Networking must also be supported by communications technologies. The

basic problem of a battlefield network is that while some nodes may

support very large data pipes, a number of nodes will be operating at

SINGCARS data rates. This led to the BADD notion of one-way data

broadcasting via GBS of large data files (such as UAV video and

overhead imagery) and very low bandwidth data querying back to the

data sources.

Modern communications will tend to be more multimedia-based, which is

particularly important for Rapid Dominance, where decisions must be

made quickly based upon very large quantities of data, some of which

will be collected and transmitted in real time. Technologies such as

digital video teleconferencing, virtual whiteboards, and even 3D

virtual environments where commanders may participate in collaborative

planning sessions will become important.

Finally, battlefield communications must be secure and, where

feasible, non-observable to the enemy.

Control of the Environment

The actual attack of targets in order to induce Shock and Awe may, in

some sense, be considered a subset of controlling the enemy's

perception. It will not always be necessary to destroy numerous

targets in order to induce shock. However, it would be vitally

important to give the appearance that there are no safe havens from

attack, and that any target may be attacked at any time with impunity

and force. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, confusion must be

imposed on the adversary by supplying only information which will

shape the adversary's perceptions and help break his will. Finally,

the enemy must be displaced from selected key positions, for if he is

allowed to occupy those areas that he considers strategically

important, it is difficult to imagine how his shock could be complete.

Controlling an enemy's perception of the battlespace includes

manipulating his view of the threat, his own troops and status, and

the environment in which he operates. This will be accomplished by

selectively denying knowledge to the enemy while presenting him with

information that is either misleading or serves our purposes. Sensing

and feedback of an enemy leadership's perception of the situation will

be critical.

Technologies of interest here include those that allow systems and

entire force units to modify their signature from being very stealthy

to being completely obvious. An ability to attack enemy information

systems will also be critical, encompassing system technologies from

laser-based counter sensor weapons to embedded computer viruses,

commonly referred to as Trojan Horses. In all cases, the goal will be

to deny the enemy any information that would be useful to him and to

impose a construct of deception and misinformation at all levels of

operations.

Clearly, technologies necessary to achieve battlefield awareness

already mentioned will be crucial in allowing a "perception attack" (a

form of information warfare) to be successfully carried out. The need

and requirements for Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) will increase

dramatically. It will be necessary to understand not only whether a

target was killed but also how enemy leadership, troops, and society

viewed this destruction.

So far, primarily information technologies have been discussed.

Obviously, there will continue to be requirements for numerous other

types of systems. Among the more important system technologies

critical to achieving control of the environment include:

- Weapons platforms with stealth technology

- Weapons systems

- Robotic systems

Weapons platforms

One of the fundamental rationales for weapons platforms is to move

people and ordinance to within an effective range of the target.

Centuries before smart weapons and robotic systems, this reasoning was

understood intuitively. Since ordinance must still be placed on the

target, weapons platforms such as described below still demand

consideration.

- Stealthy bombers and strike aircraft either land or sea platform

based

- Arsenal ships

- Submarines with conventional cruise missiles

- Stealthy land vehicles

- Stealthy observation/attack helicopters

Stealth, combined with stand off, will contribute strongly to the

protection of manned systems on the modern battlefield and will also

be used extensively for other, high-value unmanned systems. However,

protection of the force is inherent within the concept of Rapid

Dominance, and it will rely upon the control of information and the

enemy's perception of events, stealth being one of the elements

enabling this control.

Weapons systems

Smart munitions will be required on the future battlefield. Linked

with information technologies, the combination will allow killing any

target that can be identified. The main element Rapid Dominance

requires of weapons systems is the ability to be rapidly focused on

objectives as identified and targeted by commanders using the

information management systems already discussed. Commanders will

require the flexibility to call massive, precision strikes or to

attack individual, high-priority targets with near zero CEP. This

implies a mixture of weapons comprised of systems such as those

mentioned below.

- Cruise missiles

- Zero CEP, long-range cruise missile ("President's weapon")

- Stand-off submunition platforms

- Smart submunitions

- Brilliant submunitions

- Wide area smart mines

- Long-range and short-range surface attack missiles

Robotic systems

Robotic systems are an important area of consideration within Rapid

Dominance. First, selected robotic systems will enable the force by

making it more responsive in concentrating sensors and weapons.

Second, they will make fighting a 24-hour battle feasible even with

reduced manpower within the force structure. Third, robotic systems

can provide force presence even in areas considered too dangerous for

a large manned element. Finally, since the ultimate operational goal

of Rapid Dominance is to create shock, one may consider the effect

that fighting robotic systems may have on the enemy.

In examining the utility of robotic systems within Rapid Dominance,

one must first consider that, by any measure, robotic systems have not

lived up to the optimistic expectations placed on them in the past.

From the overburdening of the Aquilla UAV to the massive and poorly

planned investment in robotics made by General Motors in the early

1980s, robotics has been an area of unfulfilled promises. However, the

reasons for a string of spectacular failures lie more with planners'

faulty attempts to understand and incorporate the technology than by

egregious shortcomings of the technology itself. Robots have been seen

as replacements for manned systems rather than extremely complicated

and capable machines suitable for a set of tightly defined tasks.

Robotic systems, or taskable machines as some are beginning to refer

to them, hold promise for the future simply because they represent the

intersection of a myriad of fast-moving technology areas such as

information technologies, communications, microelectronics,

micro-electromechanical systems, simulation, and computer-aided design

and manufacturing. In some sense, taskable machines are the physical

embodiment of information technologies. It may well be that in the

future the joke will be, "Never send a robot to do a man's job." But

even so, there will be ample jobs for taskable machines and the

society that learns to properly design, build, control, and integrate

these systems into their force structure will gain significant

advantage over any potential opponent.

Conclusion

The technologies and systems presented in this section are not

extraordinary nor do they comprise a complete list. Indeed, entire

fields such as materials, bioengineering, and microelectronics are

left for future consideration, although they are of obvious and vital

importance. Also not addressed here are the training, education, and

organizational implications required under a regime of Rapid

Dominance. Given the overriding importance of information collection

and management, these will need to be addressed across the defense

community as it is most broadly defined.

Rapid Dominance combines a doctrine and operational concept that

challenges the current process of how new technologies invented in the

commercial sector are incorporated into defense, and provides an

affirmative methodology for research, development, and system

integration. We must learn to exploit the potential of these

technologies even though, in many cases, this development process in

the private sector is profoundly independent from how we conduct the

business of defense. It is this environment of innovative upheaval

that any useful foundation for strategic and operational thought must

address. Rapid Dominance capitalizes on, and may even require, this

rapid and chaotic development of technology.

We believe that what will distinguish Rapid Dominance from other

doctrines is first that it uses an intellectual construct to drive

innovation and innovation to drive exploiting and integrating

technology into new and perhaps somewhat differently constructed

systems. Second, it is the comprehensive quality of Rapid Dominance in

which strategies, doctrine, technology, systems, operations, training,

organization, and education are dealt with together that may make the

most significant difference. But, as the reader will discern, specific

identification and design of Rapid Dominance systems is part of the

next step.

Future Directions

At this stage, Rapid Dominance is an intellectual construct based on

these key points. First, Rapid Dominance has evolved from the

collective professional, policy, and operational experience of the

study group covering the last four decades. This experience ran from

Vietnam to_ Desert Storm_ and from serving with operational units in

the field to being part of the decision-making process in the Oval

Office in Washington. It also included immersion in technology and

systems from thermonuclear weapons to advanced weapons software.

Second, Rapid Dominance seeks to exploit the unique juncture of

strategy, technology, and innovation created by the end of the Cold

War and to establish an alternative foundation for military doctrine

and force structure.

Third, Rapid Dominance draws on the strategic uses of force as

envisaged by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to overpower or affect the will,

perception, and understanding of the adversary for strategic aims and

military objectives. But, in Rapid Dominance, the principal mechanism

for affecting the adversary's will is through the imposition of a

regime of Shock and Awe sufficient to achieve the aims of policy. It

is this relationship with and reliance on Shock and Awe that

differentiates Rapid Dominance from attrition, maneuver, and other

military doctrines including overwhelming force.

