THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN
[Illustration: THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN
Adapted from Fiske’s _The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_, p. 260]
WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION: ORIGINAL PAPERS, NO. 4
THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN
With especial reference to Wisconsin’s
participation therein
BY MICHAEL HENDRICK FITCH
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF THE TWENTY-FIRST WISCONSIN INFANTRY
BREVET COLONEL OF VOLUNTEERS, AUTHOR OF “ECHOES
OF THE CIVIL WAR AS I HEAR THEM”
WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION
MARCH, 1911
TWENTY-FIVE HUNDRED COPIES PRINTED
Copyright, 1911
THE WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION
(in behalf of the State of Wisconsin)
Opinions or errors of fact on the part of the respective authors of the
Commission’s publications (whether Reprints or Original Narratives)
have not been modified or corrected by the Commission. For all
statements, of whatever character, the Author alone is responsible.
DEMOCRAT PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTER
CONTENTS
PAGE
WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION ix
INTRODUCTION xi
THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN:
Chapter I. The Preliminary Campaign 1
Organization 11
Organization of the Confederate Army 33
The advance of the Union Army 39
Chapter II. The Chickamauga Campaign and Battle 51
The Confederate line on September 20 95
The Confederate attack upon the Union right 104
Wisconsin troops at Chickamauga 126
Chapter III. The occupation and battles of Chattanooga 155
The Battle of Lookout Mountain 194
Wisconsin troops in the Battle of Missionary Ridge 225
INDEX 235
MAPS
PAGE
The Chattanooga Campaign _Frontispiece_
Chickamauga, September 19, 1863 82
Chickamauga, morning of September 20, 1863 98
The fatal order to Wood, at Chickamauga 112
Chickamauga, evening of September 20, 1863 114
Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863 194
WISCONSIN HISTORY COMMISSION
(Organized under the provisions of Chapter 298, Laws of 1905, as
amended by Chapter 378, Laws of 1907 and Chapter 445, Laws of 1909)
FRANCIS E. McGOVERN
_Governor of Wisconsin_
CHARLES E. ESTABROOK
_Representing Department of Wisconsin, Grand Army of the Republic_
REUBEN G. THWAITES
_Superintendent of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin_
CARL RUSSELL FISH
_Professor of American History in the University of Wisconsin_
MATTHEW S. DUDGEON
_Secretary of the Wisconsin Library Commission_
_Chairman_, COMMISSIONER ESTABROOK
_Secretary and Editor_, COMMISSIONER THWAITES
_Committee on Publications_, COMMISSIONERS THWAITES AND FISH
INTRODUCTION
After the battle of Gettysburg in the East, and the siege of Vicksburg
in the West, attention was riveted during the later summer and autumn
of 1863 on the campaign around Chattanooga. Seated on the heights along
the southern border of Tennessee, that city commanded highways running
through the very heart of the Confederacy. The result at Gettysburg
had demonstrated that no Southern army could invade the North; the
Union victory at Vicksburg determined that the Mississippi should run
unhindered to the sea. The battles of Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain,
and Missionary Ridge not only decided that Kentucky and Tennessee
should remain in the Union, but they opened the way for Sherman’s
advance on Atlanta and his March to the Sea, which cut the Confederacy
in two and made Lee’s surrender a necessity.
The War between the States saw no more stubborn fighting than raged
on September 19th and 20th around the old Cherokee stronghold of
Chickamauga. Two months later, occurred the three days’ battle around
the hill city of Chattanooga. In all these events, the citizen soldiers
of Wisconsin played a conspicuous part, which is herein described by a
participant and student of these famous contests. In these battles the
reputations of officers were made and unmade, and from them emerged
the great generals who were to carry the Union arms to complete
victory--Thomas, Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant.
Colonel Fitch, the author of this volume, began his service July 16,
1861, as Sergeant-Major of the Sixth Wisconsin; he was commissioned
First-Lieutenant in October following, and in the succeeding April
was appointed Adjutant of the Twenty-first; he became, in succession,
Major and Lieutenant-Colonel of that regiment, and in March, 1865, was
brevetted Colonel of Volunteers “for gallant and meritorious services
during the war.” He served chiefly with the Army of Potomac, Army
of Virginia, Army of Ohio, and Army of Cumberland. He commanded his
regiment from July 1, 1864; and on the March to the Sea; and in the
Carolinas headed a wing of the brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first
Wisconsin, the Forty-second Indiana, and the One Hundred-and-fourth
Illinois. Later, he was assigned to the command of the Second Brigade
of the Fourteenth Army Corps. He now lives at Pueblo, Colorado.
The maps illustrating the text are adaptations from John Fiske’s _The
Mississippi Valley in the Civil War_ (Boston, 1900), which we are
permitted to use through the generosity of the publishers, Houghton
Mifflin Company.
The Commission is also under obligations to the editorial staff of the
Wisconsin Historical Society for having seen the volume through the
press. The index was compiled by Dr. Louise Phelps Kellogg, a member of
that staff; the proof-reading has been the work chiefly of Misses Annie
A. Nunns and Daisy G. Beecroft.
R. G. T.
WISCONSIN HISTORICAL LIBRARY
MARCH, 1911
The Chattanooga Campaign
CHAPTER I
_The Preliminary Campaign_
The Union Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Major-General William
S. Rosecrans, was, in June, 1863, encamped at Murfreesboro, Tennessee,
thirty-two miles south of Nashville. It had been lying here since
January 5, 1863, having marched from the adjacent field of Stone’s
River. The Confederate Army of the Tennessee, was, at the same time,
in camp near Tullahoma, forty miles south of Murfreesboro. The
Confederates had been defeated at Stone’s River, and had fallen back to
Tullahoma at the same time the Union forces had taken up their camp at
Murfreesboro.
I will designate the campaign of the latter army, beginning on June
23, 1863, by marching from Murfreesboro, as the “Chattanooga Campaign
of 1863.” The various engagements in that campaign, beginning with
Hoover’s[1] and Liberty gaps[2] on June 24, down to that of Missionary
Ridge, at Chattanooga, on November 25, are incidents of that campaign,
and necessary parts of it. A description of the campaign immediately
preceding, which started when General Rosecrans assumed command of the
army of the Cumberland at Bowling Green, Kentucky, in October, 1862,
and ended with the victory of the Union forces in the battle of Stone’s
River, and the occupation of Murfreesboro--would give a preliminary
historical setting.
