she overtook the steamer _Northland_, a 2,000-ton ship, and torpedoed
her off Beachy Head. The crew of the steamer were able to escape,
although their ship went down only ten minutes after the submarine
caught up with it.
The use of nets to catch submarines was vindicated, when on the 6th
of April, 1915, one of these vessels became entangled in a steel
net near Dover and was held fast. The loss of the _U-29_, which
was commanded by the famous Otto von Weddigen, who commanded the
_U-9_ when she sank the _Hogue, Cressy_, and _Aboukir_ in September,
1914, was confirmed by a report issued by the German admiralty on
April 7, 1915, after rumors of her loss had circulated throughout
England and France for a number of weeks.
In order to encourage resistance on the part of crews of British
vessels attacked by German submarines, the British Government rewarded
the crew of the steamship _Vosges_. It was announced on April 9,
1915, that the captain had been given a commission as a lieutenant
in the Royal Naval Reserve and the Distinguished Service Cross;
the remaining officers were given gold watches, and the crew were
given $15 per man.
Rumors had reached the outside world that the German submarines
were using hidden spots to store fuel and provisions so that they
might go about their raiding without having to return to German
ports for reprovisioning. Neutral nations, such as the Netherlands
and Norway, found it necessary, to maintain their neutrality, to
keep watch for such action. On the 9th of April, 1915, Norwegian
airmen reported to their Government that such a cache had been
discovered by them behind the cliffs in Bergen Bay. Submarines
found there were ordered to intern or to leave immediately, and
chose to do the latter.
Certain acts of the commanders of German submarines seemed to make it
evident that their intention was to sink ships of every description,
no matter where found, in order to make the "war zone" a reality,
and to make it shunned by neutral as well as belligerent ships.
Thus the Dutch steamship _Katwyk_, which lay at anchor seven miles
west of the North Hinder Lightship off the Dutch coast, was sunk.
This lightship was maintained by the Netherlands Government and
stood at the mouth of the River Scheldt, forty-five miles northwest
of Flushing. The _Katwyk_ was stationary there on the night of
April 14, 1915, when the crew felt a great shock and saw that their
ship was rapidly taking water. They managed to reach the lightship
in their lifeboats just as their vessel sank. The same submarine
sank the British steamer _Ptarmigan_ only a few hours later.
Among victims flying the flags of neutral nations the next ship
was of American register. This was the tank steamship _Gulflight_,
which was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands on the 29th of May,
1915. The hole made in her hull was not large enough to cause her
to sink, and she was able to get to port. But during the excitement
of the attack her captain died of heart failure and two of her
crew jumped into the sea and were drowned. Three days later the
French steamship _Europe_ and the British ship _Fulgent_ were sent
to the bottom, probably by the same submarine.
The month of May, 1915, had opened with greater activity on the part
of German submarines than had been shown for many weeks previous.
Between the 1st and the 3d of that month seven ships were torpedoed,
four of them being British, one Swedish, and two Norwegian. By
the 5th of May, 1915, ten British trawlers had been sunk; some of
these were armed for attack on either German submarines or torpedo
boats.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXII
SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA"
On the 7th of May, 1915, came the most sensational act committed
by German submarines since the war had started--the sinking of
the Cunard liner _Lusitania_. The vessel which did this was one
of the _U-39_ class. In her last hours above water the giant liner
was nearing Queenstown on a sunny day in a calm sea. When about
five miles off shore, near Old Head of Kinsale, on the southeastern
coast of Ireland, a few minutes after two o'clock, while many of
the passengers were at lunch and a few of them on deck, there came
a violent shock.
Five or six persons who had been on deck had noticed, a few moments
before, the wake of something that was moving rapidly toward the
ship. The moving object was a torpedo, which struck the hull to
the forward on the starboard side and passed clean through the
ship's engine room. She began to settle by the bows immediately,
and the passengers, though cool, made rushes for lifebelts and
for the small boats. The list of the boat made the launching of
some of these impossible.
The scenes on the decks of the sinking liner were heartrending. Members
of families had become separated and ran wildly about seeking their
relatives. The women and children were put into the lifeboats--being
given preference.
"I was on the deck about two o'clock," narrated one of the survivors,
"the weather was fine and bright and the sea calm. Suddenly I heard
a terrific explosion, followed by another, and the cry went up
that the ship had been torpedoed. She began to list at once, and
her angle was so great that many of the boats on the port side
could not be launched. A lot of people made a rush for the boats,
but I went down to my cabin, took off my coat and vest and donned
a lifebelt. On getting up again I found the decks awash and the
boat going down fast by the head. I slipped down a rope into the
sea and was picked up by one of the lifeboats. Some of the boats,
owing to the position of the vessel, got swamped, and I saw one
turn over no less than three times, but eventually it was righted."
Not all of the women and children got off the liner into the small
boats. "Women and children, under the protection of men, had clustered
in lines on the port side of the ship," reported another survivor.
"As the ship made her plunge down by the head, she finally took
an angle of ninety degrees, and I saw this little army slide down
toward the starboard side, dashing themselves against each other
as they went, until they were engulfed."
Even under the stress of avoiding death the sight of the sinking
hull was one that held the attention of those in the water. One
of the sailors said afterward: "Her great hull rose into the air
and neared the perpendicular. As the form of the vessel rose she
seemed to shorten, and just as a duck dives so she disappeared. She
went almost noiselessly. Fortunately her propellers had stopped,
for had these been going, the vortex of her four screws would have
dragged down many of those whose lives were saved. She seemed to
divide the water as smoothly as a knife would do it."
Twenty minutes after the torpedo had struck the ship she had disappeared
beneath the surface of the sea. "Above the spot where she had gone
down," said one of the men who escaped death, "there was nothing
but a nondescript mass of floating wreckage. Everywhere one looked
there was a sea of waving hands and arms, belonging to the struggling
men and frantic women and children in agonizing efforts to keep
afloat. That was the most horrible memory and sight of all."
Fishing boats and coasting steamers picked up many of the survivors
some hours after the disaster. The frightened people in the small
boats pulled for the shore after picking up as many persons as
they dared without swamping their boats. Some floated about in
the waters for three and four hours, kept up by their lifebelts.
Some, who were good swimmers, managed to keep above water till
help came; others became exhausted and sank.
Probably the best story, covering the entire period from the time
the ship was hit till the survivors were landed at Queenstown, was
told by Dr. Daniel V. Moore, an American physician: "After the
explosion," said Dr. Moore, "quiet and order were soon accomplished
by assurances from the stewards. I proceeded to the deck promenade
for observation, and saw only that the ship was fast leaning to
the starboard. I hurried toward my cabin below for a lifebelt,
and turned back because of the difficulty in keeping upright. I
struggled to D deck and forward to the first-class cabin, where
I saw a Catholic priest.
"I could find no belts, and returned again toward E deck and saw
a stewardess struggling to dislodge a belt. I helped her with hers
and secured one for myself. I then rushed to D deck and noticed
one woman perched on the gunwale, watching a lowering lifeboat
ten feet away. I pushed her down and into the boat, then I jumped
in. The stern of the lifeboat continued to lower, but the bow stuck
fast. A stoker cut the bow ropes with a hatchet, and we dropped
in a vertical position.
"A girl whom we had heard sing at a concert was struggling, and
I caught her by the ankle and pulled her in. A man I grasped by
the shoulders and I landed him safe. He was the barber of the
first-class cabin, and a more manly man I never met.
"We pushed away hard to avoid the suck, but our boat was fast filling,
and we bailed fast with one bucket and the women's hats. The man
with the bucket became exhausted, and I relieved him. In a few
minutes she was filled level full. Then a keg floated up, and I
pitched it about ten feet away and followed it. After reaching
the keg I turned to see what had been the fate of our boat. She
had capsized. Now a young steward, Freeman, approached me, clinging
to a deck chair. I urged him to grab the other side of the keg
several times. He grew faint, but harsh speaking roused him. Once
he said: 'I am going to go.' But I ridiculed this, and it gave
him strength.
"The good boat _Brock_ and her splendid officers and men took us
aboard.
"At the scene of the catastrophe the surface of the water seemed
dotted with bodies. Only a few of the lifeboats seemed to be doing
any good. The cries of 'My God!' 'Save us!' and 'Help!' gradually
grew weaker from all sides, and finally a low weeping, wailing,
inarticulate sound, mingled with coughing and gargling, made me
heartsick. I saw many men die. Some appeared to be sleepy and worn
out just before they went down."
Officials of the Cunard Line claimed afterward that three submarines
had been engaged in the attack on the liner, but, after all evidence
had been sifted, the claim made by the Germans that only one had
been present was found to be true. The commander of the submarine
had evidently been well informed as to just what route the liner
would take. Trouble with her engines, which developed after she
had left New York, had brought her speed down to 18 knots, a
circumstance which was in favor of the attacking vessel, for it
could not have done much damage with a torpedo had she been going
at her highest speed; it would have given her a chance to cross
the path of the torpedo as it approached. No sign of the submarine
was noticed by the lookout or by any of the passengers on the
_Lusitania_ until it was too late to maneuver her to a position
of safety. A few moments before the white wake of the approaching
torpedo was espied, the periscope had been seen as it came to the
surface of the water. From that moment onward the liner was doomed.
The German admiralty report of the actual sinking of the ship,
which was issued on the 14th of May, 1915, was brief. It read:
"A submarine sighted the steamship _Lusitania_, which showed no
flag, May 7, 2.20 Central European time, afternoon, on the southeast
coast of Ireland, in fine, clear weather.
"At 3.10 o'clock one torpedo was fired at the _Lusitania_, which
hit her starboard side below the captain's bridge. The detonation
of the torpedo was followed immediately by a further explosion
of extremely strong effect. The ship quickly listed to starboard
and began to sink.
"The second explosion must be traced back to the ignition of quantities
of ammunition inside the ship."
One of the effects of the sinking of the _Lusitania_ was to cut
down the number of passengers sailing to and from America to Europe
on ships flying flags of belligerent nations. Attacks by submarines
on neutral ships did not abate, however, for on the 15th of May,
1915, the Danish steamer _Martha_ was torpedoed in broad daylight
and in view of crowds ashore off the coast of Aberdeen Bay.
The sinking of ships in the "war zone" continued in spite of rumors
that the German admiralty was expected to discontinue operations
of the submarines against merchantmen on account of the unfriendly
feeling aroused in neutral nations, particularly the United States.
On the 19th of May, 1915, came the news that the British steamship
_Dumcree_ had been torpedoed off a point in the English Channel. A
torpedo fired into her hull failed to sink her immediately, and a
Norwegian ship came to her aid, passing her a cable and attempting
to tow her to port. But the submarine returned, and fearing attack,
the Norwegian ship made off. A second torpedo fired at the _Dumcree_
had better effect than the first one, and she began to settle.
When the submarine left the scene the Norwegian steamship again
returned to the _Dumcree_ and managed to take off all of her crew
and passengers. Three trawlers, one of them French, were sunk in
the same neighborhood during the next forty-eight hours.
As soon as Italy entered the war an attempt was made by the Teutonic
Powers to establish the same sort of submarine blockade in the
Adriatic which obtained in the waters around Great Britain. This
was evinced when the captain of the Italian steamship _Marsala_
reported on May 21, 1915, that his ship had been stopped by an
Austrian submarine, but the latter not wishing to disclose its
location to the Italian navy, allowed his ship to proceed unharmed.
The suspicion that the German admiralty maintained bases for their
submarines right on the coasts of Great Britain where the submersible
craft could obtain oil for driving their engines, as well as supplies
of compressed air and of food for the crew, was confirmed on the
14th of May, 1915, when it was reported that agents of the British
admiralty had discovered caches of the kind at various points in
the Orkney Islands, in the Bay of Biscay, and on the north and
west coasts of Ireland.
In order to damage shipping in the "war zone" by having ships go
wrong through having no guiding lights an attack was made by a
German submarine on the lighthouse at Fastnet, on the southern
coast of Ireland, on the night of May 25, 1915. Shortly after nine
in the evening the submarine was sighted in the waters near the
lighthouse by persons on shore. She was about ten miles from Fastnet,
near Barley Cove. When she came near enough to the lighthouse to
use her deck guns, men on shore opened fire on her with rifles,
and she submerged, not to reappear in that neighborhood again.