Shock and Awe impact on psychological, perceptual, and physical

levels. At one level, destroying an adversary's military force leaving

the enemy impotent and vulnerable may provide the necessary Shock and

Awe. At another level, the certainty of this outcome may cause an

adversary to accept our terms well short of conflict. In the great

middle ground, the appropriate balance of Shock and Awe must cause the

perception and anticipation of certain defeat and the threat and fear

of action that may shut down all or part of the adversary's society or

render his ability to fight useless short of complete physical

destruction.

Finally, in order to impose enough Shock and Awe to affect an

adversary's will, four core characteristics of a Rapid Dominance-

configured force were defined. First, complete knowledge and

understanding of self, of the adversary, and of the environment are

essential. This knowledge and understanding exceed the expectations of

dominant battlefield awareness and DBA becomes a subset of Rapid

Dominance.

Rather like the wise investor and not the speculator who is only

familiar with a particular company and not the stock market in

general, the Rapid Dominance force must have complete knowledge and

understanding of many likely adversaries and regions. This requirement

for knowledge and understanding will place a huge, new burden on the

military forces and necessitate fundamental changes in policy,

organization, training, education, structure, and equipage.

Second is rapidity. Rapidity combines speed, timeliness, and agility

and the ability to sustain control after the initial shock. Rapidity

enables us to act as quickly as needed and always more quickly than

the adversary can react or take counter-actions. Rapidity is also an

antidote to surprise. If we cannot anticipate surprise, or are

surprised, rapidity provides a correcting capacity to neutralize the

effects of that surprise.

Third, and most provocatively, is setting the standard of operations

and execution in terms of brilliance. The consequences and

implications of setting brilliance as the standard and achieving it

are profound. Reconfiguration of command authority and organization

possibly to decentrali-zation down to individual troops must follow.

Allowing and encouraging an operational doctrine of the "first to

respond" will set the tempo provided that effective de-confliction of

friendly on friendly engagements has been assured.

This, of course, means that complete revision of doctrine, training,

and organization will be required. The matter is not just "fighting

smarter." It is learning to fight at even higher standards of skill

and competence.

Fourth is control of the environment. Control is defined in the

broadest sense: physical control of the land, air, sea, and space and

control of the "ether" in which information is passed and received.

This requires signature management throughout the full conflict

spectrum-deception, disinformation, verification, information control,

and target management-all with rapidity in both physical and

psychological impact. By depriving an adversary of the physical use of

time, space, and the ether, we play on the adversary's will and offer

the prospect of certain destruction should resistance follow.

The next step in this process must be specifically defining this Rapid

Dominance force in terms of force structure, capabilities, doctrine,

organization, and order of battle. We have begun this effort and are

focusing on a joint task force sized somewhere between a reinforced

division and a full corps (i.e., a strength of 75,000 - 200,000). We

also have the aim of being able to deploy this force within 5 to 10

days of the order to move and, of course, will be able to send smaller

force packages on a nearly instantaneous basis. We appreciate the

mobility and logistical implications of this requirement.

Once we design this "paper" force and equip it with "paper" systems,

we must evaluate it against the five basic questions and tests we

noted in the Prologue.

The first test of this Rapid Dominance force will be against the MRC.

The comparison, in the broadest sense, must be with the programmed

force and whatever emerges from the Quadrennial Defense Review of

1997. We will need to examine closely how and where and why Rapid

Dominance and Shock and Awe work and where they do not. At the very

least, we expect that this will help strengthen the current force and

improve current capabilities. Of course, it is our hope that this test

will validate Rapid Dominance as a legitimate doctrine.

Second, the Rapid Dominance force must be tested across the entire

spectrum of OOTW. These are the most difficult tests because, in some

of them, no force may be suitable and no force may work.

Third, the test of determining the political consequences of Rapid

Dominance must be conducted. On one hand, if this force capability can

be achieved and Shock and Awe administered to affect an adversary's

will, can a form of political deterrence be created? In the most

approximate sense, and we emphasize approximate, the analogy with

nuclear deterrence might be drawn. An adversary may be persuaded or

deterred from taking action in the first instance. On the other hand,

this capacity may be seen as politically unusable and allies and

others within the United States may not be fully trusting of the

possessor always to employ this force responsibly.

Fourth is the test of the implications of Rapid Dominance for

alliances and for waging coalition warfare. Our allies are already

concerned that the United States is leaving them far behind in

military technology and capability. If we possess this force and our

allies or partners do not, how do we fight together? Our view is that

this can be worked out through technology sharing and perhaps new

divisions of labor and mission specialization. However, these are

important points to be considered.

Finally, what does all this mean for resource investments in defense?

It is also likely that because Rapid Dominance will cause profound

consequences, the iron grip of the political bureaucracy will make a

fair examination difficult. It is no accident that other attempts at

change, especially those that ask for or are tainted with reform, have

had a short life span. It is interesting to note in this regard that

the President's Commission on Intelligence and its fine report that

recommended changes and refinements to the U.S. intelligence

community, despite a very positive initial reception, led to only a

few meaningful actions.

This discussion leads to two final points. We are all too well aware

that any strategy and force structure have vulnerabilities and

potential weaknesses. The experiences that this study group

collectively had in Vietnam makes this concern very strongly held. We

observe that in the private sector, the vulnerability of information

systems is real and is being exploited. A former director of the FBI

has told us that in New York, for example, the number one recruiting

target for organized crime is the teenage computer whiz. We think that

this "hacking," writ large in the private sector, must be assumed as

part of the defense problem. Hence, sensitivity to vulnerabilities

must be even greater, perhaps ironically, than it was during the Cold

War, because exploitation can come from many more sources in the

future.

Second, wags may criticize Rapid Dominance as attempting to create a

"Mission Impossible Force." To be sure, we emphasize and demand

brilliance as the operational goal. However, we also know that the

military today is seen as a leading example of the best American

society has to offer. We wish to build on this reality. We note the

experience and the performance, albeit under highly unusual

circumstances, of_ Desert Storm_. We see no reason why that level of

performance cannot be made a permanent part of the fabric of the

American military.

Because we have entered a period of transition in which we enjoy a

dominant military position and a greatly reduced window of

vulnerability, this is the right time for experimentation and

demonstration. Rapid Dominance is still a concept and a work in

progress, not a final road map or blueprint. But the concept does

warrant, in our view, a commitment to explore and an opportunity that

could lead to dramatically better capabilities.

We believe that through Rapid Dominance and the commitment to examine

the entire range of defense across all components and aspects, a

revolution is possible. If Rapid Dominance can be harnessed in an

affordable and efficient way and an operational capability fielded to

impose sufficient Shock and Awe to affect an adversary's will, then

this will be the real Revolution in Military Affairs. We ask those who

are intrigued by this prospect to join us.

Appendix A

Thoughts on Rapid Dominance

by Admiral Bud Edney, USN (Ret.)

Why the need for a concept of Rapid Dominance? The answer lies in the

combined realities of modern technology, economics, and politics.

Technology

The evolution or revolution of information technology is impacting

everything we do and how we do it on a worldwide basis. The

far-reaching effects of the resulting information highway that crosses

all boundaries are already impacting the strategic decisions,

economics, and politics of the world of nation states. Borders are no

defense for the penetration of information even in highly controlled

or authoritarian societies. Similarly, the exploration and use of high

technology in space, together with the advent of sophisticated highly

accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, means borders between states

are not as important for strategic and impenetrable defenses in depth

as they used to be. The rapid advancements in telecommunications

technology, combined with the exploration and use of space vehicles to

saturate a world hungry for information, means that leaders can no

longer shield their people from the outside world. Thus information

will penetrate whatever curtain or wall that is erected in a futile

attempt to block it out. New centers of gravity are being created as

are new vulnerability choke points. The country or power structure

that harnesses the capabilities and dimensions of the information

revolution as it applies to issues of national security will remain in

control of its own destiny. The United States possesses a qualitative

and quantitative lead that, when combined with a properly focused and

coordinated (harmonized) industry, defense, and national security

policy, should ensure success for the foreseeable future. Harnessing

information technology and applying it to new strategic and doctrinal

thought in application of military force is the essence of Rapid

Dominance.

