The Thirty-ninth Hungarian Division, now incorporated in the Eleventh

German Army under the direct command of Von Mackensen himself, had

advanced from Grybow via Gorlice on the Biecz railway line, and

were making a strong attack on the Russian positions on Wilczak

Mountain with a tremendous concentration of artillery. It seems the

Russians simply refused to be blown out of their trenches, for it

required seven separate attacks to drive them out. That accomplished,

the fate of Biecz was decided and the road to Jaslo--the "key" to

the Wisloka line of defense--was practically open to General Arz

von Straussenburg. Lying at the head of the main roads leading

into Hungary through the Tilicz, Dukla, and Lupkow passes, Jaslo

is the most important railway junction in the whole region between

Tarnow and Przemysl. It was at Jaslo that Dmitrieff had held his

headquarters for four months.

Just south of him, barely fifteen miles away, General von Emmich

and General Martiny, with the "Bayonet Bavarians" and the Tenth

Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, went pounding and slashing a passage

along the Bednarka-Zmigrod road and the auxiliary road from Malastow

to Krempna. They were striving hard to reach the western passes

before Brussilov had time to withdraw. He began that operation

on the fourth. On the same night Von Emmich and Martiny reached

Krempna, and the last line of retreat for the Russians around Zboro

was imperiled. They have yet to cross the range from Hungary back

into Galicia. So subtly potent and effective was the pressure on

a flank that the whole line--be it hundreds of miles long--is more

or less influenced thereby, as witness:

On the same night, May 4, 1915, the retreat spread like a contagion

to the entire west Galician front, compelling the Russians to evacuate

northern Hungary up to the Lupkow Pass; in that pass itself preparations

are afoot to abandon the hard-earned position. It is not fear, nor

the precaution of cowardice that prompted this wholesale removal

of fighting men: the inexorable laws of geometry demanded it. The

enemy was at Krempna; as the crow flies the distance from Krempna to

the northern debouchment of Lupkow is eighty miles; yet Lupkow was

threatened, for the "line" or "front" is pierced--the vital artery

of the defense is severed. The strength of a chain is precisely

that of its weakest link.

[Illustration: GALICIAN CAMPAIGN FROM TARNOW TO PRZEMYSL]

The course of events become complex; fighting, advancing and retreating

occurred over a widespread area. Apparently disconnected movements

by the Austro-Germans or the Russians fall into their proper places

in accordance with the general scheme or objective either side may

have in view. It is necessary to follow the scattered operations

separately. We will therefore return now to the Tarnow-Tucho sector,

where we left a small Russian force holding the last remnant of

the Dunajec-Biala front. Tarnow had been the supply base for that

front, and great stores of provisions and munitions still remained

in the town. These the Russians succeeded in removing entirely.

The main forces had already withdrawn in perfect order and fallen

back beyond the Wisloka. During the night of May 4-5, 1915, two

regiments of the Ninth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps crossed the

Biala near Tuchow and moved northward in the direction of the road

leading from Tarnow to Pilzno, along which the remainder of the

garrison would have to pass in order to retreat. On the hills west

of Pilzno the Russians still held a position to protect that road.

By the morning of the sixth everything had gone eastward, and the

Austrians had surrounded the town.

The small cavalry detachment that had been left behind as rear

guard cut through the Austrian lines and rejoined the main forces

on the Wisloka. The Austrians had been bombarding Tarno for months

with their heaviest artillery, destroying parts of the cathedral

and the famous old town hall in the process.

On May 7 the Russians withdrew from the Pilzno district, and the

Dunajec-Biala Russian front had ceased to exist. From the hour that

the Austro-Germans had broken through the line at Ciezkovice, on

May 2, 1915, the Russian retreat on the Wisloka had begun. Yielding

to the terrible pressure the line had increasingly lost its shape as

the various component parts fell back, though it gradually resumed

the form of a front on the Wisloka banks, where most determined

fighting continued for five days.

The Russians lost much of their artillery; they had to reverse the

customary military practice of an army in retreat. If the retreating

army is well equipped with artillery and munitions, its guns cover

the retreat and are sacrificed to save the men. During their retreat

the Russians had often to sacrifice men in order to save their

guns for a coming greater battle at some more important strategic

point. Many prisoners fell to the Germanic armies; according to

their own official reports they took 30,000 in the fighting of

May 2-4, 1915. What the Austro-German side lost in that time was

not made public.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXX

AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST OF WESTERN GALICIA

By the time the retreating Russians had reached the Wisloka they had to

some extent recovered from the first shock of surprise, and were better

able to attempt a determined stand against the overwhelming onrush

of the Austro-Germanic troops. Ivanoff hurriedly sent reenforcements

for Dmitrieff and Ewarts which included the Caucasian Corps of General

Irmanoff from the Bzura front. The heavy German guns belched forth with

terrible effect, and the Russians could not reply at the same weight

or distance. Bayonets against artillery means giving odds away, but

the attempt was made. With a savage fury that seems to belong only

to Slavs and Mohammedans--fatalists--the Russians hurled themselves

against the powerful batteries and got to close quarters with the

enemy. For nearly twenty minutes a wild, surging sea of clashing

steel--bayonets, swords, lances and Circassian daggers--wielded

by fiery mountaineers and steady, cool, well-disciplined Teutons,

roared and flowed around the big guns, which towered over the lashing

waves like islands in a stormy ocean. A railway collision would

seem mild compared with the impact of 18,000 desperate armed men

against a much greater number of equally desperate and equally

brave, highly-trained fighters. But machinery, numbers and skillful

tactics will overcome mere physical courage. The Russian avalanche

was thrown back with terrific slaughter; the Caucasian Corps alone

lost over 10,000 men, for which, it is estimated, they killed and

wounded quite as many. More remarkable still was the fact that they

captured a big battery and carried off 7,000 prisoners. For five

days the storm raged backward and forward across the river; during

the more violent bombardments the Russians left their trenches to be

battered out of shape and withdrew into their shelter dugouts; when

the enemy infantry advanced to take possession, the Russians had

returned to face the charge. Whereas cool, machinelike precision

marks the German soldier in battle as on the parade ground, an

imperturbable obstinacy and total disregard of mortal danger

characterizes the Russian.

During the night of May 6-7, 1915, the Austrians sent two regiments

across the Wisloka, north and south of Brzoctek, about midway between

Pilzno and Jaslo, under cover of artillery posted on a 400-foot hill

near Przeczyca on the opposite bank, _i.e._, the left. Austrian

engineers constructed a bridge across the river, and on the morning

of May 7 the Austrian advance guard were in possession of the hills

north of the town. Infantry were then thrown across to storm Brzostek.

Here, again, they met with resolute opposition from the Russian

rear guards covering the retreat of the main armies, which had

already fallen back from the Wisloka. Desperate bayonet fighting

ensued in the streets, each of which had to be cleared separately

to dislodge the Russians--the civilians meanwhile looking out of

their windows watching the animated scenes below. Hungarian troops

in overwhelming masses poured across the river and finally captured

the town. Once more on the backward move, the Russians established

themselves along the western and southern fringe of the forests by

Januszkovice, only eight miles away, and prepared to make another

stand. More fighting occurred here, and during May 7 and 8, 1915,

the Russians fell back farther toward Frysztak, on the river Wistok.

We left Von Emmich and General Martiny with the Bavarians and the

Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps on their arrival at Krempna on

the night of the 4th, during which time the Russians were making

desperate efforts to evacuate northern Hungary and the western

passes. The main forces of Von Mackensen's "phalanx" were meanwhile

pushing on toward Jaslo, still in Russian possession. On the hills

west of the Wisloka the Russian rear guards had intrenched themselves

and held their positions till nightfall on May 5, 1915, all with

the object of delaying the Germanic advance sufficiently for their

comrades to clear the passes. Then they fell back again and made

a stand near Tarnoviec, about six or seven miles east of Jaslo,

where they dominated an important strategic position. Between them

and Jaslo two railways ran along the valley of the River Jasliska,

forming a serious obstacle to Von Mackensen's advance so long as

the Russians could hold it. It was imperative that they should be

cleared out, but the task of carrying it through was a difficult

one. The undertaking fell to the Hungarian troops of the Thirty-ninth

Honved Division, who advanced to the attack again and again only to

be driven back each time by the Russian fire from the heights. Big

howitzers were called into play and soon demolished the positions.

The Russians retired east of the Wistok, followed by Von Mackensen's

Austro-Hungarian corps, while the Prussian Guards moved on toward

Frysztak, where the Russian troops from the Tarnow sector had taken

up positions after the retreat from Brzostek.

On May 7, 1915, the Prussian Guards had passed over the railway

at Krosno, and at night fell upon the Russian lines east of the

Wistok. Particularly fierce encounters took place near Odrzykon

and Korczina, ten to fourteen miles southeast of Frysztak. A little

farther westward Van Mackensen delivered his main attack against

the railway crossing at Jaslo, which fell on the same day, May 7.

The Russians retreated in confusion with Von Mackensen close upon

their heels. The whole defense on the Wisloka collapsed, and nothing

apparently could now save the Dukla and those troops struggling

through to escape from the net that was gradually being tightened

around them. Meanwhile, General Ewarts's Army of the Nida, which

formed the connecting link between the Russian northern and southern

armies, had fallen back above Tarnow to the River Czarna in order

to keep in touch and conformity with Dmitrieff's shrinking line,

which was now actually broken by the Wisloka failure. The Russian

position was extremely critical, for it seemed that the German

general would roll up the two halves and thereby inflict a crushing

and decisive defeat. General Ivanoff appears to have recognized Van

Mackensen's intentions in time to devise measures to counteract

the peril and save his left (Brussilov's army) from disaster. By

pushing forward strong columns from Sanok on the Upper San to impose

a temporary check upon the advancing tide, he gained a brief respite

for the troops entangled in the passes. To that sector we will

now turn to review the course of events.

On May 4, 1915, the Russians began to evacuate the positions they

held south of the range when Von Mackensen's extreme right approached

Krempna. Forging along at high speed the Germans and Austrians

occupied the towns of Dukla and Tylava, and arrived at Rymanow--still

farther east--on the following day. The town of Dukla lies some

fifteen miles due north of the Galician debouchment of the pass

of that name, and Rymanow is about another fifteen miles east of

that. Hence the German strategic plan was to draw a barrier line

across the north of the Carpathians and hem the Russians in between

that barrier and the Austro-Hungarian armies of Boehm-Ermolli and

Von Bojna. It must distinctly be borne in mind that these two forces

are also north of the passes: that of Von Bojna being stationed

at the elbow where the Germanic line turned from the Carpathians

almost due north along the Dunajec-Biala front, or across the neck

of our hypothetical jar. The Dukla and Lupkow passes were still in

Russian hands; these were the only two that the Germanic offensives

of January, February, and March, 1915, had failed to capture; all

the others, from Rostoki eastward, were held by the Austrians and

Germans. It was through the Dukla and Lupkow that the Russians

obtained their foothold in northern Hungary, and it was the only

way open to them now to get back again. Around the Laborcza district

stood the Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under the command

of the Archduke Joseph, who now began to harass them, aided by

the German "Beskid Corps" under General von Marwitz. This was the

only section in the range where the Russians held both sides.

Boehm-Ermolli had forced the Rostoki and Uzsok, but hitherto had

been unable to get very far from their northern exits--not beyond

Baligrod. During the fighting on the Dunajec these three armies

merely marked time; it was their object to keep the Russians in

Hungary and in the two passes until Von Mackensen had thrown the

right of his "phalanx" across their only avenue of escape. That time

was now rapidly approaching, and Von Bojna was gradually squeezing

Brussilov from the west, while Boehm-Ermolli was following from the

east and south. It appears that the commanders of the Twelfth Russian

Army Corps and the Third Russian Army, which stood on Hungarian soil

from Zboro to Nagy Polena, did not grasp the full significance to

them of the Dunajec catastrophe.

Germanic troops were building a wall against their exits before

they had seriously thought of withdrawing. Escape was impossible

for many of them; some had managed to get across the Dukla in time,

while those left behind would either have to surrender or fight their

way through the lines across their path in the north. At the same

time they would have Von Bojna and Boehm-Ermolli on their tracks.

