_The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle_
A distinguished Confederate general--speaking of the importance of the
city of Chattanooga to the Confederacy--said: “As long as we held it,
it was the closed doorway to the interior of our country. When it came
into your [the Union’s] hands the door stood open, and however rough
your progress in the interior might be, it still left you free to march
inside. I tell you that when your Dutch general Rosecrans commenced
his forward movement for the capture of Chattanooga we laughed him to
scorn; we believed that the black brow of Lookout Mountain would frown
him out of existence; that he would dash himself to pieces against the
many and vast natural barriers that rise all around Chattanooga; and
that then the northern people and the government at Washington would
perceive how hopeless were their efforts when they came to attack the
real South.” With regard to the claim that Chickamauga was a failure
for the Union arms, he said: “We would gladly have exchanged a dozen
of our previous victories for that one failure.” It is correctly said,
that even Richmond was but an outpost, until the success of the Union
armies--in the centre of the Confederacy--left Lee’s legions nowhere to
go, when they were expelled from Richmond.[9] This was accomplished or
made possible only by the operations of the Army of the Cumberland in
the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863.
After the retreat of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee from the
region about Tullahoma, across the Cumberland Plateau to Chattanooga,
Rosecrans established his headquarters at Winchester, Tennessee.[10] He
began the repair of the railroad back to Murfreesboro and forward to
Stevenson, Alabama, ten miles southeast of Bridgeport and eight miles
north of the Tennessee River. The three corps were put into camp in
their normal order. The Twentieth Corps occupied the country adjacent
to Winchester; the Fourteenth Corps the region near to Decherd;[11]
the Twenty-first Corps occupied the country near McMinnville.[12]
Detachments were thrown forward as far as Stevenson. The campaign had
so far been mere child’s play, compared with what lay before the army
in the next movement against Chattanooga and the Confederate Army. The
straight line of the plateau is thirty miles across from Winchester
to the Tennessee River; the distance is perhaps forty miles by the
available roads. The railroad after reaching the summit of the plateau
followed down Big Crow Creek to Stevenson, then turned sharply up the
valley of the Tennessee, crossing the river at Bridgeport to the South
side; then winding among numerous hills, which constitute the south end
of the Sand Mountain, continued around the northern nose of Lookout
Mountain, close to the river bank, into Chattanooga. Bridgeport is
on the Tennessee River twenty-eight miles in a straight line west of
Chattanooga. Just opposite, towards the northern nose of Sand Mountain,
on the north side of the river, is the southern end of Walden’s Ridge
which extends northward from the river, and parallel with the plateau,
from which it is separated by the Sequatchie River and Valley. In
short the Cumberland Mountains are here a series of ridges and valleys
which run from northeast to southwest in a uniform trend, parallel
with each other. The Tennessee River rises in southwestern Virginia,
and runs between the Cumberland Plateau and Sand Mountain; but between
Chattanooga and Bridgeport it cuts a zigzag channel towards the west,
between Sand Mountain and Walden’s Ridge, which is the name given to
that portion of the ridge lying on the north of the river. What the
Army of the Cumberland intended to do was to cross the ridge, called
the Cumberland Plateau, then the river, and the Sand Mountain into
Lookout Valley and then the Lookout Ridge, in order to reach the
Chattanooga Valley south of Chattanooga. Such a movement would force
Bragg to march out of the city to defend his communications. These
ridges are all linked together at different places. Sand and Lookout at
Valley Head, Alabama; the Cumberland Plateau and Walden’s at the head
of Sequatchie Valley and River. Pigeon Mountain is a spur of Lookout
Ridge. Chattanooga is located on the south side of the river, between
the northern nose of Lookout and Missionary Ridge. The latter is a
separate and low ridge about three miles southeast of Chattanooga.
Without a map it will be difficult for the reader to perceive the
rugged and almost impassable field of operations, which General
Rosecrans faced, while his army lay at the northwestern base of the
Cumberland Plateau, waiting for suitable preparation for the intended
campaign.
There was an alternative line of advance open to Rosecrans, namely to
cross the plateau into the Sequatchie Valley, or to march around the
head of the valley at Pikeville, then over Walden’s Ridge, and thus
attack Chattanooga directly from the north; or, to cross the river
above and to the east of Chattanooga, at the north end of Missionary
Ridge, that is, at the mouth of the Hiawassie River. This last route
would have exposed his line of retreat or communications, and he
therefore chose to operate at his right and enter into the valley south
of Chattanooga.
Early in August the railroad was repaired to Stevenson and Bridgeport;
also the branch to Tracy City on the plateau.
Sheridan’s division of the Twentieth Corps was pushed forward to
Stevenson and Bridgeport. The commissary and quartermaster-stores were
accumulated at Stevenson as rapidly as possible. By the 8th of August
these supplies were sufficient in quantity to justify a distribution of
them to the different commands, preparatory to an advance across the
river and over the difficult ridges, that lay at almost right angles to
the line of movement. The advance of the main army began August 16.
The Fourteenth Corps crossed along the railroad line, or near to
it. Its advance was soon at Stevenson and some of it at Bridgeport.
The Twenty-first Corps--which formed the left of the army at
McMinnville--crossed by the way of Pelham, a small village on the
plateau, to Thurman’s in the Sequatchie Valley. Minty’s cavalry covered
the left flank by way of Pikeville, a village at the head of Sequatchie
Valley. The Twentieth Corps also came to Stevenson and its vicinity,
but by another route--to the right--than that taken by the Fourteenth,
namely, via Bellefont, ten miles southwest of Stevenson, and Caperton’s
Ferry, which is the river point nearest to Stevenson.
All these crossings of the plateau were made without resistance by the
enemy, although there were small Confederate cavalry outlooks here
and there, which fell back when the Union troops appeared. It seemed
as if Bragg desired to have the Union Army advance as far as possible
from its base of supplies into the mountain gorges and over a long and
difficult line of communications. That course would afford him a better
chance, as his army being reinforced would be in better condition to
successfully attack and destroy the Union Army.
In order to save the hauling of full forage for the animals,
General Rosecrans had delayed his movement until the corn should be
sufficiently ripe. No detail seemed wanting in the preparations for
the difficult campaign. Enough ammunition was provided for at least two
battles, and twenty-five days rations for the troops were hauled in
wagons.
The Tennessee River had to be crossed by the different corps; in
order to conceal this movement and deceive the enemy at Chattanooga,
Hagen’s brigade of Palmer’s division, and Wagner’s of Wood’s of the
Twenty-first Corps, accompanied by Wilder’s mounted infantry of
Reynolds’s division, crossed Walden’s Ridge from the Sequatchie Valley
into the valley of the Tennessee. These troops made ostentatious
demonstrations upon Chattanooga from the north side of the river.
Wilder--with four guns of Lilly’s battery--appeared suddenly before
Chattanooga, threw some shells into the city, sunk the steamer
“Paint Rock,” lying at the city landing, then ascending the river,
feigned to examine the crossings, making frequent inquiry as to their
difficulty and the character of the country. On the other side of
the river east of Chattanooga, General Cleburne was sent by Bragg to
make preparations for defending the crossings against the supposed
advance of Rosecrans’s army. He fortified the ferry crossings.
General Buckner--who commanded in East Tennessee against the forces of
Burnside--expressed as his opinion on August 21, that General Rosecrans
would cross above the mouth of Hiawassie River--a stream flowing
northwards--and transfer his forces into Tennessee on its south bank,
some thirty-five miles northeast of Chattanooga. Buckner’s army was at
the point mentioned.
Rosecrans’s intention was, however, to cross at Caperton’s Ferry--near
Bridgeport and not far from Stevenson--and at Shellmound; these places
are from twenty to forty miles below and to the west of Chattanooga.
On August 20 at daybreak, Heg’s brigade, of Davis’s division of the
Twentieth Corps, in which served the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry,
crossed in pontoon boats at Caperton’s Ferry, drove away the enemy’s
cavalry and occupied the southern bank. Here a twelve hundred feet
pontoon bridge was soon completed, and Davis’s division of the
Twentieth Corps, crossed and advanced to the foot of Sand Mountain,
preceded by cavalry. Johnson’s division of the same corps crossed
the following day on the same bridge. Sheridan’s division of the
Twentieth Corps crossed at Bridgeport on a bridge constructed by them
of pontoons and tressels; it was 2,700 feet long. Baird’s--formerly
Rousseau’s--and Negley’s divisions of the Fourteenth Corps followed
Sheridan’s division. The Twenty-first Corps marched down the Sequatchie
Valley and crossed at Battle Creek, nine miles up the river from
Bridgeport. Hazen’s, Wagner’s, and Wilder’s brigades were, as before
mentioned, in the Tennessee Valley to the north of Chattanooga, and
did not cross with their corps. The whole movement across the river
began on August 29 and ended on September 4. The Third brigade of Van
Cleve’s division of the Twenty-first Corps was left at McMinnville
as a garrison. The railway was protected by the reserve corps; the
Fourteenth Corps was ordered to concentrate in Lookout Valley and to
send immediate detachments to seize Cooper’s and Stevens’s gaps of
Lookout Mountain, the only passable routes to McLemore’s Cove, down
which runs the west Chickamauga Creek in a northeasterly direction,
towards Chattanooga. The Twentieth Corps was to move to Valley Head
at the head of Lookout Valley, and seize Winston’s Gap forty miles
south of Chattanooga. The Twenty-first Corps with the exception of
Hazen’s and Wagner’s infantry and Minty’s cavalry--which were still
north and east of Chattanooga--were to march to Wauhatchie, at the
lower end of Lookout Valley, near Lookout Mountain, and to communicate
with the Fourteenth Corps at Trenton in the same valley, and threaten
Chattanooga by way of the Tennessee River via the nose of Lookout
Mountain. The cavalry crossed at Caperton’s and at a ford near Island
Creek, in Lookout Valley, from which point they reconnoitered towards
Rome, Georgia, fifty-five miles south of Chattanooga, via Alpine. This
last mentioned hamlet is forty-two miles south of Chattanooga. In the
absence of Major-General Stanley--the chief of cavalry--its movements
were not prompt. If the reader will refer to a good topographical map
of the region around Chattanooga, he will see how sagacious these
movements were, and what grand strategy they displayed. The Army of the
Cumberland was stretched in line through the whole length of Lookout
Valley, between Sand Mountain and Lookout Mountain, on the south side
of the Tennessee River; it faced east towards the Chattanooga Valley,
with only one range between them and the Confederate line of retreat
and supplies; while on the northeast side of Chattanooga was a Union
force of several brigades to prevent any counter movement by the
Confederates upon the Union line of supplies.
After crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans continued his feints to
make Bragg think that the real movement was the feigned one. He had
sent Wagner’s infantry, and Wilder’s and Minty’s cavalry brigades to
report to Hazen with a force amounting to about 7,000. Hazen caused the
enemy to believe that the whole army was there, intending to cross the
river above Chattanooga. This was done by extensive firings, marchings,
countermarchings, and by bugle calls, at widely separated points; while
Wilder moved his artillery continuously across openings in sight from
the opposite bank.
The Confederates occupied in force the point of Lookout Mountain at
Chattanooga. To carry this by an attack of the Twenty-first Corps
seemed too risky; therefore the original movement was continued,
namely, against the line south of Chattanooga, over Lookout Ridge,
south of the point where it was held in force. The cavalry was ordered
to advance on the extreme right to Summerville, in Broomtown Valley,
a village eighteen miles south of Lafayette, Georgia. McCook was to
support this movement by a division thrown forward to the vicinity of
Alpine forty-two miles southwest of Chattanooga. These movements were
made on September 8 and 9.
General Thomas crossed his corps over Frick’s, Cooper’s, and Stevens’s
gaps of Lookout Mountain, to McLemore’s Cove.
These movements forced Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga on September 8.
Then Crittenden with the Twenty-first Corps and its trains marched
the same day around the point of Lookout and camped that night at
Rossville, at the gap through Missionary Ridge, five miles south of
Chattanooga. Through this gap runs the wagon road from Lafayette to
Chattanooga.
