[948] On this whole matter cf. above, p. xlv; below, pp. 312-21 on
Kant’s _Refutation of Idealism_; pp. 373-4 on the _Second Analogy_; pp.
407 ff., 414 ff. on _Phenomena and Noumena_; p. 461 ff. on the
Paralogisms; and p. 546. Cf. also A 277-8 = B 334.
[949] P. 267 ff.
[950] Though the posthumously published work of Kant’s old age, his
_Transition from the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science to
Physics_, bears the marks of weakening powers, and is much too
incomplete and obscure to allow of any very assured deductions from its
teaching, it is none the less significant that it is largely occupied in
attempting to define the relation in which the objective world of
physical science stands to the sensible world of ordinary consciousness.
As above noted (p. 275 _n._), it is there asserted in at least
twenty-six distinct passages that sensations are due to the action of
“the moving forces of matter” upon the sense-organs. What is even more
significant is the adoption and frequent occurrence (_Altpreussische
Monatsschrift_ (1882), pp. 236, 287, 289, 290, 292, 294, 295-6, 300,
308, 429, 436, 439) of the phrase “_Erscheinung von der Erscheinung_.”
Kant would seem to mean by _“Erscheinung vom ersten Range”_ (_op. cit._
p. 436) (_i.e._ appearance as such), the objective world as determined
by physical science; and by “_Erscheinung vom zweiten Range_” (_i.e._
appearance of the appearance), this same objective world as known in
terms of the sensations which material bodies generate by acting on the
sense-organs. Kant adds that the former is known directly, and the
latter indirectly--meaning, apparently, that the former is known through
_a priori_ forms native to the understanding, and the latter only in
terms of sense-data which are mechanically conditioned (cf. _loc. cit._
pp. 286, 292, and 444 _n._ The terms latter and former on p. 300 have
got transposed).
[951] Cf. below pp. 312-21, 373-4, 414 ff., 425 ff., 558 ff.
[952] B 129.
[953] B 161 _n._
[954] B 130-1.
[955] B 131.
[956] B 131-4.
[957] B 131.
[958] Cf. B 138.
[959] B 135.
[960] B 136-40.
[961] B 140-2.
[962] B 143.
[963] §§ 21-27.
[964] Above, pp. 252-3, 258, 287.
[965] _Prolegomena_, § 18.
[966] _Op. cit._ § 20.
[967] _Op. cit._ §§ 18-19; Eng. trans. pp. 54-5.
[968] Cf. above, pp. 39-40, 286-7.
[969] Cf. below, p. 370.
[970] _Op. cit._ § 22. Cf. below, p. 311 n. 4.
[971] §§ 21-7.
[972] B 143.
[973] This leads on in the second paragraph of § 21 to further
statements, already commented upon above, pp. 186, 257-8. Cf. also § 23.
[974] Cf. also § 24.
[975] Cf. above, pp. 90 ff., 171, 226-9, 267-70; below, p. 337.
[976] Cf. above, pp. 28, 47, 114, 141-2.
[977] Cf. § 21, second paragraph.
[978] Cf. above, pp. 160, 186, 257, and below, pp. 325-6, 330-1, 390-1,
404 ff.
[979] Cf. below, pp. 324, 329.
[980] Above, p. 148.
[981] Cf. above, pp. xliii-v, l-ii, 238, 261-2, 263 ff., 273 ff.; below,
pp. 295 ff., 322 ff.
[982] Cf. B 67-8; A 33 = B 49.
[983] B 67.
[984] B xxxix _n._
[985] Kant very probably arrived at this view of inner sense under the
influence of Tetens who teaches a similar doctrine in his
_Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre
Entwickelung_. Cf. Bd. i.; _Versuch_ i. 7, 8. The first volume of
Tetens’ work was published in 1777 (re-issued by the _Kantgesellschaft_
in 1913), and had been carefully read by Kant prior to the final
preparation of the _Critique_. Cf. B. Erdmann, _Kriticismus_, p. 51.
[986] Cf. A. 128-9.
[987] As just noted, it is in the second edition that the above view of
the content of inner sense is first definitely formulated.
[988] A 33 = B 49-50.
[989] A 34 = B 50.
[990] Cf. above, pp. 208-9, 251-2, 260-4; below, 311 _n._ 4. It may be
observed that Caird (i. pp. 625-7) interprets inner sense as equivalent
to inner _reflection_. This is one of the respects in which Caird’s
Hegelian standpoint has led him to misrepresent even Kant’s most central
doctrines.
[991] Cf. below, pp. 399-400, and A 277-8 = B 333-4.
[992] Above, p. 292.
[993] Cf. above, p. 155.
[994] Cf. Vaihinger in _Strassburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie_
(1884), p. 106 ff.
[995] Section III., Prop. _XII Usus_.
[996] Theil II. Hauptstück II. _W._ ii. p. 364.
[997] § 11.
[998] Pölitz’s edition (1821), pp. 100-2.
[999] _W._ iv. p. 373 ff.
[1000] It may be noted that in the _Aesthetic_ (A 38 = B 55) Kant
employs the term idealism, without descriptive epithet, in the same
manner as in his pre-Critical writings, as signifying a position that
must be rejected.
[1001] Cf. below, p. 301 ff.
[1002] Pp. 307-8.
[1003] Cf. A 368-9 and 372.
[1004] A 377: a passage which bears signs of being a later
interpolation.
[1005] B 274.
[1006] A 368-9.
[1007] A 369.
[1008] A 28 = B 44. Cf. above, pp. 76, 116-17.
[1009] A 370.
[1010] _Loc. cit._
[1011] A 372.
[1012] A 373: _Weil indessen_, etc.
[1013] Adickes regards them as _later_ additions. To judge by their
content (cf. above, pp. 204 ff., 215-16, on Kant’s doctrine of the
transcendental object), they are more probably of quite early origin.
[1014] A 377-8.
[1015] Adickes argues that this paragraph is subsequent to the main body
of the _Analytic_, but that is in keeping with the tendency which he
seems to show of dating passages, which cannot belong to the “Brief
Outline,” later rather than earlier.
[1016] A 375.
[1017] The remaining passages in the fourth _Paralogism_, together with
the corresponding passages in B 274 ff., in Kant’s note to B xxxix, and
in B 291-3, are separately dealt with below, pp. 308 ff., 322 ff.,
462-3.
[1018] A 377.
[1019] _Loc. cit._
[1020] _E.g._ Garve.
[1021] § 13, _W._ iv. pp. 288-9: Eng. trans. p. 42.
[1022] _Loc. cit._
[1023] _Op. cit._ pp. 289-90: Eng. trans. pp. 43-4.
[1024] In Note II.
[1025] § 49, _W._ iv. 336: Eng. trans. p. 99.
[1026] _Anhang_, _W._ iv. p. 375 n.
[1027] _W._ iv. p. 374: Eng. trans. p. 147.
[1028] Cf. above, p. 155 ff.
[1029] _W._ iv. p. 375.
[1030] _W._ iv. p. 375: Eng. trans. p. 147-8.
[1031] Cf. above, p. 156.
[1032] As already noted above, p. 299, it is employed by Kant in his
lectures on Metaphysics.
[1033] Kant’s phrase “in space outside me” is on Kant’s principles
really pleonastic. Cf. _Prolegomena_, § 49; Eng. trans, p. 101: “the
notion ‘outside me’ only signifies existence in space.” Cf. A 373.
[1034] Cf. text as altered by note to B xxxviii.
[1035] B xxxix.
[1036] B 291-2. The remaining points in B 274 ff. as well as in B xxxix
_n._ are separately dealt with below, p. 322 ff.
[1037] The nearest approach to such teaching in the first edition is in
A 33 = B 50. Cf. above, pp. 135-8.
[1038] Cf. below, pp. 333, 341, 360, 384-5.
[1039] Adamson (_Development of Modern Philosophy_, i. p. 241) takes the
opposite view as to what is Kant’s intended teaching, but remarks upon
its inconsistency with Kant’s own fundamental principles. “Now, in
truth, Kant grievously endangers his own doctrine by insisting on the
absence of _a priori_ elements from our apprehension of the mental life;
for it follows from that, if taken rigorously, that according to Kant
sense and understanding are not so much sources which unite in producing
knowledge, as, severally, sources of distinct kinds of apprehension. If
we admit at all, in respect to inner sense, that there is some kind of
apprehension without the work of understanding, then it has been
acknowledged that sense is _per se_ adequate to furnish a kind of
apprehension.” As pointed out above (p. 296), by the same line of
reasoning Kant is disabled from viewing inner consciousness as merely
reflective. In other words it can neither be more immediate nor less
sensuous than outer perception. Cf. below, pp. 361, _n._ 3, 384-5.
[1040] Above, pp. xlvi, 275-82; below, pp. 313-14, 384-5.
[1041] Above, pp. 276, 279-80; below, pp. 312, 384-5.
[1042] Cf. below, p. 361.
[1043] Cf. _Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science_ (1786),
_W._ iv. pp. 470-1. It should be observed, however, that the reasons
which Kant gives in this treatise for denying that psychology can ever
become more than a merely historical or descriptive discipline are not
that the objects of inner sense fall outside the realm of mechanically
determined existence. Kant makes no assertion that even distantly
implies any such view. His reasons are--(1) that, as time has only one
dimension, the main body of mathematical science is not applicable to
the phenomena of inner sense and their laws; (2) that such phenomena are
capable only of a merely ideal, not of an experimental, analysis; (3)
that, as the objects of inner sense do not consist of parts outside each
other, their parts are not substances, and may therefore be conceived as
diminishing in intensity or passing out of existence without prejudice
to the principle of the permanence of substance (_op. cit._ p. 542,
quoted below, p. 361, _n._ 2); (4) that inner observation is limited to
the individual’s own existence; (5) that the very act of introspection
alters the state of the object observed.
[1044] A 370.
[1045] B 275. These two sentences are cited in this connection by
Vaihinger: _Strassburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie_ (1884), p. 131.
[1046] Above, pp. xlv-vii, 279 ff.
[1047] Cf. also above, pp. 275-7.
[1048] § 13, _Anmerkung II_.
[1049] _Kriticismus_, p. 197 ff.
[1050] _Mind_ (1879), iv. p. 408 ff.; (1880), v. p. 111.
[1051] _A Defence of Philosophic Doubt_ (1879), p. 107 ff.; _Mind_
(1878), iii. p. 481; iv. p. 115; vi. p. 260.
[1052] _Op. cit._ p. 128 ff.
[1053] _Critical Philosophy_, i. 632 ff.; _Mind_ (1879), iv. pp. 112,
560-1; v. p. 115.
[1054] _The Philosophy of Kant_, p. 249 ff.
[1055] The one fundamental question to which Erdmann would seem to allow
that Kant gives conflicting answers is as to whether or not categories
can be transcendently employed. The assumption of a uniform teaching is
especially obvious in Sidgwick’s comments; cf. _Mind_ (1880), v. p. 113;
_Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant_ (1905), p. 28.
[1056] Cf. above, pp. 303-4.
[1057] A 491 = B 520.
[1058] A 225-6 = B 273.
[1059] A 495-6 = B 523-4.
[1060] Cf. below, p. 506.
