondary qualities

Rationalism, Kant’s type of, xxxv-xxxvi, 257-8;

relation to the rationalism of Leibniz, 418 ff.

See _A priori_

Reason, meanings of the term, liii-lv, lvi, 2-3, 71, 426 ff., 520-1, 558-61;

ineradicably metaphysical, liii-lv, lvi, 8;

condition of free actions, 515-16;

as practical, lvi ff., 515-17;

as causing antinomy, liii, 519 ff.;

hypothetical employment of, 549-50;

Ideal of, 556 ff.

_See_ Idealist and sceptical views of Reason, Ideas of Reason

_Rechtslehre_, Kant’s, 190

Reciprocity, category of, 197, 381 ff., 434-5, 439-40, 451-4

_Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, xx,

xxiii, xlix, lv, 85,

86, 106, 127, 182, 188 ff., 196, 197, 198, 200-1, 202-3

, 208, 231-2, 261, 334 _n._, 399, 433-40, 448-9, 543

Regulative. _See_ Ideas of Reason

Reicke, xx. See _Lose Blätter_

Reimarus, 193

Representation, Kant’s use of term, 81, 104;

distinction between representation and its object, 135,

136-7, 272 ff., 308

ff., 317-18, 365.

_See_ Phenomenalism and subjectivism

Representative perception, doctrine of, xxxix-xliii, xlvi, 272 ff., 298 ff.,

585-8

Riehl, A., xliv _n._, 46, 51, 88, 102 _n._, 195, 303-4,

317-18, 340-1, 342, 357-8, 372 _n._, 373, 601 _n._, 605

Rousseau, lvii, lviii-lix, 436, 567 _n._, 578

Rule, two kinds of, 372

Russell, B., 491-2, 568 _n._

Sceptical method, Kant’s, 481, 545-6

Sceptical view of Reason, 481, 500-3, 511-12, 519-21, 528-9, 533-7, 541-2, 547

ff., 558-61

Scepticism, 9, 13-15, 545-6, 567

Schematism, 195-6, 265-7, 289, 311, 333, 334 ff., 467 _n._;

and images, 337-9

Schopenhauer, 75, 197, 315-16, 365-7, 377-9, 387-9, 407 _n._, 482-3 _n._, 493

_n._, 495 _n._

Schulze, Johann, 129-31, 138, 198-9, 480 _n._

Schütz, 153

Segner, 66

Self, Kant’s semi-Critical, spiritualist view of the, l,

207-9, 212, 243, 260-3, 327-8, 473-7, 515;

may not be an ultimate form of existence, l-lii, 260-3,

277-9, 327, 459-62,

473-7;

Idea of the, 439-40, 455-62, 471, 472-7, 554;

Kant’s view of nature and destiny of, 472-7.

_See_ Apperception, Soul

Self-consciousness. _See_ Apperception, Consciousness

Self-evidence, Kant’s rejection of, xxvi-xxviii, xxxv-xxxviii,

36, 53, 118, 142, 185-6, 563-4, 565-6.

See _A priori_

Sensation, Kant’s views of, 81-2, 84-8, 274-7, 349-52;

non-spatial, 85-8, 100-1, 105;

required for determining actuality, 391 ff.;

sensations, feelings, etc., subject to law of causality,

xlvi _n._, 275, 279-82, 311-12, 313-14, 384-5

Sensibility, may have a common root with understanding, 77;

definition of, 81, 167-8;

as a limitation, 116;

criticism of Leibniz’s view of, 143-6;

Kant’s view of, 274-7

_Seven Small Papers_, Kant’s, 298

Sidgwick, H., 314

Sigsbee, R. A., 11

Sigwart, 36, 181, 197

Simultaneity. _See_ Time

Soul, and body, Kant’s view of their relation, 275-6,

279-84, 312 ff., 384-5,

464-6, 467, 471, 476.

_See_ Apperception, Self

Space, Kant’s views of, xxxv-xxxvi, lii, 85 ff., 188;

involves an Idea of Reason, liii-liv, 96-8, 102 _n._, 165-6, 390-1;

metaphysical exposition of, 99 ff., 109-10, 112 ff., 134 ff.;

transcendental exposition of, 109 ff., 344-5;

not a property of things in themselves, 112 ff.;

is the form of outer sense, 114-16;

transcendental ideality of, 76, 116-17;

uniform for all human beings, 116-18, 120, 241-2, 257;

possibility of other spaces, 117 ff.;

criticism of Newtonian and Leibnizian views of, 140-2;

merely _de facto_ character of, 57, 118, 142, 185-6, 257;

as _Unding_, 154;

in relation to Divine Existence, 159-61;

and incongruous counterparts, 161 ff.;

involved in consciousness of time, 309 ff., 384-6, 390-1;

ignored by Kant in doctrine of schematism, 341, 348, 360;

involves category of reciprocity, liii-liv, 385-7, 390-1;

and antinomy, 480 ff.

