The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the Massive

Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is questionable that a

decision to employ American force this ruthlessly in quasi- or real

assassination will ever be made by the U.S. Further, the standard to

maintain the ability to perform these missions is high and dependent

on both resources and on supporting intelligence, especially human

intelligence-not an American strong point.

Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example and is distinct

from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it focuses on

depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose Shock and Awe.

The image here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to

incapacitate an adversary, but on a far larger scale. The stun grenade

produces blinding light and deafening noise. The result shocks and

confuses the adversary and makes him senseless. The aim in this

example of achieving Shock and Awe is to produce so much light and

sound or the converse, to deprive the adversary of all senses, and

therefore to disable and to disarm. Without senses, the adversary

becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable.

A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas is a

dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a high altitude nuclear

detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic and electrical

equipment better describes the intended effect regardless of

likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in specific areas, of the

ability to communicate, observe, and to interact is a more reasonable

and perhaps more achievable variant. This deprival of senses,

including all electronics and substitution of false signals or data to

create this feeling of impotence, is another variant. Above all, Shock

and Awe are imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is

deprivation of the senses.

The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part shortcomings of

other approaches. Technological solutions are crucial but may not be

conceivable outside the EMP effects of nuclear weapons. Intelligence

is clearly vital. Without precise knowledge of who and what are to be

stunned, this example will not work.

The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the "Haitian" example

(or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It is based on

imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and indeed through

deception, misinformation, and disinformation and is different from

the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the early 1800s, native

Haitians were seeking to extricate their country from French control.

The Haitian leaders staged a martial parade for the visiting French

military contingent and marched, reportedly, a hand full of battalions

repeatedly in review. The French were deceived into believing that the

native forces numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that

French military action was futile and that its forces would be

overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their

freedom without firing a shot.

To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian example

and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile are more crucial

in this regime. However, the target or focus is the will and

perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu category comes

closest to this one except that while Sun Tzu is selective in applying

force, it is clear that imposing actual pain and shock are essential

ingredients and deception, disin-formation, and guile are secondary.

Demonstrative uses of force are also important. The issue is how to

determine what demonstrations will affect the perceptions of the

intended target in line with the overall political aims.

The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major dependency on

intelligence. One must be certain that the will and perceptions of the

adversary can be manipulated. The classic misfire is the adversary who

is not impressed and, instead, is further provoked to action by the

unintended actions of the aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis'

invasion of Kuwait demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can

backfire. Saddam simply let his bluff be called.

The next example is that of "The Roman Legions." Achieving Shock and

Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through

the adversary's perception and fear of his vulnerability and our own

invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take a

considerable period of time. The target set encompasses both military

and societal values. In occupying a vast empire stretching from the

Atlantic to the Red Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of

forces to secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman

forces were far superior to native forces individually and

collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act occurred, the

perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately would

take place. This was similar to British "Gunboat Diplomacy" of the

nineteenth century when the British fleet would return to the scene of

any crime against the crown and extract its retribution through the

wholesale destruction of offending villages.

There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to achieve Shock

and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the perception of that

prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were among the most

significant factors. In other words, reprisals and the use of force to

exact a severe punishment, as well as the certainty that this sword of

Damocles would descend, were essential ingredients. The distinction

between this category and the others is the ex post facto nature of

achieving Shock and Awe. In the other categories, there is the need

for seizing the initiative and applying con-temporaneous force to

achieve Shock and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and Awe have

already been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the rise

of new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use

of force.

The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability of

reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is not and

may not always be the case with the United States, although we can

attempt to make others believe it will be. The takeover of the Embassy

in Tehran by dissident "students" in 1979 and American impotence in

the aftermath are suggestive of the shortcoming. That aside, the

example or perception of the invincibility of American military power

is not a bad one to embellish.

The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the Decay and

Default model and is based on the imposition of societal breakdown

over a lengthy period but without the application of massive

destruction. This example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. In

this example, both military and societal values are targets. Selective

and focused force is applied. It is the long-term corrosive effects of

the continuing breakdown in the system and society that ultimately

compels an adversary to surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe

are therefore not immediate either in application or in producing the

end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and

aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do

not threaten the entire society but apply pressure as in the Chinese

water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the

preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a

variant of Shock and Awe in the form of frustration collapsing the

will to resist.

The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In many

cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock and Awe is

unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by conventional or

politically acceptable means.

The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian Mounted Police,"

whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where you can send a

bullet." The distinction between this example and the others is that

this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu and implies that

standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in place can achieve the

required objectives. There should not be too fine a point, however, in

belaboring differences with the other examples in this regard over

standoff. A stealthy aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from

a cruise missile fired at 1,000 miles regarding the effect of ordnance

on target.

A few observations about these examples offer insights on which to

test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Dominance. It is clear that

the targets in each category include military, civilian, industrial,

infrastructure, and societal components of a country or group. In

certain cases, time is the crucial consideration in imposing Shock and

Awe and in most of the examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden

imposition of Shock and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects

of Shock and Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either achieved

over time or achieved through earlier conditioning and experiences.

Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new

technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different is

the extent to which brilliance and competence in using force, in

understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in executing

military operations with deftness, are vital. While this recognition

is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting brilliance and therefore

on the presumption that brilliance may be taught or institutionalized

and is not a function only of gifted individuals.

There is also a key distinction between selective or precise and

massive application of force. Technology, in the form of "zero CEP"

weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory capability of systems

that are both precise and have the net consequence of imposing massive

disruption, destruction, or damage. This damage goes beyond the loss

of power grids and other easily identifiable industrial targeting

sets. Loss of all communications can have a massively destructive

impact even though physical destruction can be relatively limited.

In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal levels of

power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the attempt to keep war

"immaculate," at least in limiting collateral damage, one point should

not be forgotten. Above all, war is a nasty business or, as Sherman

put it, "war is hell." While there are surely humanitarian

considerations that cannot or should not be ignored, the ability to

Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the ability to frighten, scare,

intimidate, and disarm. The Clausewitzian dictum concerning the

violent nature of war is dismissed only at our peril.

For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the concerned

Member of Congress with responsibility for providing for the common

defense, what lessons emerge from these examples and hierarchies?

First, there are always broader sets of operational concepts and

constructs available for achieving political objectives than may be

realized. Not all of these alternatives are necessarily better or

feasible. However, the examples suggest that further intellectual and

conceptual effort is a worthwhile investment in dealing with national

security options in the future.

Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in

generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally viewed

as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to arrive

"firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from advancing, or to

ensure we had ample forces on station should they be required. Rapid

Dominance would alleviate many of these constraints as we would have

the capacity to deploy effective forces far more quickly. Therefore,

in this case, we can view time as an ally. The political issue rests

in longstanding arguments to limit the President from having the

capacity to deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation

without conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is

an obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force

packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration and

experimentation. Indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and

emergency release procedures shows that delegating instant

presidential authority can be handled responsibly.

Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of several

models, it is clear that one capability not presently in the arsenal

is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise and timely. It is

also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance are important

attributes in war, there are no guarantees that they can be

institutionalized in any military force.

Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates to the

Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are "EMP-like" or High Powered

Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide broad ability

to incapacitate even a relatively primitive society. In using these

weapons, the nerve centers of that society would be attacked rather

than using this illustrative system to achieve hard target kill

because there were few hard targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like

systems have been and are being carefully researched.

Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation, and

misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid Dominance

would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By using complete

signature management, larger formations could be made to look like

smaller and smaller formations made to seem larger. At sea, carrier

battle groups could be disguised and smaller warships could be made to

appear as large formations. This signature management would apply

across the entire spectrum of the senses and not just radar or

electronic ranges. Indeed, gaining the ability to regulate what

information and intelligence are both available and not available to

the adversary is a key aim. This is more than denial or deception. It

is control in the fullest sense of the word.

The next step is to match the four significant characteristics that

define Rapid Dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and

control-with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives in

order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure forces

and force packages accordingly, and determine those integrated systems

and innovative uses of technologies and capabilities that will provide

the necessary means to achieve these objectives in conditions that

include both the MRC and OOTW.

Strategic, Policy, and Operational Application

In assessing the future utility and applicability of Rapid Dominance,

it is crucial to consider the political context in which force is

likely to be employed. As we enter the next century, the probability

is low that an overriding, massive, direct threat posed by a

peer-competitor to the U.S. will emerge in the near term. Without

compelling reasons, public tolerance toward American sacrifice abroad

will remain low and may even decrease. This reluctance on the part of

Americans to tolerate pain is directly correlated to perceptions of

threat to U.S. interests. Without a clear and present danger, the

definition of national interest may remain narrow.

Americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military

solutions. But, many challenges or crises in the future are likely to

be marginal to U.S. interests and therefore may not be resolvable

before American political staying power is exhausted. In this period,

political micro-management and fine tuning are likely to be even more

prevalent as administrations respond to public sentiments for

minimizing casualties and, without a threat or compelling reason, U.S.

involvement.

Future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically correct"

alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to presenting the

nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a decisive and

irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was not politically

feasible because it would have shattered the allied coalition while

exceeding the authority of the UN mandate. Military operations that

impact across a whole population or cause "innocent civilians" to

suffer (e.g., some economic sanctions, collateral damage from raids)

also are likely to be only politically acceptable in aggravated

situations. For example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or

other health problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling

impacts hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy

may be the ultimate victim.

The U.S. military is more likely to find itself in a supporting

foreign policy role with discrete missions that are only one facet of

a larger political context. This context is almost certainly going to

expand into militarily grey areas of OOTW, including those impinging

on law enforcement and ensuring political stability. Forces may be

called upon to deal with or control situations on the margin rather

than to achieve total submission or defeat of an opponent. The

prevailing political preference is likely to continue to be to try to

bound these complex challenges through fine tuning, artificial

constructs, and discretely limited tasks, often performed in the midst

of internal conflict. Economic sanctions (e.g., Serbia, Iraq), "no

fly" zones (e.g., Southern and Northern Iraq and Bosnia), "safe

havens" (e.g., Bosnia), humanitarian relief delivered by "all means

necessary" (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia), and embassy protection and

evacuation (e.g., Liberia in 1991 and again in 1996) are the kinds of

OOTW tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers. Such tasks

tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. They also increase

vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the bombing of the Kolbah

Barracks in Riyadh in June 1996.

Americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct threat

to the U.S. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define. Therefore,

when intervention is necessary there is likely to be both a political

and practical imperative to have allied or international involvement

or at least the political cover of the UN, NATO, or appropriate NGOs.

As more states (and sub-national groups) acquire nuclear, chemical,

and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and

longer range delivery means, the ability for rogues to inflict pain

will increase as will the ability to ratchet up the political risks.

WMD can easily complicate our ability to influence positive and

constructive behavior of possessors. Because of the threat of

retaliation, WMD capabilities may become politically acceptable

targets provided collateral damage to civilians is minimized.

Preemption may become a more realistic option along the lines of

Israel's strikes against Syria's nuclear reactors in 1982. It is,

however, a responsible state's worst nightmare to have successfully

struck a chemical, biological, or nuclear production facility with

precision only to learn the next day that hundreds of civilians have

been killed due to the inadvertent release of chemical, biological, or

nuclear materials.

There must also be an appropriate political context that justifies the

use of preemptive force, as opposed to less destructive or non-lethal

types of sanctions (e.g., responses to terrorism in the case of Libya,

invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, exports of WMD to a threatening country

such as Iran, the North Korean threat to South Korea and Japan).

The U.S. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability to deter

and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to its vital

interests, preferably on a decisive basis. In an unsettled, less

structured, and volatile world, the ability to use force with

precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when needed, rapidity, will

still be a powerful influence on cooperation, stability, and, where

relevant, submission.

Imposing Rapid Dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if

achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this

turbulent period. Bosnia offers an example. At the outset of the

breakup of Yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability, without

potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely predicted

invasion of Bosnia, the U.S. strategy for dealing with that tangled

and messy situation might have been much different. Thousands of lives

might have been spared. In other grey or marginal situations Rapid

Dominance could make the difference between a politically acceptable

response or inadequate action with consequences similar to what

happened in Bosnia.

In considering how Rapid Dominance might apply and might be used, it

is first important to know what it is that we want to achieve with

military force. We need to consider whether the application of force

will allow us to influence and control an adversary's will or merely

exacerbate a bad situation. Therefore, it is essential to know what is

of value to that adversary. An objective, realistic, and in-depth

situational grasp will be essential to such an understanding. For

example, disarming or destroying may produce unintended consequences.

For a conventional foe that values its military and depends on

technology, Rapid Dominance should be particularly effective and

persuasive. In the case of less developed nations, however, the

opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against military

formations may be considerably less and must be carefully assessed.

As noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to U.S. security, the

cost in casualties needs to be low. To be effective, we must take away

an opponent's ability to make it cost us in terms of casualty levels

we consider intolerable. In applying Rapid Dominance we also must be

defending something which is of value to us. The lower the value in

terms of our national interests, the lower the price we are likely to

be willing to pay.

In MRC situations, we need to have the capability to defeat, destroy,

or incapacitate an opponent. On the other hand, in OOTW, other

non-military factors are likely to be involved and goals made more

limited. For example, it may be necessary to intimidate or capture the

leadership in order to restore order or reverse an action, or it may

simply be necessary to anticipate, prevent, and counter opposition to

conduct of a more limited mission (e.g., feeding the starving or

protecting innocent people from genocide).

In U.S. planning for OOTW, it is a virtual given that risk will be

minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional use of force

with minimal collateral damage. This means that there must be a belief

that a mission can be accomplished and is worth the resources

necessary to do so. Before initiating action in these often confusing

situations, objectives must be clearly established and, once engaged,

there should be a willingness to persevere through the inevitable

rough patches.

Whether in an MRC or in OOTW, we first will need to know what we want

to achieve with Rapid Dominance. This is a task for political

leadership which is informed with military advice concerning what is

feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain. The extent of the

mission must be clearly defined. Is it to defeat an enemy so it will

no longer pose a threat? Do we only need to stop an adversary from

carrying out a particular act? Must we control a situation entirely or

only sufficiently to be able to carry out a specific mission? Can we

really affect the adversary's will?

Recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be relevant in

the future. MRCs call for the full spectrum of outcomes-from reversing

military action (e.g., the invasion of Kuwait); to establishing a

government more acceptable to the U.S. and the world, probably using

military coercion (Haiti, Panama); to eliminating a threat to the U.S.

or its allies. We may want to persuade an adversary to cease an

aggression or act of interference or otherwise change behavior we

cannot accept or tolerate. Political expectations in MRCs are for the

effective use of force and for rapid success or at least steady

progress. Casualties should be moderate or at least acceptable, with

the threshold of American pain dependent on the directness of the

threat to U.S. interests and with the degree of compellance

appropriate to the political rationale.

