on the fierceness of the bombardment and its ineffectiveness. On
the 16th they reported that the Germans were pushing several of
their batteries up into closer range, as they had recognized the
uselessness of shooting from a greater distance and on the 18th
they stated that the fire was falling off. On the 22d, finally,
they reported that beginning with the 21st the Germans had been
withdrawing their heavy batteries. They added that a 42-centimeter
mortar had been damaged by the Russian fire, and that "not a single
shot of these mortars has reached the fortress, not a redoubt has
been penetrated. The superiority of the artillery fire evidently
rests with us. The German attack was not only far removed from
placing the fortifications of Ossowetz in a critical position,
it did not even succeed in driving our infantry out of the field
works."
On the 27th of March there was a resumption of the bombardment on
a small scale and another effort began on April 11 with some heavy
guns, ending in an attempted advance which was repulsed without
difficulty by the Russians.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLI
RUSSIAN RAID ON MEMEL
An event in which no great number of troops were concerned, but
which is of importance, because of the feeling which it aroused
in Germany and because it was the first of a series of operations
in what was practically a new theatre of the war was the Russian
invasion of the very northernmost tip of East Prussia. On Thursday,
the 18th of March, 1915, the Russians coming simultaneously from
the north and the east across the border of Courland, moved on the
Prussian city of Memel in several columns. Their troops included
seven battalions of militia with six or eight guns of an old model,
several squadrons of mounted men, two companies of marines, a battalion
of a reserve regiment, and border defense troops from Riga and
Libau, a total of some 6,000 to 10,000 men. The German Landsturm
troops at the Prussian boundary fell back on Memel, not being in
sufficient force to resist the advance. They were finally driven
through the city and across the narrow strip of water known as
the Kurische Haff to the dunes along the shore of the Baltic. The
Russians burned down numerous buildings along the roads on which
they approached, according to the German report, inflicting heavy
damage on fifteen villages. A considerable number of the inhabitants,
including women and children, were removed to Russia, and a number
of civilians were killed. The troops entered the city on the evening
of March 18 and took the mayor and three other men of the town as
hostages. Apparently the Russian commander made some efforts to
restrain his men, but plundering of stores and dwellings nevertheless
occurred. On the 20th of March, 1915, the city was for a time cleared
of Russian troops, but on Sunday, the 21st, other soldiers entered
the town from the north. These were met by German patrols, which
were followed by stronger German forces that had come up from the
south to drive back the invaders. Street fighting followed, and
the Russians were finally thrown out, losing about 150 dead.
The Russians were pursued on March 22 and 23, 1915, and in passing
through Polangen, close to the shore of the Baltic, came under the
fire of German cruisers. They lost some 500 prisoners, 3 guns, 3
machine guns, and ammunition wagons. With the German troops which
cleared the Russians out of Memel was the son of the emperor, Prince
Joachim of Prussia.
Concerning this raid the following official announcement was made
by the Germans on March 18, 1915: "Russian militia troops have
gained a cheap success in the northernmost corner of East Prussia
in the direction of Memel. They have plundered and burned villages
and farms. As a penalty, we have ordered the cities occupied by
us in Russian territory to pay considerable sums in damages. For
every village or farm burned down by these hordes on German soil
three villages or farms of the territory occupied by us in Russia
will be given over to the flames. Each act of damage in Memel will
be answered by the burning of Russian Government buildings in Suwalki
and other capitals of governments."
To this the following Russian official reply was made on March 21,
1915: "The official communiqué of the German Great Headquarters
of the 18th of March concerning the movement of Russian troops
against Memel contains a threat of reprisals to be exacted on Russian
villages and cities held by the enemy on account of the losses
which might be suffered by the population in the neighborhood of
Memel. The Russian General Staff gives public notice that Memel
was openly defended by hostile troops, and that battle was offered
in the streets. Since the civil population took part in this fight
our troops were compelled to reply with corresponding measures.
If, therefore, the German troops should carry out their threat
against the peaceful inhabitants of the Russian territory which
they hold, such acts should be considered not as reprisals but
as independent acts. Responsibility for this, as well as for the
consequences, would rest upon the Germans."
The move against Memel was apparently part of a Russian operation
which was intended also to strike at the city of Tilsit. The German
Great Headquarters reported that for operations intended to seize
the northern regions of East Prussia a so-called Riga-Shavli army
group had been formed under the command of General Apuchtin. While
portions of these troops were active in Memel on March 18, 1915,
the fourteen German Landsturm companies holding Tauroggen, just to
the north of the East Prussian boundary, were attacked by superior
forces and practically surrounded. They fought their way through
to Langszargen with some difficulty, and were being pressed back
on the road to Tilsit when on March 23 German reenforcements came
up and General von Pappritz, leading the Germans, went over to
the offensive.
A heavy thaw made movement of troops anywhere except on the main
roads extremely difficult. Guns were left stuck in the mud, and the
infantry waded to the knee in water, and sometimes to the waist.
It is reported that one of the horses of the artillery literally
was drowned on the road. Germans attacked Tauroggen, where the
enemy had intrenched himself, under an artillery fire directed
from the church tower of the place. On the 28th the town was taken,
after a difficult crossing of the Jura River in front of it, on
the ice. The Germans then exulted in the fact that not a Russian
was left on German soil.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLII
GERMAN INVASION OF COURLAND--CAPTURE OF LIBAU
On the 20th of April, 1915, an announcement was made by the German
Great Headquarters which took the Russians and the world in general
more or less by surprise. It gave the first glimpse to the public
of a group of operations which caused no little speculation in
the minds of strategists. It read:
"The advance troops of our forces operating in northwestern Russia
yesterday reached on a broad front the railway running from Dunaburg
(Dvinsk) to Libau. Thus far the Russian troops present in that
region, including also the remnants of those which took part in the
raid against Memel, have attempted no serious resistance anywhere.
Fighting is now in progress near Shavli."
The advance into Courland here announced had been made by the German
troops at high speed. The forces were under the command of General
von Lauenstein. They had begun to move early on the 27th of April,
in three columns. One of these crossed the Niemen at Schmalleningken,
forming the right wing of the troops engaged in the movement. The
columns of the left wing broke out of East Prussia at its northernmost
point, and moved along the dunes of the Baltic. On the second day
of the forward march it was learned by the leaders of the advancing
troops that the Russians had hastily left their position at Skawdwile,
on the main road from Tilsit to Mitau, to escape being surrounded
on their left flank, and had withdrawn to Shavli by way of Heilmy.
On the third day the German right column crossed the Windawski
Canal under the enemy's fire, and on the afternoon of the 30th
of April this column entered Shavli, which had been set on fire
by the Russians.
[Illustration: GERMAN ADVANCE ON RIGA]
The Germans had now crossed at several points the Libau-Dunaburg
railway. They were in Telsche and Trischki. Their cavalry pushed
ahead at full speed with orders to destroy the railways wherever
it found them. On the road to Mitau they captured Russian machine
guns, ammunition wagons, and baggage, and broke up the railway
tracks to the southwest and northwest of Shavli. The Russians who
had been taken by surprise by this movement had apparently only
weak forces in Courland, and these had retired while reenforcements
were being rushed up by railway. The German infantry, upon the
receipt of reports that the Russians were moving up by rail from
Kovno on their right flank, was ordered to stop its advance and
prepare to hold the Dubissa line, taking up a front running a little
east of south. Cavalry moving forward in the center of the German
advance on the 3d of May, 1915, got within two kilometers of Mitau,
going beyond Grünhof and capturing 2,000 Russians. At Skaisgiry on
the day before 1,000 prisoners had been taken, and Janischki and
Shagory had been occupied far beyond the Libau-Dunaburg railway.
By this time Russian reenforcements were arriving at Mitau in huge
numbers. The German cavalry ultimately fell back after indicting
all possible damage to the communications in their reach.
The Germans prided themselves a good deal on the marching of their
troops in this swift advance. They pointed out that the roads were
in extremely bad condition, the bridges for the most destroyed, and
the population to a large extent hostile. A military correspondent
figured that for a daily march of fifty kilometers, such as was
frequently made in Courland, 62,000 steps of an average of eighty
centimeters were required. This for a day's march of from nine to
ten hours gives an average of five to six kilometers per hour,
some 6,000 to 7,000 steps. That makes in the neighborhood of 100
steps per minute, which the correspondent regarded as a considerable
accomplishment when allowance is made for the fact that this was
kept up hour after hour in full marching equipment.
The column coming from Memel, directed along the Baltic shores,
had been steadily moving on Libau. In preparation for the land
attack German naval vessels on the 29th of April had bombarded the
forts defending the town. On the 6th of May the Russians themselves
blew up one of the forts on the eastern front. The shore batteries
were soon after silenced by German fire. The German troops advancing
from the land side took the forts on the south almost without
opposition. Russian troops which had been unloaded at Mitau and
sent forward toward the southwest were unable to come up in time
to offer any obstacles to the German advance, and on the 8th of
May, at six o'clock in the morning, the German soldiers marched
into Libau, where they took about 1,500 prisoners, twelve guns,
and a number of machine guns.
The Germans immediately turned the metal-working plants of the
city to their uses in the manufacture of chains, barbed wire, etc.
They also found here a large supply of tools for intrenching work.
Most of the Russians of the city had fled. One motive for the German
advance into Courland advanced by their enemies was that it was an
attempt to include a rich section of country in foraging operations,
and it is a fact that the German authorities gave expression to their
satisfaction at seizing a region that was of considerable economic
value. It is apparent, however, in regarding these operations in
the retrospect that they had no small bearing on the German plan
of campaign as a whole. It was at the time that the inroad into
Courland was started that the signal was about to be given for
the great onslaught far to the south on the Dunajec, as described
in the account of the Austro-Russian campaign. As the vast campaign
along the whole eastern front developed, it became more and more
apparent that the position of the German troops in Courland placed
them advantageously for taking the Russian line of defenses, of
which the fortress of Kovno represented the northern end in the flank
in this carrying out of an important part of the vast encircling
movement which took all Poland in its grasp. They were a constant
threat to the all-important Vilna-Petrograd Railway.
In hostile and neutral countries the Courland invasion provoked
comment indicating astonishment at the resources of the Teutonic
powers in being able to extend their lines while already fully
engaged on an enormous front.
The Russians, awakening from their first astonishment, made vigorous
attempts to obtain permanent possession of the Dubissa line. Along
this line the German troops were for a time forced to yield ground
and to go into the defensive and to resist heavy Russian attacks.
Shavli was given up under Russian pressure. By May 14, all the
territory east of the Dubissa and Windau (Vindowa) was reported
free of Germans.
Especially noteworthy among the struggles for the Dubissa was the
fight at Rossiennie, a town which was of special importance because
of its command of the roads centering in it. On the 22d of May, 1915,
an attack was delivered against this place by the First Caucasian
Rifle Brigade with artillery and assisted by the Fifteenth Cavalry
Division. On the 23d the German cavalry which had resisted their
crossing the river drew back, and the Russians here crossed the
Dubissa, approaching Rossiennie from the north. The Germans during
the night moved the greater part of their troops around the western
wing of their opponents and placed them in position for attack.
At daybreak heavy artillery fire was poured upon the Russians from
the German position to the north of Rossiennie, while at the same
time the German infantry fell upon the Russian flank and rolled it
up, with the result that the Russians were compelled to recross
the Dubissa. In the crossing numerous wounded were drowned in the
river. The Germans took 2,500 prisoners and fifteen machine guns.