But this same submarine managed to do other damage. The American
steamship _Nebraskan_ was in the neighborhood on its way to New
York. The sea was calm and the ship was traveling at 12 knots, when
some time near nine o'clock in the evening a shock was felt aboard.
A second later there came a terrific explosion, and a subsequent
investigation showed that a large hole, 20 feet square, had been
torn in her starboard bow, not far from the water line. When she
began to settle the captain ordered all hands into the small boats.
They stayed near the damaged ship for an hour and saw that she was
not going to sink. When they got aboard again they found that a
bulkhead was keeping out the water sufficiently to allow her to
proceed under her own steam. In crippled condition she made for
port, being convoyed later by two British warships which answered
her calls for help.
In spite of the sharp diplomatic representations which were at
the time passing back and forth between Germany and the United
States over the matter of the German submarine warfare, the craft
kept up as active a campaign against merchant ships as they did
before the issues became pointed. On May 28, 1915, there came the
news that three more ships had been sent to the bottom. The
_Spennymoor_, a new ship, was chased and torpedoed off Start Point,
near the Orkney Islands. Some of her crew were drowned when the
lifeboat in which they were getting away capsized, carrying them
down. On the same day the large liner _Argyllshire_ was chased
and fired upon by the deck guns of a hostile submarine, but she
managed to get away. Not so fortunate, however, was the steamship
_Cadesby_. While off the Scilly Islands on the afternoon of May
28, 1915, a German submarine hailed her, firing a shot from a deck
gun across her bows as a signal to halt. Time was given for the
crew and passengers to get into small boats, and when these were
at a distance from the ship the deck guns of the submarine were
again brought into action, and after firing thirty shots into her
hull they sank her. The third victim was the Swedish ship _Roosvall_.
She was stopped and boarded off Malmoe by the crew of a German
submarine. After examining her papers they permitted her to proceed,
but later sent a torpedo into her, sinking her.
A new raider, the _U-24_, made its appearance in the English Channel
during the last week in May, 1915. On the twenty-eighth of the
month this submarine sank the liner _Ethiope_. The captain of the
steamship attempted some clever maneuvering, which did not accomplish
its object. He paid no attention to a shot from the deck guns of
the submarine which passed across his bow. The hostile craft then
began to circle around the liner, while the rudder of the latter
was put at a wide angle in an effort to keep either stern or bow
of the ship toward the submarine, thus making a poor target for a
torpedo. But the commander of the submarine saw through the movement
and ordered fire with his deck guns. After shells had taken away
the ship's bridge and had punctured her hull near the stern the
crew and passengers were ordered into the small boats. They had
hardly gotten twenty feet from their ship when she was rent by
a violent explosion and went down.
The transatlantic liner _Megantic_ had better luck, for she managed
to escape a pursuing submarine on May 29, 1915, as she was nearing
Queenstown, Ireland, homeward bound. A notable change in the methods
adopted by the commanders of submarines as a result of orders issued
by the German admiralty in answer to the protests throughout the
press of the neutral nations after the sinking of the _Lusitania_
was the giving of warning to intended victims. By the end of May,
1915, in almost every instance where a German submarine stopped
and sank a merchantman the crew was given time to get off their
ship and the submarine did not hesitate to show itself. In fact,
warning to stop was generally given when the submarine's deck was
above water and the gun mounted there had the victim "covered."
This was done in the case of the British steamship _Tullochmoor_,
which was torpedoed off Ushant near the most westerly islands of
Brittany, France.
On the 1st of June, 1915, there came the news of the sinking of
the British ship _Dixiana_, near Ushant, by a German submarine
which approached by aid of a clever disguise. The crew managed to
get off the ship in time; when they landed on shore they reported
that the submarine had been seen and on account of sails which she
carried was thought to be an innocent fishing boat. The disguise
was penetrated too late for the _Dixiana_ to make its escape.
The clear and calm weather which came with June, 1915, made greater
activity on the part of German submarines possible. On the 4th
of June, 1915, it was reported by the British admiralty that six
more ships had been made victims, three of them being those of
neutral countries. In the next twenty-four hours the number was
increased by eleven, and eight more were added by the 9th of June,
1915.
On that date Mr. Balfour, Secretary of the British admiralty, announced
that a German submarine had been sunk, though he did not state what
had been the scene of the action. At the same time he announced
that Great Britain would henceforth treat the captured crew of
submarines in the same manner as were treated other war prisoners,
and that the policy of separating these men from the others and
of giving them harsher treatment would be abandoned.
On the 20th of June, 1915, the day's reports of losses due to the
operations of German submarines, issued by the British Government,
contained the news of the sinking of the two British torpedo boats,
the _No. 10_ and the _No. 20_. No details were made public concerning
just how they went down.
On the same day the Italian admiralty announced that a cache maintained
to supply submarines belonging to the Teutonic Powers and operating
in the Mediterranean, had been discovered on a lonely part of the
coast near Kalimno, an island off the southwest coast of Asia Minor.
Ninety-six barrels of benzine and fifteen hundred barrels of other
fuel were found and destroyed. It was believed that this supply had
been shipped as kerosene from Saloniki to Piraeus. How submarines
belonging to Germany had reached the southern theatre of naval warfare
had been a matter of speculation for the outside world. But on the
6th of June, 1915, Captain Otto Hersing made public the manner in
which he took the _U-51_ on a 3,000 mile trip from Wilhelmshaven on
the North Sea to Constantinople. He was the commander who managed
to torpedo the British battleships _Triumph_ and _Majestic_.
He received his orders to sail on the 25th of April, 1915, and
immediately began to stock his ship with extra amounts of fuel
and provisions, allowing only his first officer and chief engineer
to know the destination of their craft. He traveled on the surface
of the water as soon as he had passed the guard of British warships
near the German coast; traveling "light" allowed him to make six
or seven knots more in speed. As he passed through the "war zone"
he kept watch for merchantmen which might be made victims of his
torpedo tubes. His craft was sighted by a British destroyer, however,
off the English coast and he had to submerge to escape the fire
of the destroyer's guns. He then proceeded cautiously down the
coast of France, encountering no hostile ships. When within one
hundred miles of Gibraltar he was again discovered by British
destroyers, but again managed to escape by submerging his craft.
Passage through the Strait of Gibraltar was made in the early morning
hours, while a mist hung near the surface of the water and permitted
no one at the fort to see the wake of the _U-51's_ periscope. Once
inside the Mediterranean he headed for the south of Greece, escaping
attack from a French destroyer and proceeding through the Ægean
Sea to the Dardanelles. The journey ended on the 25th of May, just
one month after leaving Wilhelmshaven.
The British ships _Triumph_ and _Majestic_ were sighted early in
the morning, but attack upon them was difficult on account of the
destroyers which circled about them; one of the destroyers passed
right over the _U-51_ while she was submerged. Captain Hersing
brought her to the surface soon afterward and let go the torpedo
which sank the _Triumph_. For the next two days the submarine lay
submerged, but came up on the following day and found itself right
in the midst of the allied fleet. This time the _Majestic_ was taken
as the target for a torpedo and she went down. Again submerging his
vessel Captain Hersing kept it down for another day, and when he
again came to the surface he saw that the fleets had moved away.
He then returned to Constantinople.
On the 23d of June, 1915, the British cruiser _Roxborough_, an
older ship, was hit by a torpedo fired by a German submarine in
the North Sea, but the damage inflicted was not enough to prevent
her from making port under her own steam.
The deaths of a number of Americans occurred on the 28th of June,
1915, when the Leyland liner _Armenian_, carrying horses for the
allied armies, was torpedoed by the _U-38_, twenty miles west
by north of Trevose Head in Cornwall. According to the story of
the captain of the vessel, the submarine fired two shots to signal
him to stop. When he put on all speed in an attempt to get away
from the raider her guns opened on his ship with shrapnel, badly
riddling it. She had caught fire and was burning in three places
before he signaled that he would surrender. Thirteen men had meanwhile
been killed by the shrapnel. Some of the lifeboats had also been
riddled by the firing from the submarine's deck guns, making it
more difficult for the crew to leave the ship. The German commander
gave him ample time to get his boats off.
To offset the advantage which the Germans had with their submarines
the British admiralty commissioned ten such craft during the week
of June 28, 1915. These vessels were of American build and design
and were assembled in Canada. During the week mentioned they were
manned by men sent for the purpose from England. Each was manned by
four officers and eighteen men, to take them across the Atlantic.
Never before in history had so many submarines undertaken a voyage as
great. They got under way from Quebec on July 2, 1915, and proceeded
in column two abreast, a big auxiliary cruiser, which acted as
their escort steaming in the center.
The next large liner which had an encounter with the German submarine
_U-39_ was the _Anglo-Californian_. She came into Queenstown on
the morning of July 5, 1915, with nine dead sailors lying on the
deck, nine wounded men in their bunks, and holes in her sides made
by shot and shell. She had withstood attack from a German submarine
for four hours. Her escape from destruction was accomplished through
only the spirit of the captain and his crew, combined with the
fact that patrol vessels came to her aid forcing the submarine to
submerge.
A variety in the methods used by the commanders of German submarines
was revealed in the stopping of the Norwegian ship _Vega_ which
was stopped on the 15th of July, while voyaging from Bergen to
Newcastle. The submarine came alongside the steamship at night
and the commander of the submarine supervised the jettisoning of
her cargo of 200 tons of salmon, 800 cases of butter, and 4,000
cases of sardines, which was done at his command under threat of
sinking his victim.
The week of July 15, 1915, was unique in that not one British vessel
was made the victim of a German submarine during that period, though
two Russian vessels had been sunk. Figures compiled by the British
admiralty and issued on the 22d of July, 1915, gave out the following
information concerning the attacks on merchantmen by German submarines
since the German admiralty's proclamation of a "war zone" around
Great Britain went into effect on the 18th of February, 1915.
The official figures were as follows:
Week ending Vessels lost Lives lost
Feb. 25, 1915 11 9
March 4, " 1 None
March 11, " 7 38
March 18, " 6 13
March 25, " 7 2
April 1, " 13 165
April 8, " 8 13
April 15, " 4 None
April 22, " 3 10
April 29, " 3 None
May 6, " 24 5
May 13, " 2 1,260
May 20, " 7 13
May 27, " 7 7
June 3, " 36 21
Week ending Vessels lost Lives lost
June 10, 1915 36 21
June 17, " 19 19
June 24, " 3 1
July 1, " 9 29
July 8, " 15 2
July 15, " 12 13
July 22, " 2 None
---- ------
235 1,641
The first year of the Great War came to an end with the German
submarines as active in the "war zone" as they had been during
any part of it. On the 28th of July, 1915, the anniversary of the
commencement of the war, there was reported the sinking of nine
vessels. These were the Swedish steamer _Emma_, the three Danish
schooners _Maria, Neptunis_, and _Lena_, the British steamer _Mangara_,
the trawlers _Iceni_ and _Salacia_, the _Westward Ho_, and the
Swedish bark _Sagnadalen_. No lives were lost with any of these
vessels.
The first year of the war closed with a cloud gathered over the heads
of the members of the German admiralty raised by the irritation the
submarine attacks in the "war zone" had caused. Germany's enemies
protested against the illegality of these attacks; neutral nations
protested because they held that their rights had been overridden.
But the German press showed the feeling of the German public on
the matter--at the end of July, 1915, it was as anxious as ever
to have the attacks continued. Conflicting claims were issued in
Germany and England. In the former country it was claimed that
the attacks had seriously damaged commerce; in the latter it was
claimed that the damage was of little account.
PART III--THE EASTERN FRONT--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXIII
THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN--REVIEW OF THE SITUATION
In the beginning of 1915 comparative calm reigned over the
Austro-Russian theatre of war, so far as actual hostilities were
concerned. But it was not altogether the variable climatic conditions
of alternate frost and thaw--the latter converting road and valley
into impassable quagmires--that caused the lull. It was a short
winter pause during which the opposing forces--on one side at
least--were preparing and gathering the requisite momentum for the
coming storm.
During January, 1915, the Russian armies were in a decidedly favorable
position. In their own invaded territory of Poland, as we have seen,
they held an advanced position in front of the Vistula, which
circumstance enabled them to utilize that river as a line of
communication, while barring the way to Warsaw against Von Hindenburg.
Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, which they had captured in September,
1914, was still in their hands. Sixty miles away to the west there
lay the great fortress of Przemysl, invested by the Russians under
General Selivanoff, and completely cut off from the outer world since
November 12, 1914. At least 150,000 troops and enormous quantities
of stores and munitions were locked up in the town and outlying
forts, together with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, mostly
Polish. In addition to these material advantages, the Russians
held all the Carpathian passes leading from Galicia into the vast
plains of Hungary, and a strong advanced position on the Dunajec
in the west, which, besides threatening Cracow, the capital of
Austrian Poland, served also as a screen to the mountain operations.
Finally, to the far east of the range, they had occupied nearly
the whole of the Bukowina right up to the Rumanian frontier.
Such, briefly, was the situation on the Austro-Russian front when
the second winter campaign opened. For Austria the situation was
extremely critical. Her armies, broken and scattered after a series
of disastrous reverses, could scarcely hope by their own efforts to
stem the threatened invasion of Hungary. General Brussilov, however,
made no serious attempt to pour his troops through the passes into
the plain below; although what was probably a reconnaissance emerged
from the Uzsok Pass and penetrated as far as Munkacs, some thirty
miles south, while on several occasions small bands of Cossacks
descended from the Dukla and Delatyn (Jablonitza) passes to raid
Hungarian villages. General Brussilov evidently regarded it inadvisable
to risk an invasion of the plain, especially as he did not hold
control of the southern exits from the passes, beyond which he
would be exposed to attack from all sides and liable to encounter
superior forces. The main Austrian anxiety for the moment was the
precarious position of Przemysl, to relieve which it was first
essential to dislodge Brussilov or to pierce his line. Again, in
the hour of her extremity, Austria's powerful ally came to the
rescue.
[Illustration: THE CARPATHIAN PASSES AND RUSSIAN BATTLE LINE]
Under the command of the Archduke Eugene the Austrian troops--all
that were available--were formed into three separate armies. For
convenience sake we will designate them A, B, and C. Army A, under
General Boehm-Ermolli, was ordered to the section from the Dukla
Pass to the Uzsog. It was charged with the task of cutting a way
through to relieve Przemysl. Army B, under the German General van
Linsingen, who also had some German troops with him, was to assail
the next section eastward, from the Uzsog to the Wyszkow Pass; and
Army C, under the Austrian General von Pflanzer-Baltin, likewise
supplied with a good "stiffening" of German soldiers, was accredited
to the far-eastern section--the Pruth Valley and the Bukowina.
These three armies represented the fighting machine with which
Austria hoped to retrieve the misfortunes of war and recover at
the same time her military prestige and her invaded territories.
We have no reliable information to enable us to estimate the exact
strength of these armies, but there is every reason to believe that
it was considerable, having regard to the urgency of the situation
and the bitter experience of the recent past. Hence the figure of
400,000 men is probably approximately correct. Somewhere about
January 23, 1914, after a period of thaw and mud the weather settled
down to snow and hard frost. Then the machine began to move. A
snow-clad mountain rampart lay spread before; over 200 miles of
its length embraced the area of the projected operations. Here
we may leave this army for a while in order to review some of the
political and strategic considerations underlying the campaign,
which is the scope of this chapter.
The Russian occupation of the Bukowina, which was undertaken and
accomplished by a force far too small to oppose any serious resistance,
appears to have been carried out with the definite political object
of favorably impressing Rumania, and to guide her into the arms
of the Allies. From her geographical position Rumania commands
nearly the whole western frontier of the Dual Monarchy. Her fertile
soil supplied the Central Powers with grain, dairy produce, and
oil. Furthermore, Rumania's foreign policy leaned to the side of
Italy, and the general European impression was, after the death
of King Carol, October 10, 1914, that if one of the two countries
entered the war, the other would follow suit. As subsequent events
have shown, however, that expectation was not realized. Rumania, too,
had aspirations in the direction of recovering lost territories, but
her grievance in this respect was equally divided between Russia
and Austria, for, while the one had despoiled her of Bessarabia, the
other had annexed Transylvania (Siebenbürgen). Hence the Russian
tentative conquest and occupation of the Bukowina paved the way for
Rumania, should she decide on intervention. The road was clear for
her to step in and occupy the Bukowina (which Russia was prepared
to hand over), and probably Transylvania as well, which latter
the proximity of a Russian force might--at the time--have enabled
her to do. But the bait failed, no doubt for weighty reasons. Even
if Rumania had favored the Triple Entente, which there is strong
ground to presume she would, by entering the war, have found herself
in as perilous a position as Serbia, with her Black Sea littoral
exposed to hostile Turkey and her whole southern boundary flanked by
a neighbor--Bulgaria--whose intentions were as yet unknown. However,
on January 27, 1915, the Bank of England arranged a $25,000,000 loan
to Rumania--an event which further heightened the probability of
her entry into the arena.
We may safely take it for granted that these considerations were
not overlooked by the German staff, in addition to the patent fact
that the Russians were persistently gaining ground against the
Austrians. German officers and men were therefore rushed from the
eastern and western fronts to the south of the Carpathians to form
the three armies we have labeled A, B, and C. The points of attack
for which they were intended have already been stated; but the
roundabout manner in which they traveled to their respective sections
is both interesting and worthy of notice. At this stage a new spirit
seemed to dominate Austro-Hungarian military affairs; we suddenly
encounter greater precision, sounder strategy, and deeper plans: a
master mind appears to have taken matters in hand. It is the cool,
calculating, mathematical composite brain of the German General
Staff. As the formation and dispatching of three great armies can
hardly be kept a secret, especially where hawk-eyed spies abound,
a really astute piece of stage management was resorted to. Wild
rumors were set afloat to the effect that the Austrian Government had
decided to undertake a great offensive--for the third time--against
Serbia, and erase her from the map, with the assistance of four
German army corps. The concentration one for operations against
either Serbia or the Russian front in the Carpathians was naturally
in the central plains of Hungary. But to cover the real object
of Austro-German concentration active demonstrations were made
on the Serb border in the form of bombardments of Belgrade, and
occupation of Danube islands. These demonstrations made plausible
the Teutonic assertion that the concentration of troops was being
carried out with a view to an invasion of Serbia. So successful
was the ruse, and so well had the secret been kept that on February
1, 1914, a Petrograd "official" gravely announced to an eagerly
listening world: "The statement is confirmed that the new Austro-German
southern army, intended for the third invasion of Serbia, consists
of six Austrian and two German corps or 400,000 men, under the
command of the Archduke Eugene(!)" At the very time this appeared
the new Austro-German "southern" army had been already, for quite a
week, making its presence severely felt in the eastern and central
sections of the Carpathians, and still the Russian authorities
had not recognized the identity of the forces operating there.
A brief description of the battle ground will enable the reader
to follow more easily the course of the struggle. Imagine that
length of the Carpathian chain which forms the boundary between
Galicia and Hungary as a huge, elongated arch of, roughly, 300
miles. (The whole of the range stretches as a continuous rampart
for a distance of 900 miles, completely shutting in Hungary from
the northwest to the east and south, separating it from Moravia
[Mähren], Galicia, the Bukowina, and Rumania.) Through the curve
of this arch run a number of passes. Beginning as far west as is
here necessary, the names of the chief passes eastward leading from
Hungary are: into Galicia--Beskid, Tarnow, Tilicz, Dukla, Lupkow,
Rostoki, Uzsok, Vereczke (or Tucholka), Beskid[*] (or Volocz),
Wyszkow, Jablonitza (or Delatyn); into the Bukowina--Strol, Kirlibaba,
Rodna; into Rumania--Borgo. In parts the range is 100 miles in
width, and from under 2,000 to 8,000 feet high. The western and
central Carpathians are much more accessible than the eastern,
and therefore comprise the main and easiest routes across. The
Hun and Tartar invasions flooded Europe centuries ago by this way,
and the Delatyn is still called the "Magyar route." The passes vary
in height from under a thousand to over four thousand feet. The
Dukla and Uzsok passes were to be the main objective, as through
them lay the straightest roads to Lemberg and Przemysl. The former
is crossed by railway from Tokay to Przemysl, and the latter by rail
and road from Ungvar to Sambor. A railroad also runs through the
Vereczke from Munkacs to Lemberg, and another through Delatyn from
Debreczen to Kolomea. So far as concerned means of communication,
matters were nearly equal, but geographical advantage lay with the
Russians, as the way from Galicia to Hungary is by far an easier
one than vice versa.
[Footnote *: There are two passes named Beskid.]
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXIV
BATTLE OF THE PASSES
Before proceeding with the opening of the second winter campaign
in the Carpathians, the reader should remember that, as stated
in the beginning of this narrative, a Russian army under General
Radko Dmitrieff (a Bulgarian), held an advanced position on the
Dunajec-Biala line, extending from the Vistula to Zmigrod, northwest
of Dukla. This force was consequently beyond the zone of the
Austro-German offensive, but, as events proved, it had not been
overlooked, for it was here that the heaviest blow was finally
to fall. It is also important to bear in mind that the Russian
armies occupying Galicia and the northern slopes of the Carpathians
were not conducting an isolated campaign on their own account;
they formed an integral part of the far-flung battle line that
reached from the shores of the Baltic down to the Rumanian frontier,
a distance of nearly 800 miles. Dmitrieff's force represented a
medial link of the chain--and the weakest.
Over the slushy roads of the valleys and into the snow-laden passes
the Germanic armies advanced, each of the widely deployed columns
with a definite objective: From Dukla, Lupkow, and Rostoki to relieve
Przemysl; from Uzsok through the valley of the Upper San to Sambor;
through Beskid and Vereczke northward to Stryj, thence westward
also to Sambor; over Wyszkow to Dolina; via Jablonitza to Delatyn;
and across Kirlibaba and Dorna Vatra into the Bukowina. Opposed to
them were the Russian Generals Brussilov, Ivanoff, and Alexieff,
respectively.
Correspondents with the Teutonic troops in these weeks wrote in
wonderment of the scenes of the slowly forward toiling advance
into the mountains which they had seen. On every road leading into
Galicia there was the same picture of a flood rolling steadily on.
Everywhere could be seen the German and Austro-Hungarian troops
on the move, men going into the firing line to fight for days,
day after day, with the shedding of much blood, among the peaks
and valleys, under changing skies.
Here is a word picture of the supply columns winding upward into
the Carpathians to the support of the Teutonic troops furnished
by a German correspondent:
"Truly fantastic is the appearance of one of these modern supply
caravans, stretching in zigzag, with numerous sharp corners and turns,
upward to the heights of the passes and down on the opposite side.
Here we see in stages, one above the other and moving in opposite
directions, the queerest mixture of men, vehicles, machines and animals,
all subordinated to a common military purpose and organization by
military leadership, moving continually and regularly along. The
drivers have been drummed up from all parts of the monarchy, Serbs,
Ruthenians, Poles, Croats, Rumanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Austrians,
and turbaned Mohammedans from Bosnia. Everyone is shouting to his
animals and cursing in his own language. The whole mix-up is a
traveling exhibition of most variegated characteristic costumes,
for the most part, of course, extremely the worse for wear. Common
to all these are the little wagons adapted to mountain travel,
elastic and tough, which carry only half loads and are drawn by
little ponylike, ambitious horses. In between are great German
draft horses, stamping along with their broad high-wheeled baggage
and ammunition wagons, as though they belonged to a nation of giants.
"Gravely, with a kind of sullen dignity, slow-stepping steers drag
at their yokes heavily laden sledges. They are a powerful white
breed, with broad-spreading horns a yard long. These are followed
in endless rows by carefully stepping pack animals, small and large
horses, mules and donkeys. On the wooden packsaddles on their backs
are the carefully weighed bales of hay or ammunition boxes or other
war materials. Walking gingerly by the edges of the mountain ridges
they avoid pitfalls and rocks and walk round the stiff, distended
bodies of their comrades that have broken down on the way. At times
there ambles along a long row of working animals a colt, curious and
restlessly sniffing. In the midst of this movement of the legs of
animals, of waving arms, of creaking and swaying loaded vehicles of
manifold origin, there climbs upward the weighty iron of an Austrian
motor battery, with an almost incomprehensible inevitableness,
flattening out the broken roads like a steam roller.