To make matters worse, they were also being pressed severely from

the Hungarian plains by the troops which hitherto stood inactive.

The Second Austro-Hungarian Army (Boehm-Ermolli) was fighting on

both sides of the range. Through Rostoki they attempted to separate

the Russians around Zboro from those situated farther east at Nagy

Polena. We have stated elsewhere that the Forty-eighth Division

was severely handled. They were surrounded in the Dukla by an

overwhelming superior force, but General Korniloff, the commander,

with a desperate effort and no little skill, succeeded in hacking

his way through the enemy's lines and bringing a large portion of

his force safely out of the trap. Inch by inch the Russian rear

guards retreated, fighting tooth and nail to hold the pass while their

comrades escaped. No less brave were the repeated charges made by

the Austrians--clambering over rocks, around narrow pathways hanging

high in the air, dizzy precipices and mountain torrents underneath.

On Varentyzow Mountain, especially, a fierce hand-to-hand battle

was fought between Hungarians and Cossacks, the latter finally

withdrawing in perfect order. To conduct a successful retreat in

the face of disaster is a no less difficult military achievement

than the gaining of a decisive victory, and Brussilov's retreat

from the passes deserves to rank as a masterly example of skillful

tactics.

On May 8, 1915, the Third Russian Army and the Forty-eighth Division

had reunited with Brussilov's main army in the neighborhood of

Sanok, twenty miles north of the Lupkow. When the commanders of a

retreating army lose their heads the rank and file will inevitably

become demoralized and panic-stricken. The retreat became a rout,

and the possibility of making a stand, and to some extent retrieving

the lost fortune of war, was extremely remote. A deeper motive

than the mere reconquering of Galicia lay behind Von Mackensen's

plan--he aimed at nothing less than the complete overthrow and

destruction of the Russian armies. It was a gigantic effort of the

Germanic powers to eliminate at least one of their most dangerous

enemies. Once that was accomplished it would release some millions

of troops whose services were needed in the western theatre of war.

The original plan had fallen through of crushing Russia quickly

at the beginning of the war, before she would have had time to

get ready, and then to turn against France in full force. The

Austro-German Galician campaign was planned and undertaken with that

specific object, and now, although defeated and in full retreat, the

Russian troops still formed an army in being, and not a fugitive,

defenseless rabble. So long as an army is not captured or annihilated,

it can be reorganized and again put in the field. It is on this

consideration that so much importance attaches to the handling

of an army in retreat. The Russians did not, of course, run away;

on the contrary, they fought desperately and stubbornly throughout

the retreat, for their pursuers did not average more than six miles

per day--a fact which testifies to the steady and orderly character

of the Russian retirement. They suffered from the consequences of

inadequate preparation and lack of foresight on the part of their

leaders.

The Russian troops on the Lower Wisloka held their positions longest,

but they also fell back about May 8, 1915, and for the next two days

engaged the enemy near some villages southwest of Sanok. Here a strong

force had collected, which not only offered a powerful resistance,

but even attempted a counterattack against their pursuers. Over

a front of 145 miles, extending from Szczucin near the Vistula

north of Tarnow, down almost to the Uzsok Pass, a fierce battle

progressed between May 8 and 10, 1915. In the region of Frysztak,

where the Russian line was weakest, the main German offensive was

developing its strongest attack. Reenforcements were on the way,

but could not arrive in time. For the moment disaster was averted

by an aggressive Russian counteroffensive halfway between Krosno

and Sanok, from the Besko-Jacmierz front, by which move sufficient

time was gained to enable the main forces to retreat. The Russian

defense in the Vistok Valley collapsed on May 10, 1915; the German

center had almost arrived within striking distance of the important

railway line from Tarnow via Dembica and Rzeszow to Jaroslav north

of Przemysl. At Sanok the battered remnants of the Russian troops

who had escaped from the passes maintained themselves with the

greatest difficulty. Heavy German artillery followed the Bavarians

to Rymanow, five miles from the Russian line at Besko, and were

now playing fiercely upon the positions west of Sanok. The Tenth

Austro-Hungarian Army Corps as well as the Seventh were making

their presence felt from the southwest against Odrzechova and from

the south, whence Von Marwitz with the German Beskid Corps was

rapidly advancing. To the southeast, Boehm-Ermolli was battering

the Baligrod-Lutoviska front, almost in the same position he occupied

at the end of January in the first attempt to relieve Przemysl.

The battle was practically over by the night of May 10, 1915; the

Russians could hold out no longer against the ever-increasing flood

of Austrians and Germans pouring across every road and pathway

against their doomed line. Blasted and scorched by artillery,

machine-gun and rifle fire; standing against incessant bayonet

and cavalry charges; harassed by the Austrians from the south, the

Russians were indeed in sore straits. Yet they had fought well;

in the losing game they were playing they were exhausting their

enemies as well as themselves in men and munitions--factors which

are bound to tell in a long, drawn-out war. Above all, they still

remained an army: they had not yet found their Sedan. No alternative

lay before them--or rather behind them--other than retreat to the

next possible line of defense--toward Przemysl.

Between May 11-12, 1915, the Germanic troops occupied the districts

of Sendziszow, Rzeszow, Dynow, Sanok, Lisko, Lancut, and Dubiecko.

Przevorsk was deserted by the Russians on the 13th. The Seventh

Russian Railway Battalion, under Captain Ratloff, brought up the

rear of the retreat to the Dembica-Jaroslav line. From Rzeszow

onward this battalion were employed in destroying stations, plants,

tunnels, culverts, rolling stock, and railway bridges, to hamper as

much as possible the German advance. It took the Austro-Hungarian

engineers between two and three weeks to repair the road and put

it into sufficient working order to transport their heavy siege

artillery. With uninterrupted labor and the most strenuous exertions

they could only reconstruct about four miles per day. Repairs and

renovations other than those of the railway system were necessary.

The wounded had to be sent back to hospital, and fresh troops had

to be brought up to fill the gaps torn in the Austro-German ranks

during all the severe fighting since May 2, 1915. It is not known

exactly what the series of victories cost the Germanic armies in

casualties, but it is known that their successes were dearly bought.

One fairly competent authority places the loss at between 120,000 to

130,000. From May 2 to May 12, 1915, the forces of Von Mackensen,

the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and Boroyevitch von Boyna claim

to have captured 103,500 men, 69 guns, and 255 machine guns. A

retreating army must inevitably lose many of their number as prisoners,

besides their wounded must also be abandoned. Furthermore, the

Russian line of retreat led through rough and mountainous country,

where large bodies of troops could not be kept in touch with each

other. Thus it frequently happened that isolated detachments were

captured _en bloc_ without being able to offer any resistance. In

the neighborhood of Sanok and the watering places of Rymanow and

Ivonicz some of the biggest Russian base hospitals were situated.

These, of course, could not have been evacuated in time, and the

patients consequently swelled the number of prisoners. Most of

the guns captured by the Austro-Germans were those of the Russian

troops whose retreat from northern Hungary and the passes had been

intercepted.

They often sacrificed large bodies of troops to save their guns.

The lack of artillery was the main cause of their defeat; what

little they could save from the wreck was therefore husbanded with

jealous care. The German staff accurately calculated on the

preponderance of heavy artillery, and that Russia would be compelled

to bow low before the superior blast of cannon fire. Though it

involved the sacrifice of many miles of territory, it was now the

Russian object to draw the enemy's line out to the fullest extent.

After the retreat from the Wistok the Russian Generalissimo, Grand

Duke Nicholas, was concerned only to save the most for his country

at the greatest expense to her enemies. It meant continual retreat

on a gigantic scale. Przemysl, captured ten weeks ago, lay behind

Ivanoff's line, and Lemberg was but sixty miles beyond. Two hundred

miles northward the Germans were hammering at the gates of Warsaw.

A retreat such as the grand duke contemplated might involve the loss

of all three of these places, but it would stretch the Germanic

lines enormously and enable the Allies in the west to strike with

better effect. No territorial considerations must stand in the way

against the safety of the Russian armies. It was the same policy

that had crippled Napoleon in 1812.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXI

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA AND THE BUKOWINA

In order to keep the narrative abreast of the steadily advancing

Austro-German line, we must change occasionally from one sector to

another to watch the progress of operations over the huge battle

field. In accordance with the details laid down in the great strategic

plan, each of the different Germanic forces had a distinct task to

perform. Turning then to eastern Galicia and the Bukowina, we find

that on May 1, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies were

facing each other along almost the same front where we left them

in the middle of March. That front extended to the north of Nadvorna

and Kolomea, by Ottynia across to Niczviska on the Dniester, and

from there eastward along the river toward Chotin on the Russian

frontier of Bessarabia.

By the beginning of May, 1915, the spring floods had subsided,

when operations became again possible. General Lechitsky, on the

Russian side, probably aimed at recovering the Pruth Valley, while

the Austrian commander, General von Pflanzer-Baltin, directed his

efforts to establishing himself on the northern bank of the Dniester.

He would then be able to advance in line with the Germanic front that

was pressing on from the west, and northward from the Carpathian

range between Uzsok and the Jablonitza passes; otherwise his force

would lag behind in the great drive, a mere stationary pivot. At

that time he held about sixty miles of the Odessa-Stanislau railroad

(which runs through the valley via Czernovice and Kolomea) with

the Russians only twenty miles north of the line. If that position

could be taken the Austrians would have the South Russian line of

communications in their hands, for it was along this line that

supplies and reenforcements were being transported to Ivanoff's front

on the Wisloka from the military centers at Kiev and Sebastopol.

Thus the railway was of tremendous importance to both belligerents.

What it meant to the Austrians has been stated; to the Russians its

possession offered the only opportunity for a counteroffensive in

the east that could possibly affect the course of the main operations

on the Wisloka, San, and later the Przemysl lines. But however

successful such a counteroffensive might prove, it could not have

exerted any immediate influence on the western front. With the

Transylvania Carpathians protecting the Austro-German eastern flank,

there would still be little hope of checking the enemy's advance on

Lemberg even if Lechitsky succeeded in reconquering the whole of

the Bukowina and that part of eastern Galicia south of the Dniester.

Every strategic consideration, therefore, pointed to the Dniester

line as the key to the situation for the Austrian side, and Von

Pflanzer-Baltin decided to stake all on the attempt.

[Illustration: GALICIAN CAMPAIGN FROM PRZEMYSL TO BESSARABIA]

On May, 6, 1915, the machine was set in motion by a violent bombardment.

By the 8th the Austrians captured the bridgehead of Zaleszczyki;

on the 9th the Russians drove them out again, capturing 500 men,

3 big guns, 1 field gun, and a number of machine guns. On May 10

the Russians took the initiative and attacked a front of about

forty miles, along the entire Dniester line from west of Niczviska

to Uscie Biskupic, crossed into the Bukowina and advanced to within

five miles of Czernowitz from the east. A little stream and a village

both named Onut are situated southwest of Uscie Biskupic. Here a

detachment of Don Cossacks distinguished themselves on May 10,

1915. Advancing toward the Austrian wire entanglements in face of

a terrific fusilade, they cut a passage through in front of the

Austrian's fortified positions. Before the latter realized what was

happening the Cossacks were on top of them, and in a few minutes a

ferocious bayonet struggle had cleared out three lines of trenches.

Russian cavalry poured in after them, hacking the Austrian's rear,

and compelling them to evacuate the entire district. The Cossacks

charged into the hurriedly retreating masses--on horse and on foot,

with saber, lance, and bayonet, capturing 4,000 prisoners, a battery

of machine guns, several caissons and searchlight apparati.

The entire northern bank of the Dniester was in Russian possession

by the night of May 10, 1915; several desperate counterattacks

attempted by the Austrians on the 11th completely failed to recover

the lost ground. Two days later a Russian official reported: "In this

operation the Austrian units which led the offensive were repulsed

near Chocimierz with heavy losses. Our artillery annihilated two

entire battalions and a third surrendered. Near Horodenka the enemy

gave way about seven o'clock in the evening of the same day and began

a disorderly retreat. We again captured several thousand prisoners,

guns, and some fifty ammunition caissons." Being a junction of

six roads and a railway station on the curved line from Kolomea

to Zaleszczyki, Horodenka is considered to be the most important

strategic point along the Dniester-Czernowitz front. It was undoubtedly

a severe blow to the Austrians.