General Rosecrans claimed to have evidence that Bragg was moving
towards Rome, and had therefore ordered Crittenden to hold Chattanooga
with one brigade, call all the troops of Hazen’s command across from
the north side of the river, an follow the enemy’s retreat vigorously.
On September 11, Crittenden was ordered to advance as far as Ringgold,
but not farther, and to make a reconnoisance as far as Lee and
Gordon’s Mill.[13] Crittenden’s report as well as other evidence
convinced General Rosecrans that Bragg had only gone as far as
Lafayette--twenty-five miles south of Chattanooga--and then halted.
General Crittenden’s whole corps was therefore sent to Lee and Gordon’s
Mill, where he found Bragg’s rear guard. He was ordered to communicate
with General Thomas, who by that time had reached the eastern foot of
Lookout Mountain in McLemore’s Cove, at the eastern base of Stevens’s
gap. Wilder’s mounted brigade followed and covered the Twenty-first
Corps in its movements to Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and had a severe
fight with the enemy at Leet’s tan yard, five miles to the southeast.
Although Bragg made his headquarters at Lafayette in his retreat from
Chattanooga, his rear guard did not get beyond Lee and Gordon’s Mill.
On September 10 Negley’s division of the Fourteenth Corps
marched--after having crossed the ridge--from the foot of Stevens’s
Gap, across McLemore’s Cove, towards Dug Gap in the Pigeon Mountains
and then directly towards Lafayette. Dug Gap is six miles west of
Lafayette. Negley found this gap heavily obstructed, but Baird’s
division came to his support on the morning of September 11. They
became convinced by some sharp skirmishing, which occurred on the 11th,
that the enemy’s forces were advancing; and therefore fell back from
Davis’s cross roads to a good position near the foot of Stevens’s Gap.
These two officers are entitled to great credit for their coolness and
skill in withdrawing their divisions from a very perilous trap. The
forces of the enemy would have been overwhelming in their immediate
front, if the Confederates had been more expeditious and made the
attack on the afternoon of September 10 or on the morning of the 11th.
Hindman, Buckner, and Cleburne, with several divisions were there, but
failed to cooperate in an attack at the right time. The obstructions
placed in the gap by the Confederates favored Negley and Baird.
On September 12 Reynolds’s and Brannan’s divisions following over the
mountain closed up to Negley and Baird. Bragg’s army was at Lafayette,
near Dug Gap, in force. Having official information that Longstreet
was coming from Virginia with large reinforcements, and having already
received troops from Mississippi and the eastern part of Tennessee,
Bragg halted in his retreat. He was preparing to give battle to the
Union forces at the first good opportunity.
Two divisions of Joseph E. Johnston’s troops from Mississippi and
Buckner’s Corps from Tennessee--where Burnside’s forces were--had
joined Bragg before he moved north from Lafayette to Chickamauga, where
he was joined by three divisions of Longstreet’s Corps from Virginia
on the 18th, if not earlier. At the same time Halleck, chief of the
army at Washington, D. C., telegraphed Rosecrans September 11, 1863, as
follows: “It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg’s army
is reinforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be
ascertained as early as possible.”[14]
The fact stands out in bold relief, that the Confederate Government at
Richmond hastened reinforcements to General Bragg; while the Washington
Government sent none to Rosecrans, although Burnside was in the eastern
part of Tennessee with 16,000 troops, and was at that time at leisure.
Because the force, lately in his front, had reinforced Bragg at
Lafayette, Burnside did not obey Halleck’s order to join Rosecrans; on
the contrary, he drove Buckner’s force, which united with Bragg; thus
Burnside enabled Buckner’s men to take part against the Union Army in
the battle of Chickamauga.
Bragg in his official report, says: “During the 9th it was ascertained
that a column, estimated at from 4,000 to 8,000 had crossed Lookout
Mountain into the cove by way of Cooper’s and Stevens’s gaps. Thrown
off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in
reality we had concentrated opposite his center, and deceived by the
information, by deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy
pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in
detail.”[15] He says further that he ordered Hindman, Cleburne, and
Buckner to join and attack the forces--Negley and Baird--at Davis’s
cross roads, near Dug Gap; but because Dug Gap was obstructed by
felled timber, which required twenty-four hours to remove, and because
Buckner, when he joined Hindman, wanted to change the plans, Negley
and Baird had been allowed to move back in a position not wise to
follow. Bragg drew Buckner, Hindman, and Cleburne back to Lafayette
and prepared to move in order to attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s
Mill. Polk’s and Walker’s corps were moved immediately in that
direction.
The only Wisconsin troops in the affair at Dug Gap on September 10
and 11 were the First, Tenth, and Twenty-first Infantry. Lieutenant
Robert J. Nickles of the First Wisconsin Infantry, aide to General J.
C. Starkweather, commanding the brigade, was killed when reconnoitering
alone the enemy’s skirmishers. This was the only casualty to the
Wisconsin troops.
On September 12, General Leonidas Polk was ordered to attack Crittenden
the next day, at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Polk would not attack however,
without reinforcements. Bragg spent the next five days getting his army
in position along the west Chickamauga Creek, and on its east side from
the north end of Pigeon Mountains to Reed’s Bridge. Brigadier-General
B. R. Johnson, who had been holding Ringgold on the east side of the
Chickamauga with one brigade, moved on the 18th to Reed’s Bridge on
the west Chickamauga; this caused his force to become the extreme
right of Bragg’s line. While Forrest’s and Pegram’s cavalry covered
the extreme right at Reed’s Bridge, Walker’s Corps formed on the left
of B. R. Johnson’s, opposite Alexander’s Bridge; Buckner’s was next
to Thedford’s Ford; Polk’s opposite Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and Hill’s
Corps was on the extreme left, near Glass’s Mill. Wheeler’s Cavalry
protected the left flank, and was ordered to annoy the troops in
McLemore’s Cove so much that Bragg’s movement would not be discovered.
With B. R. Johnson’s movement from Ringgold came two brigades--just
arrived from Mississippi--and three of Longstreet’s from Virginia.
The other two brigades from Virginia came on the 19th in time to
take active part, the Confederate Army being in position on the east
side of west Chickamauga Creek; and Crittenden’s Corps near Lee and
Gordon’s Mill on the west side. Bragg was finally ready for attack;
and on the night of the 17th issued his order of battle, namely, that
each body of troops should cross the creek at the nearest practicable
bridge or ford, turn to the left, and sweep up the Chickamauga towards
Lee and Gordon’s Mill. This would bring the troops upon the left
flank of Crittenden’s forces. Leonidas Polk was to attack in front,
across the stream, while Hill was ordered to prevent the Union forces
in McLemore’s Cove from reinforcing Crittenden. It will be seen
how Bragg’s plan of attack failed completely. The Chickamauga Creek
or River rises at the head of McLemore’s Cove, and runs northeast,
emptying into the Tennessee River about five miles above Chattanooga.
Therefore, to retreat to Chattanooga, or to cut off the Union Army from
it, the Confederate Army had to cross on the west side of Chickamauga.
The road from Lafayette to Chattanooga--on which the Confederates
marched--runs on the east side of and parallel with Pigeon Mountains
and the river, and crosses the river at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. The
road on which the Union troops at Stevens’s gap marched, runs down the
cove on the west side of the river and Pigeon Mountains, past Crawfish
Springs, near which it branches to McFarland’s Gap and to Kelly’s farm
on the Lafayette road, three miles north of Lee and Gordon’s; this
distance is about sixteen miles. The Pigeon Mountains dwindle away into
the level country some miles south of Lee and Gordon’s.
The order of battle issued by Bragg on September 17, was not
immediately executed, on account of some resistance made by Wilder’s
mounted infantry and Minty’s cavalry at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges.
The activity of Minty and Wilder, and the bold front shown by the
troops of Crittenden at and about Lee and Gordon’s Mill, prevented
a serious attack by General Leonidas Polk, who was in front of that
position. These facts together with the affair at Dug Gap and the
presence of McCook’s Corps at Alpine caused the Confederate Army to
hesitate; thus General Rosecrans was given time to concentrate his
whole army--not Crittenden’s Corps only--at Chickamauga, across the
Lafayette road, between the Confederate Army and Chattanooga. Bragg’s
plan was to attack Crittenden’s left and rear, throwing it back upon
the centre--General Thomas’s--before Crittenden could be reinforced,
and then to thrust his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga.
Rosecrans’s plan was to prevent such a disaster. Late in the afternoon
of September 18, the first Confederate troops crossed the Chickamauga
towards the west; this movement was still going on on the morning of
the 19th, when something unexpected happened to Bragg’s Army.
About two-thirds of the Confederate Army had crossed and was facing
towards Lee and Gordon’s Mill, when at 9 o’clock a brisk engagement
commenced with Forrest’s cavalry on the right of the Confederate line
at Jay’s Mill, near Reed’s Bridge.
While these movements of the Confederate Army were being inaugurated
from Lafayette down on the east side of Chickamauga, the Union Army,
at the foot of Stevens’s Gap in the cove and McCook’s Twentieth
Corps, twenty miles away near Alpine, had to get together and join
Crittenden’s Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s Mill.
While waiting to receive sufficient information to convince him that
Bragg had halted at Lafayette, Rosecrans had on September 11 or 12
greatly widened the distance between his corps. It was a very dangerous
maneuver to face Bragg, and had a more enterprising general been in
command of the Confederate Army, the result would probably have been
fatal for the Union forces. General D. H. Hill says in a _Century
Magazine_ article, that Bragg was confused by the rapid movements of
the Union Corps; the presence of McCook’s Corps, south of Lafayette, at
Alpine, held Bragg for a while at that place. He was not well informed
as to the movements of Rosecrans’s Army.[16]
Bragg, by failing to attack the detached Fourteenth Corps nearest
him in McLemore’s Cove, and afterwards to march towards the more
distant detached Twenty-first Corps at Lee and Gordon’s gave the Union
commander an opportunity to concentrate, and place his united army
across the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga, at Kelly’s farm between
Rossville and Lee and Gordon’s Mill. How was this movement done?
While it took Bragg five days--from September 12 to 17--to concentrate
his army from Lafayette and Ringgold near Lee and Gordon’s, it required
the same length of time for McCook to march his corps from the vicinity
of Alpine to connect it with Thomas at the foot of Stevens’s Gap in
the cove. There was a distance of forty miles from flank to flank of
the Union Army, that is, from Alpine to Lee and Gordon’s. But McCook
marched fifty-seven miles by the route he took in order to connect with
Thomas. General Rosecrans in his official report says: “He [General
McCook] had, with great prudence, already moved his trains back to
the rear of Little River, on the mountain, but unfortunately, being
ignorant of the mountain road, moved down the mountain at Winston’s
Gap, down Lookout Valley to Cooper’s Gap, up the mountain, and down
again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th.”[17]
Looking back at this scattering of Rosecrans’s forces by the sending
of McCook’s Corps to Alpine--twenty miles southwest of Lafayette--one
can understand that such tactics were serious mistakes. General
Rosecrans thought himself justified for the movement upon the supposed
correctness of the information he had received, namely, that Bragg’s
Army was in full retreat towards Rome, Georgia. It is apparent,
however, that a reconnoisance of the cavalry to Alpine and Summerville
would have accomplished the same result as the corps of infantry
which was sent. The alternative before Rosecrans, when he discovered
the retreat of the Confederate Army, was to concentrate the Fourteenth
and Twentieth corps at Chattanooga, occupy Rossville Gap with a strong
outpost, well entrenched, and Lookout Mountain with another entrenched
detachment; he could then have waited for further developments. It
is hardly probable that Bragg would have attacked him after having
received his reinforcements, but would perhaps have fallen back on
his line of supplies at some point in the rear. Before that could
have occurred, however, the reinforcements that Rosecrans afterwards
received would have been able to protect his line of communications.