"From the first pass the baggage train sinks down into the depths,
again to climb upward on the next ridge, to continue striving upward
ever toward higher passages, slowly pushing forward toward its
objective against the resistance of numberless obstacles.
"The road to the battle field of to-day crosses the battle field
of recent weeks and months. Here there once stood a village, but
only the stone foundations of the hearths are left as traces of
the houses that have been burned down. Sometimes falling shots or
the terrors of a brief battle in the streets have reduced to ruins
only a part of a village. The roofs of houses have been patched
with canvas and boards to some extent, and now serve as quarters
for troops or as stables. In the narrow valleys the level places
by the sides of streams have been utilized for encampments. Here
stand in order wagons of a resting column and the goulash cannons
shedding their fragrance far and wide, or the tireless ovens of a
field bakery. Frequently barracks, hospital buildings, and shelters
for men and animals have been built into the mountain sides. Here
and there simple huts have been erected, made of a few poles and
fir twigs. Often they are placed in long rows, which, when their
inmates are warming themselves by the fire at night turn the dark
mountain road into a romantic night encampment, and everywhere
fresh crosses, ornamented at times in a manner suggestive of the
work of children, remind us of our brothers now forever silenced,
who, but a short time before went the same road, withstood just
such weather and such hardships, talked perhaps in these same huts
of the war, and dreamt of peace.
"The saddest spectacle, however, were the lightly wounded, poor
fellows, who might under ordinary conditions have readily walked
the distance from the first aid station to the central gathering
point, but who here on account of the ice or muddy roads require
double and three times the usual time."
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXV
BATTLE OF KOZIOWA--OPERATIONS IN THE BUKOWINA
Owing to the topographical conditions under which fighting must be
carried on in the central Carpathians, some weeks might be expected
to elapse before a general engagement developed along the entire
front. Lateral communication or cooperation between the advancing
columns was out of the question; the passes were like so many parallel
tunnels, each of which must first be negotiated before a reunion
can take place at the northern exits.
We will follow the achievements of the three groups in separate
order. Army A, under Boehm-Ermolli, crossed Uzsok and Rostoki, and
forced part of the Russian line back upon Baligrod, but Brussilov
held it fast on Dukla and Lupkow, strongly supported by Dmitrieff on
his right. Here the attack failed with severe losses; the Germanic
forces were thrown back into Hungary, and the Russians commanded
the southern ends of the passes around Dukla. The Uzsok Pass was of
small strategical value to the Austrians now that they had it. It
is extremely vulnerable at every point; steep, narrow, and winding
roads traverse its course nearly 3,000 feet high, with thickly
wooded mountains up to 4,500 feet overlooking the scene from a close
circle. Regarded merely as a short cut to Przemysl and Lemberg, the
Uzsok was a useful possession provided always that the northern
debouchment could be cleared and an exit forced. But the Russians held
these debouchments with a firm grip, and the pass was consequently
of no use to the Austrians. About February 7, 1915, the Russians
attempted to outflank the Austrian position in the Lupkow Pass
from the eastern branch of the Dukla by pushing forward in the
direction of Mezo-Laborc on the Hungarian side. The movement partially
succeeded; they took over 10,000 prisoners, but failed to dislodge
the Austrians from the heights east of the pass. Severe fighting
raged round this district for over a month, the Russians finally
capturing Lupkow, as well as Smolnik at the southern exit of Rostoki.
Had the Russians succeeded in getting between Uzsok and the Austrian
line of communication, as was undoubtedly their aim, the Austrians
would have been compelled to relinquish the pass without even a
fight. However, General Boehm-Ermolli's mission proved a failure.
Army B, under Von Linsingen, succeeded in traversing all the passes
in its appointed section. Crossing by the railway pass of Beskid
and the two roads leading through Vereczke and Wyszkow, they pushed
forward in the direction of Stryj and Lemberg, but never reached
their destination. Barely through the passes, the Germans struck
upon Lysa Gora, over 3,300 feet high. This mountain range is barren
of all vegetation--no sheltering trees or shrubs adorn its slopes.
The route of the Germans crossed Lysa Gora south and in front of the
ridge of Koziowa, where the Russian lines, under General Ivanoff,
lay in waiting. Passing down the bald slopes of Lysa Gora toward the
valley of the Orava River, the advancing German columns presented
a conspicuous target for the Russians on the opposite slopes of
Koziowa, screened by thick forests. Here one of the most desperate
battles of the campaign ensued on February 6, 1915, between Von
Linsingen's Austro-German army and Brussilov's center.
In close formation and with well-drilled precision the Germans
attempted to storm the position at the point of the bayonet. Again
and again they returned to the charge, only to be repulsed with
severe losses. As many as twenty-two furious bayonet charges were
made in one day, February 7. Wherever a footing was gained in the
Russian lines, there a few minutes ferocious hand-to-hand _mêlée_
developed--Saxon and Slav at death grips--the intruders were expelled
or hacked down. Great masses of Austro-German dead and wounded
were strewn over the lower slopes of Koziowa. For five weeks Von
Linsingen hammered at the Russian front without being able to break
through. So long as the Russians held the heights it was impossible
for their enemy to emerge from the passes. These two, Vereczke
and Beskid, so close together, may literally be described as twin
tunnels. Owing to the highland between them, the two columns moving
through could not cooperate; if one side needed reenforcements from
the other, they had to be taken back over the range into Hungary
to the junction where the roads diverged. It was sound strategy
on the Russian side to select Koziowa as the point from which to
check the Germanic advance. For the time being, with Dukla and
Lupkow in their hands and the exits of Uzsok and Rostoki strongly
guarded, the defense of Koziowa held Galicia safe from reconquest.
The attacks against Koziowa continued beyond the middle of March,
1915. On the 16th of that month the Russians captured a place called
Oravcyk, about four miles westward, from where they could threaten
the German left, which had the effect of keeping Von Linsingen
still closer to his mountain passages. The fighting in this region
represents one of the important phases of the war, for it prevented
the relief of Przemysl; temporarily saved Stryj and Lemberg for the
Russians; enabled them to send reenforcements into the Bukowina,
and, finally, inspired the German General Staff to plan the great and
decisive Galician campaign, which was to achieve the task wherein
Boehm-Ermolli and Von Linsingen had both failed.
Meanwhile, what had Von Pflanzer-Baltin accomplished with Army
C--the third column? His path lay through Jablonitza, Kirlibaba,
and Dorna Vatra; his task was to clear the Russians out of the
Bukowina, and either to force them back across their own frontiers,
or to turn the extreme end of their left flank. We have seen that
the Russian occupation of the Bukowina was more in the nature of
a political experiment than a serious military undertaking, and
that their forces in the province were not strong enough to indulge
in great strategical operations. Hence we may expect the Austrian
general's progress to be less difficult than that of his colleagues in
the western and central Carpathians. To some extent this presumption
is correct, for on February 18, 1915, after launching out from the
southern corner of the Bukowina at Kimpolung and via the Jablonitza
Pass down the Pruth Valley, they captured Czernowitz, and after that
Kolomea, whence the railway runs to Lemberg. Within three days
they reached Stanislawow, another important railway center, defended
by a small Russian force, and a big battle ensued. Altogether,
the Germanic troops in the Bukowina were reported at 50,000 in
number, though these were split up into two columns, one of which
was making but slow progress farther east.
Russian reenforcements were thrown into the town, and the struggle
for the railway, which lasted a week, appears to have been of a seesaw
nature, for no official reports of the fighting were issued by either
side. Still the Austrians pushed westward in the hope of reaching
the railways which supplied those Russian armies which were barring
the advance through the central passes. The Russians were forced to
withdraw from Stanislawow, and their opponents now held possession
of the line running to Stryj and Przemysl--a serious menace to the
Russian main communications. This meant that Von Pflanzer-Baltin
had succeeded in getting to the rear of the Russians. But assistance
came unexpectedly from the center, whence Ivanoff was able to send
reenforcements to his colleague, General Alexeieff, who was continually
falling back before the Austrians. Furious counterattacks were
delivered by the Russians at Halicz and Jezupol, the bridgeheads
of the southern bank of the Dniester. If the Austrians could not
force a victory at these points, their position in Stanislawow
would be untenable, since the Russians still had a clear road to
pour reenforcements into the fighting area between the Dniester and
the Carpathians. On March 1, 1915, the Austrians were defeated at
Halicz in a pitched battle, and on the 4th the Russians reentered
Stanislawow. According to their official communiqué the Russians
captured nearly 19,000 prisoners, 5 guns, 62 machine guns, and
a quantity of stores and munitions. About March 16 the opposing
forces came again into touch southeast of Stanislawow on the road
to Ottynia, but nothing of importance appears to have happened.
To sum up the results of the Germanic offensive, we must remember
what the objectives were. Of the latter, none was attained. The
Russians had not been expelled from Galicia; Przemysl was no nearer
to relief than before, and Lemberg had not been retaken. With the
exception of Dukla and Lupkow, all the passes were in Austrian
hands; but the Russians dominated the northern debouchments of all
of them excepting Jablonitza.
[Illustration: DETAIL MAP OF THE FORTS OF PRZEMYSL]
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXVI
FALL OF PRZEMYSL
The town and fortress of Przemysl formally surrendered to the Russian
General Selivanoff on Monday, March 22, 1915. The first investment
began at the early stages of the war in September, 1914. On the
27th of that month the Russian generalissimo announced that all
communications had been cut off. By October 15, 1914, the Russian
investment had been broken again, and for a matter of three weeks,
while the road was open, more troops, provisions, arms, and munitions
were rushed to the spot. As we have seen, however, the Russians
recovered their lost advantage, for, after the fall of Jaroslav,
the fortress to the north of Przemysl, their troops were hurried
up from east, north, and west, and within a few days the Austrians
were sent back along the whole front. From the region of Przemysl
three railroads cross the Carpathians to Budapest, along all of
which the Russians had pushed vigorously, besides advancing on the
west. As regarded railroad communications, the fate of Przemysl
was sealed by the capture of Chyrow, an important junction about
twenty miles south of the fortress. Przemysl itself was important
as a road junction and as a connecting link with the Uzsok and
Lupkow passes. The garrison prepared to make a stubborn resistance
with the object of checking the Russian pursuit. A week later the
Russians had broken up their heavy artillery and had begun a steady
bombardment. By November 12, 1914, Przemysl was once more completely
besieged by General Selivanoff with not more than 100,000 troops.
Przemysl is one of the oldest towns of Galicia, said to have been
founded in the eighth century. It was once the capital of a large
independent principality. In the fourteenth century Casimir the Great
and other Polish princes endowed it with special civic privileges,
and the town attained a high degree of commercial prosperity. In
the seventeenth century its importance was destroyed by inroads
of Tatars, Cossacks, and Swedes. Przemysl is situated on the River
San, and was considered one of the strongest fortresses of Europe.
The original strategic idea embodied in the purpose of the fortress
was purely defensive; in the event of war with Russia only the
line of the San and Dniester was intended to be held at all costs,
while the whole northeastern portion of Galicia was to be abandoned.
With the fortress of Cracow guarding the west, Przemysl was meant
to be the first defense between the two rivers and to hold the
easiest roads to Hungary through the Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok passes.
Within the last ten years, however, the Austrian War Staff altered
its plans and decided upon a vigorous offensive against Russia
should occasion offer, and that Eastern Galicia was not to be
sacrificed. Hence a network of strategic railways was constructed
with a view to attacking the prospective enemy on a wide front
extending from the Vistula near Cracow on the west to the Bug on
the east, where the latter flows into Austrian territory and cuts
off a corner of eastern Galicia. The plan does not appear to have
worked successfully, for, before the war was many days old, the
Russians had taken Lemberg, swept across the Dniester at Halicz,
across the San at Jaroslav, just north of Przemysl, and had already
besieged the fortress, which at no time imposed any serious obstacle
in the path of their progress. Perhaps the only useful purpose that
Przemysl served was that it restrained the Russians from attempting
an invasion of Hungary on a big scale, by holding out for nearly seven
months. Not having sufficient siege artillery at their disposal,
the Russians made no attempt to storm the place. General Selivanoff
surrounded the forts with a wide circle of counterdefenses, which
were so strongly fortified that the garrison would have found it an
almost hopeless task to attempt a rush through the enemy's lines.
