CHAPTER III

_The Occupation and Battles of Chattanooga_

When the Army of the Cumberland fell back from Chickamauga and

Rossville to Chattanooga, the first and most important thing to do

was to quickly fortify against attack. The troops marched directly to

the places assigned them, and when all were in place, the lines half

encircled the city, both flanks terminating at the river. McCook was on

the right, Thomas next, and Crittenden on the left. The troops began

at once the work of throwing up the ordinary entrenchments; these were

from time to time strengthened until satisfactory. Two forts had been

partially completed by the enemy; these were finished and occupied by

both artillery and infantry. The army was drawn in close around the

city; the point of Lookout Mountain and its slopes beyond Chattanooga

Creek were left to the enemy. This gave the Confederate Army command of

the river, the rail and wagon roads (parallel with the river), between

Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson. The only other practicable road

to the bases of supplies was over Walden’s Ridge on the north side

of the river, a distance of 60 miles by wagon; thus it became very

difficult to furnish more than half or three-quarters rations to the

men, and only very little forage could be furnished to the animals. The

road mentioned was so steep and bad that a team of four or six mules

would consume almost the entire load of feed in bringing the load and

in returning for another.

General Bragg deemed the occupancy of his main line along Missionary

Ridge--across the valley to Lookout Mountain, thence on the south side

of the river by small detachments at different points--to Bridgeport

sufficient to starve out the army in Chattanooga. Meanwhile he sent

Wheeler’s cavalry to the north side, in order to raid the line of

supplies. Wheeler burned 300 wagons in the Sequatchie Valley and went

on north doing what damage he could. Fearing that Bragg might follow

Longstreet’s advice and cross the river east of Chattanooga with a

large part of his army, Rosecrans soon completed an inside works of

circumvallation by which ten thousand men might be able to hold the

city, while he might be obliged to protect his base of supplies by

marching the rest of his army to meet such a situation. That Bragg

did not undertake an enterprise of this character was further proof

of the used-up condition of his army, the result of the late battle

of Chickamauga. Bragg’s reasoning regarding his ability to starve the

forces in the city was good only on the supposition that the Government

at Washington would fail to send sufficient reinforcements to protect

the rear, and to raise “The Siege of Chattanooga;” it was not more

than a semi-siege, however, and has been so called by some authors.

If Bragg’s army had occupied both sides of the river and practically

surrounded the city, as the German troops surrounded Paris in the

Franco-German War of 1871, then it could have been called a siege. Of

course the situation of the Union Army was critical, not only here

in the fortified city, but ever since it crossed the Tennessee River

during the campaign preceding the battle of Chickamauga. As before

mentioned, General Rosecrans estimated on September 23, 1863, that he

had about 35,000 troops in the entrenchments; the cavalry and Wilder’s

brigade of mounted infantry were then on the north side of the river

and guarded the crossings for a considerable distance, both above and

below. Union reinforcements had been ordered both from the east and

from the west; but Burnside, who commanded in East Tennessee, was

asking at the same time for help at Knoxville, instead of being able

to send any succor to Rosecrans. Before the battle of Chickamauga

reinforcements had been ordered from the Army of the Tennessee--at

that time on or near the Mississippi at Memphis--and from Burnside,

but none had arrived. After the great battle and the falling back

of Rosecrans, the commander did not need to urge the President and

Secretary of War to be convinced, that unless they really desired to

lose Tennessee and all that had so far been gained in the department of

the Cumberland, other troops must be sent with the greatest celerity.

Two corps from the Army of the Potomac were ordered to the battlefield;

the Eleventh commanded by General O. O. Howard, and the Twelfth under

General H. W. Slocum; both under the command of General Joseph Hooker.

General W. T. Sherman was also to reinforce the Union Army with the

Fifteenth Corps, and one division of the Seventeenth from the Army of

the Tennessee. In the meantime every exertion was made by the troops

present to hold the city at all hazards. When Wheeler captured and

burned the 300 wagons near Anderson’s cross roads, in the Sequatchie

Valley, Colonel E. M. McCook with the First Wisconsin Cavalry, the

Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry and a section of artillery started

from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley. Retarded by an incessant

rain, he was in time to see the smoke only of the burning wagons; he

made a charge and drove a detachment of the enemy’s troops past the

fire upon their main body. He followed this Confederate division--which

was commanded vigorously by Martin and Wheeler--out of the valley,

captured a number of soldiers and 800 mules and saved some of the

wagons. Wheeler reached McMinnville in time to capture the garrison and

burn the supplies. He was off toward Murfreesboro before the arrival

of Crook and his command, who had taken up the pursuit. The Union

cavalry corps, commanded by R. B. Mitchell, with McCook’s division,

joined Crook at Murfreesboro and saved that place from capture. They

followed Wheeler so persistently and fought him so successfully that

they prevented the destruction of the railroad, but were unable to

save the telegraph lines. Wheeler crossed back at Rogersville to the

south of the Tennessee; Mitchell followed and captured at that point a

large amount of Confederate cotton and destroyed it. Mitchell prevented

the Confederate advance to Winchester and Decherd after having heard

at Huntsville, Alabama, that Roddey’s Confederate cavalry was moving

towards these cities, having been forced to recross the river. Bragg’s

intention was to destroy Rosecrans’s communications and to force him to

abandon Chattanooga. The maintenance of the railroad back to Nashville

was of vital importance to the Union Army. Wheeler’s loss on this raid

was according to the estimate of General Crook, 2,000 men and 6 pieces

of artillery. These fatalities made the Confederate commander more

cautious. Crook’s loss was only 14 killed and 97 wounded. Wheeler’s

raid and the Union pursuit, are specimens of the kind of warfare

which cavalry are expected to make, showing the terrible destruction

of men and horses, the untiring marches, and watchfulness necessary

in a field so extensive and difficult as that of the department of

Cumberland. It would have been much more economical and effective, if

the War Department had previously protected the railway with sufficient

infantry, as it now intended to do, than to protect it by an ordinary

force of cavalry. The Department did adopt the plan of protecting the

railway with infantry, when Hooker came with a division; this mode was

most effectively used also in 1864.

Although the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was being maintained

and supplies were accumulated at the latter city, yet the necessity

of hauling supplies by wagons over such an extended and precipitous

road as the one over Walden’s Ridge, and the destruction of so many

wagons by Wheeler, told heavily on the devoted troops in the entrenched

city. The rains were heavy and continuous during the early part of

October, making the roads almost impassable in some places. The trips

to Bridgeport seemed gradually to lengthen, the mules became thinner,

and so the rations had to be reduced from time to time, until men,

horses, and mules were in very sore straits. The artillery horses

and all extra horses of mounted officers, that had not already died

from starvation, were sent back to Bridgeport or Stevenson to be kept

there until the strain could be relieved sometime in the indefinite

future. Yet no thought of retreat or surrender entered the minds of the

devoted soldiers. The fact that the army in the surrounding hills was

in a worse condition--too weak to take any advantage of the situation

by aggressive movements, except those abortive cavalry raids in the

rear--undoubtedly saved the Union Army from destruction.

In the early part of October, General Hooker arrived at Nashville with

the Eleventh and Twelfth corps. They were stationed along the railroad

to Bridgeport. The corps had come to Nashville by railroad, but were

without transportation, therefore did not supply all the relief needed

at Chattanooga. What was absolutely necessary was the restoration of

rail transportation from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and not exclusively

the protection of the railroad from the north to Bridgeport. Sufficient

reinforcements were also needed in order to enable the Union Army

to attack and destroy or drive back the enemy, who was in too close

proximity for safety; and therefore the first thing to be considered,

after the Union troops were properly fortified, was to plan means by

which the cooperation of these eastern reinforcements could be made

available. In preliminary preparation for this, a steamboat which had

been captured at Chattanooga, had been repaired and another was being

built at Bridgeport. Rosecrans ordered Hooker to bring to Bridgeport

all his command, with the exception of what was needed to protect the

railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee River. He started also the

construction of pontoons for a bridge, at some point over the river

below Chattanooga, where his troops might have to cross in order to

meet Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, and also in order to

shorten the road down the river. General W. F. Smith (“Baldy Smith”)

had lately been appointed chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland.

General Rosecrans ordered him to reconnoiter the river near Williams’s

Island, a few miles below the points of Lookout Mountain, expecting

to make of that island a steamer landing and supply depot. This last

order was issued October 19, and on that same day General Rosecrans was

relieved from the command of the Army; and General George H. Thomas

assumed command.

Prior to this date, on October 9, a complete reorganization of the Army

of the Cumberland had been made. Many of the regiments and brigades

had been so reduced in numbers by the late battle and by sickness,

that consolidation of brigades became imperative. Besides, in order

to maintain efficiency in the army and proper discipline, a weeding

out among the general officers became a necessity. Ever since the

close of fighting at Chickamauga, there had been an undercurrent of

feeling among the majority of the officers, that certain ones, who had

failed to meet the emergencies which arose during that battle, could

not continue in command, without decided detriment to the future

operations of the army. In compliance with the President’s order of

September 28, the Twentieth and Twenty-First corps were consolidated

and called the Fourth Corps. This new corps was placed under the

command of General Gordon Granger who had particularly distinguished

himself at Chickamauga. The reserve corps was made a part of the

Fourteenth Corps. Each corps was composed of three divisions and each

division of three brigades. The following short dispatch sent to the

Secretary of War by C. A. Dana, gives a very concise and interesting

statement of what was done:

“Fourth Corps: First Division, Palmer; First Brigade, Cruft, nine

regiments, 2,044 men; Second Brigade, Whittaker, eight regiments, 2,035

men; Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, eight regiments, 1,968 men. Second

Division, Sheridan; First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, ten regiments, 2,385

men; Second Brigade, Wagner, eight regiments, 2,188 men; Third Brigade,

Harker, 2,026 men. Third Division, Wood; First Brigade, Willich, nine

regiments, 2,069 men; Second Brigade, Hazen, nine regiments, 2,195

men; Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, eight regiments, 2,222 men.