Similar counterattacks were delivered by the Germans on the River
Wenta. Then, on the 5th of June, 1915, a general offensive was
entered upon by the whole German line on orders from the General
Staff, which carried it beyond the Dubissa, and after heavy fighting
finally secured for the Germans the Windawski Canal, which they
had had to relinquish before. Their troops now slowly pushed their
way back toward Shavli until the city came within reach of their
heavy guns, and took Kuze, twelve kilometers to the northwest of
Shavli on the railway. On the 14th of June, 1915, this series of
operations came to a temporary halt. German official reports pointed
to the fact that among 14,000 prisoners which they had taken there
were only a few officers, and that with these not a single cannon
was captured. They regarded it as showing that the Russians were
getting very cautious in the use of their artillery and were short
of officers.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLIII
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM KOVNO--FOREST BATTLES IN MAY AND JUNE
Offensives on a large scale such as that which had been prevented
by the "Winter Battle of the Mazurian Lakes" were not attempted by
the Russians on their northern wing after the short counterattack
that had pushed their lines into the Mlawa angle in the corner of
the Vistula and the Prussian boundary beyond Przasnysz, to the
east of Thorn. They virtually remained in their strongly fortified
positions along the Narew, the Bobr, and the Niemen, except for
the sending out of occasional attacking columns against the German
lines lying opposite to them.
These forward thrusts were made especially from the fortresses
Grodno and Kovno, and the fortified place Olita. We have already
dealt with one such operation which came to grief in the forest
of Augustowo in March. The German invasion of Courland had taken
place, and the extension of the German lines to the north invited
a thrust at their communications when, in the middle of May, the
Russians attempted to break through the German lines with columns
starting from the great forest to the west of Kovno. Here German
troops under General Litzmann, acting under the command of General
von Eichhorn, stood on guard. When Litzmann received information
that the Russians were advancing in force he was obliged hastily
to gather such troops as he could find to stem the Russian attack.
Troop units from a large variety of different organizations were
freshly grouped practically on the battle field. At Szaki and
Gryszkabuda, on May 17-20, they struck the Russians with such force
that the Slavs were driven back into the forests.
The German general now decided to clear this territory of his enemies,
as it had given them a constant opportunity for the preparation of
moves which could not be readily observed, because of the protection
of the thick woods. Again he executed the favorite maneuver of Von
Hindenburg's armies. He gathered as heavy a weight of troops as
possible on his left wing and pushed them forward in an extended
encircling movement. From the south a strong column from Mariampol
and the line of the Szsczupa moved upon the fortified position of
the Russians and the southern corner of the great forest, meeting
with strong resistance at Dumbowa Ruda. The troops moving down
from the northern part of the woods swung to their right to cut
off the Russians from their retreat toward Kovno. By the time the
operations had reached this stage it was the second week in June,
1915, and in the great pine forests extending for miles there was
an oppressive heat with perfect absence of breeze. Three Russian
positions lying in the river valleys in the forest were encircled
one after another from the north and had to be given up.
The Russians recognized the danger of the concentric attack directed
at them and fought with great bravery. They strove to keep open the
road of their retreat toward Kovno as long as possible. However,
the ring of the German troops closed swiftly. At Koslowa Ruda, in
the southern part of the forest, they found at night a sleeping
army; something like 3,000 Russians had lain down exhausted in
order on the next day to find the last opening through which to
make their escape. They were now saved the trouble and were led
away prisoners. The great forest was cleared of Russians. The German
move had served to insure the safety of the lines connecting the
troops in Courland with their bases to the south of the Niemen.
In an official announcement of the 18th of March, 1915, the German
Government sketched the line held in the east by the German troops
northward of the front covered by joint German and Austrian forces.
It read: "The line occupied by us in the east runs from the Pilica,
along the Rawka and Bzura to the Vistula. North of the Vistula
the line of our troops is continued from the region to the east
of Plozkz by way of Zurominek-Stupsk (both south of Mlawa). From
there it runs in an easterly direction through the region to the
north of Przasnysz--south of Mystinez, south of Kolno--to the north
of Lomza, and strikes the Bobr at Mocarce. From here it follows the
line of the Bobr to northwest of Ossowetz, which is under our fire,
and runs by way of the region to east of Augustowo, by Krasnopol,
Mariempol, Pilwiszki, Szaki, along the border through Tauroggen to
the northwest. This is from beginning to end entirely on hostile
soil." This long line, it appears, was under the supreme command
of Von Hindenburg, while Von Mackensen had charge of the great
drive to the south.
The statement here quoted was issued as reassurance to Germans
who had been made nervous by reports of a Russian invasion of East
Prussia, and was connected with the Russian raid on Memel.
Until June there was practically no change in this great line,
except that on its northern end it was swung outward into Russian
territory to include a large part of Courland, the River Dubissa
roughly forming the dividing line until the front swung eastward
toward Libau, in the line of the Libau-Dunaburg Railway.
The tasks of both German and Russian troops were similar. Comparatively
weak German forces held the front in the region of the Niemen, the
Bobr, and the Narew, safeguarding such Russian territory as had
been seized by the Germans, and protecting East Prussia against
invasion. Opposed to them lay considerable Russian forces whose task
it was, supported by the fortresses of the Narew and the Niemen,
especially Grodno, to protect the flank and rear of the Russians
standing in Warsaw and southward in the bend of the Vistula, with
the Warsaw-Vilna Railway behind them, while great decisions were
fought for in the Carpathians and Galicia.
In Poland, between the lower and the upper courses of the Vistula,
the Germans about the middle of February, 1915, having occupied
the Rawka-Sucha ridge of upland, had developed fortified positions
along the rivers Bzura, Rawka, Pilica, and Nida. The bad weather of
the winter and early spring, which had turned the roads of Poland
into pathless morasses, made against extensive operations, and the
momentous undertakings carried out on the wings of the eastern front
led the German General Staff to refrain from important movements in
this section, where the Russians had strongly fortified themselves
for the protection of Warsaw. It was not until the Teutonic allies had
gone over to the offensive in the Carpathians and in western Galicia,
and the Russians had withdrawn to the Polish hills of Lysa-Gora early
in May, that, favored by improved weather conditions, operations in
this part of Poland again took on larger scope. Especially along
the Bzura the German attacks again became violent in an effort
to hold the Russian forces in the district to the west of Warsaw
while thrusting at their wings from the south and north. However,
fighting was not of great consequence in this middle sector until
the middle of June, 1915.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLIV
CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN POLAND--MOVEMENT UPON WARSAW
By the 1st of July, 1915, the stupendous enveloping campaign of
the Teuton armies on the eastern front had advanced to a point
where the Allies were forced to recognize the imminence of a
catastrophe, which could be averted only by the most decisive action
of the Russian armies.
Far in the north, on the extreme right wing of the Russians, the
army of General von Bülow was hammering at the defenses of the Dubissa
line. Off and on fighting was taking place in the neighborhood of
Shavli. Russian counterattacks, reported from day to day through
June, with difficulty had held in check this army, which evidently
was aiming at the Warsaw-Petrograd Railway on the sector between
Vilna and Dvinsk. On the right flank of these forces operated the
troops of General von Eichhorn, with the line of the Niemen for
their objective. Next to these on the south, aiming at the Bobr
River and the Upper Narew, were the forces of General von Scholtz,
and on their right the army of Von Gallwitz, based on Mlawa with
Przasnysz in front of it. Below the line of the Vistula, before
the Bzura and down to the middle course of the Pilica, operated
the Ninth German Army, commanded, at least in the later stages
of the Warsaw campaign, by Prince Leopold of Bavaria. The whole
group of northern and central armies was acting under the general
direction of Field Marshal von Hindenburg.
The armies to the south of this group, cooperating in the drive
under Field Marshal von Mackensen which had gained the Teutons
Przemysl and Lemberg, had as their left flank the forces of Generals
von Woyrsch and Kövess between the Pilica and the Vistula mouth
of the San. The troops of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand were pushing
forward on the right of these, and the army directly under Mackensen
himself came next in line to the eastward, joining up with the
armies still operating in Galicia at the extreme right of the great
German battle line.
The chief danger to the Russians at this stage still threatened
from the south, where the archduke and Mackensen had pushed forward
irresistibly in their advance to the east of the Vistula toward
the railway running from Warsaw through Ivangorod, Lublin, Cholm,
and Kovell to Kiev and Moscow.
The advance of these Austro-German armies, which had operated in
the neighborhood of Lemberg, was extremely rapid in the last days
of June, 1915. In four days they covered from thirty to forty miles
in pursuit of the Russians. By the 1st of July, having swept out of
Galicia, their right, under Mackensen, entered the upper valley of
the Wieprz, a marshy country which presented considerable difficulty
to the advance of troops where a tributary of the Wieprz, the Por,
afforded the Russians a natural line of defense. Drasnik, on the
Wyznica, which here extended the Russian defensive line westward,
was occupied by the archduke's forces on Mackensen's left on the
1st of July, 1915.
The drive of the Austro-German armies through Galicia has been
dealt with in the account of the Austro-Russian campaign. As we
carry forward the account of the activities of the greatest part
of the forces concerned in that series of operations from the point
where they crossed over the boundary between Galicia and Poland
out of Austrian territory, it will be well to glance backward a
moment to enumerate here briefly the gains of these armies on Polish
soil up to the 1st of July.
On June 16, 1915, the Teutonic allies forced the Russians to fall
back upon Tarnograd from north of Siemandria, thus pushing this
section of the front across the boundary into Poland about to the
line of the Tanev. Tarnograd itself was occupied by the Teutons
on the 17th, and on the 18th the Russians retreated behind the
Tanev. There was little change in this particular sector during the
fighting which was crowned for the Austro-Germans by the capture
of Lemberg on June 22, 1915. Further to the east, however, to the
south of the Pilica and west of the Vistula, Von Woyrsch was exerting
pressure, and on the 20th of June Berlin announced the capture of
several Russian advance posts by these troops. By the 24th the
Slavs had begun to retreat before Von Woyrsch in the forest region
south of the Ilza on the left bank of the Vistula; thus rear guards
had been thrown across the Kamienna, and Sandomir was occupied
by the Austro-Hungarians. On the 25th the fighting developed on
the line Zarvichost-Sienno-Ilza, to which the Russians had fallen
back.
Defeats of the Russian rear guards on June 29, 1915, to the northeast
and west of Tomaszow, where Teutonic forces had now also crossed
into Poland, caused the Slavs to begin the relinquishment of the
Tanev forest district and the lower San. Tomaszow itself was occupied
by the pursuing troops. By the 30th the Teutonic allies had swept
forward beyond the Tanev region to Franpol, Zamoez, and Komarovo,
and on the same evening they threw the Russians out of their strong
defenses on the Zavichost-Ozarow-Sienno line, west of the Vistula.
The pursuit was pushed energetically on both sides of the Kamienna.
The important bridgehead on the Vistula, Josefovo, was taken on
the 1st of July.
The Russians between the Bug and the Vistula were now offering strong
resistance with large forces on the line Turobin-Krasnik-Josefovo,
the rivers Por and Wyznica forming roughly their defensive front,
as previously pointed out.