By the evening of the 17th the Union troops were substantially within
supporting distance, but not yet in line to resist an attack by the
enemy upon Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s, but orders were immediately
given to move the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps towards the northeast,
down the west Chickamauga River, in order to cover the Lafayette road,
somewhere near Crittenden’s Corps. The position of the troops and
narrowness of the roads retarded the march.
It must be kept in mind, that the movements which Rosecrans made after
he discovered that Bragg had halted at Lafayette, were for the purpose
of concentrating upon Chattanooga; and that the route Rosecrans took
after the junction of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps was perhaps
the shortest route he could take to Chattanooga, while he could
at the same time watch the enemy. He encountered Bragg’s force at
Chickamauga and was forced to fight there. This was, therefore, the
battle for Chattanooga. He gained his point--the military occupancy
of Chattanooga--but it required two battles to win it; those of
Chickamauga and the three days fight immediately around Chattanooga.
During the 18th Minty’s cavalry, in position east of Reed’s Bridge,
was attacked by Bushrod Johnson’s troops coming from Ringgold, and
Wilder’s mounted infantry at Alexander’s, by Walker’s Corps. Both were
holding bridges, but were driven back into the Lafayette road. General
Rosecrans’s plan, as given in orders, was that General Thomas on his
way down the cove road passing Crawfish Springs, near the battlefield,
should post General Negley’s division there, relieving two divisions of
Crittenden’s Corps. With the remainder of his corps, he was to march by
way of Widow Glenn’s house to the Lafayette road, and take position at
Kelly’s farm, across this road. General Crittenden was to move Palmer’s
and Van Cleve’s divisions, relieved by Negley, to the left of his line,
and with them prolong his left, from the left of Wood’s division, so
as to cover that part of the Lafayette road, near Lee and Gordon’s.
McCook’s Corps was to follow General Thomas and take temporary position
at Crawfish Springs, protecting the right of the Union line, and to
keep his corps mainly in reserve.
The cavalry was to close on McCook’s right, and to watch the crossings
of the Chickamauga in that region.
The Union movements began on the morning of the 18th, but were so
slow, that McCook’s Corps only reached Pond Spring at dark, and
bivouaced there for the night. Crittenden’s two divisions reached
their positions on the Lafayette road near midnight. In view of the
accumulated evidence, that the enemy was crossing his forces over the
Chickamauga below Lee and Gordon’s on the 18th, General Thomas pushed
forward his corps, uninterruptedly during the night. He halted his
leading division--Negley’s--at the assigned position near Crawfish
Springs, where his corps rested for two hours at midnight and made
coffee. From there on Baird’s division was in the lead, and General
Thomas and staff rode with General Baird at the head of the column.
This was a weird night-march. The utmost secrecy was kept. If the
enemy--who was just across the river not far away--had discovered the
movement, he would perhaps also have marched in the night and occupied
the place for which General Thomas was aiming. General Hill’s Corps
and Wheeler’s Cavalry of the Confederate Army were on the east side
of the Chickamauga, in order to prevent the Fourteenth and Twentieth
corps from making this march. To deceive the enemy campfires were
left burning in the camps in the early evening; in fact all along the
road southwest of Crawfish Springs, frequent fires were kindled.
Soon after leaving Crawfish Springs the column deflected to the right
into an obscure cross-country road, which led to Kelly’s farm. Along
the windings of this road, some of the hardest fights of the 19th and
20th took place. A pond afterwards known as “bloody pond” was passed
soon after leaving Crawfish Springs; to the left, and a short distance
from this pond, General William H. Lytle was killed September 20.
Still further on was the place where the fatal blunder of the 20th
occurred--at about 11 a. m.--near Brotherton’s house; General T. J.
Wood, obeying his interpretation of an order from General Rosecrans,
having withdrawn from the line, let in Longstreet’s troops.
This road runs almost entirely through thick hardwood timber, but about
half way between Crawfish Springs and Kelly’s farm, there was a little
dwelling in the midst of a clearing, known as Widow Glenn’s. Here the
next day, General Rosecrans lifted the name of the widow from the
depths of utter obscurity to the heights of national fame, by making
her home his headquarters. In fact, the whole region from Missionary
Ridge, on the left of the marching column as far as Rossville Gap (four
miles to the northwest) to the Chickamauga on the east, was densely
wooded and covered with heavy undergrowth. A few small farms scattered
through this woodland were tilled by the obscurest of backwoodsmen, who
lived in small log cabins or small frame buildings. Their names would
never have been known, even in Chattanooga nine miles away, had it not
been for the accidental fighting there of the greatest battle of the
west. Widow Glenn’s, Kelly’s farm, Snodgrass Hill, McDonald’s, Poe’s,
Brotherton’s, Dyer’s, Vittetoe’s, and Viniard’s were suddenly made
historical by the battle of Chickamauga.
General George H. Thomas was a very sedate man. There was about him, at
all times, the very atmosphere of solid merit and reserved strength.
As he rode beside General Baird, attended by the two staff corps,
there was no indication that he was conscious of his high position.
His modesty was always conspicuous. No one in the long line of troops
stretching for miles behind could see in this unpretentious officer
the true hero of the coming conflict, who would be known in the future
as the “Rock of Chickamauga.” After Negley’s division was left in
position near Crawfish, there remained in the marching column the three
divisions of Baird, Brannan, and Reynolds. Baird’s and Brannan’s had
three brigades each, but Reynolds’s had only two; Wilder’s was mounted
and operated as cavalry, wherefore it was not always with its division.
[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 19, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 266]
About daylight on September 19, Baird’s division filed across the
Lafayette road near Kelly’s log house, stacked arms, and commenced
to prepare breakfast. Forrest’s Confederate cavalry lay at that time
in the neighborhood of Jay’s Mill, one mile to the east, near Reed’s
Bridge; Hood’s and Walker’s corps were further up, or west towards
Lee’s and Gordon’s and within a mile and a half of Crittenden’s left.
The stream was in many places easily fordable. The whole Confederate
Army was across the Chickamauga at sunrise with the exception of
Hindman’s, Breckenridge’s, and Cleburne’s divisions. Thomas made
temporary headquarters under a large tree by the roadside; while
waiting for the closing up of the rear division, he lay down on some
blankets, and told his aide not to let him sleep more than an hour.
General Gordon Granger, who commanded the reserve corps, had been
ordered by Rosecrans on September 13 to bring three brigades of this
corps--which happened then to be at Bridgeport, Alabama, guarding that
point of the Union line of supplies--to the Rossville Gap. His duty
was to guard the approaches from the south and east and to _generally
support the main army_. He moved with his usual energy and arrived at
the gap on September 14, although the distance is about thirty-five
miles. He brought with him two brigades of Steedman’s division, viz.:
Mitchell’s and Whittaker’s, and Daniel McCook’s brigades of James D.
Morgan’s division. Granger’s presence in the front of Rossville Gap
at McAffee’s Church with Whittaker’s brigade, and his sending Daniel
McCook’s and Mitchell’s brigades towards Jay’s Mill and Reed’s Bridge,
assisted greatly in postponing the crossing of the Confederate forces
until the 18th and thus preventing an attack on Crittenden’s left flank.
On the morning of the 19th McCook’s brigade was bivouacing somewhere
near Reed’s Bridge. McCook rode over to where Thomas was, and said
hurriedly he must speak to him. He told General Thomas that a
Confederate brigade had crossed at Reed’s Bridge and that his (own)
brigade had then burned this bridge, thus this detached brigade
could be captured, if General Thomas would send forces enough to do
it. At that moment the head of Brannan’s division was approaching
in rear of the line of Baird’s division to take position on the
latter’s left. Thomas ordered Brannan to reconnoitre in that
direction with two brigades and to attack any force met. His advance
brigade--Croxton’s--encountered very soon Forrest’s cavalry, about
7:30 or 8 a. m. (some reports say 9 a. m.) and drove it more than half
a mile. “This vigorous movement disconcerted the plans of the enemy
to move on our left and opened the battle of the 19th September,”
says General Rosecrans in his official report.[18] Forrest was in
that place as a defense of Bragg’s right flank. The sudden musketry
of Croxton’s attack on Forrest far to the right of the Confederate
commanders startled them and gave them the first intimation, that
Bragg’s order did not meet the situation.
General H. V. Boynton says that, at the time the isolated Confederate
brigade was reported as on the west side of Chickamauga, early in the
morning of September 19, two-thirds of the Confederate Army were on the
west side.
It was 6:30 a. m. when Brannan left Kelly’s and moved north; he took
the Reed’s Bridge road for the capturing of the isolated brigade. It
was between 8 and 9 a. m., before the enemy was struck.
General Forrest called immediately for assistance. Ector’s and Wilson’s
infantry brigades of Walker’s Corps returned down the stream and
drove Croxton. This brought Brannan with his two remaining brigades
forward; he in turn drove back the Confederate force. Brannan in his
report[19] says, that his troops came upon a strong force of the
enemy, consisting of two divisions instead of the supposed brigade.
Very soon Baird’s division was sent in on the right of Brannan; this at
first drove the Confederate force that was attacking Brannan, but in
turn it was attacked directly on its right flank and rear by Liddell’s
division, which threw it into temporary confusion. In the meantime
McCook’s Corps arrived on the field. R. W. Johnson’s division of that
corps was sent in, at noon, on Baird’s right; it struck Cheatham’s
division on its right flank, driving it back in confusion. Johnson’s
was overlapped and in immediate danger, when General John M. Palmer’s
division of Crittenden’s Corps, relieved the right of his division;
Crittenden had very wisely dispatched Palmer’s division toward the
sound of the firing and this burst upon the enemy. Palmer’s right was
soon overlapped when Van Cleve from Crittenden’s Corps came to the
rescue, but later in the day he also was beaten back. Then Reynolds’s
division of Thomas’s corps advanced on the left of Palmer’s division,
and two brigades of Van Cleve’s division came in on Palmer’s right.
Davis’s division of McCook’s Corps attacked most opportunely and drove
the enemy, but was compelled somewhat to give way. In this attack
Colonel Hans C. Heg of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was mortally
wounded. In the meantime Crittenden’s remaining division under Wood
attacked the Confederates and turned the tide. Lee and Gordon’s Mill
was at that moment uncovered, all of Crittenden’s Corps having marched
towards the left. About 3 o’clock p. m. McCook was ordered to send
his remaining division (Sheridan’s) to support the line near Wood and
Davis, and to place Lytle’s brigade at Lee and Gordon’s as the extreme
right. This stayed the Confederate advance in that section.
Lytle’s brigade was considered sufficient at that time to hold a point
against which Bragg was, at first, directing his whole force. This
point--at Lee and Gordon’s--was the left of the Union Army on the 18th;
at noon on the 19th it was the right.
Negley’s division, which had been posted near Crawfish Springs the
night before, was then the only Union division which did not partake
in the battle at first, but arrived in accordance with orders on the
field about 4:30 p. m. He was ordered to the place, from which Van
Cleve had been driven, in order to attack; he drove the enemy steadily,
while Thomas was driving him on the Confederate right; these movements
continued until night.
It can readily be perceived that the battle of the 19th was more or
less a haphazard fight, neither side being aware of the position of the
other. The undergrowth of the woods was so dense in most places, that
opposed sides could not perceive each other until they were within a
few yards, except by the firing. It was unfortunate that Rosecrans was
not present with Thomas, when the latter’s corps crossed the Lafayette
road. Before an attack was made, the Twenty-first Corps, being the
nearest one to the Fourteenth, should have been formed on the right
of the Fourteenth, both in a compact line, and with a brigade for
each division in reserve; and the Twentieth Corps--when it closed up
on the right of the Twenty-first in the same compact order--should
have advanced swiftly upon the Confederates, some of whom were still
crossing the river, and some with their right flanks to the Union line
of attack. It is possible that such an attack would have driven the
Confederates into the river in great confusion; but an attack by only
one division (Brannan’s) on Forrest’s cavalry beyond the Confederate
right flank, simply notified the Confederate commanders, and gave them
ample time to wheel their divisions into the proper direction, and
signalled them where to attack. General Rosecrans in his report does
not mention a night fight that occurred on the extreme Union left. In
fact, he says, there was no firing after dark. Just as it began to
grow dark, however, Cleburne’s division of Hill’s Corps arrived from
across the river. He boldly and characteristically marched through the
defeated and prostrated divisions of Walker and Cheatham, was joined by
two brigades of Cheatham’s division, Jackson’s, and Preston Smith’s,
and then attacked with great fierceness the Union troops under R. W.