“Fourteenth Corps: First Division, Rousseau; First Brigade, Carlin,

nine regiments, 2,072 men; Second Brigade, King, four regiments of

regulars and four regiments of volunteers, 2,070 men; Third Brigade,

Starkweather, eight regiments, 2,214 men. Second Division, J. C. Davis;

First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, five regiments, 2,214 men [this brigade

had been in the reserve and did not take part in the late battle];

Second Brigade, John Beatty, seven regiments, 2,460 men; Third Brigade,

Daniel McCook, six regiments, 2,099 men [this brigade had few losses in

the late battle]. Third Division, Baird; First Brigade, Turchin, seven

regiments, 2,175 men; Second Brigade, Van Derveer, seven regiments,

2,116 men; Third Brigade, Croxton, seven regiments, 2,165 men.”

Those detachments of the reserve corps which still remained along

the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad beyond Bridgeport, were not

included. The garrison at Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Battle Creek,

under General J. D. Morgan, as above stated, were however included.

The State of Tennessee was divided into two districts, the northern,

commanded by General Robert S. Granger with headquarters at Nashville,

and the southern under General R. W. Johnson with headquarters at

Stevenson.

General L. H. Rousseau superseded General R. S. Granger at Nashville,

in November, prior to the battles. General Starkweather relieved

Johnson at Stevenson after the battle, the latter having been assigned

in Rousseau’s place, as commander of the First Division of the

Fourteenth Corps.

In the reorganization of the army the Wisconsin troops were distributed

as follows: The First and Twenty-First Infantry remained in

Starkweather’s Third Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth

Corps; the Tenth Infantry in the First Brigade of the same division

which was commanded by General W. P. Carlin. The Twenty-fourth Infantry

was in the First Brigade of Sheridan’s Division, commanded by Colonel

F. T. Sherman; the Fifteenth Infantry in Willich’s Brigade of Wood’s

Division, of the Fourth Corps. The Fifth Battery was attached to

Davis’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Third, Eighth and Tenth,

and Company A of the First Wisconsin Heavy Artillery were assigned

to the Second Division of the Artillery Reserve. The Eleventh and

Twelfth corps were not reorganized prior to the battles; the Third and

Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry remained in the same organization in

which they were in the Army of the Potomac--viz.: the Third in Ruger’s

Third Brigade of the First Division (Williams’s) of the Twelfth Corps;

the Twenty-sixth in the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the

Eleventh Corps.

When General Thomas became commander of the Army of the Cumberland,

General John M. Palmer was made commander in his place of the

Fourteenth Corps, and General Charles Cruft was assigned to the command

of the First Division of the Fourth Corps, in place of Palmer.

General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, had been elected member of

Congress from his district in Ohio; he left in order to assume his

duties and General J. J. Reynolds had been appointed chief of staff

in his place. General John M. Brannan was made chief of artillery.

These, with General W. F. Smith as chief engineer, greatly added to the

strength of the headquarters staff.

This order of the President--which affected these local changes in the

Army of the Cumberland--was followed by a much greater consolidation on

a very much broader scale. The Army of the Tennessee--then in western

Tennessee and northern Mississippi--was placed under command of General

W. T. Sherman, who was on his way with a portion of it to Chattanooga

in order to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. The Army of the

Ohio, under General A. E. Burnside, was at Knoxville. These three

armies had not before had a commander in common under whose orders they

could be made to cooperate. A commander-in-chief at Washington had so

far been unable to accomplish this very necessary cooperation. The

Tennessee River ran through the fields of operations of all the three

armies--less directly in the field of the Army of the Tennessee--and

the preceding lack of unity in movements jeopardized the ultimate

object of all their campaigns, namely: the re-establishment of the

former relation between the states in rebellion and the general

government. On this account the President established the Military

Division of the Mississippi, with Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant in

command. This was a virtual consolidation of the three armies; their

cooperation in that wide field was henceforth perfect. Subsequent

events showed the wisdom of this order. The Confederates never won

another battle in this department; and in fourteen months after the

organization of one command there existed no organized Confederate

force in this field, worthy of notice. There were only detachments here

and there, like Forrest’s rangers in the early spring of 1865, until

General James H. Wilson’s cavalry raid put an end to all resistance.

After its reorganization, the Army of the Cumberland was composed

of the Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth corps, and three

divisions of cavalry. Had General Sheridan been placed in command of

the combined cavalry, his subsequent career shows that its efficiency

would have been greatly improved; but all the changes, that might have

been beneficial, could not be thought of at once. The pending events in

this department developed some pre-eminent officers, who were indeed

very much needed; they became masterful factors in the early downfall

of the rebellion, both in the east and in the west; Sheridan was one of

these; others were Grant, Thomas, and Sherman.

Grant reached his new command by way of Louisville, Kentucky, where he

met the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him the

order of October 18, as well as General Grant’s commission. Grant sent

from Louisville the following telegram to Thomas, “Hold Chattanooga

at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. Please inform me

how long your present supplies will last, and the prospect for keeping

them up.” General Thomas answered: “Two hundred and four thousand

four hundred and sixty-two rations in storehouses; ninety thousand to

arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at

Bridgeport up to the 16th--probably three hundred wagons. _I will hold

the town till we starve._”

On October 19, Thomas ordered General Hooker to carry out the former

orders of General Rosecrans, namely to concentrate his forces at

Bridgeport, in order to move them to Chattanooga.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of October 23,

one month after the Union troops had taken possession of the city.

On the 24th he went to Brown’s Ferry in company with Thomas and W.

F. Smith, the chief engineer; at once he recognized the necessity

and possibility of the scheme, initiated by General Rosecrans, but

conceived and planned by W. F. Smith, of placing a pontoon bridge

there and of obtaining a hold on the south side of the river at that

point, and he ordered its execution; much had already been done toward

preparing for it. General Smith was given full power to complete the

plan. The river at Chattanooga runs almost directly west opposite

the city, but soon it curves to the north and then it turns to the

south with quite a sharp bend at the foot of Lookout Mountain, from

where the river runs directly north, forming a narrow and perfect

peninsula directly opposite or west of the city. This peninsula widens

slightly at its southern end and forms a perfect shape of a human

foot; hence it is called “Moccasin Point.” Brown’s Ferry is directly

west of the city, on the western point of the neck of this peninsula,

some miles below Lookout. It is only about a mile in direct line to

Brown’s Ferry from the northern end of the bridge, at the foot of

Cameron Hill in the western outskirts of the city. From Brown’s Ferry

the river continues north, and passes Williams Island; five or more

miles from the ferry, it makes another sharp turn to the south at the

foot of Walden’s Ridge; in the course of six or seven miles from this

northern bend it flows tortuously past Kelly’s Ferry. The peninsula

thus formed, is the northern nose of Raccoon Mountain. From Brown’s

to Kelly’s Ferry is about five miles in direct line somewhat to the

southwest, and, as said before, it is one mile across to Chattanooga.

It is about five miles from Cameron Hill bridge to Brown’s Ferry,

but from where the boats for the Brown’s Ferry bridge subsequently

started, it is about nine miles, and to Kelly’s Ferry more than

fifteen, perhaps twenty miles. These figures show the value to the

transportation, of obtaining unobstructed access to Kelly’s Ferry as a

landing for steamboats bringing supplies from Bridgeport across Brown’s

Ferry, when it should come into possession of the Union Army by the

advance of Hooker, until the railroad could be repaired or put into

working order from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The movement of troops

which accomplished this, also, gave the army a lodgment on the south

side of the river, to meet, and assist, Hooker’s forces coming from

Bridgeport, thus breaking the Confederate hold upon the river road to

Bridgeport. Under General Smith’s orders and supervision, the plans

were successfully carried out. Two flatboats and fifty pontoons, with

cars, were prepared. In these, 1,500 men under Hazen passed down the

river nine miles, and close to the Confederate pickets. They were to

land at different points in sections, the places having been pointed

out previously to the officers in command. On account of the darkness

fires were kept burning opposite these places, so that the different

sections could land at the proper points. The remainder of Turchin’s

and Hazen’s brigades--from which the men in the boats were taken--and

their batteries, were marched across the peninsula, and posted out of

sight in the woods, near Brown’s Ferry on the north side of the river.

The infantry troops were to cross in the boats, as soon as the men

under Hazen landed on the south side, and recross to the north side.