The Austrian artillery was naturally well acquainted with the range
of every point and position that lay within reach of their guns;
and Selivanoff wisely offered them little opportunity for effective
practice. Considering it too expensive to attack by the overland
route, he worked his way gradually toward the forts by means of
underground operations. To sap a position is slow work, but much
more economical in the expenditure of lives and munitions. The
weakness of Przemysl lay in the fact that its garrison was far
too large for its needs, and that provisions were running short.
In the early part of the campaign the Germanic armies operating
in the San region had drawn freely on Przemysl for supplies, and
before these could be adequately replaced the Russians had again
forged an iron ring around the place. The Russian commander, moreover,
was aware that a coming scarcity threatened the town, and that he
had only to bide his time to starve it into submission. Whilst he
was simply waiting and ever strengthening his lines, the Austrians
found it incumbent on them to assume the offensive. Several desperate
sorties were made by the garrison to break through the wall, only to
end in complete disaster. General Herman von Kusmanek, the commander
in chief of the fortress, organized a special force, composed largely
of Hungarians, for "sortie duty," under the command of a Hungarian,
General von Tamassy. These sorties had been carried out during
November and December, 1914, especially during the latter month,
when the Austro-German armies were pouring across the mountains.
So critical was the Russian position at the time that the relief
of Przemysl was hourly expected. According to an officer of General
Selivanoff's staff, "The Austrians in the fortress were already
conversing with the Austrians on the Carpathians by means of their
searchlights. The guns of Przemysl could be heard by the Austrian
field artillery. The situation was serious, and General Selivanoff
took prompt measures. He brought up fresh troops to the point of
danger and drove the sortie detachments back to the fortress." It
is stated from the Austrian side that one of the sortie detachments
had succeeded in breaking through the Russian lines and marching
to a point fifteen miles beyond the outer lines of the forts. A
Russian official announcement states that during two months of
the siege the Austrian captures amounted only to 4 machine guns
and about 60 prisoners, which occurred in an engagement where two
Honved regiments fell on a Russian company which had advanced too
far to be reenforced in time. On their part in repulsing sorties by
the garrison, frequently made by considerable forces, the Russians
made prisoners 27 officers and 1,906 soldiers, and captured 7 machine
guns, 1,500,000 cartridges, and a large quantity of arms. In two
sorties the garrison in the region of Bircza had more than 2,000
killed and wounded, among them being many officers. No further
sorties were undertaken in that particular region. During January
and February, 1915, very little fighting took place around Przemysl;
sorties were useless as there was no Austro-German force anywhere
near the fortress, and the Russians were tightening the pressure
around it. The only means of communication with the outer world
was by aeroplane, so that, despite the rigid investment, the
Austro-German war staff were kept fully informed of the straits in
which Przemysl found itself. General Boehm-Ermolli, with Army A,
was making desperate efforts to extricate himself from the Russian
grip round Uzsok, Lupkow, and Dukla; he did not get beyond Baligrod,
as the crow flies, thirty miles south of Przemysl.
On March 13, 1915, the Russians stormed and captured the village
of Malkovise, on the northeast, breaking through the outer line
of the defense. From this position they began to bombard parts of
the inner ring. About the beginning of the third week in March,
1915, a new spirit of activity appeared to seize the beleaguered
garrison: they commenced a terrific cannonade which, however, elicited
no response. It was but the energy of despair: they were firing
to get rid of their ammunition, hoping at the same time to hit
something or somebody. The end was at hand.
On March 18, 1915, a Petrograd "official" laconically reports that:
"In the Przemysl sector the fortress guns continue to fire more
than a thousand heavy projectiles daily, but our troops besieging
the fortress lose only about ten men every day." It is also on
March 18 that General von Kusmanek issued the following manifesto
to the defenders of Przemysl:--"Heroes, I announce to you my last
summons. The honor of our country and our army demands it. I shall
lead you to pierce with your points of steel the iron circles of
the enemy, and then march ever farther onward, sparing no efforts,
until we rejoin our army, which, after heavy fighting, is now near
us."
Just before the surrender two Austrian officers escaped from the
fortress in an aeroplane. These reported concerning the last days
of the siege:
"On the 18th of March the last provisions had been dealt out and
at the same time the last attempt at breaking through the line
of the besiegers had been ordered. This was carried out on the
night of the 19th of March. It was shattered, however, against the
unbreakable manifold ring of the Russian inclosing lines and against
the superior forces which were brought in time to the threatened
points. Our men were so weakened by their long fasting that it
took them fully seven hours to make the march of seven kilometers,
and even in this short stretch many of them had to lie down from
exhaustion, yet they fought well and were bravely led by their
officers.
"In spite of all this," Captain Lehmann, one of the escaped officers,
reported, "the heroic garrison fought on, after their last sortie,
for fully forty-eight hours, against assaults of the Russians which
now set in with terrific violence. The men of the fortress were fully
informed of the situation by an announcement of the commander. They
knew that the provisions were at an end and this very knowledge
spurred them on to make their last sacrifice. Practically all the
nations of the monarchy were represented in the fortress. Tyrolese
Landsturm held the south, Hungarians the west, Ruthenians and Poles
the north, and lower Austrians the east. To this last battle the
troops marched out singing, striving thus to master their weakness.
On this occasion the above mentioned notice had fallen into the
hands of the Russians and the prospect had thus been opened to
them to seize the fortress with little effort. For two days and
nights all the works of Przemysl were taken under, an uninterrupted
terrible artillery fire, including that of modern howitzers of all
calibers, up to eighteen centimeters. Then followed an assault
at night on the east front, which, however, was again bloodily
repelled."
Starvation is conducive neither to good feeling nor heroism, especially
when it is superimposed upon an unbroken series of more or less
disastrous experiences. Misfortune and the so-called "tradition of
defeat" had dogged the steps of Austria's troops from the beginning
of the war; unlucky generals--Dankl, Auffenberg, and others--had been
relieved of their commands and replaced by "new blood"--Boehm-Ermolli,
Boroyevitch von Bojna, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin. Of these three, two
had as yet failed in carrying to success the German plans which
had taken the place of those of their own strategists. Hence it
is not at all improbable that the reports of dissensions among
the garrison, which leaked out at the time, were substantially
accurate. That jealousies broke out among the numerous races forming
the Austrian Army--especially between the Slavonic and Germanic
elements--is supported by strong evidence. The sentiments of the
Slav subjects of Austria leaned more toward Russia than the empire
of which they formed a considerable portion, while there was never
any love lost between them and the Magyars. However that may be,
the Slav regiments were reported to have refused obedience to the
general's order for the last sortie, which was eventually undertaken
by a force composed of the Twenty-third Hungarian Honved Division,
a regiment of Hussars, and a Landwehr brigade, altogether about
30,000 men. Everything depended upon the venture, for not only
were all their food supplies used up, but they had already eaten
most of their horses. Instead, therefore, of making southward to
where their comrades were fighting hard to tear themselves away
from the Carpathian passes, the sortie turned toward the east, in
the direction of Mosciska, twenty miles off, which was supposed to
be the Russian supply base. This attempted foraging expedition--for
it was nothing else--can only be defended on the broad general
principle that it is better to do something than nothing as a last
resort. Supplies were essential before any more could be undertaken
to cut a passage through the strong double set of Russian lines that
lay between the Carpathians and Przemysl; but that these supplies
were stored at Mosciska was a pure speculation. Further, considering
that the whole country was in their opponents' hands, a strength of
30,000 men was insufficient to attempt so hazardous an adventure.
Even if they succeeded in breaking through, their return to the
fortress was not assured. In that case, if they could not get back,
they would have to go forward: eastward lay Lemberg, held by the
Russians; northward was the Russian frontier, and southward stood
the Russian forces holding the passes. Thus, in any case, however
successful the expedition might prove, it meant breaking at least
twice through lines which the enemy had spent months in strengthening
or fortifying. Undeterred by the almost certain possibility of
failure, the expedition of the "forlorn hope" set out across the
plain of the San--and speedily came to grief. They had to pass by
the strongest Russian artillery position, which was stationed in
the low hollow through which the railway runs to Lemberg. Here a
terrific hail of shells burst over their heads; rattle of machine
guns and rifle fire tore great holes in their ranks; the stoutest
courage and bravest hearts were unavailing against an enemy who could
not be reached nor even seen. The number of killed and wounded in
that fatal sortie has not been made public; that it was an enormous
figure is certain. The Russians took 4,000 prisoners of those who
survived the ordeal, and captured the forts on the western side
directly after the struggling remnants had regained their starting
place. General von Kusmanek issued his manifesto in the morning, and
by the same night the sortie ended in disaster. Like the misdirected
charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854, it was "brilliant,
but it wasn't war."
One more attempt was made on Saturday, March 20, 1915, toward Oikovice,
but it was easily frustrated by the vigilant Russians. On Sunday and
Monday, the 21st and 22d of March, a number of explosions were heard
in and around Przemysl. The Austrians were destroying everything
possible previous to surrendering. Large quantities of explosives were
thrown in the river; all kinds of arms were destroyed or rendered
useless; three bridges were crippled; the few remaining horses
were shot, and a railway bridge over the Wiar, which possessed no
strategic value, was also destroyed. These tactics of destroying
approaches naturally isolated the town more than ever, and made
it exceedingly difficult afterward to convey food supplies to the
starving population.
On Monday morning, March 22, 1915, the Austrian chief of staff
appeared outside the lines of Przemysl under a flag of truce. He
was blindfolded, driven by automobile to Russian headquarters, and
ushered into the presence of General Selivanoff. When the bandage
had been removed from his eyes, the Austrian officer handed over
a letter of capitulation from General von Kusmanek, which ran as
follows:
"In consequence of the exhaustion of provisions and stores, and
in compliance with instructions received from my supreme chief,
I am compelled to surrender the Imperial and Royal Fortress of
Przemysl to the Imperial Russian Army."
The Russians took charge without any triumphal display. Some officers
were sent to receive the surrender and take stock of the spoils.
General von Kusmanek himself supplied the inventory, in which were
listed 9 generals, 93 superior officers, 2,500 "Offiziere und Beamten"
(subalterns and officials), and 117,000 rank and file, besides
1,000 pieces of ordnance, mostly useless, and a large quantity of
shells and rifle cartridges.
General Artamoff was appointed military governor and to superintend
the process of dispatching the prisoners into Russian territory, which
was carried out at the rate of 10,000 a day. Extensive arrangements
were set on foot to supply the inhabitants with food, drink, and
other necessaries of life. As the Russians had not bombarded the
town, its natural and artificial beauties had suffered no damage
beyond that which the Austrians had themselves inflicted; only
the outskirts and the fortifications had been injured by fire and
explosion.
Thus fell, on March 22, 1915, Przemysl, "by its own momentum like
an overripe fruit," and with a garrison twice as large as would
have been adequate to defend it. To Austria the blow was a severe
one, for it cost her about four army corps; the immediate advantage
it brought to the Russians was the release of Selivanoff's army of
100,000 men, who were urgently required elsewhere. It was only a
week earlier that the commander in chief of all the Austro-Hungarian
armies, the Archduke Frederick, had granted an interview to an
American journalist (Dr. J. T. Roche), in the course of which he
stated: "We have only recently reached the point where we are really
prepared to carry on a campaign as it should be carried under modern
conditions of warfare. Now that our organization has been completed
and all branches of the service are working harmoniously, we entertain
no doubts as to our ability to hold the enemy at all points and
to drive him back from that section of Galicia which is still in
his possession."
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXVII
NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE--AUSTRO-GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE
Three days before the fall of Przemysl the Russians abandoned the
defensive and commenced a vigorous attack on the Carpathian front.
Active preparations for the advance had been completed when the
capitulation of the fortress was to be expected any hour. Having
so far held the Germanic armies in check, it was necessary for the
Russians to regain complete control of the Carpathians and the passes
before the snow should begin to melt, especially if they decided on
an invasion of Hungary. On the other hand, before any offensive
could be undertaken against the Germans in Poland, or the Austrians
at Cracow, it was imperative to secure the southern flank in Galicia.