_See_ Geometry

Specification, transcendental principle of, 501-2

Spencer, Herbert, 87, 584 _n._, 596

Spinoza, 74, 273 _n._, 440, 587, 601-2

Stadler, 197, 378-9, 389 _n._

Stirling, J. Hutchison, 23, 75, 366 _n._, 377

Stout, G. F., 87, 367 _n._, 387

Subconscious, the, Kant’s view of, 263 ff., 273-4

Subjectivism, in Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental

object, xxxix ff., xlv-xlvii, 206 ff., 217-18.

_See_ Phenomenalism and subjectivism, Idealism

Substance and attribute, category of, 362-3

Sulzer, xxviii _n._

Summum Bonum, 575, 577

Swedenborg, 155 _n._, 158 _n._, 299

Swift, Benjamin, 74

Synthetic, problem of knowledge _a priori_ and, xxv ff.,

xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii,

28 ff., 37 ff., 59 ff.;

knowledge from mere concepts, 64;

decomposing synthesis, 95;

ambiguities in Kant’s formulation of problem of _a priori_

synthetic judgments, 43 ff.;

processes, xliii-xlv, l-lii, 245-8, 261-2, 263 ff.,

277-8, 293, 295 ff., 322,

327 ff.

_See_ Analytic and synthetic judgments, and methods

System of pure reason, 71-3, 579-80

Teleological argument, 536-7, 538-42, 556-8

Terrasson, Jean, 15

Tetens, 82, 148, 294 _n._, 475

Thales, 18

Theist, as contrasted with deist, 541

Things in themselves, Kant’s first use of phrase, 112 _n._;

transcendental object equivalent to thing in itself, 204 ff.

_See_ Appearance

Thinking, discursive and creative. _See_ Understanding

Thomasius, 193

Time, consciousness of, Kant’s datum, xxxiv, 120, 241-2;

metaphysical exposition of, 123 ff.;

as infinite, 125;

transcendental exposition of, 126 ff., 344-5;

as form of inner sense, 134-5, 293 ff.; axioms of, 127;

not a determination of outer appearance, 134 ff.;

merely _de facto_ character of, xxxv-xxxvi, lii, 142, 565-7;

simultaneity not a mode of, 135 ff., 356, 358-9;

and simultaneous apprehension, 135-6, 348, 358-9, 367-8, 371-2, 381-2;

and reality of inner changes, 138-40;

transcendental ideality of, 76, 138;

Kant’s view of, not a mere hypothesis, 147;

space involved in consciousness of, 134-6, 309 ff., 341, 347-8;

subjective and objective order of, 358 ff., 365 ff., 381 ff.;

time relations determined by the given, 34-5, 267-8, 367, 370, 371-2, 377;

does not itself change, 142, 359-60;

category of causality involved in consciousness of, liii-liv, 365 ff., 377

ff., 387;

cannot be experienced in and by itself, 375-6;

category of reciprocity involved in consciousness of, 381-91;

Idea of Reason involved in consciousness of, liii-liv, 96-8, 390-1;

infinitude and infinite divisibility of, 390-1, 481, 483 ff.

Totality. _See_ Unconditioned

Transcendent. _See_ Transcendental and Metaphysics

Transcendental, meaning of term, 73-6, 116-17, 302; illusion, 13, 427-9, 552,

555;

method of proof, xxxv, xxxvii-xxxviii, 45, 238-9, 241-3, 259-60, 344, 568,

572 ff.;

ideality of space and time, 76, 116-17, 138;

exposition of space and time, 109 ff., 126 ff., 344-5;

object, Kant’s doctrine of, xlvi _n._, 203, 204 ff., 322, 328, 371-3, 406-7,

412, 414, 415, 513-14, 518;

unity of apperception, Kant’s pre-Critical view of, 207 ff., 212;

unity of apperception, Kant’s doctrine of, l-lii, 250-3, 260-3, 270, 277-9,

322 ff., 455 ff., 473-7;

psychology, xliii-xlvii, l-lii, 50-1, 235 ff., 253, 263 ff.; Ideal, 522 ff.;

principles of Reason, 550-1;

illusion, 13, 427-9, 437, 456 ff., 480, 552, 555.