During the night of May 11, 1915, and the next day they evacuated

a front of about eighty-eight miles, and retired south of the Pruth.

General Mishtchenko led his Cossacks on the Austrian trail, taking

several towns on their way to Nadvorna, which they captured after a

fierce fight. From here they took possession of part of the railway

line from Delatyn to Kolomea, and completely severed the connection

between Von Pflanzer-Baltin's forces and those of Von Linsingen

lying along the north of the range. Larger bodies of Russian troops

were on the way to Kolomea; on May 13, 1915, they stormed and carried

some strongly fortified Austrian positions eight miles north of the

town, in front of which the Austrians had placed reenforcements

and all their last reserves. By dint of great efforts they held

their position here, but from May 9 to May 14, 1915, the Russians

drove them back elsewhere on a front of over sixty miles for a

distance of about twenty miles, also capturing some 20,000 prisoners

with many guns and valuable stores of munitions. About the middle of

May matters quieted down in the eastern sector; the only fighting

of importance consisted of severe artillery combats around Czernowitz

and Kolomea. The issue of the conflict hung in the west with Von

Mackensen's armies; fighting in the Bukowina at this stage became

an unnecessary expenditure of strength and energy. The fate of

eastern Galicia was being decided 140 miles away, on the banks

of the River San, to which region we will now direct the reader's

attention.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXII

RUSSIAN CHANGE OF FRONT--RETREAT TO THE SAN

After the Russian troops retreated from the Lower Wisloka northward

toward the confluence of that river with the Vistula they held

the two important bridgeheads of Sandomierz and Rozvadov.

On May 14, 1915, Ivanoff's right was being forced toward the Vistula

in the vicinity of Opatow. This right wing was the army under General

Ewarts, which since December, 1914, had been stationed in strongly

fortified positions on the Nida in Russian Poland. The front extended

across the frontier into western Galicia and joined on to the right

wing of Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala front, which was shattered between

Otfinow and Gorlice. The retreat of Dmitrieff's army was in an

easterly direction along Tarnow, Pilzno, Dembica, Rzeszow, and

Lancut to Przevorsk on the San; from the region of Gorlice and

Ciezkovice along Biecz, Jaslo, Frysztak, Krosno to Dynow, Dubiecko,

and Sanok, the latter also on the San. The troops that Brussilov

extricated from the passes and those with which he held the northern

part of the western Carpathians against Boehm-Ermolli were now

likewise concentrated on the San. A glance at the map will show

that the Russian front on the San from Przevorsk down to Sanok

forms a shield between the Germanic advance and the two towns of

Jaroslav and Przemysl. It will also be observed that General Ewarts's

forces about Rozvadov are on the west side of the San, that is

to say, nearer toward the advancing Austrians under the Archduke

Joseph Ferdinand.

The retreat in Galicia necessitated modifications in the Russian

front in Poland on the way to Warsaw. The line south of the Pilica

had to be withdrawn and positions on the Nida abandoned to conform

with the retreating line in Galicia. New positions were taken up along

Radom and across the Kamienna River. The pivot or hinge from which

the line was drawn back was the town of Ivanlodz, about fifty-five

miles southwest of Warsaw. North of Ivanlodz the front remained

unaltered. While this line shifting was in progress (in Poland) the

German troops hung closely to the heels of the retiring Russians,

evidently mistaking the motive behind the change of position. Mr.

Stanley Washburn thus summarizes the results of these retreating

battles:

"Regarding the movement as a whole, suffice it to say that in the

two weeks following the change of line one (Russian) army inflicted

upon the enemy a loss of nearly 30,000 in killed, wounded, and

prisoners. The Russian losses were comparatively trifling." The

Austro-German forces were following up leisurely the retreating

Russian corps, not expecting any serious fighting to occur until

the lines behind the Kamienna were reached.

Instead of that, however, on May 15, 1915, the Russian commander

suddenly halted the main body of his troops in front of his fortified

positions on a line extending from Brody by Opatow toward Klimontow.

Between May 15-17, 1915, a battle developed on this front, which

is the more notable as it is one of the few in this war fought in

the open without trenches. To quote Mr. Washburn: "In any other

war it would have been called a good-sized action, as from first

to last more than 100,000 men and perhaps 350 to 400 guns were

engaged."

The Austro-Germans came on in four groups. The Third German Landwehr

was moving from the southwest by Wierzbnik against Ilza, slightly

to the north of Lubienia. Next to it, coming from the direction

of Kielce, was the German Division of General Bredow, supported

by the Eighty-fourth Austrian Regiment. This body was advancing

against Ostroviec, the terminus of a railway which runs from the

district of Lodz to the southeast by Tomaszow and Opoczno, and

crosses the Ivangorod-Olkusz line halfway between Kielce and Radom.

Farther to the south three Austro-Hungarian divisions were also

advancing--namely, the Twenty-fifth Austrian Division against Lagow,

and the Fourth Austrian Landwehr Division, supported by the Forty-first

Honved Division, against Ivaniska; they moved along roads converging

on Opatow. The Twenty-fifth Austrian Division, commanded by the

Archduke Peter Ferdinand, was composed of crack regiments, the

Fourth Hoch and Deutschmeisters of Vienna, and the Twenty-fifth,

Seventeenth, and Tenth Jäger battalions. The Russians were outnumbered

about 40 per cent. The supposedly demoralized Russians were not

expected to give any battle short of their fortified line, to which

they were thought to be retiring in hot haste. The Russian general

selected the Austrians on whom to spring his first surprise, but

commenced by making a feint against the German corps, driving in

their advanced guards by vigorous attacks which caused the whole

force to halt and begin deployment for an engagement.

This occurred on May 15, 1915. On the same day, with all his available

strength, he swung furiously with Opatow as an axis from both north

and south, catching in bayonet charge the Twenty-fifth Division on

the road between Lagow and Opatow. Simultaneously another portion

of his command swept up on the Fourth Division coming from Ivaniska

to Opatow. "In the meantime a strong force of Cossacks had ridden

round the Austrians and actually hit their line of communications

at the exact time that the infantry fell on the main column with a

bayonet charge, delivered with an impetuosity and fury that simply

crumpled up the entire Austrian formation. The Fourth Division was

meeting a similar fate farther south, and the two were thrown together

in a helpless mass, losing between 3,000 and 4,000 casualties and

nearly 3,000 in prisoners, besides a large number of machine guns

and the bulk of their baggage. The remainder, supported by the

Forty-first Honved Division, which had been hurried up, managed

to squeeze themselves out of their predicament by falling back on

Uszachow, and the whole retired to Lagow, beyond which the Russians

were not permitted to pursue them, lest they should break the symmetry

of their own line." It is admitted by the Austrians themselves

that their losses were very severe in this battle. An Austrian

source at the time stated that on May 16, 1915, not a single officer

and only twenty-six men were left of the entire Fourth Company,

First Battalion of the Tenth Austrian Infantry Regiment. By the

17th of May the Austrians had withdrawn more than twelve miles

from the scene of the disaster.

During the following night, May 25, 1915, an Austrian division

was moving from the line of advance of General Bredow's troops

along the Lagow-Opatow road where it is separated by a spur of

the Lysa Gora, the highest mountain group in Russian Poland. The

Russians, elated over their recent victory, crossed the mountains by

a forced march, and fell on the right flank of the German formation,

while other troops opened a general frontal attack against it.

Bredow was compelled to fall back in haste in the direction of

Bodzentyn and to call for assistance from the adjoining Fourth

German Landwehr Division. The sudden withdrawal of that division

had the effect of weakening the German line southwest of Radom

near the Radom-Kielce and the Konsk-Ostroviec railway crossings.

The opportunity of thinning the enemy's line in that sector was

too good to be lost, for a Russian communiqué of May 17, 1915,

states that "near Gielniow, Ruski-Brod, and Suchedniov our sudden

counterattacks inflicted severe losses on the enemy's advance guards."

Having thus checked the German advance for the time being, the

Russians ceased from further troubling to await developments on

the San.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXIII

BATTLE OF THE SAN

When the Austro-German armies reached the line of the San on May

14, 1915, the battle for mid-Galicia was over, and a fresh chapter

of the campaign opened with the battle of the San, which might more

fittingly be described as the battle for Przemysl. The position

of Ivanoff's right has been shown; his right center lay west of

the Lower San; the center east of the river covered Przemysl; his

left center extended along the Upper Dniester, while his left,

under Lechitsky, was keeping Von Pflanzer-Baltin employed. Von

Mackensen's "phalanx" was slowly coming into action again, directing

its course toward the Russian center. The "phalanx" was compelled

to travel slowly, for it carried about 2,000 pieces of artillery

with ample munitions, and the railroads had been wrecked by the

retreating Russians. What has been described by military writers

as "Von Mackensen's phalanx" was a concentration of troops along

the lines on which the strongest resistance was expected or where

the quickest advance was intended. No special group of forces appear

to have been set apart for that purpose; there was very little

shifting about or regrouping necessary during the campaign, and

so well was the plan arranged that the concentrations occurred

almost automatically wherever and whenever they were most needed.

The infantry marched in successive lines or echelons, about forty

yards apart, while in the ranks the men were allowed about four

feet elbow room apiece. For frontal attacks this might be considered

fairly close formation, but Von Mackensen calculated more upon the

disintegrating effect of his artillery to first demoralize the

enemy and wreck his position, after which the infantry came into

play to complete the destruction. Without an overwhelming supply

of artillery the "phalanx" plan would have been unworkable--machine

guns would exact too heavy a sacrifice of life.

Ivanoff's chief object for the moment was to hold the enemy in

check long enough to allow Przemysl to be cleared of ammunitions

and supplies, and to withdraw the troops in possession of the place.

Already, on May 14, 1915, the German troops of Von Mackensen's

army had occupied Jaroslav, only twenty-two miles north of the

fortress. Ivanoff had concentrated his strongest forces on the

line between Sieniava, north of Przevorsk, and Sambor, thirty miles

southeast of Przemysl. Here he had deployed the three armies which

had held the entire front from the Biala to Uzsok in the beginning of

May, 1915, nearly twice as long as the line they were now guarding.

These were to fight a holding battle on the center while he adopted

a series of vigorous counterthrusts on his right and left wings.

By the retirement of the center Ewarts had been compelled to fall

back from the Nida to the Vistula with Woyrsch's Austrian army

against him. When Ewarts dropped behind Kielce in Russian Poland,

Woyrsch seized the junction of the branch line to Ostroviecs in

front of the Russian line. Ivanoff decided to venture a counterattack

which would at the same time relieve the pressure on his center

and also check the move on Josefov, dangerously near to the

Warsaw-Ivangorod-Lublin line. The result of this plan was the brilliant

surprise attack on the Austrians and Germans previously described.

Along the San the troops just south of Ewarts delivered a fierce

attack and drove the Archduke Ferdinand back to Tarnobrzeg on the

Vistula. Ivanoff next drew as many reenforcements from that flank

to strengthen his center as was compatible with safety. What had

happened meanwhile on Ivanoff's extreme left--in eastern Galicia

and the Bukowina--has already been stated. These counterattacks

may be regarded as merely efforts to gain time, but the hour of

another great battle was at hand.

The battle of the San, one of the greatest of the war, opened on May

15, 1915. Jaroslav was in German hands; the Fourth Austro-Hungarian

Army (Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) reached the western side of the

San on the 14th; by the 16th the Austro-German armies held almost

the entire left bank of the river from Rudnik to Jaroslav, about

forty miles. They crossed at several points on the same day and

enlarged their hold on the right bank between Jaroslav and Lezachow

near Sieniava, which they captured. A German division arrived at

Lubaczovka, due north of Jaroslav, and half of the Germanic circle

around Przemysl was now drawn. The German plan was an advance in

force from the Sieniava-Jaroslav front against the Przemysl-Lemberg

railway, the most vulnerable point of the Russian line of retreat

from the fortress. Fifteen bridges were accordingly erected over the

San in that sector between May 20-24, 1915, across which the German

battering ram was to advance on Przemysl. South of the town mounted

patrols came into touch with Russian cavalry; four Austro-Hungarian

and one German army corps were standing prepared between Dobromil

and Sambor; Sambor was occupied by them. The Russians held the left

bank close to the river from Sieniava to Jaroslav, and northward of

the former and to the west as far as Tarnobrzeg. From Jaroslav their

front ran in almost a straight line for thirty miles southeastward

to the outer and northern forts around Przemysl, described nearly a

complete circle around the western and southern forts to Mosciska

on the east, thence south to Sambor, and from Sambor to Stryj. From

Stryj eastward to the Bukowina the line remained unaltered. In

that region Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-Baltin had been conducting a

campaign all by themselves; they were now resting, waiting, watching.