In fact, a full history of the Chattanooga campaign may well include
the entire movements of the army under General Buell, from October
1, 1862, when it marched out of Louisville, Kentucky, in pursuit of
Bragg’s army. The latter was then supposed to be in the vicinity of
Frankfort, the capital of that State, engaged in the inglorious
occupation of coercing the legislature to pass an ordinance of
secession. It was also trying to recruit its ranks from the young
citizens of Kentucky, and was restocking its commissary from the rich
farms of the blue-grass region. Buell found it, on October 8, at
Perryville, seventy-five miles southeast of Louisville. He drove it out
of Kentucky, and then marched to Bowling Green, on the railroad between
Louisville and Nashville, where in the same month he was superseded, as
commander, by Rosecrans.
The Atlanta campaign, immediately following that of
Chattanooga--beginning on May 4, 1864, and ending in the capture of
Atlanta on September 8 of that year--gives a subsequent historical
setting: a connection in time as well as in space, to the operations
of the Army of the Cumberland in 1863. By referring to these several
important military campaigns of the war, the reader may obtain a
synchronous perspective of the most important events in the Middle
West, in the department occupied by that army.
A larger setting can be given to this campaign for the capture of
Chattanooga, by framing it into the two military fields of the
Potomac on the east, and the Tennessee on the west. The Army of the
Potomac was opposed to General Lee’s forces. It operated generally
between Washington, D. C., and Richmond, Virginia, the latter being
the objective. At the time the Army of the Cumberland marched out of
Murfreesboro, Lee had taken advantage of the defeat of the army under
Hooker from May 1 to 3, 1863, at Chancellorsville, Virginia, and
invaded Maryland and Pennsylvania. He was decisively defeated in the
battle of Gettysburg, on July 3 following, by Major-General George C.
Meade, which closed his campaigning into the North. The old field north
of Richmond was reoccupied by the Army of the Potomac, then in command
of Meade, as successor to Hooker. It was the latter who, in October,
brought the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac to
the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga.
On the west of the Army of the Cumberland, was the field of the Army
of the Tennessee. Its task was the opening of the Mississippi River.
At this time, General U. S. Grant was in command, and had his army
at Vicksburg. That stronghold surrendered to him on July 4. Thus the
great river was opened. This left the greater part of the Army of
the Tennessee free to cooperate in the autumn with the Army of the
Cumberland in the battles around Chattanooga; and from that date to
assist in the Atlanta campaign, and the March to the Sea, the following
year.
It will thus be seen that victory crowned all three of the great
armies during the time of the Chattanooga campaign. The confidence and
discipline of the Union forces, increased at this time; the discovery,
by the governing powers at Washington, of those of the general officers
who displayed the most ability; the placing of such officers in the
command of the Union armies; and the gradual weakening of the secession
armies, were the principal factors contributing to the final end of
the war. The resulting campaigns of 1864 and the early part of 1865,
sufficed to crush the most powerful rebellion in history.
During its long occupancy of Murfreesboro, the Army of the Cumberland
had been somewhat recruited; its equipment was restored to its former
condition; and it had also been very much improved, as well as
reorganized. During this time the formidable Fortress Rosecrans was
built at Murfreesboro, so that a small force might continue to hold the
place after the army moved on. This fort proved of great value during
the Hood campaign against Franklin and Nashville, in November and
December, 1864. Nashville had to be permanently occupied. In fact, the
line of railway running from Louisville through Kentucky and Tennessee
to Chattanooga, through Bowling Green, Nashville, Murfreesboro,
Tullahoma, and Bridgeport, formed the line for carrying supplies, as
well as the line of operations. This line, about three hundred and
forty miles long, had to be defended and kept open, as the Union Army
advanced. As part of it--if not the whole--lying in southern Kentucky
and Tennessee, was in the enemy’s country, it was necessary to build
and man as the army advanced, a line of forts and block houses, for the
protection of this railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga.
By glancing at a good map, the reader can see the immense difficulty
involved in the maintenance and defense of this line of supplies
consisting of but a single-track railroad. The task required the
services of about a fourth of the entire army. The field of operations
contained no navigable rivers parallel with the line of advance, upon
which gunboats might assist the army in its conflicts with the enemy,
and by which the railroad could be assisted in carrying supplies.
Two somewhat important streams traversed the field, or rather ran at
right angles to it--the Cumberland, on which Nashville is located;
and the Tennessee, flowing past Chattanooga. These run westward from
the Cumberland Mountains, and for very small craft plying for limited
distances only, were navigable within the field of the Army of the
Cumberland. But they were of practically no use to the Union Army,
except at Chattanooga after its occupation--when for a time, supplies
were thus transported from Bridgeport and Stevenson pending the
repairing of the railway from those places. There were also two smaller
streams in southern Tennessee, running at right angles to the line of
operation, called the Duck and the Elk. It was necessary that the
Union commander consider these in his advance from Murfreesboro, for
they were fordable only in places, and not even there when floods were
rampant. They were bridged on the main wagon roads, but these bridges
were easily destroyed by the enemy. In its campaigns from Louisville,
Kentucky, to Chattanooga, the Army of the Cumberland did not have any
assistance from the navy.
In this sketch, it is not necessary to give a tedious account of the
most difficult natural obstacles, such as streams, mountains, and
distances. These are apparent upon the study of any good map. But
mention must be made, that the Union Army faced a chain of mountains
lying between it and Chattanooga, at the northwestern edge of which
then lay the Confederate Army. This is the plateau of the Cumberland
Mountains, extending in a southwest direction from West Virginia to
northern Alabama, and covering what is known as East Tennessee. This
plateau is about 2,200 feet above tidewater.
Chattanooga is the commercial gateway through which run both the
Tennessee River and the railways from north, east, and south. It
lies near the junction of the boundary line between Alabama and
Georgia, with the south line of Tennessee, at the eastern edge of the
Cumberland Mountains, where the Tennessee River, flowing westward, cuts
through the range. It is in a direct southeast line from Nashville.