Economics

With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union,

there is no major power capable of destroying the U.S. mainland. Given

this absence of devastating threat, defense expenditures will continue

to be squeezed to address more pressing domestic priorities. Voter

demands for a balanced budget, national health care, social security

reform, educational reform, family values, crime and drug use

reduction, lower taxes, etc., will combine to put increasing pressure

on the defense bottom line in the out years. The result will be a

steady decline in war fighting readiness and force structure that will

place our security interests at risk unless we leverage our technology

leadership to achieve military advantage with lower force levels but

increased war fighting effectiveness. This is also the essence of

Rapid Dominance.

Politics

The reality of current politics is that the trauma of Vietnam, the

results of the Gulf War, and our status as the only remaining

superpower after the Cold War equate to some new constraints (real or

perceived) on the application of military force to support our foreign

policy. These political sensitivities need to be understood up front

and include the following:

- The U.S. is not the world's policeman

- Involvement of U.S. Forces must be justified as essential to vital

U.S. security interests

- Support of Congress and People is a necessary prerequisite

- Avoid commitment of ground forces

- Offer instead U.S. intelligence, air lift, sea lift, logistics

support, etc.

- Avoid risk of loss of U.S. lives at almost all costs

- Ensure decisive force applied for mission assigned

- Rules of Engagement allow U.S. forces to defend themselves

aggressively

- Minimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage

- Specify achievable mission objectives up front with an end in the

not-too-distant future sight before committing

- U.S. led coalition force preferred-U.S. Forces remain under U.S.

Command. These political restraints may limit the application of

Rapid Dominance to Major and Minor Regional Conflicts. This is an

issue that needs further exploration and analysis.

What is Rapid Dominance?

Rapid Dominance is the full use of capabilities within a system of

systems that can decisively impact events requiring the application of

military/defense resources through affecting the adversary's will.

Rapid Dominance envisions execution in real or near real time to

counter actions or intentions deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. On

one end of the spectrum, Rapid Dominance would introduce a regime of

Shock and Awe in areas of high value to the threatening individual,

group, or state. In many cases the prior knowledge of credible U.S.

Rapid Dominance capabilities would act as a deterrent. Rapid Dominance

would ensure favorable early resolution of issues at minimal loss of

lives and collateral damage. The concept ideally should be able to

impact adversarial situations that apply across the board, addressing

high-, mid-, low-, and no-technology threats. Some of these aims may

not be achievable given the political and technology constraints, but

need to be explored.

Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms war fighting

capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance requires a sophisticated,

interconnected, and interoperable grid of netted intelligence,

surveillance, reconnaissance, communications systems, and data

analysis to deliver in real time, actionable information to the

shooter. This network must provide total situational awareness and

nodal analysis that enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversary's

decision loop in a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe

among the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this

grid of knowledge and vulnerability will enable the shutting down of

specific or all essential functions nearly simultaneously. We expect

that through these netted pieces of data, often, the sum of the parts

will yield profound battlefield advantages to the possessor. The

"Rapid" part of the equation becomes the ability to get real time

actionable targeting information to the shooter, whether the shooter

is a tank division, an individual tank, an artillery battery, an

individual rifleman, a naval battle group, an individual ship, an air

wing/squadron, or an aircraft in flight. At whatever unit level, Shock

and Awe are magnified by the speed and effectiveness of targeting. The

ability to achieve Rapid Dominance simultaneously throughout the

battlefield will create strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing

forces, their leadership, and society. When the video results of these

attacks are broadcast real time worldwide on CNN, the positive impact

on coalition support and negative impact on potential threat support

can be decisive.

The top priority of Rapid Dominance should be to deter, alter, or

affect those actions that are either unacceptable to U.S. national

security interests or endanger the democratic community of states and

access to free markets. These political objectives are generally those

envisioned in the major and lesser regional conflict scenarios (MRC &

LRC). Should deterrence fail, the application of Rapid Dominance

should create sufficient Shock and Awe to intimidate the enemy forces

and leadership as well as provide a clear message for other potential

aggressors. Rapid Dominance would not be limited to MRC and LRC

scenarios. It has application in a variety of areas, including

countering WMD, terrorism, and other political problems. The challenge

is that should deterrence fail, the execution of a response based on

Rapid Dominance must be proportional to the threat yet decisive enough

to convey the appropriate degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance

cannot solve all or even most of the world's problems. It initially

appears that Rapid Dominance should be applied sparingly for egregious

threats or violations of international law, such as:

- Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small state

- Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD

- Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale

- Threat to essential world markets

Clearly the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign borders and

penetrating even the most closed societies. The inequities and

benefits in closed societies are becoming known to both the public as

well as the bosses. The requirement for Rapid Dominance to develop

sophisticated capabilities to penetrate the Information Highway and

create road blocks as well as control input/outputs to the highway

both overtly and covertly is fundamental to the concept.

These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies targeting

international crime and drug cartels using the highway. Closer

interagency cooperation and coordination between military and law

enforcement activities and capabilities must be established.

Experience with the military involvement in the drug war revealed

considerable cultural differences between these organizations.

Overcoming these cultural differences is not easy. The required trust

and confidence for sharing sensitive information and support between

these agencies and the military needs to be developed further.

Interagency coordination and cooperation must be raised to a new level

of sophistication. Some laws may need to be changed. War in Cyberspace

does not recognize domestic versus foreign boundaries. In this

environment the subjects of Information Warfare and Information In

Warfare take on new meaning and require focused development. We must

become proficient within this environment.

This breakdown of traditional boundaries requires a great deal more

thought with regard to the issues of security, vulnerabilities

(their's and our's), and the concept of Rapid Dominance. Does Rapid

Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the spectrum,

involving more traditional applications of force to achieve political

objectives as envisioned in the MRC and LRC scenarios? Yet to be

explored is the degree to which a concept of Rapid Dominance applies

to OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S. interests, controlling

rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the political and military

prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are they applicable and

realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interaction of

national governments/law enforcement organizations and international

as well as local private venture or non-government organizations

(PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care

to refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept of

Rapid Dominance offend and generate a counterproductive public

relations backlash from those who believe force should only be used as

a last resort and then with a measurable degree of proportionality?

At this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be

addressed at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and

issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front

during the concept development phase of the development of specific

Mission Capability Package concepts. We must be careful that we do not

overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable

capabilities to execute the concept. Rapid Dominance does not eliminate

the fog of war. Decisions will still be made on the leader's judgment

and confidence in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat

intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity targets, and confidence

in our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the

ability to penetrate this fog is the key to Rapid Dominance.

Complicating the issue is the fact that the U.S. has not clearly

defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the world's only credible

superpower, the U.S. can not avoid a leadership role, but neither can

it avoid the focused criticism applied to all leaders. We are in the

classical "damned if we do and damned if we don't" syndrome. One of the

serious side effects of Rapid Dominance could be that if you adapt a

strategy of Rapid Dominance and succeed, you may now own the problem

and be responsible for the solution. Do we know the funding tail to

such a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost when/if

Rapid Dominance is applied in situations that are less than of vital

interest? This subject needs further development beyond the limitations

of this book.

Rapid Dominance and The Future Battlefield

What will the battlefield of the future really look like? The _Desert

Storm_ conflict indicated to many who analyzed it that the real focus

of battle will no longer be force on force as we have traditionally

considered it. By the time the Allied Forces engaged the opposing Iraq

forces, the enemy force for all practical purposes had already been

demoralized and smashed. This was accomplished by establishing air

superiority followed by a carefully orchestrated campaign of precision

air strikes (including Tomahawk missiles). The Iraqi ground forces

were isolated by cutting off logistic support, severing communications

with its leadership, and stinging them with the Shock and Awe achieved

by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the open desert.

