Appendices -- Reflections of Three Former Commanders
Appendix A. "Thoughts on Rapid Dominance" by Admiral Bud Edney
Appendix B. "Defense Alternatives: Forces Required" by General
Chuck Horner
Appendix C. "Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance" by General
Fred Franks
Biographies of the Study Group Members
Foreword
We are in the early stages of what promises to be an extended debate
about the future of conflict and the future of our defense
establishment. Few will deny that the winds of change are blowing as
never before, driven by a radically altered geopolitical situation, an
evolving information-oriented society, advancing technology, and
budgetary constraints. How our nation responds to the challenge of
change will determine our ability to shape the future and defend
ourselves against 21st century threats. The major issue, however it
may be manifested, involves the degree of change that is required.
Advocates, all along the spectrum from a military technical revolution
to a revolution in military affairs to a revolution in security
affairs, are making their cases. Military institutions are by their
very nature somewhat conservative. History has shown that success has
often sown the seeds of future failure. We as a nation can ill afford
to follow in the footsteps of those who have rested on their laurels
and failed to stretch their imaginations.
Often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced about a
subject are not in the most advantageous position to understand a new
world order. Yet these same individuals are often among the most
credible voices and therefore are essential to progress. The authors
of Shock and Awe are a highly accomplished and distinguished group
with the credibility that comes from years of front line experience.
Thus, this work is important not only because of the ideas contained
within, but because of the caliber and credibility of the authors.
ACTIS seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. In sponsoring
this work and in disseminating its initial results, we hope to
contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives, their promises,
and their risks. As the authors note, this is a work in progress meant
not to provide definitive solutions but a proposed perspective for
considering future security needs and strategies. To the extent that
vigorous debate ensues we will be successful.
David S. Alberts
Washington, D.C.
October 1996
Prologue
The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts for
structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which future U.
S. military forces might be configured. From the very outset of this
study group's deliberations, we agreed that the most useful
contribution we could make would be to attempt to reach beyond what we
saw as the current and commendable efforts, largely but not entirely
within the Department of Defense, to define concepts for strategy,
doctrine, operations, and force structure to deal with a highly
uncertain future. In approaching this endeavor, we fully recognized
the inherent and actual limits and difficulties in attempting to reach
beyond what may prove to be the full extent of our grasp.
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently the
most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a long time
to come. Why then, many will ask, should we examine and even propose
major excursions and changes if the country occupies this position of
military superiority? For reasons noted in this study, we believe that
excursions are important if only to confirm the validity of current
defense approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have
led us to this conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes that the
Cold War has ended, there is not a consensus about what this means for
more precisely defining the nature of our future security needs.
Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a galvanizing external
danger, the United States is actively examining new strategic options
and choices. The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the
Pentagon to deal with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of American
military power, unencumbered by the danger of an external peer
competitor, have created a period of strategic advantage during which
we have the luxury of time, perhaps measured in many years, to
re-examine with a margin of safety our defense posture. On the other
hand, potential adversaries cannot be expected to ignore this
predominant military capability of the United States and fail to try
to exploit, bypass, or counter it. In other words, faced with American
military superiority in ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most
importantly, in competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries
may try to change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant
as possible these current U.S. advantages. We proceed at our own risk
if we dismiss this possibility.
Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military capability
will shrink. Despite the pledges of the two major American political
parties to maintain or expand the current level of defense capability,
both the force structure and defense infrastructure are too large to
be maintained at even the present levels and within the defense
budgets that are likely to be approved. Unless a new menace
materializes, defense is headed for "less of the same." Such
reductions may have no strategic consequences. However, that is an
outcome that we believe should not be left to chance.
This shrinkage also means that the Pentagon's good faith strategic
reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs may be caught
up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and could too easily
drift into becoming advocacy or marketing documents. As the services
are forced into more jealously guarding a declining force structure,
the tendency to "stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and
special programs is likely to increase, thereby complicating the
problem of making full use of our extraordinary technological
resources. This means that some external thinking, removed from the
bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating
and sustaining innovation.
Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing profound
change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature of the free
enterprise system and the American personality. Whether in information
or materials-related technology or for that matter in other areas too
numerous to count, the nature of competition is driving both product
breadth and improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. One
sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in
this country are being created by small business. In the areas of
commercial information and related management information systems,
these changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a
few years ago.
On the so-called information highway, performance is increasing
dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the time to bring to
market new generation technology are diminishing. These positive
trends are not matched yet in the defense-industrial base. One
consequence of this broad commercial transformation is that any future
set of defense choices may be inexorably linked to and dependent on
this profound, ongoing change in the commercial sector and in learning
to harness private sector advances in technology-related products. It
must also be understood that only the United States among all states
and nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and commercial
capability to undertake the full exploitation of this revolutionary
potential.
Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed
worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than during
the Cold War. These demands will continue and the diversity of
assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces must be properly
manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out their missions to
standards that are both high and expected by the nation's leaders and
its public. The matter of maintaining this capability while attempting
to reshape the force for a changing future is a major and daunting
challenge not to be underestimated.
These structural realities are exciting and offer a major opportunity
for real revolution and change if we are able and daring enough to
exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to develop the concept of
Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on Shock and Awe. Rapid
Dominance seeks to integrate these multifaceted realities and facts
and apply them to the common defense at a time when uncertainty about
the future is perhaps one of the few givens. We believe the principles
and ideas underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and
different enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated
by "overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield awareness,"
and "dominant maneuver" to warrant closer examination.
Since before Sun Tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war recorded
their observations, strategists and generals have been tantalized and
confounded by the elusive goal of destroying the adversary's will to
resist before, during, and after battle. Today, we believe that an
unusual opportunity exists to determine whether or not this
long-sought strategic goal of affecting the will, understanding, and
perception of an adversary can be brought closer to fruition. Even if
this task cannot be accomplished, we believe that, at the very
minimum, such an effort will enhance and improve the ability of our
military forces to carry out their missions more successfully through
identifying and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the
conflict and by identifying and creating additional options and
choices for employing our forces more effectively.
Perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of strategy,
technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has the potential for
revolutionary change. We envisage Rapid Dominance as the possible
military expression, vanguard, and extension of this potential for
revolutionary change. The strategic centers of gravity on which Rapid
Dominance concentrates, modified by the uniquely American ability to
integrate all this, are these junctures of strategy, technology, and
innovation which are focused on the goal of affecting and shaping the
will of the adversary. The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy
or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no
alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military
objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid Dominance must control the
operational environment and through that dominance, control what the
adversary perceives, understands, and knows, as well as control or
regulate what is not perceived, understood, or known.
In Rapid Dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital condition
to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an adversary's military
power. We still must maintain the capacity for the physical and
forceful occupation of territory should there prove to be no
alternative to deploying sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment
on the ground to accomplish that objective. Should this goal of
applying our resources to controlling, affecting, and breaking the
will of an adversary to resist remain elusive, we believe that Rapid
Dominance can still provide a variety of options and choices for
dealing with the operational demands of war and conflict.