The occupation of Chattanooga by the Union Army cut the Confederacy
asunder. Hence, the struggle for this position became a fierce one. It
cost both sides strenuous campaigns, an immense number of lives, and
the destruction of an incalculable amount of property. Its possession
by a Union Army was an inhibition of any serious Confederate invasion
into Middle Tennessee or Kentucky. The object of the Chattanooga
campaign was, therefore, the capture of that city; and ultimately, the
destruction of the Confederate Army. Should the capture of the city
be accomplished, but the army of the Confederate escape, Chattanooga
could be made the sub-base of a new campaign, which would effectually
dismember the Confederacy, and greatly hasten its downfall. Such was
the Union theory, and this actually occurred.
Followed by the “March to the Sea,” the Atlanta campaign dismembered
the enemy’s domain and made possible the end of the war. Lee’s
surrender would not have occurred at the time it did (April, 1865),
if the homes of his soldiers in the Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee,
and Alabama had not been invaded by the Western armies of the Union;
and his rear threatened by Sherman’s troops. These results were made
possible only by the capture and continued possession of Chattanooga.
After Sherman had marched through Georgia and South Carolina, and
penetrated North Carolina, with a large part of the old Army of the
Cumberland and troops from other armies, thousands of Lee’s army
deserted, and lined the roads leading back to their homes. When
captured and paroled, as they were in immense numbers, by Sherman’s
“bummers,” they invariably said that they left Lee when Richmond was
abandoned; and would not longer fight for a Confederacy that could
not defend their homes. Love of home is greater than love of country;
unless the state or nation can protect the homes from invasion and
desecration, there is little incentive for its volunteers to fight for
the abstract principles of patriotism.
A description of the contour of the field, from Murfreesboro to the
Chickamauga, would be only an interminable and profitless account; it
being a tangle of flat and rolling land, from Murfreesboro to the gaps
in the first hills, where the enemy was met; and thenceforth steep
mountains and deep valleys. But the grand strategy subsequently adopted
by Rosecrans, depended so entirely upon this contour, that when each
separate movement or battle shall hereafter be described, a somewhat
minute account of the country contiguous to that particular military
event will be given.
ORGANIZATION
After the battle of Stone’s River and while lying at Murfreesboro, the
Army of the Cumberland was reorganized. As previously stated, Rosecrans
joined it as the successor of Buell, at Bowling Green, in October,
1862. Stone’s River was the army’s first battle under Rosecrans. In
that, the army was called the Fourteenth Corps, Department of the
Cumberland; and it was divided into three divisions--the centre, right,
and left wings. General George H. Thomas commanded the centre, General
Alexander McD. McCook the right, and General Thomas L. Crittenden
the left. In the new organization, the command was called the Army
of the Cumberland, and divided into three corps, the Fourteenth, the
Twentieth, and the Twenty-first. Thomas was assigned to the command of
the Fourteenth, General McCook to the Twentieth, and Crittenden to the
Twenty-first.
Rosecrans came to the Army of the Cumberland with considerable
prestige. He was then forty-three years old, having graduated from West
Point in 1842. As brigadier-general he had gained the battle of Rich
Mountain, Virginia, in July, 1861; won the battle of Carnifex Ferry,
Virginia, in September of the same year; as commander of the Army of
the Mississippi was victorious in the battles of Iuka in September,
1862, and of Corinth in October following. He came to the Army of the
Cumberland with a record of unbroken successes behind him. He was
genial, and had untiring industry. His heart and head were devoted
to the Union cause. His troops saw him frequently. He was a lover of
approbation, and had the confidence of his generals, and the love of
his rank and file. The men affectionately nicknamed him “Old Rosy,” and
that was his usual cognomen with the whole army. He was a strategist of
high order. A study of his Chattanooga campaign will show his eminent
ability, in so maneuvering as to compel the enemy to fight in the open.
When an engagement was thus brought on, and the actual combat occurred,
he lacked (in those which he fought with the Army of the Cumberland)
the proper supervision of his line of battle. He too implicitly relied
upon his subordinates. During the whole of the Chattanooga campaign
his strategy was of the first order; but at both Stone’s River and
Chickamauga, the right of his line was too attenuated; in both
engagements, disaster occurred to this part of his troops.
The chief of staff to Rosecrans was General James A. Garfield, who was
then thirty-one years old, brainy and very energetic. Although not a
graduate of West Point, he was possessed of decided military instincts.
Before the war he was an instructor in, and later president of, Hiram
College, Ohio; and later was a member of the Ohio Senate. Entering the
army as lieutenant-colonel of an Ohio regiment, he defeated Humphrey
Marshall in the battle of Middle Creek, Eastern Kentucky, January 10,
1862, and was that year promoted to be a brigadier-general. Able and
conscientious as an officer, he was perhaps rather too democratic and
academic to become a typical soldier. He became very nervous at the
delay in moving from Murfreesboro, and instituted an inquiry into
the reasons, both for and against an earlier advance on Tullahoma. A
majority of the subordinate generals in the Army of the Cumberland
supported General Rosecrans in his delay. Later on, notice will be
taken of Garfield’s service in the battle of Chickamauga, and his
retirement to a seat in Congress.
Next to Rosecrans, the most important figure among the subordinate
commanders was Thomas. He was then forty-seven years old, and a
graduate of West Point in 1840. Between that time and the Civil War,
he served in the war with Mexico, and against the Indians in the West.
At the beginning of the War between the States he was major of the
Second Cavalry, of which Albert Sidney Johnston was colonel, Robert
E. Lee lieutenant-colonel, and William J. Hardee senior major. Thomas
was the only field officer of that regiment who remained loyal to
the Union. He was commissioned colonel of the regiment, reorganized
it, and during the first battle of Bull Run served in General
Patterson’s detachment, in the Shenandoah Valley. He was commissioned
brigadier-general in August, 1861, and was sent to Kentucky to serve
in the then Army of the Ohio (afterwards the Army of the Cumberland),
under General Robert Anderson of Fort Sumter fame. Thomas organized
the first real little army of that department at camp Dick Robinson,
Kentucky, between Danville and Lexington; and in January, 1862, with
this force defeated the Confederate troops under Zollicoffer, at Mill
Springs, Kentucky, on the Cumberland River. This force and this place
were then the extreme right of the Confederate line of defense, of
which Forts Donelson and Henry, in Tennessee, and Paducah, Kentucky,
constituted the left. This line was fortified, and extended through
Bowling Green. A month after General Thomas had turned its right at
Mill Springs, General Grant also turned its left, by capturing both
Forts Donelson and Henry. This necessitated the establishment of a new
Confederate line farther south, the evacuation of Kentucky, and the
eventual loss to the Confederates of Middle Tennessee. Just before the
battle of Perryville, Kentucky, the President offered General Thomas,
on September 29, 1862, the command of the Army of the Cumberland at
Louisville, but he declined it. Buell was in command of the army during
the battle of Perryville; after which he was superseded by Rosecrans.