OOTW present a different set of challenges. These challenges are

likely to require discrete dominance of specific circumstances rather

than total dominance. The general tasks may include a wide variety of

requirements. For example, it may be necessary to try to prevent or

stop genocide (e.g., Rwanda) and ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia). The

task may be to cooperate with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g.,

prevention of starvation in Somalia or Bosnia). The goal of employing

force may be free and fair elections (e.g., Cambodia, Bosnia). The

requirement could be to destroy a limited objective (e.g., an

above-ground or underground chemical weapons plant or documented

nuclear weapons facilities developed by hostile or unfriendly states).

Other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights (e.g.,

protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in the Gulf

during the Iran-Iraq war). A more testing challenge might be to

accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to deal with

Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982). We undoubtedly will face the

future requirement to reverse a potential threat to Americans or to a

region of importance with a limited military action (e.g., in Grenada

in 1983 or the Mayaguez rescue in Cambodia in 1975). Discrete moves to

bolster preventive diplomacy and/or overt measures to demonstrate

preparedness to assist (e.g., forces sent to Sudan to support Chad

under threat of invasion from Libya and recent Navy operations in the

Taiwan Strait) will still be relevant.

Countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda (hostage

rescue-e.g., Iran, Lebanon; hijacking-e.g., _Achille Lauro_; deterrent

to further moves-e.g., the Higgins operation, Libyan raids, missile

attack on Iraq after the threat to former President Bush). We may also

need to interdict weapons, terrorists, or other discrete cargoes

moving between nations (e.g., North Korean missile shipments to Iran,

Iranian and Libyan arms exchanges).

Economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable political

alternative or a necessary political prelude to an offensive military

step (e.g., implemented as the first step in actions to counter

Libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an alternative to war with

Iraq; used ineffectively against the Serbs to try to convince them not

to continue to support Bosnian Serb aggression; and tried with Haiti

as an unsuccessful alternative to occupation). Our past experience has

been that we seldom have had decisive or immediate results from these

economic measures, sanctions, and embargoes. Considerable time is

required to have impact and we have not been particularly efficient in

controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations. Sanctions

almost always require full international cooperation which cannot be

assumed or guaranteed. In Bosnia, of course, some portions of the arms

embargo were deliberately allowed to be permeable and the U.S. turned

a blind eye to Iran's support of the Bosnians.

Past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about the

potential of Shock and Awe. Improvements in the capabilities enhancing

these outcomes could make a decisive difference in dealing with future

challenges. History also cautions us as well that there will be

restraints in employing Rapid Dominance and that there are fundamental

differences in MRC and OOTW applications.

Shock and Awe, when properly applied, have been very effective in the

past. They will be effective in the future, even when applied in

limited ways that do not reflect the more encompassing impact

envisioned by Rapid Dominance. There are many examples of how a very

limited application of force made a significant difference through the

mechanisms of Shock and Awe. Experiences, including successes and

failures, illustrate some of the potential of Rapid Dominance if

implemented effectively.

The Vietnam War provides certain lessons. When B-52 strikes, which

made the ground rumble, were added to the equation during the

Christmas 1972 bombing of Hanoi, dragging negotiations with the North

Vietnamese on a peace agreement moved swiftly to an acceptable

conclusion. Daily reports following the controversial B-52 "carpet"

bombing raids in Cambodia talked of North Vietnamese/Vietcong soldiers

wandering around in a daze due to shock and concussion. Both B-52s and

naval gunfire, especially from 16 inch guns of a battleship, had a

similar impact on invading North Vietnamese troop concentrations. The

mining of Haiphong Harbor, although initiated late in the war, was

equally effective in immediately stopping shipping in and out of North

Vietnam.

When President Nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing problems of

our POWs and failing domestic morale, as well as take away substantial

political leverage from the North Vietnamese, he directed the raid to

rescue prisoners jailed just outside Hanoi. The raid itself was well

executed. American forces reached and searched the prison and returned

safely. But no Americans were freed because a last minute transfer of

the POWs from the prison had not been detected. If there had been

prisoners still there to be rescued, the operation would have been a

highly dramatic and influential event. The point is that accurate and

timely intelligence remains crucial.

There seems to be little doubt that the combined F-111 and naval air

strike against Libya in 1986 in response to the discotheque terrorist

attack in Germany gave Gadhafi pause. The perception that he

personally might be targeted appeared to get Gadhafi's attention.

When our troops were having difficulty dislodging Grenadian soldiers

from their main fortress, Marine tanks were sailed around the island

to confront them. At the sight of tank guns, the seemingly stubborn

occupants surrendered almost immediately without a fight.

The cease fire in the bloody Iran-Iraq war was quick to follow after

the commencement of daily Iraqi long-range rocket bombardments of

Tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. Given that both sides were

exhausted at that point, a show of force could have been convincing.

Strong U.S. action in response to Iran's mining of neutral waters may

also have had a sobering effect on the mullahs. Not only were Iran's

vulnerable oil-producing platforms in the Gulf boarded and destroyed

with impunity by the U.S., but Iranian naval forces that had come out

to challenge the U.S. Navy were destroyed. Iraq's reign of terror, and

the strong American message to Iran, possibly helped end the war.

In our troublesome stay in Somalia, AC-130 gunships earned immediate

respect from potential troublemakers with their ability to see wide

areas night or day, remain on station for hours as night patrols, and

strike with precision and relative impunity. The methodical drone of

AC-130s circling in the air was enough to restore some order, although

a few civilians found the noise unsettling. In another situation, the

aftermath of systematic UN efforts to destroy faction leader Mohamed

Aideed's illegal arms facilities generated an unexpected reaction from

other warlords, including those colluding with him, which was to

volunteer to hand over their own weapons storage areas. For a fleeting

moment, Shock and Awe created an important opportunity.

During the many vagaries of the Bosnia tragedy, it would appear that

when NATO accurately delivered potent doses of air power, rather than

occasional pin pricks, the Serbs seemed finally to understand that an

appearance of cooperation rather than defiance was in their interest.

This NATO message in the form of air power, of course, was

strengthened by the effectiveness of the accompanying Croatian/Muslim

counter-offensive and the fatigue of Bosnian Serb fighters. Sustaining

the shock effect with forces on the ground was a necessary combination

to gain the staying power effect to change the will of the Serbs. It

was not accomplished by air alone. Timing remains important.

Past failures also offer examples of how Rapid Dominance might have

made a difference in reacting to those difficult situations. Rapid

Dominance might have provided a better response to those setbacks or

might have offered a more effective alternative that would have

avoided the vulnerabilities in those situations in the first place

(e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iran embassy rescue in 1980, Lebanon Marine

barracks bombing in 1983, response to the Pueblo seizure by North

Korea in 1968, and the reaction to the downed helicopters during the

Ranger raid in Somalia).

We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated effective

application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance. Israel's rout

of Syria's air force and missile defenses in Lebanon's Baaka Valley

shows how dramatic success can have political spillover. On the other

hand, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor produced the reverse

effects of Shock and Awe and had the unintended consequence of

galvanizing the U.S. into action.

Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a more

technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these examples

and many others in recent U.S. experiences that certain improvements

in capabilities would provide us with greater flexibility in the

future. This is especially true in OOTW situations, which require a

multiplicity of effective instruments at our disposal. It is also true

that certain operations such as peacekeeping tend to be manpower

intensive.

If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of value to

that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated intelligence is

essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels unprecedented in

scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in real time. The Gulf

War, despite its success, showed classic limitations in intelligence.

Even though we had nearly every intelligence asset designed to deal

with the USSR available for use, we were unable to detect the full

extent of Iraq's WMD capability; unable to find mobile missile

launchers even with a major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some

cases, we could only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing

forces; and we mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate

but had civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human

intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example, in

order to understand what is happening in deep underground facilities).