The artillery was to move into position as soon as the boats landed,

in order to cover a retreat in case of disaster. The equipment for the

pontoon bridge was also in place and ready for use. The boats commenced

to float at 3 a. m. October 27, and they were not discovered by the

enemy until 5 a. m., when the first section had landed; a portion of

the second section, which did not land in the proper place, was fired

on by the enemy’s picket, calling forth an attack by the picket-reserve

of the enemy. But the Union troops on the north side of the ferry

crossed rapidly in the boats, pushed forward to the top of the ridge,

and in two hours they protected themselves sufficiently with timber

and abatis to hold the _tête de pont_. On the 27th the bridge was

completed at 4:30 p. m.; the work was done under some shelling from

Lookout Point. Captain P. V. Fox of the First Michigan Engineers was

the skillful superintendent of the bridge building. Twenty beeves,

six pontoons, a barge and about 2,000 bushels of corn fell into the

hands of the Union troops. The Union loss was 6 killed, 23 wounded,

and 9 missing. Six prisoners were taken from the Confederates and 6

were killed; how many were wounded is not known. While the bridge was

being laid, General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on a pontoon

bridge, and was marching up towards Chattanooga. At 3 p. m. on the

28th, his head of column reached Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley, at the

junction of the railroad from Bridgeport, with the branch from Trenton

up the valley. The wagon road from here to Brown’s Ferry runs about

four miles, along the western base of a ridge, which here and there

has deep depressions; through one of these the railroad continued to

Chattanooga, around the nose of Lookout, close to the river; through

another the wagon road runs. General Hooker had with him Howard’s

Eleventh Corps, and Geary’s division of the Twelfth, with the exception

of one regiment left at the bridge at Bridgeport, one at Whiteside’s

and one at Shellmound; the latter two places being on the railroad

between Bridgeport and Chattanooga.

The First Division of the Twelfth Corps, (Williams), had been left to

guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. In Ruger’s brigade

of this division was the Third Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Colonel

William Hawley. This regiment had been mustered into the service on

June 29, 1861, and had been serving with the Army of the Potomac

since that date until now, when it became a part of the Army of the

Cumberland. In the Second Brigade of the Third Division, (Schurz) of

the Eleventh Corps was the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry, commanded

by Captain Frederick C. Winkler, who was appointed Major November

17, 1863. It was exclusively a German regiment, and was mustered in

at Milwaukee on August 17, 1862. On the following October 6, it left

Wisconsin for the Army of the Potomac, in which it served until it

became a part of the Eleventh Corps under Howard and Hooker of the Army

of the Cumberland.

Hooker’s advance troops, under General Howard, camped that night

within a mile or so of Brown’s Ferry, where they opened communication

with the troops there. Geary’s division was in the rear and camped

near Wauhatchie, three miles from Howard’s troops; thus the road

from Wauhatchie to Kelly’s Ferry--three miles to the northwest of

Wauhatchie--was controlled. About 1 a. m. on the 29th, Geary was

heavily attacked by a part of Longstreet’s troops, but not before he

had his division in line for defense. Howard was ordered to double

quick his nearest division, under command of General Carl Schurz, to

Geary’s relief. Before proceeding far, it was fired upon from the

near hills on the division’s left, but at long range. The firing

produced no great injury to Schurz’s troops. Howard detached one

brigade to deploy on these hills, and pushed on with the other; in the

meantime Steinwehr’s division, also of Howard’s, came up. Then it was

discovered that another hill, in the rear of Schurz was also occupied

by the enemy. Smith’s brigade charged it and carried it with the

bayonet against three times its number.

Hooker says, “No troops ever rendered more brilliant service. The

name of their valiant commander is Colonel Orlando Smith of the

Seventy-third Ohio Infantry. * * * For almost three hours, without

assistance Geary repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior

numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field.” Thus

the Lookout Valley was secured, and new communications were opened.

The loss to General Hooker’s command was 416. Longstreet practically

conceded that the Union commander had succeeded in opening this new

line of communication, but spoke lightly of it. Whittaker’s and John

G. Mitchell’s brigades were subsequently moved over to this region.

The steamboat at Chattanooga passed down on the night of the 28th;

thereafter two steamboats (one had been built at Bridgeport), made

regular trips with supplies from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry. Good

roads were made from Chattanooga via Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry and the

railroad from Bridgeport towards the east was being repaired. There was

no shortage of rations or forage after these rapid preparations were

commenced to attack the enemy in his strong positions around the city.

Hope and confidence had always inspired the Army of the Cumberland;

the rank and file had never despaired; now, they took the lead in

anticipating that the end was in sight; success in battle depends very

much on the condition of the human body and the enthusiasm of the

spirit.

The feeble and ineffectual efforts of Longstreet to prevent the opening

of the river, and the advance of Hooker’s troops, opened the eyes of

all the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland to the weakness

of the Confederate Army, both in the ranks and among the officers.

General Longstreet, in his official report of the battle of Wauhatchie,

attributes his defeat to the jealousy of brigade officers.[35] The

Confederate troops, making the attack on General Geary, were withdrawn

from the east side of Lookout, but they returned immediately before

daylight on the night of the attack. General Longstreet gave reasons

for this action; he showed that it was not good military tactics to

keep a large force on that side of the mountain, where its only line of

retreat was around the slope of Lookout; if it were defeated, it would

be exposed to the fire of the Union troops at and opposite Chattanooga.

These reasons were sound and foreshadowed the ease with which Hooker’s

forces, on November 24, drove the enemy so easily and captured Lookout

Mountain. It was after this defeat, that Bragg (for reasons unknown),

sent Longstreet’s Corps toward Knoxville to assist in defeating

Burnside. Bragg hoped that it could be returned in time to assist in

the battle, that he knew must be fought at Chattanooga. Longstreet took

with him the two divisions of McLaws and Hood, and Alexander’s cavalry.

Wheeler’s cavalry passed him on the road; it was supposed to do certain

things that it failed to do. Longstreet recommended that Bragg’s army

should be drawn back in a strong position behind the Chickamauga, after

the departure of Longstreet’s troops in November; his reason for this

recommendation was, that in its present position it could be reached

in twenty minutes by the Union Army. Bragg seemed to be blind, however,

to the events so rapidly transpiring in Chattanooga; he did not seem

to realize that the troops Longstreet had fought at Wauhatchie, were

reinforcements from the East to the Union Army.

In the meantime the Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain and

Missionary Ridge sent an occasional artillery shot into the Union

lines. The pickets of the two armies held their lines close to each

other in the valley and watched each other’s movements, firing whenever

a soldier on his beat became visible. There being no good reason for

this desultory and ineffectual warfare, an agreement was finally

reached, that the pickets should fire only when advances of troops

became apparent; henceforth, an officer could with impunity ride along

the picket line in plain view of the opposite pickets.

As soon as Grant became aware of Longstreet’s departure for East

Tennessee, he prepared for an attack on Bragg’s army in order to keep

him from detaching more troops against Burnside and to compel him to

return those already sent. He ordered General Thomas to assault the

north end of Missionary Ridge; the order was given November 7; but on

account of the utter lack of animals--caused not only by the great loss

in the recent battles, but also by the death of a large number from

starvation since the occupation of the city--it was finally decided by

Grant, Thomas, and Smith, that nothing but a defensive attitude would

be feasible until General Sherman’s forces could arrive. The necessity

for aggressive operations, on account of Bragg’s boldness in taking

such a desperate chance as to send a large force commanded by his

ablest general away from his weak little army, increased the activity

of the Union Army in its preparation for battle, and thus was opened

a way for the relief of Burnside; the hope was that he could hold out

until help arrived.

It is to be presumed, that Bragg had implicit confidence that the Union

Army would not dare to attack such a strong position as Bragg’s army

then held. General Grant at once wrote the facts of the situation to

Burnside and urged him to maintain his attitude at Knoxville, until

a battle could be fought at Chattanooga and a detachment sent to his

assistance. Not waiting for Sherman, he formulated his plans; and thus

knew before the latter’s arrival, just where he should place Sherman,

what his part of the attack should be, and that he should march

immediately on his approach directly to the north end of Missionary

Ridge. Grant planned furthermore that Hooker should attack Lookout

Mountain from his position in Lookout Valley; the one should attack the

right of the Confederate Army and the other the left. Sherman arrived

at Bridgeport, with his leading division, on November 15. Arriving at

Chattanooga ahead of his troops, he with Grant, Thomas, and Smith,

looked over the entire situation and learned how, and by what route, he

could reach his point of attack. It had become apparent to the Union

commanders, that Bragg’s line did not reach the immediate river hills,

at the north end of Missionary Ridge, but was deflected to the east,

along the third hill to the south of the river, with a deep depression

between it and the next hill to the north. This made necessary a much

stronger position than the supposed location at Bragg’s right flank,

and stronger forces and dispositions were needed. Grant announced his

plan to his generals on the 18th and expected the attacks could be made

on the 21st; a rain storm delayed, however, the arrival of Sherman’s

troops. When they did arrive at Brown’s Ferry the high water had broken

the bridge, which delayed the crossing. When the bridge was repaired,

Sherman crossed it in plain view of the enemy’s signal station on the

point of Lookout Mountain; he marched into the woods behind a series of

hills on the north side of the river; these hills concealed his march

all the way to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where Davis’s division

of the Fourteenth Corps had been placed to cover his movement, and to

protect the bridge there, after Sherman’s troops had again crossed to

the south side. The crossing at the Chickamauga was also protected by

artillery, placed on the heights north of the river. After crossing at

the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman was to follow Missionary Ridge as

far as the railroad tunnel. This seemed to be the principal point of

attack; the plan further contemplated that all the forces available

should be converged toward General Sherman’s position. Therefore

Howard’s Eleventh Corps was taken from Hooker’s position and replaced

by Whittaker’s and Grose’s brigades of the Fourth Corps; the Eleventh

Corps was placed on the left of the Army of the Cumberland south of the

river, looking towards Sherman’s position perhaps four miles further

east. Thomas was to cooperate by moving his troops to his left, so

that he could join with Sherman’s right, when the latter should push

the Confederate forces back to the tunnel. The combined forces should

then advance against the enemy, with the object in view of sweeping the

Confederate Army into the south Chickamauga Creek, which runs on the

opposite side of Missionary Ridge. General Hooker was to hold Lookout

Valley with Geary’s division and the two brigades of Whittaker and

Grose, and Howard’s corps was to be in readiness to act with either

Sherman or Thomas, as circumstances should dictate. The plan was a fine

one, because, if that flank could be defeated, the Confederate line of

retreat could be easily cut off.

Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry moved to Sherman’s left. When

Sherman should sweep the ridge, he was ordered to cross the Chickamauga

and raid the rear of the Confederate Army. This attack was to begin

on the 22nd, but was postponed on account of the fact that two of

Sherman’s divisions had not been able to cross Brown’s Ferry bridge, on

account of a break. To avoid any further delay, Thomas suggested that

Howard’s Corps be sent to General Sherman in place of the two delayed

divisions, and that the latter be ordered to report to General Hooker,

whose combined forces should immediately attack Lookout Mountain in

order to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman’s contemplated

attack; this suggestion was in part approved by General Grant.

A singular thing happened on November 22. General Ewing’s division

of Sherman’s troops had come into Lookout Valley at Trenton from

Bridgeport; Bragg’s rear was thus threatened. The movement of some

of Bragg’s troops to avert this calamity together with the former

withdrawal of Longstreet’s Corps for Knoxville, produced the

impression in the Confederate Army, that the whole was going to fall

back. Deserters who came into the Union line reported this impression.

Bragg also notified the Union commander to remove all non-combatants

from the city; this was on the 20th. General Grant ordered Thomas to

make a reconnoisance in front of Chattanooga in order to test the truth

of this report, and to find out whether Bragg was really falling back,

and if so, Thomas should prevent him from doing it undisturbed. The

Army of the Cumberland was nearest to the enemy and in readiness to

do this with the most celerity. It seems that General Bragg had such

confidence in the strength of his position on the top of Missionary

Ridge, about 500 feet high, that he was willing not only to send away

Longstreet, but actually started other forces to follow him. The latter

he recalled, however, in time to take part in the battle. He supposed,

and with good reason, that Missionary Ridge could not be taken by

assault; and even if Lookout should become untenable on account of

the capture of the valley of Chattanooga, he would be safe in his

entrenchments on Missionary Ridge. This must have been his conclusion,

and he must have known that the Army of the Cumberland was receiving

considerable reinforcements. Bragg’s lines were altogether too long.

When the object of holding Lookout Mountain no longer existed, after

the reopening of the river and railroad route to Bridgeport, he should

have withdrawn from there and from Chattanooga Valley; he should either

have concentrated on Missionary Ridge or taken Longstreet’s advice

and fallen back to Dalton, behind the second ridge, southeast of

Chattanooga, where he was finally driven.

Fortunately for the success of the Union movements, Bragg did not do

the things that an abler general would have done. He stood stolidly

in his original line along its whole length until the opening of the

battle of Missionary Ridge. It has been stated, that Bragg expected

Grant when he discovered the departure of Longstreet for East

Tennessee, would send forces to support Burnside.

In pursuance of the order to make a reconnoisance, Thomas ordered

Granger, who commanded the Fourth Corps, to advance a division of his

corps towards Orchard Knob November 23, about noon. This elevation of

land is located about half way between the city and Missionary Ridge,

at the left of Thomas’s line. Between the Union line and this knob was

a growth of trees and bushes. These concealed the formation of the

troops for a while only from the enemy. Wood’s division was deployed

in front of Fort Wood. Sheridan’s division formed next on the right

and rear of Wood. Howard’s Corps was massed in the rear of these two

divisions. General Baird’s division fell, in echelon, at the right

of Sheridan. General Johnson’s division (formerly Rousseau’s) of the

Fourteenth Corps stood with arms in the entrenchments, ready to move

in any direction. This really placed the latter in echelon with Baird.

It is said the enemy looked upon these movements as a parade for

display or to obtain wood for fires, when seeing them from the top of

Missionary Ridge. The Confederates had a line of rifle-pits along the

base of Orchard Knob, following Citico Creek for a mile or more.

With Willich’s and Hazen’s brigades in front and Beatty’s in reserve,

General Wood moved forward about 2 p. m. His troops pushed back easily

whatever was in their front. Willich struck Orchard Knob squarely on

his front, and soon captured it, clearing it of the enemy’s lines.

Hazen met more resistance from the Confederates who were perhaps more

numerous or better fighters, although the hill he attacked was not so

high as Orchard Knob. He carried the hill, however, and captured the

Twenty-eighth Alabama Regiment and its flag. This advanced line gave

a good position for further advances, and was held; the rest of the

troops on the right moving up to and extending the line far to the

right. General Wood fortified his line over Orchard Knob, and General

Howard formed his corps on its left. The summit of this Knob gave

a splendid outlook over the field between it and Missionary Ridge,

and gave a fine view of the ridge itself. It afforded an opportunity

for Grant and Thomas to view later on the whole subsequent movements

against the enemy. General Wood lost 125 men killed and wounded in this

battle of Orchard Knob. The Fifteenth Wisconsin of Willich’s brigade

took part in this engagement; its losses were not reported until after

the battle of the 25th, when its commander reported 6 men slightly

wounded in both engagements. Wood occupied this position until 3:15

p. m. on the 25th, when he moved forward with the rest of the army to

the assault on Missionary Ridge. Bridge’s Illinois Battery occupied an

epaulment in Wood’s line on Orchard Knob.

The taking of Orchard Knob had a most important bearing on the attack

that General Hooker made on Lookout Mountain the next day. It caused

Bragg to withdraw Walker’s division from that point to strengthen his

right, which Bragg thought to be menaced by this advance to Orchard

Knob. These troops prolonged Bragg’s line towards Sherman’s front but

did not reach it. The Confederate general, Stevenson, signalled from

the top of Lookout to Bragg that night that if an attack was intended

by Grant, it would be delivered on Lookout Mountain. This is what

actually occurred. Another of Sherman’s divisions crossed Brown’s Ferry

on the 23rd; the bridge was again broken, however, leaving Osterhaus’s

division still on the left bank. This gave General Sherman only three

divisions besides General Davis’s of the Fourteenth Corps, with which

to operate at the designated place on Missionary Ridge. General Thomas

informed General Hooker of the proximity of Osterhaus’s troops and

directed, that if they did not get over to Sherman, he should have them

join him and “take the point of Lookout Mountain.” This division was at

that time in command of General Charles R. Woods, one of its brigade

commanders. How sagacious was General Thomas in seeing immediately the

advantage that should be taken of a mere accident, like the breaking of

a pontoon bridge! It looks as though Thomas had made this suggestion

to Hooker, without having beforehand a distinct understanding with

General Grant; for he told General Hooker later, that Grant still hoped

Woods’s (Osterhaus’s) division could cross in time to participate in

Sherman’s movement, but if it could not the mountain should be taken

if practicable. Hooker, finding that there was little possibility of

the bridge being quickly repaired, made preparations for the advance

against the mountain. It will be observed further on, that this

accident resulted in modifying the original plans very materially,

as the taking of Orchard Knob had already done. The left of Bragg’s

line was turned, but not his right; this movement was a result of the

accidents to the Brown’s Ferry pontoon bridge. General Grant showed his

broad mind in this affair as well as in other changes he made in his

original plan, at a later date.

[Illustration: CHATTANOOGA AND VICINITY, NOVEMBER, 1863

Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 288]

THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

At 4 p. m. on November 24, 1863, one of the most spectacular battles of

the war commenced. General Hooker’s force consisted of the following:

Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps, Cruft’s (formerly

Palmer’s) of the Fourth; Geary’s of the Twelfth--with the exception of

such regiments from the last two divisions as were required to protect

the communications with Bridgeport and Kelly’s Ferry; battery K of the

First Ohio, and battery I of the First New York of the Eleventh Corps,

having sufficient horses for but one battery; a part of the Second

Kentucky Cavalry, and Company K of the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry. The

aggregate number of this force was 9,681. The foregoing statement of

the forces is taken from General Hooker’s official report[36], which

is remarkably well written, clear in statement and full of essential

facts. “At this time the enemy’s pickets formed a continuous line along

the right bank of Lookout Creek, with the reserves in the valley, while

his main force was encamped in a hollow half way up the slope of the

mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson’s

division, and those were comparatively safe, as the only means of

access from the next [that is, from the valley in which Hooker’s troops

were located] for a distance of 20 miles up the valley was by two or

three trails, admitting to the passage of but 1 man at a time; and even

these trails were held at the top by rebel pickets.”