_See_ Deduction of Categories and of Ideas

_Transition from the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural

Science to Physics_, Kant’s treatise, 275 _n._, 283 _n._,

482 _n._, 514 _n._

Trendelenburg, 113-14, 140

Truth. _See_ Coherence theory of truth

_Ueber das Organ der Seele_, Kant’s, 81 _n._, 275 _n._

_Ueber eine Entdeckung_, etc., Kant’s reply to Eberhard, 90 ff., 143 _n._

_Ueber Philosophie überhaupt_, Kant’s, 83 _n._, 128

Ulrichs, 467, 471

Unconditioned, Idea of the, its relation to category of totality,

199-200, 433-4, 451, 480, 529, 559-60;

our awareness of the conditioned presupposes the, 416-17, 429 ff.;

in connection with Kant’s view of the self, 473-7;

Kant’s criticism of the Idea of the, 498, 527 ff., 533-7,

541-2, 555, 558-61.

_See_ Idealist and Sceptical views of Reason

Understanding, and Reason, lii-lv, 2, 52;

defined, 81;

may have common root with sensibility, 77;

distinction between its discursive and its originative

activities, 172, 176

ff., 182-3, 263 ff., 277-8, 334-5, 370, 377;

viewed by Kant as a unity, 174 ff., 185-6;

its primary function, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxviii, xli-xlii, 93-94,

133, 181-2, 288-9, 332, 370, 377;

as intuitive, 160, 291, 408 ff., 468 _n._, 542.

_See_ Concept

_Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens_, Kant’s, 539

_Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze_, Kant’s, 110 _n._, 131

Vaihinger, Hans, xx, xxv, xxviii _n._, xliv _n._, 2, 13, 23, 43,

45 ff., 52,

53, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 81, 87, 104, 105, 109, 112, 113, 117,

127, 130, 139, 140, 143, 147, 148, 156, 161, 162, 202 ff.,

261, 268-9, 298-9, 301, 314-315, 579 _n._, 601 _n._

Value, problems of, lvi, lx-lxi

Void, Kant’s doctrine of the, 354-5

Voltaire, xxxi, 436, 539

_Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume_, Kant’s, 40,

86 _n._, 140, 162

Watson, J., 1 _n._, 23 _n._, 75, 102 _n._, 117, 183, 195, 196, 198, 262, 328,

462, 468 _n._, 564

Windelband, 46

Wolff, 192-3, 272, 436, 440, 522, 579, 587, 601-6

Zedlitz, Freiherr von, 6-7

THE END

_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Headings not in Kant’s Table of Contents are printed in italics.

[2] _W._ x. p. 323.

[3] _W._ x. p. 316.

[4] Cf. Kant’s letter to Lambert, September 2, 1770: _W._ x. p. 93.

[5] Embodied in his edition of the _Kritik_ (1889).

[6] From letter to Marcus Herz, June 7, 1777: _W._ x. pp. 116-17.

[7] From letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772: _W._ x. p. 127.

[8] _Reflexionen_ ii. 5.

[9] These passages are by no means unambiguous, and are commented upon

below, p. 61 ff.

[10] For justification of this interpretation of Hume I must refer the

reader to my articles on “The Naturalism of Hume” in _Mind_, vol. xiv.

N.S. pp. 149-73, 335-47.

[11] To this fact Kant himself draws attention: “But the perpetual hard

fate of metaphysics would not allow Hume to be understood. We cannot

without a certain sense of pain consider how utterly his opponents,

Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and even Priestley, missed the point of the

problem. For while they were ever assuming as conceded what he doubted,

and demonstrating with eagerness and often with arrogance what he never

thought of disputing, they so overlooked his inclination towards a

better state of things, that everything remained undisturbed in its old

condition.”--_Prolegomena_, p. 6; Mahaffy and Bernard’s trans. p. 5.

[12] Sulzer’s translation of Hume’s _Essays_ (including the _Enquiries_)

appeared in 1754-56.

[13] The word which Kant uses is _Erinnerung_ (cf. below, p. xxix, _n._

4). There are two main reasons for believing that Kant had not himself

read the _Treatise_. He was imperfectly acquainted with the English

language, and there was no existing German translation. (Jakob’s

translation did not appear till 1790-91. On Kant’s knowledge of English,

cf. Erdmann: _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, Bd. i. (1888) pp.

62 ff., 216 ff.; and K. Groos: _Kant-Studien_, Bd. v. (1900) p. 177 ff.:

and below, p. 156.) And, secondly, Kant’s statements reveal his entire

ignorance of Hume’s view of mathematical science as given in the

_Treatise_.

[14] Cf. Vaihinger, _Commentary_, i. p. 344 ff. Beattie does, indeed,

refer to Hume’s view of mathematical science as given in the _Treatise_,

but in so indirect and casual a manner that Kant could not possibly

gather from the reference any notion of what that treatment was. Cf.

Beattie’s _Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth_ (sixth

edition), pp. 138, 142, 269.