Thomas was a soldier, pure and simple, having never resigned from the
army after his graduation from the Military Academy. He had shown great
ability in the recent battle of Stone’s River, as well as in every
position in which he was placed, prior to that battle. It will be
seen, further on, what important movements he directed in the battle
of Chickamauga, which saved the Army of the Cumberland from imminent
disaster.
General McCook, who commanded the Twentieth Corps, belonged to the
younger class of West Point graduates, of which General Sheridan was
a type. He graduated in 1853, and was thirty-two years old in April,
1863. He was a handsome man, of striking presence, and commanded with
some dramatic effect.
General Crittenden, commanding the Twenty-first Corps, was then a year
older than Rosecrans--forty-four years. He was not a graduate of West
Point, but had served as a volunteer in the Mexican War. He was a son
of U. S. Senator John J. Crittenden, of Kentucky.
The Fourteenth Corps was made up of four divisions. These were
commanded respectively by Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau,
Major-General James S. Negley, Brigadier-General John M. Brannan, and
Major-General Joseph J. Reynolds. Each of these divisions contained
three brigades, and three light field batteries. The brigades were
generally composed of four regiments, but sometimes of five.
The Twentieth Corps contained three divisions, commanded respectively
by Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis, Brigadier-General Richard W.
Johnson, and Major-General Philip H. Sheridan. These were made up of
brigades of four and five regiments of infantry and three batteries of
artillery.
The Twenty-first Corps likewise was organized into three divisions,
commanded by Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, Major-General John M.
Palmer, and Brigadier-General Horatio P. Van Cleve, each with three
brigades and several batteries. The artillery of each division of the
army was commanded by a chief of artillery.
All of the cavalry were organized into a separate corps, commanded
by Major-General David S. Stanley. This was divided into two
divisions; the First was composed of two brigades, and commanded by
Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell; the Second, also of two brigades,
was commanded at first by Brigadier-General John B. Turchin. Prior to
the battle of Chickamauga, Turchin was assigned to an infantry brigade.
These cavalry brigades were much larger than the infantry brigades, for
they contained five or six regiments. Generally there was a battery
attached to each brigade of cavalry.
On June 8, 1863, a reserve corps was organized, with Major-General
Gordon Granger in command. It contained three divisions, commanded by
Brigadier-General James D. Morgan, Brigadier-General Robert S. Granger,
and Brigadier-General Absalom Baird, respectively. The last-named was
afterwards transferred to the First Division, Fourteenth Corps, being
succeeded by General James B. Steedman. It was the duty of this reserve
corps to guard the communications in the rear of the army; but it was
also subject, in emergency, to be ordered to the front, as will be seen
further on--for example, when General Granger with three brigades,
marched from Bridgeport, Alabama, to Rossville Gap, Georgia, and
assisted very greatly in the battle of September 20, at Chickamauga.
In this reserve corps should also be included certain miscellaneous
troops, scattered in forts along the line of the Louisville &
Chattanooga railroad, such as Nashville, Clarksville, and Gallatin,
Tennessee. At this time Colonel Benjamin J. Sweet of the Twenty-first
Wisconsin Infantry was in command of the forces at Gallatin. He had
been wounded severely in the battle of Perryville, Kentucky, on October
8, 1862, and was not able to endure active service at the front.
The First Brigade of the Third Division, reserve corps, was stationed
at Fort Donelson, Tennessee, and commanded by Colonel William P. Lyon,
of the Thirteenth Wisconsin Infantry, that regiment being a part
of the garrison. The First Wisconsin Cavalry, commanded by Colonel
Oscar H. LaGrange, was attached to the Second Brigade of the First
Division of the cavalry corps. Captain Lucius H. Drury, of the Third
Wisconsin Battery, was chief of artillery to the Third Division of the
Twenty-first Corps.
This organization of the Army of the Cumberland remained substantially
the same, until after the battle of Chickamauga. Sometime in the latter
part of July, or first part of August, General Rousseau received
leave of absence, and General Absalom Baird was assigned on August 24
to command the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps in his stead.
Baird remained in command of this division until after the battle of
Chickamauga, when Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau again took the
command. Rousseau was a loyal Kentuckian, who at the very beginning of
hostilities had raised a regiment for the service of the Union. He was
then forty-five years old and had served in the Mexican War. He was a
spectacular officer of great bravery, who is entitled to much credit
for his unflinching devotion to the Union, under circumstances which
made other men desert our cause.
Major-General John M. Palmer of Illinois, a lawyer of eminence in his
State, was an officer of more than usual ability. He was not a West
Point graduate, and was forty-six years old.
General Granger was then forty-two years old, a graduate of West Point
in the class of 1845, and had fought in the Mexican War. It will be
noticed that many of the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland
served in the Mexican War. The experience they then acquired in the
field, in actual campaigning, and by some of them in actual battle,
undoubtedly served to give to the Army of the Cumberland much of its
_esprit de corps_, and its general success in winning battles and
in holding the territory over which it marched. General Granger was
an unusually able and gallant officer. Later on, it will be told
what important service he rendered General Thomas in the battle of
Chickamauga.
Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was then thirty-two years old. He
graduated at West Point, rather low in his class, in 1853. At the
outbreak of the war he was promoted to a captaincy. In May, 1862,
he was commissioned colonel of cavalry in the volunteer service,
and brigadier-general of volunteers July 1, 1862, being made a
major-general on December 31, 1862. He had commanded a division in the
battle of Perryville, Kentucky, in October, 1862, and was at Stone’s
River December 31, 1862, to January 3, 1863. He is entitled to this
special notice more for what he became, than for what he had done prior
to the Chattanooga campaign. He had as yet shown no extraordinary
ability as a commander. His age was the same as that of his corps
commander, General McCook, and they graduated in the same class at West
Point.
Generals Absalom Baird, John M. Brannan, Jefferson C. Davis, Thomas J.
Wood, R. W. Johnson, and David S. Stanley were all officers of the old
regular army, soldiers by profession, whose minds were not distracted
from their duties in the field by politics or academic proclivities.