In its daily bulletins of July 1, 1915, the German Great Headquarters
made this announcement for the eastern theatre of war (from the
Baltic to the Pilica): "The booty for June is: Two colors, 25,595
prisoners, including 121 officers, seven cannon, six mine throwers,
fifty-two machine guns, one aeroplane, also a large amount of war
material." For the southeastern theatre of war (from the Pilica to
Bukowina) the headquarters announced: "The total booty for June
of the allied troops fighting under the command of General von
Linsingen, Field Marshal von Mackensen, and General von Worysch
is 409 officers, 140,650 men, 80 cannon, 268 machine guns." The
Austro-Hungarian General Staff on the same day reported: "The total
booty for June of the troops fighting under Austro-Hungarian command
in the northeast is 521 officers, 194,000 men, 93 cannon, 364 machine
guns, 78 ammunition wagons, 100 field railway carriages, etc."
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLV
BATTLE OF KRASNIK--CAPTURE OF PRZASNYSZ
On July 2, 1915, the forces of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand which
had passed through Krasnik, on the Lublin road, struck serious
resistance from the Russian army of General Loesche which held
strong positions across the highway, just to the north of the town,
and was now evidently determined to stop once for all the Teuton
advance toward the railway at its back, connecting Warsaw with
Kiev, through Lublin and Cholm.
On July 3, 1915, the Austrian report, however, announced that 4,800
prisoners and three machine guns had been taken in the neighborhood
of Krasnik and along the Por stream, and the next day they reported
that they had occupied the heights which run along to the north of
the city, having pierced the enemy's main position on both sides
of Studzianki, and taken more than 1,000 prisoners, three machine
guns and three cannon.
The Russian front was turned to such an extent that they had to
fall back some three miles on the Lublin road. The Austrians on the
5th of July summed up their enemy's losses as twenty-nine officers,
8,000 men, six cannon, five ammunition wagons, and six machine
guns. As the result of this Austrian advance the adjoining enemy
forces to the eastward along the Wieprz River had been obliged to
fall back beyond Tarnograd, and by the 6th of July Vienna summarized
the Austrian captures in these battles as having grown to forty-one
officers, 11,500 men.
The Austrians, however, could make no further headway. On July
5, 1915, they were heavily attacked, being forced back to their
intrenched lines on a ridge of hills to the north of Krasnik. The
Russians now reported that they had taken 15,000 prisoners and a
large number of machine guns. Two thousand bodies were reported by
the Russians to have been found before their front. More prisoners
were taken by the Russians on the 7th and it was only on the afternoon
of July 9 that the Austrians were able to stem the tide. The total
loss of the Austrians in this action was given by their opponents
as 15,000 men.
The Austrian explanation of their retirement in front of Krasnik
issued on July 11, 1915, pointed out that the relative subsidence
of activity of the Teutonic allies was due to the fact that the
goal set for the Lemberg campaign had now been attained. This,
they explained, was the taking of the city and the securing of
strong defensive positions to the east and north. The ridge to
the northward of Krasnik was a natural choice for this purpose on
the north, while the line of the Zlota Lipa and Bug rivers served
the purpose toward the east (see Austro-Russian campaign). The
Austrian explanation pointed out further that some of their troops
had rushed beyond the positions originally selected to meet heavy
reenforcements brought up by the Russians from Lublin, and that
these had to withdraw to the ridge, where they were successfully
resisting all attacks.
The battle of Krasnik was regarded by the Russians as an effective
victory, for it seemed to have halted the advance on Lublin. The
army of Von Mackensen had now also come to a stop about halfway
between Zamosc and Krasnostav, an artillery duel on July 7, 1915,
being the last activity noted on the front of this army for some
time.
Their comparative quiet in the region between the Vistula and the
Bug where the main advance of the Teutonic forces on the south
had been under way with great vigor for several weeks until the
check at Krasnik was not interrupted until July 16, 1915. Day after
day the Teutonic headquarters reported "nothing of importance"
in this quarter. When the quiet was finally broken it appeared
that it had been the lull before the storm. Before taking up again
the activities on this section of the front, it will be necessary
to take a glance toward the northern half of the great arc that
enveloped the Warsaw salient on two sides.
In these early days of July, 1915, considerable uncertainty prevailed
among those who were watching the progress of the campaign in Poland
as to where the heaviest blow of the Teutons would fall, whether
from the south or the north. The decisive stroke came with lightning
suddenness. A tremendous attack was launched in the direction of
the Narew by the army of General von Gallwitz.
A laconic announcement of the German General Staff on July 14,
1915, bore momentous news, although its modest wording scarcely
betrayed the facts. It read: "Between the Niemen and the Vistula,
in the region of Walwarga, southwest of Kolno, near Przasnysz and
south of Mlawa, our troops have achieved some local successes." The
Russian report referring to the beginning of the same action was
equally noncommittal, though possibly more misleading. This states:
"Considerable enemy forces between the Orczy and the Lidynja adopted
the offensive and the Russians declining a decisive engagement
retreated during the night of the 13th to the second line of their
positions."
On July 15, 1915, the Germans announced that the city of Przasnysz,
for which such hot battles had been fought in February, and which
had since been strongly fortified by the Russians, had been occupied
by them. The German summary of this action given out a few days
later stated that three Russian defensive lines lying one behind
the other northwest and northeast of Przasnysz had been pierced
and taken, the troops at once rushing forward to Dzielin and Lipa,
respectively west and east of the town. Under attack from these
two points the Russians after yielding Przasnysz, on the 14th,
retired to their defensive line Ciechanow-Krasnosielc which had been
prepared long beforehand. On the 15th the German troops pressing
closer upon the retiring Slavs stormed this line and broke through
it to the south of Zielona on a breadth of seven kilometers, forcing
the Russians again to retire. General von Gallwitz's troops in
this assault were supported by the forces of General von Scholtz,
on their left, who were pressing the Russians from the direction
of Kolno. On July 16, 1915, the Russians were retreating on the
whole front between the Pissa and the Vistula, toward the Narew.
The German summary of the fighting during these days reported the
capture by the army of General von Gallwitz of eighty-eight officers,
17,500 men, thirteen cannon (including one heavy gun), forty machine
guns, and seven mine throwers; and by the army of General von Scholtz
of 2,500 prisoners and eight machine guns.
This great attack in the north, to which may be ascribed the final
breaking of the lines that had so long protected Warsaw, had been
carefully planned and undoubtedly was timed in coordination with
the movements of Mackensen's armies on the south, striking the
Russians just when Mackensen and the Archduke Josef, having had
time for recuperation and preparation for another push forward after
the check administered at Krasnik, were in readiness to inflict
a heavy blow on their side of the Warsaw salient. When it began
the German lines all along the front burst into fresh activity. It
was the signal for a simultaneous assault along nearly a thousand
miles of battle front.
In the Mlawa sector to the north of Przasnysz the Russians had
developed an exceedingly strong system of fortified positions between
their advance lines and the Narew fortresses. For miles, to a depth
of from fifteen to twenty kilometers, there ran some three or four
and at certain points even five systems of trenches, one behind
the other. Hundreds of thousands of thick tree trunks had been
worked into these defensive works and millions of sand bags piled
up as breastwork. Bombproof dugouts had been constructed deep in
the ground. Everywhere there were strong wire entanglements before
the front, sometimes sunk below the level of the earth, arranged in
from two to three rows. Projecting bastions and thoroughly protected
observation posts gave these systems of trenches the character of
permanent fortifications.
The country in this region is hilly, with here and there steep
declivities and peaks of considerable elevation. The Russians had
cut down whole stretches of forest in order to afford them a free
field for their fire and an opportunity to observe the advance of
their opponents. Enveloping tactics on the part of the Germans
were here quite excluded as the two lines ran uninterruptedly close
to one another. Przasnysz which had become a heap of ruins had
been converted virtually into a fortress by strong defensive works
built while the Germans and Russians lay opposite each other in
front of it throughout the spring. The country round about had
been drenched with much German and Russian blood.
General von Gallwitz, to capture a place with the least possible
loss, decided to break through the Russian defenses at two points
at both sides of the town sufficiently close to each other so that
the intervening lines would be immediately affected. His attacks
were therefore directed at the first line Russian positions, which
formed projecting angles to the northwest and northeast of Przasnysz
so that instead of taking the city directly from the front he would
seize it as with a gigantic pair of pincers from both sides and
behind. The plan succeeded to the full. The Russian lines were
broken on both sides of the city and the German troops, rushing
through, met behind it, forcing the Russian defenders hastily to
evacuate the place to avoid being caught within the circle.
Strong infantry forces were collected opposite the points of attack,
and enormous masses of artillery were placed in position with abundance
of ammunition in readiness. The preparations had been made with
all possible secrecy and even when the German batteries had begun
gradually to get their range by testing shots no serious assault
seems to have been expected by the Russians. On the morning of the
attack they were just to inaugurate service on a small passenger
railway line they had constructed behind their front.
On the morning of July 13, 1915, soon after sunrise, a tremendous
cannonade was let loose from guns of all calibers. Although the
weather was rainy and not well fitted for observation the German
guns seem to have found their marks with great accuracy. When the
German infantry stormed the first line of works which had been
shattered by the artillery fire they met with comparatively little
resistance and their losses were small. The bombardment apparently
had done its work thoroughly. The German infantry rushes were started
in successive intervals of a quarter of an hour, line following
line. Swarms of unarmed Russians could be seen coming out of the
trenches seeking to save themselves from the terrible effect of
the shell fire by surrendering. During the course of the forenoon
the sun came out and illuminated a scene of terrific destruction.
The Russian positions on the heights northwest of Przasnysz had
been completely leveled. In their impetuous forward rush the German
troops did not give the enemy time to make a stand in his second
line of trenches and overrunning this, by night began to enter
the third Russian defensive line. Przasnysz was flanked in the
course of twenty-four hours and could no longer be held. A fine
rain was falling as the German columns marched through the deserted,
smoke-blackened city, a melancholy setting for a victory.
On July 14, 1915, the German troops had broken through on both sides
of the city, met to the south of it and forming a mighty battering
ram, on the next day, forced the next Russian line, the last, to the
north of the Narew. This ran through Wysogrod-Ciechanow-Zielona
to Kranosiele. The Russians here made a desperate defense and the
German advance pushed forward but slowly. The effect of the German
artillery fire seems not to have been as striking as on the first
day of battle. The German report of the attack on this line points
out that the regiment of the Guard holding the right wing of a
division which was to attack the heights to the south and southeast
of Zielona was impatient to go forward, and was allowed to advance
before the reserves which were to be held in readiness to support
the move had come up.
However, confident of the accuracy with which the "black brothers"
(shells from the big guns) struck the enemy's trenches, the riflemen
leapt forward through fields of grain as soon as they saw that a
gust of their shells had struck in front of them. By means of signs
which been agreed upon they then signaled their new positions and
the guns laid their fire another hundred meters farther forward. The
infantrymen then stormed ahead into the newly made shell craters.
Thus they went forward again and again. Neither Russian fire nor the
double barbed wire entanglements were able to check their assaults.
As the German shouts rolled forth the Russians ran. A neighboring
division consisting of young men who had enlisted in the course
of the war, in a brilliant charge took a bastion at Klosnowo. The
effect of this first penetration of the Russian main position made
itself felt in the course of the afternoon and night along the
whole front. Further German forces were thrown into the breach and
strove to widen it.