Another important capability we should try to achieve in the future is

the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or significantly

influence the perceptions and understanding of individual

troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent

years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in Somalia, Saddam Hussein in

Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a perception is particularly relevant

when the problem appears not to be caused by a unified population but

by the ambitions of individual leaders who have intimidated or killed

off any likely internal opposition. Such a capability requires

effective real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for

accomplishing the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to

effective "snatch" operations).

In a world in which non-lethal sanctions are a political imperative,

we will continue to need the ability to shut down all commerce into

and out of any country from shipping, air, rail, and roads. We ought

to be able to do this in a much more thorough, decisive, and shocking

way than we have in the past. The ability to apply pressure or cause

acquiescence employing non-lethal means also will be important in some

circumstances. Weapons that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do

not kill in significant numbers may be the only ones that are

politically acceptable in the future. This also means that crowd

control with minimum violence may be needed. In certain circumstances,

the costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically

expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the U.S. and

internationally.

As is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down key

electronic communications to, from, and within a country (or within a

specific sub-group or faction). We also need the ability to control

radio and television within a country. It is important, however, in

all cases, to be able to deny an adversary's ability to communicate

and to have our own means of reaching the population with appropriate

messages.

In addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities

selectively, including weapons systems, overt and covert stockpiles,

fuel, WMD, and related logistics, we will need to have the capability

selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or destroy other things

considered of great value to opponents. Increased targeting precision

will compound effectiveness as well as help to avoid the political

pitfalls of using force such as the inevitable, unintended collateral

damage that has been the pattern of the past.

More surgical and carefully crafted applications of force, however,

will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on utilizing

Rapid Dominance in MRCs and OOTW. There are substantial differences in

the political constraints likely to be imposed in dealing with MRCs

and with OOTW. For example, there is much greater latitude to use

dominant force and Shock and Awe in MRCs than in OOTW.

In MRC situations, we are often likely to face conventional powers

which are well organized, well equipped, and broadly dependent on

technology. Although more powerful, these developed states are also

likely to be especially vulnerable to a technologically sophisticated

approach such as Rapid Dominance as long as we maintain this military

edge and the ability to neutralize their military systems. Even in the

most compelling circumstance where a Rapid Dominance force is used,

however, support from other nations will be politically desirable.

In most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of value to

an adversary which can be destroyed as well as to the numbers and

types of weapons that can be employed. For example, the political

circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be employed are quite

limited. In both MRCs and OOTW, certain actions are politically as

well as morally unacceptable except in extreme cases. Such

restrictions are likely to apply to targets affecting control of

access to food, water, and clean air, and to destruction of religious

and cultural centers, even if there is low collateral damage.

In OOTW situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism of using

excessive force, especially if there is civilian or collateral damage.

The concept of proportionality is likely to remain an operative

principle in U.S. policy and may be taken to extremes, especially if

the marginal nature of a situation leads to a marginal and ineffective

response. Some people, both military and civilian, even argue that

superior technology should not be employed in such situations and that

an adversary should be fought on his own terms. While such arguments

should be rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political

influence that must be considered. We should always use technology to

minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce collateral

damage, and make us look more formidable. At the same time, there

needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant destruction or denial.

Our actions must always be consistent with our own system of values.

The "rapid" component of Rapid Dominance is one of the most appealing

aspects of the concept, both politically and militarily. The ability

to take action that is timely and decisive multiplies substantially

the chances of ultimate success. Action needs to be taken precisely

when it will have greatest impact. Often initial public outrage and

political support for action in response to a provocation subsides if

a prolonged buildup is necessary in order to prepare to take action.

The ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate

information and act on it effectively, is also an important advantage.

In a NATO region-wide dynamic computer war game a few years ago, it

was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing faster than the

defensive chain of command could make counter moves. The tradition of

sending decisions up the line was simply too slow to cope with the

dynamic challenge posed by the adversary. Commanders on scene lacked

the authority to respond and adjust to rapidly changing situations.

The exercise graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need

to institute fundamental command and control streamlining. It also

demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local decisions in

real time while still effectively coordinating and optimizing the

overall effort.

The Navy's "command by negation" concept evolved in the 1980s in order

to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat and the need to

integrate dynamically the offensive and defensive missile, air, sea,

and undersea capabilities of a battle group and its joint components

(e.g., AWACs). This concept was one way of solving the time problem

while keeping the overall commander in the picture. The commander

could then intervene and modify actions as necessary to conform to the

broader strategy. This type of control was helped by the evolution of

electronic links and secure communications and the availability of

satellites.

Commanders employing Rapid Dominance will need to orchestrate it using

similar principles, while applying greater selective ability to turn

on and off a variety of systems, sensors, and devices influencing the

whole operational picture. Technology should also give commanders a

much better grasp of what is evolving during a battle. Just as the

American military of today has made "owning the night" part of its

tactical advantage, "owning" the dimension of time will be critical to

the success of Rapid Dominance.

In conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future force

configuration and the design of a mission capability package (MCP)

based on Rapid Dominance.

Operational Construct

Rapid Dominance is based on affecting the adversary's will,

perception, and knowledge through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to

overcome resistance, allowing us to achieve our aims. Four

characteristics are vital: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and

control of the environment.

Application of all or of selective capabilities within the Rapid

Dominance systems of systems will then decisively direct the

application of military/defense resources and produce the requisite

outcome. Rapid Dominance envisages the execution of specific actions

in real or near real time to counter actions or intentions deemed

detrimental to U.S. interests. On the high end of conflict, Rapid

Dominance would introduce a reaction of Shock and Awe in areas of

highest value to the threatening individual, group, or state. In many

cases, prior understanding of the power of Rapid Dominance would act

as a deterrent to the objectionable action. When used, Rapid Dominance

would ensure favorable early resolution of issues with minimal loss of

lives and collateral damage. The concept theoretically should be able

to impact adversarial situations that apply across the board to high,

mid, low, no, or minimal technology threats.

Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting

capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated,

interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence,

surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, data analysis,

and real-time deliverable actionable information to the shooter. This

network must provide total situational awareness and supporting nodal

analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's

decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe

among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this

knowledge grid will enable the shutting down of specific functions or

all essential functions near simultaneously. This will often times be

netted pieces of data where the sum of the parts gives the answer and

the battlefield advantage to the force possessing this rapidly netted

information.

The "rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real-time

actionable targeting information to the appropriate shooter, whether

the shooter is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery

battery, an individual rifle man, a naval battle group, an individual

ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. This means the

need to have the right shooter in the right place; locating and

identifying the target correctly and quickly; allocating and assigning

targets rapidly; getting the "shoot" order or general authority to the

shooter; and then assessing the battle damage accurately.

At whatever the unit level, Shock and Awe are provided by the speed

and effectiveness of this cycle. Then, the ability to do this

simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a strategic Shock

and Awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, and populous. This

simultaneity and concurrency are central tenets of imposing Shock and

Awe. When the video results of these attacks are broadcast in real

time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact on coalition support and

negative impact on potential threat support can be decisive.

The first priority of a doctrine of Rapid Dominance should be to

deter, alter, or affect the will and therefore those actions that are

either unacceptable to U.S. national security interests or endanger

the democratic community of states and access to free markets. These

political objectives are generally those envisioned in the major and

lower regional conflict scenarios (MRC & LRC). Should deterrence fail,

the application of Rapid Dominance in these circumstances should

create sufficient Shock and Awe to the immediate threat forces and

leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential

threat partners. The doctrine of Rapid Dominance would not be limited

to MRC and LRC scenarios. It has applications in a variety of areas

such as countering WMD, terrorism, and perhaps other tasks. The

challenge is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response

based on Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat, yet

decisive enough to convey the right degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid

Dominance cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. We

repeat our disclaimer that this is not a silver bullet. However, Rapid

Dominance and its capacity for achieving Shock and Awe could be

applied for egregious threats or violations of international law, such

as:

- Direct military threats to the territory of the U.S., its friends,

and allies;

- Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state;

- Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD;

- Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; and

- Threat to essential world markets.