Shock and awe were introduced in the manner that stealth aircraft

penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically attacked center of

gravity targets with impunity. Shock and awe were also present in the

degree that coalition forces owned the night and could rapidly

maneuver large units in terrain thought to be foreign, imposing, and

unforgiving for the predominantly U.S. forces. Instead, as Colin

Powell noted, the Coalition Forces cut off the head and life lines to

the Iraqi Army in the field and then set about killing it. The fact

that a democratically led coalition could choose not to massacre the

remnants of Iraq's army during its panic-induced retreat underscores

that we knew how much power we had and could employ restraint. The

impact of real-time video media coverage of these events, beamed

simultaneously into government headquarters and civilian living rooms

worldwide, is a phenomenon that impacted events on the battlefield and

further highlighted the compassion of that decision. In dealing with a

"butcher" we could not fall to that level.

The battlefield of the future will not be a neat 200x200 mile box

where you will know everything that is going on inside the box

(although that would be an extremely helpful first step). The

battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that

controls or influences the elements of the battle. In examining this

battlefield and the application of force and Shock and Awe, we seek to

mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous firepower on critical

nodes/targets that count for the mission at hand, rather than

necessarily having to mass large armies in the field to engage one

another. Clearly, the Gulf War raised warfare to a new level with the

demonstrated effectiveness and application of air to ground/water and

surface to ground/water launched precision guided weapons. No longer

will commanders count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but

rather targets destroyed per sortie! Note: there may well be an issue

of affordability here. We may not be able to get 1) high tech, 2)

MRC/OOTW, and 3) large armies. This does not eliminate the requirement

for sufficient force in the field to defend against an all-out assault

or eject another force and occupy the contested land to ensure the

objectives of conflict are carried out. Air power can punish,

simultaneously destroy center of gravity targets, and so demoralize

the opposing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with

smaller forces. In some cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by the air

campaign may result in an early cessation of conflict before the land

campaign is necessary. This is more likely against a modernized,

developed state than an underdeveloped government.

The confluence of several technologies, including all aspects of

stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved weapon

targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile technology, space

relayed command & control, real-time surveillance from space, the

introduction of JSTARS, and massive application of night vision

techniques, are the first phase of these changes. With elements of

this technology now more and more on the open market to whomever has

the cash or friends, the advantage of obtaining greater situational

awareness and real-time processing of available data cannot be taken

for granted.

In future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear that

political and military decision making will have to establish close

control of the actionable information distributed to shooters in the

field. It is legitimate to ask why Israeli forces that had air

superiority, UAV surveillance, and extremely accurate firepower

capabilities in the most recent incursion into Southern Lebanon

against Hezbolla terrorist attacks had to respond with an artillery

barrage to one Kaytusha rocket fired from close to a known UN

encampment. When this artillery response resulted in killing more than

100 refugees fleeing the Israeli operation, the result was a public

relations disaster and mission failure for the stated limited Israeli

objectives. This represents a case of ill-conceived application of

Rapid Dominance that resulted in counter-productive Shock and Awe

generating adverse public opinion focused against Israel. This was

also a case of applying high technology and state controlled Rapid

Dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force. Clearly

the Hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in this exchange. The

lessons learned from this tragic incident as well as the applicability

of Rapid Dominance techniques in this environment need further study.

The massing and movement of refugees in large numbers is a reality and

a planning factor that must be dealt with up front. The fact that the

value of life itself is viewed differently by warring factions must

also be considered. If one side willingly uses refugees as a shield

and the other is trying to protect their lives, then operations to

achieve Rapid Dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) rules

of engagement in the field. The rapidity of response may not always be

the right tactic and an escalation of targeting different centers of

gravity rather than responding directly to events in the field

promises to be more effective. The theory of Rapid Dominance clearly

needs further development, gaming, and simulation. Each decision to

apply Rapid Dominance will be unique, complex, risky, and different

than the previous one. Knowledge and information on the battlefield as

well as that concerning center of gravity targets will be incomplete

even with a goal of total situational awareness.

Instruments to Achieve Shock and Awe

Shock and awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and destruction

that are incompre-hensible to the people at large, specific

elements/sectors of the threat society, or the leadership. Nature in

the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, uncontrolled

fires, famine, and disease can engender Shock and Awe. The ultimate

military application of Shock and Awe was the use of two atomic

weapons against Japan in WWII. The Shock and Awe that resulted from

the use of these weapons not only brought an abrupt end to the war

with Japan (through unconditional surrender), but have deterred the

further use of these weapons for over 50 years. Not unexpectedly,

these events did not stop the proliferation or increase in the

destructive power of these weapons by a factor of ten. The holocaust

was a state policy of Shock and Awe that stunned the world in its

brutality and inhumanity. Yet it has not deterred the world from

executing or tolerating atrocities of equal brutality and inhumanity

(Cambodia, Syria, Rwanda, etc.). Similar applications of Shock and Awe

have differing toleration levels and impacts depending on the

environment and political system against which it is applied. As an

example, the massive bombing raids of WWII by Germany and the U.S. did

not result in a sufficient level of Shock and Awe to end the fighting.

The fear of the unknown created by the atomic attacks rather than

their actual destruction was the deciding factor in that theater. The

B-52 raids in Vietnam provided localized elements of Shock and Awe,

but until applied to the capital city of Hanoi, had no impact toward

war termination. When applied in concentrated repetitive strikes in

November/December of 1972 under _Operation Rolling Thunder III_, the

cease fire followed in short order. In fact, throughout history there

have been weapons and tactics designed to create varying degrees of

Shock and Awe. While there has always been shock, awe, and fear

associated with warfare, unless the fear or losses are focused and

great enough, a quick cessation of hostilities under favorable terms

is not certain. How to apply elements of Shock and Awe against rogue

states, terrorist elements, international drug and crime cartels, as

well as in the more traditional MRCs and LRCs needs much further study

and analysis. Shock and awe, to reach the level required to achieve

Rapid Dominance, must also bring fear to those who are in charge. It

must be applied quickly, decisively, and preferably with impunity

(such as stealth bombing with air superiority). The element of

impunity, that is the other side is powerless to stop the damage, is a

key element of this strategy. If on the other hand attacks are

directed at the general public a backlash could be unleased because of

the excessive and brutal losses of innocent civilians.

Much more study and analysis is needed to identify and examine the

pros and cons of a policy that initiates a doctrine of Shock and Awe

for limited objectives rather than responds in kind to a provocation.

What are the limits of the doctrine of Shock and Awe? What

circumstances merit the application? Can Shock and Awe be used to

achieve limited objectives with little or no risk of life to allied

forces or innocent civilians? Can true center of gravity targets be

identified for ideological/terrorist groups? Can levels of Shock and

Awe be categorized by effectiveness and priority of weapons systems?

If so, what are the key enabling technologies? What types of Shock and

Awe would be both impressive and generate high returns? A few

desirable capabilities from a former CINC's perspective are listed

below:

- Blow up an entire mine field simultaneously in its entirety

immediately after it had been laid.

- Destroy the mine laden mine-laying vehicles at their loading

point.

- Destroy in real time terrorist training camps or publicity

generating threats such as the recent display of 70 bomb laden

suicide terrorists pledging to wreak havoc worldwide. (This

probably requires inside penetration of the targeted

organization).

- Destroy simultaneously all/selective WMD launchers,

storage/production facilities of a rogue state.

- Selectively target rogue terrorist leaders as was apparently done

by the Russians in Chechnya recently when they killed the top

rebel leader by detecting and homing in on his satellite phone

conversation (helicopter rocket attack).

- Stop, divert, capture the cash flow to terrorist elements.