They were brave and always at the front, working for success with
military spirit. All of them served faithfully until the close of the
war. Davis, Wood, and Stanley afterwards commanded corps--commanded
them ably and with notably unassuming manners. There was no taint about
these officers of “playing to the galleries.” They were not expecting
applause, and did their work without brass bands or reporters to sound
their achievements to the country. Such were the officers of this great
central army.
What of the musket bearers? Who were they? Where did they come from?
Were they soldiers by profession or merely citizens in arms for a
special purpose? I have already said that very many of the general
officers of the Army of the Cumberland were of the regular army. The
United States regular army was represented only, however, by one
brigade of the regular troops, namely, the Third Brigade of the First
Division of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by Brigadier-General
John H. King. Thus almost the entire rank and file of the army were
volunteers. The regiments were filled and officered by the executives
of the different states. The men were mustered into the service of the
General Government as volunteers for three years or during the war.
These volunteers were citizens of the states, and each company elected
its officers among those who had originally enlisted as privates. The
musket bearers were men from all callings in life--farmers, mechanics,
merchants, teachers, students, and laborers. They were the voters
who made up the political divisions of the townships, counties, and
states, whose ultimate power lay in their voting franchise which they
shared with the men, who--for various reasons--remained at their homes
during the war. The volunteer-regiments which composed the Army of
the Cumberland were mostly from the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Minnesota; Pennsylvania had three
infantry and two cavalry regiments; Missouri had two regiments, and
Kansas one; Tennessee was represented by several regiments. The great
bulk of the troops came, however, from the states north of the Ohio
River--the Northwest Territory. No drafted men in the army partook
in the Chattanooga Campaign of 1863. These volunteers sought the
service and understood what it involved. Very few of them knew what
regimentation meant, and the great majority had never before handled
a musket. But they were young and teachable. They readily learned the
drill, and became good marksmen. These soldiers realized very soon
that a clean musket, plenty of ammunition, and obedience to orders,
composed the military moral code of efficiency. By the laws of their
states, they were entitled to vote for officers and affairs at home,
and to have their votes counted, just as if they had been cast at home.
The soldiers received during the prolonged war as many furloughs
as were compatible with the exigencies at the front, and thus they
were occasionally enabled to visit the folks at home during their
strenuous service. The intelligence of the private soldier was often
superior to that of his officer. Nevertheless he obeyed faithfully
that officer’s commands, because he fully understood that discipline
could be maintained only by implicit obedience and the object of his
service, viz: the suppression of a rebellion be accomplished. Many of
these volunteers enlisted directly from the public schools, which they
were attending. They had been taught the history of their country; how
its independence from the tyranny of a foreign power had been gained
by the valor and patriotism of Washington and his volunteers, that
by the discipline and perseverance of the revolutionary soldiers the
sovereignty of a foreign king had been transferred to the citizens
of their native land; that a new foe was now trying to dismember the
nation, and that the corner stone of the Union was the principle,
that all power is derived from the people. These volunteers were
convinced that no power had the right to protect the maintenance and
perpetuation of slavery. They were soldiers therefore until the Union
was re-established; and they tacitly resolved to fight until slavery
was abolished. Such was the personnel of the Army of the Cumberland.
Wisconsin was well and ably represented in this army by the following
organizations, viz: The First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and
Twenty-fourth volunteer infantry; the First Cavalry; and the Third,
Fifth, and Eighth light batteries.
The First Wisconsin Infantry was a noted regiment in more than one
way. It served as the only three-months regiment from Wisconsin, and
was organized under President Lincoln’s first call for 75,000 men. It
was mustered out after the ninety days’ service August 21, 1861, and
reorganized under the second call for three years’ service. This second
mustering was completed October 19, 1861. The regiment proceeded from
Milwaukee to Louisville, Kentucky, and the volunteers served during
the next three years in the Army of the Cumberland. It was active in
various parts of Tennessee during the first year of its service,
marching as far as Bridgeport, Alabama, to which place it returned
during the campaign of Tullahoma. John C. Starkweather was its first
colonel. He was made commander of the brigade when it was reorganized
at Murfreesboro, and Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham commanded the
regiment. This regiment had fought in both the battles of Perryville
and Stone’s River. It was assigned to the Second Brigade of the First
Division of the Fourteenth Corps.
The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry was mustered into the service October 14,
1861, at Milwaukee. Alfred R. Chapin was its first colonel. Proceeding
to Louisville, Kentucky, it became part of the future Army of the
Cumberland, and advanced with General O. M. Mitchell’s forces to
Stevenson and Huntsville, Alabama, in the spring and summer of 1862.
The regiment returned to Louisville in September with Buell’s army
and engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. When the
reorganization at Murfreesboro took place this regiment became a part
of Scribner’s Brigade of Rousseau’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps.
Almost side by side with the First and Twenty-first infantries, it
took part in all engagements.
The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was a Scandinavian regiment, and its
first colonel was Hans C. Heg. It was mustered into the service on
February 14, 1862, at Madison. It had taken part in the siege of Island
Number Ten. It did not join the Army of the Cumberland until just
before the battle of Perryville, in which it took active part, as in
the battle of Stone’s River. In the reorganization at Murfreesboro, it
became a part of the Third Brigade--and was commanded by its colonel,
Hans C. Heg, of the First Division, Twentieth Corps.
The Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry was organized at Oshkosh, in
August, 1862, and on September 11, 1862, it joined the Army of the
Cumberland at Louisville, Kentucky. Benjamin J. Sweet was its first
colonel; he was so severely wounded in the battle of Perryville as
to be disabled for further field service. This regiment was brigaded
with the First Wisconsin Infantry at Louisville, and served also in
the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. At the time of the
reorganization at Murfreesboro it was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Harrison C. Hobart, and it was assigned to the Second Brigade of the
First Division of the Fourteenth Corps.
The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was mustered into the service
at Milwaukee, August 21, 1862. It proceeded to Louisville, where it
became a part of the Army of the Cumberland. This regiment engaged in
the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River, and was assigned to the
First Brigade, Third Division, Twentieth Corps in the reorganization at
Murfreesboro; its commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore S. West.