Johnson and Baird; they covered Johnson’s front and lapped over on
Baird. It was too dark to recognize friend from foe, and it was more or
less a hand-to-hand contest. Finally the attack was repulsed, the Union
troops holding the field. The Confederate general, Preston Smith, and
two of his staff officers were killed.
Some idea of the severity of the fighting on the 19th--the charging
and falling back of both sides; the difficulty in keeping alignments;
the impossibility of officers identifying friend or foe; the losing
of artillery batteries and single pieces, their recapture; and the
awful slaughter in both armies--can be obtained only by reading
official reports in serial numbers 50 and 51 of _Rebellion Records_.
Its intensity can be estimated from the following data. Breckenridge’s
division was not in the fight of September 19, but fought on the 20th
only; his loss in killed and wounded was 1,075. Cleburne was in the
night fight of the 19th, and was as active as Breckenridge on the 20th;
his loss was 1,743 in killed and wounded. The total difference of 668
does not give an accurate comparison of the two days’ fighting, but
does give some idea of the awful slaughter. The battle of the 19th was
fought without breastworks; it was a square stand-up fight; nearly
every division engaged on both sides, first attacked, then drove its
opponent, and after falling back in some disorder, reformed, and again
advanced, until the day and part of the night were gone.
The surgeon-general of the Union Army reported that about 4,500 wounded
were treated after this battle of the 19th. The loss in killed and
wounded must, therefore, have reached 6,000, but the Union reports do
not separate the losses of the 19th from the total.
Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Brannan’s division was withdrawn
from the left and placed in reserve, or rather in echelon at the right
of Reynolds, near Brotherton’s house, at the right of Thomas’s line.
During the night of the 19th the lines of both armies were readjusted.
That of the Union Army was drawn back. Palmer of Crittenden’s Corps and
Johnson of McCook’s, who had reported to General Thomas the day before,
were ordered to remain under his direction. He placed his troops in a
compact line--facing east with the Lafayette road in his rear--around
Kelly’s farm, but some distance in the woods. The divisions were in the
following order from left to right: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds,
and Brannan; Brannan was drawn back so far, however, that he could be
available as a reserve and at the same time close enough to advance
quickly to the front line. The right and left were both refused.
Baird had no reserve; but Johnson and Palmer had each a brigade in
reserve. Each division was formed in two lines, and both were protected
by hastily thrown up log breastworks. The artillery was in battery
between brigades; this line was not broken during the battle of the
20th. Reynolds’s line crossed the Lafayette road at Poe’s house, near
Brotherton’s, and from there to Lee and Gordon’s neither of the armies
was in possession of the road. Reynolds had Turchin’s brigade in line
and King’s in reserve. Baird’s left did not reach to the Lafayette
road. Kelly Field, which was a parallelogram about half a mile long
and a quarter of a mile wide, was the storm centre of battle during
September 20. Besides the immense fighting along the main line of log
works, there were five different charges, in rear of the main line from
the south to the north side by five different Union brigades. These
charges were made against the Confederate troops, which had turned on
the left of Baird’s line and gained his rear. The brigades of Stanley,
Van Derveer, Gross, Willich, and Turchin made these charges.
The right of the Union line on the 20th--from Brannan’s right--was
neither compact nor protected. During the night of the 19th, or early
morning of the 20th, the four divisions of Sheridan, Davis, Wood, and
Van Cleve had been moved to the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge,
a mile or more from the Lafayette road, in order to cover the road
leading from Crawfish Springs to McFarland’s Gap, west of Rosecrans’s
headquarters. General Rosecrans says he rode the line about daylight,
and that he suggested certain changes to McCook, especially that he
keep close to the left, which was not done, however, in time to prevent
disaster. Negley of the Fourteenth Corps, who was in line on the right
adjoining Brannan, was ordered to proceed to Thomas’s left, but only
two brigades, John Beatty’s and Stanley’s, arrived, one at a time; both
were driven away by the enemy. John Beatty’s brigade--which at 8:30
a. m. was placed on the left of Baird, so as to reach the Lafayette
road--was not fortified; its thin line was swept away at the first
attack by the enemy. Negley was expected to fill this gap with his
whole division, and Thomas sent request after request for Negley’s
division. There was so much re-adjustment going on at the wrong time,
and much of it not going on at any time in the troops under McCook and
Crittenden on the 20th, that it is difficult now to try to place them
up to 11 a. m. Wood, with his two brigades from the reserve, relieved
Negley’s two remaining brigades in the front line, next to Brannan’s
about 9:30 a. m., his brigade being a little withdrawn in echelon. This
was done to enable Negley to take position on Baird’s left. About 11
a. m. Van Cleve marched to the rear of Wood and had his men lie down.
All these troops on the right--from Reynolds’s right to Sheridan’s the
extreme right of the Union Army--were very thinly drawn out, and did
no good in the day’s fight, with the exception of one full brigade
of Wood’s, namely, Harker’s, one regiment of Buell’s brigade, and a
few regiments from other divisions, which will be mentioned further
on. The troops had done excellent service the day before; but future
events will show that they seemed to be paralyzed, by not having been
well fortified and compactly placed the night before. This mistake had
been corrected to some extent, when the disaster came. On the 20th the
troops faced Longstreet, a most sagacious general, who was exceedingly
energetic in taking advantage of every defect of his opponent’s line
and every blunder in his maneuvers.
McCook had Davis’s and Sheridan’s divisions still on his extreme right.
Crittenden had Van Cleve’s and Wood’s, although the latter was in the
early morning supposed to be in reserve. Wood came into the front line
as stated, but Van Cleve seems not to have found a place there on the
20th.
THE CONFEDERATE LINE ON SEPTEMBER 20
The Confederate line was in admirable formation on the morning of the
20th, at a distance of 400 to 1,000 yards east of the Lafayette road.
From its right to its left it may be described as follows: General
Leonidas Polk commanded the right wing which was formed as follows:
Forrest’s cavalry on the extreme right, 3,500 strong, a large part of
it dismounted; and next to him Breckenridge’s division. The cavalry and
two infantry brigades of Breckenridge’s extended beyond Baird’s left;
next in line came Cleburne’s division, in reserve behind Breckenridge
was Walker’s two divisions of five brigades.
General Longstreet commanded the left wing of the Confederate Army.
This began at Cleburne’s left with Stewart’s division opposite
Palmer’s and Reynolds’s; then came B. R. Johnson’s opposite Brannan’s
and Wood’s; next in line came Hindman’s, just opposite to Davis,
and Sheridan’s, and in reserve behind Hindman’s was Preston’s. In
reserve behind B. R. Johnson’s were Law’s or Hood’s--until Hood was
wounded--and Kershaw’s five brigades in both. Cheatham’s five brigades
were in reserve behind Stewart’s right, but fought only the Union left,
both on the 19th and 20th. At 3:30 p. m. Cheatham went to the extreme
right of the Confederate Army. The strength of the whole Confederate
formation lay in its reserves; they were used with consummate ability.
The only reserves on the right wing of the Union Army at the time
of the Confederate assault was Van Cleve’s division--which as an
organized division did not fight on the 20th--and Wilder’s mounted
brigade.
Longstreet had brought with him from Virginia two divisions of Hood’s
Corps--McLaws’s and Law’s. Of McLaws’s division only Kershaw’s and
Humphreys’s brigades arrived in time to take part in the battle of
Chickamauga. Law had three brigades in his division. These were
Robertson’s, Benning’s, and another, later commanded by Colonel James
L. Sheffield.
Bushrod R. Johnson’s division belonged to Buckner’s Corps from East
Tennessee. Buckner’s Corps included also Stewart’s and Preston’s
divisions. These were not together during the battle, but were
presumably under direct command of General Longstreet. The condition
of Leonidas Polk’s old corps, was almost similar. Cheatham’s division
of five brigades, and Hindman’s of three brigades--of Polk’s former
corps--were separated, and operated in different parts of the field.
Daniel H. Hill’s Corps consisted of Cleburne’s and Breckenridge’s
divisions; these acted together, commanded by Hill in person. General
W. H. T. Walker’s Corps was composed of his old division, commanded
by General State Rights Gist, and Liddell’s division consisting of two
brigades--Govan’s and Walthall’s.
[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA, MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 268]
It will be understood that the Confederate forces were large, strongly
organized, well officered, and extremely well placed on the field.
Since falling back from Tullahoma the following reinforcements had
joined Bragg: Walker’s five brigades from Mississippi, Buckner’s six
brigades from East Tennessee, and Hood’s five brigades from Virginia,
besides a large amount of artillery. The coming of General Longstreet
from Virginia was a distinct assistance to the Confederate Army. He
was a genuine soldier of great ability, and capable of commanding his
soldiers, clearly shown when he handled the left Confederate wing on
the 20th. The contrast between him and Leonidas Polk was very much in
evidence on the 20th. Longstreet was exceedingly strong, while Polk was
very weak. The Confederate right overlapped the Union left and had the
Union right been as compactly drawn towards its left as it should have
been, the Confederate left would also have overlapped that flank.
The Confederate Army facing the Union forces on the morning of the
20th was made up of eleven divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry.
General Rosecrans had no cavalry on his left, and Wheeler’s Confederate
cavalry was at first on the east side of the Chickamauga and afterwards
on the west side, watching Mitchell’s Union horsemen near Crawfish
Springs.
General Rosecrans had 141 regiments of infantry, 18 of cavalry, and
36 batteries. Bragg had 173 infantry regiments, 11 of cavalry--which
were dismounted and fought as infantry--28 cavalry regiments, and 50
batteries.
The Union front of battle on the morning of the 20th, was about two
and a half miles in length. Although Bragg had ordered the attack to
be commenced on his right at daylight, and to be continued towards the
left, yet it was 9:30 o’clock before Breckenridge advanced his three
brigades, Adams’s, Stovall’s, and Helm’s against the left of Baird’s
and John Beatty’s thin line beyond. Adams’s brigade on the right
crossed the Lafayette road, and Stovall struck Beatty. The latter had
to give way, but inflicted terrible punishment on the enemy.
Part of Stovall’s brigade came against the regular brigade, but made no
impression. Helm, the left of Breckenridge’s line, attacked the right
of the regulars’, Scribner’s line. The Confederate line was shattered
and went to pieces. Helm, in bravely trying to rally his men was
killed; two of Helm’s colonels were also killed, and two others wounded.
Adams’s brigade was gaining the rear of King, when Stanley’s brigade of
Negley’s long delayed division came into the Kelly field, and formed at
right angles with the road and the Union line swept to the north, past
King’s left, charged into the woods upon Adams’s brigade, and drove
it away. Sometime during their attacks Adams was wounded and taken
prisoner. Breckenridge’s attack was a failure, but the firing by the
infantry and the artillery was terrific while it lasted. Cleburne’s
division advanced while Breckenridge was still in the fight; his attack
covered part of Baird’s and Johnson’s. Cleburne was a very capable
officer; brave to the utmost; still his attack completely failed.
Polk’s brigade of that division assaulted Starkweather. With regard
to this attack Polk states in his official report[20] “My line from
right to left, soon became furiously engaged, the enemy pouring a most
destructive fire of canister and musketry into my advancing line--so
terrible indeed, that my line could not advance in face of it, but
lying down, partially protected by the crest of the hill, we continued
the fight for an hour and a half.”
Cleburne states in his report[21] “Polk’s brigade and the right of
Wood’s encountered the heaviest artillery fire I have ever experienced.
