Gradually the prices of certain securities began to edge up

in this early thin trading, enticing more and more holders to "sell on

strength." What issues? First off, anything to do with computers. Of

course there weren't all that many hardware manufacturers left around

by then, after the shakeout and mergers of the mid-eighties, but

somebody was buying heavily into the few that remained. They were also

actively purchasing little software outfits. Those stocks had taken a

heavy beating over the past week, so prices were at an all-time low for

most.

Other industries they started to nibble at were telecommunications,

aerospace, biotechnology. They seemed to be looking for outfits with

substantial R&D operations: the focus was on creativity, growth

sectors, the sunrise industries.

Of course, what this mysterious new buyer was really doing was snapping

up outfits loaded with labs and Ph.D.'s. Dr. Richardson and my new

client Matsuo Noda had DNI acquiring companies short on competent

management and market share but long on research, innovation--the one

thing we were still halfway good at. Looked at differently, what Dai

Nippon was really buying was underused brainpower, the American smarts

currently going to waste thanks to inept corporate management.

Explanations began to sprout all over the place--from the "Heard on the

Street" column in the Journal to Dan Dorfman, a guy with a bloodhound's

nose for Wall Street shenanigans. But the hard truth was nobody could

put it together. Who could have? The play was too ambitious even to

imagine.

You guessed it. With the trillions and trillions now at its disposal,

Japan was about to take charge of America's future.

The Samurai Strategy · 第 63 / 135 题