They had by this time partially grasped one particular feature of
German strategy, namely, to parry a blow from one direction by
striking in another. A further consideration may have been the
absolute certainty that Germany would dispatch more reenforcements
to the aid of her ally. Selivanoff's siege army was distributed
between Dmitrieff, Brussilov, and Ivanoff, but they could not be
employed to full advantage owing to the restricted area presented
by the Germanic front. Being largely composed of siege artillery
as well as cavalry, a considerable portion of Selivanoff's army
was unsuited for mountain warfare. Cavalry were converted into
infantry, but could not be supplied with the necessary equipment;
they had no bayonets, and most of the fighting was hand-to-hand.
Great masses of Germanic reserves were concentrating in northern
Hungary, into which the Russians had driven a thin wedge south
of Dukla, where they held an isolated outpost near Bartfeld. To
leave this position undeveloped meant compulsory withdrawal or
disaster. With the continual influx of reenforcements on both sides,
the struggle for the main passes gradually develops into an
ever-expanding and unbroken battle front: all the gaps are being
filled up. From Dukla westward to the Dunajec-Biala line and the
Carpathian foothills a new link is formed by the Fourth Austrian
Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with two and a
half army corps and one German division. In the Central Carpathians
a fifth army, under the command of the Austrian General von Bojna,
appears between the forces of Boehm-Ermolli and those of Von Linsingen.
Right away eastward the purely Austrian army of Von Pflanzer-Baltin
was holding the Pruth Valley. The Germanic chain was complete,
with every link welded together.
When the Russian offensive opened on March 19, 1915, the entire
battle line still rested on the northern side of the Carpathians,
and here the struggle was resumed. The Russian grand attack was
directed between the Lupkow and Uzsok passes, where great forces
of the enemy, concentrated for the purpose of relieving Przemysl,
were stationed. In the western sector, facing Dmitrieff, the Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand held the roads leading from Novy-Sacz and Grybow
to Tarnow, covering Cracow; and from south of the range the two
roads diverging from Zboro to Gorlice and Jaslo were in Russian
possession, though the Austrians held their junction at Zboro,
eight miles north of Bartfeld. Of the actual fighting that took
place in this region very few details were published by the Russian
official communiqué. One of these documents, dated April 18, 1915,
announced that on March 23, "our troops had already begun their
principal attack in the direction of Baligrod, enveloping the enemy
positions from the west of the Lupkow Pass and on the east near the
sources of the San. The enemy opposed the most desperate resistance
to the offensive of our troops. They had brought up every available
man on the front from the direction of Bartfeld as far as the Uzsok
Pass, including even German troops and numerous cavalrymen fighting
on foot. The effectives on this front exceeded 300 battalions.
Moreover, our troops had to overcome great natural difficulties at
every step. In the course of the day, March 23, 1915, we captured
more than 4,000 prisoners, a gun, and several dozen machine guns."
On March 24, 1915, the battle was in full progress: "Especially
severe is the fighting for the crest of the mountain south of Jasliska
and to the west of the Lupkow Pass. The forests which cover these
mountains offer special facilities for the construction of strong
fortifications." March 25: "The woods in the Lupkow region are
a perfect entanglement of barbed wire... surrounded by several
layers of trenches, strengthened by deep ditches and palisades. On
this day our troops carried by assault a very important Austrian
position on the great crest of the Beskid Mountains." The Russian
captures for the day amounted to 100 officers, 5,600 men, and a
number of machine guns. Advancing from Jasliska the Russians seriously
threatened the Austro-German position in the Laborcza Valley, to
which strong reenforcements were sent on March 25. With terrific
violence the battle raged till far into the night of the 27th, the
Russians forcing their way to within seven miles of the Hungarian
frontier.
In eight days they had taken nearly 10,000 prisoners. By the night
of March 28, 1915, the entire line of sixty miles from Dukla to
Uzsok was ablaze--the storm was spreading eastward. Like huge ant
hills the mountains swarmed with gray and bluish specks--each a human
being--some to the waist in snow, stabbing and hacking at each other
ferociously with bayonet, sword, or lance, others pouring deadly fire
from rifle, revolver, machine gun, and heavy artillery. Over rocks
slippery with blood, through cruel barbed-wire entanglements and into
crowded trenches the human masses dash and scramble. Here, with heavy
toll, they advanced; there, and with costlier sacrifice, they were
driven back. Fiery Magyars, mechanical Teutons and stolid muzhiks
mixed together in an indescribable hellbroth of combative fury and
destructive passion. Screaming shells and spattered shrapnel rent
the rocks and tore men in pieces by the thousand. Round the Lupkow
Pass the Russians steadily carved their way forward, and at the close
of the day, March 29, 1915, they had taken 76 officers, 5,384 men, 1
trench mortar, and 21 machine guns. Along the Baligrod-Cisna road
the fighting proceeded, up to March 30, by day and night.
Gradually the Russians pushed toward Dvernik and Ustrzyki south
of Lutoviska, threatening the Austrian position in the Uzsok and
lines of communications to the south. German reserves were hurried
up from the base at Ungvar, but could not prevent the capture of 80
Austrian officers, over 5,000 men, 14 machine guns, and 4 pieces of
cannon. Ivanoff had been careful to hold his portion of Selivanoff's
army in reserve; their presence turned the scale.
On the day and night of March 31, 1915, the Russians stormed and
carried the Austrian positions 4,000 feet high up on the Poloniny
range during a heavy snowstorm. So deep was the snow in places that
movement was impossible; the trampling of the charging battalions
rushing down over the slopes dislodged avalanches of snow, overwhelming
both attackers and defenders. By April 1, 1915, the Russians approached
Volosate, only twelve miles from the rear of the Uzsok Pass, from
which they were now separated by a low ridge. Holding full possession
of the Poloniny range farther west, they commanded the road from
Dvernik to Vetlina. From the north other Russian columns captured
Michova on the Smolnik-Cisna railroad, crossed the Carpathians,
and penetrated into the Virava Valley. Occupying the entire loop of
the Sanok-Homona railway north and south of Lupkow, and Mezo-Laborcz
toward Dukla, the Russians now threatened the Austrian mountain
positions between Lupkow and the Vetlina-Zboj road from the western
flank as well. Violent winter storms raged across the Carpathians
on April 2 and 3, 1915; nature spread a great white pall over the
scenes of carnage. While the elements were battling, the weary
human fighting machine rested and bound its wounds. But not for
long. Scarcely had the last howls of the blizzard faded away when
the machine was again set in motion.
South of Dukla and Lupkow and north of Uzsok fighting was resumed
with intense vigor. Painfully digging through the snowdrifts the
Austrians retired from the Smolnik-Kalnica line, now no longer
tenable. Storm hampered the pursuing enemy, who captured the Cisna
railway station on April 4, 1915, with all its rolling stock and
large stores of munitions.
On April 6, 1915, a Russian communiqué announced that "during the
period from March 20 to April 3, 1915, we took prisoners in the
Carpathians, on the front from Baligrod to Uzsok, 378 officers,
11 doctors, and 33,155 men. We captured 17 guns and 101 machine
guns. Of these captives 117 officers, 16,928 men, 8 guns, and 59
machine guns were taken on a front of fifteen versts (10 miles)."
The Russians again advanced along their whole front on April 4,
1915; forcing their way along the Rostoki stream, they carried
the village of Rostoki Gorne with the bayonet and penetrated the
snow-bound Rostoki Pass. Their first line arrived at a Hungarian
village called Orosz-Russka, five miles from Nagy Polena, at the
foot of the pass. The Austrians attempted to drive them back, but
they held their ground.
While fortune was steadily following the efforts of the czar's troops
in the Lupkow-Uzsok sector, the German War Staff were preparing
their plans for the great decisive blow that was soon to be struck.
South of the Carpathians, barely thirty miles away, formidable
reenforcements were collecting; they arrived from the East Prussian
front, from Poland, and even from the west, where they had faced
the French and British. There were also new formations fresh from
Germany. General von der Marwitz arrived in the Laborcza Valley
with a whole German army corps. These gigantic preparations were
not unknown to the Russians; they, also, strained every nerve to
throw all available reenforcements behind and into the battle line,
strengthening every position _except one_. South of the Lupkow the
Germanic forces opened their counteroffensive on April 6, 1915.
Official reports on the first day's fighting differ somewhat. The
Russians admit a slight German advance, but assert that they were
able to withstand all further attacks. The Germans, on the other hand,
claim great successes and the capture of 6,000 Russian prisoners.
The Germanic armies in this case, however, certainly did advance,
for the Russians withdrew from the Virava Valley, which they had
entered four days earlier. The first object of the counteroffensive
was to save the Austrians who were holding the frontier south of
Lupkow from being enveloped and cut off. But on April 9, 1915,
the Russians again moved forward, and recovered part of the Virava
Valley. By this day the whole mountain crest from Dukla to Uzsok, a
distance of over seventy miles, had been conquered by the Russians.
By the same night they had repulsed a counterattack near the Rostoki
and captured a battalion of Austrian infantry. The Russian report
sums up thus: "We seized Height 909 (909 meters=3,030 feet) with
the result that the enemy was repulsed along the entire length
of the principal chain of the Carpathians in the region of our
offensive."
For the next three days Brussilov attempted to work his way to the
rear of the Uzsok position with his right wing from the Laborcz
and Ung valleys, while simultaneously continuing his frontal attacks
against Boehm-Ermolli and Von Bojna. Cutting through snow sometimes
more than six feet deep, the Russians approached at several points
within a distance of three miles from the Uzsok Valley. But the
Austrians still held the Opolonek mountain group in force. Severe
fighting then developed northwest of the Uzsok on the slopes between
Bukoviec and Beniova; the Russians captured the village of Wysocko
Nizne to the northeast, which commands the only roads connecting
the Munkacz-Stryj and the Uzsok-Turka lines. Though both sides
claimed local successes, they appear to have fought each other to
a deadlock, for very little fighting occurred in this zone after
April 14, 1915. Henceforth Brussilov directed his main efforts
to the Virava and Cisna-Rostoki sector. From here and Volosate,
where there had been continuous fighting since the early days of
April, the Russians strove desperately for possession of the Uzsok.
They were now only two or three days' march from the Hungarian
plains.
Between April 17 and 20, 1915, a vigorous Austrian counterattack
failed to check the Russian advance. Between Telepovce and Zuella,
two villages south of the Lupkow, the Russians noiselessly approached
the Austrian barbed-wire entanglements, broke through, and after
a brief bayonet encounter gained possession of two heights and
captured the village of Nagy Polena, a little farther to the east.
During the night of April 16-17, 1915, the Russians took prisoners
24 officers, 1,116 men, and 3 machine guns.
On April 18, 1915, the Austrians directed several fierce attacks
against the heights south of Telepovce, but were compelled to evacuate
the approaches to their positions. Here, also, an Austrian battalion
was cut off and forced to surrender. Meanwhile the fighting was
gradually decreasing in intensity; the great Carpathian campaign
had reached the end of another chapter. The Austro-German offensive
had failed in its purpose. From Uzsok eastward there had been but
little fighting after the Russian recapture of Stanislawow.
[Illustration: DRIVES AND RETREATS ON THE VARIOUS EASTERN FRONTS
GERMANS ON THE WEICHSEL, THE MEMEL AND THE BALTIC COAST · A PETROGRAD
HOSPITAL · AN OPEN-AIR SERVICE
A German machine gun mounted for bringing down aeroplanes. The
gunners have sighted a Russian battle plane and are preparing to
bring it down]
[Illustration: A Russian floating mine brought ashore along the
River Weichsel. The German soldiers are inspecting it and listening
to an explanation of its design]
[Illustration: German soldiers resting on the sands of Skatre.