The First Wisconsin Cavalry was mustered into the service at Kenosha,
on March 8, 1862, with Edward Daniels as its first colonel. It was
sent to Benton Barracks, near St. Louis. There and in various parts of
Missouri its first year of service was performed. On June 14, 1863,
at Nashville, it was made a part of the Army of the Cumberland, with
which it was from that time identified until the close of its service.
This regiment’s activity in the Tullahoma campaign, the Chickamauga
campaign, and in pursuit of Confederate cavalry in the Sequatchie
Valley on October 2, 1863, and along the line of communication during
the battles around Chattanooga is mentioned in more appropriate places,
relating to the general movements of the army. It was commanded by
Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange, and assigned to the Second Brigade, First
Division, Cavalry Corps, during the reorganization.
The Third Wisconsin Light Battery was mustered into the service at
Racine, Wisconsin, October 10, 1861. Lucius H. Drury was its first
captain. The regiment went first to Louisville, then to Nashville,
whence it marched with Buell’s army in order to reinforce General Grant
at Shiloh. It was engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s
River. The regiment was assigned to the Third Brigade, Third Division
of the Twenty-first Corps, and was commanded by Lieutenant Courtland
Livingston.
The Fifth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into the service at Racine,
October 1, 1861. Oscar F. Pinney was its first captain. March 16,
1862, it arrived at St. Louis. Afterwards it proceeded to New Madrid,
Missouri (on the Mississippi River), and became a part of General John
Pope’s army, in the reduction of Island Number Ten. It was also active
at the siege of Corinth, and marched about two hundred miles from Iuka,
Mississippi, to Nashville, Tennessee, where the regiment joined the
forces of General Buell. On the northward march in September, 1862,
these forces engaged in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River;
the service of the Fifth Wisconsin Battery was of the most active and
valuable kind. It was commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner, and was
assigned to the First Brigade, First Division, of the Twentieth Corps.
The Eighth Wisconsin Battery was mustered into the service on January
8, 1862, and moved to St. Louis on March 8, 1862. Its first captain
was Stephen J. Carpenter. It formed a part of the force that moved to
Forts Leavenworth and Riley, Kansas, in April and May, 1862, whence it
moved to Columbus, Kentucky, and finally took part in the campaign at
Corinth and Iuka, Mississippi. From there it marched to Nashville, and
Louisville, engaging in the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. It
was commanded by John D. McLean, lieutenant, and was assigned to the
Third Brigade, First Division of the Twentieth Corps.
ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY
The Confederate Army which confronted the Army of the Cumberland on
June 24, 1863, was officially called the Army of the Tennessee. It was
divided into four corps--two of infantry and two of cavalry. General
Leonidas Polk commanded one infantry corps, and General William J.
Hardee the other. The cavalry corps were commanded by General Joseph
Wheeler, and General N. B. Forrest. In addition to the artillery,
attached to the regular corps, there was also a reserve artillery. In
General Bragg’s return of the “aggregate present” of his army in the
field on June 20, 1863, his figures are 55,070. His reserve troops were
not included in this statement; they were scattered throughout the
districts of Tennessee and northern Alabama.
At this same date the return of the Army of the Cumberland was 71,409
of all arms--exclusive of the reserve corps--as “aggregate present.”
It will be noticed later on, that the Confederates greatly increased
their numbers prior to the battle of Chickamauga, but that the Union
Army received no reinforcements; on the contrary, it lost heavily by
sickness as the army advanced.
General Bragg was at that time forty-six years old. He had
distinguished himself in the Mexican War. He commanded the Confederate
Army in both the battles of Perryville and Stone’s River. He did not
win either of these, having in both of them abandoned the field to the
Union forces.
Perhaps the most distinguished officer in Bragg’s army was
Major-General John C. Breckenridge. He was more distinguished, however,
as a politician, than as a military leader. He was forty-two years old.
Before the war he had been a member of Congress, vice-president of the
United States, and in 1860 the presidential candidate of the Southern
democrats. At the breaking out of the war, he was a United States
Senator from Kentucky. He was a Confederate officer at Shiloh in April,
1862, and commanded the right wing of the Southern forces at Stone’s
River.
General Leonidas Polk was fifty-seven years old in 1863. He was a
bishop of the Episcopal church. He graduated from West Point in 1827,
but resigned his commission in the army in the same year. He entered
the Confederate Army as a major-general, but was soon promoted to
lieutenant-general.
General William J. Hardee was forty-seven years old at this time.
He graduated from West Point in the class of 1838. He served with
distinction in the Mexican War. He entered the Confederate service
as colonel, commanded a corps at Shiloh in 1862; was appointed
lieutenant-general in October, 1862; and commanded the left wing of the
Southern Army at Perryville.
General Simon Bolivar Buckner, another officer in the Confederate Army,
was forty years old, and a West Pointer. He surrendered Fort Donelson
to General Grant in February, 1862.
Of the two Confederate cavalry commanders, General Nathan B. Forrest
was by far the greater. He was a rough, uneducated man, but of great
force as a partisan leader. When Lord Wolseley was at the head of the
British Army, he said of Forrest that he was the ablest cavalry leader
that was produced by our War between the States. He was personally
brave, possessed a fine physique, and had sufficient magnetism to
inspire the soldiers of his command to great activity and endurance.
During the war twenty-nine horses were shot under him, and he took
active part in thirty-one encounters, it has been stated. He was
wounded several times.
The rank and file of the Confederates were made up of the citizens
of the Southern states, in much the same manner that the Union
Army was composed of Northern citizens. They fought with a certain
fanaticism, for what they deemed their rights. It is singular, that
at the beginning of the war, so universal a desire to dissolve the
Union seized the great majority of the white people of the South,
although they might not be slave owners. They made most efficient
soldiers and suffered many hardships, unknown to the soldiers of the
Union Army. The martial temperament, inherited as well as acquired
through personal habits, was more predominant in the South than in the
North. The Southerners lived largely a country-life before the war;
they rode horseback, hunted with hounds, and had become more familiar
with firearms than the Northerners. The practice of duelling continued
longer with them than with the men of the North, who were not as
fiery tempered as those of the South. These traits made them soldiers
by nature; they liked to serve in the field, and were therefore
difficult to conquer. They seemed more lithe and active, than the
staid volunteers from the colder North. They have claimed, that they
were largely outnumbered; that is true in the aggregate, but not so
true on the firing line. The battles of Stone’s River and Chickamauga
illustrate these facts. The numbers in both armies were quite evenly
matched. During the last year of this war there was little difference
in the fighting qualities of the veteran regiments on both sides. The
rebellion was put down according to the rules of warfare, and whatever
that result may have cost in numbers, it was worth the price. Not every
revolt against authoritative power has been suppressed by superior
numbers, not even that of the thirteen colonies against England’s.