Clearly, the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and

penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and

benefits in all societies are becoming known to the masses as well as

the power brokers. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop

sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and

create road blocks as well as control inputs/outputs to the highway

both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept.

These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting

international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer

interagency cooperations and coordination between military and law

enforcement activities and capabilities must be established.

Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed

considerable cultural differences between these organizations.

Overcoming these cultural differences among organizations is not easy.

The required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive information

and support between these agencies and the military needs to be

developed further. Interagency coordination and cooperation must be

raised to a new level of sophistication. Some laws may need to be

changed. War in Cyberspace does not recognize domestic or foreign

boundaries. In this environment the subjects of Information Warfare

and Information In Warfare take on new meaning and require focused

development. We must become proficient within this environment.

Operational Assumptions

- The enemy picks the time and place to initiate the conflict (i.e.,

we are surprised).

- We then attain control of the initiative through superior speed,

knowledge, and capacity to act and react.

- Our forces are perceived to be invincible; engagements must

convince the enemy there is no hope.

- Combat must be unrelenting and omnipresent at times, places, and

tempo of choosing.

- Allied operations must be thoroughly integrated, from political

objectives through combat to include psychological warfare.

- The enemy must be hit in those areas of greatest importance to him

and devastated by the ferocity and swiftness of our attack.

From these assumptions, certain operational criteria follow that help

to define a Rapid Dominance Force with more specificity in improving:

- Intelligence, indications, and warning on an aggressor's actions

- The length of time required for a decision to react

- Decisive responses at various levels and times after the crises or

conflict begins to develop:

- Respond in 1 to 3 days with air and missile strikes and special

forces

- Respond in 5 to 10 days with more massive power up to and

including a joint task force of corps size

- Respond in 10 to 30 days with a second corps

The Rapid Dominance MCP

As a next step, we need to sketch out what a Rapid Dominance Force

might look like for a corps-sized air, ground, sea, and space joint

task force supported by necessary intelligence assets that can impose

sufficient Shock and Awe to break the will of the adversary. First,

this force will emphasize capabilities to maximize the core

characteristics of knowledge of self, adversary, and environment;

rapidity; brilliance in execution; and control of the environment.

Knowledge means more than dominant battlefield awareness. It means

understanding the adversary's mind and anticipating his reactions. It

means targeting those things that will produce the intended Shock and

Awe. And, it means having feedback and good, timely battle assessment

to enable knowledge to be used dynamically as well as to know how our

forces will react.

Rapidity means moving and acting as quickly as necessary and always on

a timely basis. Rapidity can be instant or as required.

Brilliance in operations means achieving the highest standards of

operational competence and, through a superiority of knowledge,

maintaining the ability to impose Shock and Awe through continuously

surprising and psychologically and physically breaking the adversary's

will to resist. This will require training and exercising of joint

land, sea, air, space, and special forces to new standards of

excellence and competence. It is mainly in training where the

difference lies in achieving operational brilliance. This desired

standard of performance can be achieved by making innovations to

permit new levels of battlefield fidelity for training units and

developing leaders.

Control of the environment would include complete signature control on

the entire battle area out to hundreds of miles. We would control our

signatures as well as what we wanted the adversary to see or hear and

what we do not want the enemy to know. Destruction of the adversary's

systems would begin with long-range stealthy, or "stand-off" Zero CEP

weapons, extend to FOG-M type battlefield weapons to close-in systems.

Small units would be able to call in "fires" for 360 degrees on a

nearly instant basis.

Attacks from all aspects would be complemented by deception,

disinformation, surveillance, targeting, and killing. "Pulse" weapons

would be used to disarm and actively deceive the enemy through

disrupting and attacking all aspects of the adversary's electronics,

information, and C4I infrastructure. It is this "lay down" of total

power across all areas in rapid and simultaneous actions that would

impose the Shock and Awe.

The remainder, roughly a third of this Joint Task Force, would consist

of traditional platforms including conventional ground, air, and

amphibious forces, naval battle group forces, and the necessary

supporting logistical, C4I, medical and other capabilities and ground

forces to conduct and sustain conventional or traditional operations

if needed and to support or defend traditionally vulnerable targets

such as ports, roads, and other infrastructure.

Tactical employment is, of course, dependent on the conditions of the

MRC. In general, the most rapidly deployable units of this corps, the

future equivalent of the Eighteenth Airborne Corps, would be sent to

secure or reinforce a limited area into which the remainder of the

force would flow. This AOR would be self-protected. Our goal is that

perhaps a Rapid Dominance force of as few as 2,000 troops could

successfully defend against an enemy of 10-20,000 in an MRC and that a

full corps can be deployed within 5 to 10 days.

These units would arrive quickly and, as directed, begin disarming,

destroying, and disabling the enemy's military wherewithal using

"stand-off" capabilities. Forward-based or long-range reconnaissance

units could be employed/supported by UAVs and overhead surveillance.

Units would be forward deployed in accordance with their time phased

plan. These units would be used either to complete the attack or to

carry it to the adversary, occupy selective territory physically, or

carry out the requirements of the post-war occupation campaign. Should

traditional forces be needed, they would of course be available.

Protection and self-defense would partly be provided by controlling

the environment. In effect, we would cast a cloak around the adversary

and permit the adversary to see and know what we alone provided. This

would leave an adversary blind, deaf, and dumb. With superior and

rapid firepower, the blinded, deafened enemy would be destroyed and

defeated as we saw fit. This would maximize Shock and Awe and help

break the adversary's will.

In OOTW, the Rapid Dominance JTF might function as follows. First, the

ability to deploy dominant force rapidly to attack or threaten to

attack appropriate targets could be brought to bear without involving

manpower-intense or manned sensors and weapons. Second, once deployed,

since self-defense is likely to be required against small arms, mines,

and shoulder carried or mortar weapons, certainly some form of "armor"

or protective vehicles and shelters would be necessary. However,

through the UAVs, C4I, and virtual reality systems, as well as through

signature management and other Shock and Awe weapons including High

Powered Microwave (HPM) and "stun-like" systems, this force would have

more than dominant battlefield awareness.

There are, of course, caveats. Unless strategic or policy objectives

are in line with operational capabilities, military force is unlikely

to be a useful instrument. It is also unlikely that any operational

construct, no matter how brilliantly conceived, could overcome such a

disconnect. Vietnam and Somalia remind us of these limitations.

The assimilation of intelligence-strategically, culturally, and

operationally-is a central thrust and component of the knowledge

aspect of Rapid Dominance. Our forces must not only fight smarter;

these forces, at all or most levels, must be educated and trained

differently with far more emphasis on intelligence, broadly defined.

This knowledge, when applied rapidly under conditions of brilliance

and in a controlled environment, is a centerpiece of Rapid Dominance.

There must be full comprehension of the adversary across strategic,

political, military, cultural, intellectual, and perceptual lines.

This understanding must go beyond how an adversary might use military

force. Those crucial values that motivate and underlie a nation or a

group must be understood if the appropriate level of Shock and Awe is

to be achieved.