Thoughts on Applications of Shock and Awe

It is the use of Shock and Awe to achieve Rapid Dominance that is so

fascinating and has the greatest potential for leverage if it can be

harnessed in a variety of situations. This basis for Rapid Dominance

requires a clearer under-standing of what our end objectives are than

we usually have when we stumble into the use of military force, often

it seems by default and at the last possible minute. At this point, I

have more questions than answers. How does Rapid Dominance differ by

the goals and missions assigned? What are the key elements to apply

Rapid Dominance for each envisioned threat? What are the most likely

threats for the next 20 years? Is Rapid Dominance applicable to all

these threats? Can we separate Rapid Dominance into categories with

and without Shock and Awe?

In addition to answering these and other questions, it seems to me it

would be helpful to generate a list of desirable capabilities that

would help me select a response option. This list of capabilities

would be useful to focus (1) scarce R&D dollars to fill in the holes

with technology, (2) intelligence and surveillance collection

priorities, (3) innovative thought to further develop the concept (War

College papers and Wargaming series), and (4) development of CINC

plans and requirements to meet these capabilities. Examples of such

capabilities are:

- Deploying highly effective TBMD and Cruise Missile Defense.

- Severing all/selective communications between leadership and field

as well as selective elements by call in the field.

- Intercepting and transmitting revised orders to selective threat

field units.

- Projecting false radar pictures on selective key threat scopes.

- Inserting fouled fuel in threat storage facilities that generates

engine failures.

- Inserting metal/material fatigue to failure attachments on key

threat systems.

- Identifying specific location and determining strength and

material of protected targets of value.

- Developing dial a setting ordnance capable of destroying all

hardened targets.

- Detecting and tracting (destroying at will) all targets of value

including mobile targets.

- Detecting and targeting key threat launch systems before launch.

- Detecting plot and simultaneously destroying an employed mine

field (land & sea).

- Making threat submarine movements transparent to targeting at

will.

Obviously, such a wish list should be prioritized and tailored to the

limits of achievable near/mid-term technology and affordability. This

may not even be the right type of capabilities one might want. That

is, we may need a totally non-standard list. My judgment is that we

should develop one or two black "silver bullet" capabilities, if we

get too far afield, the system will not be able to digest the

recommendations. However, the concept of Rapid Dominance requires

stepping to a new level of getting inside the opposition's decision

loop. Rapid Dominance at the ultimate level would enable stopping,

diverting, or changing the decision process and decision executing

machinery/systems either preemptively or reactively in time to ensure

core U.S. security requirements are met.

Rapid Dominance Infrastructure

The current direction and speed of downsizing and acquisition reform

is adequate for the type of forces and capabilities necessary to

implement a Rapid Dominance strategy. I would like to reserve comments

in this area until the project is further developed. We do not need to

raise reasons to discard the concept as too hard before it is

sufficiently defined. I have the feeling that bringing these

conceptual capabilities to realities within a system of systems is

neither cheap nor easy. There is still too much waste and inefficiency

in our defense acquisition process as well as in the overlap between

service requirements and capabilities. Rapid Dominance will not be

service-unique and requires a synergistic approach from planning to

execution.

Final Thoughts

The implications of the ongoing revolution in telecommunications and

information processing as it applies to our national security

interests dictate that we need new imaginative concepts of operation

to ensure the efficacy of our international leadership in a multipolar

world. With technology upgrading capabilities by factors of 10 or more

every 18 months, we can no longer afford to have concepts of

operations wait for the technology to reach the field. The concept of

Rapid Dominance requires innovative thought and different directions

than that imbedded in our military hierarchy. We need to introduce the

concept at all levels of military professional education and training.

The best results of this effort will be generated from the younger

minds brought up on the leading edge of the information revolution.

The challenge is to engage those minds in the solution and to take the

risks required to fund priorities enabling the development of this

capability now. Such a cultural change is not easy. One thing is

certain-business as usual will not get us there. The window of

opportunity will close faster than we think.

Appendix B

Defense Alternatives: Forces Required

by General Chuck Horner, USAF (Ret.)

The end of the Cold War will require a review of United States

National Security Policy and a concomitant change in our National

Defense Strategy. This strategy will respond to the changes in the

world's security environment, including the dissolution of the Soviet

Union and Warsaw Pact, the evolution in U.S. security alliances such

as NATO and NORAD, the increased and unique threat posed by the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the widening of the

spectrum of conflict which will challenge the peace and security of

our nation and its allies.

The causes of conflict and the modes which threats to our security

interests will take have multiplied with the end of the Cold War. The

nuclear weapons of the Cold War remain and will remain for some

considerable time, even though there is a growing appreciation as to

the declining utility of these devices. For sure there will be

continuing pressure throughout the world to eliminate the presence of

nuclear weapons in conjunction with efforts to halt the production,

stockpiling, and deployment of chemical and biological weapons. It is

likely that START II will be followed by START III and IV, as nations

who claim ownership of nuclear weapons realize ownership has a high

cost and marginal payoff. However, progress will be slow due to the

immense importance of achieving symmetry during nuclear disarmament

and the cumbersome and exacting safeguards associated with the

disarmament process. Therefore, for the foreseeable future the threat

of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will be less likely

than before. The spectrum of national security challenges will expand

as the threat of nuclear annihilation subsides.

The decisive victory achieved by the coalition forces over Iraq during

_Desert Storm_ should give future aggressors of major regional

conflict cause to pause. While this does not mean that the threat of

conventional warfare has vanished, it does mean that the national

leader intending to use major conflict to achieve political aims must

carefully craft strategy that will avoid the opportunity for

confrontation with a large coalition force lead by the United States.

Such a strategy might include surprise attack; short intense military

action; the threat or use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical

weapons; advanced surveillance measures and precision munitions; and

warfare carried out on a fragmented battlefield which includes attacks

on the capitals of other nations by means of ballistic missiles or

unconventional warfare forces. This will be warfare for which the

United States is ill trained and ill equipped.

Other challenges to the world's security will take many forms to which

the military forces of the United States can play a constructive role.

These are commonly referred to as Operations Other Than War, even

though they may include the use of force to achieve desired political

goals. They include the increasingly familiar peacemaking,

peacekeeping, show of force, and humanitarian relief efforts. Success

in these operations may well require retraining, re-equipping, or

reorganizing our military forces. Each mission should be evaluated

with respect to what is required to accomplish its unique challenges.

However, the basic doctrine, training, or equipage of the military

forces should be based on what is required to fight the residual Cold

War, as well as deal with the growing demands of a major regional

conflict.

The political goals upon which our national security strategy should

be crafted are fairly straightforward. First, we should seek to

preserve and invigorate the role of leadership the United States has

maintained since the end of World War II, or the end of the Cold War

(you take your pick). Second, and not apart from the first goal, the

United States must be sufficiently strong to prevent or deter use of

effective military power against us. It is not inconceivable that our

so-called superpower status could be defeated in battle by a crafty

and well-prepared adversary. Witness what happened to the powerful

victors of WWII in Vietnam. Third, U.S. military forces must be of

sufficient size, configuration, and readiness to bring a major

conventional conflict to a successful termination. It goes without

saying that during this process we need to reduce nuclear weapons to

numbers that do not threaten the virtual destruction of the world.

Nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place. Fourth and

lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding to all the

other tasks and functions for which the national command authority

calls upon the military. This first of challenges should be used to

define the military forces we field, how we train them, and the

methods we use to employ them.

The strategic geographic depth the United States enjoys, bounded by

two oceans on the east and west and non-threatening nations to the

north and south, means that our nation is somewhat immune from attack,

other than by means of infiltration such as a terrorist, or from the

skies by means of long-range aircraft, and cruise or ballistic

missiles. We will require some actions and defenses which address

these threats, but the major portion of our national defense effort

must be placed on building and sustaining offensive forces for combat

in environments other than our own soil. This dictates that our

projection forces must be capable of rapidly responding to an

unforeseen crisis anywhere in the world, keeping in mind that quick,

decisive surprise favors our potential enemies. Given that we have

proven unable to predict the outbreak of conflict in the past, these

forces must also be ready at all times to carry out combat operations

in most any place. There will not be time to modernize their equipment

or train reserve force units. They must be capable of projecting and

sustaining their military power over long distances and operating in

the environment of the enemy's choosing. Last but not least, when

required, they must be capable of decisive combat, not by attrition of

the enemy force in head-to-head combat as was our nature in past wars,

but by Shock and Awe so that conflict resolution is achieved with a

maximum of success at the minimum loss of life in the shortest time.

