CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The task ahead can be described very simply. I was going to help Dai

Nippon acquire controlling stock positions in a bevy of ineptly managed

American high-tech companies, and she was going to be in charge of

turning them around. I was DNI's takeover artist; Tam was the fix-it

expert. That probably sounds a bit ambitious on everybody's part, but

after watching the Dai Nippon juggernaut for a couple of days I knew

one thing for sure: we'd have plenty of heavy backup.

Why did I agree to ride shotgun for Matsuo Noda's "Save America"

project? Because, if he meant what he said, such a program was long

overdue. American industry was in trouble, and it was hurting a lot of

good, hardworking people who didn't deserve to be hurt. Worse still,

this wasn't some random act of God. It was largely the result of self-

serving corporate management. Most occupiers of the executive suites

these days were too busy merging and acquiring and leveraging to do

what stockholders thought they were paying them for: building industry

and creating American jobs. (Well, maybe that's an overstatement; they

had kept Drexel Burnham's junk-bond cowboys working overtime.) In the

mid-eighties, American corporations were spending two and three times

more on mergers and acquisitions than on research and development. Most

industrialists here no longer cared to try making anything as old-

fashioned as competitive products; they preferred to make deals and

sell imports. The net result was that America, the world's major

economic locomotive, was veering off the track and seriously in danger

of taking everybody else in the world along with it.

That's where Matsuo Noda came in. Part of the arrangement he'd made

with the Japanese institutions putting up the funds was that he would

be given proxy to exercise all voting rights. Face it, he had a pretty

impressive performance record overseeing the long-range planning and

investment of well-run corporations. So after I'd helped Dai Nippon

acquire control of a long list of poorly managed companies, he and Tam

Richardson were planning to move in, clear out the deadwood, and lay

down priorities for restructuring. She was Dai Nippon's technical

director for all U.S. operations, which meant she was going to head up

the team on the newly evacuated floor just above the financial section--

Noda's management samurai.

Enough theory. Here's how it actually went. On Friday the story was

finally broken by The Wall Street Journal, a little squib in "What's

News," with a short two-column analysis on page 3. The piece revealed

that all the heavy new activity building in the high-tech sector of the

market represented buys being coordinated by a new Japanese investment

concern.

This sudden, unexpected program of foreign investment was heralded at

first as a salubrious omen, refuting those doomsayers who were claiming

the world had lost confidence in the U.S. In fact, if anything it was

proof that overseas enthusiasm was actually increasing. Japan's

previous practice of focusing on debt instruments was at best passive

investment. But buying heavily into a sector of the economy that

appeared weak was something else entirely. It was a rousing endorsement

of America's prospects.

To be fair, there was still a modest case to be made in that direction.

Our high-tech sector wasn't all struggling high fliers operating out of

some one-story cinder block on Route 128 or the Washington Beltway.

America had plenty of solid industry in high tech--computers, aerospace,

office machinery--and American laboratories and universities were the

envy of the world. The problem lay with the downside. We'd lost our

lead in electronics, drugs, scientific instruments, plastics,

communications equipment . . . it's a long list. In fact, America's

overall trade balance in high-tech products had actually gone negative,

shrunk from a twenty-five billion dollar surplus as recently as 1980.

The ignored question, therefore: Given the direction things were

headed, why were the Japanese suddenly supposed to be so impressed?

The market's initial euphoria didn't last long however. By the end of

the second week the SEC was sniffing the air and the lunch talk

downtown, from the AMEX traders at Harry's to the expense-account crowd

at historic Fraunces Tavern, was

focused on what appeared to be a major shift in Japan's investment

strategy. Now that the stock market was in shambles, they weren't just

dabbling anymore; they were cashing in on the fire sale hand over fist.

Thus the Street's early cheering melted into apprehension. Japan had

already taken apart our debt and currency markets, turned them upside

down, and scored a bundle. Now Noda had Wall Street looking over its

shoulder and reminiscing about the good old days when all it had to

worry about was rich, crazy Arabs. When it became clear that Dai Nippon

was assaulting the U.S. securities markets with high-speed computers

and a checkbook that just kept coming, there weren't all that many

wisecracks about camels and tents.

Wall Street, however, merely counts; it doesn't think. The real

disquiet was reserved for corporate boardrooms. Take it as a given that

when the Securities and Exchange Commission reports some ten, twenty,

or thirty percent of your company's stock has just been swallowed by a

cash-rich Japanese raider, your attention can focus most exquisitely.

In a word, Matsuo Noda was the talk of industrial America. More to the

point, and exactly what he had expected, the boards and CEOs of the

companies being bought were beginning to be scared shitless. A major

player with seemingly bottomless pockets was gobbling up heavy blocks

of their publicly traded shares. Worse still, nobody had the slightest

inkling why.

What all those entrenched CEOs didn't realize, in their wildest

paranoia, was that seven-figure salaries and cushy executive perks were

about to go the way of Cadillac tail fins. World competition, not

executive compensation, would be the new game. Playtime was over;

America was about to get serious again.

My early suspicions concerning my role in Noda's design had been

precisely on the mark. I was indeed the freelance gunslinger he wanted

by his side when the companies he was aiming at started to shoot back,

which they surely would. Needless to say, if his plan was ever allowed

to reach the courts, it would create a virtual "living trust" for half

the corporate lawyers in the land. He'd be in litigation through the

twenty-first century as managements fought to the last stockholder's

dollar to keep their jobs.

Enter Matt Walton. Time for some samurai-style legal swordsmanship.