The top of Lookout Mountain at this point consists of a perpendicular

crest, or palisade of rocks which rises out of the main body of the

mountain about a hundred feet. From the foot of this crest the mountain

slopes by a gradual descent but with a very broken surface on all sides

to the valleys on the east, west, and to the river on the north. An

army could operate on this slope only below the crest, from the west

to the east, or on the side of Chattanooga, around the northern slope,

under the crest. Hooker’s army did not cross the top of the crest;

but by taking the slope, the Confederate troops occupying the top,

were forced to retreat by the only wagon road reaching to the top

on the Chattanooga side. The slope on that side is less precipitous

than on the west side where Hooker was. At the foot of the slope on

the Chattanooga side flows the Chattanooga Creek and on the west side

Lookout Creek, both flowing north, practically parallel with the trend

of the mountain, and emptying into the Tennessee River, which runs

west at the foot of the northern slope. Hooker continues his report

as follows: “On the northern slope midway between the summit and the

Tennessee, a plateau or belt of arable land, encircles the crest.

There, a continuous line of earth-works had been thrown up, while

redoubts, redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope to repel an

assault from the direction of the river.”

Geary commenced his movements as instructed, crossed the creek at 8

o’clock a. m., “captured the entire picket of 42 men posted to defend

it, marched directly up the mountain until his right rested on the

palisades, and headed down the valley.” The Confederate Walthall was in

command of the troops immediately opposed to Geary, and Moore’s brigade

near the Craven house on the eastern, or northeastern slope. General

Stevenson was there in command of all the Confederate troops on the

mountain. He placed sharpshooters along the western edge of the crest,

and wherever there was depression enough, the artillery by raising the

trails of the gun carriages did some execution until Geary’s troops

reached the foot of the palisades. The Confederate troops located

on the western slope, moved into position, facing Lookout Creek, in

order to prevent the Union troops crossing at the bridge; but this

disposition subjected them to a flank enfilading fire from Geary’s

troops. The other Union troops moved up the Creek, crossed behind

Geary’s line, and joined on his left. The batteries had been placed on

elevated points, so as to enfilade the route by which the enemy had to

march down the slope, and on other points, by which the Confederates

had to retreat if they were driven back. The Union line advanced, the

artillery opened. The rout of the enemy was complete, many prisoners

were taken, and many were killed and wounded. At noon when Geary’s

advance rounded the northern slope, his flags were plainly visible from

Chattanooga. There had been a fog all morning, which greatly favored

Hooker’s movements, preventing the Confederates on top of the crest

from directing their shots satisfactorily. As the Union flags appeared

on the sky line of the northern slope, and were visible at Chattanooga,

this fog settled down upon the lower stretches of the slope and

revealed the Confederate lines badly broken and in flight with the

compact ranks of the Union soldiers triumphantly advancing with flags

flying and muskets glistening in the sun. It was a glorious sight to

the Union troops, then in line in front of the works at Chattanooga.

The picture presented was a “battle above the clouds,” for the fog

obscured all that part of the mountain which was below the conquering

lines of Hooker. General Stevenson says in his report, with regard

to this affair: “Finding that the fog was becoming so dense that the

troops on the northern part of the mountain [meaning Pettus’s brigade

on the crest] could not see the enemy moving upon Walthall, I gave

orders for Pettus with my only disposable force to move down and report

to Brigadier-General Jackson. He started at 12:30 o’clock and reached

the scene of action a little past 1 o’clock. * * * This position was

held by Moore, Walthall, and Pettus until about 8 p. m.”[37]

Stevenson had six brigades in his command; four of these took part

in the fight on the mountain, the other two were placed between

Chattanooga Creek and the road up the slope, in order to guard the

line of retreat on the east side of the mountain against any advance

from Chattanooga. Stevenson reports, that he lost only 380 in his

three brigades; he does not state the number of troops he had on the

mountain. Hooker rested at 2 o’clock p. m. after passing the point. The

settling down of the fog shut off his view of the Chattanooga Valley

and prevented his seeing sufficiently the topography to justify him

in advancing down into the valley that same evening. He formed his

lines on the eastern slope; his right was at the palisades, and his

left was near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. This line he fortified,

and reported the fact to the department commander. In this position

he enfiladed the enemy’s line in the Chattanooga Valley, and also had

communication across the mouth of the creek with the Union forces in

the city. At 5:15 p. m. General Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division

of the Fourteenth Corps, reported to General Hooker after having

crossed the mouth of the creek by ferry; he was placed on the right of

the line relieving Geary’s troops, which were almost exhausted with

fatigue. During the night the enemy withdrew entirely, leaving behind

20,000 rations, and the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades.

General Thomas reported, that Hooker captured 500 or 600 prisoners. The

Eighth Kentucky Infantry scaled the crest about daylight on the 25th

and hoisted the United States flag amid wild and prolonged cheers from

the whole army.

At ten o’clock a. m. on the 25th, leaving two regiments to hold the

mountain, Hooker started towards Rossville, across Chattanooga Creek

and the valley, with Osterhaus’s division of the Fifteenth Corps

in the lead. Thus the left of the Confederate Army was completely

turned, while the right still held its own. Hooker was too far from

the Confederate line of retreat to menace it. To have turned the

right first would have been better. Hooker was delayed four hours by

a destroyed bridge in crossing Chattanooga Creek. The Tenth Wisconsin

Infantry of Carlin’s brigade of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth

Corps participated in this engagement; it was detached from the

brigade, and held a fort south of the Crutchfield house on the east

side of the mountain; its losses were not reported.

While these operations were occurring on Lookout Mountain under the

command of Hooker, Sherman advanced across the Tennessee River at

the mouth of the Chickamauga with three divisions of the Army of the

Tennessee, and one division (Davis’s) of the Army of the Cumberland,

on the morning of the 24th, against the other or extreme right wing

of the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge. He advanced and formed

his lines on the north end of the ridge; a brigade of Howard’s Corps

moved to the left at 9 a. m. on the same day and communicated with

Sherman about noon. Later Howard joined Sherman with his two divisions

and formed on his right. Carlin’s brigade rejoined his division on the

25th, which was then in the valley half way to Missionary Ridge and on

the right of Thomas’s line. Palmer’s and Granger’s corps were held in

readiness by Thomas to advance to the foot of the ridge, as soon as

Hooker should get into position at Rossville. It was after 2 p. m. that

General Hooker effected a crossing of Chattanooga Creek and advanced

as above stated. At noon General Sherman was heavily engaged with

the enemy in his position, and finding it to be very strong was not

making any headway against it. General Baird was, therefore, ordered to

march his division within supporting distance of Sherman, and to move

promptly.

He reported to Sherman, but the latter told him he could not find room

for him and could not make use of his troops. General Baird marched

back a distance of about two miles, and arrived at the left of General

Thomas’s line at 2:30 p. m.; he was ordered to fall in on the left of

Wood, the left division of Grangers Fourth Corps.

It will be well at this time to take a rapid view of the entire lines

of the Union and the Confederate armies, as they stood facing each

other, arms in hand, at 3 o’clock p. m. on November 25, 1863, just

before they grappled in a struggle for life and death, and for the

permanent possession of the stronghold of the Middle West. So many

changes having occurred in the previous three or four days in the Union

Army, and equally as many and more important changes occurring on the

Confederate side, makes it necessary to pause, just before describing

the great spectacular battle of Missionary Ridge, and try to get at

least a bird’s-eye view of the position of the numerous divisions and

corps.

General Osterhaus had again taken command of his own division,

relieving General Charles R. Woods; General Cruft, and General Geary

were near enough with their troops to the ridge at Rossville to form

the extreme right of the Union line. There was an interval between

Geary’s left and Johnson’s right, where Carlin stood after coming

from Lookout. Johnson had only two brigades, Carlin on the right, and

Stoughton (John H. King’s successor) on the left; Starkweather had been

left in the works around the city. Hooker’s and Thomas’s troops were

without reserves. Sheridan’s three brigades, F. T. Sherman’s, Harkers’s

and Wagner’s were next to the left of Johnson; then Wood’s three

brigades, Hazen’s, Willich’s, and Beatty’s; the latter appeared in two

lines, being the last in Thomas’s section, and forming the left flank

of the line; and then Baird’s three brigades, Turchin’s, Van Derveer’s

and Phelps’s.

A mile and a half to the left of General Thomas’s line lay Sherman’s

right flank, with no troops in the interval. The latter’s line

was composed from right to left of the following brigades, viz.:

Buschbeck’s, Ewing’s Matthies’s, Corse’s and A. Smith’s; Raum, was

behind Matthies, and two brigades of J. E. Smith’s were in reserve

behind the centre. Behind this line, a half mile in the fortified line

lay from left to right the brigades of Loomis, Cockerill, Alexander,

and Lightburn, and Schurz’s division. Sherman thus had six divisions.

The Confederate line from its right, which faced Sherman, was as

follows by divisions: Cleburne, Stevenson, Gist, Cheatham, Anderson,

Bate, and Stewart. Stewart held the left of Bragg’s line, and his

troops were the first to encounter those of Hooker on their way to

Rossville from Lookout Mountain. General Hardee commanded the right

wing, consisting of the following four divisions: Cheatham, Cleburne,

Stevenson, and Walker; General Breckenridge was in charge of the left

wing, which was composed of Bate, Stewart, and Anderson. Cheatham’s

division faced Baird, Anderson’s Wood; Bate’s Sheridan, and Stewart’s

Johnson. Cleburne’s division reached the front of Sherman’s line on

the afternoon of the 24th while marching from the Confederates’ left.