[1061] Viz. A 225-6 = B 273.
[1062] B 277.
[1063] Above, p. 208 ff.
[1064] A 346 = B 404.
[1065] A 224-5 = B 272-3.
[1066] Cf. B 277.
[1067] Quoted by B. Erdmann: _Kriticismus_, p. 107.
[1068] B xxxix _n._, 67-8, 70, 157-8 with appended note, 276-8, 422
_n._, 427-9.
[1069] B 70, 157, 428.
[1070] B 157.
[1071] B 157 _n._ Regarding the un-Critical character of Kant’s language
in this passage, and of the tendencies which inspire it, cf. below, p.
329.
[1072] B 157.
[1073] B 429.
[1074] Cf. B 277-8 and B 157.
[1075] B 278.
[1076] B 420 and B 422 _n._
[1077] B 422 _n._
[1078] Cf. above, pp. 204 ff., 404 ff.
[1079] Cf. above, p. 204 ff.
[1080] B 406.
[1081] B 422 _n._ Though both concepts are denoted by the same term,
they may not--such is the implication--be for that reason identified.
[1082] B 429. Kant does not, however, even in the second edition, hold
consistently to this position. In the sentence immediately preceding
that just quoted he equates the transcendental self with the notion of
“object in general.” “I represent myself to myself neither as I am nor
as I appear to myself, but think myself only as I do any object in
general from whose mode of intuition I abstract.”
[1083] The broader bearing of this view may be noted. If consistently
developed, it must involve the assertion that noumenal reality is
apprehended in terms of the Ideas of reason, for these are the only
other concepts at the disposal of the mind. Cf. above, pp. liii-v,
217-18; below, pp. 331, 390-1, 414-17, 426 ff., 558-61.
[1084] A 402.
[1085] It is doubtful whether A 401-2 represents a genuinely Critical
position. Several of its phrases seem reminiscent of Kant’s
semi-Critical view of the nature of apperception. This is especially
true of the assertion that self-consciousness is “itself unconditioned.”
[1086] A 346 = B 404. Cf. below, pp. 456, 461-2.
[1087] Cf. A 345.
[1088] That he does not really do so is clear from the context and also
from the manner in which he restated this argument in the second edition
(B 421-2).
[1089] A 401-2, B 421-2; below, pp. 461-2.
[1090] A 402; cf. B 407.
[1091] Cf. B 421-2.
[1092] Cf. above, pp. l-ii, 208-9, 260-3.
[1093] Cf. above, _loc. cit._
[1094] Cf. B 157-8 and 157 _n._, B 278, B 428-9.
[1095] Above, pp. 295-6, 311 _n._ 4.
[1096] There is this difference between the category of existence and
the categories of relation, namely, that it would seem to be impossible
to distinguish between a determinate and an indeterminate application of
it. Either we assert existence or we do not; there is no such third
alternative as in the case of the categories of substance and causality.
The category of substance, determinately used, signifies material
existence in space and time; indeterminately applied it is the purely
problematic and merely logical notion of something that is always a
subject and never a predicate. The determinate category of causality is
the conception of events conditioning one another in time;
indeterminately employed it signifies only the quite indefinite notion
of a ground or condition. Also, Kant’s explicit teaching (A 597 ff. = B
625 ff.) is that the notion of existence stands in an altogether
different position from other predicates. It is not an attribute
constitutive of the concept of the subject to which it is applied, but
is simply the positing of the content of that concept as a whole. Nor,
again, is it a relational form for the articulation of content. These
would seem to be the reasons why no distinction is possible between a
determinate and an indeterminate application of the notion of existence,
and why, therefore, Kant, in defending the possible dual employment of
it, has difficulty in holding consistently to the doctrines expounded in
the _Postulates_. He is, by his own explicit teaching, interdicted from
declaring that the notion of existence is both a category and not a
category, or, in other words, that it may vary in meaning according as
empirical or noumenal reality is referred to, and that only in the
former case is it definite and precise. Yet such a view would, perhaps,
better harmonise with certain other lines of thought which first obtain
statement in the _Dialectic_. For though it is in the _Dialectic_ that
Kant expounds his grounds for holding that existence and content are
separate and independent, it is there also that he first begins to
realise the part which the Ideas of Reason are called upon to play in
the drawing of the distinction between appearance and reality.
[1097] In the _Fortschritte_ (_Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 548 ff.)
this final step is quite definitely taken. Cf. below, pp. 390-1, 414-17,
426 ff., 558-61. We have, as we shall find, to recognise a second
fundamental conflict in Kant’s thinking, additional to that between
subjectivism and phenomenalism. He alternates between what may be
entitled the sceptical and the Idealist views of the function of Reason
and of its relation to the understanding, or otherwise stated, between
the regulative and the absolutist view of the nature of thought. But
this conflict first gains explicit expression in the _Dialectic_.
[1098] For Kant’s use of the terms ‘canon’ and ‘dialectic’ cf. above,
pp. 72, 77-8, 173-4, and below, p. 425 ff.
[1099] Above, pp. 181-2.
[1100] As we shall have occasion to observe below (p. 336), when Kant
defines judgment as “the faculty of subsumption under rules,” he is
really defining it in terms of the process of reasoning, and thus
violating the principle which he is professedly following in dividing
the _Transcendental Logic into the Analytic of Concepts_, the _Analytic
of Judgment_, and the _Dialectic of Reasoning_.
[1101] A 132 = B 171.
[1102] Pp. 252-3, 258-9, 287-8.
[1103] The passages that have gone to constitute this chapter are
probably quite late in date of writing. This would seem to be proved by
the view taken of productive imagination, and also by the fact that in
the _Reflexionen_ there is no mention of schematism.
[1104] Cf. above, p. 176 ff.
[1105] Cf. A 137 = B 176. “The empirical concept of a plate is
homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle, since the
roundness which is thought in the former can be intuited in the latter.”
[1106] A 138 = B 177.
[1107] Above, p. 334.
[1108] Cf. E. Curtius, _Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der reinen
Vernunft (Kantstudien_, Bd. xix. p. 348 ff.).
[1109] _Op. cit._ § 58.
[1110] A 138 = B 177. Cf. above, pp. 96-7.
[1111] A 141 = B 180.
[1112] Cf. above, pp. 268-9.
[1113] Cf. above, pp. 133-4.
[1114] A 140 = B 179.
[1115] _Loc. cit._
[1116] Cf. E. Curtius, _op. cit._ p. 356.
[1117] Kant’s other definition of the schema as “a rule for the
determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain universal
concept” (A 141 = B 180) is open to similar objections. When, however,
Kant states that “schemata, and not images, _underlie_ our pure sensuous
concepts,” he seems to be inclining to the truer view that the schema
_is_ the concept.
[1118] Above, pp. 131-3.
[1119] Cf. Riehl, _Philos. Krit._ 2nd ed. i. pp. 488, 533. Cf. above,
pp. 195-6, 198; below, pp. 404-5.
[1120] _Critical Philosophy_, i. bk. i. chap. v., especially pp. 437 and
440.
[1121] _Theorie der Erfahrung_, second edition, p. 384.
[1122] _Op. cit._ p. 532.
[1123] Cf. above, pp. 240-3.
[1124] For comment upon the definition of number, which Kant takes as
being the schema of quantity, and upon the view of arithmetic which this
definition may seem to imply, cf. above, p. 128 ff.
[1125] Cf. above, p. 192.
[1126] Cf. above, pp. 339-40, and below, pp. 357, 404 ff.
[1127] Cf. above, pp. 20, 25, 290-1; below, pp. 407, 412, 414-17.
[1128] _E.g._ Riehl, _Philos. Krit._ 2nd ed. i. pp. 535-6.
[1129] Above, pp. 258, 332-3.
[1130] A 148 = B 188.
[1131] A 156 = B 195.
[1132] A 157 = B 196.
[1133] A 24.
[1134] § 13, _Anmerkung_ i.
[1135] B 40-1.
[1136] B 110.
[1137] A 160 = B 199-200.
[1138] Cf. above, pp. 288-9.
[1139] A 161-2 = B 201-2.
[1140] Cf. below, pp. 510-11.
[1141] A 178-9 = B 221.
[1142] Cf. above, pp. 94-5.
[1143] Cf. below, pp. 358-9, 367-8, 371-2, 381-2.
[1144] Above, p. 309 ff.
[1145] Cf. Adickes, _K._ p. 190 _n._
[1146] Cf. above, p. 127 ff.
[1147] That is to say, in the first edition.
[1148] The phrase is followed, it may be observed, by a verb in the
irregular.
[1149] A 143 = B 182.
[1150] _Loc. cit._ in the chapter on _Schematism_.
[1151] _Loc. cit._ Italics not in Kant.
[1152] Cf. A 175 = B 217. Cf. above, pp. 350-1.
[1153] B 217-18.
[1154] Cf. above, pp. 192, 341.
[1155] A 169-70 = B 211-12. For comment upon Kant’s view of the point as
a limit, cf. below, p. 489 ff.
[1156] Though Kant maintains in A 171 = B 212-13 that owing to our
dependence upon empirical data and our necessary ignorance of the nature
of the causal relation we cannot similarly demonstrate the principle of
the continuity of change, he has himself, in characteristically
inconsistent fashion, given three such demonstrations. Cf. below, pp.
380-1.
[1157] Cf. Kant’s _Monadologia physica_ (1756), and _New Doctrine of
Motion and Rest_ (1758). Kant’s final statement of this dynamical theory
is given in his _Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science_
(1786).
[1158] In this matter Kant regards himself as defending the Newtonian
theory of an attractive gravitational force. The mechanistic view admits
only one form of action, viz. transference of motion through impact and
pressure. “From ... Democritus to Descartes, indeed up to our own day,
the mechanistic method of explanation ... has, under the title of
atomism or corpuscular philosophy, maintained its authority with but
slight modification; and has continued to exercise its influence upon
the principles of natural science. Its essential teaching consists in
the assumption of the _absolute impenetrability_ of primitive matter, in
the _absolute homogeneity_ of its constitution (difference of shape
being the sole remaining difference), and in the _absolutely
indestructible coherence_ of matter in its fundamental corpuscles”
(_Metaphysical First Principles_, _W._ vol. iv. p. 533; ii. Allgemeine
Anmerkung, 4).
[1159] This is additional to its other correlative assumption of the
absolute void. “The absolute void and the absolutely full are in the
doctrine of nature very much what blind chance and blind fate are in
metaphysical cosmology, namely, a barrier to the enquiring reason, which
either causes its place to be taken by arbitrary fictions, or lays it to
rest on the pillow of obscure qualities” (_Metaphysical First
Principles_, _W._ vol. iv. p. 532 (I read _forschende_ for
_herrschende_)). “There are only two methods of procedure ...: the
mechanistic, through combination of the absolutely full with the
absolute void, or an opposite dynamical method, that of explaining all
material differences through mere differences in the combination of the
original forces of repulsion and attraction” (_loc. cit._).
[1160] In the first edition Kant formulates this principle in the light
of his extremely misleading distinction between mathematical and
dynamical principles (cf. above, pp. 345-7): “All appearances, _as
regards their existence_, are subject _a priori_ to rules determining
their relation to one another in one time.”