[15] These Hume had himself pointed out both in the _Treatise_ and in

the _Enquiry_; and because of them he rejects scepticism as a feasible

philosophy of life. Kant’s statement above quoted that Hume’s critics

(among whom Beattie is cited) “were ever assuming what Hume doubted, and

demonstrating with eagerness and _often with arrogance_ what he never

thought of disputing,” undoubtedly refer in a quite especial degree to

Beattie.

[16] _Werke_, x. p. 123 ff. It is dated February 21, 1772. Cf. below,

pp. 219-20.

[17] In _Prolegomena_, p. 6 (above quoted, p. xxviii, _n._ 1), and p. 8

(trans. p. 6): “I should think Hume might fairly have laid as much claim

to sound sense as Beattie, and besides to a critical understanding (such

as the latter did not possess).”

[18] Cf. _Prolegomena_, p. 8: “I honestly confess that my recollection

of David Hume’s teaching (_die Erinnerung des David Hume_) was the very

thing which many years ago [Kant is writing in 1783] first interrupted

my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of

speculative philosophy quite a new direction.” Kant’s employment of the

term _Erinnerung_ may perhaps be interpreted in view of the indirect

source of his knowledge of Hume’s main position. He would bring to his

reading of Beattie’s quotations the memory of Hume’s other sceptical

doctrines as expounded in the _Enquiry_.

[19] Kant, it should be noted, classifies philosophies as either

dogmatic (= rationalistic) or sceptical. Empiricism he regards as a form

of scepticism.

[20] Quoted by Beattie (_op. cit._, sixth edition, p. 295), who, however

incapable of appreciating the force of Hume’s arguments, was at least

awake to certain of their ultimate consequences.

[21] For a more detailed statement of Kant’s relation to his

philosophical predecessors, cf. below, Appendix B, p. 583 ff.

[22] The term “recognition” is employed by Kant in its widest sense, as

covering, for instance, recognition of the past as past, or of an object

as being a certain kind of object.

[23] Consciousness of time, consciousness of objects in space,

consciousness of self, are the three modes of experience which Kant

seeks to analyse. They are found to be inseparable from one another and

in their union to constitute a form of conscious experience that is

equivalent to an act of judgment--_i.e._ to be a form of awareness that

involves relational categories and universal concepts.

[24] As we have noted (above, pp. xxvi-xxvii), it was Hume’s insistence

upon the synthetic, non-self-evident character of the causal axiom that

awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Cf. below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.

[25] Cf. below, pp. lvi ff., 571 ff.

[26] Cf. below, pp. 36-7.

[27] Cf. below, p. 543 ff.

[28] Cf. below, pp. liii-iv.

[29] Cf. below, pp. 45, 238-43.

[30] Cf. below, pp. 33-6, 181, 183-6.

[31] Cf. below, pp. 33-42, 394-5, 398.

[32] With the sole exception of Malebranche, who on this point

anticipated Kant.

[33] This is the position that Kant endeavours to expound in the very

unsatisfactory form of a doctrine of “inner sense.” Cf. below, pp. l-ii,

291 ff.

[34] This was Kant’s chief reason for omitting the so-called “subjective

deduction of the categories” from the second edition. The teaching of

the subjective deduction is, however, preserved in almost unmodified

form throughout the _Critique_ as a whole, and its “transcendental

psychology” forms, as I shall try to show, an essential part of Kant’s

central teaching. In this matter I find myself in agreement with

Vaihinger, and in complete disagreement with Riehl and the majority of

the neo-Kantians. The neo-Kantian attempt to treat epistemology in

independence of all psychological considerations is bound to lead to

very different conclusions from those which Kant himself reached. Cf.

below, pp. 237 ff., 263-70.

[35] This subjectivism finds expression in Kant’s doctrine of the

“transcendental object” which, as I shall try to prove, is a doctrine of

early date and only semi-Critical. That doctrine is especially prominent

in the section on the Antinomies. See below p. 204 ff.

[36] Cf. pp. 270 ff., 298 ff., 308-21, 373-4, 414-17.

[37] That this statement holds of feelings and desires, and therefore of

all the emotions, as well as of our sense-contents, is emphasised by

Kant in the _Critique of Practical Reason_. Cf. below, pp. 276, 279-80,

312, 384-5.

[38] The connection of this teaching with Kant’s theory of consciousness

may be noted. If consciousness in all its forms, however primitive, is

_already_ awareness of meaning, its only possible task is to define,

modify, reconstruct, and develop such meaning, never to obtain for bare

contents or existences objective or other significance. Cf. above, pp.

xli-ii, xliv.

[39] _Reflexionen zur Anthropologie_, 207.

[40] In sketch of a letter (summer 1792) to Fürst von Beloselsky (_W._

xi. p. 331).

Though such is Kant’s own method of formulating the issue, it