To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will apply a
variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the necessary level of
Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and military leverage
points. This means that psychological and intangible, as well as
physical and concrete effects beyond the destruction of enemy forces
and supporting military infrastructure, will have to be achieved. It
is in this broader and deeper strategic application that Rapid
Dominance perhaps most fundamentally differentiates itself from
current doctrine and offers revolutionary application.
Flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the adversary's
will to resist through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe to achieve
strategic aims and military objectives, four characteristics emerge
that will define the Rapid Dominance military force. These are noted
and discussed in later chapters. The four characteristics are near
total or absolute knowledge and understanding of self, adversary, and
environment; rapidity and timeliness in application; operational
brilliance in execution; and (near) total control and signature
management of the entire operational environment.
Whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities driven-that is, it
focuses on defeating the military capability of an adversary and
therefore tends to be scenario sensitive-Rapid Dominance would seek to
be more universal in application through the overriding objective of
affecting the adversary's will beyond the boundaries traditionally
defined by military capability alone. In other words, where decisive
force is likely to be most relevant is against conventional military
capabilities that can be overwhelmed by American (and allied) military
superiority. In conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this
idealized scenario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be
sufficiently broad to prevail. Rapid Dominance would not make this
distinction in either theory or in practice.
We note for the record that should a Rapid Dominance force actually be
fielded with the requisite operational capabilities, this force would
be neither a silver bullet nor a panacea and certainly not an antidote
or preventative for a major policy blunder, miscalculation, or
mistake. It should also be fully appreciated that situations will
exist in which Rapid Dominance (or any other doctrine) may not work or
apply because of political, strategic, or other limiting factors.
We realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an adversary's
will, perception, and understanding through Shock and Awe on the
grounds that this idea is not new and that such an outcome may not be
physically achievable or politically desirable. On the first point, we
believe the use of basic principles of strategy can stand us in good
stead even and perhaps especially in the modern era when adversaries
may not elect to fight the United States along traditional or expected
lines. On whether this ability can and should be achieved, we believe
that question should be part of a broader examination.
Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is the way in
which we attempt to integrate far more broadly strategy, technology,
and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It is this interaction and
focus which we think will provide the most interesting results.
For these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambitious
intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition of Rapid
Dominance. For the moment, we view Rapid Dominance in the formation
stage and not as a final product. Over the next months, we believe
further steps should be taken to refine Rapid Dominance and to develop
"paper" systems and force designs that will add crucial specificity to
this concept. Then, this Rapid Dominance force can be assessed against
five sets of questions:
- First, assuming that a Rapid Dominance force can be fielded with
the appropriate capabilities of Shock and Awe to affect and shape
the adversary's will, how would this force compare with and
improve on our ability to fight, win, and deal with a major
regional contingency (MRC)?
- Second, what utility, if any, does Rapid Dominance and its
application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other Than War
(OOTW)? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in OOTW, where would it
not, and where might it offer mixed benefits?
- Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Dominance in
both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a form
of political deterrence to underwrite future U.S. policy? Would
this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to our
own public?
- Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances, coalitions,
and the conduct of allied and combined operations?
- Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance on defense
resource investment priorities and future budgets?
From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful results
will flow.
We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the National
Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In particular, we
owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts of NDU whose
intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his full support,
have been invaluable and without which this project would have been
far less productive.
Washington, D.C.
1 September 1996
L.A. Edney J.T. Howe
F.M. Franks H.K. Ullman
C. A. Horner J.P. Wade
Introduction to Rapid Dominance
The military posture and capability of the United States of America
are, today, dominant. Simply put, there is no external adversary in
the world that can successfully challenge the extraordinary power of
the American military in either regional conflict or in "conventional"
war as we know it once the United States makes the commitment to take
whatever action may be needed. To be sure, the first phase of a crisis
may be the most difficult-if an aggressor has attacked and U.S. forces
are not in place. However, it will still be years, if not decades,
before potential adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a
full panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to or better than the
aggregate strength of the ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and
weapons systems in our inventory. Even if an adversary could deploy
similar systems, then matching and overcoming the superb training and
preparation of American service personnel would still be a daunting
task.
Given this reality that our military dominance can and will extend for
some considerable time to come, provided we are prepared to use it,
why then is a re-examination of American defense posture and doctrine
important? The answers to this question involve (1) the changing
nature of the domestic and international environments; (2) the complex
nature of resolving inter and intra-state conflict that falls outside
conventional war, including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism,
crime, and the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) resource
constraints; (4) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases
raised on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future
of austerity; and (5) the vast uncertainties of the so-called social,
economic, and information revolutions that could check or counter many
of the nation's assumptions as well as public support currently
underwriting defense.
It is clear that these so-called grey areas involving non-traditional
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and law enforcement tasks are growing
and pose difficult problems and challenges to American military
forces, especially when and where the use of force may be
inappropriate or simply may not work. The expansion of the role of UN
forces to nation-building in Somalia and its subsequent failure comes
to mind as an example of this danger. It is also arguable that the
formidable nature and huge technological lead of American military
capability could induce an adversary to move to a strategy that
attempted to circumvent all this fighting power through other clever
or agile means. The Vietnam War is a grim reminder of the political
nature of conflict and how our power was once outflanked. Training,
morale, and readiness to fight are perishable commodities requiring
both a generous expenditure of resources and careful nurturing.
Thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most dominant
military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in overcoming the
inertia of this success. We may be our own worst enemy.
During the Cold War when the danger was clear, the defense debate was
often fought over how to balance the so-called "strategy-force
structure-budget" formula. Today, that formula has expanded to include
"threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure."
Without a "clear and present danger" such as the Axis Powers in 1941
or, later, the Soviet Union to coalesce public agreement on the
threat, it is difficult to construct a supporting strategy that can be
effective either in setting priorities or objectives. Hence, today's
"two war" or two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingency (MRC)
strategy has been criticized as strategically and financially
excessive. As noted by administration officials, the current force
structure does not meet the demands of the "two war," MRC strategy
and, in any event, the budget will not support the planned force
structure. Finally, it is widely recognized that the United States
possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and facilities than it
needs to support the current force, thereby draining scarce resources
away from fighting power. As a result, there is a substantial defense
imbalance that will erode fighting power.
In designing its defense posture, the United States has adopted the
doctrine of employing "decisive or overwhelming force." This doctrine
reinforces American advantages in strategic mobility, prepositioning,
technology, training, and in fielding integrated military systems to
provide and retain superiority, and responds to the minimum casualty
and collateral damage criteria set first in the Reagan Administration.
The Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA is cited as the phenomenon
or process by which the United States continues to exploit technology
to maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms of
achieving "dominant battlefield awareness." Through this awareness,
the United States should be able to obtain perfect or near perfect
information on virtually all technical aspects of the battlefield and
therefore be able to defeat or destroy an adversary more effectively,
with fewer losses to ourselves and with a range of capabilities from
long-range precision strike to more effective close-in weapons.
Before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some of the
as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities, changes,
and trends. The deployment of American forces to Bosnia is a reaction
to and representation of major shifts occurring in the post-Cold War
world. With these shifts, this deployment is suggestive of what may
lie ahead for the use, relevance, and design of military force. The
legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and then, the start of the Cold War,
caused the West to adopt policies for containing and deterring the
broad threat posed by the Soviet Union and its ideology. Thermonuclear
weapons, complemented over time by strong conventional forces,
threatened societal damage to Russia. Conventional forces backed by
tactical nuclear weapons were later required, in part, to halt a
massive Soviet ground attack in Europe and, in part, to provide an
alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear weapons.
Today, the First Armored Division, the principal American unit serving
in Bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so well in
_Desert Storm_ and, for the bulk of the Cold War along with our other
units, had been designed to defend NATO against and then defeat a
numerically superior, armored and mechanized Soviet adversary
advancing across the plains of Germany. Now these troops, as well as
others from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, are engaged in OOTW
for which special training, rules of engagement, command arrangements,
and other support structures have been put in place at short notice,
few of which were even envisaged a few years ago. These are also
operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media coverage, can
have huge domestic political impact especially if events go wrong.
Whether or not this armored division is the most optimally configured
force for such an operation is not relevant for the moment even though
this unit probably was the most appropriate for this task. However, it
is prudent to examine the consequences of changing tasks presaged by
Bosnia, in which the enemy is instability rather than an ideological
or regional adversary we are trying to contain or defeat and
neutrality on our part may be vital to the success of the mission. Do
these changes mean that we should alter our traditional approach to
the doctrine for and design of forces? If so, how? Are there
alternative or more effective ways and means to conduct these
peacekeeping-related operations? And, in this evaluation, are there
alternative doctrines we should consider to fight wars more
effectively as we envisage scenarios under the construct of the MRC?
With the end of the USSR and absent a hostile Russian superpower,
there is no external threat to the existence or survival of the United
States as a nation and there will not be such an immediate threat for
some time to come. This means that there is a finite window of
opportunity when there is no external adversary threatening the total
existence of American society; that our forces are far superior to any
possible military adversary choosing to confront us directly; and
that, with innovative thought, we may be able to create a more
relevant, effective, and efficient means to ensure for the common
defense at the likely levels of future spending.
At the same time that the Bosnia operation is underway, the
fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be addressed.
The industrial and technical base of the United States is changing
profoundly. The entrepreneurial and technical advantages of the
American economy were never greater and it is small business that is
creating virtually all new jobs and employment opportunities.
Commercial technology and products are turning over on ever shortening
cycles. Performance, especially in high-technology products, is
improving and costs are being driven downwards.
Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense sector,
where cost is high and will create even tougher choices among
competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle time to
field new generation capabilities is lengthening and performance,
especially in computer and information systems, is often obsolete on
delivery. The defense industrial base will continue to compress and it
is not clear that the necessary level of efficiencies or increases in
effectiveness in using this base can be identified and implemented,
suggesting further pressures on a defense budget that is only likely
to be cut.
Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the
military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot wars
such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships and
submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers, technology,
strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our national preference
for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare continues to shape the
way we design and rationalize our military capability. Therefore, it
is no surprise that in dealing with the MRC, American doctrine, in
some ways, remains an extension of Cold War force planning. While the
magnitude and number of dangerous threats to the nation have been
remarkably reduced by the demise of the USSR, we continue to use
technology to fill traditional missions better rather than to identify
or produce new and more effective solutions for achieving military and
strategic/political objectives.
While there is much talk about "military revolutions" and winning the
"information war," what is generally meant in this lexicon and
discussion is translated into defense programs that relate to
accessing and "fusing" information across command, control,
intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and precision
strike technologies. What is most exciting among these revolutions is
the potential to achieve "dominant battlefield awareness," that is,
achieving the capability to have near-perfect knowledge and
information of the battlefield while depriving the adversary of that
capacity and producing "systems of systems" for this purpose.
The near and mid-term aims of these "revolutions" largely remain
directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and on fielding
more effective ways of defeating an adversary's weapons systems and
infrastructure for using those systems. The doctrine of "decisive or
overwhelming force" is the conceptual and operational underpinning for
winning the next war based largely on this force-on-force and
attrition model, and winning the information war is vital to this end.
Few have asked whether the pattern of employing more modern technology
for traditional firepower solutions is the best one and if there are
alternative ways to achieve military objectives more effectively and
efficiently. In other words, can the idea of dominant battlefield
awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in terms of
fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic objectives?
Rapid Dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would advance
the military revolution to new levels and possibly new dimensions.
Rapid Dominance extends across the entire "threat, strategy, force
structure, budget, infrastructure" formula with broad implications for
how we provide for the future common defense. Organization and
management of defense and defense resources should not be excluded
from this examination although, in this paper, they are not discussed
in detail.
The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception, and
understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our strategic
policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe. Clearly, the
traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, or neutralizing the
adversary's military capability is a fundamental and necessary
component of Rapid Dominance. Our intent, however, is to field a range
of capabilities to induce sufficient Shock and Awe to render the
adversary impotent. This means that physical and psychological effects
must be obtained.
Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to control, on an
immediate basis, the entire region of operational interest and the
environment, broadly defined, in and around that area of interest.
Beyond achieving decisive force and dominant battlefield awareness, we
envisage Rapid Dominance producing a capability that can more
effectively and efficiently achieve the stated political or military
objectives underwriting the use of force by rendering the adversary
completely impotent.
In Rapid Dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly before
an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity applies throughout the
spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to all stages of
battle and conflict resolution.
"Dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an adversary's
will both physically and psychologically. Physical dominance includes
the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neutralize, and to render
impotent. Psychological dominance means the ability to destroy,
defeat, and neuter the will of an adversary to resist; or convince the
adversary to accept our terms and aims short of using force. The
target is the adversary's will, perception, and understanding. The
principal mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing
sufficient conditions of "Shock and Awe" on the adversary to convince
or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military objectives.
Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and disinformation,
perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed.
The key objective of Rapid Dominance is to impose this overwhelming
level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or
sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on. In crude
terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of the environment and
paralyze or so overload an adversary's perceptions and understanding
of events that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical
and strategic levels. An adversary would be rendered totally impotent
and vulnerable to our actions. To the degree that non-lethal weaponry
is useful, it would be incorporated in the ability to Shock and Awe
and achieve Rapid Dominance.
Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Dominance seeks to
impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact
that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the
Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until
both nuclear bombs were used. The impact of those weapons was
sufficient to transform both the mindset of the average Japanese
citizen and the outlook of the leadership through this condition of
Shock and Awe. The Japanese simply could not comprehend the
destructive power carried by a single airplane. This incomprehension
produced a state of awe.
We believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential in
combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce systems
capable of yielding this level of Shock and Awe. In most or many
cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing the full
destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced conventional
technologies but must be underwritten by the ability to do so.
Achieving Rapid Dominance by virtue of applying Shock and Awe at the
appropriate level or levels is the next step in the evolution of a
doctrine for replacing or complementing overwhelming force. By way of
comparison, we have summarized how we view the differences between the
doctrines of Rapid Dominance and Decisive Force in terms of basic
elements that apply to the objectives, uses of force, force size,
scope, speed, casualties, and technique. We recognize that there will
be debate over the relative utility and applicability of these
doctrines and readers are encouraged to participate.
In considering the differences between the concepts of Rapid Dominance
and Decisive Force, it is important to define the terms as precisely
as possible.
The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and Awe must be
compared with overwhelming force. "Rapid" implies the ability to "own"
the dimension of time-moving more quickly than an opponent, operating
within his decision cycle, and resolving conflict favorably in a short
period of time. "Dominance" means the ability to control a situation
totally.
Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the means to
anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will involve the
capability to deny an opponent things of critical value, and to convey
the unmistakable message that unconditional compliance is the only
available recourse. It will imply more than the direct application of
force. It will mean the ability to control the environment and to
master all levels of an opponent's activities to affect will,
perception, and understanding. This could include means of
communication, transportation, food production, water supply, and
other aspects of infrastructure as well as the denial of military
responses. Deception, misinformation, and disinformation are key
components in this assault on the will and understanding of the
opponent.
Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across tactical,
strategic, and political levels will destroy the will to resist. With
Rapid Dominance, the goal is to use our power with such compellance
that even the strongest of wills will be awed. Rapid Dominance will
strive to achieve a dominance that is so complete and victory is so
swift, that an adversary's losses in both manpower and material could
be relatively light, and yet the message is so unmistakable that
resistance would be seen as futile.
"Decisive Force," on the other hand, implies delivering massive enough
force to prevail. Decisive means using force with plenty of margin for
error. Force implies a traditional "force-on-force" and attrition
approach. This concept does not exclude psychological and other
complementary damage imposition techniques to enhance the application
of force; they have been used throughout the history of warfare. But
such non-destructive means would have an ancillary role. Military
force would be applied in a purer form and targeted primarily against
the military capabilities of an opponent. Time is not always an
essential component. As in _Desert Shield/Storm_, enough time would
have to be allowed to assemble an overwhelming force. Such a luxury is
not always feasible.
The differences become clearer if broken down into their essential
elements:
Elements Rapid Dominance Decisive Force
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Objective Control the adversary's will, Prevail militarily and
perceptions, and understanding decisively against a set of
opposing capabilities defined
by the MRC
Use of Control the adversary's will, Unquestioned ability to
Force perceptions, and understanding prevail militarily over an
and literally make an adversary opponent's forces and based
impotent to act or react against the adversary's
capabilities
Force Size Could be smaller than Large, highly trained, and
opposition, but with decisive well-equipped. Materially
edge in technology, training, overwhelming
and technique
Scope All encompassing Force against force (and
supporting capability)
Speed Essential Desirable
Casualties Could be relatively few in Potentially higher on both
number on both sides sides
Technique Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, Systematic destruction of
destroy military capability.
applicable in some situations
Four general categories of core characteristics and capabilities have
been identified that Rapid Dominance-configured mission capability
packages must embrace. These are identified briefly and discussed in
later chapters.
First, Rapid Dominance seeks to maximize */knowledge/* of the
environment, of the adversary, and of our own forces on political,
strategic, economic, and military/operational levels. On one hand, we
want to get into the minds of the adversary far more deeply than we
have in the past. Beyond operational intelligence required for
battlefield awareness, Rapid Dominance means cultural understanding of
the adversary in ways that will affect both ours and their planning
and the outcome of the operation at all appropriate tactical and
strategic levels.
Second, Rapid Dominance must achieve */rapidity/* in the sense of
timeliness. Rapid Dominance must have capabilities that can be applied
swiftly and relatively faster than an adversary's.
Third, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve total */control of the
environment/* from complete "signature management" of both our and the
adversary's information and intelligence to more discrete means to
deceive, disguise, and misinform.
Fourth, Rapid Dominance aims to achieve new levels of operational
competence that can virtually institutionalize */"brilliance."/* In
some cases, this may mean changing the longstanding principle of
military centralization and empowering individual soldiers, sailors,
and airmen to be crucial components in applying and directing the
application of force.
As we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and
capabilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging reality
to consider. If the commercial-economic sector is transforming at the
current rate and breadth, it could be that, over the course of many
years, the defense industrial base would follow suit, or face
irrelevance and extinction. Clearly, there are certain areas in
defense which will never or may never be eliminated or replaced.
Nuclear systems are a current example.
Should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may mean that
military force design and procurement will become dependent on the
private sector and commercial technology. Rapid Dominance is a first
conceptual step to deal with this possibility.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the concept
of Rapid Dominance, its concentration on strategy, technology and
innovation, and its focus on Shock and Awe. Based on this, subsequent
steps will involve expanding mission capability packages concepts
consisting of operations harmonized with doctrine, organization, and
systems and then move on to field prototype systems for further test
and evaluation as advanced concept technology demonstrations.
Background and Basis
In both relative and absolute terms, since the end of World War II,
the military strength and capability of the United States have never
been greater. Yet this condition of virtual military superiority has
created a paradox. Absent a massive threat or massive security
challenge, it is not clear that this military advantage can (always)
be translated into concrete political terms that advance American
interests. Nor is it clear that the current structure and foundations
for this extraordinary force can be sustained for the long term
without either spending more money or imposing major changes to this
structure that may exceed the capacity of our system to accommodate.
As a consequence, the success of the current design and configuration
of our forces may ironically become self-limiting and constraining.
That is not to claim automatically that there are better military
solutions or that the current defense program is not the best our
political system can produce. It is to say, however, that we are
well-advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance and
measure against the current and planned program.
To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset that one
thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine of overwhelming
or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To push the conceptual
envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions: Can a Rapid Dominance
force lead, for example, to a force structure that can win an MRC such
as _Desert Shield_ and _Desert Storm _far more quickly and cheaply
with far fewer personnel than our planned force both in terms of
stopping any invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? Can
Rapid Dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity
to deal with grey areas such as OOTW?
Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of political
deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or "shut down" an
adversary can actually control behavior? What are the possible
political implications of this capability and what would this power
mean for conducting coalition war and for how our allies react and
respond?
Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will, perception,
and understanding of an adversary rather than simply destroying
military capability, this focus must cause us to consider the broadest
spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and across all aspects of war
including intelligence, training, education, doctrine, industrial
capacity, and how we organize and manage defense.
We observe at first that even with the successful ending of the Cold
War, the response of the United States in re-evaluating its national
security and defense has been relatively and understandably modest and
cautious. In essence, while the size of the force has been reduced
from Cold War levels of 2.2 million active duty troops to about 1.5
million, and the services have been vocal in revising doctrine and
strategy to reflect the end of the Soviet threat, with the exception
of emphasis on jointness, there are few really fundamental differences
in the design and structure of the forces from even 10 or 15 years
ago.
Throughout the Cold War, the defense of the United States rested on
several central and widely accepted and publicly supported
propositions. The "clear and apparent danger" of the Soviet threat was
real and seen as such. The USSR was to be contained and deterred from
hostile action by a combination of political, strategic, and military
actions ranging from the forging of a ring of alliances surrounding
the USSR and its allies to the deployment of tens of thousands of
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
Following the truce ending the Korean War, a large, standing military
force was maintained and defined by the operational requirements of
fighting the large formations of military forces of the USSR and its
allies with similar types of military forces, albeit outnumbered. The
role of allies, principally NATO, was assumed and taken into account
in planning, although the paradox of the issue of planning for a long
versus short war in a nuclear world remained unresolved.
Mobilization, as in World War II, was likewise assumed if the Cold War
went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that any war might be
ended quickly. The largely World War II defense, industrial, and
basing structure was retained along with the intent to rely on our
technological superiority to offset numerical or geographical
liabilities.
It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense through
mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the Second World War
and the literal ability of ultimately overwhelming the enemy using the
massive application of force, technology, and associated firepower.
Two decades later, Vietnam exposed the frailty of this approach of
dependence on massive application of firepower especially when
political limits were placed on applying that firepower.
Currently, _Desert Storm_ and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 have
been taken as the examples that confirm the validity of the doctrine
of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring that both strategic
objectives and tactical methods were in congruence. We argue that now
is the time to re-examine these premises of reliance on overwhelming
or decisive force as currently employed and deployed in the force
structure if only as a prudent check.
Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major threat to
generate consensus and to rally the country around defense and defense
spending, the military posture of the United States will erode as the
defense budget is cut. Hence, relying in the future on what is
currently seen to be as sufficient force to be "decisive" could easily
prove unachievable and the results problematic or worse for U.S.
policy.
The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat is, of
course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in defining the future
defense posture of the nation. The United States has long resisted
maintaining a large standing military and the Cold War years could
prove an aberration to that history. Extending this historical
observation of small standing forces, it is clear that there is no
adversary on the horizon even remotely approaching the military power
of the former USSR. While we might conjure up nominal regional
contingencies against Korea or Iraq as sensible planning scenarios for
establishing the building blocks for force structure, it will prove
difficult to sustain the current defense program over the long term
without a real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public
support. Allocating three percent or less of GDP for defense could
easily prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. It should be noted that
in Europe, defense spending is closing in on 1 to 2 percent of GDP.
Ironically, as the Department of Defense seeks to come to grips with
this new world, the structural limitations and constraints in how we
develop systems and procure weapons based on current technological and
industrial capacity for producing them will be exacerbated by downward
fiscal pressure giving us little room for mistakes and flexibility.
Air, land, space, and sea forces are currently limited in the actual
numbers and types of systems that are available for purchase and more
limited in that there are virtually no new major systems on the
horizon. That could change.
The M-1A-1 tank is in production only for foreign sales. Despite the
allure of the Arsenal Ship, the Navy still has only four active
classes of warships from which to replace its capability and, for the
first time this century since aircraft entered the inventory, is
without a new aircraft in development. The Air Force can be placed in
similar straits if the F-22 program is deferred or canceled because of
rising cost and fiscal constraints. Time will tell what happens to the
Joint Strike Fighter. Assumptions about reliance on technology and R&D
providing insurance policies for future defense needs may prove
ill-advised if and as DOD is forced to cut back and reduce those
programs even further. Indeed, over time, commercial R&D could become
the main source for procuring software and other systems needed to
upgrade today's weapons systems and for so-called "leap-ahead"
technologies that may prove elusive to create.
There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed developing new
doctrine and military thought to deal with these changing
circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and with the clear
bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing and defending an
annual budget, more of the same (or more likely, less of the same)
becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While the JCS or OSD or CINCs
may have genuine need for jointly packaged forces that are rapidly
deployable irrespective of Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels,
the services cannot be expected to reverse the years of viewing the
world through service- specific arguments and doctrine.
Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced with the
end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to assume that there
are no risks to the nation nor an absence of evil-doers wishing this
nation harm. It would also be shortsighted to expect that potential
adversaries are unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge
of their environment and simplicity to overcome our current military
and technical superiority much as the North Vietnamese did. In
addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, our
assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological superiority
should welcome thoughtful examination.
Lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" As a start, the United
States should act to exploit the several major advantages it
possesses. First, we have time. The clarity and danger of future
threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a longer view. While we
may have deferred adding to the inventory of future systems in
development, current systems possess more than enough military
capability to get us through this transition period, even if this
period were to last for more than a decade. This does not mean we can
rest on our oars; if we take advantage of this opportunity, time is on
our side. If we squander this opportunity, then we could ultimately
find ourselves in trouble.
Second, the combination of American technical know-how, the luxury of
the best technically educated and trained society in the world, and
the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers vast potential if we
are clever enough to exploit this extraordinary resource.
Third, because of significant changes in law and organization
regarding the military, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and
through a willingness to examine alternatives, the Department of
Defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts. The enhanced role
of the CINCs and the acceptance of jointness are positive
illustrations. Yet, for understandable structural and political
realities noted above, assuring productive innovation continues will
not be automatic. Against these conducive signs, vision, true joint
thinking, and tactical advances still are premium commodities to be
nourished and encouraged.
In building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful to rely
on successful lessons of the past. For five decades, we have been
successful in applying containment and deterrence in the Cold War.
When deterrence or diplomacy failed as in Kuwait, then the use of
force was inevitable. A first-order issue is how can we augment or
improve the use of existing military capability should it be required.
Should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a regime
of Rapid Dominance throughout the area of strategic as well as
operational concern. By Rapid Dominance, we are seeking the capability
to dominate, control, and isolate the entire environment in, around,
over, and under the objective area as quickly as possible, and with
fewer forces than currently envisaged, although direct insertion of
forces is an important component depending upon the tactical
situation. In many cases, this capacity need not be the traditional
firepower solution of only physically destroying an adversary's
military capabilities. Our focus is on the Clausewitzian principle of
affecting the adversary's will to resist as the first order of
business, quickly if not nearly instantaneously. A second goal would
be to stop an attack during the first stages. A third goal, should it
be achievable, would be to promote a regime of political deterrence
that might restrain aggression in the first place.