[1161] Cf. below, p. 358.
[1162] In A 182 = B 225 the stronger term change (_Wechsel_) is
employed.
[1163] A 178-80 = B 221-3 (on the distinction between mathematical and
dynamical principles) has been commented upon above, pp. 345-7.
[1164] _Philos. Krit._ 2nd ed. i. p. 545. Caird adopts a similar view,
i. pp. 540, 580.
[1165] A 181 = B 224.
[1166] Cf. below, pp. 373-4.
[1167] That is to say, in the first edition.
[1168] Cf. above, pp. 332-3, 343-4.
[1169] Cf. above, p. 348; below, pp. 367-8, 371-2, 381-2.
[1170] Cf. above, pp. 94, 135-8, 309 ff., 347-8.
[1171] That is to say, in the first edition.
[1172] The new proof added in the second edition calls for no special
comment. In all essentials it agrees with this second proof of the first
edition. It differs only in such ways as are called for by the mode of
formulating the principle in the second edition.
[1173] This statement, as Caird has pointed out (i. p. 541), is
extremely questionable. “It may be objected that to say that ‘time
itself does not change’ is like saying that passing away does not itself
pass away. So far the endurance of time and the permanence of the
changing might even seem to mean only that the moments of time never
cease to pass away, and the changing never ceases to change. A perpetual
flux would therefore sufficiently ‘represent’ all the permanence that is
in time.” This is not, however, in itself a vital objection to Kant’s
argument. For he is here stating more than his argument really requires.
Events are dated in a _single_ time, not in an unchanging time. Kant’s
statement betrays the extent to which, as Bergson has very justly
pointed out, Kant spatialises time, _i.e._ interprets it on the analogy
of space. It is based on “the mixed idea of a measurable time, which is
space in so far as it is homogeneity, and duration in so far as it is
succession; that is to say, at bottom, the contradictory idea of
succession in simultaneity” (_Les Données immédiates_, p. 173, Eng.
trans. p. 228).
[1174] Cf. A 184 = B 227: “the proposition, that substance is permanent,
is tautological.”
[1175] Cf. A 188 = B 231.
[1176] Above, p. 341.
[1177] Cf. above, p. 309 ff.
[1178] B. Erdmann’s edition of the _Nachträge_, lxxx. p. 32. Cited by
Caird, i. pp. 541-2.
[1179] _Op. cit._ pp. 33-4.
[1180] That Kant does not mean to imply that the category of substance
has no application to the contents of inner sense is made clear by a
curious argument in the _Metaphysical First Principles of Natural
Science_ (1786), _W._ iv. p. 542: “What in this proof essentially
characterises substance, which is possible only in space and under
spatial conditions, and therefore only as object of the outer senses, is
that its quantity cannot be increased or diminished without substance
coming into being or ceasing to be. For the quantity of an object which
is possible only in space must consist of parts which are external to
one another, and these, therefore, if they are real (something movable),
must necessarily be substances. On the other hand, that which is viewed
as object of inner sense can, _as substance_, have a quantity which does
not consist of parts external to one another. Its parts are therefore
not substances, and their coming into being and ceasing to be must not
be regarded as creation or annihilation of a substance. Their increase
or diminution is therefore possible without prejudice to the principle
of the permanence of substance.” (Italics not in Kant.) Cf. also
_Prolegomena_, § 49, and below, pp. 367, 377 _n._ 3.
[1181] A 187 = B 230.
[1182] _K._ p. 211 _n._
[1183] C. A 205-7 = B 252.
[1184] _Werke_ (Frauenstädt, 1873), i. p. 85 ff.
[1185] As evidence of this failure I may cite Schopenhauer’s comment
upon A 371 and 372: “From these passages it is quite clear that for Kant
the perception of outer things in space is antecedent to all application
of the causal law, and that this law does not therefore enter into it as
its element and condition: mere sensation amounts in Kant’s view to
perception” (_Werke_, i. p. 81). Even when, as in the passages referred
to, Kant is speaking in his most subjectivist vein, he gives no
justification for any such assertion. Schopenhauer, notwithstanding his
sincere admiration for Kant--“I owe what is best in my own system to the
impression made upon me by the works of Kant, by the sacred writings of
the Hindoos, and by Plato” (_World as Will and Idea, Werke_, ii. p. 493,
Eng. trans. ii. p. 5)--is one of the most unreliable of Kant’s critics.
His comments are extremely misleading, and largely for the reason that
he was interested in Kant only as he could obtain from him confirmation
of his own philosophical tenets. Several of these tenets he certainly
derived directly from the _Critique_; but they are placed by him in so
entirely different a setting that their essential meaning is greatly
altered. We have already noted (above, p. 41) Schopenhauer’s exaggerated
statement of Kant’s intuitive theory of mathematics. Kant’s subjectivism
is similarly expounded in a one-sided and quite unrepresentative manner
(cf. below, p. 407 _n._). Hutchison Stirling’s criticisms of Kant in his
_Text Book to Kant_ are vitiated by a similar failure to recognise the
completely un-Critical character of the occasional passages in which
Kant admits a distinction between “judgments of perception” and
“judgments of experience” (cf. above, pp. 288-9). Stirling (cf. below,
p. 377) has amplified his criticism of Kant in _Princeton Review_ (Jan.
1879, pp. 178-210), _Fortnightly Review_ (July 1872), and in _Mind_
(ix., 1884, p. 531, and x., 1885, p. 45).
[1186] Cf. above, pp. 240-2, 365, and below, p. 377.
[1187] Cf. Stout, _Manual of Psychology_, third edition, pp. 444-6:
“Unless we assume from the outset that the primitive mind treats a
perceived change which challenges its interest and attention, not as
something self-existent in isolation, but as something conditioned by
and conditioning other changes, it seems hopeless to attempt to show how
this causal point of view could have arisen through any extension of
knowledge in accordance with ascertained psychological laws and
conditions.... There is good reason for denying that customary
repetition is even required to furnish a first occasion or opportunity
for the first emergence of the apprehension of causal relations. For, as
we have already insisted, the process of learning by experience is from
the first experimental.... Regularities are only found because they are
sought. But it is in the seeking that the category of causal unity is
primarily involved.” Cf. below, pp. 371-2.
[1188] A 193 = B 238.
[1189] A 191 = B 236.
[1190] By an “arbitrary” order Kant does not, of course, mean an order
of succession that is not determined, but only one that is determined by
subjectively conditioned direction of attention. Cf. below, p. 377.
[1191] Cf. A 199 = B 244, and above, pp. 133, 288-9; below, p. 377.
[1192] Cf. A 195-6 = B 240-1, and above, pp. 172, 176 ff., 182-3, 263
ff., 277-8.
[1193] A 736-7 = B 765. Italics of last sentence not in Kant.
[1194] A 189-94 = B 234-9: first to fourth paragraphs (first edition).
[1195] Cf. above, pp. 348, 358.
[1196] Cf. A 192-3 = B 238-9.
[1197] Cf. Riehl, _Philosophischer Kriticismus_ (second edition), i. pp.
551-2. While recognising the above main point, Riehl seems to assert
that empirical sequence determines the _application_ of the causal
concept. It would be truer, and more in accordance with the position
which Kant is endeavouring to establish, to assert that appeal to
constancy of sequence enables us to determine which antecedents of any
given event are causal conditions. The principle of causality is already
applied when the sequent experiences are apprehended as sequent events.
This ambiguity, however, would seem to be due only to Riehl’s mode of
expression. For, as he himself says (p. 551), the law of causality is a
ground of experience, and cannot therefore be derived from it. Cf.
above, pp. 267-8, 367.
[1198] Pp. 365-71, 377.
[1199] A 191 = B 236. Cf. above, pp. 216-18.
[1200] As pointed out above, this is really a secondary meaning which
Kant reads into the term analogy; it is not the true explanation of his
choice of the term.
[1201] _Critical Philosophy of Kant_, vol. i. pp. 540, 580.
[1202] _Kant_, p. 198: trans. by Creighton and Lefevre, p. 196.
[1203] Cf. above, pp. 270 ff., 313-21.
[1204] Kant, of course, recognises that we cannot make any such positive
assertion; to do so would be to transcend the limits imposed by Critical
principles. Cf. below, p. 382.
[1205] A 194-6 = B 239-41: fifth to seventh paragraphs (first edition).
[1206] A 196-9 = B 241-4: eighth to tenth paragraphs (first edition).
[1207] A 199-201 = B 244-6: eleventh to thirteenth paragraphs (first
edition).
[1208] Cf. above, pp. 224 ff., 264 ff.; below, 377.
[1209] A 201-2 = B 246-7: fourteenth paragraph (first edition).
[1210] B 233-4: second paragraph (second edition).
[1211] B 233-4.
[1212] From A 202 = B 247 to the end.
[1213] Kant’s phenomenalist substitute for the Cartesian subjectivism
(cf. above, pp. 270 ff., 312 ff.) enables him to develop this thesis in
a consistent and thoroughgoing manner. The subjective is a subspecies
within the class of what is determined by natural law; and the principle
of causality is therefore applicable to subjective change in the same
rigorous fashion as to the objectively sequent.
[1214] A 204 = B 249.
[1215] _W._ i. pp. 87-92.
[1216] _Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntniss-Theorie_, p. 151. Quoted and
translated by Caird, i. p. 572. Caird sums up the matter in a sentence
(p. 571): “Kant is showing, not that objective succession is always
causal, but that the determination of a succession of perceptions as
referring to a succession of states in an object, involves the principle
of causality.”
[1217] _Loc. cit._
[1218] The connected question how we can determine the ball and the
cushion as objectively coexistent is the problem of the third _Analogy_.
[1219] III. _Erklärung_ 1 and 2, _Lehrsatz_ 1 (especially _Anmerkung_
thereto). Cf. also II. _Erklärung_ 1 and 5, and the last pages of the
_Allgemeine Anmerkung_.
[1220] Pp. 351, 373-4. Cf. pp. 318-21.
[1221] A 170-1 = B 212-13, above, p. 353, _n._ 2.
[1222] A 208 = B 253-4.
[1223] _Metaphysical First Principles, II. Lehrsatz 4, Anmerkung 2._
[1224] A 209-10 = B 255-6.
[1225] A 210 = B 256.
[1226] _W._ ii. p. 22.
[1227] _W._ ii. p. 168.
[1228] _Loc. cit._
[1229] For lack of a more suitable English equivalent I have translated
_Gemeinschaft_ as “communion.” As Kant points out in A 213 = B 260, the
German term is itself ambiguous, signifying _commercium_ (_i.e._
dynamical interaction) as well as _communio_.
[1230] Cf. above, pp. 348, 358-9, 367-8, 371-2.
[1231] § 17 ff. Cf. _Nachträge zu Kants Kritik_, lxxxvi, with B.
Erdmann’s comment, p. 35.
[1232] A 211-12 = B 258. Cf. A 211 = B 257.
[1233] A 211 = B 257.
[1234] A 211-13 = B 258-60: first three paragraphs (first edition).
[1235] A 213-14 = B 260-1: fourth paragraph (first edition).
[1236] A 214-15 = B 261-2: fifth paragraph (first edition).