While great Germanic preparations for the capture of Przemysl were

proceeding north of the town, the battle opened on Saturday, May 15,

1915, in the south, against the Russian front between Novemiasto and

Sambor. Here the Austro-German troops were thrown against Hussakow

and Krukenice to hack their way through trenches and barbed-wire

entanglements in order to reach the Przemysl-Lemberg railway and

thereby complete the circle. "At the cost of enormous sacrifices the

enemy succeeded in capturing the trenches of our two battalions."

But on May 17, 1915, these trenches near Hussakow were recaptured

by the Russians. The Austrians returned to the charge, however,

and by May 19 were within six miles of Mosciska. By May 21 they

had overcome the main Russian defenses to the east of Przemysl and

were threatening the garrison's line--their only line--of retreat

to Grodek, for other Germanic forces were advancing upon Mosciska

from the north.

On May 21, 1915, the Russians opened a sudden counteroffensive along

the whole line in a desperate effort to save, not the fortress,

but the garrison. The Austrians had destroyed most of the forts

before they surrendered the town on March 22; and forts cannot

be built or reconstructed in a few weeks. Besides, the Austrians

knew the ground too well. Von Mackensen's "phalanx" was meanwhile

advancing against the Jaroslav-Przemysl front with Von Bojna's

corps on his right; Boehm-Ermolli deserted the passes which had

so long occupied him and was now pressing against the south of

the town while Von Marwitz on his right attempted to seize the

railway between Sambor and Dobromil. Von Linsingen was forging

ahead toward Stryj and the Dniester; he had finally worked through

the ill-fated Koziova positions, and was now able to rest his right

upon Halicz. From there his connection with Von Pflanzer-Baltin

had been broken by Lechitsky, and was not repaired till June 6,

1915.

The Russian counteroffensive was a homeopathic remedy, on the principle

of "like curing like:" an enveloping movement against being enveloped

themselves at Przemysl; but the case was hopeless. Yet they met with

some successes of a temporary nature. Between the Vistula and the

San they captured some towns and villages; they also got very close

to Radava, north of Jaroslav, and forced the Austro-German troops to

fall back on to the left bank of the river on a considerable line

of front north of Sieniava, where they captured many prisoners

and guns.

The counteroffensive reached its zenith on May 27, 1915, when Irmanow's

Caucasian Corps stormed Sieniava and captured something like 7,000

men, six big guns, and six pieces of field artillery. Von Mackensen

resumed the offensive on May 24, by advancing due east of Jaroslav,

capturing Drohojow, Ostrov, Vysocko, Makovisko and Vietlin all

in one day. Radymno was occupied by the Austro-Hungarians under

General Arz von Straussenburg, still further narrowing the circle and

compelling the Russians to fall beyond the San. On the twenty-fifth

the Austrians followed them over, captured the bridgehead of Zagrody,

the village of Nienovice and the Heights of Horodysko, while Von

Mackensen's troops farther north captured Height 241. South of

the village of Naklo, between Przemysl and Mosciska, a hill 650

feet high was violently attacked; it commanded the only line of

retreat from the fortress still left open. To the south of the

town the Russian counteroffensive tried to outflank the Austrian

troops which had approached close to the fortress and the railroad

to Lemberg. With the assistance of strong reenforcements the Russians

were able to check the advance here and make 2,200 prisoners, besides

capturing ammunitions and machine guns.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXIV

RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL

The counteroffensive ended--of necessity--on May 24, 1915. The

Russians could still offer an effective resistance between Krukienice

and Mosciska, but the pressure of continuous attack against their

positions around Hussakow grew fiercer every hour. The enemy was

knocking at the outer ring of the forts; from the west the heaviest

cannons were pouring shot and shell with such violence that the

fall of Przemysl could no longer be prevented. Most of the troops

had already been withdrawn, as well as the supplies and munitions;

only a small garrison remained behind to man the guns of the forts

to the last moment; the little avenue to safety on the east was

still open.

On May 30, 1915, the Austrian batteries began their deadly work on

the Grodek line near Medyka. The exit was under fire; since May 17,

Przemysl had been invested from three sides, and the fourth was all

but closed. From the northern side, guarded by the Bavarians under

General Kneusel, twenty-one centimeter Krupp howitzers bombarded

the Russian positions round Korienice and Mackovice, drawing ever

nearer the forts commanding the road and railway to Radymno. The

Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, approaching from Krasiczyn,

endeavored to rush some of the outer works, but paid heavily for

the venture. They settled down before the forts of Pralkovice,

Lipnik, Helicha and Grochovce, and those round Tatarovka mountain.

General Artamoff, the Russian commander of Przemysl, had laboriously

reconstructed some of the old Austrian forts and equipped them with

Russian 12-centimeter howitzers. As the Austrians had brought only

their 15-centimeter howitzers, they were obliged to wait until their

30.5 batteries arrived before they could undertake any serious

attack.

These batteries came on the scene about May 25, 1915, it took five

days' preparation, and the final bombardment began on the 30th. It

was an ironical circumstance that the Austrians and Germans were

in numerous places sheltering themselves behind the very earthworks

which the Russians had constructed when they were besieging the

place two months earlier. There had been no time to destroy them

on the retreat.

The northern sector of the outer ring of forts fell on May 30, 1915,

when the Bavarians captured the Russian positions near Orzechovce. A

terrific bombardment was directed against the entire northern and

northwestern front; great columns of infantry were pushed forward

to finish the cannons' work--still the Russians hung on, ever bent

on doing all possible damage to the enemy.

During the night of May 30-31, 1915, the enemy succeeded in approaching

within 200 paces, and at some points even in gaining a footing

in the precincts of Fort No.7, around which raged an obstinate

battle that lasted until two in the afternoon of the 31st, when

he was repulsed after suffering enormous losses. The remnants of

the enemy who had entered Fort No.7, numbering 23 officers and

600 men, were taken prisoners.

Since the 20th of May, 1915, the clearing of the road had been

going on; Von Mackensen battering the western forts and the river

line as far as Jaroslav, and Boehm-Ermolli struggling to force

the southern corner to get within range of the Lemberg railway.

On his right, Von Marwitz had become stuck in the marshes of the

Dniester between Droholycz and Komarno. The Bavarians on the north

again let fly their big guns against the forts round Dunkoviczki on

May 31, 1915. At four in the afternoon they ceased fire; the forts

and defenses were crumpled up into a shapeless mass of wreckage. Now

Prussian, Bavarian and Austrian regiments rushed forward to storm

what was left. They still found some Russians there, severely mauled

by the bombardment; but they could no longer present a front. They

retreated behind the ring. The Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps

now made another attempt on Pralkovice and Lipnik. Von Mackensen's

men captured two trenches near Fort No. 11--"they had to pay a heavy

price in blood for every yard of their advance." Heavy batteries are

also spitting fire against Forts Nos. 10 and 12. When the curtain

of night fell over the scene of carnage and destruction, two breaches

had been made in the outer ring of the forts.

June 2, 1915, dawned--a bright, warm summer's day; the sun rose

and smiled as impassively over the Galician mountains, and valleys,

and plains as it had smiled through countless ages before the genius

of man had invented even the division of time. From all sides of the

doomed fortress eager, determined men were advancing; Fort No. 10

was captured at noon by the Twenty-second Bavarian Infantry Regiment;

later in the day the Prussian Grenadier Guards took possession of

Fort No. 12; during the night the besieger's troops marched into

the village of Zuravica, within the outer ring. Austrian troops

had broken through from the southwest and also penetrated the inner

circle.

June 3, 1915, dawned and again the sun smiles over Galicia and sees

the same iron belt of machinelike men still nearer the fortress;

but the haggard defenders, where are they? Gone! Flown! They have

vanished during the night. Austrians and Bavarians march into the

town early in the morning. The only enemies they meet are the dead.

Przemysl has fallen again--fallen before twenty times as powerful

a blow as that which struck it down seventy-two days earlier.

Before proceeding with the progress of Von Mackensen and his mighty

"phalanx," let us briefly trace the progress of Von Linsingen,

whom we left on the road to Stryj and the Dniester, or rather,

attempting to force that road. While the forts of Przemysl were

being smashed in the north, Von Linsingen was pounding and demolishing

the Russian positions between Uliczna and Bolechov. Heavy mortars

and howitzers were at the same time being placed into position

in front of the Russian trenches between Holobutow and Stryj.

On May 31, 1915, they began to roar, and before long the trenches

were completely pulverized--the very trenches that thousands of

Germans and Austrians had died in vain attempts to carry by assault.

The Thirty-eighth Hungarian Honved Division were sent to finish

the work of clearance and take possession of Stryj. The entire

Russian line withdrew to the Dniester, step by step, ever fighting

their favorite rear guard actions, killing and capturing thousands

of their enemies. They retired behind the Dniester, but maintained

their hold on any useful strategical position south of the river,

so far as was possible without imperiling the continuity of their

line.

We must also consider two more Austro-German sectors in order to

bring the combatants stationed there into line with the Germanic

advance--the Uzsok Pass and the Bukowina-_cum_-Eastern Galicia

sectors. In the former the army of Von Szurmay stood beside that

of Von Linsingen opposite the Ninth Russian Army. Von Szurmay led

his men out of the pass and advanced northward on May 12, after

the fall of Sanok had forced the Russians away from their positions

in the vicinity of it. Their line of retreat was threatened by

the Austrian approach to Sambor.

On May 16, 1915, Von Szurmay moved across the upper Stryj near

Turka and passed along secondary roads in the direction of the

oil districts of Schodnica, Drohobycz and Boryslav, arriving on

May 16-17, 1915. Von Linsingen's troops had started their advance

on the same day as those of Von Szurmay, when the Russians found

Koziowa had to retire for the purpose of keeping in touch with

their line: the same pressure that Sambor exerted on the Uzsok.

Here again the Russians adopted rearguard tactics and considerable

fighting occurred during their retreat to Stryj and Bolechow, both

of which were eventually captured by Von Linsingen.

In Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina matters had come almost to a

standstill between Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-Baltin about the middle

of May, 1915. When the former had cut the latter's connection with

the main line, the brigade of General von Blum and other adjoining

German troops on the extreme right of Von Linsingen tried hard

to relieve the pressure of Lechitsky on the Austrian forces. Not

till after the fall of Przemysl was the connection restored, when

the Russians had to fall back from Kalusz and Nadvorna; on June 9

they evacuated Obertzn, Horodenka, Kocman and Sniatyn. Lechitsky

was also compelled to withdraw from the Bukowina between Zaleszczyki,

Onut, and Czernowitz, where the Austrians were moving along the

Dniester in the north, the Pruth in the south, and over the hills

in the center against the village of Szubraniec. Here the Russians

once more inflicted severe losses on the Austrians, but being in

danger from a flanking movement by the Forty-second Croatian Infantry

through the Dniester forests, they retired from the Bukowina on

to Russian territory on June 12, 1915.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXV

CAPTURE OF LEMBERG

The capture of Przemysl and of Stryj terminates the second stage

of the Austro-German offensive in Galicia. The third stage may

be described as the battle for Lemberg, or Lwow. Lemberg is the

ancient capital of Galicia, and formerly bore the name of Lwow.

The Austrians many years ago had changed it to "Lemberg." When the

Russians captured the town on September 3, 1914, they had given

it back the old Slavonic name, which, however, was destined soon to

be transformed back again into the more pronounceable appellation

of "Lemberg."