To accomplish the rendering an adversary incapable of action means
neutralizing the ability to command; to provide logistics; to organize
society; and to function; as well as to control, regulate and deny the
adversary of information, intelligence, and understanding of what is
and what is not happening. This means we must control all necessary
intelligence and information on our forces-the ultimate form of
stealth-and on an adversary's forces as well and then exploit total
situational awareness for rapid action.
Regarding the emergence of current military thought and doctrine, as
implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early and far less mature
stages of a major revolution than is generally assumed. It is
understandable that despite major strategic reassessments, current
doctrine is still highly influenced by Cold War tactics and strategy
and perhaps by the iron grip of the history of conflict since the
early 19th century.
Since Napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has been
largely dominated by combining industrial might with vast amounts of
manpower over time and space. The United States advanced Napoleon's
use of industry and mass armies in the Civil War and our planning up
to the Cold War tended to follow this same pattern. World War II, of
course, exemplified the triumph of this industrial, mobilization, and
massive use of force approach.
In the evolution of U.S. military theory, it can be argued that this
model combining massive industrial might and manpower finally ended in
1989. Although, by then, technological advances to conventional
military capabilities seemed to be approaching the destructive power,
or more precisely, the system lethality of nuclear weapons. In other
words, modern non-nuclear precision weapons perhaps could produce
effects against enemy targets roughly comparable to the military
lethality of theater-level nuclear weapons. If this condition proves
true, could this new lethality fundamentally change the construct for
designing American doctrine and strategy? This question is at the
heart of the "precision and battlefield awareness" school of decisive
force thinking that believes that this fundamental change is in place.
Since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the need to
prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally powerful adversary,
the United States military has conducted two post-Cold War crises
against lesser adversaries quite differently than it fought the Cold
War. In the Panama intervention in 1990 and in Kuwait shortly
thereafter, the suggestion of newer and different methods of warfare
was present. Perhaps both will turn out to be transition campaigns,
where there is much of the old, but also signs of the new. But there
are specific pieces of evidence that should command our attention.
Underlying the planning for _Operation Just Cause_ in Panama and
_Desert Shield/Storm_ in Kuwait was the premeditated incorporation of
a series of rapid, simultaneous attacks designed to apply decisive
force. The aim was to stun, and then rapidly defeat the enemy through
a series of carefully orchestrated land, sea, air, and special
operating forces strikes that took place nearly simultaneously across
a wide battle space and against many military targets. The purpose of
these rapid, simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis
of both the national state and its armed forces that would lead to
prompt neutralization and capitulation.
In both _Just Cause_ and _Desert Storm_, the United States (plus
coalition forces in _Desert Storm_) had such overwhelming military
capabilities that, in retrospect, the outcome was largely a matter of
drafting a cogent and coordinated operation plan based on using the
entire system of capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce
a decisive victory. The Haitian incursion in 1995 used similar
principles of intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. However, in
_Desert Storm_ unlike Haiti, it took the U.S. and its allies nearly 6
months to deploy over a half million troops before the fighting began.
The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-5 Pamphlet
reflect and exploit operational rapidity and simultaneity. Yet,
progress in these operational directions may be in danger of faltering
if only old Cold War yardsticks are used to make future force
investments and to direct studies about future force structure and
associated infrastructure. As in any transition period, innovation
must be joined by a willingness to experiment. This means the
establishment and cultivation of an experimental apparatus to test and
evaluate new concepts are matters of importance both to foster
innovation and assess its application.
We build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek to
emphasize control and time. Control is necessary to force behavioral
change in adversaries to achieve strategic or political ends. Control
and then influence come from a range of threats and outcomes,
including putting at risk the targets an adversary holds dear, to
imposing a hierarchy of Shock and Awe, to affecting will, perception,
and understanding. Achieving control may now be theoretically possible
in even more compressed or shortened time periods because of the
potential superiority of enhanced U.S. military capability and further
training and education. To obtain this level of military superiority
that can affect the adversary's will and perception, or at least
achieve the practical military consequences, a great deal of thought,
debate, and experimentation over new concepts will be needed if only
to test and validate contemporary doctrine.
If the political objective is to achieve a level of Shock and Awe
beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must follow. The
end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way as to achieve
the desired objectives. From this concept follows the need to shut
down either a state or an organized enemy through the rapid and
simultaneous application (or threat of application) of land, sea, air,
space, and special operating forces against the broadest spectrum of
the adversary's power base and center or centers of gravity and
against the adversary's will and perception at tactical and strategic
levels.
In _Desert Storm_, the objectives were first to evict Iraqi forces
from Kuwait and then to restore the legitimate government. From these
objectives, more limited strategic and political objectives followed,
some for purposes of maintaining coalition solidarity and UN-imposed
sanctions. Not occupying Baghdad was one such political limitation.
These strategic objectives led to identification of the enemy's
centers of gravity as the basis for the application of force to
destroy these centers. This planning led to the repeated, rapid, and
simultaneous use of massive force with great effect.
One obvious tactical objective was to eliminate Saddam Hussein's
command and control. This was accomplished by simultaneous and massive
attacks. Once command and control was destroyed, Iraqi forces in the
Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) would be destroyed as quickly as
possible with overwhelming force and with minimum casualties. As
General Colin Powell simply stated, "My plan is to cut off Saddam's
army and then kill it."
There was no sanctuary for Iraqi forces in the KTO. They were
completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating attack. Outside
the KTO, targeting was more selective, not because the means were
unavailable for imposing sufficient damage but because our military
objectives were purposely limited. Given the effectiveness of the air
campaign and the overwhelming superiority on the ground, coalition
land forces required only 4 of the 41 days of the war to defeat and to
eject Iraq's forces from Kuwait.
Suppose a _Desert Storm_-type campaign were fought 20 years from now
based on a plan that exploited the concept of Rapid Dominance. Further
assume that Iraq has improved (and rebuilt) its military and that, in
a series of simultaneous and nearly instantaneous actions, our primary
objective was still to shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its
leadership, and isolate and destroy its military forces as we did in
1991. However, two decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably
achieve this objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not
after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 to
1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an
invasion in its tracks.
Shutting the country down would entail both the physical destruction
of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and control of the flow
of all vital information and associated commerce so rapidly as to
achieve a level of national shock akin to the effect that dropping
nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese.
Simultaneously, Iraq's armed forces would be paralyzed with the
neutralization or destruction of its capabilities. Deception,
disinformation, and misinformation would be applied massively.
This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also demonstrate
to the adversary our endurance and staying power, that is, the
capability to dominate over as much time as is necessary less an enemy
mistakenly try to wait it out and use time between attacks to recover
sufficiently. If the enemy still resisted, then conventional forms of
attack would follow resulting in the physical occupation of territory.