There are also obvious questions that must be answered. Does Rapid

Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the conflict

spectrum involving more traditional applications of force to achieve

political objectives, as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet

to be explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance

with Shock and Awe applies to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S.

interests, controlling rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the

political and military prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are

they applicable and realistically achievable in the increasingly

complex interaction of national non-government organizations

(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care

to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of

Rapid Dominance with a degree of Shock and Awe offend and generate

counterproductive public relations backlash from those who believe

force should only be used as a last resort and then with a measurable

degree of proportionality?

At this point, we can only raise questions and expect to have them

answered at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and issues

as well as a host of others, needs to be examined up front and

answered in the Rapid Dominance concept development process. We must

be careful that we do not overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the

reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the concept.

Rapid Dominance must still confront the fog of war. Decisions will

still be made based on judgment and confidence in the intelligence

provided, the estimate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center

of gravity targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to

inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the key will be the ability to

penetrate this fog with increased clarity and to control events now

unmanageable through more rapid gathering, analyzing, and distributing

actionable information. Complicating the issue is the fact that the

U.S. has not clearly defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the

world's only credible superpower, the U.S. cannot avoid a leadership

role but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all

leaders. This is the classical "damned if you do and damned if you

don't" syndrome.

At this stage, the concept of Rapid Dominance is a work in progress.

It needs to be "operationalized." By designing a nominal MCP and

fitting with it paper systems and capabilities, we can explore the

answers to many of the questions we raised above. Three steps are

needed to proceed down the road on the way to a real capability.

First, feasibility of the requisite technical capabilities needs to be

established. Second, wargaming of the MCP must be done. Third, and

perhaps most difficult, deriving the means for implementing the most

promising aspects of Rapid Dominance must occur.

An Outline for System Innovation and Technological Integration

Achieving Shock and Awe is central to Rapid Dominance, and therefore

must serve as the key organizing principle for any rigorous

examination and exploitation of system concepts and technologies for

Rapid Dominance. Understanding the interplay between technology and

doctrine is not only or simply a straightforward matter of

establishing operational requirements and then seeking to attain them

through invention and design. It is a complex and interactive process

of experimentation and discovery wherein intellect, hard work,

endurance, and innovation must drive the use of technology. Rather

than make changes, however significant, to modifying current

capabilities or building newer, similar ones, Rapid Dominance seeks to

identify and field systems specifically designed to achieve Shock and

Awe-systems that may break the mold much as the Model T Ford once did

years ago.

The genetic decoders in bioengineering laboratories, computer-aided

design tools used by engineers, vast database management systems in

place in corporate offices, computer-controlled machines enabling

composite materials, and the countless academic, business, and

personal computers are all evidence of the prominent and ever

increasing role information technologies have assumed in modern

economies. Many of the technologies underlying the Information Age are

being spearheaded by U.S. small business and its entrepreneurial

culture. Certainly, from the huge consumer electronics firms in Japan

to software development businesses in India, the rest of the world

participates and competes. But few can deny that U.S. industry

provides the leadership in and is the preeminent developer of

information technologies as they are most broadly defined. This

leadership position, properly leveraged, provides the United States

with an ever increasing military advantage over competing nations.

Leveraging technology requires more than merely incorporating it into

U.S. forces; it is likely to include a significant redesign of both

forces and leadership to embrace these rapidly evolving technologies.

Many of the technologies that will support Rapid Dominance are already

discernible. Unlike the impact of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that

a single technology or system will emerge to produce Rapid Dominance.

It will only be attainable through the broadest integration of

strategic concepts, doctrine, operational needs, technological

advances, system design, and appropriate organization of command,

control, training and education. And only a large, immensely capable

country such as the U.S. may be able to achieve this.

Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate this confluence of strategy,

technology, and innovation. Four core characteristics were defined

earlier as crucial:

- Complete knowledge of self, adversary, and the environment;

- Rapidity;

- Brilliance of execution; and

- Control of the environment.

What follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive of how technology

can be used in a broad system approach. Many of these technologies

currently are being addressed within the defense community. Analysts,

military strategists, acquisition planners, and even "futurists" are

wrestling with the meaning and consequences of the Information Age.

Our focus on systems and technologies begins with these four

characteristics.

Knowledge of Self, Adversary, and Environment

In the modern threat environment, it is difficult to estimate where

the next crisis may occur, let alone the next war. Even 5 years ago,

who would have foreseen the significant involvement of the U.S.

military in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and the South

China Sea? To which hot spots can we expect to see U.S. troops

deployed over the next 5 years? Over the next 20? In this section we

argue that, in addition to improving our force capabilities, the U.S.

must develop an intelligence repository far more extensive than during

the Cold War, covering virtually all the important regions and

organizational structures throughout the world.

During the Cold War, intelligence agencies focused more on a bipolar

world and built sizable organizations to collect information on "the

other side." This same intelligence structure, in the main, is in

place today facing a multipolar world, where any number of power

structures-whether they be states, international organizations, or

even small groups of individuals-must be monitored with an

understanding that extends to their leadership, culture, economic

direction, and military capability.

As the technologies relevant to knowing the adversary and his

environment are examined, an emerging theme is the clear shift from

technology developments that once resided within our government to

those driven by commercial demands. For example, the information

technologies used by U.S. intelligence agencies are of such

complexity, importance, and expense that they are referred to as

"national assets" and are developed and managed by large, dedicated

organizations. Even here, commercial companies are rapidly encroaching

on what once seemed to be an unassailable market position in Earth

observation systems. One may already purchase synthetic aperture radar

interferometry images from any number of sources, and panchromatic

visual images with one meter resolution will soon be available over

the counter for remarkably little cost. Indeed, the only real barrier

to this burgeoning market is the understandable concerns that

governments have with allowing such technology to be widely available.

In areas such as encryption and data security, commercial developers

are more likely to reach limits of government acceptance before those

of technological capability.

With untold billions invested in communications systems, even the most

modern U.S. military communication systems often compare poorly with

commercial systems. While this has long been the case for fielded

systems, it is becoming true for even the most sophisticated research

and development programs being undertaken by defense organizations.

As a case in point, one may consider a program recently initiated by

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) called

Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination (BADD). At the heart of

this program, large amounts of data are collected within a vast

database residing on commercial computers and enterprise management

systems. This information is then disseminated to the troops through

the commercial Global Broadcast System (GBS) onto "set-top" boxes, an

enabling technology that was developed commercially. Even with this

leveraging of private industry, there is a real question as to whether

DARPA will be able to field a system that would compete well with

surprisingly similar commercial systems. Internet channels planned by

media industry giants such as BSkyB will offer multi-megabit,

interactive, digital data connections to the Net merely as an

enticement for subscribers to enroll for their full digital

broadcasting service (200 to 300 channels of digital video and sound).

Understanding that there is much more to BADD than the little

discussed here, one still almost wonders whether DARPA could simply

buy a subscription and connect it to an appropriate, commercial,

network management system. More to the point, if even well funded and

aggressive technology development organizations such as DARPA find it

difficult to remain ahead of commercial advancements, there may be a

fundamental lesson to be learned regarding the management of

defense-related technologies.

Knowledge and Intelligence

"Intelligence" is comprised of five categories of knowledge and

understanding: a society's leadership; culture and values; the

strategic, political, economic, and physical environment; military

capabilities and orders of battle; and comprehensive battlefield

information. Examples of technologies and system approaches of

potential relevance in these areas are discussed below.

Understanding potential adversaries, coalition partners, and involved

neutral countries implies an infrastructure for acquiring an in-depth

knowledge about cultures, leadership values, and other driving factors

that allow us, when needed and on a timely basis, to get "into their

minds." Applicable technologies include automated language

translators, interactive and autonomous computer simulations, advanced

database systems for organizing and understanding data and

transactions of individuals and institutions, and computerized

educational systems for training and learning these skills.