It is estimated that between April 28, 1915, and the recapture

of Przemysl the Russian forces in Galicia had been diminished by

at least a quarter of a million casualties. The heaviest losses

occurred among Dmitrieff's troops in the first days of May, 1915,

but in the battles on the San, at the close of the month, the forces

of Von Mackensen's "phalanx" were also greatly reduced. Along the

entire Galician front, it is computed that quite 600,000 Austro-German

troops were put out of action.

While the fight for Przemysl was in full swing an important event

of the war occurred--Italy joined the enemies of Austria on May

3, 1915; the Dual Monarchy had now to defend her western frontier

as well. Dankl and Von Bojna were transferred to the Italian front

with a considerable portion of their Galician troops. A general

redistribution of units was effected among the Austrian and German

armies. The army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was held along

the lower San as far as Sieniava. Von Mackensen was advancing east

of Jaroslav along the railway toward Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli

was fighting on the road to Lemberg from Mosciska. An army under

Count Bothmer was operating near the Dniester marshes, beyond which,

farther south, a group of armies under Von Linsingen (mainly German)

had forced the passage of the Dniester at Zuravno, and was trying

to advance on Lemberg and catch Ivanoff's main forces on the flank.

This last movement, if successful, would be the most effective method

of crushing the retreating Russian armies: being thus outflanked,

some of their lines of retreat would be cut and a dissolution of a

large portion of the retiring forces could hardly have been avoided.

However, all attempts in this direction failed. The Russians gradually

rolled up their line on the Dniester from west to east, keeping

step with the retreat of the armies which were facing west. With

strong reenforcements from Kiev and Odessa Brussilov commanded

the Dniester front under the direction of General Ivanoff. If only

the ponderous advance of Von Mackensen could have been arrested,

Brussilov would have had little difficulty in sweeping Von Linsingen

back to the Carpathian barrier. A somewhat similar condition existed

in the north, where the Austrians were at the mercy of Ivanoff's

strong right wing.

The archduke's front was smashed at Rudnik early in June, 1915; his

forces were driven back a day's march and lost 4,000 men in prisoners,

besides many guns. The Second, Third and Fourth Tyrolese regiments

were almost annihilated. German troops were hurried to the rescue.

Boehm-Ermolli also got into serious difficulties at Mosciska, where

the Russians held him up for a week with a furious battle. Ivanoff

was scoring points against all his individual opponents excepting

only Von Mackensen. The "phalanx," always kept up to full strength

by a continuous influx of reserves and provided with millions of

high-explosive shells, not only pursued its irresistible course

eastward, but had to turn now right, now left, to help Austrian

and German commanders out of trouble. Heavy howitzers lumbered

along the way to Rawa-Ruska--not to Lemberg, but to the north of

it, on the flank of the Russian army still holding the Lower San.

This army had therefore to retire northward to the river line of

the Tanev stream, cautiously followed by the archduke's forces.

The "phalanx" had again saved them from disaster. Similarly, at

Mosciska, when Boehm-Ermolli tried to storm the Russian position

by mass attacks, his infantry was driven back with such terrible

punishment that they could not be induced to make another advance.

There was nothing to be done here, but wait till Von Mackensen

turned the flank of the Russian position for them, which he did in

one of the most stubborn conflicts of the war--the battle of the

Lubaczovka, a tributary of the San between Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg.

Never were the fighting abilities of Slav and Teuton more severely

tested. For over a week the struggle raged; a half million men

were brought up in groups and flung against the Russian front.

Shell, shrapnel, bullets and asphyxiating bombs finally wore down

the Russian resistance.

Incapacitated by physical exhaustion and outnumbered by three to

one, the Russian infantry gave way on June 13, 1915. The "phalanx"

drove into their ranks and advanced rapidly in a northerly direction

on its great flanking movement. But the Russian spirit was not

broken, for at this critical moment General Polodchenko rode out

with three regiments of cavalry--the Don Cossacks, the Chernigov

Hussars, and the Kimburn Dragoons. They dashed into the unbroken

lines of the triumphant German infantry like a living hurricane,

sabered the enemy, and put thousands on the run. Swerving aside,

they next charged deep into the German rear, mauled the reserves into

confusion, hacked their way out again and captured several machine

guns. The most remarkable feature about this extraordinary exploit

was the fact that the losses sustained by the cavalry amounted only

to 200 killed and wounded. The effect on the "phalanx," however,

was such that no more attacks were made that day, and the Russians

were able to retire to the hills near Rawa-Ruska. Ivanoff was now

compelled to draw reenforcements from other parts of the line to

strengthen his front at Rawa-Ruska. This meant weakening Ewarts's

against the archduke and Brussilov against Boehm-Ermolli. The downfall

of the Dunajec-Biala front had been attributed by the Russian War

Staff to overconfidence or neglect on the part of General Dmitrieff,

who was subsequently relieved of his command and replaced by General

Lesch. At an official inquiry Dmitrieff was exonerated and reinstated

on the reasonable ground that, whatever precautions of defense he

might have taken, they would have proved ineffective against the

preponderance of the German artillery.

After the battle of Lubaczow the Russian line drew back about twenty

miles. For the defense of Lemberg the front ran in a concave form

from along the River Tanev, five miles from Rawa-Ruska, down to

Grodek and Kolodruby; then eastward behind the Dniester to Zuravno

and Halicz. The marshes of the Dniester, then swollen by heavy

rains, formed a good natural defense; the intrenchments on the

hills north of Grodek to Rawa-Ruska protected the approaches to

Lemberg from that direction. The weakest spot lay around Janov,

fifteen miles north of Grodek, where the level ground would permit

the easy transport of heavy artillery. This position had been fortified

with trenches and wire entanglements. Here also were concentrated

the troops withdrawn from other parts of the line, and four armored

trains with quick-firing guns from the depot at Rovno. General

Ivanoff had no intention of making any decisive stand against the

"phalanx"; neither did he think of risking his armies in a battle

for Lemberg. That town was certainly of great military and political

importance--worth a dozen Przemysls--and worth fighting for. But for

that he would need artillery in enormous quantity. Von Mackensen

carried 2,500 guns with him, as well as siege trains of heavy howitzers.

Ivanoff possessed none of these, and could therefore hope only to

fight rear-guard actions while retiring before Von Mackensen. In

any other part of the Galician line except the center he had little

to fear. We left Von Linsingen forcing the Dniester at Zuravno. He

got the bulk of his army across, the main advance commanded by

Von Bothmer, who captured the northern heights and penetrated the

forests near the Stryj-Tarnopol railway. They were less than fifty

miles from Lemberg.

The "retreating" Brussilov suddenly turned round and fell on Von

Bothmer's advance. The fight lasted three days, with the result that

the Austro-Germans were obliged to fall back across the Dniester,

leaving behind 2,000 killed and wounded, besides 17 guns, 78 machine

guns, 348 officers and 15,430 men as prisoners, June 8-10, 1915.

On June 11, 1915, however, the Germans renewed the attack on Zuravno,

recaptured the town, and on June 12 were five miles north of it. By

June 13 they had made ten miles, when Brussilov lashed out again.

Within two days the Germans were back on the Dniester. Von Mackensen

had meanwhile concentrated a new series of heavy batteries around

Jaroslav and formed a new "phalanx" (with reenforcements) west

of the San between Piskorovice and Radymno. Another attempt was

preparing to break through Ivanoff's right wing.

A violent bombardment began on June 12, 1915, and Austro-Hungarian

troops crossed the river and occupied both Sieniava and Piskorovice.

Next day the advance spread along the whole line, extending from

Tarnoviec on the Zlota to the Radymno-Javorov road, pressing north

and eastward against the Russian front. Pivoting on Sieniava, Von

Mackensen swung his right toward Mosciska, which Von Marwitz captured

on June 14, 1915. The same night the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's

entire army was slowly wheeling from the San toward the Tanev,

facing due north.

On June 16, 1915, the left of this line was already inside the

borders of Russian Poland, and its right wing along the entire

Tanev front. By June 16 numerous towns and villages were taken

by the Germans. The Wolff Telegraphic Bureau announced that Von

Mackensen's army had captured 40,000 men and 69 machine guns, which

undoubtedly referred to all the Galician groups, for on June 12,

1915, Von Mackensen had "replaced" the Archduke Frederick as

generalissimo of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The "phalanx" was

pressing against Rawa-Ruska, Magierow, and Janov; Boehm-Ermolli

against Grodek, part of which he captured by a midnight assault

on June 16. In five weeks the Russian line or front in Galicia

had shrunk from 300 miles to about 100. Before Dunajec, when it

was united with the northern groups, it had represented the longest

battle line in the history of the world.

The Russians began to evacuate Lemberg about June 17, 1915, the day

Von Mackensen's right entered Javorov. On the 19th his advance guard

was approaching Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli was meanwhile undergoing

severe punishment near Komarno, where an Austrian advance force

endeavored to get through the Grodek Lakes. The Russian artillery

drove them back; for three days there were furious bayonet and

cavalry charges and countercharges; despite the most terrific

bombardments the Austrian attacks were broken by the desperate

Russians. On this occasion, at least, the Russians were well supplied

with shells hurriedly sent by rail from Kiev, which enabled them to

repulse the Austrians on the lakes. Boehm-Ermolli is said to have

lost half of his effectives in his attempt to penetrate through

Grodek and Dornfeld, fifteen miles south of Lemberg.

Von Mackensen again came to the rescue by making a great turning

movement in the district of Zolkiev, about sixteen miles north of

Lemberg, and attacking the Russian positions about Janov, forcing

the Russians over the hills and the Rawa-Ruska railway to Zolkiev.

His left wing, resting on Lubaczov, swung northward in a wheeling

movement to envelop Rawa-Ruska. But the Russians intercepted the

move; ferocious encounters and Cossack charges threw the Germans

back to their pivot with heavy losses on both sides. Von Mackensen's

center, however, was too strong, and Ivanoff desired no pitched

battle--the only way to check its advance. He therefore fell back

between Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg, yielding the former to Von Mackensen

and the latter to Boehm-Ermolli, who was able to lead his battered

troops into the town on June 22, 1915, without further resistance.

Brussilov now had to withdraw from the Dniester. As at Przemysl,

the Russian garrison departed with all stores and baggage before

the victors arrived. Lemberg had been in Russian possession for

293 days.

A German attack near Rawa-Ruska was repulsed by the Russians on

June 25, 1915. For two days the "phalanx" rested to replenish its

stock of shells; when these had arrived along the Przemysl line,

Von Mackensen turned northward in the direction of Kholm on the

Lublin-Brest-Litovsk railway. On his left marched the Austro-Hungarian

army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. These two armies drop out of

the Galician campaign at this stage and become part of the great

German offensive against the Polish salient. The gigantic enveloping

movement had failed in the south; it was now to be attempted against

the Russian line in front of Warsaw, conducted by Von Hindenburg

and Von Gallwitz in the northern sector, and by Von Mackensen,

assisted by General Woyrsch and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, in the

southern. These operations are described in the pages following.

More than three-fourths of Galicia had now been reconquered, and it

was left to the Austrians and the Germans to complete the conquest.

The campaign was one of the greatest operations of the war. An

English military writer thus describes the achievement: "Only a

most magnificent army organization and a most careful preparation,

extending to infinite detail, could execute a plan of such magnitude

at the speed at which it was done by the Austrian and German armies

in May, 1915."

Not yet, however, were the Russian armies destroyed; to the German

War Staff it was not now a question of taking or retaking territory,

but of striking a final and decisive blow at the vitals of Russia.

The continuous series of reverses suffered by Boehm-Ermolli and Von

Linsingen exerted an important effect on the end of the Galician

campaign: it frustrated the plan of eliminating the Russian forces.

The battle lines in France and Flanders could wait a while till

the Russian power was annihilated.

After the fall of Lemberg, Ivanoff withdrew the main body of his

troops toward the river line of the Bug, Boehm-Ermolli following up

behind. Again that unfortunate general was roughly handled--another

of his divisions was annihilated southeast of Lemberg in a rear-guard

action. Von Linsingen directed his efforts against the Gnila Lipa and

Halicz, while Von Pflatzer-Baltin still operated on the Dniester.

For many months the Russians and Austrians faced each other in

eastern Galicia; they were still skirmishing at the end of the

year. Both Russia and Austria had more important matters on hand

elsewhere: the former against Germany in the north, and the latter

with her new enemy--Italy. Galicia became a side issue.