The Russians at many points resisted obstinately, but under the
pressure from the front and in the flank they were finally unable
to hold their ground. The German account speaks with admiration
of the ride to death of a Russian cavalry brigade which attacked
the German infantry southeast of Opinozura without achieving any
results. Cossacks and Hussars were mowed down in an instant.
The German advance taking several intermediate places did not halt
until it stood before the fortification of the Narew line itself.
As a result or this stroke the German troops had advanced some
forty to fifty kilometers into hostile territory on a breadth of a
hundred and twenty kilometers and had captured some 10,000 prisoners
and much war material. By the 18th of July, 1915, German trains
were running as far as Ciechanow.
Advances were likewise made by the Germans to the right of the attack
on the Przasnysz positions on both sides of the Mlawa-Ciechanow
Railway, rolling up the Russian positions as far as Plonsk. On
the left progress had also been made and heavy fighting done, but
the German great headquarters pointed out that in times to come
history will assign the important place to the central feature of
this great offensive by General von Gallwitz, that is the enveloping
attack at Przasnysz and the ramming thrust at Zielona.
The report issued by the Russian General Staff on July 19, 1915,
admitted that to the west of Omulev their troops had withdrawn
to the Narew bridgeheads on the 17th. The points of some of the
German columns on this day, in fact, came within the range of the
artillery of the fortress of Novo-Georgievsk and the army of General
von Scholtz reached the line of the Bobr and the Narew between
Osowice and Ostrolenka. The action at Przasnysz had been decisive.
It resulted ultimately in the relinquishing by the Russians of the
lines of the Rawka and Bzura which had been so stubbornly held
against the Germans in the long defense of Warsaw. The troops directly
charged here with defending the capital fell back to the Blonie
lines about fifteen miles from the city.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLVI
GRAND OFFENSIVE ON THE WARSAW SALIENT
The great stroke at Przasnysz was the most dramatic feature of a
grand offensive all around the German lines that were endeavoring
to close in upon the Russian armies. On July 16, 1915, the Archduke
Joseph struck hard at the Russians on the Krasnik-Lublin road in
an endeavor to carry the fortified positions at Wilkolaz. His men,
however, were thrown back after ten furious assaults. Krasnostav,
on the road to Cholm, was attacked on the same day by the army or
General von Mackensen, and after a series of desperate rear-guard
actions had been fought by the Russians was swept over by the German
Allies. By the close of the day the Germans had taken twenty-eight
officers, 6,380 men, and nine machine guns.
The Germans, prepared in the recent pause in the fighting, by the
bringing up of their artillery on the long lines of communication
which now stretched behind them, with troops reenforced by such
fresh forces as they could muster, were hurling themselves upon
the Russian defensive positions everywhere along the line. Thus,
on the forenoon of July 17, 1915, the army of General von Woyrsch,
whose objective was the mighty fortress Ivangorod, operating just
to the west of the upper Vistula, broke through the Russian wire
entanglements and stormed the enemy's trenches on a stretch of
2,000 meters. The breach was widened in desperate hand-to-hand
combat. The Teutons by evening inflicted a heavy defeat on the
Moscow Grenadier Corps at this point and the Russians were forced
to retreat behind the Ilzanka to the south of Swolen. Some 2,000
men were taken prisoners by the Germans in this battle and five
machine guns were captured.
Far in the northeast in Courland the army of General von Bülow,
on July 17, 1915, defeated Russian forces that had been rushed up
at Alt-Auz, taking 3,620 prisoners, six cannon and three machine
guns, and pursuing the Slavs in an easterly direction. Desperate
fighting was also taking place to the northeast of Kurschany.
Notes of anxiety mixed with consoling speculations had begun to
appear in the press of the allied countries when the vast German
offensive had thus become plainly revealed and had demonstrated
its driving force. A Petrograd dispatch to the London "Morning
Post" on the 15th of July, 1915, said of the German plan that it
was to catch the Russian armies like a nut between nut crackers,
that the two fronts moving up from north and south were intended
to meet on another and grind everything between them to powder.
The area between the attacking forces was some eighty miles in
extent, north to south, by 120 miles west to east. The writer offered
the consolation that this space was well fortified, the kernel of
the nut "sound and healthy, being formed of the Russian armies,
inspired not merely with the righteousness of their cause, but
the fullest confidence in themselves and absolute devotion to the
proved genius of their commander in chief."
The dispatch pointed out that it was all sheer frontal fighting,
that the Germans had been twelve months trying frontal attacks
against Warsaw on a comparatively narrow front and in vain. What
chance had they, he added, "of success by dividing their forces
against the united strength of Russia." This sort of argument is
typical of the endeavor to sustain the hopes of Russia's friends
during these days. Doubts, however, began to creep in more strongly
as to the possibility of holding Warsaw.
In Berlin the announcement of the Teutonic victories that began
with the successful assault at Przasnysz was received with general
rejoicing, and the appearance of flags all over the city. The Russian
retreat toward the Narew River in particular was regarded by the
military critics as threatening momentarily to crumble up the right
flank of the positions of the Russians before the capital of Poland.
[Illustration: GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO REACH WARSAW IN 1914]
Cholm and Lublin on the southern line of communication of the Russian
armies were now in imminent danger. On July 19, 1915, came the
announcement that the troops under Field Marshal von Mackensen,
which had pierced the Russian line in the region of Pilaskowice and
Krasnostav, had increased their successes, and that the Russians
were making the most desperate effort to prevent complete defeat.
All day the battle had swayed in a fierce struggle for mastery.
The Russians threw a fresh division of the Guards into the fight,
but this too had to yield to the overwhelming force of the Teuton
onslaught. Farther to the east as far as the neighborhood of Grabowiec,
Austro-Hungarian and German troops forced the crossing of the Wolica,
and near Sokal in Galicia Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the Bug. (See
Austro-Russian Campaign.) In consequence of these Teuton successes
the Russians on the night of the 18th to the 19th of July retreated
along the whole front between the Vistula and the Bug--practically
the last line of defense, for the Warsaw-Kiev railway had been
broken down. The German troops and the corps under the command
of Field Marshal von Arz alone from the 15th to the 18th of July,
1915, took 16,250 prisoners and 23 machine guns.
It was announced by the Germans that according to written orders
captured during this action the Russian leaders had resolved to
hold the positions here conquered by the Germans to the utmost,
regardless of losses.
The same day that brought the report of this Russian retreat on
the south brought the news that in the adjoining sector to the
west of the Upper Vistula the army of General von Woyrsch had met
resistance from the Russians behind the Ilzanka after the Russian
defeat on July 13, 1915, that, however, Silesian Landwehr on the
18th had captured the Russian defenses at Ciepilovo by storm, and
that the Russian line at Kasonow and Barenow was beginning to yield.
The army of General von Gallwitz had now taken up positions along the
whole Narew line from southwest of Ostrolenka to Novo Georgievsk.
The Russians, however, as already indicated, were still holding
fortified places and bridgeheads on the right bank of the river.
In this sector the number of prisoners taken by the Germans had
risen to 101 officers and 28,760 men.
In the sector next adjoining, passing onward around the enveloping
lines, that lying between the Pissa and the Szkwa, the Russians
likewise had retreated until they stood directly on the Narew.
Here the Slavs had been favored by forests and swampy land which
made pursuit difficult.
At the extreme left end of the German line a magnificent success
had been achieved in the occupation of Tukkum and Windau. This
capture brought the Germans to within fifty miles of Riga, seat of
the governor general of the Baltic provinces. They were, however,
destined not to make any substantial progress in the direction of
that city for many months to come.
Blow fell upon blow. The question "Can Warsaw be held?" began to
receive doubtful answers in the allied capitals. The colossal coordinate
movement of the Teutonic forces in these July days had received so
little check from the Russian resistance that the British press
had begun to discount the fall of the Polish capital. Shortness
of ammunition and artillery was ascribed as the cause of Russia's
failure to make a successful stand against the onrushing Teutons.
On July 20, 1915, Berlin announced the capture of those fortifications
of Ostrolenka lying on the northwest bank of the Narew River. This was
one or the strong places designed to protect the Warsaw-Grodno-Petrograd
railway. The threatened fall was highly significant. To the south
of the Vistula the Teuton troops had advanced to the Blonie-Grojec
lines. Blonie is some seventeen miles west of Warsaw and Grojec
twenty-six miles south of the city.
Farther eastward and to the south troops of the army of General
von Woyrsch had completely turned the enemy out of the Ilzanka
positions, having repulsed the counterattacks of the Russian reserves
which had been quickly brought up, and captured more than 5,000
prisoners. Von Woyrsch's cavalry had now reached the railway line
from Radom to the great fortress of Ivangorod, the objective point
of this army, and Radom itself had been seized.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLVII
BEGINNING OF THE END
So uncertain had grown the positions of Lublin on the southern
railway line leading to Warsaw that the Russian commander in chief
had issued an order that in case of a retreat the male population
of the town was to attach itself to the retiring troops.
On July 21, 1915, the Russians throughout the empire were reported
to be joining in prayer. "Yesterday evening," telegraphed the London
"Daily, Mail's" Petrograd correspondent on the 21st, "the bells in
all the churches throughout Russia clanged a call to prayer for a
twenty-four hours' continual service of intercession for victory.
"To-day, in spite of the heat, the churches were packed. Hour after
hour the people stand wedged together while the priests and choirs
chant interminable litanies. Outside the Kamian Cathedral here an
open-air Mass is being celebrated in the presence of an enormous
crowd."
The chronicle of the closing days of July, 1915, is an unbroken
narrative of forward movements of German armies on all parts of
the great semicircle. The movement now, however, was slow. The
Russians were fighting desperately, and the Germans had to win
their way inch by inch. By the 21st the Russians were withdrawing
in Courland to the east of the line Popeljany-Kurtschany, and the
last Russian trenches westward of Shavly had been taken by assault.
To the north of Novgorod the capture of Russian positions had yielded
2,000 prisoners and two machine guns to the Germans on the 20th.
Farther south on the Narew a strong work of the fortress Rozan
defending an important crossing was stormed by the Germans, and
desperate fighting was going on at Pultusk and near Georgievsk.
Already the Russians were beginning to yield their positions to
the west of Grojec, which meant that the Teuton armies were about
to push into the opening between Warsaw and Ivangorod and divide the
Russian forces. The armies of Von Woyrsch on July 20, 1915, seized
a projecting bridgehead to the south of Ivangorod, and captured the
lines that had been held by the Russians near Wladislavow.
In the positions defending the railway between Cholm and Lublin,
Russian resistance was once more marked, and was checking the progress
of the armies of Von Mackensen and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.
By noon of July 21, 1915, the Silesian troops of Von Woyrsch had
stormed the bridgehead on the Vistula between Lagow and Lugawa-Wola,
with the result that Ivangorod was now inclosed from the south,
while to northwest of the fortress Austro-Hungarian troops were
fighting on the west bank of the Vistula. Austro-Hungarian troops
too were battling their way close up to the fortress directly from
the west. Line after line was giving way before the Teutons. The
Russian retreat over the bridge at Novo Alexandria to the south
of Ivangorod was carried on under the fire of German artillery.
Numerous villages set afire by the Russians were now sending great
clouds of smoke into the sky over all this region.
The troops of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, after a stubborn resistance
on the part of the Russians, seized enemy positions on July 21,
1915, near Chodel and Borzechow, advancing another step toward
Lublin. Eight thousand Russian prisoners, 15 machine guns, and 4
ammunition wagons were taken.