Collecting sufficient and timely environmental information is crucial

to Rapid Dominance. Logistics, demographics, and infrastructure are

broad areas of collection along with geography, road/rail/ship lanes,

utility sites and corridors, manufacturing, government sites, military

and paramilitary facilities, population demographics, economic and

financial pressure points (such as oil wells or gold mines), and major

dams and bridges. Technologies used to provide environmental awareness

include traditional means such as satellites that can be augmented

with dynamic sensor management tools for optimizing observation

routines. The vast quantities of data that reside on the world's

computer networks, if properly exploited, provide another rich source

of information. Data mining tools, such as Web crawlers, gatherers,

brokers, and repositories that pull and organize data from public

networks, will be essential to building a more complete picture of

potential adversaries. Since not all databases and host computers are

cooperative with these methods, offensive information warfare tools

will be required to obtain specific pieces of information that are

vital for national security purposes.

Once data are collected, they must be processed and disseminated and

then stored for future access. Enterprise data storage and retrieval

systems that are capable of working with many terrabytes (1,000

gigabytes) of information are already commonplace. Since it is

impossible for humans to comprehend such vast quantities of

information without some assistance, data exploitation tools (filters,

fusion, automatic target recognition, image understanding, etc.) will

be crucial technologies. Finally, the information, once processed,

will be of little use if not disseminated to the right people in a

timely fashion. "Intelligent data" dissemination and wide bandwidth

communications are examples of essential technologies emerging in this

area.

In addition to knowledge about regions and locations where U.S. force

may be applied, it is important to maintain vigilance and up-to-date

knowledge on specific "hot spots" and to have sufficient flexibility

within the system to shift attention rapidly to new areas. Systems

addressing this more time-sensitive set of tasks would include light,

quickly deployable satellites, high altitude and endurance unmanned

aerial vehicles, manned platforms, and unattended ground sensors.

As a crisis unfolds and the insertion of U.S. troops or other military

action becomes more probable, information needs and the number of

information consumers both increase dramatically. Information that

must be collected and correlated include targeting, battle damage

assessment (BDA), weather, terrain, infrastructure, tracking of

special targets, logistics, position and status of our own troops,

identification friend or foe (IFF), and status of material. It is

vitally important that sufficient sensor systems work in all weather

conditions and at night to maintain the "operations tempo" required by

Rapid Dominance.

Battlefield awareness requires three information technologies:

collection, fusion, and dissemination of real-time actionable

information to a shooter. Rapid Dominance requires an unprecedented

level of real-time information collection that will be provided by

sensor systems such as space platforms, UAVs, unattended ground

sensors, and advanced manned reconnaissance platforms. In addition,

the entire infosphere of the adversary will be monitored not only for

classic information such as operational commands but also to determine

the shock effect being created by Rapid Dominance operations.

Collecting data from cooperative sources such as one's own troops,

allies, and friendly non-combatants is also critical. While _Operation

Desert Storm_ showed the value of self-location sensors such as GPS,

the friendly fire casualties demonstrated that there is still work to

be done in terms of giving each commander and soldier sufficient

information to operate effectively. Much of this information, such as

the physiological status of individual combatants, is not currently

collected, and much of what is sensed is not properly disseminated.

It would be hard to overstate the importance of information

dissemination within Rapid Dominance. Administering Shock and Awe

requires a spectrum of attacks that the adversary is unable to fathom,

but our own forces must operate effectively, even aggressively, within

an environment that could easily lead to serious information

bottlenecks and overload. Commercial technologies will be key to the

U.S. developing a structure to effectively disseminate information.

Already, commercial communications technologies such as global

broadcast satellites and protocols like those underlying the Internet

have been used as stop gaps by the U.S. military in major deployments.

Merely transmitting the right information at the right time will not

be sufficient for operations enabling Rapid Dominance. Information

will need to be fused to create knowledge-based displays. The

technologies that will be important in this area go beyond the data

fusion algorithms currently in place and should leverage heavily off

of technologies in fields such as computer image generation, virtual

reality, and advanced simulation.

Rapidity

In a technology sense, rapidity includes the speed of operational

planning, determining appropriate action, deployment, and employment

all focused toward minimizing response time. Three factors combine to

make military planning far more difficult today than in the Cold War

era. First, there is great uncertainty early on in the location of a

conflict, who the adversary may be, and with whom one may be allied.

Second, there is normally very little time available for planning,

with the military sometimes having only weeks or days before

committing troops to an unanticipated mission. Third, vastly more

information is available to the planner, which is both a blessing and

a curse. Several technologies that partially define Intelligent

Dynamic Planning will make it easier for the commander to plan Rapid

Dominance:

- Model based planning

- Machine intelligence

- Dynamic planning based upon feedback and new information

- Selectively automated decision aides (commanders associate)

- Imbedded rehearsal and training

- Brilliance in Execution

It is impossible to institutionalize brilliance. However, the standard

can be set. The Dynamic Planning noted above is part of the capability

for this characteristic as are the systems and technologies discussed

below.

Technologies Critical to Achieving Brilliance in Rapid Dominance

For shock to be administered with minimum collateral damage, key

targets of value must be neutralized or destroyed, and the enemy must

be made to feel completely helpless and unable to consider a

meaningful response. Furthermore, the enemy's confusion must be

complete, adding to a general impression of impotence. Most

importantly, strategic targets, military forces, leadership and key

societal resources must be located, tracked, and targeted. This will

require substantial sensor, computational, and communication

technologies. Designated targets must be destroyed rapidly and with

assurance. Finally, the status and position of friendly forces must be

known at all times, and the logistics supporting them must be

sufficiently flexible to allow for rapid movement, reconfiguration,

and decentralization of location.

Several technologies that can help in this are discussed below, as

divided into the following subsections: sensors, computational

systems, communications and system integration.

Sensor Technologies

Sensor technologies are grouped into four areas: active, passive,

imbedded, and processing.

_Active sensors:_ By far, the most important of the energy-emitting

sensors is radar. Among the best all-weather capabilities of any type

of sensor, the role for and capabilities of radar have steadily

increased since the Second World War. Radar systems are used for early

warning, air defense, air asset management, air traffic control, naval

fleet defense, detection and tracking of moving ground targets,

missile targeting, missile terminal guidance, terrain data

development, and weather prediction. For Rapid Dominance, radars and

other active sensors must operate with low probability of intercept.

Particularly with stealthy systems, this will present a unique

challenge to military systems where one may not expect a great amount

of "spin-on" from the commercial sector. It is vitally important to be

able to sense the enemy under all conditions and environments. Sensors

must penetrate foliage and walls and detect threats such as

underground and underwater mines.

There are many other important active sensor classes, three of which

are active acoustics, lidar and magnetic anomaly detectors. Broadband

underwater active acoustics could address pressing needs such as

shallow-water anti-submarine warfare and mine detection (both buried

and silt covered). The practical application of lidar is a relatively

recent development enabled by advances in laser, power management, and

data processing technologies. Lidar can be used for fire control,

weapon guidance, foliage penetration (vegetation is translucent in the

near infrared (NIR) regime), and target imaging/recognition. Lidar

detects shape directly and shape fluctuations such as vibration and

motion and has proven very hard to spoof. Magnetic anomaly detectors

will continue to find application in areas of anti-mine and

anti-submarine warfare and in screening for weapons at security

checkpoints and elsewhere.

Electronic emissions are of themselves a liability only where they

create a signature of use to an enemy. The ability to emit energy, yet

in ways that are less discernible, should be an attractive avenue to

explore for the future. The coordinated application of many sensor

platforms, some of which may be completely passive, in conjunction

with emitting sensors is a potentially major area of exploration.