These characteristics for our projection force cannot be achieved

easily, as the processes that defined our Cold War doctrines, force

structures, equipment, and ways of doing business are loath to change.

The Services' and joint requirements oversight processes that define

the equipment provided our military forces place emphasis on force

structure and the traditional roles for those forces. This inertia can

freeze our land, sea, air, and space capabilities at current or near

current levels, but may prove inadequate to carry out new strategies.

There are few incentives for a Service or the Joint Staff to reward

innovation or divestiture of roles or missions in order to change the

character and mix of land, sea, air, and space forces and to prepare

them to fight the battles we must envisage for the twenty-first

century.

For example, the Services claim lessons learned from _Desert Storm_

which reinforce late twentieth century ways of fighting and ignore the

troublesome aspects which loom in the future and threaten our

traditional view of the battlefield. Many acclaim the role of

precision weapons for our forces, but ignore the threat they pose if

they are in the hands of the enemy. What would be the lessons learned

if several hundred canisters of live Sensor Fused Weapons were

released by a red force ballistic missile on the 24th Division during

a Fort Irwin engagement? Certainly there would be profound changes in

tactics, doctrine, and equipment indicated for the surviving U.S. Army

force. What if radar homing Surface to Air Missiles were employed by

the red force during a Red Flag exercise in the Nevada desert, not

using centralized Soviet tactics/doctrine, but instead using

decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations as would be used

by our best and brightest if unleashed from their stagnant doctrines?

I doubt that the Air Force would be spending millions of dollars

trying to build electronic countermeasures to hide the large number of

expensive and very non-stealthy aircraft they continue to build, such

as the F-15E.

Imagine the shock on our populace if a single cruise missile were

actually allowed to score a direct hit on the Carl Vinson aircraft

carrier during a Solid Shield joint exercise with the attendant loss

of life numbering in the 4,000 to 5,000 range. You would think the

maritime force would reexamine the method it provides air power from

the sea, vital yet today too vulnerable.

How many times do we hear that the space forces are configured to

provide intelligence from overhead only to find in Iraq or Bosnia that

the front line forces receive products that are old, inaccurate and

altered to keep our Soviet foes from gaining knowledge of our

capabilities? Perhaps we if we would dual hat the Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency to the position of J-2, or even

Commander-in-Chief of a regional unified command, there would be vast

improvements in the tasking, evaluation, and delivery of space-derived

intelligence to regional combat forces. Then we might see full

understanding of the increasing role of space forces and implement

change to make them more relevant to our national security strategies

of the next century. Innovation, not size, must be sought because we

do not have the resources to do both. Moreover, large forces drive our

operational level strategy to force-on-force engagements in the

attrition warfare model of the last century with its attendant

causalities and destruction of equipment. George Patton's dictum still

stands that directed his troops not to die for their country, but to

get the other SOB to die for his.

Military operations will also place less emphasis on dying and

destruction. The ever-present television camera ensures that the

horrors of war are broadcast worldwide. War's immorality should some

day lead to its banishment. Unfortunately, that day is probably a long

way away. Nonetheless, weapons of war and their employment tactics

must minimize death and destruction. This is not a call for non-lethal

weapons; it is a call for military forces to get right to the heart of

the enemy and conclude operations as rapidly and efficiently as they

possibly can given their equipment, training, and doctrine. This means

there must be wide flexibility in how they may function. Military

operations will be across a wide spectrum of warfare and will demand

flexibility. Modern war will require our military leadership to

navigate through a changing spectrum of political constraints and ever

changing political goals as each scenario unfolds. We must make our

forces capable of dampening the capacity of the enemy to use force by

controlling the conflict rapidly even when surprised. We failed to do

that tactically in _Desert Storm_ in the case of the SCUD missile

attacks, but were fortunate that the Iraqis were equally inept at

taking political advantage of this card they held and skillfully

employed on the battlefield. We must also look for efficiency before

we even join in battle.

Defense spending has declined as a percent of federal outlays since

the end of the Cold War. Given the leadership role the United States

plays in the world, one could think a reasonable sum to devote to

defense might be three percent of our gross national product,

certainly an amount much smaller than what an average family expends

for its security by means of life, health, causality, car, medical

insurance, and retirement benefits. Given the prospect of long-term,

constant funding, the Department of Defense could then give more

thought to how to build the most modern, efficient military force

within the dollars available. We would no longer define our forces

against some mythical threat or scenario which generates impetus to

protect force size rather than quality. The Army, Navy, Air Force,

Marine Corps, and space forces would be required to build a team based

on a salary cap. You might be willing to pay big bucks for a B-2

superstar quarterback, but you will also need lower cost and capable

riflemen or destroyers to block and tackle. Most of all, you would

reward the Service or Agency who would innovate to provide efficiency.

Manpower has become the driving cost in the all-volunteer military

force. Investment cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or satellite might be

high, but it is the operations and maintenance costs that will drive

how much resources we are required to expend to gain and maintain a

given military capability. Again turning to _Desert Storm_, the huge

advantages of overflight precision munitions dropped from stealth

aircraft has not been understood or accepted by the operations

analysts who argue what we should build or buy next. If it had been,

would the Navy have allowed the A-12 program to fail, would the Air

Force be pouring hundreds of millions if not eventually billions of

dollars into equipping forty year old B-52s with conventional

missiles, or would the Army be maintaining heavy divisions at a

personal cost of $60 billion for 35 years of ownership? Why not build

a Division force equivalent using technology and doctrine to provide a

"heavy division equivalent" force using far fewer troops featuring

speed, shock, precision fire while avoiding the manpower costs of

dollars that in peacetime include added costs for recruitment,

training, and sustaining and in war have an even greater added cost

computed in blood? Why don't we do this? The answer is because it

would require rare innovation, trust, and support from the equally

intransigent federal funding authorities. Most importantly, the

Services are not rewarded for innovation which recognizes the

contributions of another Service or Ally.

Jointness has become an altar at which all military personnel must

worship even if they don't understand or believe. Defenders of the

status quo argue that there is merit in duplication or redundancy and

these arguments have some validity. The question becomes how much

overlap or redundancy between land, sea, air, and space forces can the

nation afford, and what is the opportunity cost to the core competency

of the land, sea, air, or space force that builds and/or maintains the

duplicative force structure. A second yet vastly different question

arises when considering the unique capabilities a Service provides to

support itself and the other services. For example, how much the Air

Force should spend on airlift forces is not cast in terms of what the

envisaged requirement is for airlift, ton miles per day, to support

the mythical scenarios. The alternative sea, land, and space lift

requirements can be postulated; however, if the Navy, Army, or Air

Force do not satisfy those sea, land, and space lift requirement, then

there is a shortfall which will in turn generate a need for more

airlift!

During _Desert Storm_, nearly 90 percent of the deployed equipment

arrived by sea, but not in time if the Iraqis had continued their

first attack in August. A majority of overland movement was provided

by Saudi Arabian civilian trucks and drivers, and the Army had neither

the resources nor the responsiveness to activate reserve forces needed

to meet the truck and rail support requirements of our military

forces. As a result, costly airlift was used to move forces that

should have traveled by land and sea. If added space capabilities had

been needed, there was almost no capability for the timely launch of a

satellite. Would it not be wise to index spending on land, sea, air,

and space launch on one and other, postulate lift requirements on what

the new force needs as it innovates and slims down. The need to

respond on a moment's notice adds to the value of airlift and

prepositioned ships. The outcome though would be not to allow any of

the Services to divert general support money into core competencies

and thereby shift the jointness burden to another Service.