By the 23d of July, 1915, the Teutonic troops were close up to
the encircling forts of Ivangorod and stood on the Vistula all
the way between the fortress and the mouth of the Pilica. On the
24th the Teutons announced a victory over the Fifth Russian Army
by General von Bülow at Shavli. The report read: "After ten days
of continuous fighting, marching, and pursuit, the German troops
yesterday succeeded in bringing the Russians to a stand in the
regions of Rozalin and Szadow and in defeating them and scattering
their forces. The booty since the beginning of this operation on
the 14th of July consists of 27,000 prisoners, 25 cannon, 40 machine
guns, more than 100 loaded ammunition wagons with their draft animals,
numerous baggage wagons and other material."
This day brought the announcement also of the capture of the fortresses
of Rozan and Pultusk on the Narew, after violent charges by troops
of General von Gallwitz. The crossing of the Narew between these
places was now in German hands, and strong forces were advancing
on the southern shore. The Russians had been resisting obstinately
in this quarter, and the Germans had made their way only by the
most heroic efforts. German headquarters announced at this time
that in the battles between the Niemen and the Vistula covering
the ten days since July 14, 1915, more than 41,000 prisoners, 14
cannon, and 19 machine guns had been captured. The German troops
now also attained the Vistula to the north of the Pilica. In their
summing up of results since the 14th of July the Teutons recounted
further on this day, the 24th, that some 50,000 prisoners had been
taken by the armies of General von Woyrsch and Field Marshal von
Mackensen during the period.
The army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had been making rapid progress.
On July 24, 1915, under the attacks of these troops the Russians
retreated on a front of forty kilometers, between the Vistula and the
Bistritza, from eight to ten kilometers northward to prepared lines,
their attempts to halt in intermediate positions being frustrated
by the onrush of the victorious Teutonic forces in pursuit.
By July 25, 1915, the Narew had been crossed by the Germans along
its whole front, southward from Ostrolenka to Pultusk, and by the
26th they had gained the farther side of the Narew above Ostrolenka
likewise. The troops moving southeast from Pultusk now approached
the Bug, getting toward the rear of Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw, and
threatening to close the Russians line of escape, the Warsaw-Bielostok
railway.
On July 26, 1915, the Russians made a determined counteroffensive
from the line of Goworowo-Wyszkow-Serock in an effort to remove the
threat to the rear of Warsaw. This, however, had little success,
the Russians losing 3,319 men to the Germans in prisoners.
To the south of Warsaw the Germans had seized the villages of Ustanov,
Lbiska, and Jazarzew, which brought them nearly to the Vistula,
just below the capital.
The great attacks of the Germans on the troops defending Warsaw were
being hampered to some extent by the laying waste of the country
by the retiring Russians. Difficulty in moving heavy artillery on
roads had also interfered with their progress, but on the morning
of July 28, 1915, Von Woyrsch crossed to the eastern shore of the
Vistula between the mouth of the Pilica and Kozienice at several
places, and was threatening the Warsaw-Ivangorod railway.
Novo Georgievsk was steadily being inclosed. The Russian counterthrusts
in the neighborhood of Warsaw both on the north and the south of the
city were repelled by night and day. To the south near Gora-Kalvaria
a desperate attempt of the Russians to push forward toward the west
on the night from July 27th to the 28th, 1915, was shattered.
The armies of Field Marshal von Mackensen, breaking through Russian
positions to the west of the Wieprz, captured thousands of prisoners
and many guns, and once more thrust back the Russian front between
the Vistula and the Bug. On the evening of the 29th they attained
the Warsaw-Kiev railway at Biskupice, about halfway between Lublin
and Cholm, thus crowning their efforts to get astride their important
line of communications. The Russians were destroying everything
of value in the country as they retired, even burning grain in
the fields.
On the afternoon of July 30, 1915, Lublin at last was occupied
by the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and on the 31st the
Germans of Von Mackensen passed through Cholm. Thus the Teutonic
armies were now across the important railway from Warsaw and Ivangorod
to Kiev, on a broad front, running all the way down to the Vistula at
Novo Alexandria. In Courland the Germans continued to push forward,
so that on the 12th of August they were enabled to seize the important
railway center Mistan.
Hope in Russia died hard. Press correspondents up to July 29, 1915,
still spoke of the possibility of the Russians standing a siege
in their principal fortress on the Warsaw salient. On the 29th,
however, reports came from Petrograd that the fortresses of the
Warsaw defense were to be abandoned and the capital of Poland given
up to the army.
The correspondent of the New York "Times" on July 29, 1915, in
a special cable summed up the situation in an announcement that
the fate of Europe hung on the decision that Russia might make
on the question: "Shall Russia settle down to a war of position
in her vast fortifications around Warsaw, or shall she continue
to barter space against time, withdrawing from the line of the
Vistula and points on it of both strategic and political importance,
in order to gain the time which Germany has already stored in the
form of inexhaustible gun munitions?" The reply was the evacuation
of Warsaw.
The decisive blow to Russia's hopes came with the crossing of the
Vistula about twenty miles north of Ivangorod on July 28, 1915,
already noted. It showed that Warsaw was being rapidly surrounded.
The Russian communiqué of the 30th of July told of the crossing
over of the Teutons on both sides of the Radomka, a tributary of
the Vistula, to the right bank of the Vistula on pontoons, and of
attempts to throw bridges across the great rivers. Von Woyrsch's
troops that had crossed over were irresistibly pursuing still farther
east on the 30th, defeating troops hastily brought up to stop their
advance. By August 1 two entire German army corps reached the right
bank of the Vistula. Ivangorod, now threatened from all directions,
could evidently not be held much longer.
The fortress surrendered on August 4, 1915, after a violent bombardment
of the outer forts had taken place, beginning on the first of the
month. Austro-Hungarian troops under General von Koevess especially
distinguished themselves in the attack on the west front.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLVIII
WARSAW FALLS
The retreat from Warsaw began during the night of August 3 and 4,
1915. Already the city had been stripped as far as possible, to
judge by reports from Petrograd, of metals, such as church bells
and machinery that might possibly be of use to the Germans. A portion
of the civilian population left the city. The Blonie line just
to the west of the capital was given up under pressure from the
Teutons on the 3d. While the retreat was taking place the Russians
gave all possible support to their forces defending the Narew lines,
so far as they still were maintained.
Desperate charges were hurled by the Russians against the Germans
moving forward all along the front Lowza-Ostrow-Wyszkow. The bravery
of the Russians, especially in their counterattacks on both sides
of the road from Rozan to Ostrow on the 4th of August, won the
admiration of the Germans.
The correspondent of the London "Times" reports that on August 4,
1915, there was probably not over one Russian corps on the west
side of the Vistula. "Half of that crossed south of Warsaw before
6 p. m.," he writes, "and probably the last division left about
midnight, and at 3 a. m. on August 5 the bridges were blown up.
The Germans arrived at 6 a. m." The formal entry of the Polish
capital was made by Prince Leopold of Bavaria as Commander in Chief
of the army which took the city.
The formal announcement issued by the German Great Headquarters
on the 5th of August read: "The army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria
pierced and took yesterday and last night the outer and inner lines
of forts of Warsaw in which Russian rear guards still offered stubborn
resistance. The city was occupied to-day by our troops."
[Illustration: ADVANCE AND CAPTURE OF WARSAW]
In the capture of Warsaw seven huge armies had been employed. The
German northern army, operating against the double-track line which
runs from Warsaw to Petrograd, 1,000 miles in the northeast, via
Bielostok and Grodno; the army operating in the Suwalki district,
threatening the same line farther west; the army aimed at the Narew
based on Mearva; the army directly aimed at Warsaw, north of the
Vistula; the (Ninth) army directly aimed at Warsaw, south of the
Vistula; ten or twelve Austrian army corps attempting to reach the
single- and double-track railway from Ivangorod to Brest-Litovsk
and Moscow, and the line from Warsaw to Kiev via Lublin and Cholm,
which is for the most part a single track, and, finally, the army
of Von Linsingen, operating on the Lipa east of Lemberg.
The campaign for Warsaw had been fought along a front of 1,000
miles, extending from the Baltic to the frontier of Rumania. An
estimate which lays claim to being based upon authoritative figures
placed the number of men engaged in almost daily conflict on this
long line at between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000. The attacks upon
the sides of the lines on which the defense of Warsaw depended
had been the most furious in the course of the war on the eastern
front. The losses on both sides undoubtedly were enormous, though
they can be ascertained only with difficulty, if at all.
The following summary of captures was issued by the German Great
Headquarters on August 1, 1915: "Captured in July between the Baltic
and the Pilica, 95,023 Russians; 41 guns, including two heavy ones;
4 mine throwers; 230 machine guns. Taken in July in the southeastern
theatre of war (apparently between Pilica and the Rumanian frontier):
323 officers; 75,719 men; 10 guns; 126 machine guns."
PART V--THE BALKANS
* * * * *
CHAPTER XLIX
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS
In discussing the causes of the Great War in Vol. I we have already
shown how important a part the little Balkan States played in the
long chain of events leading up to the final catastrophe. When
two mighty lords come to blows over the right of way through the
fields of their peasant neighbors, it is only natural that the
peasants themselves should be deeply concerned. While it is not
likely that any of them would feel especially friendly toward either
of the belligerents, it might, however, be to their advantage to
take a hand in the struggle on the side of the victor. But until
each thought he had picked the winner he would hold aloof.
This was, in fact, the situation of all the Balkan States when
the Great War began, with the exception, of course, of Serbia,
which had been directly attacked. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece
very hastily announced their complete neutrality to each other
as well as to the world at large, though Greece was in the very
awkward position of having signed a defensive treaty with Serbia.
Though the Balkan situation has always been considered very complicated,
certain broad facts may be laid down which will serve as a key to
a fair understanding of the motives behind each of the various
moves being made on the Balkan chess board.
First of all, it must be realized that popular sentiment plays a
much smaller part in Balkan politics than it does in such countries
as England, France and our own country. Though each is more or less
democratic in form, none of these governments is really controlled
by its people in matters requiring such quick decisions as war. At
the head of each of the Balkan States is a monarch surrounded by a
governing clique who have full authority in military matters. Each
of these cliques has only one aim in mind: How shall it increase
the area of its territory, or at least save itself from losing any
of what it already controls?
Rumania, being of Latin blood, has no natural affinity with either
of the big fighting powers that concern her: Austria or Russia.
In her case, therefore, sympathy may be entirely eliminated. She
does, however, covet a piece of Austrian territory, Transylvania,
in which there is a substantial Rumanian population which has always
been rather badly treated by Austria.
Bulgaria, like Russia, is Slavic. Added to that, Bulgaria owes
her freedom to Russian arms. Because of these two reasons there
is a very strong sentiment among the people in favor of Russia.
Russian political intrigues during the past thirty years have done
a great deal, however, in undermining this kindly feeling among
the more intelligent Bulgarians. And then Russia's ambition to
possess herself of the Bosphorus as an outlet into the Mediterranean
is directly contrary to the ambitions of the governing clique of
Bulgaria, which also has its eyes on Constantinople.
Toward the Austrians the Bulgarians feel nothing but dislike: "Schwabs,"
they call them contemptuously. Moreover, Austria's contemplated pathway
to Saloniki would cut down through Macedonia, another territory
coveted by Bulgaria. Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria, however, is a
German by birth and training.