_Passive sensors:_ Among the passive sensor types, the most important

for U.S. forces is forward-looking infrared (FLIR). FLIR technology

has allowed the U.S. to "own the night," as was handily displayed in

_Operation Desert Storm_. Some of the significant technology

advancements underway in this area include multiple wavelength

sensors, very large focal planes, and the increasing performance of

uncooled sensors. Particularly in the area of uncooled sensors,

commercial developments are underway that promise to drastically

reduce the cost of competent IR sensors.

Other passive sensor technologies of note include hyperspectral

visible/NIR collection and processing and inexpensive, scatterable,

unattended ground sensors (acoustic, seismic, "hot spot," etc.).

Hyperspectral imaging allows target searches to be conducted in the

frequency domain, as opposed to the spatial domain as is the norm

today. This provides a powerful new input for automatic target

recognition (ATR) systems, is useful for addressing low observables

(LO), and is especially important for remote imaging assets.

Unattended ground sensors allow critical areas to be monitored

continually. For example, the actual area of operations for Scuds in

ODS was relatively small, but it was very difficult for then-current

sensing systems to oversee. Technologies being developed in the area

of microelectromechanical systems, in particular, hold promise for

enabling capable and inexpensive sensor fields.

_Imbedded sensors:_ Monitoring the position and status of Blue and

friendly forces and assets is of equal importance in tracking the

enemy. GPS presented a tremendous advantage to troops in ODS. This

capability needs to be extended down to the individual soldier, and

the status of all critical material and personnel needs to be tracked.

_Sensor signal processing:_ Finally, the signals from modern sensors

are of limited use without proper processing and presentation to the

user. This area will be developed further in the computational

technologies section. Technologies that are historically grouped with

sensor systems include automatic target recognition, imbedded

multisensor fusion and correlation, and displays.

Computational Technologies

The capabilities of the integrated circuit (IC), and in particular the

microprocessor, continue to increase unabated. Certainly, physical

limits must be approached at some point, but each looming barrier has

so far been met by technological innovation. Nevertheless, should the

march of IC improvements slow somewhat, the software and networking

technologies that are being developed at an accelerating pace will

permit the vision of Rapid Dominance to become of ever increasing

utility.

Rapid Dominance requires the collection, management, and fast access

of enormous quantities of information. Technologies that will enable

this include computational hardware advances such as increasingly

powerful workstations, reduced-cost image generators, massively

parallel machines, compact displays, reduced-cost memory devices

(i.e., DRAM, RAID, and optical jukeboxes) client/server-specific

database engines, reconfigurable simulation cells, "wearable" PCs,

advanced human-computer interface (HCI) techniques (i.e., voice

interfaces and those coming to define "virtual reality"), and PCMCIA

technology for peripherals (i.e., digital comms boards, miniaturized

hard drives, and modems).

Software advances will be even more critical for Rapid Dominance.

Areas of importance include:

- Network data engines

- Object-oriented architectures

- Advanced modeling and simulation

- Machine intelligence

- Automatic target recognition

- Computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools

Network technologies are just now emerging but are being driven at a

frenzied pace in the commercial marketplace. A variety of advanced

tools beyond "hot link" browsing are being introduced daily. Data

browsers, brokers, gatherers, and network repositories are being

released, as demonstrated by products like _Harvester_ and _Netscape's

Catalog Server_. Platform independent languages such as JAVA and their

associated virtual computational engines promise the same network

flexibility for programs that is now enjoyed by data.

Perhaps the most important area of technology development for Rapid

Dominance is the development of practical object-oriented

architectures and protocols. Protocols such as CORBA, OLE, ALSP, HLA

and DIS[1] are changing the face of computing, making it much easier

to link programs and databases, and access and correlate information

that was previously "entombed" within its legacy application.

[Footnote 1: CORBA (common object request broker architecture), OLE

(object linking and embedding), ALSP (aggregate level simulation

protocol), HLA (high-level architecture), DIS (Distributed Interactive

Simulation). These are all protocols or the architectures defining

protocols that, in part, enable disparate software and/or hardware

components to be linked or otherwise share information and logical

elements.]

One interesting application area migrating toward an object-oriented

approach is geospatial databases. In the past, geospatial data were

stored as either raster-based or vector information, and significant

processing was required for users to make queries regarding roads,

areas, or objects such as building sites. A new approach, called a

spatial database engine, creates intuitive objects from standard

geospatial databases and uses commercial databases to add attributes

to the objects. This is a very powerful technique that allows

geospatial data, a key element of warfighting, to be managed quickly

and efficiently using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software. It is

particularly useful for distributed databases such as one would find

on a network.

Modeling and simulation is also benefiting from object-oriented

technologies. Simulations were once stand-alone codes. If one wanted

to simulate a joint battle, one began with an existing model (i.e.,

land combat) and then modified it to include other components (i.e.,

aircraft and ships). Similarly, if a new technology were to be

modeled, new code normally had to be written, even in cases where

good, validated, stand-alone technology models existed. The obvious

drawbacks to this approach are that it is costly, often produces

inferior simulations for the new additions, and quickly results in

extremely large codes with commensurate large code management

problems. Object-oriented approaches allow models and simulations to

be linked to form a richer environment for examining new technologies

and joint force structures.

Linking force-on-force simulations with design tools such as

computer-aided design (CAD) programs and physics-based simulations

presents a new type of tool referred to as simulation-based design.

Once fully realized, this capability will allow new technologies to be

much more easily evaluated, introducing a source for greater

efficiency into today's somewhat haphazard acquisition system.

Simulations based on object-oriented architectures also promise more

flexibility that will enable scenarios and unexpected situations to be

made as inputs and simulated rapidly, forming the core for a

battlefield visualization system capable of modeling "what if"

situations. Outputs from these simulations could be used for mission

rehearsal. Even today, pilots and special operations forces often "fly

through" crude, three-dimensional renderings of a mission area to

familiarize themselves with information such as surface-to-air missile

(SAM) sites and landmarks.

The promise of computational technologies brings with it potential

vulnerabilities that must be protected against threats. In a world

where information plays a vital role in warfare, information

collection and processing tools will become targets. Defenses against

information warfare must be developed. The threat is real and is

growing especially in the commercial and private sectors. Even today,

malicious hackers devise data-destroying viruses and distribute them

through a plethora of electronic media; numerous sites on the Net are

dedicated to the discussion and development of offensive computer

viruses, with ample tools for even the novice to download and employ.

Moreover, computer crimes cost the world economy billions of dollars

annually. Although information warfare poses serious threats, the

realm of information is where operations underlying Rapid Dominance

most reside, and the enemy will find himself fully engaged should he

choose to fight on our terms. Rapid Dominance is essentially

information warfare on a grand scale in all dimensions of offensive,

defensive and leveraging effective use of available information.

Communication Technologies

One of the modern communication devices being fielded within U.S.

forces today is the SINGCARS radio. With a data rate of somewhat less

than 10 kbps, SINGCARS is woefully inadequate for supporting Rapid

Dominance. However, more appropriate technologies are emerging:

- GBS and other satellite broadcast services

- Wider bandwidth, digital communication protocols

- Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches

- Advanced comm relay platforms (UAV, Lightsat, Iridium, etc.)

GBS, for example, figures prominently in the BADD (battlefield

awareness and data dissemination) program that aims at providing close

to 30 Mbps of data broadcast bandwidth. This will be supported by

multi-terrabyte databases, advanced data browsers, and query managers,

and will be linked to the Joint Tactical Internet.