The Galician campaign will rank as one of the most instructive

episodes in military history, an example of unparalleled calculation,

scientific strategy, and admirable heroism, involving, it is computed,

the terrible sacrifice of at least a million human lives.

PART IV--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXVI

WINTER BATTLES OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES

The battle known in the German official accounts as the "Winter

Battle in Mazurian Land" is sometimes described as the "Nine Days'

Battle." In this sense it is to be considered as beginning on the

7th of February, 1915, and ending on the 16th, when the German

Great Headquarters reported that the Tenth Russian Army, consisting

of at least eleven infantry and several cavalry divisions, had

been driven out of its strongly fortified positions to the east of

the Mazurian Lake district, forced across the border, and, having

been almost completely surrounded, had been crushingly defeated.

In fact, however, fighting continued as part of the same action

until the 21st of February, 1915, when the pursuit of the defeated

army ended.

The forces engaged in this titanic conflict were the Russian Tenth

Army, consisting, according to the Russian version, of four corps,

under General Baron Sievers, and the German East Prussian armies,

under General van Eichhorn, operating on the north on the line

Insterburg-Lötzen, and General van Bülow on the line Lötzen-Johannisburg

to the south of Van Eichhorn. Sources favorable to the Allies represent

the strength of General Sievers's army as 120,000 men. They assert

that the total German force consisted of nine corps, over 300,000

men. These are said to have included the Twenty-first Corps, which

had been with the Crown Prince of Bavaria in the west; three reserve

corps, also from the west; the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth Corps,

new formations, from the interior of Germany; the equivalent of

three corps from other sections of the eastern front; and a reserve

corps of the Guard. The German official description of the battle

credits the Russians with having had in this sector of the battle

front in East Prussia at the beginning of February six to eight

army corps, or about 200,000 men.

For months the heavy fighting in the east had centered on other

sections of the immense battle line, running from the Baltic to

the Carpathians. The second general Russian offensive, the great

forward thrust of the Grand Duke Nicholas toward Cracow in the

direction of Berlin, aimed through the center of the German defense,

had been met, and the German counterthrust toward Warsaw had come to

a standstill in the mud of Poland and before the stone-wall defensive

of the Russians on the Bsura and the Rawka. Attacks launched by the

Russians against the East Prussian frontier, centering at Lyck,

in January, 1915, seemed to forebode a fresh Russian offensive

intended to sweep back the German armies in this section whose

position on the Russian right wing was a continual threat to the

communications of the Russian commander in chief.

The Germans, disposing of comparatively weak forces, estimated at

three army corps, were compelled to yield a strip of East Prussian

territory, and had fallen back to positions of considerable natural

strength formed by the chain of Mazurian Lakes and the line of

the Angerapp River. They reported their forces standing on the

defensive here as 50 per cent Landwehr, 25 per cent Landsturm,

and only 25 per cent other troops not of the reserve. Repeated

attempts of the Russians to gain possession of these fortified

positions had, however, broken down. They had been directed especially

against the bridgehead of Darkehmen and the right wing of the German

forces in the Paprodtk Hills. Wading up to their shoulders in icy

water, the hardy troops of the Third Siberian Corps had attempted

in vain to cross the Nietlitz Swamp, between the lakes to the east

of Lyck.

At the beginning of February, 1915, finally Von Hindenburg had been

able to obtain fresh German forces and to put them in position for

an encircling movement against the Russians lying just to the east

of the lakes, from near Tilsit to Johannisburg. With the greatest

secrecy the reenforcements, hidden from observation by their fortified

positions, and the border forces maintaining the defense, were

gathered behind the two German wings. The Russians apparently gained

an inkling of the big move that was impending about the time the

advance against their wings was under way. The first news of the

opening of the battle came to the public in a Russian official

announcement of the 9th of February, 1915, to the effect that on

the 7th the Germans had undertaken the offensive with considerable

force in the Goldap-Johannisburg sector. The northern group of

Germans began its movement somewhat later from the direction of

Tilsit.

Extensive preparations had been made by the German leaders to meet

the difficulties of a winter campaign under unfavorable weather

conditions. Thousands of sleighs and hundreds of thousands of sleigh

runners (on which to drag cannon and wagons), held in readiness,

were a part of these preparations for a rapid advance. Deep snow

covered the plain, and the lakes were thickly covered with ice. On

the 5th of February, 1915, a fresh snowstorm set in, accompanied

by an icy wind, which heaped the snow in deep drifts and made

tremendously difficult travel on the roads and railways, completely

shutting off motor traffic.

The Germans on the south, in order to come into contact with the

main Russian forces, had to cross the Johannisburg Forest and the

Pisseck River, which flows out of the southernmost of the chain of

lakes. The attacking columns made their way through the snow-clad

forests with all possible speed, forcing their way through barriers

of felled trees and driving the Russians from the river crossings.

Throughout the 8th of February, 1915, the marching columns moved

through whirling snow clouds, the Germans driving their men forward

relentlessly, so that, in spite of the drifted snow which filled

the roads, certain troops covered on this day a distance of forty

kilometers. The Germans under General von Falck took Snopken by

storm; those under General von Litzmann crossed the Pisseck near

Wrobeln. The immediate objectives of these columns were Johannisburg

and Biala, where strong Russian forces were posted.

On the 9th the southern column, under Von Litzmann, was attacked on

its right flank by Russians coming from Kolna, to the south of them.

The German troops repelled the attack, taking 2,500 prisoners, eight

cannon, and twelve machine guns. General Saleck took Johannisburg,

and Biala was cleared of the Russians. The advance of these southern

columns continued rapidly toward Lyck.

The German left wing at the same time fell overwhelmingly on the

northern end of the Russian line. On the 9th they took the fortified

Russian positions stretching from Spullen to the Schorell Forest

and nearly to the Russian border. They had here hard work to force

their way through wire entanglements of great strength. Having

noticed signs of a retreat on the part of their opponents, these

German forces had on the preceding day begun the attack without

waiting for the whole of their artillery to come up. The Russians

retreated toward the southeast.

Swinging forward toward the Russian border, the German left wing

now exerted itself to the utmost to execute the sweeping encircling

movement for which the strategy of Von Hindenburg had become famous.

The Russian right wing had been turned and was being pressed continually

toward the southeast. The German troops rushed forward in forced

marches, ignoring the difficulties which nature put in their way. By

the 10th of February these columns reached the Pillkallen-Wladislawow

line, and by the 11th the main highway from Gumbinnen to Wilkowyszki.

The right wing, up to the capture of Stallupohnen, had taken some

4,000 prisoners, four machine guns, and eleven ammunition wagons.

The center of this army, at the capture of Eydtkuhnen, Wirballen,

and Kibarty, took 10,000 prisoners, six cannon, eight machine guns,

numerous baggage wagons, including eighty field kitchens, three

military trains and other rolling stock, a large number of gift

packages intended for the Russian troops, and, of chief interest

to the fighting men, a whole day's provisions.

On the afternoon of February 10 some one and a half Russian divisions

had come to a halt in these three neighboring villages: Eydtkuhnen,

Kibarty, and Wirballen. Although it was known that the Germans

were approaching, it was apparently regarded by the Russians as

impossible that pursuers would be able to come up with them in

the raging snowstorm. So certain were they of their security that

no outposts were put on guard. Only thus could it happen that the

Germans, who had not allowed the forces of nature to stop their

advance, arrived right at the Russian position on the same day,

though with infantry alone and merely a few guns, everything else

having been left behind, stuck in the snowdrifts.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE RUSSIANS OUT OF GERMANY

It was evening when the Germans made their surprise attack on Eydtkuhnen

and midnight when they fell upon Wirballen. On the roadway stood two

Russian batteries with twelve guns and a considerable number of

ammunition wagons. The German infantry approached without firing

a shot until they were within fifty yards. Then all the horses

were shot down and the guns and ammunition seized. The men of the

battery fled. In both these towns there was street fighting in

the night, lit up by burning houses which had been fired by the

Russians in their retreat.

One of the captured trains was the hospital train of the czar.

This was utilized as headquarters for the night by the staff of

General von Lauenstein.

By the 12th of February, 1915, the German troops of the left wing,

sweeping down from the north and pressing the Russians back from

village to village, were entirely on Russian soil. Wizwiny, Kalwarja,

and Mariampol were occupied on this day. The number of guns taken by

these troops had been increased by seventeen, according to German

reports. The German Headquarters Staff declared that by this time

the Russian Seventy-third and Fifty-sixth Divisions had been as good

as annihilated, and the Twenty-seventh division nearly destroyed.

The Russians lying before the Angerapp line and the defenses of

Lötzen had in the meantime also begun to retreat toward the east.

German troops, consisting chiefly of reserves of the Landwehr and

Landsturm which up to this time had been held back within the German

fortified line, now advanced to attack the yielding army, whose

long marching column could be observed by the German flyers. While

General von Eichhorn's troops, coming from the neighborhood of

Tilsit and making their way through snow and ice, were advancing

upon Suwalki and Sejny, and the German right wing was fighting its

way through Grajewo, toward Augustowo, the center of the troops of

General von Bülow for several days fought the Russians in furious

battle in the vicinity of Lyck. From all sides the Germans were

closing in. To protect the withdrawal of this main army to Suwalki

and Augustowo, the Russians endeavored by all means to hold the

narrows of the lakes before Lyck, where they were favored by the

nature of the ground and aided by strong defensive works, for the

most part well provided with wire entanglements. The best of the

Russian troops, Siberian regiments, here fought with great energy

under a determined leadership, and the Russians, in fact, at some

places took the offensive. By the 12th of February, 1915, however,

the Germans had taken these positions and the Russians had withdrawn

to the narrow passages among the lakes before Lyck. The battles

around this town were carried on under the eye of the German Emperor.

The German soldiers were still occupied in hunting through the

houses for scattered Russians as the emperor stepped from his motor

car. He was received with hurrahs, and the soldiers surrounded

him, singing "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles." The emperor,

standing amid the blackened ruins of burned homes, delivered a

short address to the soldiers gathered about him, giving special

recognition to Infantry Regiment No. 33, an East Prussian unit

which had especially distinguished itself and suffered great losses.

On the same day the Germans advanced beyond Lyck, and by the 15th

of February no Russian remained on German soil.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXVIII

TIGHTENING OF THE NET--REPORT OF THE BOOTY

The Russian right, retiring to avoid envelopment, sought the natural

line of retreat along the railway to Kovno. In executing this movement

it turned toward the northeast, and exceeding in speed of movement

the corps to the south of it, the Twentieth, under the command of

General Bulgakov, the latter was left out of the line. In consequence

its right wing was turned and it was pressed down toward the south

with the enemy on three sides of it. It speedily became a broken

force in the forest north of Suwalki. The Russians endeavored to

reach the protection of their great fortress of Grodno. It was the

task of the German division coming down from the north in forced

marches to cut off this way of escape and prevent the Russians

coming out of the forest toward the southeast.

The march of these German troops carried them through great woodlands,

amid frozen lakes, when suddenly a thaw set in. The sleighs which

had been used had to be abandoned and wagons requisitioned on the

spot wherever possible.

An officer with these troops relates that infantrymen were sent

forward on wagons, and on the night following the 15th of February

took Sopozkin, to the east of Augustowo, on the line of the Russian

retreat, capturing the baggage of an entire Russian army corps. "The

morning," he writes, "presented to us a unique picture. Hundreds

of vehicles, baggage carts, machine guns, ammunition, provision

and ambulance wagons stood in a vast disorder in the market place

of the town and in the street. In between were hundreds of horses,

some harnessed, some loose, dead Russians, dead horses, bellowing

cattle, and sounding over it all the words of command of our troops

endeavoring to create order in this mad mix-up, and to take care of

the rich booty. Many an interesting find did we make--'mementos'

which the Russians had taken with them from Prussia and which now

were to find their way back."

A German commander tells how, in their efforts to cut off the Russian

retreat, the artillery were compelled to cross many brooks running

through deep gullies, so that it was necessary frequently to lower

guns and wagons by means of ropes on one side and pull them up

on the other.