Greece, like Rumania, is also racially isolated. She fears Russia
for the same reason that Bulgaria does; Greece is determined that
Constantinople shall one day be hers. And she fears Austria because
Austria's pathway would even take Saloniki from her. And finally she
fears Italy because Italy has ambitions in Asia Minor and Albania.
All the belligerents seem to be treading on the toes of Greece.
It will be seen, therefore, that the diplomatic game was an especially
delicate one in the Balkans. Being comparatively weak, these small
states cannot fight alone for themselves. Their selfish ambitions,
or of their governing cliques rather, make a combination impossible.
Their only chance is to bargain with the winner at the right moment.
During the first half year of the war there was very little for
the Balkan diplomats to do but lie low and watch; watch for the
first signs of weakening of either the Allies or the Teutons. To be
sure, Turkey threw in her lot with the Teutons during this period,
but German control of the Turkish machinery of government and the
army appears to have been so strong that it seems doubtful whether
Turkish initiative was much of a factor in the move.
One of the first moves by the Teutonic Powers through Austria-Hungary
was the attempted invasion of Serbia, by which they hoped to eliminate
her from the field and also to swing the other Balkan States, especially
Bulgaria, over to their side. And had Austria succeeded in penetrating
the peninsula through Serbia, there can hardly be any doubt that
the effect would have been immediate.
But the invasion by Austria, attempted three times, was an abject
failure. At the end of five months a whole Austrian army corps had
been annihilated by the Serbians and the rest of the huge invading
armies had been driven back across the Danube and Save. Following
close upon this came the extraordinary success of the Russians in
Bukowina and in the Carpathians, which placed Hungary in immediate
danger of being invaded. The cause of the Allies began to look
promising and the machinery of Balkan diplomacy began slowly to
revolve.
Meanwhile the principal efforts of the Entente statesmen had been
directed toward effecting a reconciliation between Bulgaria and
the other Balkan States which, she maintained, had robbed her of
Macedonia. Indeed, it may well be said that the Treaty of Bucharest,
whereby the Macedonian Bulgars were largely handed over to Serbia,
and Greece was, and continued to be, the main stumbling block in
the path of the Allies to bring Bulgaria around to a union with
Serbia and Greece and Rumania, for Rumania had also picked Bulgaria's
pockets while she was down, by taking a strip of territory at the
mouth of the Danube. In this she had not even had the excuse of
reclaiming her own people, for here were none but pure Bulgarians.
In January, 1915, Rumania began to show signs of shaping a definite
policy that might later lead her to taking sides. Her King, Carol,
a Hohenzollern by blood, had died shortly after the war and his
nephew, Ferdinand, ascended the throne on October 11, 1914. Possibly
he may have had something to do with the change. At any rate, though
Rumania had previously accepted financial assistance from Austria, in
January she received a loan of several millions from Great Britain,
most of which was spent on the army, then partly mobilized.
At the same time negotiations of a tentative nature were opened
by the Foreign Office with Russia offering to throw the Rumanian
troops into the conflict on the side of the Allies for a certain
consideration. This consideration was that she receive Bukowina,
part of the province of Banat, and certain sections of Bessarabia
populated by Rumanians, The Allies considered these demands
extortionate, and the negotiations were protracted. When the Austrians
and Germans, later in the spring, succeeded in driving the Russians
out of the Carpathians, Rumania hastily dropped these negotiations
and seated herself more firmly on top of the fence. And so, under
the guidance of Bratiano, her prime minister, she has continued
throughout the whole year, listening to proposals, first from one
side, then from the other, but always carefully maintaining her
neutral position.
Bulgaria had, at about the same time, accepted a loan from Germany.
Attempts were made at the time to explain away the political
significance of the transaction by representing the advance as an
installment of a loan the terms of which had been arranged before
the beginning of the war, but the essential fact was that the cash
came from Germany at a time when she was herself calling in all
the gold of her people into the Imperial treasury.
Bulgaria now plainly let it be understood under what conditions
she would join a union of the Balkan neutrals against the Teutonic
Powers. Her premier, Radoslavov, head of the Bulgarian Liberal Party,
whose policy has always been anti-Russian, is one of the most astute
politicians in the Balkans, and this description is equally true of
King Ferdinand as a monarch. These two stated definitely Bulgaria's
price; that part of Macedonia which was to have been allowed to
her by the agreement which bound her to Serbia and Greece during
the first Balkan War; the Valley of the Struma, including the port
of Kavalla, that part of Thrace which she herself had taken from
Turkey, and the southern Dobruja, the whole of the territory Rumania
had filched from her while her back was turned during the two Balkan
wars.
The Entente Powers held council with the other Balkan States, each
of which had taken its share of booty from Bulgaria. In order to
persuade them to consent to Bulgaria's terms, they suggested certain
compensations for the concessions they were asked to make. To Serbia,
which, in spite of her very precarious situation at the time, was
very averse to returning any part of her Macedonian territory,
they pointed out that she could find compensation in adding to
her territory Bosnia, Herzegovina and the other Slav provinces of
Austria, where the population was truly Serb. To Rumania, which was
already willing to meet Bulgaria half way, they promised Transylvania
and Bukowina. To Greece, which had done less and gained more than
any of the other states during the two Balkan Wars and so could
afford to be generous, they held out the prospect of gaining a
considerable area in Asia Minor, thickly populated by Greeks.
These changes naturally all depended on the complete defeat of
the Teutonic Powers, but Bulgaria demanded that at least some,
and especially Serbian Macedonia, should be handed over to her at
once.
This latter demand brought about strong opposition. The other Balkan
States considered that, granting even that all these concessions were
to be promised to Bulgaria, she should not expect their fulfillment
until she had earned them by helping to defeat the Teutonic Powers.
Venizelos, the premier of Greece, and probably the most broad-minded
statesman in the Balkans, stated that, on the part of Greece,
concessions to Bulgaria were possible, though, as developed later,
in this he did not have the backing of the King and the rest of the
governing clique. In February no progress in the negotiations had
been made, though a special French Commission, headed by General
Pau, visited all the Balkan capitals and tried to bring about a
mutual agreement.
At about that time another important military event occurred, especially
affecting the Balkans; the warships of the Entente began bombarding
the forts in the Dardanelles and it seemed that Constantinople was
presently to fall into their hands. Not long after Venizelos stated,
in an interview, that he was privy to this action and proposed to
send 50,000 Greek soldiers to assist the Allies by a land attack
on the Turks.
The Greek General Staff, however, immediately declined to support
Venizelos. Such a campaign, it declared, was impossible unless
Greece first had strong guarantees that Bulgaria would not take
the opportunity to invade Greek Macedonia and fall on the flank
of the Greek army operating against the Turks. Venizelos thereupon
approached Bulgaria and was told that Bulgaria would remain neutral
if Greece would cede most of her Macedonian conquests, which would
include Kavalla, Drama, and Serres, which stretch so provokingly
eastward along the coast and hold Bulgaria back from the sea.
Venizelos attempted to compromise, and here he was caught between
two obstacles. Bulgaria absolutely refused to recede one inch from
her demand; and, on the other hand, the Greek governing clique
suddenly refused to consider any proposal that would mean the cession
of any territory at all to the hated Bulgars. What probably stiffened
the opposition of the other members of the Greek Government to the
Turkish campaign was the growing suspicion on their part that the
Allies were also negotiating with Italy for her support. Now it
was obvious that if Italy was to fight in the Near East, she meant
to demand a good price. And this looked bad for Greece. Greece
and Italy had already nearly come to blows over their clashing
interests in southern Albania, yet even this was a small matter
compared to rivalry in the Ægean and Asia Minor. What deepened
these suspicions was the fact that the Allies refused to indicate
definitely just what territory Greece was to have in return for her
support against the Turks. Their promise of "liberal compensation"
was not at all definite enough. Only Venizelos was satisfied with
this promise; he was in favor of trusting implicitly to Anglo-French
gratitude.
To bring this deadlock to a conclusion King Constantine called a
Royal Council, and by this body the matter was thoroughly discussed
during the first few days of March. The Council, together with
the king, decided against supporting the Allies actively on such
terms. On the morning of March 6 Venizelos called at the British
legation in Athens to say that the opposition of the king made
it impossible to fulfill his promise. That night he resigned.
The fall of Venizelos was, naturally, a heavy blow to the Allies. He
was succeeded by Gounaris, an ex-Minister of Finance, who announced
his policy as one of strict neutrality. Venizelos was so deeply
mortified that he declared that he would withdraw permanently from
public life, and then left Greece.
April, 1915, opened with an occurrence that seemed to throw a strong
light on the attitude of Bulgaria. On the night of the second day
of the month a large force of Bulgar Comitajis made a raid over the
southeastern frontier of Serbia, and, after attacking successfully the
Serbian outposts and blockhouses, in an attempt to cut the railroad,
by which Serbia was getting war supplies from the Allies, they were
repelled by the Serbians, though only after severe fighting.
Serbia and Greece both protested loudly, but Bulgaria affirmed that
she had had nothing to do with the matter.
As has developed since, Bulgaria had by this time definitely decided
to strike for the Teutonic allies when the right moment should come.
Already back in January, 1912, a secret treaty had been negotiated
between Bulgaria and Germany. This was signed a little later by
Prince Bülow and M. Rizoff at Rome. There were more reasons than
one for keeping this secret. For within the Bulgarian Parliament
there was a strong opposition to the German policy of Ferdinand
and Radoslavov, led by Malinoff, chief of the Democratic party,
and Stambulovski, chief of the Agrarian party, an opposition so
bitter and determined that the king had good reason to fear an
open revolution should he openly declare himself for the Germans.
On May 29, 1915, the Allies again sent a note to Bulgaria, making
proposals which comprised the results of their efforts to obtain
concessions from the other Balkan States. On June 15 Radoslavov
sent a reply, asking for further information, obviously drawn up
in order to gain time.
Meanwhile, on June 11, Venizelos had again appeared in Athens,
where he received a warm welcome from the populace, with whom he
was the prime favorite. Within a few days he resumed the leadership
of the Greek Liberal party and, at a general election, which was held
shortly after, he showed a popular majority support of 120 seats
in the Popular Assembly, notwithstanding a determined opposition
made by his opponents. Before the Balkan wars the Greek Parliament
had consisted of 180 members, but by according representation to
the districts in Macedonia annexed after the wars the number was
brought up to 316. Venizelos and his policy in favor of the Allies
were emphatically indorsed by the Greek suffrage. Naturally this
expression of the people's voice was a smart blow at the king and
his councillors. On the other hand, they were encouraged by an
unfavorable turn that was now taking place in the military operations
of the Allies.
The attack on the Dardanelles by the warships had been a decided
failure. Nor were the operations of the British troops on the peninsula
of Gallipoli meeting with any real success. The Austrians and the
Germans had driven the Russians back from the Carpathians and had
retaken Przemysl and Lemberg. In fact, the situation of the
Austro-German armies had now become so favorable that it was possible
for the Teutonic allies to make proposals to the Balkan States
with a fair chance of being listened to.
During July, 1915, Serbia was approached by Germany with an offer
of a separate peace, but Serbia would not even consider the terms.
On July 8 Austria delivered a note to Rumania, through the Austrian
Minister in Bucharest, Count Czernin, which contained two sets of
proposals. One was contingent upon the continued but "friendly"
neutrality of Rumania, the other on her active participation in
the war on the side of Austria-Hungary.