I was now within short canister range of a line of log breastworks, and
a hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods from the unseen enemy in
my front.” This charge was also a failure, but most destructive to the
Confederates. Wood reported[22] a loss in his brigade of 96 killed and
680 wounded. The great disparity of the wounded, in comparison with the
killed, showed that the Confederate lines did not get very close to
the Union boys. The Union forces were so pleased with having repulsed
so forceful an attack, that they sent forward a strong skirmish line.
General Hill--who was forming from the reserves a stronger second
attack--paused, and concluded he would have to resist an attack from
the Union line.
Walker’s reserve corps of two divisions of five brigades was therefore
moved forward and distributed along the broken points of the first
line. During the day successive charges were made from Palmer’s
position to the Union left, by ten Confederate brigades along the
Union line, which, however, they could not penetrate, nor could they
get very close to the breastworks. Colquitt, commander of one of
these brigades, fell as well as several of his officers, and General
Deshler of Cleburne’s division was killed. Govan of Walker’s troops
gained the rear of Baird’s division by marching around Baird’s left
and driving away the thin unprotected Union line at that point. This
second advance--which was actually another phase of the continuous
attack from 9:30 to nearly noon--had extended its right much further
beyond the Union left, and by a wide left wheel it had straddled
the Lafayette road. One brigade on the right of the road, another on
the left, boldly threw out skirmishers and advanced towards General
Reynolds’s rear, beyond the Kelly house. It was a very threatening and
dangerous situation. The Confederate line in front--from Baird around
to Brannan--opened a heavy fire upon the barricades. It looked for a
while, as if the movement would succeed in destroying the heretofore
invincible line of General Thomas’s troops; but Thomas saw every
movement and knew the weakness of the left beyond Baird. Brannan had
a reserve brigade--Fred Van Derveer’s--and this arrived just in time
to form in front of the Confederate brigades in the Kelly field. It
changed front under fire, charged the Confederate line, broke it, and
finally drove it clear of the Union left. Then the reserve brigade
returned to a point near the Kelly house. Van Derveer’s brigade had
come, at this time, with an order from General Rosecrans to Brannan,
to report his whole division to General Thomas. It was under the
supposition that Brannan had done so, that Rosecrans soon after
issued the fatal order to Wood to close up on Reynolds. But the enemy
had gained the line, where Beatty had before stood. Palmer sent his
reserve brigade (Grose’s), in accordance with General Thomas’s order;
his brigade formed double lines, and with cheers they charged into
the woods and the enemy was driven away. Then Barnes, of Van Cleve’s
division, was placed on or near the left; the Union left was henceforth
safe.
THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK UPON THE UNION RIGHT
About 11 o’clock the successive attacks of the Confederate divisions
from the left to the right had reached Longstreet’s wing; they were
continued with a charge by Stewart upon Reynolds’s position; it
involved Hazen or Palmer, who had been transferred to the right of
Reynolds and to the left of Brannan. This was the beginning of the
general assault on the Union right, which came so near being disastrous
to General Rosecrans’s army. This attack of Stewart’s took place at the
time when Adams and Stovall of Breckenridge’s division were entering
the open Kelly field upon the Confederate right. General Stewart
acknowledges, in his report, that his charge was repulsed with great
slaughter. The division next to Stewart took up the assault. It was
Bushrod R. Johnson’s supported by Law and Kershaw. Just before this
attack an aide of General Thomas had come to General Rosecrans to ask
again for support on the left. In riding close to the line between
General Reynolds’s and General Brannan’s divisions he observed that
the latter--Brannan being in echelon with Reynolds--did not make a
continuous line, but a broken one. The position of General Brannan was
nevertheless just as effective, and perhaps more so, than if he had
been in the main line. General Thomas J. Wood’s division, which had
just replaced Negley’s division, was next to the right of Brannan but
in the main line; it joined, however, its left to Brannan’s right;
wherefore the aide reported to General Rosecrans that Reynolds’s right
was unprotected. Brannan had been ordered to go to General Thomas’s
left, but on account of being threatened with an attack on his front
he remained with two of his brigades, and sent Van Derveer’s, his
reserve brigade. Rosecrans dictated at once an order to Wood, “to close
upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him.” Thereupon Wood
withdrew from the line, and marched to the rear of Brannan, just as
the Confederate charge, under B. R. Johnson, reached its old front.
Rosecrans issued his order to Wood supposing that Brannan had gone with
his whole division to the Kelly field. Brannan reported what action
he had taken, and that Reynolds had approved it. Rosecrans gave his
approval instantly; but the fatal order had been issued to Wood some
minutes before, and consequently his division was moving out, just
as the eight brigades made the attack. Longstreet had massed these
brigades opposite the Union centre. They were formed in three lines,
lapped over the right of Brannan and the left of Davis--whose division
was on the right of Wood--and moved close to the gap; they widened
the awful space left by Wood; the attack struck Wood’s rear brigade
(Buell’s) and shattered it. Brannan who was a very able commander threw
back his right, but lost a part of Connell’s brigade in this movement.
With great skill and considerable deliberation he re-established his
line on the Horse Shoe Ridge, near the Snodgrass house, on a line
nearly perpendicular to the one from which he had retreated. Although
Wood’s division was subjected to a heavy attack, he--with the aid of
General Thomas, who had just come from the left wing--succeeded in
establishing his remaining troops in prolongation of Brannan’s new
line, and in reaching towards, but not entirely, Reynolds’s right,
which retired slightly. Hazen’s brigade of Palmer’s division filled
up the gap between Reynolds and Wood, thus making the Union line
a nearly continuous one from Snodgrass Hill to the left of Baird,
where Barnes’s brigade had taken position. The shape of the line was
that of a very flattened crescent, with the convex side towards the
enemy; it was greatly shortened, however, by the losses of the 19th,
and the cutting off on the right of two whole divisions, Davis’s and
Sheridan’s, a part of Wood’s, and some of Van Cleve’s. These were now
beyond the Confederate line and were attacked by heavy forces while
on the march, driving them from the field. Negley with his remaining
brigade was caught in the gap from whence he drifted towards Brannan.
General H. V. Boynton said about this affair on this part of the field:
“Negley, gathering up much artillery, was ordered by General Thomas to
post it on the crest overlooking the field in front of Baird’s left,
but instead he took it to Brannan’s right. This was a good position
for it and it could have been of great service there later, when the
Confederate line made an advance to that point, but he retired with it
in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the artillery to follow him,
before he was attacked.”
Jefferson C. Davis was a fine and brave officer. He had only two
brigades, Carlin’s and Heg’s; the latter was commanded by Martin, for
Colonel Heg had been mortally wounded the day before. These brigades
had done some wonderful fighting on the day before, when they were
greatly reduced. After the break they could not stand against the
Confederate charge, wherefore they drifted towards Rossville. Davis
and Sheridan were both on the move by the left flank closing up toward
the left, when the Confederate charge struck them. Van Cleve with
his remaining brigades in motion--Barnes had gone to the left--was
thrown into disorder by the rapid dash of some artillery through the
ranks, while a portion of them rallied with Wood. General Lytle of
the Sheridan brigade was killed while trying to rally his troops.
These divisions and brigades went back, together with Wilder’s mounted
brigade, carrying with them Generals Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden,
who at that time were to the right of the break. The line of their
retreat was through McFarland’s Gap in Missionary Ridge, south of
Rossville. These troops did not go further back than to Rossville,
but Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden kept on to Chattanooga. Boynton
says, that Sheridan’s division was in good order when it arrived
at Rossville. Davis tried his best to reform his troops near to
McFarland’s Gap; he did march them back to the field, but reached
it too late in the evening. In the neighborhood of the two gaps,
McFarland’s and Rossville, were some ten thousand fugitive troops; the
way was open for them to have been led either to the right or to the
left of the Union line. But who was there who had rank and authority
enough to lead them, while their army and corps commanders were still
further to the rear? James A. Garfield, Gates P. Thruston, chief of
McCook’s staff, Surgeons Gross and Perkins, medical directors of the
Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, rode back and joined General Thomas.
Sheridan was requested by Thruston, the adjutant-general and chief of
staff to General McCook, at McFarland’s Gap--by a message from General
Thomas--to march to the latter’s relief, but he insisted on marching
back to Rossville and from there taking the Lafayette road to the left
flank of the army.[23] This was a most out of the way road to the
battlefield. Sheridan wanted to report quickly to General Thomas when
the break occurred and was doing that by way of Rossville. It was dark
before he arrived near to the left; the Union troops had then begun the
backwood movement.
After the second attack on the left by Walker’s and Hill’s corps,
Breckenridge again came in behind Baird, but was repulsed by Van
Derveer, Grose, and Willich. All was quiet on the left, while heavy
firing continued on the right, when General Thomas rode over to the
right to look at matters there. This occurred during the adjustment
after the break, and he placed what remained of Wood’s on the left of
Brannan, the latter having taken his position prior to that on Horse
Shoe Ridge. General Thomas did not return to the left until about 5:30
p. m.
There had been no intimation to the four commanders on the left--Baird,
Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds--that everything had not gone well with
the right. They could get no message from Thomas for two or three
hours. At this juncture, fearing another assault by the Confederate
lines, and supposing that Thomas had been cut off from them, Palmer,
Johnson, and Reynolds consulted with Baird and proposed that General
Palmer, as the senior and ranking officer, be placed in command of
their four divisions and march them off the field. General Baird
refusing to join them, prevented this calamity. Had this been done,
the Confederate right wing, confronting them, could have advanced
unimpeded in the rear of the Union troops on Snodgrass Hill, about
three-quarters of a mile directly in the rear of the Union left.
In view of what happened later in the evening with regard to the
successful falling back, it is not necessary to state what a probable
disaster General Baird prevented.
[Illustration: THE FATAL ORDER TO WOOD, AT CHICKAMAUGA
Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 270]
Longstreet followed the drawing back of the Union right, by a right
wheel of his divisions, while keeping Preston’s division in reserve,
probably in order to be ready to repel quickly any attack upon his
left and rear by Davis, Sheridan, Wilder, or R. B. Mitchell. There was
no need to be alarmed, for no troops approached from that quarter.
He largely outflanked and outnumbered the right wing of Rosecrans.
General Garfield had brought an order to Thomas from Rosecrans to take
command of the army, which was left on the field, and to fall back
to Rossville, to form a new line, and to hold back the enemy from
Chattanooga. Thomas made his headquarters near the Snodgrass house and
directed all the movements of the Union forces for the rest of the day.
He determined to hold the present line at least until night, when
the retreat could be made with less danger. To meet the six triumphant
divisions of Longstreet, the available troops in line were Croxton’s
and part only of Connell’s brigades of Brannan’s division; Wood, with
only Harker’s brigade, and one regiment of Buell’s; his other regiments
seemed to have faded away, or been cut off in the break. With Wood’s
line were a part of John Beatty’s brigade, a part of Stanley’s, and the
Twenty-first Ohio of Sirwell’s: these were of Negley’s division, but
Negley was not with them. There were parts of the Ninth and Seventeenth
Kentucky, Forty-fourth Indiana, and Thirteenth Ohio of Van Cleve’s
division, but no division commander with them.
The Forty-fourth Indiana of Dick’s brigade, and the Seventeenth
Kentucky of Beatty’s brigade, and both of Van Cleve’s--Barnes’s brigade
being still on the left--were the only regiments which deflected from
the fugitives, and fell in with Wood’s and Brannan’s line.