One of the German leaders, describing this encircling movement

to the southeast from the north in which he played a part, says:

"The roads and the weather were beyond all description--twelve to

fifteen degrees Reaumur, with a cutting wind and driving snow,

with nothing to eat, as the field kitchens on these roads could

not follow. During pauses in the march one could but lean against

the wall of a miserable house or lie down in the burned-out ruins,

without straw to lie on and no covering. Men and horses sank to

their hips in the snow, and so we worked our way forward, usually

only about two kilometers an hour. Wagons and horses that upset

had to be shoveled out of the drifts. It was a terrible sight,

but we got through. We had to go on without regard for anything,

and the example of the higher officers did much."

Two Russian corps from the southern wing of the army retreating by

the Suwalki-Sejny causeway and by the Ossowetz Railway, according

to accounts from Russian sources, made their way out of the trap

under heavy rear-guard fighting.

The escaped portions of the Russian army crossed the Bobr toward

Grodno. From the direction of this Russian stronghold a desperate

effort was made to relieve the four corps which were endeavoring to

escape toward the fortress from the forest southeast of Augustowo

into which they had been pressed by the Germans from the west and

north. On the 21st of February came the final act in the great

drama. The German troops pushed forward at their best speed from

all directions toward the forest. The help that had been intended

for them came too late. Concerning the captures of this day, the

German Great Headquarters reported: "On the 21st of February the

remnants of the Tenth Army laid down their arms in the forest of

Augustowo after all attempts of the Russian commander of this army,

General Sievers, to cut a way out for the encircled four divisions

by means of those parts of his army which remained to him after

escaping over the Bobr to Grodno failed with extremely heavy losses."

Summarizing the results of the entire battle in an announcement of

the 22d of February, the German Great Headquarters said: "The pursuit

after the winter battle in Mazurian Land is ended. In cleaning up

the forests to the northwest of Grodno, and in the battles reported

during the last few days in the region of the Bobr and the Narew,

there have been captured to date one commanding general, two division

commanders, four other generals, and in the neighborhood of 40,000

men, seventy-five cannon, a quantity of machine guns, whose number

is not yet determined, and much other war material.

"The total booty of the winter battle in Mazurian Land, therefore,

up to to-day rises to seven generals, more than 100,000 men, more

than 150 cannon, and material of all sorts, inclusive of machine

guns, which cannot yet be approximately estimated. Heavy guns and

ammunition were in many cases buried by the enemy or sunk in the

lakes; thus eight heavy guns were yesterday dug out or hauled out

of the water near Lötzen and Lake Widmin.

"The Tenth Russian Army of General Baron Sievers may, therefore,

now be considered as completely annihilated."

This summary was corrected in a later announcement, which stated

that the number of guns taken as booty in the pursuit after the

winter battle in Mazurian Land had risen to 300, including eighteen

heavy guns. This was published on the 23d of February. In an

announcement of the 26th of February the Great Headquarters amplified

its account of the victory with this statement:

"In the Russian official report the extent of the disaster in the

winter battle of Mazurian Land is either concealed or an attempt

is made to obscure it. It is unnecessary to go further into these

denials. As evidence of the extent of the defeat, the following

list of the positions held by the captured generals, however, may

serve:

"Of the Twentieth Army Corps: the commanding general, the commander

of the artillery, the commander of the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth

Infantry Divisions, and of the First Brigade of Infantry of the

Twenty-ninth Infantry Division. The commander of this latter division

succumbed to his wounds soon after being made prisoner.

"Of the Third Army Corps: the commander of the Twenty-seventh Infantry

Division and the commander of the artillery and of the Second Infantry

Brigade of this division.

"Of the Fifty-third Reserve Division: the division commander and

the commander of the First Infantry Brigade.

"Of the First Siberian Cossack Division: a brigade commander."

This brought the total of Russian generals captured up to eleven.

This account of one of the greatest battles of the European War

is necessarily based to a large extent on reports of the Germans,

owing to the fact that material from this source is virtually the

only official account available of the operation as a whole. The

Russian General Staff has contented itself with the following

announcement, made public on February 21, 1915:

"When the Germans, after a series of extraordinary obstinate and

persistent attacks which caused them heavy losses, had recognized

the impossibility of pressing in our front on the left bank of the

Vistula, they turned at the end of January to the execution of a

new plan. After the creation or several new corps in the interior of

the country, and the bringing up of troops from their west front, the

Germans threw important forces into East Prussia. The transportation

of troops was made easier by the extraordinarily developed net of

railways which Germany has at its disposal.

"The task of the new troops sent to East Prussia was to defeat

our Tenth Army, which held strongly constructed positions along

the Angerapp. To assure the success of the undertaking the Germans

brought a portion of their forces from the Bzura and Rawka fronts

to the right bank of the Vistula. A movement of the Germans in

East Prussia already became noticeable on the 4th of February,

1915. But the extent of this movement could only be recognized a

few days later. As our leaders, because of the lack of railroad

lines, could not collect the necessary forces on the East Prussian

front with the necessary speed to meet the hostile attack adequately,

they decided to take back the above-mentioned army of East Prussia

to the border. In this movement of the right wing the Tenth Army,

which was pressed by heavy hostile forces and threatened with being

surrounded from the right, was forced to make a rapid change of

alignment in the direction of Kovno. In this rapid movement a corps

was separated from the rest of the army. The other corps which

continued the battle obstinately without interruption, slowly drew

back in the prescribed direction, bravely repelling the enemy and

inflicting upon him heavy losses. Our troops overcame unbelievable

difficulties, which were caused by the snow which filled all roads.

As the streets were impassable, automobiles could not run. Trains

were delayed and frequently failed to arrive at their destination.

Our corps which formed the left wing of the Tenth Army held the

enemy, while drawing back step for step for nine days on a stretch

of territory which ordinarily is covered in four days. On the 19th

of February these corps withdrawing by way of Augustowo left the

battle field and took the position assigned to them. Further battles

developed in the region before Ossowetz, on the roads from Lomza

to Jedwabno and to the north of Radislow, also halfway between

Plozk and Plonsk. These battles were in places very intense."

An English authority says: "The chief Russian loss was in General

Bulgakov's Twentieth Corps, which the German staff asserted they

had completely destroyed. But during the fortnight which ended

on Saturday the 20th, at least half of that corps and more than

two-thirds of its guns safely made their way through the Augustowo

and Suwalki woods to the position which had been prepared for the

Russian defense. The total Russian losses may have been 80 guns and

30,000 men; they were no more. The two southern corps, in spite of

their stubborn action at Lyck, crossed the woods between Augustowo

and Ossowetz without serious disaster."

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXIX

BATTLES OF PRZASNYSZ--BEFORE MLAWA

The shattering of the Tenth Russian Army in the "winter battle" of

the Mazurian Lakes was part of a greater conflict which in February,

1915, extended far down the armies on the right flank of the great

Russian battle line which ran from the Baltic to the Dniester. A

"new gigantic plan" of the Slavs was involved. As interpreted by the

German General Staff it meant that while the extreme northern wing

of the Russian armies was to sweep westward through the projecting

section of Germany, East Prussia, along the Baltic another Russian

army was to advance in force from the south against the corner

formed by West Prussia and the Vistula. With vast masses of cavalry

in the van, it was to break through the boundary between Mlawa and

Thorn, and pushing northward, come into the rear of those German

forces which were facing eastward against the attack aimed at East

Prussia from the northeast. For operations in this section the

Russians had favorable railway connections. Two railways terminating

at Ostrolenka permitted the rapid unloading of large masses of

troops at this point, and the line Warsaw-Mlawa-Soldau led straight

into the territory aimed at by such an invasion. It seemed easily

credible that the Russian commander in chief did, as reported,

give orders that Mlawa should be taken be the cost what it might.

The northern Russian armies based upon the fortresses of Kovno and

Grodno on the Niemen had not fully started on their part of this great,

well-planned undertaking when the German counteroffensive was suddenly

launched with tremendous strength from the Tilsit-Insterburg-Mazurian

Lakes line. The disaster which followed, and which banished all hope

of an advance of the Russians on this wing, has been described on

a preceding page. While the Germans, using to the best advantage

their net of railroads for the swift accumulation of troops, had

gathered large forces on the Mazurian Lakes line, they had at the

same time strengthened the troops standing on the southern boundary

of West and East Prussia. An artillery officer, General von Gallwitz,

was placed in command of this army with orders to protect the right

flank of the German armies attacking in Mazurian Land, and to prevent

the expected Russian attempt at invasion in his own sector of the

front.

While the "winter battle" was raging to the east of him, Von Gallwitz

in the characteristic German fashion of defense by a strong offensive

moved forward up the right bank of the Vistula to Plozk. A cavalry

division and regiments of the Guard at Sierpe and Racionz, February

12-18, 1915, won well-earned laurels for themselves by driving

an enemy of superior strength before them. At Dobrin, according

to German report, they took 2,500 prisoners.

General von Gallwitz's plan, however, was of more ambitious scope.

It was his intention, by encircling the Russians in the territory

before him from both wings, to sweep clear of enemies the entire

stretch of country in the Polish triangle between the Vistula and

the Orczy rivers. The right wing of his troops that had come down

the bank of the Vistula was to swing to the eastward in behind the

Russians. German troops which had arrived at Willenberg inside

of the East Prussian boundary, one of the German concentration

points on the line of railroad lying behind their front, on the

other hand, received orders to descend the valley of the Orczy

and to come in behind the Russian right flank from the east. These

troops, making a wide detour, swept past Przasnysz on the east,

and swinging round to the south of the city attacked the Russians

holding the place from this direction. The Germans had understood

that only small Russian forces were in the city. Anticipating the

German movement, however, a Russian division, as the Germans learned

later, had hastened to Przasnysz. The Russians also had collected

large forces on the Narew, and were hurrying them toward Przasnysz

on roads covering a wide front. Two full Russian corps from this

line were flung upon the German left wing.

The forces of Von Gallwitz which had carried out the encircling

movement from the east and south of Przasnysz now found themselves

caught between two Russian armies. However, they were unwilling to

relinquish the booty which they had planned to seize. A part of the

German forces was disposed in a half circle as a defense against the

Russians coming up from the south, and a division of reserves, February

24, stormed Przasnysz. The German Great Headquarters announced that

the Germans captured 10,000 prisoners, including 57 officers, and

took 36 cannon, 14 machine guns, and much war material of various

sorts. However, the Russian troops were now pressing forward from

the south with irresistible force. The Germans, in consequence,

slowly fell back, fighting under great difficulties, and moving

northward toward their defensive lines, carrying with them their

prisoners and booty.

The Russian General Staff on the first of March, 1915, devoted

an explicit account to the fighting about Przasnysz which differs

but slightly from the narrative by the German Great Headquarters

which has in general been followed in the preceding description.

Both sides apparently considered the operation of special importance,

and as reflecting credit upon their respective troops. The Russian

story emphasizes the attacks made by their force on the line

Lyssakowo-Chainovo simultaneously from north and south, that is,

both in the flank and in the rear of the Germans to the west of

Przasnysz. They represent their troops in the city as having consisted

of only a brigade of infantry and some insignificant cavalry units.

On the 25th of February, when the Germans had established themselves

in the town, the Russians, according to their account, were pressing

their enemies hard upon a long front from Krasnoseltz through

Vengerzinovo, Kolatschkowo to Voliaverlowska.

On the evening of this day they drove the Germans into positions

close to the city. The Thirty-sixth German Reserve Division on the

same evening is said to have met serious disaster after a determined

resistance at the crossings of the Anetz. On the evening of the next

day the Russians began to reenter Przasnysz, but did not completely

occupy the town until the night after the 27th. "The Germans," the

Russian account continues, "hereupon began a disorderly retreat,

endeavoring to withdraw in the direction of Mlawa-Chorgele. Regardless

of the exhaustion consequent upon the marching they had undergone and

four days of battle, our troops energetically took up the pursuit

of the enemy. On the 28th of February they inflicted serious losses

upon his rear guard. In these battles we seized a large amount of

booty. The total number of prisoners amounts to at least 10,000."

The Russians maintain that they had defeated no less than two German

army corps and thrown them back to the border.