At first, the power of England seemed so overwhelming, that scarcely
any one expected that colonial independence could be gained. Foreign
nations did not believe that this rebellion could be suppressed,
notwithstanding the superiority in numbers of the Union Army.
The wonderful thing about it is, that Lincoln persevered to the end,
against discouragements and disasters which seemed, at the time, to be
insurmountable. Fortunately there was no compromise, the rebellion was
simply crushed, no terms were made; and no promises given to embarrass
the reconstruction. Of course, it required large armies and grim
determination to reach the goal. The great fact is, not that the Union
armies outnumbered the Confederate forces, but that the Union itself
was restored. The war was merciless; all wars are. Mercy, pity, and
the extension of the hand of helpfulness came after the war was over,
not while it was going on. Each side did all it could to fight and win
its battles. The North had the larger number of citizens from which to
draw, and of course, availed itself of that advantage. The South would
have put larger armies into the field if it could have done so; it did
use every available man, however, and fought its best. The South might
have conquered the Union by overwhelming forces, could such have been
secured, but available men were lacking. At all events, the rebellion
was crushed by means of legitimate warfare, and the Union was restored.
THE ADVANCE OF THE UNION ARMY
The Confederate Army, commanded by General Braxton Bragg, lay in
front of Tullahoma,[3] where Bragg had his headquarters. There
was a large entrenched camp at the junction of the Nashville &
Chattanooga railroad. This camp and the McMinnville branch was each
a secondary depot for commissary stores, while the base of supplies
was at Chattanooga. Its front was covered by the defiles of the Duck
River, a deep narrow stream edged by a rough range of hills, which
divides the “Barrens” from the lower level of Middle Tennessee. The
Manchester Pike passes through these hills at Hoover’s Gap, nineteen
miles south of Murfreesboro, ascending through a long and difficult
canon to the “Barrens”. The Wartrace road runs through Liberty Gap,
thirteen miles south of Murfreesboro and five miles west of Hoover’s.
There were other passes through these hills, but the enemy held all
of them. Bragg’s main position was in front of Shelbyville, about
twenty-eight miles southwest of Murfreesboro, and was strengthened
by a redan line extending from Horse Mountain, located a little to
the north of Shelbyville, to Duck River on the west, covered by a
line of abatis. The road from Murfreesboro to Shelbyville was through
Guy’s Gap, sixteen miles south of Murfreesboro. Polk’s corps was at
Shelbyville, Hardee’s held Hoover’s, Liberty, and Bellbuckle gaps, all
in the same range of hills. It was not wise to move directly against
the entrenched line at Shelbyville, therefore Rosecrans’s plan was to
turn the Confederate right and move on to the railroad bridge, across
Elk River, nine miles southeast of Tullahoma. To accomplish this,
it was necessary to make Bragg believe that the advance would be
by the Shelbyville route. The following dispositions were therefore
made: General Granger’s command was at Triune on June 23, fifteen
miles west of Murfreesboro; some infantry and cavalry advanced that
same day toward Woodbury seventeen miles to the east of Murfreesboro;
simultaneously Granger sent General Mitchell’s cavalry division on
the Eaglesville and Shelbyville Pike, seventeen miles southwest of
Murfreesboro, in order to make an attack on the enemy’s cavalry, and to
drive the enemy’s infantry guards on their main line. General Granger,
with his own infantry troops and Brannan’s division, moved--with ten
days rations--to Salem.[4]
On June 24, Granger moved to Christiana, a small village a few miles
southwest of Murfreesboro, south of Salem, towards Shelbyville. On the
same day Palmer’s division, and a brigade of cavalry, were ordered
to move to the vicinity of Bradyville, fourteen miles southeast of
Murfreesboro; his advance columns were to seize the head of the
defile leading up to the “Barrens” by an obscure road to Manchester
thirty-five miles southeast, and by way of Lumley’s Stand seven miles
east of Hoover’s Gap. General Mitchell accomplished his work after a
sharp and gallant fight. McCook’s corps advanced on the Shelbyville
road, and turning to the left, six miles out, moved two divisions via
Millersburg, a small village eleven miles south of Murfreesboro. By
advancing on the road to Wartrace[5] he seized and held Liberty Gap.
Five companies of the Thirty-ninth Indiana mounted infantry opened
the fight for Liberty Gap on June 24; they were followed by Willich’s
brigade. General R. W. Johnson, in his report[6] says: “Here I placed
at the disposal of General Willich a portion of the Second Brigade,
Colonel Miller commanding, who sent the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania
and the Twenty-ninth Indiana to the right of the Fifteenth Ohio,
then to change direction to the left, sweeping the hillside on which
the Confederates were posted. This movement was handsomely executed.
As soon as the change to the left had been made, General Willich
ordered his entire line forward. Under his own eye and management, the
Confederates were driven at every point, their camps and camp equipages
falling into our hands, and Liberty Gap was in our possession.” The
next morning Carlin’s and Post’s brigades of Davis’s division came to
Johnson’s support. The Confederates attacked quite fiercely, but were
repulsed, and finally retired. The enemy here was Cleburne’s division;
he reported a loss of 121.
General Thomas advanced on the Manchester Pike with the Fourteenth
Corps in order to make an attempt to take possession of Hoover’s Gap.
Major-General Crittenden was to leave Van Cleve’s division of the
Twenty-first Corps at Murfreesboro, concentrate at Bradyville, fourteen
miles southeast of Murfreesboro, and there await orders. All these
movements were executed with success in the midst of a continuous rain,
which so softened the surface of the roads, as to render them next to
impassable. The advance of the Fourteenth Corps on Hoover’s Gap, June
24, was Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry, of Reynolds’s division;
it was followed by the other two brigades of the same division. Wilder
struck the enemy’s pickets within two miles of his camp at Murfreesboro
and drove them through Hoover’s Gap to McBride’s Creek. The two rear
brigades moved up and occupied the Gap. Soon afterwards Wilder’s
brigade was attacked by a portion of Stewart’s division; this brought
the rest of Reynolds’s division, and eventually the regular brigade of
Rousseau’s division to his assistance.