Innovate. Use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then fly the

fighters aboard after the helicopters or tanks are unloaded. Accept

the benefits of Federal Express that can be federalized during times

of national emergency as a costly, but ready augmentation to military

supply lines that has no cost during the much longer periods of

peacetime. Our nation has other industrial capacities that also have

duplicate military capabilities. They may be 80 percent solutions, but

the cost of ownership could prohibit creation and maintenance of a

military owned and operated 100 percent solution. Iridium telephones

may not be jam-resistant or secure, but 80 percent of the time they

will satisfy the need for 2 percent of the cost. Of course, this

avoids the problem we have created for ourselves with our medieval

acquisition system.

Finally, we must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that will

assure the future force capability will be enduring. We cannot keep up

with technology using our current ways of acquiring military hardware

and training our people in how to use and maintain it. In many areas

we would be better off to throw it away when it breaks given the low

cost, durability, and reliability of modern solid state electronics.

Why train technicians? Give the troops a gold card and a telephone

number and they know how to spend money more efficiently than do our

government agencies. Make sure the equipment we do buy not only

integrates with that of other services and functions, but that it can

integrate with both older and newer equipment designated to do the

same function. The fighter aircraft secure radio must be capable of

communicating with the ground and sea based forces command and

control, as importantly it must be able to communicate with the next

generation fighter aircraft radio.

The added dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to fight

alone in the future. We gain valuable legitimacy from forming

coalitions, plus it makes up for the growing feeble force structure we

maintain in declining budget years. An enduring force must also

recognize the necessity to operate cooperatively with the forces of

other nations. This means we must more freely release our technologies

to foreign nations so that our military forces can fight side by side,

so that our deployment forces can draw from stocks of others while our

logistics system seeks to catch up with the rapidly deployed combat

force.

In the final analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of our

military forces will be for naught if there is not an equal change in

the policy side of the equation. What good are highly trained,

efficient, capable land, sea, air, and space forces if the

implementing authorities are incapable of defining principles, goals,

and integrating strategies for their employment? While this is not the

province of the military to solve, the military must understand how

disjointed policy, weak political leadership, or dysfunctional

international cooperation will preclude success on the battlefield.

Again, one of the missed lessons of _Desert Storm_ was the difficult

and successful integration of international leadership achieved by the

President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Congressional leaders, and allied National Command Authorities

as well as many others. It was this leadership, coupled with the

ineptness of the enemy, that covered over the failures of our Cold

War-equipped and trained forces that fought _Desert Storm_. This does

not take anything away from the military victory, but it does make it

difficult to glean the right lessons for the future. Perhaps that is

why we are so loathe to change our forces at a time when change is

demanded by a new strategic environment and new threats to our

national security. Defining alternative forces in light of the changed

national security environment, goals and strategy raises two

questions: what kind or mix of military force and how much best

balances the requirements and funds available.

Deep Strike: A Key to Shock and Awe

In the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases, all

initial responses to combat operations will be some form of deep

strike. Given strategic warning (don't bet on it) after deployment of

our military forces, Deep Strike is a term that relates to the

political boundaries or proximity to military forces. The geography of

the area of conflict will further define deep strike. But a rule of

thumb might be attacks on a target beyond range of surface-based fires

except for ballistic or cruise missiles. More important than range is

the characteristics of the Deep Strike targets. Deep Strike targets

could be classified as ones the enemy does not wish to place at high

levels of risk. They can be characterized by the functions they

perform, such as:

- Leadership

- Command and Control (a function of leadership)

- Control of Military Forces, especially air and space

- Logistics and Sustainment

- National Economic Base

- Internal Security/Political

- National Will, Theirs and Ours

Intelligence used to nominate the targets for these strikes must

examine the functions and then define the physical objects or people

who comprise the system which is responsible for the successful

operation of the function. You define the system and then attack the

critical elements in order to achieve economy of force. Often these

target sets are difficult to define, as these functions often

represent the enemy's most valuable and therefore protected elements.

The intelligence collection associated with each function will vary

from target set to target set. Large, fixed infrastructure, such as

associated with an electrical grid, lends itself to traditional

reconnaissance and evaluation of technical analysis. Leadership

targets are better defined by using human intelligence and subjective

analysis. In all cases success starts with innovative intelligence

products, which has not been a hallmark of United States operations.

Such intelligence products must be examined through the eyes of the

enemy, their values and concerns. Too often we apply judgments based

on our viewpoint.

One target system may serve the attainment of a number of different

goals. For example, attacks on the electrical power system of the

enemy may debilitate his capacity to command and control his military

forces, operate vital elements of the economy and thus degrade the

political support required to sustain the conflict. This same target

system may be attacked a variety of ways. Most common methods would be

using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to bomb power plants and

switching centers. Areas with isolated populations lend themselves to

using special operations forces infiltrated to destroy an isolated

power grid node for transmission of energy from one highly populated

area to another. Now it is obvious that computer signals used to

command the power grid are targets as intrusion into the enemy's

control system provides the means to simply turn off electricity to

selected areas. Attacks by all these means achieves even greater

results than the sum of its parts because enemy responses to restore

electrical power will be confused as elements such as computer

intrusion are confused with bombing destruction.

The characteristics of value in attacking these important targets

systems are simultaneity, impunity, and timing. The greatest effect

will be achieved when the strikes are coordinated in such a manner as

to inflict maximum Shock and Awe on the enemy element. This means

operations must be coordinated and orchestrated carefully and flexibly

as enemy reaction to the attack is evaluated. Moreover, presence is

projected when a combination of functions or target sets supporting a

variety of functions are struck at the same time with impunity. In

order to achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be

evaluated quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of

the system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system.

Finally, the attacker must be alert as to the interaction of the

functions as the effects of these Deep Strikes begin to take hold. In

order to achieve desired levels of Shock and Awe, the attacker must

know the current and projected effects of his strikes against elements

of the enemy's residual system. If the trick is to define the system

of targets needed to conduct successful Deep Strike, it is even more

important to know how to alter the initial plan as the battle unfolds

and timing becomes everything.

The characteristics of forces needed to carry out Deep Strike are long

range, flexibility, precision, survivability, and speed. Cost of the

operation is a factor; however, system cost must include peacetime

operations and maintenance costs as well of the costs during actual

combat. There is also a human element in the cost of combat operations

which escalates rapidly as military force is misused. The total cost

of these operations must also address the cost of intelligence used to

support Deep Strikes. Intelligence operations may be the most costly

due to the importance of these targets to the enemy. Alternatively,

the human intelligence associated with these attacks may be the most

inexpensive since their national importance makes them vulnerable to

knowl-edgeable dissidents.

Stand-off

Deep Strike is defined by distance, albeit relative distance. Some of

the target sets may lend themselves to circumstances beyond the

nation's control; for example, Seoul borders on North Korea. Our

protective oceans mean that likely conflict is offshore. The

likelihood our next adversary may have access to surveillance,

precision munitions, and long-range delivery systems dictates that

much of our operations will be at long range, lest our forces come

under attack at their ports, camps, and bases. There will be a need

for systems capable of projecting military force from distances of

10,000KM. A sizable portion of the force must be able to deliver

ordnance of enemy targets from ranges in excess of 5,000KM. Launching

attacks from inside 1,000KM of the enemy forces will demand that

friendly forces be protected from attack by means of active and

passive defenses and dispersal. This latter constraint will preclude

achieving levels of Shock and Awe through simultaneous attack.

Survivability

Great cost benefits are attained if the vehicle used to deliver the

attack is reusable. Keep in mind that the force built for the most

demanding conflict must also be flexible for other operations.

Therefore, while ballistic missiles provide great range, speed, and

survivability in reaching their target, their cost become prohibitive

in large-scale operations which endure beyond a few hours, or in

smaller-scale operations where the goals are modest and the demands on

other military forces are low. Simultaneous combat operations require

a number of expensive, expendable platforms in the opening hours of

the conflict if our response is to be timely and induce shock. Awe is

not achieved if the enemy is permitted to gain experience in being

attacked; at best you may make them numb. Alternatively, reusable

long-range survivable systems provide needed flexibility to alter the

Deep Strike plan as it unfolds. The food chain of weapons systems

ranges from the most valuable systems such as ballistic missiles,

cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less valuable, but useful,

stealth fighter and long-range surface-to-surface high trajectory

fires.