Control is thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the
stun effects of the initial rapid series of blows long enough to
affect the enemy's will and his means to continue. There must be
staying power effect on the enemy or they merely absorb the blows,
gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change tactics
much as occurred during the WWII bombing campaigns and the air war
over North Vietnam.
Achieving these levels of Shock and Awe requires a wide versatility
and competence in employing land, sea, air, space, and special
operating forces and in investment in technology to produce Rapid
Dominance. Different methods for commanding the battle using both
hierarchical and non-hierarchical command to control and direct our
forces are likely to be required especially given the simultaneous
application of capabilities throughout the given battle space by the
full spectrum of our forces. To use these combinations of forces will
require adjustment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles
and functions. Rapid Dominance also means looking to invest in
technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the Cold War
paradigm.
To develop the proper combination of forces and future technology
investment for Rapid Dominance, extensive experimentation with this
core concept will be required. This exper-imentation must apply to all
levels of military educational institutions; it must be joint; it can
be accelerated by availability of recent advances in simulation
technology; and it must have operational trials in the field.
To advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and
application are vital. Here, understanding several facts is important.
The U.S. today is graduating through its college and universities
system approximately 200,000 American and foreign scientists and
engineers per year. This is a great national resource. This technology
infrastructure is dimensions larger in number and scope than the
aggregate of anywhere else in the world. Through appreciation and
exploitation of this potential, a U.S. position of pre-eminence in
science and technology could be assured for the foreseeable future.
One adjunct of this technology revolution is in the information and
information management areas- which, in the U.S., are heavily
commercially oriented. Future military application may well be
analogous to the impact of the internal combustion engine and wireless
radio on land, sea, and air forces in the 1920s and 1930s. The size of
this technological lead between ourselves and the rest of the world,
especially in the base for new information products and services,
should widen further in knowledge and in application. The "Silicon
Valley" revolution is likely to continue increasing computer capacity
on an almost annual basis. By the year 2005, computing power should be
many fold times today's capacity-perhaps ultimately beginning to close
in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as the ability
to condense and synthesize data.
In parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability to
transfer information into and out of the hands of individual users.
The addition of virtual reality and other technical aids will enhance
and potentially quicken individual decision-making ability.
Technologies associated with bioscience and bioengineering are likely
to be of particular importance in enhancing these capabilities and are
also an area of American predominance. Material sciences, software,
and communications are all American strengths, and should remain so
well into the next century.
A significant element supporting this explosion in applied information
and other technologies is the American free enterprise system and its
entrepreneurial character. This drive is needed to translate this
technology into military hardware. The nature of the U.S. market and
its competitive basis reinforce this element. The largest challenges
may be to shape and exploit this commercial potential and then to
ensure that its enduring advantages become fundamental in the makeup
of our military forces. Unlike the defense industrial base required
during the Cold War, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is
it a massive industry relying on producing large things. Indeed, its
edge has depended on getting "smaller, smarter, and cheaper."
The fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new American
industrial base to support Rapid Dominance must be toward the control
and management of everything that is significant to the operations
bearing on the particular Area of Interest (AOI). And we mean
everything! Control of the environment is far broader than only the
objective of achieving dominant battlefield awareness. Control means
the ability to change, to a greater or lesser degree, the "signatures"
of all of the combat forces engaged in the AOI. With this concept, the
operational frameworks in applying force across the entire spectrum of
platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles, ships) can be measured
(and controlled) from many minus decibels of cross section, to many
plus decibels; communications can be entirely covert, i.e., many dB
less than the ambient environment, or that approaching "white noise."
The location of both the individual and his unit can be measured in
real time in meters, if not feet, anywhere in the world. Through
virtual reality, movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of
square kilometers, offer precise location and movement control, both
during day and night in conditions of unprecedented confidence. This
occurs in real time. Denying or deceiving the adversary, including
real-time manipulation of senses and inputs, is part of this control.
A Rapid Dominance-configured force would enter an AOI and immediately
control the operational/environmental signatures both individually and
in the aggregate. As needed, line and non-line-of-sight weapons of
near pin-point accuracy would be delivered across the entire area of
operation. Stealthy UAVs and mobile robotics systems, together with
decoys, would be deployed in large numbers for surveillance,
targeting, strike, and deception and would produce their own impact of
electronic Shock and Awe on the enemy. This application of force can
be done as rapidly as political and strategic conditions demand.
The effects mean literally "turning on and off" the "lights" that
enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the conditions and
events concerning his forces and, ultimately, his society. What is
radically different in Rapid Dominance is the comprehensive system
assemblage and integration of many evolving and even revolutionary
technical advances in dominant battlefield awareness squared-materials
application, sensor and signature control, computer and bioengineering
applied to massive amounts of data, enable weapon application with
simultaneity, precision, and lethality that to date have not been
applied as a total system. Deception, disinformation, and
misinformation will become major elements of this systemic approach.
The R&D reality is that technology advances will likely come from the
commercial world as the DOD base continues to shrink. It is clear that
in certain areas, DOD must remain involved where there is no private
R&D or to fill gaps in R&D. Warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and
missile defense are examples. However, advances in commercial
technology in the Information Age are unlikely to be matched by DOD.
Of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate our combat
officers and key enlisted personnel. Command must be geared to
achieving the best of the best-not the best among the good.
Assimilating in real time the vast amount of information and putting
information to use will no doubt lead to major changes in the
composition, competence, and authority of (even and especially)
individual military unit commanders perhaps to the squad or private
soldier level.
Of course, even with the most perfect information, an unqualified,
inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may not win except
with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe. And, we repeat that
there are cases where NO military force may be able to succeed if the
objectives are unobtainable. The match of the entrepreneurial
individual with the potential of the technology base is key.
Optimizing and integrating all elements into a total system is a
certain way to exploit the opportunity that we can perceive becoming
more visible in the coming years.
Shock and Awe
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will,
perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing
sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political,
strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to
the use of force. War, of course, in the broadest sense has been
characterized by Clausewitz to include substantial elements of "fog,
friction, and fear." In the Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were
necessary effects arising from application of military power and were
aimed at destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and
similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military
writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an
adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome a
commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial
importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending
battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying that Shock
and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not brilliant,
employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will,
understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is
multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first to
examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock and Awe
affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and movie or
television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions of survivors
of the great bombardments of World War I and the attendant horrors and
death of trench warfare. These images and expressions of shock
transcend race, culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of _Desert
Storm_ vividly portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of
battlefield Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe
can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force
or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our will in the
Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and military
objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end. Then, Shock
and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics that define Rapid
Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and control.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of
different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to
identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that
differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage,
historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task
will be to identify current and future examples to show the effects of
Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step in this
methodology is to develop alternative mission capability packages
consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics, force
structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and determine how
best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be achieved. To
repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs we seek to obtain
by the threat of use or by the actual application of our alternative
force package. Then the mission capability package is examined in
conditions of both MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing
historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe have
been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap
exists between and among them. The first example is "Overwhelming
Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force
structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or
overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to
disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy militarily impotent with as
few casualties and losses to ourselves and to non-combatants as
possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and
operationally, is crucial to successful application.