They are on their way to capture the Baltic port of Libau, Russia]
[Illustration: A German observation station in a tree overlooking
the valley of the River Memel, or Niemen, which flows through Poland
and East Prussia]
[Illustration: Two German cruisers--the "Themis" and the "Lubeck"--in
the harbor of the Baltic port of Memel, not far from the Russian
frontier]
[Illustration: A disinfecting apparatus used in one of the large
hospitals in Petrograd. Bags containing patients's clothing are
inserted in a huge cylinder, where the disinfecting takes place]
[Illustration: The town of Gerdauen, East Prussia, which was burned
during the Russian invasion, when for a time East Prussia suffered
like Belgium and Poland]
[Illustration: Austrian soldiers reverently listening to an open-air
religious service in front of a wayside chapel in Galicia]
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXVIII
CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA--BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC
While the struggle for the passes was raging in the central Carpathians
an interesting campaign was being conducted in Eastern Galicia and
the Bukowina between Von Pflanzer-Baltin and Lechitsky. There we
left the Russians in possession of Stanislawow, which they had
reoccupied on March 4, 1915. Two days before, an Austrian detachment
of infantry and two divisions of cavalry attempted a raid into
Russian territory near the Bessarabian frontier. Within forty-eight
hours they were hurled back. Beyond local skirmishes and maneuvering
for positions, nothing of importance happened from March 4 till the
15th, when the Russians attacked the main Austrian forces southeast
of Czernowitz. Crossing the River Pruth opposite Ludihorecza, which
lies about 600 feet high, and where the Czernowitz waterworks are
situated, the Russians occupied the place and threatened the Austrian
position in the town, around which pressed laborers were digging
trenches night and day for the defenders. Along the line between
Sadagora and Old Zuczka the Russians had been settled for over six
months. The Austrians attacked this position on March 21, 1915,
with the aid of reenforcements and compelled the Russians to evacuate
Sadagora. While falling back in the south the Russians endeavored
to advance in the north, from the direction of Czerniavka, and
outflank the Austrians. Violent fighting raged for several days,
especially northeast from Czernowitz to beyond Rarancze, with the
result that the Russians were compelled to withdraw toward Bojan,
near their own frontier, on March 27. Three days later some Hungarian
Honved battalions, who had penetrated into Russian territory near
Szylowce, were surrounded by Cossacks and severely handled. Besides
many killed and wounded the Austrians lost over 1,000 prisoners,
and by April 2, 1915, the Russians had thrown the remainder back
across their borders. On April 10, 1915, the Russians withdrew
from Boyan, but returned on the 14th. Here, at the close of April,
they concentrated large reenforcements and recovered most of the
ground they had lost since the middle of March.
Some twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, sheltered in a loop of
the Dniester, lies an important fortified town called Zaleszczyki.
It had a population of over 76,000, and is a station on the branch
line connecting Czortkow junction with the Kolomca-Czernowitz railway.
From the dense forests east of the town an Austrian column commanded
by Count von Bissingen had attempted during the night of March 22-23,
1915, to turn the adjacent Russian positions, held by Cossacks and
Siberian fusiliers. A furious fight developed, and the Austro-Hungarian
column, which included some of the finest troops, was repulsed with
heavy loss. Two other attempts were made here, on April 10 and
17, 1915. On the latter date a detachment of Tyrolese sharpshooters
were trapped in the wire entanglements and annihilated.
One more battle on a big scale remains to be chronicled from the far
eastern sector; it may also serve to illustrate the wide divergence
that not infrequently exists between official communiqués recording
the same event. Early in April, 1915, a Russian force threw a bridge
across the Dniester near the village of Filipkowu and moved along
the road running from Uscie Biskupie via Okna and Kuczurmik on to
Czernowitz, the intention being to turn the Austrian positions
south of Zaleszczyki from the rear. We will let the rival communiqués
relate what happened:
_Austrian Version_ _Russian Version_
Annihilated two battalions Annihilated two battalions
of Russian infantry belonging of the Honveds; captured 21
to the Alexander Regiment; officers, over 1,000 rank and
took 1,400 prisoners, and file, and 8 machine guns.
drove Russians back beyond
the Dniester.
The curtain was about to rise for the next act, wherein will be
played one of the most terrific reversals of fortune ever produced
in military history.
For quite a month it had been an open secret that considerable
masses of German troops were being transported to the Carpathian
front. What was not known, however, was the magnitude or the plan
of these preparations. Never was a greater concentration of men
and machinery more silently and more speedily accomplished. All
along the south of the range, on the great Hungarian plains, there
assembled a gigantic host of numerous nationalities. But it was
away to the west, in that narrow bottle neck where the Dunajec
flows from the Polish frontier down to the Tarnow Pass, that the
mighty thunderbolt had been forged. Thousands of heavy guns were
here planted in position, and millions of shells conveyed thither
under cover of night. Countless trains carried war materials, tents,
pontoons, cattle, provisions, etc. Finally the troops arrived--from
the different fronts where they could be spared, and new levies
from Germany and Austria-Hungary. Smoothly and silently men and
machines dropped into their respective places: All was ready; not
a detail had been overlooked; German organization had done its
part. The commander was Von Mackensen, nominally Commander of the
Eleventh German Army, but in reality supreme director of the whole
campaign.
During April, 1915, a number of changes had taken place among the
commanding officers of the Austro-German armies; the new dispositions
of groups along the battle line differ considerably from those
which obtained during the fighting for the passes. The line was
now enormously strengthened, and more compact. This applies only
to the Germanic side; there is little change on the Russian. At
this stage the Russian front on the west of Galicia extended from
Opatovie on the Polish frontier along the Dunajec, Biala, and Ropa
Rivers by Tarnow, Ciezkovice, and Gorlice down to Zboro in Hungary;
from here it runs eastward past Sztropko, Krasnilbrod, Virava,
and Nagy Polena to the Uzsok Pass, a distance of about 120 miles.
Ewarts commanded the army on the Nida; the Dunajec-Biala line was
still held by Dmitrieff, Commander in Chief of the Eighth Russian
Army; Brussilov still commanded the main army of the Carpathians,
and Lechitsky in the Bukowina in the place of Alexeieff, who had
succeeded General Russky in the northern group. The whole southern
group, from the Nida to the Sereth inclusive, was under the supreme
command of General Ivanoff. Facing Dmitrieff on the Dunajec front
stood now the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand, about five army corps, including a German cavalry division
under General von Besser; then the Ninth and Fourteenth Austrian
Army Corps; to their right, several Tyrolese regiments; the Sixth
Austro-Hungarian Army Corps of General Arz von Straussenburg, with
the Prussian Guards on his left and Bavarian troops under Von Emmich
on his right; the Eleventh German Army Corps under Von Mackensen; the
Third Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna; the
Tenth Army Corps under General Martiny. This formidable combination
now confronted the Dunajec-Biala positions, which Dmitrieff had
held without exertion for four months. Only a mile or two away he
still inspected his trenches and conducted his minor operations,
totally unconscious of the brewing storm specially directed against
him. The Laborza district was held by the Archduke Joseph with the
Seventh Army Corps; on his left stood a German corps under Von
Marwitz, and on his right the Tenth Army Corps, north of Bartfeld,
with some additional forces in between. Around the Lupkow and Uzsok
passes the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under Boehm-Ermolli was
stationed where it had been since February, 1915. Next, on the
right, the Austro-Hungarian army corps under Von Goglia; in the
Uzsok lay an army under Von Szurmay, nearly all Magyars, of whom
the chief commander was Von Linsingen. Farther eastward stood a
Prussian corps, embodying a division of Prussian Guards and other
regiments commanded by General Bothmer, a Bavarian, who had been
reenforced with a Hungarian division under Bartheldy; then followed
the corps of Generals Hofmann and Fleischman, composed of all Austrian
nationalities, intrenched in the mountain valleys. More German troops
held the next sector, and, finally, came Von Pflanzer-Baltin's
army groups in the Bukowina and Eastern Galicia. Against this huge
iron ring of at least twenty-four Germanic corps (about 2,000,000
men) and a great store of reserves, the Russians could not muster
more than about fourteen of their own corps. As has already been
pointed out, the greatest disparity of strength existed on the
Dunajec line, where Dmitrieff stood opposed to about half of the
enemy's entire force with only five corps of Russian troops. The
Austro-German forces, moreover, were infinitely better equipped with
munitions and heavy artillery. The lack of big guns was undoubtedly
the reason why the Russians had not attempted an invasion of Hungary.
Hence they stuck to the mountain passes where their opponents were
unable to carry their artillery, although they were amply supplied
with the same. It is true that the Russians could have produced
an equal--or even greater--number of men, but they had not the
arms and accouterments.
Speaking from safe knowledge after the event, it is possible to
indicate with moderate accuracy at least one of the ingenious stratagems
adopted by the Germans to disguise their tremendous preparations
against the Dunajec line. For months the fighting in this region had
never been severe. When, therefore, local attacks and counterattacks
on a small scale started on the Biala, as far back as April 4, 1915,
Dmitrieff and his staff regarded this activity on the Austrians
part as merely a continuation of the sporadic assaults they had
grown accustomed to. Besides holding his own, Dmitrieff had on
several occasions been able to assist Brussilov on his left. Until
the big German drive commenced they had only been opposed to three
Austro-German army corps and a Prussian division; now there were
twelve corps on their front, supplied with enormous resources of
artillery, shells, and cavalry. Most serious of all, Dmitrieff had
neglected to construct second and third lines to which he could
retire in an emergency. Of the rivers that lay behind him--the
Wisloka, the Wistok, and the San--the first would be useful to
cover Brussilov's position at the western passes, but beyond that
he could not retreat without imperiling the whole Carpathian right
flank. It was on this very calculation that the German plan--simple
but effective--was based. The Russian grip on the Carpathians could
only be released either by forcing a clear road through any pass
into Galicia, or by turning one of the extreme flanks. Had the
Austrians succeeded in breaking through as far as Jaslo, Dmitrieff
would have been cut off and Brussilov forced to withdraw--followed
by the whole line. The same result would follow if a thrust from
the Bukowina succeeded in recapturing Lemberg. Both methods had been
attempted, and both had failed. Germany's overwhelming superiority
in artillery could not be effectively displayed in mountain warfare,
but Dmitrieff's position on the Dunajec offered an easy avenue of
approach.
At the eleventh hour Dmitrieff grasped the situation and applied
to Ivanoff for reenforcements. Owing to some blunder the appeal
never reached the Russian chief, and Dmitrieff had to do the best
he could. Nothing now could save his small force from those grim
lines of gaping muzzles turned against his positions. The overture
began on April 28, 1915, with an advance on the Upper Biala toward
Gorlice, by Von Mackensen's right. Here some minor attacks had been
previously made, and the gradually increasing pressure did not
at first reveal the intent or magnitude of the movement behind it.
Meanwhile the German troops about Ciezkovice and Senkova--respectively
northwest and southeast of Gorlice--were moving by night nearer to
the battle line. The Russian front line extended from Ciezkovice in
a southeasterly direction. Hence it soon became clear that Gorlice
itself was to be the main objective of the attack. A Russian official
announcement of May 2, 1915, boldly states:
"During the nights of April 30 to May 1 strong Austrian forces
opened an offensive in the region of Ciezkovice. Our fire forced the
enemy to intrench 600 paces in front of our trenches." Furthermore,
the Germans at the same time had directed artillery fire and bayonet
attacks against various points on the Rava, Pilica, Nida, and the
Dunajec. These, however, were merely movements aiming at diversion,
meant to mask the intentions of the main attack and to mislead
the Russians. On the evening of May 1, 1915, the German batteries
began experimenting against the Russian positions. This was kept up
all night while the engineers attempted to destroy the first line of
the Russian wire entanglements. During the same night the Austrians
dragged several heavy howitzers across the road from Gladyszow to
Malastow, and got them into position without the knowledge of the
Russians. In the morning of May 2, 1915, the great batteries began
to roar against the Russian line--a fire such as had perhaps never
been witnessed before. A spectator thus describes the scene: "In
one part the whole area was covered with shells till trenches and
men were leveled out of existence." It was reported that 700,000
shells had been fired in the space of four hours, for which period
this preliminary bombardment lasted. The Russian line was turned
into a spluttering chaos of earth, stones, trees, and human bodies.
The German and Austrian batteries then proceeded to extend the
range, and poured a hurricane or shells behind the enemy's front
line. This has the effect of doubly isolating that line, by which
the survivors of the first bombardment cannot retreat, neither can
reenforcements be sent to them, for no living being could pass
through the fire curtain. Now is the time for the attacker's infantry
to charge. Along the greater part of the Ciezkovice-Walastow line
this stage was reached by ten o'clock in the morning or May 2,
1915.
A German writer tells us that "in this part or the front infantry
fighting has given place for the time being to the action of our
heavy artillery, which is subjecting to a terrible fire the positions
of the enemy. These positions had been carefully reconnoitered during
the lull in the fighting which prevailed during the last few months.