[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA, EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 274]
Longstreet’s troops attacked these fragments repeatedly with tremendous
force, but were repulsed with great loss. Finally one of Hindman’s
brigades gained a position on Brannan’s right and rear, without
opposition, for no troops were there to oppose them. Negley had held
that point earlier with ample artillery and infantry supports, but he
was then in Rossville. Just at this time, when disaster again seemed
inevitable, General Gordon Granger reported to General Thomas; having
marched his troops with the true instincts of a soldier from McAffee’s
church, in front of Rossville Gap facing Ringgold, to the sound of the
battle. Thomas ordered him to the right of Brannan. Two large brigades,
Whittaker’s and John G. Mitchell’s, were commanded by the gallant
General James B. Steedman; these formed in line, charged up the hill
against that brigade which had gained the flank of Croxton, and drove
it pell-mell back down the hill with great slaughter. At this time,
Van Derveer’s brigade came from the Kelly field, where it had done
such fine service. This brigade formed on Steedman’s left and joined
in the attack. When this combined force struck the enemy the musketry
firing was heavier than any before delivered. It lasted perhaps twenty
minutes. It was immediately in the rear of Baird’s division, on
the left, about three-fourths of a mile away; could not be seen on
account of the woods, but was heard, and it was terrific. Twice Hindman
reformed at a safe distance, and tried to recapture the hill, but being
overwhelmed, abandoned any future efforts; these brigades formed in
prolongation of Brannan’s right and fought until dark. While Sheridan
was marching on the west side of Missionary Ridge towards Rossville,
Granger was marching on the east side of it towards the battle, without
other orders than a general one, given days before to support the army.
They both must have heard the firing, and should have marched to it;
if these fugitive troops could have been brought on the field with a
competent commander, what would the result have been? How could they
keep away? Would not the Confederate Army--which was so nearly used
up--have been glad to fall back to Rome?
Hindman, in his report[24] speaks in the following words of this
desperate contest on the Union right lasting over four hours, viz.: “I
have never known Federal troops to fight so well.” General Daniel H.
Hill, who commanded a Confederate corps on the army’s right, says in
an article on the battle of Chickamauga, that he never saw the dead
so thick anywhere as he did on the slopes of Snodgrass Hill after the
attacks by Longstreet’s several divisions.[25]
General Garfield after returning from Rossville to the field, rode
long the lines of his old brigade, now Harker’s of Wood’s division,
cheered the men with muskets and gave by his presence the evidence
that others who did not come back from the rear could have done so.
Longstreet’s report states: “Hood’s column broke the enemy’s line near
the Brotherton house, and made it wheel to the right. In making this
movement Major-General Hood fell severely and it was feared mortally
wounded by a minie ball breaking his thigh.” Law succeeded Hood in
command. Longstreet continues as follows: “About three o’clock in the
afternoon I asked the commanding general for some of the troops of the
Right Wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back
so badly that they could be of no service to me.”[26] The figures of
losses on the two wings given later on will show that Bragg was right.
The forces to resist the whole Confederate Army were but five divisions
in line. The rank and file of these divisions did not know of the
condition on the right, which was very fortunate; they stood and fought
therefore defensively, and with great confidence and bravery.
The Union line, as now formed, consisted of Thomas’s original five
divisions and such troops as Wood’s one brigade (Harker’s), a fraction
of another (Buell’s) and fractions of regiments which had drifted in,
together with Steedman’s two brigades. It stood off the Confederate
Army until dark. An attack on General Thomas’s left--organized about
three o’clock--must be mentioned, however. It is supposed that this
was made in order to prevent any of the Union troops at that point
from being sent to the right. The attack was a general one and was
easily repulsed. The divisions of Breckenridge, Liddell, Armstrong’s
dismounted cavalry, and Forrest’s artillery across the Lafayette road,
were active. Willich made the fourth charge along the length of Kelly’s
field against these troops across the Lafayette road. At half after
five o’clock all was quiet on the Union left, and confidence filled the
hearts of the troops; but the attacks by Longstreet on the Union right
lasted another hour.
Thomas had orders from Rosecrans to draw back to Rossville; Granger
wanted him to ignore the orders and hold the field; but Thomas would
not accede to such a request, and began the movement at half past five.
His line was solid and confident, but had very little ammunition, and
no rations. He was largely outnumbered and outflanked at both right and
left; by falling back to Rossville he would gain the fugitive troops,
whom he had been unable to induce to march back to this position; he
would also gain a stronger defensive line, which would better cover
the approaches to the city. He intended to start the movement so
early in the evening that he could get the troops in the proper roads
and directions before night, when darkness would protect them from
danger of attack during the march. Boynton says: “It was in no sense
a military retreat,” it was done “because Chattanooga, and not the
Chickamauga woods, was the objective of the campaign.” Still, it may
also be said, that the Confederate Army was the objective, and that its
destruction was of more importance than the occupation of the city. It
is quite certain that General Thomas would gladly have remained on the
field, if he had been confident that he could have destroyed Bragg’s
army the next day. He did not know at that time that it was badly used
up as later events proved and the movement backwards in the face of a
very vigilant foe, who was constantly advancing in almost full force,
would have been dangerous.
The dispositions made by General George H. Thomas--before and after
he discovered the break in the Union right--were of the highest
military character; his plan of withdrawal to Rossville was equally
scientific. In his report he says, that after the arrival of Granger’s
forces and their effective attack on the enemy’s troops on the right
of Brannan, every assault of the enemy until nightfall was repulsed
in the most gallant style by the whole line. This was the result of
his skillful placing of troops, his constant watchfulness with regard
to the movements of the enemy, and the excellent counter movements by
the Union forces. But the real cause of the preservation of the army
was the masterful formation of the five divisions remaining under
General Thomas’s command on the morning of the 20th; they were formed
in compact, double lines, protected by log breastworks and had three
or four brigades in reserve; these lines required no re-adjustment and
were not penetrated. His watchfulness of the troops--of which many
formed under his own direction on Snodgrass Hill after the break on the
right--enabled him to point out instantly where they should go, when
Granger and Steedman appeared. Let it be remembered that he was at that
time unaware of the extent of the disaster on the right. In his report
he states, “General Garfield, chief of staff of General Rosecrans,
reached this position about 4 p. m., in company with Lieutenant-Colonel
Thruston, of McCook’s staff, and Captains Gaw and Barker, of my
staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if
possible. General Garfield gave me the first reliable information
that the right and centre of our army had been driven, and of its
condition at that time. I soon after received a dispatch from General
Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with
Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position, and assume a threatening
attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga
for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at
Chattanooga, and then join me; also that he had sent out rations and
ammunition to me at Rossville.”[27]
General Thomas, of course, knew before Garfield reached him that
disaster of some kind had occurred on the right; but he did not know
its extent, neither did he know of the departure of the many troops
and high officers from the field. When he received this dispatch from
General Rosecrans he determined to fall back and immediately formulated
his plans. To enable the troops in line to hold the positions they
occupied until the proper time to fall back, he sent two aides to
distribute some ammunition--ten rounds to the man--which Granger had
brought with him. As soon as this was done he sent Captain Willard,
an aide, to direct the division commanders to be prepared to withdraw
their commands as soon as they received orders. At 5:30 p. m. Captain
Barker carried the order to Reynolds to commence the movement. Thomas
does not indicate in his report why he wanted Reynolds to commence the
movement, but it has been shown that his division was the one best
located for the work. A brigade of Confederate troops of Liddell’s
division occupied at that time the woods on the west of the Lafayette
road, between the Union right on Snodgrass Hill and the left around
the Kelly field. It was in the rear of both Union wings. Reynolds’s
position was at the head of these woods, and his troops could fire
into the Confederate lines without danger to the backs of the Union
soldiers. Under Thomas’s direction, Turchin’s brigade moved down the
Lafayette road, and filed to the left; when his rear had cleared
the road and faced to the right on the march, he threw his brigade
upon the Confederate forces and drove them in utter defeat entirely
beyond Baird’s left. This was the fifth charge made during the day
in the same direction along this road, in and adjacent to the Kelly
field. General Thomas posted Reynolds’s two brigades, Turchin’s and
Robinson’s--formerly King’s--together with Johnson’s reserve brigade
and General Willich’s on the ridge road west of the Lafayette road,
near the Mullis farm, in order to cover McFarland’s Gap. Thomas’s
report describes best what followed: “These dispositions being made,
I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from
their positions. Johnson’s and Baird’s division were attacked at the
moment of retiring, but, by being prepared, retired without confusion
or any serious losses. General Palmer was attacked while retiring.
* * * I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield
and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in
position at that point.”[28]
During Baird’s withdrawal he was heavily attacked by the enemy, and
lost a great many who were taken prisoners; some of these remained too
long behind the breastworks, others took a wrong direction in falling
back. The troops which had retreated to Rossville Gap during the day
were reorganized by their officers prior to the falling back of the
main army. Negley’s division was placed directly across the gap, and
the next morning Baird’s was placed behind it; the other divisions on
the right and left (on the crest of the ridge) were stationed with
Minty’s cavalry in front of the gap, about one mile and a half on the
Ringgold road. General R. B. Mitchell’s cavalry was on the Union right
covering McFarland’s Gap, and extending his right to the Chattanooga
Creek. McCook’s Corps was in line about a mile behind him.
On September 21, General N. B. Forrest advanced at Rossville some
Confederate cavalry close enough to throw a shell or two into a Union
wagon train and Minty’s advance Union cavalry on the Ringgold road
had a little skirmish. But the Confederate Army was not advancing;
apparently it did not intend to attack the position at this point.
In fact, General Bragg did not know of the retirement of the Union
Army until the 21st, and he did not order an advance. The Confederate
Army lay still on the field during the 21st, and most of the 22nd.
Therefore General Thomas advised General Rosecrans to concentrate the
troops at Chattanooga, and this was done on the night of September
21, in a most admirable manner under Thomas’s direction. Brannan’s
division--in order to cover and protect the movement--was posted
half way between Rossville and Chattanooga. Nearly all the infantry
and artillery were in or around the city by 7 a. m. of the 22nd. The
different organizations were marched directly to positions previously
assigned them.
Baird’s division (now Rousseau’s), with Minty’s cavalry still in rear
of it, brought up the rear, and did not arrive in the entrenchments
around the city until late in the evening of the 22nd. General
Rousseau, who was absent from early in August, joined the army again
at Rossville on September 21, and assumed command of his old division.
General Baird was later assigned to another division at Chattanooga.
In the forenoon of the 22nd, Cheatham’s Confederate division marched
to the neighborhood of Chickamauga station, and took a road leading
thence to the top of Missionary Ridge; it was followed by the rest of
Polk’s Corps on the 23rd. On the same day, Hill’s and Longstreet’s
corps followed on different roads and slowly formed their line on top
of the ridge. Longstreet’s and Hill’s was thrown across the valley to
the foot of Lookout; their left was on the top of Lookout Mountain and
their right on the northeast nose of Missionary Ridge, abutting on the
Tennessee River, but the main line did not reach to the river. Their
camps were principally located in the Chickamauga Valley on the east
side of the ridge, where they were protected from observation by the
Union forces.
WISCONSIN TROOPS AT CHICKAMAUGA
There were five infantry regiments from Wisconsin in the battle of
Chickamauga, viz.: the First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and
Twenty-fourth. The First and Twenty-first were parts of the Second
Brigade, commanded by General John C. Starkweather--formerly Colonel
of the First Wisconsin Infantry--of the First Division, commanded by
General Absalom Baird, of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General
George H. Thomas. They were actively engaged near the extreme left on
both days of the battle. When Baird’s division on the morning of the
19th advanced from Kelly’s house on the Lafayette road, Starkweather’s
brigade was in reserve behind the other two brigades of the division.
His brigade was formed in two lines, the first composed of the First
Wisconsin on the right and the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania on the
left, with the Fourth Indiana Battery between the two wings. The
Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry and Twenty-fourth Illinois Infantry
formed the rear line. Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham commanded
the First, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison C. Hobart the Twenty-first.
Having advanced about a mile through the woods, driving the enemy’s
skirmishers, Starkweather moved to Thomas’s left by the order of the
General, in order to relieve Croxton’s brigade of Brannan’s division,
reported to be out of ammunition. General Starkweather seems to have no
sooner taken position here than the enemy attacked in such overwhelming
numbers as to force him back. He retreated to a ridge in the rear of
his left; leaving his battery temporarily in the possession of the
enemy. Very soon the enemy was struck on his flank and rear by General
Johnson’s division of McCook’s Corps and forced back; the battery was
then recovered.