In the first proposal Rumania was promised all of Bukowina south
of the Seret River, better treatment of the Rumanian population
of Austrian territory, the establishment of a Rumanian university
in Brasso, large admissions of Rumanians into the public service
of Hungary, and greater liberty of administration to the Rumanian
churches in Austria.
The second proposal specified that Rumania should put five army corps
and two cavalry divisions at the disposal of the Austro-Hungarian
General Staff to operate against the Russians. In return Rumania
should receive all of Bukowina up to the Pruth River, territory
along the north bank of the Danube up to the Iron Gate, complete
autonomy for the Rumanians in Transylvania and all of Bessarabia that
the Rumanian troops should assist in conquering from the Russians.
Just a week after this note was received in the Rumanian capital,
Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, whose wife was a sister of the Queen of
Rumania, arrived in Bucharest and tried to induce King Ferdinand to
come to terms with Austria, or at least to allow the transportation
of war munitions through the country to the Turks, who were then
running short of ammunition. The king refused this concession. How
important it would have been, had it been granted, may be judged
from the many efforts the Germans had made to smuggle material down
to Turkey. In one case the baggage of a German courier traveling
to Constantinople had been X-rayed and rifle ammunition had been
found. Again, cases of beer had been opened and found to contain
artillery shells.
Rumania, however, could not yet make up her mind which was going
to be the winner. She accepted neither of the Austrian proposals,
and protracted making any definite answer as long as possible.
There was another reason why Rumania wished to continue her neutrality
until the following winter, at least. The harvesting of her great
wheat crops would begin soon, and this wheat could, as had been
done the previous year, be sold to the Germans and Austrians at big
prices, the blockade of the British fleet having already produced
a pressing shortage in foodstuffs. And then, her conscience being
uneasy regarding her robbery of territory from Bulgaria, she must
also be quite certain how Bulgaria was going to turn.
Having failed at Bucharest, the German agent, Prince
Hohenlohe-Langenburg, moved on to Sofia. At that moment King Ferdinand
of Bulgaria was endeavoring to get Turkey to sign a treaty, for
which negotiations had been going on secretly for some months,
by which Bulgaria was to obtain all the Turkish land on the west
side of the Maritza River, and so free the Bulgarian railroad to
Dedeagatch from Turkish interference. On July 23 this treaty was
finally signed, and Bulgaria acquired a full right of way along
the line.
Bulgaria was now frankly asking bids for her support from both
sides. In an interview which the Premier, Radoslavov, granted to
the correspondent of a Budapest newspaper on August 3, 1915, and
who remarked to the premier that it was at least strange for a
nation to carry on such negotiations simultaneously with two groups
of powers, he replied:
"It is these negotiations which give us the chance to make a decision.
Our country seeks only her own advantages and wishes to realize
her rights. We have decided to gain these in any case. The only
question is: How can we achieve this with the least sacrifices?
As regards the internal situation of Bulgaria, I may proudly say
that our conditions have improved, and that everybody in the country
looks forward to the great national undertaking we are about to
embark on with immense joy and enthusiasm."
So far as Bulgaria was concerned things did not look well for the
Allies in the beginning of August, 1915. Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg
was warmly received. As was afterward made known, he effected a
further treaty between Germany and Bulgaria, which promised Bulgaria
practically all of Greek and Serbian Macedonia. Unaware then of the
existence of this or the earlier compact, the Entente Powers made
further efforts to secure the support of the Bulgarians. Early in
August they made a collective representation to the Balkan States,
and delivered to Bulgaria a reply to her note of June 14, in which
she had asked for further details in regard to the concessions
promised.
In the collective presentation they spoke of the desirability of
making further concessions to Bulgaria, and in the special note
to Bulgaria they stated that it was probable that the causes of
friction would be removed and a union brought about. Bulgaria,
however, was not satisfied, and Radoslavov, the Premier, in an
interview to an American correspondent, said that she would enter
the war only on receiving absolute guarantees of obtaining all
of what she demanded.
The chief obstacle in the path toward an agreement that would satisfy
the demands of Bulgaria now seemed to be Serbia, and, on behalf
of the cause, she was again pressed by the Allies to surrender
all of southeastern Macedonia. Finally, in a secret session of
her Parliament, which was held toward the middle of August, she
consented.
On the 16th of August the Greek Parliament assembled. The Venizeloists
were in a large majority. The next day the Gounaris government
felt that it could no longer maintain itself, and consequently
resigned. A few days later Venizelos was again Prime Minister of
Greece, and the Allies, who were still ignorant of the fatal treaties
between Bulgaria and Germany, believed that the difficulties in
the Balkan situation had finally been smoothed out.
Thus the beginning of the second year of the war opened in the Balkans
very favorably in aspect to the Allies.
PART VI--ITALY ENTERS THE WAR
* * * * *
CHAPTER L
ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH THE WARRING POWERS
After nearly ten months of kaleidoscopic changes in the diplomatic
situation, which kept the outside world constantly uncertain as
to her ultimate determination, Italy declared war upon Austria
May 23, 1915. The bare official explanation of these negotiations
gave the impression of selfish bargaining, and a broad survey of
conditions on the Italian peninsula before and during the first
months of the war is necessary to a proper understanding of the
causes that led Italy to take sides with Great Britain, France,
and Russia.
Behind these long diplomatic exchanges, their foundation rather
than the result of them, lay Italy's national aspirations and a
gradual crystallization of public sentiment. Officially, Italy
went to war with Austria over an alleged violation of the Triple
Alliance; but to most Italians the hope of the war meant the return
to the Italian flag of Italians living south of the Austrian Alps,
realignment of their northern and eastern frontier on better national
and military principles, the possession of certain territory on
the eastern shore of the Adriatic as would secure her harborless
eastern coast from hostile attack, a reduction of Austrian control
over Trieste, and the repatriation of thousands of Italians living
in the "unredeemed" portions of southern Austria, which despite many
years of Austrian domination was essentially Italian in traditions,
customs, language, and loyalty.
Negotiations were prolonged, also, by the fact that at the outbreak
of the war Italy was, in a military sense, quite unprepared to
engage in a desperate struggle. When Italian Alpine troops finally
moved out and took possession of Austrian mountain outposts, the
army had undergone regeneration. In both men and munitions Italy
was equipped to play a part in the war worthy of a first-class
power, and befitting her wide ambitions.
Although Italy was allied with the Central Powers, her peculiar
situation dictated a national policy of cordial relations with all
Europe. Geographically, she forms a unified mass with Germany and
Austria, but the barrier of the Alps across her northern frontier
diverts her interests from the north to the south. She is essentially
a Mediterranean power, the one great nation on the inland sea with
a long coast line and a number of ports. Her hope of the future lay
along the Mediterranean shore, but her national unity was gained
almost too late to enable her to realize the aspiration of African
colonies. It was the disappointment of obtaining possessions in
Tunis by the establishment of French control there in 1881 that found
expression in the Triple Alliance. Her antagonism against Austria
and the Hapsburgs was still unmitigated, but as a practical matter
of statesmanship she had to choose between two antagonists--Austria
opposing her on the Adriatic, and France on the Mediterranean.
Since Africa presented the larger field for expansion, she enlisted
the aid of Austria and Germany against France. At the same time she
became friendly with England, and largely through this understanding
gained her hold upon Tripoli. Cordial relations with France were
reestablished in 1903. The sum of her efforts made her a link between
the rival groups of European powers. This will explain the peculiar
obligations of neutrality incumbent upon the nation when the Triple
Entente went to war with her associates in the Triple Alliance.
Alliance with Germany and Austria was a necessity of statesmanship
and diplomacy; but at no time was it generally popular with the
mass of Italian population. It gave no support to Italian aims
in the Mediterranean; it failed to hold the balance between Italy
and Austria in the Balkans; it seemed to promise nothing for the
future, except, perhaps, immunity from Austrian attack. In fact,
it is doubtful whether the alliance would have been renewed in 1912
but for an unexpected outbreak of resentment against France due
to a clash over rival interests in northern Africa and increasing
suspicion of French action in Tunis. At the same time Italy took
offense at the attitude of France toward her position in the war
with Turkey, which resulted in the Italian occupation of Tripoli.
[Illustration: NORTHERN ITALY, SHOWING THE WHOLE ITALIAN-AUSTRIAN
FRONTIER AND THE PART OF AUSTRIA DEMANDED BY ITALY]
This better understanding between Italy and her allies soon was
disturbed by their attitude toward Serbia, resulting from the successes
of that country and Greece in the Balkan wars. For the sake of
maintaining the equilibrium between Italy and Austria, the former
sympathized with Serbia's aspirations for a port on the Adriatic.
In August, 1913--this incident was not revealed until the Premier of
Italy told it to the Chamber of Deputies on December 5, 1914--Austria
proposed that Italy should consent to an Austrian attack on Serbia.
Italy refused to countenance any such action. Revelations made
after the beginning of the Great War showed that during the twenty
months that elapsed between the renewal of the Triple Alliance and
the outbreak of the war, Italy was constantly engaged in combating
the policy of Austria-Hungary toward Serbia and striving to maintain
the balance of power in the Balkans. The notes exchanged in this
period emphasized particularly Articles III, IV, and VII of the
Alliance, and since these portions of the treaty were the basis
of subsequent negotiations leading up to the final severance of
Italo-Austrian relations, their text may be set down here:
"III. In case one or two of the high contracting parties, without
direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or
more of the great powers not signatory of the present treaty, and
should become involved in a war with them, the _casus foederis_
would arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.
"IV. In case a great power not a signatory of the present treaty
should threaten the state security of one of the high contracting
parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled
to declare war against that great power, the two other contracting
parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality toward
their ally. Each of them reserves its right, in this case, to take
part in the war if it thinks fit, in order to make common cause
with its ally.
"VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the
maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial _status quo_
in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent
all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one
or the other of the powers signatory of the present treaty. To
this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to
enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of
other powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course
of events, the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the territory of
the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or
the Ægean Sea become impossible, and that, either in consequence of
the action of a third power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary
or Italy should be obliged to change the _status quo_ for their
part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would
only take place after previous agreement between the two powers
which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal
compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either
of them might acquire over and above the existing _status quo_,
and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of
both parties."
When Austria-Hungary sent her ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914,
Italy had lost no time in making her position clear. Premier Salandra
and the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister,
conferred with Herr von Flotow, German Ambassador at Rome, on July
5, and dispatched the following memorandum to the Duke d'Avarna,
the Italian Ambassador at Vienna:
"Salandra and I called the special attention of the ambassador
to the fact that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of
the Triple Alliance Treaty, to make such a move as she has made
at Belgrade without previous agreement with her allies. Austria,
in fact, from the tone in which the note is conceived, and from
the demands she makes--demands which are of little effect against
the pan-Serb danger, but are profoundly offensive to Serbia and
indirectly to Russia--has shown clearly that she wishes to provoke
a war. We therefore told Flotow that, in consideration of Austria's
method of procedure, and of the defensive and conservative nature of
the Triple Alliance, Italy is under no obligation to help Austria
if as a result of this move of hers she should find herself at
war with Russia. For in this case any European war whatever will
be consequent upon an act of aggression and provocation on the
part of Austria."