[1237] Cf. above, pp. 189-90, 208 ff.
[1238] B 257-8: first paragraph (second edition).
[1239] Cf. B 291-3, partially quoted above, pp. 310-11. In the
_Metaphysical First Principles_ (_III. Lehrsatz_, 4) the principle that
action and reaction are always equal is similarly limited to the outer
relations of material bodies in space, and Kant adds that all change in
bodies is motion. Cf. _W._ xi. p. 234; and above, p. 147.
[1240] Above pp. 311-12; below, pp. 473-7.
[1241] A 213 = B 260.
[1242] The inconsistency of Kant’s view of pure manifolds of time and
space with the argument of the _Analytic of Principles_ is too obvious
to call for detailed comment.
[1243] Cf. B 257.
[1244] A 213-14 = B 260-1.
[1245] B 257.
[1246] Third edition, p. 438.
[1247] Stout does not himself offer it as complete.
[1248] _World as Will and Idea, W._ ii. pp. 544-5: Eng. trans. ii. pp.
61-3.
[1249] Cf. above, p. 197.
[1250] A 212-13 = B 259.
[1251] B 258.
[1252] _Op. cit._ pp. 545-6: Eng. trans. p. 63.
[1253] _Op. cit._ pp. 546-7: Eng. trans. pp. 63-5.
[1254] Cf. above, p. 379.
[1255] Cf. Stadler, _Grundsätze_, p. 124.
[1256] _Op. cit._ p. 546: Eng. trans. p. 63.
[1257] Cf. above, pp. 97-8, 102 _n._, 165-6; below, pp. 429 ff., 447
ff., 547 ff.
[1258] Cf. Adickes, K. p. 233 _n._
[1259] A 222 = B 269. Cf. A 220 = B 268.
[1260] A 148 ff. = B 187 ff.
[1261] A 219 = B 266.
[1262] This, by Kant’s own account (A 232-4 = B 285-7), is what led him
to adopt the title ‘postulates.’ A geometrical postulate does not add
anything to the concept of its object but only defines the conditions of
its production.
[1263] Cf. above, pp. 38-9; below, pp. 398-9, 418 ff.
[1264] Cf. A 220-3 = B 267-71.
[1265] A 223 = B 270.
[1266] Cf. A 220 = B 268.
[1267] A 223 = B 270-1.
[1268] K. p. 223 _n._
[1269] A 224 = B 272.
[1270] Cf. above, pp. 288-9.
[1271] A 225 = B 272. Cf. above, pp. 394-6.
[1272] A 225 = B 273. Italics not in Kant.
[1273] _The Critical Philosophy of Kant_, i. p. 591.
[1274] _Op. cit._ p. 595.
[1275] A 226 = B 273-4.
[1276] A 226 ff. = B 279 ff.
[1277] A 218 = B 281.
[1278] A 232 = B 284.
[1279] A 231 = B 284.
[1280] Cf. above, p. 309 ff.
[1281] Kant’s argument in the note to B 290 is that of his early essay
on _Negative Quantity_. Cf. below, pp. 527 ff., 533 ff., 536.
[1282] A 236 = B 295.
[1283] Cf. above, pp. xxxv-vi, xxxviii, 185-6, 191, 195-6, 257-8, 290-1,
325 ff., 339.
[1284] The mathematical illustrations which Kant proceeds to give (A 239
= B 299) are peculiarly crude and off-hand in manner of statement. Cf.
_per contra_ A 140 = B 179 for Kant’s real view of the distinction
between image, schema, and concept.
[1285] Cf. above, pp. 195-6, 198, 339-42.
[1286] A 243 = B 301.
[1287] A 242 = B 302.
[1288] Cf. A 248 = B 305.
[1289] A 246-7 = B 303-4. A 247-8 = B 304-5 (beginning “Thought is the
action,” etc.) is merely a repetition of the preceding argument, and
probably represents a later intercalation.
[1290] Beginning “Appearances, so far as ...,” which was omitted in the
second edition. It probably constitutes, as Adickes maintains (_K._ p.
254 _n._), the original beginning of this chapter. The “as we have
hitherto maintained” of its second paragraph, which obviously cannot
apply to the pages which precede it in its present position, must refer
to the argument of the _Analytic_.
[1291] A 249, 251.
[1292] Above, p. 204 ff.
[1293] In large part it represents the Critical position as understood
by Schopenhauer, who never succeeded in acquiring any genuine
understanding of Kant’s more mature teaching (cf. above, p. 366 _n._).
Schopenhauer is correct in maintaining that one chief ground of Kant’s
belief in the existence of things in themselves lies in his initial
assumption that they must be postulated in order to account for the
given manifold. Schopenhauer is also justified in stating that Kant,
though starting from the dualistic Cartesian standpoint, so far modified
it as to conclude that the origin of this manifold must be “_objective,
since there is no ground for regarding it as subjective_” (_Parerga und
Paralipomena_, 1851 ed., p. 74 ff.). But for two reasons this is a very
incomplete, and therefore extremely misleading, account of Kant’s final
teaching. In the first place, Schopenhauer fails to take account of
Kant’s implied distinction between the sensations of the special senses
and the manifold of outer sense. When Kant recognises that the
sensations of the special senses are empirically conditioned, he is
constrained in consistency to distinguish between them and the manifold
which constitutes the matter of all experiences (cf. above, p. 275 ff.).
Things in themselves, in accounting for the latter, account also, but in
quite indirect fashion, for the former. Though sensations are
empirically conditioned, the _entire_ natural world is noumenally
grounded. Secondly, Kant’s subjectivism undergoes a similar
transformation on its inner or mental side. The analysis of
self-consciousness, which is given both in the _Deductions_ and in the
_Paralogisms_, indicates with sufficient clearness Kant’s recognition
that the form of experience is as little self-explanatory as its
content, and that it must not, without such proof as, owing to the
limitations of our experience, we are debarred from giving, be regarded
as more ultimate in nature. The realities which constitute and condition
our mental processes are not apprehended in any more direct manner than
the thing in itself. When, therefore, Schopenhauer asserts in the _World
as Will and Idea_ (_Werke, Frauenstädt_, ii. p. 494, Eng. trans, ii. p.
6) that Kant proves the world to be merely phenomenal by demonstrating
that it is conditioned by the intellect, he is emphasising what is least
characteristic in Kant’s teaching. Schopenhauer’s occasional
identification of the intellect with the brain--the nearest
approximation in his writings to what may be described as
phenomenalism--itself suffices to show how entirely he is lacking in any
firm grasp of Critical principles.
[1294] As we have noted (above, p. 204 ff.), the doctrine of the
transcendental object was entirely eliminated from those main sections
that were rewritten or substantially altered in the second edition,
namely, the chapters on the _Transcendental Deduction_, on _Phenomena
and Noumena_, and on the _Paralogisms_. That it remained in the section
on _Amphiboly_, in the _Second Analogy_, and in the _Antinomies_ is
sufficiently explained by Kant’s unwillingness to make the very
extensive alterations which such further rewriting would have involved.
[1295] A 251.
[1296] Not even, as Kant teaches in his doctrine of inner sense, in the
inner world of apperception, cf. above, p. 295 ff.
[1297] Kant claims in the _Dialectic_ that this process is also
unavoidable, constituting what he calls “transcendental illusion.”
[1298] A 254-7 = B 310-12.
[1299] A 255 = B 310-11.
[1300] Cf. below, p. 412 ff.
[1301] A 256 = B 312. For A 257 = B 312 on the empirical manner of
distinguishing between the sensuous and the intelligible, cf. above, pp.
143 ff., 149 ff.
[1302] Cf. above, pp. 143-4, 147, 214-15, 291 ff.
[1303] Kant here (A 286 = B 342) speaks of this concept of the noumenon
_as an object of non-sensuous intuition_ as being “merely negative.”
This is apt to confuse the reader, as he usually comes to it after
having read the passage introduced into the chapter on _Phenomena and
Noumena_ in the second edition, in which, as above noted (p. 409), Kant
describes this meaning of the term as positive, in distinction from its
more negative meaning as signifying a thing merely so far as it is not
an object of _our_ sense-intuition. Cf. below, p. 413.
[1304] Kant’s meaning here is not quite clear. He may mean either that
the categories as such are inapplicable to things in themselves, or
that, as this form of intuition is altogether different from our own, it
will not help in giving meaning to the categories. What follows would
seem to point to the former view.
[1305] A 286 = B 343.
[1306] A 287-8 = B 344.
[1307] A 288 = B 345.
[1308] A 288 = B 344. Kant allowed the section within which this passage
occurs to remain, without the least modification, in the second edition.
[1309] Benno Erdmann’s explanation (_Kriticismus_, p. 194) of Kant’s
omission of all references to the transcendental object, namely, because
of their being likely to conduce to a mistaken idealistic interpretation
of his teaching, we cannot accept. As already argued (above, p. 204
ff.), they represent a view which he had quite definitely and
consciously outgrown.
[1310] B 306. Cf. above, pp. 290-1.
[1311] B 308. This, it may be noted, is in keeping with the passages
above quoted from the section on _Amphiboly_.
[1312] A 255 = B 311.
[1313] Cf. above, p. 404 ff., especially pp. 409-10; also above, p. 331.
[1314] In order to form an adequate judgment upon Kant’s justification
for distinguishing between appearance and reality the reader must bear
in mind (1) the results obtained in the _Transcendental Deduction_
(above, p. 270 ff.); (2) the discussions developed in the _Paralogisms_
(below, p. 457 ff.); (3) the treatment of noumenal causality, that is of
freedom, in the _Third_ and _Fourth Antinomies_; (4) the many connected
issues raised in the _Ideal_ (below, pp. 534-7, 541-2), and in the
_Appendix to the Dialectic_ (below, p. 543 ff.). Professor Dawes Hicks
is justified in maintaining in his book, _die Begriffe Phänomenon und
Noumenon in ihrem Verhältniss zu einander bei Kant_ (Leipzig, 1897, p.
167)--a work which unfortunately is not accessible to the English
reader--that “the thing in itself is by no means a mere excrescence or
addendum of the Kantian system, but forms a thoroughly necessary
completion to the doctrine of appearances. At every turn in Kant’s
thought the doctrine of the noumenon, in one form or another, plays an
essential part.” Indeed it may be said that to state Kant’s reasons for
asserting the existence of things in themselves, is to expound his
philosophy as a whole. Upon this question there appears in Kant the same
alternation of view as in regard to his other main tenets. On Kant’s
discussion of the applicability of the category of existence to things
in themselves, cf. above, p. 322 ff. Also, on Kant’s extension of the
concepts possibility and actuality to noumena, cf. above, pp. 391 ff.,
401-3.
[1315] ‘Ideal’ and ‘Idealist’ are printed with capitals, to mark the
very special sense in which these terms are being used. As already noted
(above, p. 3), the same remark applies to the term ‘Reason.’
[1316] Cf. above, pp. xli-ii, xliv, liii-v, 331.
[1317] A 260 ff. = B 316 ff.
[1318] Cf. above, pp. 38-9, 119, 131-3, 338-9, 394-400.
[1319] Above, p. xxx ff., and below, p. 601 ff.
[1320] Cf. A 267 = B 323.