The rules: If you're CEO of a company and somebody starts buying up a

major chunk of your stock with the intent of taking you over, you've

got roughly four basic ways to stop him. The first is to try and bribe

that buyer to go away, paying him a ransom--politely called greenmail--to

sell his holdings and disappear. (More than one corporate raider you've

read about in the papers has made millions in a couple of weeks using

that very play.) The drawbacks of trying to buy off a potential

acquirer are, (1) it's expensive, and (2) maybe he really does plan to

eat you, in which case it won't work anyway. Matsuo Noda was in that

category.

A second popular means to thwart a hostile takeover is to go out and

find somebody else to buy you first, the proverbial "white knight."

Ideally this friendly buyer should be, (1) too big to be taken over

himself, and (2) willing to let you keep your playpen.

A third technique to stop somebody from acquiring a controlling chunk

of your stock is to jack up the price, usually by offering to buy it

yourself. Float some junk bonds, sell off a few divisions, do anything

that will raise cash and then offer the shareholders more than the

raider is willing to bid. This can be very expensive, but if you're a

CEO with millions in compensation every year, why should you care if

your stockholders' company is leveraged to the brink of ruin? You've

still got your job and your goodies. It's used a lot.

The fourth and most fashionable way these days to stop hostile mergers

is to try and make yourself unmergeable. To do that, you get your board

of directors to vote a poison pill. What this does is make sure that

any company that swallows you is going to be ingesting a piranha that

will eat said company's own guts instead. The newest twist on this is

to use phony bonds with a so-called flip-over provision, a killer pill

invented by a clever New York law operation I won't name but whose

initials might be WLR&K. Their game is as follows. In order to protect

yourself you invent some convertible bonds and stash them away

somewhere, ready. Then, should a raiding company start acquiring your

stock or make an unauthorized tender offer to your shareholders, you

hand out these little bombs to everybody who owns your shares. If this

unfriendly company is then unlucky enough to actually acquire you,

those convertibles "flip over" into the stock of that buyer. Your

stockholders suddenly have the right to exchange their funny paper for

huge, discounted chunks of real stock in the acquiring company--which

would, naturally, be ruined should that happen. And usually, just for

good measure, you also vote through a few "golden parachutes" for you

and all your cronies, giving everybody in the executive suite severance

pay in the tens of millions.

Those were the stakes. Now, a lot of outfits suddenly found themselves

being bought by a mysterious Japanese entity named Dai Nippon,

International. What were they going to do? At first of course everybody

just assumed NDI was merely angling for a little greenmail. No such

luck. After a couple of days went by and we hadn't returned anybody's

phone call, they knew that wasn't it. Next, a few went looking for a

white knight with more money than DNI (a tough assignment). Not

surprisingly, however, most corporate managers very quickly decided to

call a board meeting and ram through a poison pill.

I got more than a few phone calls at my downtown office from CEOs

wanting to know if I could pitch in and help them stave off what looked

like an unfriendly Japanese buy-up. I had to say, sorry fellows, I'm

unavailable. But why not give it your best shot and try the old "pill"?

Most of them did. They had no option really.

Which suited me fine.

The time was late Friday--the afternoon was gorgeous, sunny and crisp--

and the place was Noda's office. Naturally he understood all about

poison pills, so he knew the problem. What he wanted to hear was our

solution.

"I'd like to try something that's never been done before. A different

battle plan." I glanced out at the blue sky and wished I was already in

St. Croix on holiday with Amy. "However, I think it's possibly just

unconventional enough to fly."

"It has to be legal, Mr. Walton." Noda leaned back in his chair,

waiting.

"It is. But in order to lay the groundwork, we'll first need to set up

a string of dummy corporations."

"Any particular state?" He was listening closely now, his mind clicking

away. I was never sure what the man was thinking, but I figured he'd

probably seen it all before.

"That old standby Delaware should do fine, though you might want to

consider going for some offshore tax-haven places, if only because the

paperwork is minimal. In the Caribbean I'd recommend the Turks and

Caicos Islands, maybe the Cayman Islands. Then there's Bermuda or the

Bahamas or the Channel Islands. If you really want to get esoteric, why

not Vanuatu--used to be the New Hebrides--in the South Pacific."

"I'm familiar with world geography, Mr. Walton." He was deadpan. A

joke?

"Fair enough. These dummy corporations of course will have no assets."

"I understand." He smiled and ran his fingers through his silver hair,

doubtless already miles ahead of me. "Absolutely no problem. Please

proceed."

"While those corporations are being set up, you continue buying stock

in whatever companies you need to control, making sure in all cases

that you acquire just enough to deliberately trigger their poison-pill

mechanism. We force them to issue their flip-over bonds. They can't

stop the process, since it's always set up to be automatic after a

certain percentage of stock has been acquired. Not even the boards of

directors can revoke it."

"Yes, Mr. Walton. I'm aware of that." He didn't seem the slightest bit

ruffled by my unorthodox opener.

"Well, let me elaborate. The reason we want to trigger their poison

pill first is so that nobody can later come in as a white knight and

save them. They're totally isolated. They'll have made themselves into

sitting ducks."

"Very good." He leaned back. Was he really that far ahead of me?

"While that's happening, you 'sell' the stock acquired thus far to one

of the dummy outfits we've set up, in return for debt paper. Which puts

DNl at arm's length and untouchable. After that, you lend that dummy

corporation the rest of the millions or billions necessary to acquire a

controlling interest in the company, taking back as collateral more

junk bonds at absurdly usurious rates. That makes it a financial leper,

but you don't care: you're merely lending yourself the money. This

paper corporation is all that can be touched when the acquired

company's poison bonds flip over. So instead of being convertible into

the stock of some cash-rich corporation, the way they were intended,

those flip-bonds are going to give their holders a piece of some

offshore phone booth with zero assets and enough debt to choke a horse.

They're worthless paper. And you're in the clear."

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