Firepower

Discriminate fires are important due to the likelihood of people and

structures being in close proximity to the desired target. It is not

improbable that the national command center is located next door to a

children's hospital.

Discriminate fires require precision in target cordinate

identification and location. Precision does not mean "small warhead,"

although there is a beneficial impact as the right amount of explosive

is placed on the target due the penalties imposed on the delivery

vehicle required to carry the warhead long distances. All operations

involving the use of firepower must also understand and evaluate the

beneficial aspects of using non-destructive elements in conjunction

with the attack to include all aspects of the so-called information

warfare.

Appendix C

Enduring Realities and Rapid Dominance

by General Fred Franks

Rapid Dominance, as we see it, is a markedly different concept for the

use of force to gain national security ob jectives. At its core, Rapid

Dominance blends unique capabilities of land, sea, air, space, and

special operating forces. It is important to note the vital role of

jointness in using forces from all elements and resisting the lure of

gimmicks and cost-free options that may appear within the reach of

high technology but are not.

Examining current joint force capabilities reveals some enduring

truths that should be used to evaluate future concepts. Joint force

commanders today benefit from the wide array of capabilities available

to the joint warfighting team. The ability to combine and use forces

from all dimensions in a variety of powerful combinations to fit

mission circumstances presents a versatility of capabilities that

makes defense by adversaries difficult. Balance and versatility are

key. Balance in capabilities and the inherent versatility to combine

them in unpredictable, yet highly effective ways has served U.S.

national security interests well since the end of the Cold War. One

has only to look at the variety of methods employed in Panama (1989),

Desert Storm (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1993), Haiti (1994), and

Bosnia (1995) in both war and operations other than war. Joint force

commanders employed, and in some cases invented, new combinations of

balanced capabilities and were willing to go beyond the confines of

service doctrines to fit mission circumstances. For example, a U.S.

Army brigade of the 10th Mountain Division with helicopters replaced

much of the carrier air wing and flew off the carrier Eisenhower

during the Haiti operation. This force packaging capability is an

advantage unique to the U.S.

As we look beyond the present to future and bolder defense concepts

such as Rapid Dominance, the key will be to maintain that balance in

land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces combinations

available to the joint force commander. U.S. military forces are now

multidimensional in capabilities, able to use force in ways

unpredictable to an adversary. U.S. forces also have enormous

versatility, able to be used in war and what have become termed

operations other than war. Balance permits that.

Moreover, joint force commanders, recognizing this capability, have

found ways to introduce land forces even more rapidly given today's

methods. Recently, a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division rapidly

deployed by air from Ft. Hood, Texas, to Kuwait and was able to fall

in on equipment forward positioned and be available for combat soon

after arrival. A recent article in Navy Times pointed out, "In fact,

as each wave of soldiers arrived in Kuwait, they were heading north --

combat ready -- within six hours." This was a dramatic example of the

rapid ability to combine land forces with air and sea forces using

both distant forces with those already in the theater. That

combination in that set of strategic circumstances provided a rapid

deterrent in an area of vital national security interests to the U.S.

Another enduring truth is the need for staying power and ensuring that

capacity is perceived by a potential adversary. Staying power means

the ability to press the initial advantage gained until the strategic

objective is achieved. On-the-ground presence, in addition to forces

in theater, as demonstrated in Kuwait in 1993 and again in 1996,

provided commitment and staying power to convince Iraq that it would

be disastrous to consider any form of military action. The inherent

staying power of land forces, wherever future tactical concepts may

lead, makes them a powerful contributing partner in our Rapid

Dominance concept.

Finally, there is the issue of physical control. Control combines with

staying power to defeat the enemy's will. One of the many lessons of

Desert Storm is that it was not until after land forces attacked Iraq

and Kuwait that Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. Despite the

awesome shock and destructive effects of attacks f rom the air and

sea, it was only after coalition ground attacks to extend control to

both Kuwait and southeastern Iraq by defeat and destruction of

defending Iraqi forces that strategic objectives were secured. Control

on land was extended past the cease fire until such time in April as

the UN passed a permanent cease fire and sanctions resolution. Land

forces remaining in southeastern Iraq provided the staying power and

control.

The size, shape, and composition of forces that will fight in all

elements will assuredly change in the future. Early work done in

advanced warfighting experiments out of TRADOC's Battle Labs beginning

in 1992 and growing into the current Force XXI and other promising

capabilities as well as by the USMC at MCCDC at Quantico are the

precursors of how change may be discovered and implemented. The

challenge is to ensure that all components of our fighting power are

properly balanced and combined into the most effective and lethal

mixes of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces. This is

the heart of the Rapid Dominance force of the future.

Extension of real and perceived control over the will and ability of

any adversary to oppose or threaten us will insure and guarantee

success of initial operations, thereby maximizing Shock and Awe.

Indeed, getting forces on land rapidly and operationally will be a

major factor in achieving the enduring effects of Shock and Awe.

Certainly, as forces on land evolve and change, they must meet the

requirements of rapidity and sustainment and are vital components of

any mix of forces that seek by Shock and Awe to stun and then rapidly

dominate an adversary to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

We strongly feel that we as a nation cannot stand still in exploring

defense alternatives. We must seize this time to be bold in our

thinking. More thought and hypotheses with operational methods that

break through or expand current service doctrines are needed from a

joint perspective even as services look to the future from their own

service perspective. Then there must be rigorous experiments using

both high fidelity simulations and actual joint field trials to

determine the worth of these hypotheses to blend the wide array of

technology available to the total joint force and according to bold

new concepts. The results will determine the worth of Rapid Dominance

concepts by judging whether they will permit even more balanced,

versatile, and lethal combinations to fit known and anticipated future

strategic circumstances.

Study Group Members

*/L.A. "Bud" Edney/* is a retired Navy admiral and naval aviator. A

veteran of over 350 combat missions in Vietnam, Admiral Edney's senior

billets included Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief,

Atlantic Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral Edney has

an advanced degree from Harvard and was a 1970 White House Fellow.

*/Fred M. Franks/* is a retired Army general and a highly experienced

combat armor officer. During the Gulf War, he commanded VII Corps and

last served as Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine

Command. He has two master's degrees from Columbia and is a graduate

of the National War College. He is the author of _Into the Storm, a

Study in Command,_ written with Tom Clancy to be published by G.P.

Putnam's Sons in 1997.

*/Charles A. Horner/* is a retired Air Force general and a highly

experienced combat fighter and attack pilot. During the Gulf War,

General Horner commanded all allied air forces. His last assignment

was Commander-in-Chief, Space Command. A graduate of the National War

College, he now serves as consultant to government and industry.

*/Jonathan T. Howe/* is a retired Navy admiral and both a submarine and

surface warfare qualified officer. He has served as Deputy Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs, Deputy Chairman of

NATO's Military Committee, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern

Europe/CINC U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and was Special Representative

of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia. He has a Ph.D. from the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and currently heads a charitable

foundation.

*/Harlan K. Ullman/* divides his time between the worlds of business and

public policy. A former naval person, he is with the Center for

Strategic and International Studies and the Center for Naval Analyses.

His last book, _IN IRONS: U.S. Military Might in the New Century,_ was

published by the National Defense University Press in 1995.

*/James P. Wade, Jr./*, a scientist by training, is a West Point

graduate and infantry officer. He has held many senior positions in

DOD, including head of Policy Planning, Assistant to SECDEF for Atomic

Energy, Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, and Acting Head of

Defense Research and Engineering. He is Chairman and CEO of DGI which

conducted this study.

*/Keith Brendley/* is a Vice President with Defense Group Inc. He was

formerly with Sarcos Research Corporation, RAND, System Planning

Corporation and NASA, Ames Research Center. He holds mechanical

engineering degrees from the University of Illinois (B.S.) and the

University of Maryland (M.S.).