Before the fight of the 25th occurred, Cheatham’s, Stevenson’s, and

Walker’s divisions had prolonged Bragg’s line to within three-quarters

of a mile of the tunnel; Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division held

Tunnel Hill on the 25th against Sherman; the rest of the division was

not heavily engaged, but it had the assistance of Brown’s and Cumming’s

brigades of Stevenson’s division, and Maney’s of Walker’s. Tunnel

Hill was not captured by Sherman’s troops until after the retreat of

these Confederate forces on the evening of the 25th, the result of the

successful assault in the centre by Thomas.

The whole Confederate line on the left across the Chattanooga Valley

was abandoned; Stewart withdrew to the top of the ridge before Hooker

reached Rossville. It must be noticed, that General Thomas’s line

in the centre, contained only four divisions of the Army of the

Cumberland, namely two of the Fourth Corps, and two of the Fourteenth;

one division (Davis’s) of the Fourteenth Corps was with Sherman on the

left, and one (Cruft’s) was with Hooker on the right. Hooker had three

divisions and Sherman six.

Starkweather’s brigade of Johnson’s division was left to hold the

original works around Chattanooga; and did so during the assault of the

rest of the troops upon Missionary Ridge.

At 1 p. m. on the 12th, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who

was in Chattanooga, sent this dispatch to the Secretary of War at

Washington, “In our front here [meaning Thomas’s front], Confederate

rifle-pits are fully manned, preventing Thomas gaining ridge.” At

4:30 p. m. he sent another dispatch showing how misleading the former

dispatch was: “Glory to God. The day is decisively ours. Missionary

Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent charge of Thomas’s troops,

and rebels routed.” The reader must not lay much stress on the time

given, at which the various movements were made; this is a mere guess

in most instances. Seldom did an officer think of looking at his watch,

at the moment any orders were given to make an important movement.

The original Army of the Cumberland, referred to by Dana, were the

troops General Grant thought would not fight, because they had been so

roughly handled at Chickamauga.[38] It was quite a natural conclusion.

The entire Union Army was in line at about 3:30 p. m., ready for any

commands which might be given by Grant, Thomas, Sherman and Hooker.

The array of soldiers in the Union ranks from the three armies, those

of the Potomac, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, was formidable,

commanded by such heroes as Grant, Thomas, Sherman, Hooker, Sheridan,

and Howard. Thomas’s four divisions had about 18,000 in rank and file,

Hooker’s about 9,000, and Sherman’s about 24,000.

It is not likely that Bragg had more than 30,000; but his position

was sufficiently strong to almost equal Grant’s advantage in numbers.

The Confederate Army was concentrated on a 500 feet ridge, which had

a very steep and rough surface, sloping towards the Union lines at an

angle of about forty-five degrees. This ridge had a fortified line on

the top, manned by veteran infantry and artillery, and a thinner line

of infantry at its foot in a series of deep rifle-pits; in front of

the latter was a swarm of skirmishers. The army was still in command

of Braxton Bragg, a commander of great experience; and of two wing

commanders, Hardee a veteran of the old regular army, and Breckenridge

a former vice-president of the United States. Its division commanders

were, as a rule, soldiers of the old regular United States Army, and

were very capable officers. That army had two months before (or thought

it had) won the battle of Chickamauga, and it was now fighting--at

least in the centre where Thomas’s troops faced them--the same troops

they claimed to have defeated a short time ago. It had every advantage

of position at this time, and it had success in the past to fire

the hearts of its soldiers, and arouse in them confidence in their

ability to hurl back their old foe, who had the audacity to assault so

formidable a stronghold.

Standing on any of the Union forts at Chattanooga, especially on Fort

Negley or Fort Wood, or better still on Orchard Knob, where Grant and

Thomas remained during the 25th, one would have not only a rear view

of the Union Army as it stood, but also a front view of most of the

Confederate force. From the top of Missionary Ridge, where Bragg had

his headquarters, the whole panorama was magnificent. The lines of

blue, and their array of glittering muskets, could be seen from there

in front. The backs of the troops were turned on Chattanooga. “Their

faces were to the foe.” Bragg had a view of them which Grant and Thomas

missed, and if he could have had an hour undisturbed by the conflicting

emotions aroused in him by the pending conflict, if he could have

watched through his field-glass the valorous mien, the confident air,

and the evident determination of these veteran soldiers, to “feed fat

the ancient grudge” against the old foes they had met at Mill Springs,

Perryville, Stone’s River, and Chickamauga, he would surely have

read in these characteristics the doom of the defeat which an hour

later overwhelmed him and his little army, and from which it never

sufficiently recovered to win another battle. Had he been half as much

of a philosopher, as he was a soldier, he would have foreseen, what

afterwards was expressed by one of his ablest generals (D. H. Hill),

that the holding of Chattanooga “sealed the fate of the confederacy.”

The living, moving lines of soldiers, presented to the view of the

two opposing commanders, stationed at vantage points above the valley

in which the Union Army was then formed, although a most interesting

picture, was more impressive because of its background of magnificent

mountains, rivers, and hills. On the west rose great Lookout Mountain,

1,500 feet above the level of the valley; while across the valley,

east of Lookout, Missionary Ridge stretched from the north to the

South, rising 500 feet and crowned by the lines of grey soldiers, every

movement of whom could be seen from Orchard Knob.

General Grant’s most excellent plan on the 24th was that Thomas’s

troops should bear to the left, join with the right of Sherman after

his forces had advanced to the tunnel, through which the railroad from

Chattanooga to East Tennessee ran, and together they should make an

assault with the whole union line. Thomas’s troops were in line until

3:30 p. m. on the 25th, waiting for Sherman to capture the hill over

the tunnel. General Sherman had begun the fight early in the morning

of the 25th by advancing Corse’s brigade; the latter moved down the

southern slope of the second hill which had been gained the day

before, and under a galling fire advanced against Cleburne’s fortified

position. This position was very strong, however, and Corse could not

drive the enemy from the hill. Then other brigades were brought up,

but they did not succeed in loosening Cleburne’s firm hold. General

Grant observing this from Orchard Knob sent the rest of Howard’s Corps

to Sherman’s aid at 10 a. m. Howard had two divisions, Steinwehr’s and

Schurz’s. It was evident, that Bragg endeavored most vigorously to keep

Sherman from turning his right. Had Sherman succeeded in his effort, he

would have been in Bragg’s rear and able to menace his line of retreat

at Chickamauga station, which was immediately in the rear of the right

flank. There was no evidence, however, that Bragg was weakening his

lines in front of Thomas; although he had already sent the forces,

which Hooker had defeated the day before on Lookout, to his right wing;

and these proved to be amply able to hold so strong a natural fortress

without any further reinforcements. When General Sherman received

Howard’s two divisions, he renewed his efforts to take Tunnel Hill; he

made a charge and received one in return, which broke some of John E.

Smith’s brigades.

It appears that Grant did not contemplate any attack by Thomas on the

centre, when he at noon ordered Baird to report to Sherman; for with

Baird’s he had already detached nearly half of Thomas’s troops to

Sherman and Hooker. With Baird gone, Thomas had only eight brigades

to Sherman’s seven divisions; General Hooker had seven brigades as

far from General Thomas’s right, as General Sherman’s were from the

latter’s left.

General Grant and General Thomas were together when these orders were

given on the 25th; they were in accordance with Grant’s original

plan, that Bragg’s defeat should be accomplished by Sherman’s turning

the enemy’s right. Grant must therefore have consulted with Thomas

concerning this maneuver. Whether General Thomas expressed his opinion

on the 25th with regard to making the attack in some other place than

at Sherman’s line, is not known; but it will be seen, that the success

of the day pivoted around Thomas, because of the invincible position

of the enemy at Tunnel Hill, and the valor of the old Army of the

Cumberland. This is no disparagement to General Grant’s original idea;

his plans were generally correct and successful, and this one was fine

in conception, but it shows definitely, that the “best laid schemes,

o’mice and men, gang aft a’gley.”

General Grant boldly made his third deviation from his original outline

planned for the battle. Seeing the improbability of Sherman advancing

his present line to join with Thomas’s left, as contemplated, he

ordered an independent assault by Thomas’s troops alone; this order

was given at 3 p. m. This section of the Union line was covered by two

lines of skirmishers; and was confronted by something less than four

divisions of the enemy, namely, a part of Stewart’s on the Confederate

left, which was facing Hooker’s line under General Breckenridge’s

personal direction. The signal for the advance was to be six shots

from a battery (perhaps Bridge’s), on Orchard Knob. General Grant’s

report will best tell what occurred, viz.: “Thomas was accordingly

directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center, * * *

with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy

supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at

the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines, on

the rifle-pits with a view to carry the top of the ridge. These troops

moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the

ridge like bees from a hive--stopped but a moment until the whole

were in line--and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to

left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy,

without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape

and canister from near thirty pieces of artillery and musketry from

still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver,

however, was seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress

was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.”[39]

When the summit was reached by the Union troops, the scene of confusion

and flight of the Confederate forces, down the eastern slope of the

ridge, was wonderful to behold.

General Thomas in his report,[40] says: “Our troops advancing steadily

in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works

at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, where

they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired

by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six

different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy, that many

of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their

cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed.”