On June 25 and 26, Rousseau’s, Reynolds’s, and Brannan’s divisions
cooperated in an advance on the enemy; after a short resistance the
enemy fled to Fairfield, five miles southwest of Hoover’s Gap, towards
which place the Union pickets had advanced.
The First and the Twenty-first Wisconsin infantry were actively
engaged at Hoover’s Gap, but suffered no casualties. The Seventy-ninth
Pennsylvania, in the same brigade, lost twelve men, one wounded.
General John T. Wilder’s brigade lost sixty-one men killed and wounded.
On June 27, Gordon Granger captured Guy’s Gap and the same evening took
Shelbyville, the main Confederate Army having retreated. The Union
headquarters reached Manchester on June 27. Here the Fourteenth Corps
concentrated during the night. Part of McCook’s arrived on the 25th;
the rest of it did not reach Manchester before the night of the 29th.
The troops and animals were very jaded. Crittenden’s Twenty-first Corps
was considerably delayed. The troops encountered continuous rains and
bad roads, and the last division did not arrive at Manchester before
June 29, although an order to march there speedily was received on the
26th. On arrival it was badly worn out.
The forces were at last concentrated on the enemy’s right flank, about
ten miles northeast of Tullahoma. During the incessant rain of June 30,
an effort was made to form them into position in anticipation of an
attack by the enemy. The wagons and horses could scarcely traverse the
ground, which was quite swampy. Fortunately the enemy’s forces suffered
likewise. What was trial and hardship to one of the armies--on account
of the weather--was equally detrimental to the other side. That army
which could overcome quickly and victoriously the climatic conditions,
had the best chances to win in the martial contest. In forming a line
at Manchester to resist an attack, the Fourteenth Corps occupied the
centre, with one division in reserve, the Twentieth Corps on the
right and the Twenty-first on the left. The last two corps had each
one division in reserve. The Union Army was on the right flank of the
Confederate line of defense, and of course expected to be attacked. But
it was not.
In the meantime Stanley’s cavalry, supported by General Gordon
Granger’s infantry and all troops under Granger’s direction, had
attacked the enemy at Guy’s Gap--sixteen miles south of Murfreesboro
and five miles west of Liberty Gap--and had driven the Confederate
troops back to their entrenchments. Then, finding that the enemy’s
main army had fallen back, Stanley captured the gap by a direct and
flank movement with only three pieces of artillery. The cavalry
unexpectedly captured Shelbyville with a number of prisoners, a
quantity of arms, and the commissary stores. The reports of this
cavalry battle show the retreat of the enemy to Tullahoma forty miles
southeast of Murfreesboro, where it was supposed that he intended to
make a stand. But on July 1, General Thomas ascertained that the enemy
had retreated during the night from Tullahoma. Some Union divisions
occupied Tullahoma about noon that same day, while Rousseau’s and
Negley’s divisions pushed on by way of Spring Creek overtaking late in
the afternoon the rear guard, with which these divisions had a sharp
skirmish.
On July 2, the pursuit was made by the Fourteenth and Twentieth
corps. The bridge over the Elk River had been burned by the enemy
while retreating. The stream had risen and the cavalry could barely
ford the river. On July 3, Sheridan’s and Davis’s divisions of the
Twentieth Corps, having succeeded in crossing the Elk River, pursued
the enemy to Cowan, on the Cumberland plateau, eighteen miles southeast
of Tullahoma. Here it was learned that the enemy had crossed the
mountains; and that only cavalry troops covered its retreat. Meanwhile
the Union Army halted to await needed supplies, which had to be hauled
by wagon from Murfreesboro over miserable roads. These supplies had to
be stored at the railway station, nearest to the probable battlefield;
and before the army could advance over the Cumberland plateau--where
a battle would probably soon ensue--the railway had to be repaired.
General Rosecrans in his official report says: “Thus ended a nine
days’ campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions and
gave us possession of Middle Tennessee, conducted in one of the most
extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that period of the year,
over a soil that became almost a quicksand.”[7] He claims--perhaps
justly--that it was this extraordinary rain and bad roads, which
prevented his getting possession of the enemy’s communications, and
debarred him from forcing the Confederate Army to fight a disastrous
battle. He speaks very highly of James A. Garfield, his chief of staff,
saying: “He possesses the instincts and energy of a great commander.”
The Union losses during the “Tullahoma Campaign”--thus named in the
official record--were as follows: 14 officers killed, and 26 wounded;
71 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, and 436 wounded; 13
missing. Total, 85 killed, 462 wounded, and 13 missing. 1,634 prisoners
were taken, some artillery and small arms of very little value; 3,500
sacks of corn and cornmeal were secured.
On July 3, General Braxton Bragg sent the following dispatch
from Bridgeport, Alabama--twenty-eight miles directly west from
Chattanooga--to Richmond, Virginia: “Unable to obtain a general
engagement without sacrificing my communications, I have, after a
series of skirmishes, withdrawn the army to this river. It is now
coming down the mountains. I hear of no formidable pursuit.”[8] The
Confederate Army crossed the mountains to the Tennessee River and on
July 7, 1863, encamped near Chattanooga. The Union Army went into camp
along the northwestern base of the Cumberland plateau. The object of
the Army of the Cumberland for the ensuing campaign was Chattanooga;
the Tullahoma campaign was only a small part of the greater one which
had yet to take place.
In the Tullahoma campaign the Tenth Wisconsin Infantry lost 3 enlisted
men, wounded, and the First Wisconsin Cavalry 2 enlisted men. All the
Wisconsin troops bore their full share of the fatigues of the campaign,
but only the losses mentioned were reported.
There was one feature of the Tullahoma campaign that was very peculiar.
A part of the Union Army had the previous year passed over this same
region, while marching to the relief of Grant at Shiloh. Now returning
by the way of Chattanooga, where Buell had marched on his way back to
Louisville, they again came to this section of the country where the
inhabitants mostly sympathized with the South. They were surprised
and shocked in 1862 when the hated Yankees invaded their towns and
farms. The Confederate authorities told them, that another invasion
would never occur, that they could plant their crops and pursue their
business without fear. Therefore, when their country was again overrun
by the Union Army in 1863, their confidence in the Confederate generals
was quite shaken.