[1321] Cf. Adickes’ _Systematik_, pp. 60, 70, 72, and 111-12.
[1322] A 270 = B 326.
[1323] Cf. A 264 = B 319, and A 266 = B 322.
[1324] Cf. below, pp. 563-5, 589 ff., 601 ff.
[1325] I have dwelt upon this at length in my _Studies in the Cartesian
Philosophy_.
[1326] A 271 = B 327.
[1327] The un-Critical character of Kant’s doctrine of the pure concept
has already been noted (above, pp. 418-19), and need not be further
discussed.
[1328] A 272 = B 328.
[1329] A 273 = B 329.
[1330] This is Leibniz’s mode of stating the absolutist view of thought
(cf. above, p. xxx ff.) to which, as we shall find, Kant gives much more
adequate and incomparably deeper formulation in the _Dialectic_. Cf. pp.
430, 547 ff., 558 ff.
[1331] Adickes, _K._ p. 272 _n._, allows that the passage may be of
earlier origin than the passages which precede and follow it.
[1332] Pp. 214-15.
[1333] As such it is commented on above, p. 410 ff.
[1334] _Loc. cit._
[1335] A 290 = B 347.
[1336] Cf. above, p. 409 ff.
[1337] Kant’s commentators have frequently misrepresented this aspect of
his teaching. Cf. below, pp. 498, 520-1, 527-37, 541-2, 543 ff., 555,
558-61.
[1338] A 490 = B 518.
[1339] Cf. above, pp. 416-17.
[1340] Those readers who are not already well acquainted with the
argument of the _Dialectic_ may be recommended to pass at once to p.
441. What here follows presupposes acquaintance with the nature and
purposes of the main divisions of the _Dialectic_.
[1341] Introd. to _Reflexionen_, Bd. ii.
[1342] _W._ x. p. 123 ff. Cf. above, pp. 219-20.
[1343] Cf. _Dissertation_, § 27 _n._
[1344] _Op. cit._ Cf. § 24 with § 27.
[1345] _Op. cit._ § 27.
[1346] Cf. ii. 567, 571, 584, 585.
[1347] Cf. ii. 1251 and 586.
[1348] Cf. below, pp. 458, 488 ff.
[1349] In _Reflexionen_ ii. 573, 576, and 582 we find Kant in the very
act of so doing. _Compositio_, _co-ordinatio_, and _commercium_ are
treated as synonymous terms.
[1350] The problem of freedom is first met with in Kant’s _Lectures on
Metaphysics_ (Pölitz, edition of 1821, pp. 89, 330), but is not there
given as an antinomy, and is treated as falling within the field of
theology. In _Reflexion_ ii. 585, also, it is equated in terms of the
category of ground and consequence, with the concept of Divine
Existence, the “_absolute_ or _primum contingens_ (_libertas_).” Upon
elimination of theology, and therefore of the cosmological argument,
from the sphere of antinomy, Kant raised freedom to the rank of an
independent problem.
[1351] A 462 = B 490.
[1352] Cf. below, pp. 498-9, 571 ff.
[1353] Cf. below, p. 454, with references in _n._ 1.
[1354] A 507 = B 535. Cf. below, pp. 481, 545-6.
[1355] Cf. ii. 93, 94, 95, 1233, 1247.
[1356] This is the view represented in _Reflexionen_ ii. 94, 95.
[1357] Cf. _Reflexionen_ ii. 124.
[1358] Cf. _Reflexionen_ ii. 95.
[1359] Cf. below, p. 457.
[1360] Cf. ii. 86 ff.
[1361] Cf. _Reflexionen_ ii. 114-15.
[1362] B 394 _n._ Immortality is here taken as representing the Idea of
the soul as unconditioned substance.
[1363] Cf. below, p. 454, with further references in _n._ 1.
[1364] _Systematik_, pp. 115-16.
[1365] Above, p. 334.
[1366] This conclusion is supported by the evidence of the
_Reflexionen_: they contain not a single reference to schematism.
[1367] A 293 = B 349.
[1368] Pp. 173-4.
[1369] Cf. A 61 = B 85.
[1370] Adickes, _Systematik_, p. 77 ff.
[1371] Cf. Kant’s _caveat_ in A 293 = B 349 against identifying
dialectic with the doctrine of probable reasoning.
[1372] Pp. 427-8.
[1373] A 298 = B 355.
[1374] Cf. above, p. 332.
[1375] Reicke, i. p. 105.
[1376] _Op. cit._ i. pp. 109-10.
[1377] A 301-2 = B 358.
[1378] A 303 = B 359.
[1379] A 305 = B 362.
[1380] The wording of the concluding sentence of the third paragraph (A
307 = B 363-4) is so condensed as to be misleading. “It [viz. the
principle of causality] makes the unity of experience possible, and
borrows nothing from the Reason. The latter, if it were not for this
[its indirect] reference [through mediation of the understanding] to
possible experience, could never [of itself], from mere concepts, have
imposed a synthetic unity of that kind.”
[1381] A 310 = B 366.
[1382] _Schein des Schliessens_ would seem to be here used in that
sense.
[1383] Cf. above, p. 424.
[1384] Cf. also A 669 = B 697; A 680 = B 709.
[1385] Cf. Vaihinger, “Kant--ein Metaphysiker?” in _Philosophische
Abhandlungen_ (Sigwart _Gedenkschrift_), p. 144.
[1386] A 312 = B 368.
[1387] A 313 = B 370.
[1388] A 316-17 = B 373. The context of this passage is a defence of
Plato’s _Republic_ against the charge that it is Utopian, because
unrealisable.
[1389] A 317-18 = B 374-5.
[1390] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1240. Cf. Schopenhauer: _World as Will and
Idea_ (_Werke_, ii. p. 277: Eng. trans. i. p. 303): “The _Idea_ is the
unity that falls into multiplicity on account of the temporal and
spatial form of our intuitive apprehension; the _concept_, on the
contrary, is the unity reconstructed out of multiplicity by the
abstraction of our reason; the latter may be defined as _unitas post
rem_, the former as _unitas ante rem_.”
[1391] _Lectures on Metaphysics_ (Pölitz, 1821), p. 79.
[1392] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1243.
[1393] _Lectures on Metaphysics_, pp. 308-9.
[1394] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1244.
[1395] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1254.
[1396] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1258.
[1397] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1259.
[1398] _Reflexionen_ ii. 1260.
[1399] A 320 = B 376-7.
[1400] A 321 = B 377.
[1401] A 323-4 = B 380-1. Cf. below, pp. 480, 529, 559-60.
[1402] Regarding the _progressive series_ from the conditioned to its
consequences, cf. A 336-7 = B 393-4, A 410-11 = B 437-8, A 511 = B 539.
[1403] A 333 = B 390.
[1404] Cf. above, pp. 418, 436, 439-40; below, pp. 473-7, 520-1, 537,
543 ff., 575.
[1405] Cf. A 335.
[1406] Cf. A 337-8 = B 394-6 and note appended to B 394.
[1407] A 336 = B 393.
[1408] Cf. A 671 = B 699; above, pp. 426, 430, 436; below, pp. 552-4,
572 ff.
[1409] On the difference between the ascending and the descending
series, cf. A 331-2 = B 338 and A 410-11 = B 437-8.
[1410] The questions raised in the two introductory paragraphs (A 336-40
= B 396-8) as to the content of the Ideas, their problematic character,
and their possibility as concepts, are first adequately discussed in
later chapters. The three new terms here introduced, Paralogism,
Antinomy, and Ideal, can also best be commented upon in their own
special context.
[1411] A 341 = B 399.
[1412] Cf. below, pp. 466, 470.
[1413] A 347.
[1414] A 345-6 = B 403-4.
[1415] Cf. A 354-5.
[1416] Cf. above, p. 437.
[1417] A 348.
[1418] A 351.
[1419] A 363-4.
[1420] A 351.
[1421] _K._ 688 _n._
[1422] A similar criticism holds true of the conception of identity
employed in the third _Paralogism_, and arbitrarily equated with the
categories of quantity.
[1423] Cf. A 355-6.
[1424] It is very forcibly developed in Mendelssohn’s “Phädon” (1767)
(_Gesammelte Schriften_, 1843, ii. p. 151 ff.). This is a work with
which Kant was familiar. Cf. below, p. 470.
[1425] This is the argument which William James has expounded in his
characteristically picturesque style. “Take a sentence of a dozen words,
and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a
row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently
as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence”
(_Principles of Psychology_, i. p. 160).
[1426] A 363 _n._ Cf. below, pp. 461-2.
[1427] A 356. Cf. Adickes, _K._ p. 688 _n._
[1428] The argument is here in harmony with Kant’s definition of
transcendental illusion.
[1429] A 358.
[1430] A 361.
[1431] A 364.
[1432] William James’s psychological description of self-consciousness
is simply an extension of this illustration. Cf. _Principles of
Psychology_, i. p. 339; quoted above, p. 278 _n._
[1433] A 363 _n._
[1434] A 362-3 and A 364. We must also, however, bear in mind that in
this chapter Kant occasionally argues in _ad hominem_ fashion from the
point of view of the position criticised.
[1435] Cf. A 353-4.
[1436] Cf. Adickes, _K._ p. 695 _n._
[1437] A 366.
[1438] P. 301 ff.
[1439] The note to A 344 has evidently got displaced; it must, as
Adickes points out, belong to A 404.
[1440] Cf. above, pp. 320, 455.
[1441] A 371-2.
[1442] A 380-1.
[1443] Cf. A 383.
[1444] A 383.
[1445] A 383.
[1446] A 381.
[1447] The first four paragraphs are probably a later intercalation
(Adickes, _K._ p. 708 _n._), since they connect both with the
introductory sections of the _Dialectic_ and with the _Introduction_ to
the _Critique_. Also, the opening words of the fifth paragraph seem to
refer us not to anything antecedent in this section, but directly to the
concluding passages of the fourth _Paralogism_.
[1448] A 385.
[1449] A 393.
[1450] A 387.
[1451] Cf. above, pp. 215-16.
[1452] A 393-4.
[1453] A 394.
[1454] Pp. 326-7.
[1455] Pp. 327-8.
[1456] A 402. Cf. B 407.
[1457] _K._ p. 717 _n._
[1458] Cf. below, p. 470.
[1459] B 406 ff.
[1460] _Kriticismus_, p. 227, cf. p. 106 ff.
[1461] A. H. Ulrichs, _Institutiones logicae et metaphysicae_ (1785).
[1462] In his review of Kant’s _Prolegomena_ in the _Allgemeine Deutsche
Bibliothek_ (1784).
[1463] Obviously by categories Kant here really means schemata. Cf. A
348, where Kant states that “pure categories ... have in themselves no
objective meaning.... Apart from intuition they are merely functions of
a judgment, without content.”
[1464] Above, pp. 404 ff., 413 ff.
[1465] B 408.
[1466] _Critical Philosophy_, ii. p. 34. So also in Watson’s _Kant
Explained_, p. 244.
[1467] Caird (_op. cit._ p. 35) takes account of Kant’s conception of a
possible intuitive understanding, but illegitimately assumes that by it
he must mean a _creative_ understanding.
[1468] Cf. above, p. 295 ff.