In the meantime Hooker was advancing toward Thomas’s right with his

line stretched across the ridge, at right angles to it. Stewart’s

troops, seeing their left threatened by Hooker, tried to escape down

the eastern slope toward Ringgold, but encountering there Osterhaus’s

troops, moved northward along the base; here they ran into Johnson’s

division, and more than a thousand were captured. After General Baird’s

division had gained the summit, Stewart wheeled his division to the

left, across the crest, and advanced toward the troops, resisting

General Sherman. He had not advanced far before he met Cheatham’s

forces in line across the crest; the contest here lasted until after

dark. During the night all the Confederate forces retreated across the

Chickamauga, burned the bridges, and continued their flight to Taylor’s

Ridge, near Ringgold, the nearest heights across the Chickamauga

Valley, sixteen miles in a straight line southeast. General Sheridan,

after halting a few moments on top of the ridge to reform his troops,

pushed on to Chickamauga Creek; he captured 300 prisoners, 13 cannon,

and a train of 12 wagons.

Mr. C. A. Dana sent a dispatch to the Secretary of War at 10 a. m.

November 26, which contained the following paragraph: “The storming of

the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military

history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind

along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken

and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It

seems as awful as a visible interposition of God. Neither Grant, nor

Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along

the base of the ridge, and capture their occupants; but when this was

accomplished, the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily

up those impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits on the

crest, and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully.”

General Grant says in his report that he intended the lines should be

readjusted and ascend the ridge if they were successful at the base.

The reports of the corps and division commanders indicate that some of

them misunderstood the orders. The men advanced without special orders,

however, when they found the position at the foot of the ridge too much

exposed to the plunging fire of the enemy. In some instances they were

even called back to the foot after proceeding part way up the hill.

The assault was made, however, and was so successful, that no one was

court-martialed; no one was bold enough to repudiate the responsibility

for its initiation. General Grant did not hesitate to modify his

original plans from time to time, when inevitable circumstances showed

him that some other movement than the one laid down was essential to

success. This characteristic is the quality of a great general.

The artillery also under command of General Brannan did fine service

during the assault. The large guns in Forts Wood, Sherman, Cheatham,

and battery Rousseau directed their fire first upon the Confederate

line at the foot of the ridge, as did four light batteries in front

of Chattanooga. When the Union line was ascending the ridge, this

artillery turned their shots to the entrenched Confederate line on top.

The enemy’s artillery and musketry seemed largely to have over-shot the

Union lines; the records do not show that the Union troops suffered

as heavy losses during the time they were under fire, as the enemy’s

apparently advantageous position would warrant. It is also probable

that the audacity of the blue coats in assaulting the top of the ridge

surprised the Confederates and induced nervousness, wild shooting,

terror, confusion, and flight.

The Union troops did not advance up the ridge as if on parade; but

conformed more or less to the contour of the ground; the line appeared

to an onlooker as a zigzag one; but the standards were always where

they ought to be, and there were no stragglers. They did not fire

their muskets to any extent while advancing, although they received

a constant wild fire from the enemy. It was an assault by the musket

bearers, and it is not likely they received many orders from their

officers. As soon as the Union troops gained the crest at one point,

although it appeared as if the six different points were gained

simultaneously, it greatly assisted the rest of the troops, who were

so near the crest. The Confederates began to fall back as soon as the

first Union troops gained the top. General Bragg tried to send his

troops from a less threatened point to one more in danger, but his

attempt failed, because his men saw better than he seemed to do that

all was lost when one point was carried. This observation applies

only of course to the isolated line on the right and left of Bragg’s

headquarters, which was attacked by General Thomas’s troops. His troops

further to the right, beyond an unoccupied space--such as Cheatham’s

division--were not affected that way, because they turned on left

wheel, and attacked Baird’s division on the crest.

The Union troops, which were called back to the foot of the ridge by

those officers who thought their orders carried them only thus far,

caused Bragg to believe that they had been repulsed by the fire of

his troops; he rode along his line congratulating them, when he was

informed that his line was broken further to the right, and the Union

forces had crowned the ridge. The victory was gained too late in the

evening to ensure an effective pursuit. The enemy had all night, after

crossing the Chickamauga, in which to move undisturbed his troops and

wagon trains; he made the distance between himself and the pursuing

force as great as possible before morning. General Grant was apparently

justified in waiting for Hooker to arrive at Rossville before he

ordered Thomas’s advance, but he was not justified in waiting so long

as he did for Sherman’s expected capture of Tunnel Hill. Yet who could

hope or believe that Thomas’s troops could successfully assault so

formidable a position as they did? Hooker was delayed four hours in

crossing Chattanooga Creek. If Grant had sent Howard’s Corps at 10 a. m.

on the 25th to Rossville in Hooker’s place, instead of sending it

to Sherman, and as soon as it was in position, ordered Thomas, Howard,

and Sherman to advance in unison, the same result would have occurred

at one or two o’clock as was secured much later, and then the four and

a half or five hours of daylight would have been sufficient to injure

the Confederate Army very greatly before it could have crossed the

Chickamauga. But it is very easy to look back and criticise. On the

battlefield there may be reasons, apparent to a commander, why these

supposable movements could not be made that are not so palpable to a

historian, who may lose sight of all the complex situations, the inside

knowledge of the commander, and his fearful responsibility to the

country.

The pursuit was taken up on the morning of the 26th by General Hooker’s

troops and Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps. Hooker attacked the enemy in a

strong position at Ringgold Gap on Taylor’s Ridge; he lost heavily

without inflicting corresponding injury on the enemy. The Fourth

Corps was marched back to the city on the morning of the 26th to make

preparations for the relief of Burnside at Knoxville.

On the 27th, the pursuit was abandoned at Ringgold, twenty-three miles

by rail south of Chattanooga. General Grant telegraphed from that place

at 2 p. m. to General Halleck at Washington, D. C.: “I am not prepared

to continue pursuit further.” The official reports neither give the

strength of the Union Army nor of the Confederate Army. At the time of

the attack on Missionary Ridge the Union Army outnumbered largely the

Confederate Army. A large part of this disparity in numbers was offset

by the extraordinarily strong position of the Confederate forces,

and the fact that the Union Army was the aggressor. Could Bragg have

commanded the resources that Grant did, he would have gladly availed

himself of them in order to outnumber the Union Army; no false notions

of chivalry prevented either army from availing itself of any great

advantage in battle, which is habitually taken where war is waged. The

Confederate boast at the beginning of the war that one Confederate

could out-fight five Yankees--as all northern troops were called by the

Confederates--was rather incompatible with their complaint after the

war, that they were crushed only by weight of numbers.

Military skill will sometimes win battles against numbers; this was not

the case in the battles around Chattanooga, however. Bragg does not

give his losses in his official report; but he lost to the Union Army

in prisoners 6,142 men, 42 pieces of artillery, 69 gun carriages, and

7,000 stands of small arms. He destroyed much other material before and

during his flight.

The Union less was 5,286 killed and wounded, and 330 missing.

These losses seem small compared with other battles of less

importance--Chickamauga for instance; but it must be remembered that

the sacrifice for the continued possession of Chattanooga by the Union

Army includes also all the losses of the conflicts of the Tullahoma

campaign, of Chickamauga, Wauhatchie, Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob,

and Missionary Ridge. When it is considered how much these battles

meant, in their causal effect on the final suppression of the

rebellion itself, their value becomes apparent.

WISCONSIN TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE

Wisconsin’s part in the battle of Missionary Ridge was important and

honorable. The First and Twenty-first Infantry were in Starkweather’s

brigade of Johnson’s division. This brigade had lost heavily at

Chickamauga; it was assigned to remain in Chattanooga in order to hold

the works, while the army was assaulting the ridge. This duty was

cheerfully and thoroughly done, although it deprived the brigade of the

glory of charging up the ridge.

The Tenth Infantry remained on detached duty holding a fort south of

the Crutchfield house, on the side of Lookout Mountain, and did not

ascend the ridge.

The Fifteenth Infantry was attached to Willich’s brigade of Wood’s

division of Granger’s fourth corps; it was commanded by Captain John A.

Gordon. In the ascent of the ridge it was in the reserve line of the

brigade, therefore its loss was nominal; the entire loss during the

battles was 6 men wounded. General Willich speaks of the regiment in

high terms in his report. It consisted only of 130 men.

Before coming to the Army of the Cumberland the Fifteenth Infantry had

distinguished itself. On October 19, 1862, Major Quincy McNeill of the

Second Illinois Cavalry wrote to the Governor of Wisconsin, from Island

Number Ten, that there was no braver man in the service than Captain

John A. Gordon.

The Eighteenth Infantry came with Sherman’s troops of the Army of the

Tennessee; it was commanded by Colonel Gabriel Bouck and attached

to the First Brigade (Alexander’s), of the Second Division (General

John E. Smith’s), of the Seventeenth Corps. This infantry regiment

was engaged with Sherman’s troops on the extreme left; its losses are

not reported. It was organized at Milwaukee in February, 1862, and

was mustered in March. It proceeded to Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee,

and became a part of the Army of the Tennessee on April 5, 1862. This

regiment was heavily engaged in the battle at that place on April

6; also in the battle of Corinth and other engagements prior to its

coming to Chattanooga. The Eighteenth Infantry was noted for the size

of its men; it was said that Company G of this regiment averaged by

actual weight 160 pounds to the man. At the battle of Pittsburg Landing

on April 6, 1862, this regiment was in the left brigade of General

Prentiss’s division; it was then commanded by its first colonel, J.