In reforming the lines late in the afternoon, Starkweather’s brigade
was placed on the left of Johnson’s division; it took part in the night
attack by the Confederate General Cleburne, and was under fire during
the whole of the battle of the 19th. On the morning of the 20th it
formed the right of Baird’s position in the woods east of the Kelly
field, and was in one of the most exposed positions; this brought it
again on the left of Johnson’s division. The Fourth Indiana Battery had
two guns in the centre of the brigade and two upon the left. General
Starkweather in his official report says: “This position was held and
retained during the whole day under repeated attacks from the enemy
in heavy columns supported with batteries, repulsing and driving the
enemy back from time to time; driving the enemy also back from the
extreme left with the artillery. * * * While holding this position the
ammunition of my first line was expended, and most of the second line,
together with all the ammunition of the battery, except three rounds
of canister.”[29] He retired with the rest of Baird’s division in the
evening of the 20th to Rossville, thence to Chattanooga on the 22nd.
In the retirement, Lieutenant-Colonel Hobart, eight other commissioned
officers, and 67 men of the Twenty-first Wisconsin were captured by the
enemy. The loss of the First Wisconsin was 188 killed, wounded, and
missing; the latter being 77. The officers killed were Captains Abner
O. Heald, and William S. Mitchell; Lieutenants James S. Richardson, and
Charles A. Searles. Of the Twenty-first the loss was 121, of these 76
were missing. The First seems to have gone into the battle with 391,
and the Twenty-first with 369 men.
The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry--commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John H.
Ely--was in Scribner’s brigade of Baird’s division. The history of its
fighting is almost identical with that of the First and Twenty-first.
On the 20th the Tenth Wisconsin Infantry was immediately on the
left of Starkweather. Colonel Ely, Major McKercher and several other
officers, together with a large number of men were captured in falling
back (by orders), on the evening of the 20th. They, by mistake, took
the wrong direction, going too far to the right, as they faced the
rear, and thus ran into the enemy. Its loss was a total of 211, but
145 of these were missing. Captain J. W. Roby, who made the report
says: “Monday morning September 21st we numbered three officers and 26
men.” Lieutenant-Colonel Ely’s name appears among those killed; the
other officers killed were Captain George M. West and Lieutenant Robert
Rennie.
The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry served in the Third brigade, Davis’s
division of the Twentieth Corps. This brigade was commanded by Colonel
Hans C. Heg until he was killed on the 19th; and afterwards by Colonel
John A. Martin. This regiment fought most gallantly with Davis’s
division on the 19th, when, according to their official report, the
loss was 7 officers and 59 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing.
It will be remembered that on the 20th General Davis’s division was
cut off on the right by the break at Wood’s division, and that it,
after some desultory fighting, retired to McFarland’s Gap. The total
loss of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was 111, of which 55 men were
captured or missing. The officers killed were Colonel Hans C. Heg,
Captains Hans Hanson, Henry Hauff, John M. Johnson, and Lieutenant
Oliver Thompson.
The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was in General Lytle’s brigade
of the First Division of the Twentieth Corps. This regiment, with the
brigade to which it was attached, occupied the entrenchments at Lee
and Gordon’s Mill on the afternoon of the 19th, where it relieved
General Thomas J. Wood’s division; it remained here all afternoon under
a little artillery fire from the enemy, which did no harm, however.
At 3 a. m. on the 20th it went to a point near General Rosecrans’s
headquarters, near the Widow Glenn’s house; at 10:30 a. m. it double
quicked--under a terrific fire from the enemy--to the point where
General Lytle was killed; it fought here for thirty minutes driving
the enemy, but was soon outflanked by Hindman’s troops coming toward
its left flank from the celebrated break. The official report of its
commander (Major Carl Von Baumbach), from which the foregoing facts
are gleaned, says further: “We retreated in some disorder; but quickly
reformed on a hill some 400 yards to the rear. Our brave and gallant
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. West, being among the missing, I
assumed command.” This regiment bivouaced for the night at Rossville;
its loss was 3 officers and 69 men killed and wounded, and 20 missing;
Captain Gustavus Goldsmith was killed. The Major in his report makes
especial mention of Lieutenant Thomas E. Balding, acting adjutant, for
his gallant conduct.
The First Wisconsin Cavalry--under command of Colonel Oscar H.
LaGrange--was a part of the Second Brigade, of Colonel Edward M.
McCook’s cavalry division. During the campaign, preceding the battle,
this regiment performed the usual duties of cavalry in reconnoitering,
picketing, leading in advance of the marching column of infantry, and
generally acting with the rest of the cavalry, as the eyes of the army.
On the 19th it was stationed on the right of the army to watch the
enemy’s cavalry, which kept on the east side of the Chickamauga in the
movement back to Rossville, and thence into Chattanooga, it protected
the trains and rear of the army. Its loss was 2 men wounded and 4
missing.
There were three Wisconsin light batteries with the Army of the
Cumberland, in the battle of Chickamauga: the Third, Fifth, and Eighth.
The Third Battery--commanded by Lieutenant Courtland Livingston--was
attached to Van Cleve’s division of Crittenden’s Corps. Captain L. H.
Drury of this battery, was chief of artillery of the division; he was
severely wounded in a skirmish several days before the battle. This
battery followed the fortunes of its division; but there seems to be no
definite report by its commanding officer. Its losses were 2 killed, 12
wounded and 12 missing, out of an aggregate of 119.
The Fifth Wisconsin Battery, commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner
was attached to the First Brigade, commanded by Colonel P. Sidney Post
of General Jefferson C. Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps. This
brigade was guarding the supply train, and was not engaged in the
battle, and this battery had no losses. The brigade commander, in his
official report, commends Captain Gardner for great zeal and ability in
the management of the battery.
The Eighth Wisconsin Battery--commanded by Lieutenant John D.
McLean--was attached to Colonel Heg’s brigade of Davis’s division of
McCook’s Twentieth Corps. The chief of artillery of Davis’s division
reports, that the movement of the artillery in the Chickamauga woods
was not deemed practicable; therefore, this battery did not become
engaged, and had no losses.
The Chickamauga campaign proper was now ended. It formed the second
step in the campaign from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga; the Tullahoma
campaign being the first. It is true, the city was now occupied by the
Army of the Cumberland, but its possession was not secure as long as
the Confederate Army lay within two or three miles, and held the city’s
most available lines of supply by the river and the river road, between
Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Therefore, another conflict was necessary,
which would constitute the third step in the great campaign. An
account of that struggle will include the coming of reinforcements to
the Union Army; the opening of what the men in the ranks called, “the
cracker line;” the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland; and
an account of the four battles of Wauhatchie, Orchard Knob, Lookout
Mountain, and Missionary Ridge. But before that is attempted, it
will be necessary to make some observations on the late battle of
Chickamauga.
The Army of the Cumberland--or rather that part of it which now
occupied the city--was reduced by the Chickamauga battle to an
estimated aggregate of 35,000. This estimate excluded perhaps the
cavalry. Its total losses, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the
Chickamauga campaign reached 13,615. A large number of sick, besides
the wounded, were in hospitals. But the Confederate losses were at
least 5,374 more than those of the Union Army. General Longstreet, in
his book, _From Manassas to Appomatox_, claims that the Confederate
force at Chickamauga was somewhat less than 60,000 men. The Confederate
records are so defective that it is largely an estimate to give
their numbers or losses. General H. V. Boynton estimates the number
at very much more than 60,000. There is no doubt that Bragg actually
outnumbered Rosecrans on the field by several thousand troops, perhaps
in the proportion of 60,000 to 50,000.
The Union Army captured 2,003 prisoners, and lost 4,774. Of the latter
2,500 were wounded and left on the field when the army fell back to
Rossville. The terrible fighting which took place is shown by the
number of killed and wounded on each side. Longstreet says in his book,
that Bragg’s killed and wounded amounted to 16,986, but the official
returns make them about 1,100 less, or 15,881. The official returns
of the army give the Union losses of killed and wounded 11,338. The
Confederate loss was greater in killed and wounded than at Gettysburg;
and the largest the enemy had in a single battle. Attention is called
to the fact, that the numbers engaged at Gettysburg were about 80,000
on each side; and that the battle lasted three days.
The killed and wounded in some battles of the war are shown in the
following table:
Union Confederate
Shiloh, Tenn. 10,162 9,735
Second Bull Run 10,199 9,108
Fredericksburg, Va. 10,884 4,664
Chancellorsville, Va. 11,368 10,746
Gettysburg, Pa. 17,567 15,298
Chickamauga, Ga. 11,409 15,881
Stone’s River 9,532 9,239
Antietam, Md. 11,657 11,234
In every one of these battles the Union loss was greater than the
Confederate, except at Chickamauga; yet Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Stone’s
River are recorded as Union victories. The Confederate loss at Antietam
was much smaller than that given above, which includes Harper’s Ferry,
South Mountain, Crampton’s Gap, and Shepardstown. The prisoners
captured are excluded from the above list, because only the killed and
wounded indicate the intensity of the fighting.
The Confederate’s large losses at Chickamauga show plainly the active
musketry of the Union troops, their good marksmanship, and the
difference (in the number of casualties) between making and receiving
attacks. On the second day the Union troops remained in line and
received the attacks of the Confederates. At Gettysburg the Union
forces did the same thing during the last two days. Those on the left
at Chickamauga were protected by breastworks, and suffered but little
loss on the 20th; while they inflicted very heavy punishment on the
Confederates; for instance, Hill’s Corps of the Confederate right lost
2,990 out of 8,894; Jackson’s brigade of Cheatham’s division lost 35
per cent. of his force, and the losses in Govan’s brigade exceeded 50
per cent. On the Union side Steedman, while attacking the Confederate
troops--which had gained an enfilading position and were about to
attack the right flank of Brannan--lost in this assault and in the
subsequent position which his troops occupied, 1,787 out of 3,700
in about four hours. The loss is fearful, when assaults are made on
protected lines, or on points held with difficult approaches. On the
Confederate left Benning’s brigade of Hood’s division lost 56.6 per
cent.; Gregg’s brigade of B. R. Johnson’s lost 44.4 per cent. Taking
Longstreet’s estimate of 16,986 killed and wounded, and adding to it
the number of prisoners captured, namely, 2,003, the total Confederate
loss aggregates 18,989. It is officially established that the Union
loss was 11,338 in killed and wounded; its loss in prisoners was 4,774;
but 2,500 of them were wounded and were left on the battlefield. It
is reasonable to suppose that these wounded left on the field were
reported as wounded by their company officers, and are included in the
official returns of the 11,338.
The historian will point out sharply the immense benefit to the Union
Army derived from the log works and the compact lines of the four
divisions under General Thomas on the 20th. The conclusion is a fair
one, that the whole line ought to have been similarly fortified;
there was ample supply of timber along the line to provide for such
protection. Of the five divisions under General Thomas’s command on
the 19th and on the 20th, Brannan’s was the only one which fought
both days without works; on the 19th none of them fought behind any
entrenchments, yet they fought against six Confederate divisions, viz.:
two of Walker’s corps, two of Cheatham’s, Cleburne’s, and Stewart’s.
On the 20th Brannan was on the right and did not fight any of the
Confederate troops, which Baird’s, Johnson’s, Palmer’s, Reynolds’s,
and his own divisions had fought on the 19th. Van Derveer’s brigade
of Brannan’s division made one charge, however, along the Kelly field,
against two brigades of Breckenridge’s; then returned to the right.
But it must be noticed that Breckenridge was not in the fight of the
19th. On the 20th Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds fought behind
breastworks all day the same divisions they had fought the day before
without breastworks, and also Breckenridge’s in addition. It is true
they were assisted a little by two brigades of Negley’s and one of Van
Cleve’s on the left of the breastworks. In addition to the Confederate
infantry divisions mentioned, there was also Forrest’s cavalry of
3,500, which would more than offset any assistance these four Union
divisions had received from other troops on the 20th. The following
table will show the losses in killed and wounded of the divisions on
both sides, with the exception of prisoners captured during the two
days of battle in and around the Kelly field.