Only after all cover is destroyed, the enemy's infantry killed or
forced to retire, we take up the attack against the positions;
the _élan_ of our first attack now usually leads to a favorable
result."
At Ciezkovice the Germans pushed bridges across the Biala under
cover of a furious cannonade. Troops were thrown over, and after
a very short struggle the village was taken. The huge oil tanks
soon were in flames and Ciezkovice a heap of smoldering ruins.
The Russian defense crumpled up like smoke; their position blown
out of existence. Their guns were toys compared with those or the
Germans and Austrians. North of Ciezkovice the Prussian Guard and
other German troops under General von François fell upon the Russians
and forced them to retire toward the Olpiny-Biecz line. The ground
of the Russian positions on Mount Viatrovka and Mount Pustki in
front of Biecz had been "prepared" by 21-centimeter (7-inch) Krupp
howitzers and the giant Austrian 30.5-centimeter (10-inch) howitzers
from the Skoda-Werke at Pilsen. The shells of the latter weigh
nearly half a ton, and their impact is so terrific that they throw
the earth up 100 feet high. Whatever had remained of the town of
Gorlice in the shape of buildings or human beings was meanwhile
being wiped out by a merciless spray of shells. Being the center
or an important oil district, Gorlice possessed oil wells, great
refineries, and a sulphuric-acid factory. As the flames spread from
building to building, streets pouring with burning oil, huge columns
of fire stretching heavenward from the oil wells in full blaze,
and, over all, the pitiless hail of iron and explosives pouring
upon them, the horror of the situation in which the soldiers and
civilians found themselves may be faintly imagined. Gorlice was an
inferno in a few hours. When the German infantry dashed into the
town they found the Russians still in possession. Fighting hand
to hand, contesting every step, the Russians were slowly driven
out.
We have mentioned that German troops were moving on Senkova, southeast
of Gorlice, by night. During the last two days of April the Bavarians
captured the Russian position in the Senkova valley. A further
move was made here during the night of May 1-2, 1915, preparatory
to dislodging the Russians from the ground they still held. At
seven o'clock in the morning the big howitzers started to "prepare"
that ground. By ten o'clock it was deemed that every living thing
had perished, when the "fire curtain" was drawn behind the Russian
position. Infantry were then thrown forward--some Bavarian regiments.
To their intense astonishment they were received with a most murderous
fire from Russian rifles, and machine guns. The first attack failed
and many were killed, few getting beyond the wire entanglements.
Cautiously other troops advanced to the battered Russian trenches
cut off from the rear by the artillery screen behind. Yet here
again they met with strenuous resistance in the Zamczysko group of
hills. The Austrian artillery shelled the heights, and the Bavarians
finally took possession. The Tenth Austrian Army Corps had meanwhile
conquered the Magora of Malastow and the majority of the heights
in the Ostra Gora group. On Sunday, May 2, 1915, the Austro-German
armies pierced the Dunajec-Biala line in several places, and by
nightfall the Russians were retreating to their last hope--the line
of the Wisloka. The operations round Gorlice on that day resulted
in breaking the Russian defenses to a depth of over two miles on
a front of ten or eleven miles. Mr. Stanley Washburn wrote from
the battle field at the time: "The Germans had shot their last
bolt, a bolt forged from every resource in men and munitions that
they could muster after months of preparation." Of the Russian
army he said, "it was outclassed in everything except bravery,
and neither the German nor any other army can claim superiority
in that respect."
With the center literally cut away, the keystone of the Russian
line had been pulled out, and nothing remained but to retire. Ten
miles north of Ciezkovice lies the triangle formed by the confluence
of the Dunajec and Biala rivers and the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road.
Within this triangle, commanding the banks of both rivers up to
the Cracow-Tarnow line, the Russians held the three hills marked
402, 419, and 269 which figures express their height in meters.
During February and March, 1915, the Austrians attempted to dislodge
the enemy, but without success. It was now necessary to take those
positions before advance could be made against Tarnow, and the
Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand, undertook the task. At six A. M. on May 2 the Austrian
artillery opened fire against Hill 419 from Mount Val (also within
the triangle), and the opposite bank of the Dunajec. After three
hours' bombardment some regiments of Tyrolese fusiliers, who had
crossed the valley between Mt. Val and 419 and had taken up positions
at the foot of the latter, about 400 yards from the Russian trenches,
were ordered to charge. Dashing up the open, steep slope the fusiliers
were suddenly enfiladed from their right by a spray of machine gun
and rifle fire, killing many and driving back the survivors. Next
day Hill 419 was again fiercely shelled, this time with deadly
effectiveness; but even then the Russians still clung to their
battered ground.
The Austrians now charged the trenches on Hill 412, whence the
fusiliers had been ambushed the previous day. A desperate hand-to-hand
encounter, in which they had to force their way step by step, finally
gave the position to the attackers. The few Russians still left on
419 could not hold out after the loss of 412. They retired northward
on to Height 269, but subsequently followed the general retreat
of the line. Still farther north, almost at the right flank of
Dmitrieff's line, the Austrians effected a crossing of the Dunajec
opposite Otfinow, thus breaking the connection between the West
Galician Army of Dmitrieff, and the neighboring Russian Army on the
Nida--the left wing of the northern groups commanded by Alexeieff.
Just below Tarnow, however, the Russians still held out; losing the
three hills had not quite broken their defense on the Biala. The
right wing of Von Mackensen's army, which had smashed the Russian
front around Gorlice, rapidly moved east in an almost straight line
to reach the Dukla Pass and cut off the retreat of the Russian
troops stationed south of the range between Zboro and Nagy Polena,
in northwest Hungary. The left wing, on the other hand, advanced
in a northeasterly direction, ever widening the breach made in
the enemy's domain. This clever move brought the Germans to the
rear of Tarnow and onto the lines of communications of the Russians
holding it. It also prevented reenforcements from reaching the
truncated end of Dmitrieff's right--or what had been his right--wing.
By pushing on to Dembica and Rzeszow, along which route assistance
could otherwise have been sent to the Russians, Von Mackensen opened
a wide triangle into Western Galicia, by drawing an almost horizontal
line from Gorlice to Radymno, between Jaroslav and Przemysl, and
from there perpendicular down to the Uzsok Pass.
From Uzsok to the Lupkow westward stood the Second Austro-Hungarian
Army under Boehm-Ermolli on the north of the Carpathians. To his left,
southwest of the Magora of Malastow, and adjoining the formidable
Germanic array facing the Dunajec-Biala line lay the Third
Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna. These
two armies, it will be remembered, took part in the first offensive
in January, and had been there ever since. Both of these armies now
began to advance into the triangle, and the brilliant simplicity
of Von Mackensen's geometrical strategy becomes clear. Let one
imagine Galicia as a big stone jar with a narrow neck lying on
the table before him, neck pointing toward the left hand, and he
will obtain an approximately accurate idea of the topographical
conditions. That side of the jar resting on the table represents
the Carpathian range, solid indeed, but with numerous openings:
these are the passes. The upper side of the jar represents the
Russian frontier, across which the invaders had swarmed in and
taken possession of the whole inside, lining themselves right along
the mouths of the passes at the bottom and across the neck upwards.
For months the Austrians vainly endeavored to force an entrance
through the thickest walls--from the lower edge, and from the base
or bottom of the jar (the Bukowina), apparently overlooking the
rather obvious proposition that the cork was the softest part and
_that_ was Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala line. Here at least no mountain
range stood in the way. It may also be regarded as a mathematical
axiom that, given sufficient artillery power, the strongest defense
the wit of man could devise can be smashed. What Mackensen did,
thererore, was to blow a hole through the cork, push in a pair of
scissors up to the rivet, meanwhile opening the blades to an angle
of about forty-five degrees. From the lower or southern shoulder
of the jar the Third Austro-Hungarian Army pushes forward inside,
supported on its right by Boehm-Ermolli, who had been just inside
a long time, but could get no farther. They began to shepherd the
Russian troops around and in the western passes toward the lower
double-edged blade of Von Mackensen's terrible scissors. The Russian
retreat to the Wisloka was a serious disaster for Dmitrieff; he
had been caught napping, and had to pay dearly in men and guns for
not having created a row of alternative positions. His force had
been a cover for Brussilov's operations on both sides of the western
passes as well as for the whole Russian line in the Carpathians. Now
that Von Mackensen had pried the lid off, Brussilov's men in the
south encountered enormous difficulties in extricating themselves
from the Carpathian foothills, suddenly transformed from comparative
strongholds into death-traps and no longer tenable. They suffered
severely, especially the Forty-eighth Division.
Besides the menace from the northwest of Von Mackensen's swiftly
approaching right, a third blade was gradually growing on the deadly
scissors, in the shape of Boehm-Ermolli's and Von Bojna's forces,
threatening to grind them between two relentless jaws of steel. It
is Sunday, the second day of May, 1915; to all intents and purposes
the battle of the Dunajec, as such, was over, and the initial aim
of the Germanic offensive has been attained. The Russian line was
pierced and its defense shattered. Von Mackensen's "Phalanx" was
advancing two mighty tentacles guided by a master mind, remorselessly
probing for the enemy's strongest points. Its formation comprised,
in the northeastern tentacle, the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps
and the Prussian Guards; in the southern, the Bavarians under Von
Emmich and the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under General
Martiny.
On May 3, 1915, Dmitrieff's troops were falling back farther every
hour, continuously fighting rear-guard actions and compelling the
pursuers to conquer every foot of ground. There was a powerful reason
for this stubborn retirement: it was to gain time for Brussilov
to get his men out of their perilous positions and to join the
main line again with Dmitrieff's receding ranks. If this could
be effected, the fatal gap between them--made by Von Mackensen's
battering-ram--would be repaired, and they could once more present
a united front to the enemy. It was mentioned a little farther
back that the Austrians had pierced the Dunajec line at Otfinow,
north of Tarnow, by which was cut in two the hitherto unbroken
Russian battle front, from the Baltic to the Rumanian frontier
(900 miles); the "scissors" at Gorlice had made it three; if
Boehm-Ermolli's drive from the Uzsok upward along the "triangle
line" to Jaroslav succeeds, there will be four separate pieces
of Russian front. But from Tarnow southward to Tuchow, a small
twenty-mile salient on the Biala, the Russians are still in possession
on May 4, 1915, defying the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXIX
RUSSIAN RETREAT
It is a matter for speculation whether the numerous successes achieved
by the Russians against the Austrians and Germans in Galicia and the
Carpathians during the first seven months of the war had begotten
a spirit of overconfidence among the Russian commanders, or whether
it was not in their power to have made more effective preparations
than they had done. We have seen that Dmitrieff had not provided
himself with those necessary safety exits which were now so badly
needed. As no artificially prepared defenses were at hand, natural
ones had to be found. The first defense was irretrievably lost;
the second line was a vague, undefined terrain extending across
the hills between Biala in the west and the River Wisloka in the
east. Between Tuchow and Olpiny, the Mountain Dobrotyn formed one
of the chief defensive positions, being 1,800 feet high and thickly
covered with woods.
Southward, the Lipie Mountain, about 1,400 feet, formed another
strong point. Just below Biecz, close to the road and railroad
leading to Gorlice, a mountain of 1,225 feet, called Wilszak, is the
strategical key to the valley of the lower Ropa. Between Biecz and
Bednarka, the line of defense followed the heights of the Kobylanka,
Tatarovka, Lysa Gora, and of the Rekaw; hence to the east, as the
last defense of the Jaslo-Zmigrod road, lay the intrenched positions
on the Ostra Gora, well within Brussilov's sector. Southward of
the Gorlice-Zmigrod line lay the mountain group of the Valkova,
nearly 2,800 feet high, the last defense of the line of retreat
for the Russian forces from Zboro.
The Wisloka was the third line of defense, only a river, and without
intrenchments. From Dembica to Zmigrod it runs roughly parallel
with the Dunajec-Biala line; its winding course separates it in
places from fifteen to thirty-five miles from the latter river.
Strong hopes were entertained that the Russians would be able to
stem the Germanic torrent by a firm stand on the Wisloka.
A fierce battle raged on the third and fourth of May, 1915, for the
possession of the wooded hills between the Biala and the Wisloka.
The Prussian Guard stormed Lipie Mountain and captured it on the
third; on the fourth they took Olpiny, Szczerzyny and the neighboring
hills at the point of the bayonet.