S. Alban. It formed for battle only thirty rods from its tents, and

fifteen minutes later the Confederate line was upon it. The enemy

outflanked and overpowered it; Alban was wounded, and carried from the

field, dying soon afterwards; the Lieutenant-Colonel was also wounded

and Major Crane was killed. All this occurred one week after the

regiment left its camp of organization in Wisconsin. Captain Gabriel

Bouck, Company E, Second Wisconsin Infantry was made Colonel of the

Eighteenth on April 22, 1862.

The Twenty-fourth Infantry was attached to Francis T. Sherman’s Brigade

of Sheridan’s division of the Fourth Corps, and was commanded by Major

Carl Von Baumbach. His official report is a vivid account of how the

top of the ridge was gained, “My regiment advanced in admirable line

of battle up to the first pits of the enemy. Upon reaching the first

line, the men were pretty much exhausted, and unable to move for some

time. In about five minutes, however, we moved over the first pits

of the enemy, but after advancing beyond the first line, the line of

battle was not regular. The men took advantage of all obstacles, in

the way, for shelter, and thus advanced toward the top of the ridge.

The fighting was fierce and severe, but owing to the formation of the

ground my men were able to screen themselves partially, from the deadly

volleys, that were being hurled at us, at every step of our advance. In

the course of the ascent my men had to rest several times on account

of exhaustion. But at length we succeeded in gaining the crest of the

ridge, after two hours steady fighting * * * I would most respectfully

mention Adjutant Arthur McArthur, Jr., for his bravery. When the color

sergeant was exhausted he carried the flag in front of the regiment,

cheering the men to follow him up the ridge.”

The loss of the Twenty-fourth is given as 31 killed and wounded.

Captain Howard Greene and Lieutenant Robert J. Chivas were killed.

Captain Richard H. Austin and Lieutenant Thomas E. Balding were

wounded. Major Von Baumbach commended especially the bravery of the

latter two.

The Twenty-sixth Infantry, still in the second brigade of Schurz’s

division of the Eleventh Corps, was commanded by Major F. C. Winkler;

this regiment followed the movements of its brigade and on November 25,

was with Sherman on the extreme left. Its losses are not reported.

The Third, Eighth, and Tenth light batteries were in the First Brigade

of the Second Division of the artillery reserve. Company C of the first

heavy artillery was in the Second Brigade of the same division.

The Eighth Battery did excellent service on the evening of the 24th,

when Carlin’s brigade crossed Chattanooga Creek at its mouth and joined

Hooker. Lieutenant O. German, commanding the battery, placed two

sections near the mouth of the creek on its right bank, and shelled the

Confederate position and the road up the east of the mountain. On the

25th, after the infantry had taken Missionary Ridge it ascended to the

crest. Losses, none.

The Fifth Battery was part of the artillery which was so placed as

to cover the pontoon bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, where

Sherman’s troops crossed on the 24th.

The Twelfth Battery was placed on a hill near the location of the Fifth

Battery.

The Sixth and Twelfth batteries were attached officially to the Second

Division of the Seventeenth Corps; therefore they were on the left with

Sherman during the 25th. Their losses are not reported.

There is no report from the Tenth Battery, which was stationed

at Harrison’s Landing, about twelve miles up the river, east of

Chattanooga; a section of this battery reported to Colonel Eli Long (of

the cavalry) at Calhoun, Tennessee.

Battery C of the First Regiment of Wisconsin Heavy Artillery was

mustered in October 1, 1863; it was sent directly to Chattanooga and

assigned to Fort Wood.

The Sixth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into service at Racine,

Wisconsin, October 2, 1861. It did not leave the State until March

15, 1862, when it went to St. Louis. It took part in the siege of

Island Number Ten, the siege and battle of Corinth, and the siege of

Vicksburg. This battery came to Chattanooga with the Fifteenth Corps

under Sherman.

The Tenth Wisconsin Light Battery was mustered into the service

at Milwaukee on February 10, 1862, with Captain Yates V. Beebe as

commander. It left the State March 18 and went to St. Louis. From there

it joined the Army of the Tennessee and took part in the battle of

Corinth. On September 14, 1862, it arrived at Nashville, and took part

in the battle of Stone’s River. It did active duty in various locations

until the date of the battles around Chattanooga.

The Twelfth Wisconsin Battery was organized and equipped at Jefferson

Barracks, Missouri. It did service in both Tennessee and Mississippi

until coming to Chattanooga with General Sherman.

The Army of the Cumberland--as reorganized prior to the battles around

Chattanooga--with General Thomas in command, was now in permanent

possession of Chattanooga. The Confederate Army took up its winter

quarters at Dalton, Georgia, on the railway twenty-eight miles

southeast of Chattanooga, across two mountain ranges. The assignment of

General Grant as commander of the Division of the Mississippi--giving

him command of all the forces, operating in the States of Kentucky,

Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi--which so greatly

contributed to the victories in the battles around Chattanooga, insured

also the permanent holding of that city.

Whatever was accomplished by Rosecrans during the four months of the

campaign, beginning on June 23 at Murfreesboro, and ending on October

19, 1863 at Chattanooga, was done by him and his Army of the Cumberland

alone. He could not get any cooperation from the East or West. The

President and General Halleck at Washington, seemed to be in earnest

by the wording of their dispatches, as published in the _Rebellion

Record_, in urging and commanding Burnside in east Tennessee and the

Army of the Tennessee on the Mississippi to join with Rosecrans prior

to the battle of Chickamauga; for reasons not apparent to the reader

of present history, no reinforcements came. It is pathetic to read the

official record of those days, which gives an account of the struggles,

the marches, the battles, the sacrifices, the patient endurance by the

musket bearers of extreme fatigue, and the cheerfulness with which the

soldiers endured all. They faced death without a thought of their real

heroism. To one who went through the campaign and came out alive and

unwounded it is incomprehensible, that all did not die.

It is true other armies, such as those of the Potomac, the Tennessee,

and the one in Missouri had campaigns at the same time and were

equally exposed to the hazards of war; but none of them marched over a

territory so mountainous and so difficult; none of them fought battles

in so perilous a region or with more deadly effect, than the soldiers

in the battle of Chickamauga. Had the Union Army been really defeated

and had it lost Chattanooga, the army could hardly have recovered

from the disaster, without the quick aid of large reinforcements,

which were too far away at that time to be available in an emergency.

Burnside was besieged at Knoxville, and the Army of the Tennessee so

far away, that it took weeks to get it to Chattanooga. It will be

of great interest to the future student of the military history of

the War between the States to follow the subsequent campaigns of the

Western armies after Grant became commander-in-chief, and Sherman was

assigned to the command in the West, with headquarters at Chattanooga.

He will apprehend how all the armies worked together, and how soon

the rebellion itself was crushed, although its soldiers fought to the

bitter end.

INDEX

[Armies, Battles, Corps, Creeks, Forts, Gaps, Islands, Losses,

Mountains, Rivers, and Wars are grouped under those respective heads;

Regiments are grouped under the caption of their respective States.]

Adams, Gen. Daniel W., at Chickamauga, 99, 100, 104.

Alabama, 8-10;

troops in, 33, 232;

28th Infantry, 191.

Alexander, Col. E. Porter, at Knoxville, 181.

Alexander, Col. Jesse I., at Missionary Ridge, 205, 226.

Alexander’s Bridge, near Chickamauga, 69, 72, 77.

Alpine (Ga.), 61, 63, 72-75.

Anderson, Gen. Patton, at Missionary Ridge, 205.

Anderson, Gen. Robert, in Kentucky, 15.

Anderson’s Cross Roads (Tenn.), 159.

ARMIES--

Cumberland, 1, 3, 5, 8, 13, 15, 164, 177, 178, 201, 206-208, 226,

232;

organization, 12, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28;

commander, 16;

reorganized, 164, 169, 170, 231;

reinforced, 135, 189;

retreats, 155;

at Murfreesboro, 4, 5, 11;

in Chickamauga campaign, 52-154;

at Chattanooga, 186;

courage of, 22, 180, 214;

personnel, 25-27, 33.

Mississippi, 12.

Ohio, 15, 169.

Potomac, 4, 158, 177, 178, 208, 233.

Tennessee (Confederate), 1, 33;

organized, 33-39;

in Chickamauga campaign, 52-154;

on Missionary Ridge, 202-222.

Tennessee (Union), 4, 5, 158, 159, 169, 201, 208, 226, 231-233.

Armstrong, Gen. Frank C., at Chickamauga, 117.

Atlanta (Ga.), capture, 3, 5, 10.

Austin, Capt. Richard H., wounded, 229.

Baird, Gen. Absalom, of regular army, 23;

commands division, 19, 21, 166;

in Chickamauga campaign, 60, 65, 66, 68;

at battle of Chickamauga, 79, 81-103, 107, 108, 111, 112, 115, 122,

126-129, 139-142, 145, 152;

withdraws, 123, 125, 129;

at Rossville, 124;

Orchard Knob, 190;

Missionary Ridge, 202-205, 213, 216, 221;

commended, 148, 149.

Balding, Lieut. Thomas E., 132;

wounded, 229.

Barker, Capt. John D., aide to Thomas, 120, 122.

Barnes, Gen. Sidney M., at Chickamauga, 104, 107, 109, 113, 142.

Bate, Gen. William B., at Missionary Ridge, 205.

Battle Creek (Tenn.), 60, 167.