The figures are taken from the official returns:
Union Confederate
Brannan--Three Brigades 1,977 Walker--Five Brigades 2,290
Baird--Three Brigades 975 Cheatham--Five Brigades 1,843
Johnson--Three Brigades 1,088 Cleburne--Three Brigades 1,743
Palmer--Three Brigades 1,165 Stewart--Three Brigades 1,674
Reynolds--Two Brigades 778 Breckenridge--Three Brigades 1,075
------ ------
Total 5,983 Total 8,625
There were 14 Union brigades and 19 Confederate. It will be seen
that Brannan, who was not protected by works on the 20th, lost about
800 more than the highest loss of any of the Union divisions, which
were protected. That is a practical illustration of the value of the
precautions thus taken by the protected troops. Estimating Brannan’s
loss on the 20th at 900, his loss on the 19th would be 1,077. This
would reduce the total loss in the Union column above to 5,083.
Considering that the Confederate divisions mentioned above encountered
no other Union troops during the battle, except those five divisions
mentioned, it will be understood that the five Union divisions by
incurring a loss of 5,083 killed and wounded, inflicted a loss on the
enemy of 8,625. Forrest’s loss does not appear but should be added
to the latter; let this item be offset, however, by the losses to
Beatty’s Stanley’s and Barnes’s brigades in their assistance on the
left of Baird.
We will make a similar comparison of the losses on the right of the
Union, and the left of the Confederate Army:
Union
Steedman 1,174--Two Brigades
Sheridan 1,090
Davis 944--Two Brigades
Wood 876--Two Brigades
Van Cleve 660
Negley 496
Brannan (estimate) 900
------
Total 6,140
Confederate
Hood }
Hindman } Six Divisions, 6,881 (estimated)
Buckner }
Preston }
The estimated Confederate loss given above has been made up in the
following manner. The official Confederate loss is given by Colonel W.
F. Fox in his _Regimental Losses in the Civil War_ as 15,881 killed and
wounded at Chickamauga, the Confederate loss of the troops opposed to
the above named Union divisions can be found by adding to 8,625--the
Confederate losses in the first table given above--the estimated loss
of the Confederate cavalry, probably enough to bring the figures to
9,000, and deducting that from 15,881, the total Confederate loss is
secured. The result makes 6, 881 killed and wounded--as given in the
last table--by the seven Union divisions mentioned above, at a cost to
the latter of 6,140 killed and wounded. Longstreet gives in his report
his loss at 7,594 killed and wounded; deducting Stewart’s loss from
this sum leaves 5,920 as the loss of the above mentioned Confederate
forces. This makes the contrast between the two tables still greater.
These figures emphasize the deadly fighting in that great battle,
and they are more eloquent of the valor of American soldiers than
words of song or oratory. They emphasize also the value of defensive
breastworks, in comparison with fighting unprotected.
The Union troops expended 2,650,000 musket cartridges in hitting the
15,881 Confederate killed and wounded; some of them were, however,
wounded by artillery. It appears as if it took about 150 infantry
cartridges to hit one man. The expenditure was 650,000 more cartridges
than at Stone’s River; but then 6,642 more of the Confederates were
struck at Chickamauga, which shows that the firing was much more
destructive.
General Rosecrans states:[30] “The fight on the left after 2 p. m.,
was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least have
troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet charges,
often heard of but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and
regiments in several of our divisions.”
At 2 p. m. on September 21, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War,
sent a dispatch from Chattanooga to the Secretary of War. It contained
the following statements: “Thomas, finding himself cut off from
Rosecrans and the right, at once brought his seven divisions into
position for independent fighting. Refusing both his right and left,
his line assumed the form of a horse-shoe posted along the slope and
crest of a partly wooded ridge. He was soon joined by Granger from
Rossville, with the brigade of McCook and division of Steedman, and
with these forces firmly maintained the fight till after dark. Our
troops were as immovable as the rocks they stood on. The enemy hurled
against them repeatedly the dense columns which had routed Davis and
Sheridan in the morning, but every onset was repulsed with dreadful
slaughter. Falling first on one and then another point of our lines,
for hours the rebels vainly sought to break them. Thomas seemed to have
filled every soldier with his own unconquerable firmness, and Granger,
his hat torn by bullets, raged like a lion wherever the contest was
hottest with the electrical courage of a Ney. * * * When night fell
this body of heroes stood on the same ground they had occupied in the
morning their spirit unbroken, but their numbers greatly diminished.
* * * The divisions of Wood, Johnson, Brannan, Palmer, Reynolds, and
Baird, which never broke at all, have lost very severely.”[31] He
should have added that they inflicted greater loss upon the enemy than
any of the other divisions. The discouraged spirit of the Confederate
Army at the close of the battle was sufficiently apparent when the
forces under Thomas’s command were able--after the arrival of General
Gordon Granger’s troops--to stop the enemy’s further successes. It is
evident that the fighting spirit was gone from Bragg’s army since,
although they discovered the falling back, they did not approach
Rossville Gap on the 21st with a considerable force, nor seriously
interfere in the backward movement to Chattanooga, not even trying to
capture a wagon, mule, or horse, although its great cavalry leader,
Forrest and his troopers, were in force close to Rossville Gap. It
was more paralyzed than the Union Army. General Daniel H. Hill, who
commanded a Confederate corps on the right in the battle, states in
the article referred to before: “There was no more splendid fighting
in ’61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than
was displayed in those bloody days of September, ’63. But it seems
to me that the _elan_ of the Southern soldier was never seen after
Chickamauga--that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone
forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two
of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. * * * He fought stoutly to
the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and
without the enthusiasm of hope. That ‘barren’ victory sealed the fate
of the Southern Confederacy.”[32]
If the Army of the Cumberland accomplished so much at Chickamauga in
spite of certain mistakes, after having penetrated to the centre of the
Confederate territory, what might not have been done, if the right of
the Union line had been properly placed and protected during the night
of the 19th, and if the disastrous order to Wood had not been issued?
The withdrawal of Wood from the line--just before Bushrod Johnson
advanced against the centre--cost the Union fighting line 10,000 men,
and caused the withdrawal, some hours later, of the Union Army to
Rossville. Whether Wood interpreted that order correctly, the fact is
that the order should never have been issued. The movement of closing
in towards the left and of throwing the right further back, should have
been done hours before. One of Mitchell’s cavalry divisions should have
been placed on the Union left during the night of the 19th.
It must be conceded that Brannan’s division was the most active in
the battle. It was well managed, but its loss in killed and wounded
was greater than that of any other Union division. Brannan lost in
killed and wounded 1,977, with 214 missing. His division fought bravely
under his skillful management, yet he was unprotected on both days.
Negley’s loss was 496 killed and wounded, the smallest loss of all. The
following officers went through the battle with great credit, viz.:
Generals Thomas, Granger, Steedman, Brannan, Baird, Johnson, Palmer,
Reynolds; and Brigade-Commanders Hazen, Harker, Van Derveer, Croxton,
Whittaker, John C. Mitchell, Willich, and Turchin.
If a real soldier, like Longstreet, had been in command of the
Confederate right and had found upon advancing against the Union line,
that two brigades lengths extended beyond the Union left, he would
certainly have made more out of such a condition than did Breckenridge
or Leonidas Polk.
General D. H. Hill, in his report[33] discusses the situation as
follows: “The important results effected by two brigades on the flank
proved that, had our army been moved under cover of the woods a mile
farther to the right, the whole Yankee position would have been turned
and an almost bloodless victory gained. A simple reconnoisance before
the battle would have shown the practicability of the movement and
the advantage to be gained by it.” Hill was in command on that flank
and should have acted in accordance with his understanding of the
situation, or at least reported the facts to his superior. This was
what Rosecrans was anxious about when he hastened troops from the right
to the left. If Sheridan could have reached Thomas before Longstreet
cut him off in the act of double-quicking toward the left flank, what
would have happened?
General Thomas’s dispositions to protect his left showed military
genius of the highest order, and General Baird greatly assisted him in
this matter. This was only one instance, however, of General Thomas’s
many equally meritorious tactics in this great battle. He rose to the
highest point in the estimation of both officers and men.
Both days’ fighting illustrates the fact that when troops are
outflanked or attacked in the rear, however brave they may be in other
positions relative to the enemy, they will as a rule go to pieces. It
was repeatedly shown on both sides, especially on the 19th, during
the battle, that the veteran troops as well as the new regiments,
would become disheartened and confused in such a position; many of the
regiments on the left during the second day, who did not flinch when
attacked in flank and rear on the day before, then went to pieces.
The protected troops on the Union left fought through the entire day of
the 20th, entirely unconscious that they were frequently surrounded not
only in front and rear of their own line, but that the two flanks of
the army were only about three-fourths of a mile apart, although in the
morning they were two and a half miles apart. At noon the Union right
was contracted, and thrown back against the left. The order to retreat
late in evening of the 20th came as a surprise and shock to these
troops, who had been repulsing the enemy all day with comparative ease.
Thousands of musket bearers were so stiff and sore from the two days’
conflict and the marches over the mountains during the preceding days,
that when a regiment lying down on the evening of the 20th attempted to
rise there was a distinct creaking of bones and an accompanying groan,
slight, but perceptible. Many of them while moving back to Rossville
at night, took the desperate chance of lying down for a nap in the
woods by the roadside, intending to rest for an hour or two and then
join their regiments again before daylight; but hundreds of these awoke
to find it was already daylight and many were captured by the enemy’s
cavalry.
The Confederate Army itself did not advance from the battlefield until
the 23rd; only a small part leaving on the 22nd. The fact is that the
Confederate Army was much more used up than the Union Army; General
Bragg said to General Longstreet on the 20th that his troops upon
his right were used up.[34] The same Confederate troops which had
penetrated the line and driven Davis, Sheridan, and others from the
field, were so roughly handled by Brannan and Granger on Snodgrass
Hill that they could not be brought forward for another attack. The
slowness with which the Confederate Army moved to their positions
around Chattanooga proves that they were practically defeated. At the
time the orders were sent to the divisions behind the log works on
the left to prepare for withdrawal, their commanders sent word back
to General Thomas that there was no reason for them to retreat; they
had been, and were at that moment repulsing easily every assault.
They did not know of the disaster to the right, caused by Wood’s
withdrawal, nor did General Baird and his brigade commanders know of
the movements of either Union or Confederate forces until after the
retreat. Many writers have expressed the opinion that the Union Army
should not have retreated. But to a soldier who was present on the
field and knew the facts--such as the absence of the commander of the
army; his order sent from the far rear to fall back to Rossville; the
absence of ammunition and rations; the utterly exhausted condition of
the rank and file by the superhuman exertions of the two days’ fighting
and the preceding hard marching; the fear that if the Union Army
remained, the Confederate Army might yet wedge its way between it and
Chattanooga, the Union commander not being aware at that time of the
exhausted and discouraged condition of the Confederate Army--it seems
that the falling back in the way and at the time it did was the correct
thing. At least it seems as if Thomas had really nothing else to do
than to fall back when the order from General Rosecrans was received.
Had General Thomas been the commander of the army, it might have been
different.
The Union cavalry did not properly cooperate with the other arms of the
Union forces. Forrest, with his large Confederate cavalry force, was
close to the right of the Confederate Army, and did fine service; the
force was equal to the infantry in number. Forrest should have been
opposed by a division of the Union cavalry. Only one cavalry brigade
was needed at Crawfish Springs; the other cavalry brigade together
with Wilder’s mounted infantry which closed up on the right of McCook,
should have given better service at a time when it was most needed.
This was not the fault of the cavalry commander, for he only obeyed
orders from his superiors. In a dispatch to General R. B. Mitchell,
the commander of the cavalry, at 7:15 p. m. September 20, General
Rosecrans said, “Had you been on our right today you could have charged
the enemy’s flank, and done much incalculable mischief.” Why was not
his cavalry as close to the Union right flank as Forrest’s was to
the Confederate right flank? Mitchell’s cavalry was too far away to
be effective, when disaster overtook the wing: it was supposed to be
protecting, but it was farther away from Snodgrass Hill on the right
than were the forces of Gordon Granger, at McAffee’s church on the
left.