[1469] Cf. B 415 _n._ In B xxxix. _n._ (at the end), quoted above pp.
309-10, Kant is careful to point out that the representation of
something permanent is by no means identical with permanent
representation.
[1470] P. 463.
[1471] Namely, as _Refutation of Idealism_, B 274 ff. Cf. above, p. 308
ff.
[1472] Cf. above, pp. 457, 462-3.
[1473] A 402.
[1474] Cf. above, p. 466.
[1475] B 413-15.
[1476] _Gesammelte Schriften_, ii. p. 151 ff.
[1477] _Op. cit._ p. 121 ff.
[1478] _Op. cit._ pp. 128 ff., 168.
[1479] _Op. cit._ p. 125 ff.
[1480] Regarding the value of the hypotheses propounded by Kant in his
note to B 415, cf. below, p. 543 ff.
[1481] P. 321 ff.
[1482] Cf. above, p. 467.
[1483] Pp. 473-7.
[1484] _Kriticismus_, p. 226.
[1485] B 424.
[1486] B 421.
[1487] B 424-5.
[1488] B 425-6. Cf. above, pp. lvi-lxi; below, p. 570 ff.
[1489] The only approach to such a reference is in B 426-7, noted above,
p. 471.
[1490] A 672 = B 700. Cf. below, p. 554.
[1491] A 649 = B 677-8. Tetens in his _Philosophische Versuche_ (1777)
had devoted an entire chapter to this question. His term _Grundkraft_ is
that which Kant here employs. Cf. _Philosophische Versuche_, Bd. i.,
_Elfter Versuch_: “Concerning the fundamental power of the human soul.”
Incidentally Tetens discusses Rousseau’s suggestion that this
fundamental power consists in man’s capacity for perfecting himself. Cf.
Kant’s _Lectures on Metaphysics_ (Pölitz, 1821, p. 192 ff.).
[1492] A 682-4 = B 710-12. A 771-2 = B 799 in the _Methodology_ is
similarly ambiguous, though tending to the spiritualist mode of
formulation.
[1493] Cf. above, pp. 275-6, 279 ff., 312 ff., 384-5, 464-5.
[1494] Cf. end of B xxxix. _n._, quoted above, pp. 309-10.
[1495] A 405 = B 432.
[1496] A 408 = B 435.
[1497] Cf. A 414 = B 441, where it is stated that there is no
transcendental Idea of the substantial.
[1498] Cf. above, p. 434 ff.
[1499] A 419 = B 447.
[1500] A 420 = B 447.
[1501] A very curious sentence in Kant’s letter to Schulze (_W._ x. pp.
344-5, quoted above, p. 199) seems to be traceable to this source.
[1502] Cf. below, pp. 529, 559-60, and above, pp. 199-200, 433-4, 451.
For A 410-11 = B 439-40 on the difference between the ascending and
descending series, cf. A 331-2 = B 387-8 and A 336-7 = B 393-4.
[1503] A 420 = B 448.
[1504] Cf. _per contra_ A 486 = B 514.
[1505] The limitation of Kant’s discussion to space, time, and causality
is, of course, due to his acceptance of the current view that the
concepts of infinity and continuity are derived from our intuitions of
space and time. As we have already noted in discussing his intuitional
theory of mathematical reasoning (above, pp. 40-1, 117 ff., 128 ff.), he
fails to extend to mathematical concepts his own “transcendental” view
of the categories, namely, as _conditioning_ the possibility of
intuitional experience. Such concepts as order, plurality, whole and
part, continuity, infinity, are prior to time and space in the logical
order of thought; and to be adequately treated must be considered in
their widest application.
[1506] Cf. A 507 = B 535, and above, p. 431 ff.; below, pp. 501, 545-6.
[1507] Cf. Kant’s posthumously published _Transition from the
Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science to Physics_
(_Altpreussische Monatsschrift_, 1882), pp. 279-80: “If we take in
regard to space, not its definition, but only an _a priori_ proposition,
_e.g._ that space is a whole which must be thought only as part of a
still greater whole, it is clear ... that it is an irrational magnitude,
measurable indeed, but in its comparison with unity transcending all
number.” “If space is something objectively existent, it is a magnitude
which can exist only as part of another given magnitude.”
[1508] Cf. Schopenhauer, _World as Will and Idea_ (_Werke, Frauenstädt_,
ii. pp. 585-6; Eng. trans, ii. pp. 107-8). “I find and assert that the
whole antinomy is a mere delusion, a sham fight. Only the assertions of
the antitheses really rest upon the forms of our faculty of knowledge,
_i.e._ if we express it objectively, on the necessary, _a priori_
certain, most universal laws of nature. Their proofs alone are t
herefore drawn from objective grounds. On the other
hand, the assertions and proofs of the theses have no other than a
subjective ground, rest solely on the weakness of the reasoning
individual; for his imagination becomes tired with an endless
regression, and therefore he puts an end to it by arbitrary assumptions,
which he tries to smooth over as well as he can; and his judgment,
moreover, is in this case paralysed by early and deeply imprinted
prejudices. On this account the proof of the thesis in all the four
conflicts is throughout a mere sophism, while that of the antithesis is
a necessary inference of the reason from the laws of the world as idea
known to us _a priori_. It is, moreover, only with great pains and skill
that Kant is able to sustain the thesis, and make it appear to attack
its opponent, which is endowed with native power.... I shall show that
the proofs which Kant adduces of the individual theses are sophisms,
while those of the antitheses are quite fairly and correctly drawn from
objective grounds.”]
[1509] Cf. F. Erhardt’s _Kritik der Kantischen Antinomienlehre_ (1888),
a brief but excellent analysis of this section of the _Critique_.
[1510] § 1 _n._
[1511] Cf. A 431-2 = B 460-1: “...the concept [of the infinite] is not
the concept of a maximum; by it we think only its relation to any
assignable unit, in respect to which it is greater than all number.”
[1512] Cf. Kant’s statement in the _Observation_ to this antithesis, A
431-3 = B 459-61.
[1513] Kant regarded the point as a limit, _i.e._ as a boundary
(_Dissertation_, § 14, 4; § 15, C: “The simple in space is not a part
but a limit”; A 169-70 = B 211); whereas certain modern mathematicians
take the point as one of the undefined elements. When the point is
regarded in this latter manner, space may perhaps be satisfactorily
defined as a set of points. In arguing for the antithesis, and in the
passages just cited, Kant also assumes that, in the case of space, the
properties of the class are determined by the properties of its
elements. This questionable assumption is involved in his assertion that
space can consist only of spaces.
[1514] A 438 = B 466.
[1515] A 439-41 = B 467-9.
[1516] A 441 = B 469.
[1517] Developed in the _Dissertation_ (1770).
[1518] Zweites Hauptstück, Lehrsatz 4, Anmerkung 1. Cf. also Anmerkung
2.
[1519] _Principles of Mathematics_, i. p. 460.
[1520] Cf. above, p. 481 _n._ 2.
[1521] P. 489 _n._
[1522] Cf. Schopenhauer, _World as Will and Idea_ (_Werke_,
_Frauenstädt_, ii. p. 590; Eng. trans. ii. pp. 111-12). “The argument
for the third thesis is a very fine sophism, and is really Kant’s
pretended principle of pure reason itself entirely unadulterated and
unchanged. It tries to prove the finiteness of the series of causes by
saying that, in order to be _sufficient_, a cause must contain the
complete sum of the conditions from which the succeeding state, the
effect, proceeds. For the completeness of the determinations present
_together_ in the state which is the cause, the argument now substitutes
the completeness of the series of causes by which that state itself was
brought to actuality; and because completeness presupposes the condition
of being rounded off or closed in, and this again presupposes
finiteness, the argument infers from this a first cause, closing the
series and therefore unconditioned. But the juggling is obvious. In
order to conceive the state A as the sufficient cause of the state B, I
assume that it contains the sum of the necessary determinations from the
coexistence of which the state B inevitably follows. Now by this my
demand upon it as a _sufficient_ cause is entirely satisfied, and has no
direct connection with the question how the state A itself came to be;
this rather belongs to an entirely different consideration, in which I
regard the said state A no more as cause, but as itself an effect; in
which case another state again must be related to it, just as it was
related to B. The assumption of the finiteness of the series of causes
and effects, and accordingly of a first beginning, appears nowhere in
this as necessary, any more than the presentness of the present moment
requires us to assume a beginning of time itself.”
[1523] _Op. cit._ p. 24.
[1524] For comment upon Kant’s defence of his procedure cf. below, p.
496.
[1525] Cf. Kant’s _Observation_ on the thesis.
[1526] A 451 = B 479.
[1527] Cf. also A 451 = B 479.
[1528] Cf. Schopenhauer, _op. cit._ p. 591; Eng. trans. p. 113. “The
fourth conflict is ... really tautological with the third; and the proof
of the thesis is also essentially the same as that of the preceding one.
Kant’s assertion that every conditioned presupposes a complete series of
conditions, and therefore a series which ends with an unconditioned, is
a _petitio principii_ which must simply be denied. Everything
conditioned presupposes nothing but its condition; that this is again
conditioned raises a new consideration which is not directly contained
in the first.”
[1529] Above, p. 494.
[1530] A 459 = B 487.
[1531] Jean Jacques Dortous de Mairan (1678-1771), physicist and
mathematician. In 1740 he succeeded Fontenelle as perpetual Secretary of
the French Academy of Sciences.
[1532] Cf. above, pp. 435, 495 _n._ 4.
[1533] A 448-50 = B 476-8.
[1534] Cf. above, p. 427 ff.; below, pp. 520-1, 527-37, 541 ff.
[1535] A 462 = B 490.
[1536] Cf. above, pp. 434 ff., 479.
[1537] A 476 = B 504.
[1538] A 484 = B 512.
[1539] _Ibid._
[1540] A 483 = B 511.
[1541] A 485 = B 513.
[1542] Cf. above, p. 481; below, pp. 545-6.
[1543] Kant is here playing on the double meaning of the German
“sinnleeres”--“empty of sense” and “non-sense.”
[1544] A 489 = B 517.
[1545] A 490 = B 518.
[1546] Above, p. 426 ff.
[1547] A 490 = B 518.
[1548] Cf. above p. 204 ff.
[1549] A 494 = B 522-3.
[1550] A 495 = B 523.
[1551] Cf. A 494 = B 522-3: “...we can say of the transcendental object
that it is given in itself prior to all experience.”
[1552] A 496 = B 524.
[1553] A 491 = B 519.
[1554] Pp. 306-7.
[1555] A 497 = B 525.
[1556] A 501-2 = B 529-30.
[1557] A 506 = B 534.
[1558] Cf. end of passage: “There can be no lack of conditions that are
given through this regress.”
[1559] Cf. below, pp. 507-8.
[1560] Cf. below, pp. 507-9.
[1561] _K._ p. 414 _n._ The two last paragraphs of Section VII., which
correct its argument, that of the Transcendental Aesthetic, are probably
later additions.
[1562] A 508 = B 536.
[1563] _Loc. cit._
[1564] As to the distinction between the ascending and the descending
series, cf. above, pp. 453 _n._, 484.
[1565] Cf. A 522 = B 549-50.