When Austria failed to yield to this suggestion and declared war
on Serbia, Italy, on July 27 and 28, 1914, had notified Austria
and Germany that if she did not receive compensation for Austria's
disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, "the Triple Alliance would
be irreparably broken."
While the Italian statesmen declare that they had made their position
at the opening of the war perfectly clear to Germany and Austria,
the world at large lacked knowledge of these negotiations upon
which to base satisfactory judgment of Italy's action--or lack
of action--at this time. Italy was in no position to go further
than this. The unsettled state of political and popular opinion
and her lack of equipment for war forced her to wait; but while
she temporized she made ready. In reality, the Italian diplomats
maintained that they took a definite position upon their charge
that Austria had violated the terms of the Triple Alliance, and
that from this stand they never receded. Negotiations with the
other members of the alliance received a check, also, through the
death of San Giuliano on October 16, 1914. On his deathbed the
foreign minister declared his sole regret was that he had not lived
to see the day of Italy's entrance into complete national unity.
* * * * *
CHAPTER LI
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS
During the fall and winter of 1914, the Italians had seemed about
equally divided in favor of intervention and neutrality. While a
large majority of the common people clamored for war, the neutralists
probably included the larger proportion of influential citizens.
Among the latter were the extreme clericals, who distrusted France
and Russia on religious grounds, aristocrats who viewed Germany
as a bulwark against socialism; bankers with German connections,
and a great body of the middle class who dreaded a war that would
interfere with their comfort and prosperity. A genuine admiration for
Germany's military prowess, exemplified in the successive victories
of 1914, offset to a large extent traditional antipathy to Austria.
Nevertheless, interventionist sentiment steadily gained, and Germany,
recognizing the trend, organized a determined effort to keep Italy on
the side of the alliance. German agents invaded Italy and conducted
a campaign of propaganda through the neutralist newspapers and
through more secret labors among various organizations influential
in their control of public sentiment.
This German campaign reached its climax in December with the arrival
at Rome of Prince von Bülow, one of the most skillful diplomats at
the call of the German Foreign Office. Von Bülow's capabilities
were particularly adapted to a task of this kind among a people
that set store upon the niceties of international relations. As
an aristocrat and a politician, he ranked among the first of the
empire. He had been foreign minister and later imperial chancellor.
But his chief qualification for the work was that, before returning
to Berlin for greater honors, he had been ambassador at Rome. He
had married a Sicilian lady, and was accustomed to spend part of
each year in Rome and on his wife's Sicilian estates. The prince
was a finished courtier and a charming host. At this juncture his
house in Rome became a center of neutralists, and Von Bülow began
overtures to Baron Sonnino, the new Italian Foreign Minister, to
discover what territorial concessions the Italian Government would
demand as recompense for the action of Austria and as the price
of adherence to the alliance.
It is remarkable that, throughout the critical period pending Italy's
decision, Italian statesmen negotiated mainly with German and not
Austrian diplomats. Although the Italians believed that Germany
had dictated Austria's war policy, in the end it developed that
the kaiser and his ministers were unable to control Austria to
the full extent that they considered desirable in the matter of
yielding to the Italian demands. The purpose of Prince von Bülow was
to find out the minimum terms acceptable to Italy, and meanwhile,
by making small concessions, create the impression that Italy could
gain without firing a shot all that she could hope for through
successful war. In fact, the Teutonic agents did bring against
the Italian Cabinet the accusation that they were not acting for
the best interests of their country, and were determined to fight
regardless of proffered concessions. This charge was denied by the
Italian premier in a speech wherein he asserted that the offers
of Germany were not in good faith.
Germany asked if the Italian claims would be satisfied by the cession
of Trentino. To this Baron Sonnino replied that he "did not consider
that Italian popular sentiment would be content with the Trentino
alone." A stable condition of accord between Austria and Italy, he
said, could be effected only by satisfaction of the old Irredentist
formula, "Trent and Trieste." Von Bülow answered that Austria certainly
would prefer war to the surrender of Trieste. Here the negotiations
stuck fast, the Italian ministry declining to define their demands
any further until Austria agreed to the cession of Italian territories
actually in the possession of the Hapsburg monarchy.
On February 12, 1915, Sonnino addressed a solemn warning to
Austria-Hungary. He declared that any military action undertaken by
that monarchy in the Balkans against either Serbia or Montenegro,
without previous arrangement with Italy, would be considered an
open infringement of Article VII of the Triple Alliance. Disregard
of this declaration, he added, would lead to grave consequences for
which the Italian Government henceforth declined all responsibility.
Five days later, February 17, 1915, he repeated the warning. "It is
necessary," he said, "to state very clearly that any other procedure
on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government could only be interpreted
by us as an open violation of the terms of the treaty, and as clear
evidence of its intention to resume its liberty of action; in which
case we should have to regard ourselves as being fully justified
in resuming our own liberty of action for the safeguarding of our
interests."
At this time there were rumors of a fresh attack on Serbia by both
Austria and Germany, and there is little doubt that the Serbs for
the time being were saved by Italy's firm stand. Germany redoubled
her efforts at Vienna. Baron Burian, who had recently succeeded Count
Berchtold as Foreign Secretary of the Dual Kingdom, had adopted a
much more intransigent position than his predecessor. He clung to
the contention that it was impossible to settle the question of
compensation for Austria's invasion of Serbia until it had become
clear how that enterprise would result. Military action, he argued,
could not afford to wait upon diplomatic discussion.
Early in March, 1915, it looked for a time as if the Central Powers
and their ally would find a satisfactory way out of the tangle. On
March 9, 1915, Baron Burian accepted the principle that compensation
to Italy must be made from Austrian territory. Italy demanded that
negotiations begin at once, and that they should be between Italy
and Austria without German interference. Prince von Bülow, still
acting for his country, protested, but finally, on March 20, 1915,
notified Baron Sonnino that he had been authorized to guarantee
in the name of Germany the execution of any agreement which Italy
and Austria might conclude.
As announced by the German imperial chancellor, the concessions
Austria was willing to make were as follows:
Cession to Italy of that part of Tyrol and the western bank of the
Isonzo inhabited by Italians, and of the town of Gradisca.
Trieste to be made an imperial free city, receiving an administration
insuring an Italian character to the city, and to have an Italian
university.
Recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona and the sphere of
interests belonging thereto.
Austria-Hungary to declare her political disinterestedness regarding
Albania.
National interests of Italian nationals in Austria-Hungary to be
particularly respected.
Austria-Hungary to grant amnesty to political or military criminals
who were natives of the ceded territories.
The further wishes of Italy regarding general questions to be assured
of every consideration.
Austria-Hungary, after the conclusion of the agreement, to give
a solemn declaration concerning the concessions.
Appointment of mixed committees for the regulation of details of
the concessions.
After the conclusion of the agreement Austro-Hungarian soldiers,
natives of the occupied territories, should not further participate
in the war.
At last Germany, weighed down by the burden of war and anxious to
keep Italy neutral, appeared to believe that the difficulty had
been settled. But Baron Sonnino's reply proved disappointing. He
found the proposals too vague. They did not settle the Irredentist
problem; above all they made no appreciable improvement in Italy's
military frontier; finally, they did not offer adequate compensation
for the freedom of action Austria would enjoy in the Balkans. "A
strip of territory in the Trentino," he concluded, would not satisfy
any of Italy's requirements.
On April 2, 1915, Austria, spurred on by Germany, endeavored to
meet the Italian objections by offering more specific concessions.
She expressed willingness to cede the districts of Trento, Roveredo,
Riva, Tione (except Madonna di Campiglio and the neighborhood),
and Borgo. This readjustment would give Italy a frontier cutting
the valley of the Adige just north of Lavis. These districts Baron
Burian considered far more than a "strip of territory," and he
hoped Italy would be satisfied.
But Italy was far from satisfied, and six days later, in response
to an invitation for counterproposals, Baron Sonnino drafted the
following demands:
I. The Trentino, with the boundaries fixed for the Kingdom of Italy
in 1811.
II. A new eastern frontier, to include Gradisca and Gorizia.
III. Trieste and its neighborhood, including Nabresina and the
judicial districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, to be formed into
an autonomous state with complete independence from Austro-Hungarian
rule. Trieste to be a free port.
IV. The cession by Austria-Hungary of the Curzolari Islands off
the coast of Dalmatia.
V. The immediate occupation by Italy of the ceded territories and
the immediate evacuation by Austria-Hungary of Trieste and the
neighborhood.
VI. The recognition by Austria-Hungary of Italian sovereignty over
Valona and district.
VII. The renunciation by Austria-Hungary of any claims in Albania.
VIII. A complete amnesty for all political or military prisoners
belonging to the territories mentioned in I to IV.
The next three articles provided:
IX. That Italy should pay to Austria-Hungary as indemnification
for the loss of government property, as a share of the public debt,
and against all money claims, the sum of 200,000,000 lire.
X. That Italy should pledge herself to maintain neutrality throughout
the war, this pledge applying to both Germany and Austria-Hungary.
XI. That Italy should renounce any further claims under Article
VII of the Triple Alliance for the whole duration of the war, and
that Austria-Hungary should renounce any claim to compensation
for Italy's occupation of the Dodecannesus.
These demands were pressed by Italy in the face of disquieting
rumors that Austria-Hungary was on the point of concluding a separate
peace with Russia, which would leave her free to devote her whole
attention to Italy and Serbia if the former refused to make terms.
They were rejected by Austria, April 16, with a few unimportant
exceptions: Article VIII was accepted. As regards Article IX, Baron
Burian asserted that the amount offered was totally insufficient, but
suggested that the question of pecuniary indemnity be referred to The
Hague. He held that the pledge of neutrality should be extended to
Turkey as well as to Germany and Austria, and asked for the insertion
of an extra clause in Article XI, providing that Italy's renunciation
of further claims under Article VII of the Triple Alliance should
cover all such advantages, territorial and otherwise, as Austria
might gain from the treaty of peace which should terminate the war.
The only cardinal point on which Austria offered concessions was
in regard to the proposed Trentino frontier. This she agreed might
follow a course more advantageous for Italy than that suggested in
Austria's former proposals.
Baron Sonnino's reply was sent from Rome on April 21, 1915. It
declared that these additional concessions failed to "repair the
chief inconveniences of the present situation, either from the
linguistic and ethnological or the military point of view." Austria,
he pointed out, seemed determined to maintain positions on the
frontier that were a perpetual threat to Italy. There were three
more conversations between Baron Burian and the Italian Ambassador
at Vienna before negotiations were broken off, and on April 29, 1915,
the Italian Ambassador telegraphed to Rome that Austria virtually
negatived all the Italian demands, especially those contained in the
first five articles. The real break, which made war inevitable,
came on May 3 when Baron Sonnino sent to Vienna a formal denunciation
of the Italo-Austrian alliance.
It must be remembered that behind the text of these formal proposals
and counterproposals lay a belief in the minds of many Italians that
Austria made even the slight concessions she granted unwillingly
and under pressure from Germany, and that if the war resulted
successfully for the Central Powers, Austria would immediately begin
to scheme for a restoration of her old frontiers.
Since it is an axiom of diplomatic bargaining that each side asks
more than it expects to receive, there is no doubt that Italy would
have been willing to modify her demands if her statesmen and people
had been sure that the concessions obtained from Austria under
these circumstances would not have been disturbed in the event of
a Teutonic victory.