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of this
approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers of highly
capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank, F-14,15, and
18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed principally to be
used jointly or individually to destroy and attrite other forces and
supporting capability. In other words, this example has principally
been derived from force-on-forces attrition relationships even though
command and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be
disaggregated from this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a
platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of
worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against whom to apply this
doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and public will
prove more difficult. While it is clear that "system of systems" and
other alternative military concepts are under consideration, for the
time being, these have not replaced the current platform and
force-on-force attrition orientation. It should be noted, there will
be no doctrinal alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a
comprehensive and detailed examination of possible alternatives.
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large amounts
of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the time to
transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always follow,
especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities of
decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of
maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money
provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces needed.
Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is increasing the
performance of its products while also lowering price and cycle time
to field newer generations systems, the opposite trends are still
endemic in the defense sector. This will compound the tension between
quality and quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is
necessarily fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller
understanding.
Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives that
are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction is that
Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force across a
broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock and Awe. This
breadth should lead to a more comprehensive and integrated interaction
among all the specific components and units that produce aggregate
military capability and must include training and education, as well
as new ways to exploit our technical and industrial capacity. It is
possible that in these resource, technical, and commercial industrial
areas that Rapid Dominance may provide particular utility that
otherwise may constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.
The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier. The
intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through delivery of
instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction
directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and
public, rather than targeting directly against military or strategic
objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. The employment
of this capability against society and its values, called
"counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively
destructive strikes directly at the public will of the adversary to
resist and, ideally or theoretically, would instantly or quickly
incapacitate that will over the space of a few hours or days.
The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in
determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can
actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an adversary
impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within acceptable and
probably unachievably low levels of societal destruction; and whether
a political decision would be taken in any case to use this type of
capability given the magnitude of the consequences and the risk of
failure.
It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of _Desert Storm_,
similar objectives were envisioned. The differences between this
example and _Desert Storm_ are through the totality of a society that
would be affected by a massive and indiscriminate regime of
destruction and the speed of imposing those strikes as occurred to
those Japanese cities. This example of shock, awe, and intimidation
rests on the proposition that such effects must occur in very short
periods of time.
The next example is "Massive Bombardment." This category of Shock and
Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively precise destructive
power largely against military targets and related sectors over time.
It is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the
adversary to resist. In a sense, this is an endurance contest in which
the enemy is finally broken through exhaustion. However, it is the
cumulative effect of this application of destruction power that will
ultimately impose sufficient Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy
the physical means to resist, that an adversary will be forced to
accept whatever terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of the
First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the
Second World War (which was not effective in this regard), and related
B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year period of
1972-73, illustrate the application of massive bombardment.
Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic targets,
is indeed an aspect of applying "Overwhelming Force," even though
political constraints make this example most unlikely to be repeated
in the future. There is also the option of applying massive
destruction against purely civilian or "counter-value" targets such as
the firebombing of Tokyo in World War II when unconditionality marks
the terms of surrender. It is the cumulative impact of destruction on
the endurance and capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects
the will to resist that is the central foundation of this example.
The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the question
of political feasibility and acceptability, and what circumstances
would be necessary to dictate and permit use of massive bombardment.
Outright invasion and aggression such as Iraq's attack against Kuwait
could clearly qualify as reasons to justify using this level of Shock
and Awe. However, as with Overwhelming Force, this response is not
time-sensitive and would require massive application of force for some
duration as well as political support.
Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock and Awe
were not achieved through the massive application of firepower across
a broad front nor through the delivery of massive levels of force.
Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly
focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of
scale. The German Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not a massive attack
across a very broad front, although the opponent may have been
deceived into believing that. Instead, the enemy's line was probed in
multiple locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated,
attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of the
shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a tank's
armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum cone of damage
against the unarmored or less protected innards.
To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is directed
against military targets, it requires skill if not brilliance in
execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary. The
adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear vulnerable, panics,
surrenders, or both. Hitler's campaign in France and Holland and the
seizure of the Dutch forts and the occupation of Crete in 1940 are
obvious illustrations. The use of Special Operations forces in
significant numbers is an adjunct to imposing this level of Shock and
Awe.
_Desert Storm_ could have been a classic Blitzkreig maneuver if the
attack were mounted without the long preparatory bombardment and was
concentrated in a single sector-either the "left hook" or the Marine
attack "up the middle," and with total surprise. The major differences
between the operation in Kuwait and Germany's capture of France in
1940 were that the allies in Saudi Arabia had complete military and
technical superiority unlike the Germans and that, once under attack,
Iraq's front line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition
license to pick and choose the points for penetration and then
dominate the battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future
adversaries about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that
they will face in us an opponent able to employ technically superior
forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in achieving Shock
and Awe through the precise application of force.
It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such as
guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to obtain
Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example, the German
Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest difficulty in the
Vietnam War, where enemy forces had relatively few lines to be
penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of warfare.
The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its strengths. Can
brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there a flexible enough
infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and can the
supporting industrial base continue to produce at acceptable costs the
systems to maintain this operational and technical superiority? Rapid
Dominance requires a positive answer to these questions, at least
theoretically.
The fifth example is named after the Chinese philosopher-warrior, Sun
Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example is based on selective, instant decapitation
of military or societal targets to achieve Shock and Awe. This
discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this from
Hiroshima and Massive Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before
Ho Lu, the King of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters
on war and proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the
rules applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged
Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. The
concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head cut off the
head concubine. The ladies still could not bring themselves to take
the master's orders seriously. So, Sun Tzu had the head cut off a
second concubine. From that point on, so the story goes, the ladies
learned to march with the precision of a drill team.
The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe and hence
compliance or capitulation through very selective, utterly brutal and
ruthless, and rapid application of force to intimidate. The
fundamental values or lives are the principal targets and the aim is
to convince the majority that resistance is futile by targeting and
harming the few. Both society and the military are the targets. In a
sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe
but through far more selective and informed targeting. Decapitation is
merely one instrument. This model can easily fall outside the cultural
heritage and values of the U.S. for it to be useful without major
refinement. Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to
communicate is another variant but without many historical examples to
show useful wartime applications.
A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is deception. In
this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into what we wish the
enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or force the
adversary. The thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and
knowledge of the adversary. In some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is
an early example of deception. However, as we will see, the deception
model may have new foundations in the technological innovations that
are occurring and in our ability to control the environment.