On the 12th of March, 1915, the German Great Headquarters protested

against this version of the affair, and pointed to the fact that

within a few days their troops were again threatening Przasnysz,

and that since giving up the city they had captured on the battle

fields between the Vistula and the Orczy no less than 11,460 Russians.

The city of Przasnysz itself suffered heavily in these attacks and

counterattacks. For days and nights it had lain under bombardment

and repeatedly fierce, hand-to-hand combats had been fought in its

streets. Most of the houses of the place were left mere heaps of

smoking ruins.

From the German point of view this offensive just north of the

Vistula which included the temporary capture of Przasnysz was a

success, especially in this, that it had prevented the big Russian

forward movement against the West Prussian boundary which the impending

great Russian offensive had foreboded. It had been impossible for

the Russians seriously to endanger the German flank in this section,

while the Germans had struck to the east in the "winter battle,"

and had definitely spoiled the Russian appetite for invasion from

the Kovno-Grodno line.

As though determined to avenge their defeat to the east of the

lakes, the Russians now continued to direct a series of fierce

attacks in the direction of Mlawa, intending apparently to break

through the German line of defense between Soldau and Neidenburg.

It was said that the Russians believed General von Hindenburg in

person to be in charge of the German forces in this sector. In

consequence the German troops for the most part were forced to

stand upon the defensive. In the beginning of March the Russian

attacks increased steadily in violence. They broke against the

German positions to the east and south of Mlawa, according to German

reports, with enormous losses. At Demsk, to the east of Mlawa, long

rows of white stones mark common graves of masses of Russians who

perished before the German barbed-wire entanglements. The Germans

point to these as dumb witnesses of the disaster that overtook

forty-eight Russian companies that assaulted ten German ones. The

cold weather at this time had made possible the swampy regions in

which the Orczy rises, and had enabled the Russians to approach

close to the German line of defense.

The Russian attack at this point in the night of the 7th of March,

1915, was typical of the fighting on this line in these weeks.

After a thousand shells from the Russian heavy guns had descended

upon and behind Demsk, a seemingly ceaseless series of infantry

attacks set in. They were carried close up to the lines of wire of

the German defense. Enough light, however, was shed by the searchlights

and light balls shot from pistols to enable the Germans to direct

a destructive infantry and machine-gun fire on the approaching

lines. Those of the Russians who did not fall, fled to the next

depression in the ground. There they were held by the beams of the

searchlights until daybreak. Then they surrendered to the German

patrols. Of another attack a few kilometers farther to the north, at

Kapusnik, the Germans reported that after the enemy had penetrated

into their trenches and had been driven out in a desperate bayonet

fight, they buried 906 Russians and 164 Germans.

[Illustration: RUSSIAN RETREAT BEFORE THE TEUTON DRIVE TO WARSAW

TRIUMPHAL ENTRY · WRECKED BRIDGE · GUNS AT GRODNO · BRIDGE OVER

THE DRINA · AMERICAN DOCTORS · SERBIAN DEAD · FORT AT PRZEMYSL

An Austrian telephone station in a bombproof shelter. Efficient

telephone service is a most important detail in conducting a campaign]

[Illustration: The triumphal entry of the Austrian uhlans and artillery

into Przemysl. Their horses are decorated with sprays of leaves]

[Illustration: A bridge on the Kalesch-Warsaw line blown up by

the Russians in their retreat toward Warsaw. At the left is the

pontoon bridge built by the Germans]

[Illustration: German artillerymen at Grodno, Russia, digging out

a carefully concealed Japanese gun, together with other supplies

of Japanese ammunition]

[Illustration: In the foreground is a temporary bridge across the

Drina, while on the west bank there is a long row of gun positions

and of dugout shelters]

[Illustration: These two Americans, Dr. Richard P. Strong (left)

and Dr. Edward Ryan, aided in stamping out the plague of typhus

in Serbia]

[Illustration: Serbians who died from typhus. American doctors and

nurses aided in stamping out this dreaded disease, which followed

the horrors of invasion in Serbia]

[Illustration: The effect of Teuton shells on the forts of Przemysl,

Galicia. This fortress fell to the Russians after a long siege,

but was recaptured by Teuton troops]

On the 8th of March, 1915, General von Gallwitz again tried an

offensive with fresh forces which he had gathered. It was thwarted,

however, on the 12th, to the north of Przasnysz. The Germans estimated

the Russian forces which here were brought up for the counterattack

at some ten army corps and seven cavalry divisions. The Russians in

advancing this time, instead of directing their thrust at Mlawa,

pushed northeastward of Przasnysz along the rivers Orczy and Omulew.

In this sector the Germans counted from the 13th to the 23d of

March forty-six serious assaults, twenty-five in the daytime and

twenty-one at night. With special fury the battles raged in the

neighborhood of Jednorozez. This attempt to break into Prussia

was also unsuccessful, and in the last week of March the Russian

attacks slackened, quiet ensuing for the weeks following Easter.

For six weeks the armies had struggled back and forth in this bloody

angle, fighting in cold and wet, amid snow and icy rains. The Germans

asserted that in these six weeks the troops of General von Gallwitz

had captured 43,000 Russians and slain some 25,000. They estimated

the total losses of the enemy in this sector during the period

at 100,000. Countless graves scattered about the land, and the

ruins of cities and villages were left to keep awake the memory

of some of the fiercest fighting of the war in the east.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XL

FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR--BOMBARDMENT OF OSSOWETZ

The winter battles of the Mazurian Lakes had forced the armies at

the northern end of the Russian right flank back into their great

fortresses Kovno and Grodno, and behind the line of the Niemen

and the Bobr. A great forest region lies to the east and north of

Grodno, and between the Niemen and the cities of Augustowo and

Suwalki which the Germans, after their successful offensive, used

as bases for their operations. A strip of country including these

forests, and running parallel to the Niemen was a sort of no-man's

land in the spring of 1915. Movements of troops in the heavily wooded

country were difficult to observe, and the conditions lent themselves

to surprise attacks. This resulted in a warfare of alternate thrusts

by Russians and Germans aimed now at this point, now at that, in

the disputed territory. Several actions during the spring stand out

beyond the rest in importance, both because of the numbers engaged

and their effects. In what follows will be described a typical

offensive movement in this district undertaken by the Russians,

and the way it was met by the Germans.

A new Russian Tenth Army had been organized by the end of February,

1915, with Grodno for its base. General Sievers, his chief of staff,

and the general in command of the Third Russian Army Corps had

been demoted from their commands, and three new army corps (Two,

Three, and Fifteen) had been brought to Grodno. The ranks of the

remaining corps that had suffered in the "winter battle" had been

filled up with fresh recruits. Hardly had the German pursuit in the

forest of Augustowo come to an end when the freshly strengthened

Russians moved forward from their defensive lines in a counterattack.

The Germans had been engaged in the task of gathering and carting

away their enormous booty which lay scattered about the forest.

They now drew back from in front of the Russian fortified lines

to prepare positions close to Augustowo, and on a line running

roughly north and south from this place, with the forest in front

of them.

The Third Russian Army Corps advanced from Simno toward Lozdsisjo,

their Second Army Corps from Grodno by way of Kopiewo and Sejny

toward Krasnopol and other Russian corps advanced through the forest

of Augustowo. Here they soon struck strong German resistance, and

for several days vainly attacked German fortified positions.

On the 9th of March, 1915, a German offensive began against the

Russian Third Corps which held the right wing of the advancing

army. When this corps suddenly found itself threatened in the flank

from the north and in danger of being surrounded it hastily began

to retreat toward the east and southeast, leaving several hundred

prisoners and several machine guns in the hands of the Germans.

This withdrawal exposed the right flank of the adjoining Second

Army Corps, which by this time, March 9, 1915, had reached Berzniki

and Giby. The German attack was now continued against this corps.

It was cold weather, the thermometer was considerably below the

freezing point, and the roads were slippery with ice, so that dozens

of horses fell, completely exhausted, and the infantry could march

only two or three kilometers an hour.

On March 9 and 10, 1915, the battle flamed up at Sejny and Berzniki,

the Russian corps, which had developed its front toward the west,

being forced to swing about and face the north, whence the Germans

were driving down upon it. At Berzniki two Russian regiments made

up entirely of young troops were, according to the German account,

completely annihilated, and the commanders of the regiments captured.

It seemed as though the leader of the Russian armies saw approaching

a repetition of the encircling movements that had proved fatal

to the Russians in the Mazurian "winter battle," for on the 10th

of March he gave orders for the withdrawal of his entire army.

The German airmen on this day reported the Russian columns on the

march through the forest in full retreat toward Grodno all along

the line from Giby to Sztabiz, far to the south.

On the 11th of March, 1915, the German troops vigorously pushed

the pursuit. They occupied Makarze, Froncki, and Giby. On the same

night a German cavalry division took Kopciovo by assault. At this

place alone they counted 300 dead Russians, and more than 5,000

prisoners, 12 machine guns, and 3 cannon, fell into the hands of

the Germans.

The threatened envelopment of this Russian army was typical of

the method employed by the leaders under Von Hindenburg in local

operations, as it was of German method in general when applied to

operations extending over the entire field of action. It could be

applied with special success where the German information service was

superior to that of the Russians, as it usually was, and the movements

of German troops were facilitated by good railway connections. In

the Augustowo forests, however, rapidity of movement had to be

achieved by the legs of the German soldiers to a large extent,

and on this they prided themselves not a little. The operation just

described was regarded by the German Great Headquarters as being

of great significance, valuable for its moral effect in establishing

in the German troops a sense of superiority, and confidence in

their leadership, and for its infliction of material losses of

considerable moment on the Russians.

The Russians likewise claimed advantages from their forward thrust

from Grodno. As represented by the Russian General Staff the withdrawal

of the Germans from a front close to the line of the fortress in

the first place was not a voluntary one, as it is pictured in the

German account, but was forced by the strong pressure exerted by

the Russian attacks following upon their retreat after the "winter

battle." Thus they report the complete defeat of two German army

corps, resulting in the seizure by the Russians of Height 100.3,

which they described as dominating the entire region of the operations

before Grodno. "In this battle," says the Russian report of March

5, 1915, "we took 1,000 prisoners and six cannon and a machine gun.

Height 100.3 was defended by the Twenty-first Corps, the best of

them all which lost during the battle 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers,

as can be estimated from the dead left behind. After the shattering

of the German counterattack at Height 100.3 the operations of the

enemy became entirely passive. We, on the other hand, took village

after village, and everywhere made prisoners."

The fortress of Ossowetz on the Bobr River proved inconquerable by

the 42-centimeter mortars which had worked such terrific effects

on the forts of Belgium and France. It was continually under German

artillery fire through the months of February and March, 1915,

without suffering appreciable damage. The great mortars were brought

up within range of the fortress with much difficulty, owing to the

fact that the place is almost completely surrounded by swamps.

The Germans apparently had counted seriously at first on making a

breach in the Russian defensive lines at this place. After persistent

attempts to make an impression on the fortress with their heaviest

guns they were obliged, however, to content themselves with keeping

the garrison in check so as to forestall offensive moves.

A German artillery officer who took part in the bombardment relates

that the chief obstacle to the pressing home of an attack were

several heavily armored batteries which lay concealed outside the

visible works of the fortress itself in the broad strip of swampland

surrounding it. These were built deep into the ground, protected by

thick earthworks, and very effectively screened from observation.

They were a constant menace and apparently could not be destroyed by

the German fire. Even though the main fort itself had been destroyed

they would have prevented the approach of the enemy's troops, for

they commanded the only causeway leading through the swamps to the

fortress and would have blown to pieces any infantry that ventured

to push along this road.

Furthermore, even the intense cold did not make the swamp passable

except by the roadway because warm springs here and there prevented

the ice from freezing sufficiently strong to bear the troops. The

German gunners noted too that their shots fell practically without

effect, plunging quietly into the mud to a great depth so that

they did not even throw up earth or mud.

The result was that the 42-centimeter monsters were hastily withdrawn

after a few trial shots and the bombardment was continued with a

battery of 28-centimeter coast defense guns, an Austrian motor

battery, a 30.5-centimeter mortar and some other heavy batteries.

The fire rose to considerable intensity in the last days of February

and the first days of March.