[1566] A 514 = B 542.
[1567] Above, p. 506.
[1568] Cf. A 522 = B 550.
[1569] A 515 = B 543.
[1570] A 519-20 = B 547-8.
[1571] When Kant adds (A 521 = B 549), “and therefore absolutely also,”
he inconsistently reverts to the position ambiguously suggested in A 499
= B 527. Cf. above, p. 506.
[1572] A 523-6 = B 551-4.
[1573] The assertion of infinite divisibility is not applicable, Kant
states (A 526-7 = B 554-5), to bodies as organised, but only to bodies
as mere occupants of space. Organisation involves distinction of parts,
and therefore discreteness. How far organisation can go in organised
bodies, experience alone can show us.
[1574] P. 508.
[1575] A 528 = B 556.
[1576] Cf. above, pp. 345-7.
[1577] A 535-6 = B 563-4.
[1578] Cf. A 537 = B 564-5; also A 546 = B 574-5, in which Kant asserts
that man knows himself not only through the senses but “also through
pure apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations which
cannot be reckoned as impressions of the senses.” Such statements would
seem to show that, at the time of writing, Kant had not yet developed
his doctrine of inner sense.
[1579] A 532 = B 560.
[1580] A 536-7 = B 564-5.
[1581] A 533 = B 561.
[1582] A 536 = B 564.
[1583] A 538 = B 566.
[1584] Cf. Kant’s _Uebergang von der metaph. Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenschaft zur Physik (Altpreussische Monatsschrift_ (1882), pp.
272-3).
[1585] A 549 = B 577. Italics not in Kant.
[1586] In A 540 = B 568 a different and less satisfactory view finds
expression.
[1587] A 542 = B 570.
[1588] A 544 = B 572.
[1589] A 546-7 = B 574-5.
[1590] A 548 = B 576.
[1591] A 552 = B 580.
[1592] A 553 = B 581.
[1593] A 557 = B 585.
[1594] A 553-4 = B 581-2.
[1595] Cf. A 537-41 = B 565-9 and A 544 = B 572.
[1596] Cf. A 566 = B 594.
[1597] Cf. above, p. 204 ff.
[1598] A 559 = B 587.
[1599] A 561 = B 589.
[1600] A 565 = B 593.
[1601] A 567 = B 593.
[1602] For Kant’s comparison of his Ideas with those of Plato, cf.
above, pp. 447-9.
[1603] §§ 803 ff. in 5th edition (Halle, 1763).
[1604] A 578 = B 606.
[1605] A 580 = B 608.
[1606] Cf. above, p. 418 ff.
[1607] A 272-4 = B 328-30.
[1608] Cf. Kant’s distinction between distributive and collective unity
in A 582-3 = B 610 with A 644 = B 672.
[1609] A 583 = B 611.
[1610] A 603 = B 631.
[1611] A 603-4 = B 631-2.
[1612] Cf. below, pp. 533, 536.
[1613] A 592 = B 620.
[1614] A 593 = B 621.
[1615] Cf. A 4-5 = B 8-9; A 735-8 = B 763-6.
[1616] Cf. above, pp. 427-8, and references there given.
[1617] Cf. above, p. 424.
[1618] Cf. above, p. 392 ff.
[1619] _K._ p. 475 _n._
[1620] A 603 = B 631.
[1621] Cf. above, p. 527. The concluding paragraphs A 613-14 = B 641-2
can best be treated later in another connection. Cf. below, p. 536.
[1622] A 614 = B 642.
[1623] A 613 = B 641.
[1624] A 616 = B 644.
[1625] A 619-20 = B 647-8.
[1626] Cf. below, pp. 541-2, 552 ff.
[1627] A 620 = B 648.
[1628] A 624 = B 652.
[1629] _Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens_ (1755).
[1630] _Critique of Judgment_, §§ 64, 65.
[1631] Hamann completed his translation of Hume’s _Dialogues on Natural
Religion_ on August 7, 1780 (cf. Hamann’s _Werke_, vi. 154 ff.): and
Kant, notwithstanding his being occupied in finishing the _Critique_,
read through the manuscript. It is highly likely that this first perusal
of Hume’s _Dialogues_ not only confirmed Kant in his negative attitude
towards natural theology, but also enabled him to define more clearly
than he otherwise would have done, the negative consequences of his own
Critical principles. The chapter on the _Ideal_, as we have already
observed (above, pp. 434-5, 527-9, 531), was probably one of the last
parts of the _Critique_ to be brought into final form. It does not seem
possible, however, to establish in any specific manner the exact
influence which Hume’s _Dialogues_ may thus have exercised upon the
argument of this portion of the _Critique_. When Schreiter’s translation
of the _Dialogues_ appeared in 1781, Hamann, not unwilling to escape the
notoriety of seeming to father so sceptical a work, withdrew his own
translation.
[1632] This is the main point of Hume’s argument in Section XI. of his
_Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding_.
[1633] A 631 = B 659.
[1634] A 641 = B 669.
[1635] Cf. above, p. 407 ff., and below, p. 552 ff.
[1636] Cf. above, p. 454, with further references in _n._ 1.
[1637] Cf. above, pp. 536-7.
[1638] A 642 = B 670.
[1639] A 769-82 = B 797-810.
[1640] A xiv, B xxiii-iv, and _Reflexionen_ ii. 1451: “In metaphysics
there can be no such thing as uncertainty.” Cf. above, pp. 10, 35.
[1641] A 770-1 = B 798-9.
[1642] A 772 = B 800.
[1643] A 775 = B 803.
[1644] Cf. A 781-2 = B 809-10.
[1645] Cf. above, pp. 481, 501.
[1646] A 777-8 = B 805-6.
[1647] A 782 = B 810.
[1648] Cf. above, pp. 97-8, 102, 390-1, 426 ff., 447 ff.
[1649] A 651 = B 679.
[1650] _Loc. cit._
[1651] A 653 = B 681.
[1652] _Dissertation_, § 30.
[1653] The extremely un-Critical reason which Kant here (A 647 = B 675)
gives for its necessarily remaining hypothetical is the “impossibility
of knowing all possible consequences.” This use of the term hypothetical
is also confusing in view of Kant’s criticism of the hypothetical
employment of Reason in A 769 ff. = B 797 ff.
[1654] A 647 = B 675.
[1655] _Loc. cit._ and A 649 = B 677.
[1656] A 648 = B 676.
[1657] A 652 = B 680.
[1658] A 660-1 = B 688-9.
[1659] A 656 = B 684.
[1660] A 656 = B 684.
[1661] A 658 = B 686.
[1662] A 660 = B 688.
[1663] The opening paragraphs of the section, A 642-5 = B 670-3, may be
of the same date as the concluding paragraphs.
[1664] Cf. _per contra_ A 669-70 = B 697-8.
[1665] A 666 = B 694.
[1666] A 669 = B 697.
[1667] Cf. above, pp. 446-7.
[1668] Cf. A 681 = B 709.
[1669] Cf. _per contra_ A 663-4 = B 691-2.
[1670] A 670 = B 698.
[1671] I may here guard against misunderstanding. Though the Ideas of
Reason condition the experience which they regulate, this must not be
taken as nullifying Kant’s fundamental distinction between the
regulative and the constitutive. Even when he is developing his less
sceptical view, he adopts, in metaphysics as in ethics, a position which
is radically distinct from that of Hegel. Though the moral ideal
represents reality of the highest order, it transcends all possible
realisation of itself in human life. Though it conditions all our
morality, it at the same time condemns it. The Christian virtue of
humility defines the only attitude proper to the human soul. In an
exactly similar manner, the fact that the Ideas of Reason have to be
regarded as conditioning the possibility of sense-experience need not
prevent us from also recognising that they likewise make possible our
consciousness of its limitations.
[1672] Cf. above, pp. 473-7.
[1673] A 679 = B 707.
[1674] A 678 = B 706.
[1675] A 674 = B 702. Cf. A 678-9 = B 706-7.
[1676] A 680 = B 708.
[1677] As above noted (pp. 499 ff.), when we find Kant thus insisting
upon the completely soluble character of all problems of pure Reason,
the sceptical, subjectivist tendency is dominant.
[1678] A 669 = B 697.
[1679] Cf. above, pp. 536-7, 541-2.
[1680] A 686-7 = B 714-15.
[1681] A 693 = B 721.
[1682] A 699-700 = B 727-8.
[1683] A 701 = B 729.
[1684] Nearly all the important points raised in the _Methodology_, and
several of its chief sections, I have commented upon in their connection
with the earlier parts of the _Critique_. Also, the _Methodology_ is
extremely diffuse. For these reasons I have found it advisable to give
such additional comment as seems necessary in the form of this Appendix.
[1685] On Kant’s use of the terms ‘discipline’ and ‘canon,’ cf. above,
pp. 71-2, 170, 174, 438.
[1686] Cf. above, p. 438.
[1687] A 4-5 = B 8-9.
[1688] _Untersuchung: Zweite Betrachtung, W._ ii. p. 283.
[1689] Kant here disavows the position of the _Untersuchung_ in which
(_Erste Betrachtung_, § 4) he had asserted that mathematics deals with
quantity and philosophy with qualities.
[1690] For comment upon this distinction, cf. above, pp. 131-3, 338-9.
[1691] _Untersuchung: Erste Betrachtung_, § 2.
[1692] A 728 = B 756.
[1693] _Untersuchung: Zweite Betrachtung, W._ ii. p. 283.
[1694] _Untersuchung: Erste Betrachtung_, § 1, _W._ ii. p. 276:
“Mathematics proceeds to all its definitions by a _synthetic_ procedure,
philosophy by an analytic procedure.”
[1695] In the _Untersuchung_ Kant’s statements are more cautious, and
also more adequate. Cf. _Erste Betrachtung_, § 3, _W._ ii. p. 279: “In
mathematics there are only a few but in philosophy there are innumerable
irresolvable concepts....”
[1696] A 731 _n._ = B 759 _n._
[1697] The phrases which Kant employs (A 732-3 = B 760-1) are:
“_unmittelbargewiss_,” “_evident_,” “_augenscheinlich_.” Cf. above, pp.
xxxv-vi, 36 ff., 53.
[1698] Cf. above, pp. 118, 142, 185-6.
[1699] Cf. above, p. 117 ff.
[1700] Cf. above, pp. 38-42, 93-4, 118-20, 133.
[1701] Cf. above, pp. 111-12, 114-15.
[1702] Cf. above, p. 131 ff.
[1703] A 737 = B 765.
[1704] Cf. above, pp. 36 ff., 117 ff., 128 ff., 565-6.
[1705] A 743-4 = B 771-2.
[1706] A 753 = B 781. In A 745 = B 773 Kant’s mention of Hume can hardly
refer to Hume’s _Dialogues_ (cf. above, pp. 539-40 n.). Kant probably
has in mind Section XI. of the _Enquiry_. The important discussion of
Hume’s position in A 760 ff. = B 788 ff. has been commented upon above,
p. 61 ff. With Priestley’s teaching (A 745-6 = B 773-4) Kant probably
became acquainted through some indirect source. The first of Priestley’s
philosophical writings to appear in German was his _History of the
Corruptions of Christianity_. The translation was published in 1782. In
A 747-8 = B 775-6 Kant quite obviously has Rousseau in mind.
[1707] Section III., on _The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to
Hypotheses_, has been commented on above, pp. 543-6.
[1708] A 782 = B 810.
[1709] Even in mathematics the indirect method is not always available.
Cf. Russell, _Principles of Mathematics_, i. p. 15.
[1710] A 794 = B 822.
[1711] Cf. above, p. 563 _n._ 2.
[1712] A 797 = B 825.
[1713] Cf. _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. p. 473; Bernard’s trans. p.
411: “_God_, _freedom_, and _immortality_ are the problems at the
solution of which all the preparations of Metaphysics aim, as their
ultimate and unique purpose.”
[1714] A 800-1 = B 829.
[1715] The statement in A 801 = B 829 that morals is a subject foreign
to transcendental philosophy is in line with that of A 14-15 = B 28, and
conflicts with the position later adopted in the _Critique of Practical
Reason_. Cf. above, p. 77.
[1716] A 803 = B 831-2.
[1717] Cf. below, pp. 571-5.
[1718] A 804 = B 832.
[1719] Cf. above, p. lvi.
[1720] These statements are subject to modification, if the distinction
(not clearly recognised by Kant, but really essential to his position)
between immanent and transcendent metaphysics is insisted upon. Cf.
above, pp. liv-v, 22, 56, 66-70.
[1721] Cf. above, p. 541.
[1722] _W._ v. pp. 47-8; Abbott’s trans. (3rd edition) p. 136.
[1723] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. pp. 31-7; Abbott’s
trans. p. 120.
[1724] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. p. 43; Abbott’s trans.
p. 132: “The moral law, although it gives no _view_, yet gives us a fact
absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world, or from the
whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact which points to a
pure world of the understanding, nay, even defines it _positively_, and
enables us to know something of it, namely, a law.”
[1725] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason_, in note to Preface.
[1726] _Op. cit._, Preface, at the beginning, Abbott’s trans. pp. 87-8.
Cf. also the concluding pages of Book I., _W._ v. pp. 103-6, Abbott, pp.
197-200.
[1727] _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. p. 468; Bernard’s trans. p. 406.
[1728] _Op. cit._ p. 474; Bernard’s trans. p. 413.
[1729] A 815 = B 843.
[1730] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. pp. 143-4 _n._;
Abbott’s trans. p. 242: “It is a duty to realise the _Summum Bonum_ to
the utmost of our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it
is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is
necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary
as the moral law, in connexion with which alone it is valid.”
[1731] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v. p. 142 ff.; Abbott’s
trans. p. 240 ff.; _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. pp. 469-70; Bernard’s
trans. pp. 406-8.
[1732] _Critique of Judgment, W._ v. pp. 369-72; Bernard’s trans. pp.
407-10. Cf. note in same section: “It is a trust in the promise of the
moral law; not, however, such as is contained in it, but such as I put
into it, and that on morally adequate grounds.”
[1733] A 819 = B 847.
[1734] A 820 = B 848.
[1735] The distinction is less harshly drawn in Kant’s _Logic,
Einleitung_, ix. (Hartenstein), viii. p. 73; Eng. trans, p. 63:
“Conviction is opposed to persuasion. Persuasion is an assent from
inadequate reasons, in respect to which we do not know whether they are
only subjective or are also objective. Persuasion often precedes
conviction.”
[1736] Cf. above, pp. 10, 543. Cf. _Fortschritte; Werke_ (Hartenstein),
viii. p. 561.
[1737] Cf. _Logic, loc. cit._ Cf. _Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals, W._ iv. pp. 416-17: Abbott’s trans. pp. 33-34.
[1738] Regarding Kant’s distinction in A 827 = B 855 between Ideas and
hypotheses cf. above, p. 543 ff. Cf. also _Critique of Judgment, W._ v.
pp. 392 ff., 461 ff.; Bernard’s trans. pp. 302 ff., 395 ff.
[1739] A 829 = B 857.
[1740] Cf. Kant’s Preface to the _Critique of Practical Reason, W._ v.
p. 8 _n._; Abbott’s trans. p. 93 n. “A reviewer who wanted to find some
fault with this work--[the _Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals_]--has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he
says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a
_new formula_. But who would think of introducing a new principle of all
morality, and making himself as it were the first inventor of it, just
as if all the world before him were ignorant what duty was, or had been
in thorough-going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a
mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is to be done
to work out a problem, will not think that a formula is insignificant
and useless which does the same for all duty in general.” Cf.
_Fortschritte_, _Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 563.
[1741] _Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse, Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 624,
already quoted above, p. lvii. Cf. also _op. cit._ p. 630.
[1742] Cf. _Critique of Practical Reason_, Conclusion, _W._ v. pp.
161-2; Abbott’s trans. p. 260.
[1743] A 832 = B 860.
[1744] _K._ p. 633 _n._ Cf. above, p. xxii.
[1745] Cf. Adickes, _K._ p. 635 _n._, and Vaihinger, i. p. 306. In this
table _Critique_ is distinguished from the _System_ of pure Reason (cf.
above, pp. 71-2). The transcendental philosophy of pure Reason of this
table corresponds to the _Analytic_ of the _Critique_, and to “pure
natural science” in the absolute sense (cf. above, pp. 66-7). The
rational physics of this table corresponds to the _Metaphysical First
Principles of Natural Science_.
[1746] When Kant in A 840 = B 868 takes philosophy as including
empirical knowledge he contradicts the spirit, though not the letter of
his own preceding statements. In his _Introduction to Logic_
(Hartenstein, viii. p. 22, Abbott’s trans. p. 12) the empirical is
identified with the historical.
[1747] _Fortschritte, Werke_ (Hartenstein), viii. p. 554.
[1748] _Op. cit_. p. 520.
[1749] _I.e._ between the conception of philosophy as _Schulbegriff_ and
as _Weltbegriff_ (_conceptus cosmicus_). He explains in a note to A 839
= B 868 that he employs these latter terms as indicating that philosophy
in the traditional or humanistic sense is concerned with “that which
must necessarily interest every one.” I have translated _Weltbegriff_ as
‘_universal concept_.’ By _conceptus cosmicus_ Kant means ‘concept
shared by the whole world,’ or ‘common to all mankind.’
[1750] Cf. Kant’s _Logic, Introduction_, § iii.: Abbott’s trans. pp.
14-15: “In this scholastic signification of the word, philosophy aims
only _at skill_; in reference to the higher concept common to all
mankind, on the contrary, it aims at _utility_. In the former aspect,
therefore, it is a doctrine of skill; in the latter a doctrine of
wisdom; it is the lawgiver of reason; and hence the philosopher is _not_
a _master of the art of reason_, but a _lawgiver_. The master of the art
of reason, or as Socrates calls him, the _philodoxus_, strives merely
for speculative knowledge, without concerning himself how much this
knowledge contributes to the ultimate end of human reason: he gives
rules for the use of reason for all kinds of ends. The practical
philosopher, the teacher of wisdom by doctrine and example, is the true
philosopher. For philosophy is the Ideal of a perfect wisdom, which
shows us the ultimate ends of all human reason.”
[1751] A 839 = B 867.
[1752] A 851 = B 879.
[1753] A 850 = B 878.
[1754] A 848-9 = B 876-7. Cf. above, pp. 237, 311 _n._, 312 _n._, 384-5,
473-7, 554.
[1755] A 852 = B 880.
[1756] Cf. A 313 ff. = B 370 ff., above, pp. 498-9.
[1757] Cf. above, pp. xxviii-xxix.
[1758] _Einleitung_, § iv.: Abbott’s trans, pp. 17-23.
[1759] Supplementary to pp. xxv-xxxiii. Throughout I shall make use of
my _Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy_, and may refer the reader to
them for further justification of the positions adopted.
[1760] For recognition of this distinction, cf. Herbert Spencer,
_Principles of Psychology_, vol. i., 3rd ed., pp. 620-3.
[1761] Cf. _Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy_, pp. 80-2, 106-7.
[1762] This distinction is due to Galileo, though the terms “primary”
and “secondary” were first employed by Locke.
[1763] I have dealt with Avenarius’ criticism in “Avenarius’ Philosophy
of Pure Experience” (_Mind_, vol. xv. N.S., pp. 13-31, 149-160); with
Bergson’s criticism in “Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy”
(_Philosophical Review_, vol. xvii. pp. 138-148); and with the general
issue as a whole in “The Problem of Knowledge” (_Journal of Philosophy_,
vol. ix. pp. 113-128).
[1764] On Descartes’ failure to distinguish between the mathematical and
the dynamical aspects of motion, cf. above, p. 584.
[1765] _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, IV. vi. 16.
[1766] _Op. cit._ IV. xii. 7.
[1767] _Op. cit._ IV. vi. 11.
[1768] Cf. above, pp. 27-8.
[1769] Though the concept of substance is also discussed by Hume, his
treatment of it is quite perfunctory.
[1770] Cf. above, pp. xxv ff., 61 ff.
[1771] _Treatise on Human Nature_ (Green and Grose), i. p. 380.
[1772] _Op. cit._ p. 383.
[1773] _Loc. cit._
[1774] For justification of the phrase “synthetic reason,” I must refer
to my articles in _Mind_, vol. xiv. N.S. pp. 149-73, 335-47, on “The
Naturalism of Hume.”
[1775] _Treatise_ (Green and Grose), i. pp. 474-5.
[1776] _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_ (Green and Grose), p.
40.
[1777] _Treatise_, p. 471.
[1778] _Enquiry_ (Green and Grose), pp. 25-6.
[1779] _Éclaircissement_ sur chap. iii. pt. ii. liv. vi. _de la
Recherche_: tome iv. (1712) p. 381.
[1780] _Enquiry_, p. 57.
[1781] _Enquiry_, p. 32.
[1782] This is the objection upon which Beattie chiefly insists.
[1783] _Op. cit._ pp. 33-4.
[1784] Cf. above, pp. 39 ff., 54, 222 ff., 241, 286-9.
[1785] How far Hume’s criticism of empiricism really influenced Kant in
his appreciation of this deeper problem, it seems impossible to decide.
Very probably Kant proceeded to it by independent development of his own
standpoint, after the initial impulse received on the more strictly
logical issue.
[1786] The assertion, by Kuno Fischer and Paulsen, of an empirical
period in Kant’s development, has been challenged by Adickes, B.
Erdmann, Riehl, and Vaihinger.
[1787] Cf. B. Erdmann’s _Kriticismus_, p. 147; _Critique of Judgment,
W._ v. p. 391 (Bernard’s trans, p. 301).
[1788] Above, pp. xxx-iii.
[1789] _Philosophischer Kriticismus_, 2nd ed. p. 209.
[1790] Cf. above, pp. lv-vi, lxi, 543 ff.
* * * * *
Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber:
The transcenedntal doctrine=> The transcendental doctrine {pg 77}
non-commital=> non-committal {pg 122}
widersinnisches=> Widersinnisches {pg 444}
Erkenntniss=> Erkenntnis {pg 449}
themelves=> themselves {pg 505}
which contain the the material=> which contain the material {pg 523}
it as valid=> it is valid {pg 575}