American magistrates never did in general enjoy the arbitrary power

Tocqueville ascribes to them. They assuredly do not enjoy it now, but in

municipalities there is a growing tendency to concentrate power,

especially the appointing power, in the hands of one or a few officers

in order that the people may have some one person on whom responsibility

can be fixed. Such power is sometimes very wide, but it cannot be called

arbitrary. A few minor offices are unsalaried; the salaries of the

greater ones have been raised, particularly in the older States.

The methods of administration, especially of Federal administration,

have been much improved, but are still behind those of the most advanced

European countries, one or two departments excepted.

Government is far from economical. The war of the Rebellion was

conducted in the most lavish way: the high protective tariff raises a

vast revenue, and direct local taxation takes more from the citizen than

in most European countries. An enormous sum is spent upon pensions to

persons who purport to have served in the Northern armies during the

Civil War[186].

-----

Footnote 186:

In 1892 the expenditure on this head was $155,000,000: in 1901 it was

estimated at $142,000,000.

-----

Congress does not pass many public statutes, nor do they greatly alter

ordinary law within the sphere open to federal legislation. Many

legislative experiments are tried in the newer States, but the ordinary

private law is in no such condition of mutability as Tocqueville

describes. The law of England suffered more changes between 1868 and

1885 than either the common or statute law of the older States of the

Union.

The respect for the rights of others, for the regular course of legal

process, for the civil magistrate, remains strong; nor have the rich

(although of late years more threatened) seriously begun to apprehend

any attacks on them, otherwise than as stockholders in great railway and

other corporations.

The tyranny of the majority is not a serious evil in the America of

to-day, though people still sometimes profess alarm at it. It cannot act

through a State legislature so much as it may have done in Tocqueville’s

days, for the wings of these bodies have been effectively clipped by the

newer State constitutions. Faint are the traces which remain of that

intolerance of heterodoxy in politics, religion or social views whereon

he dilates[187]. Politicians on the stump still flatter the crowd, but

many home truths are told to it nevertheless in other ways and places,

and the man who ventures to tell them need no longer fear social

proscription (at least in time of peace) in the Northern or Western

States, perhaps not even in the Southern.

-----

Footnote 187:

Competent American observers in Tocqueville’s own time thought he

greatly exaggerated this danger. See a letter from Jared Sparks

printed in Professor Herbert B. Adams’ interesting monograph _Jared

Sparks and Alexis de Tocqueville_, in Johns Hopkins University

Studies, 1898.

-----

The Republic came scatheless out of a terrible civil war, and although

the laurels of the general who concluded that war twice secured for him

the Presidency, they did not make his influence dangerous to freedom.

There is indeed no great capital, but there are cities greater than most

European capitals, and the Republic has not been imperilled by their

growth. The influence of the clergy on public affairs has declined:

whether or no that of religion has also been weakened it is more

difficult to say. But all Americans are still agreed that religion gains

by its entire detachment from the State.

The negro problem remains, but it has passed into a new and for the

moment less threatening phase. Neither Tocqueville nor any one else then

living could have foreseen that manumission would come as a war measure,

and be followed by the grant of political rights. It is no impeachment

of his judgement that he omitted to contemplate a state of things in

which the blacks have been made politically the equals of the whites,

while inferior in most other respects, and destined, apparently, to

remain wholly separate from them. He was right in perceiving that fusion

was not possible, and that liberation would not solve the problem,

because it would not make the liberated fit for citizenship. Fit—that is

to say, as fit as a considerable part of the white population—they will

probably in the long run become, but even then the social problem will

remain. His remark that the repulsion between the races in the South

would probably be greater under freedom than under slavery has so far

been strikingly verified by the result.

All the forces that made for the maintenance of the Federal Union are

now stronger than they were then, while the chief force that opposed it,

viz. the difference of character and habits between North and South,

largely produced by the existence of slavery, tends to vanish. Nor does

the growth of the Union make the retention of its parts in one body more

difficult. On the contrary, the United States is a smaller country now

when it stretches from the Bay of Fundy to the Gulf of California, with

its seventy-six millions of people, than it was then with its thirteen

millions, just as the civilized world was larger in the time of

Herodotus than it is now, for it took twice as many months to travel

from Persepolis or the Caspian Sea to the Pillars of Hercules as it does

now to circumnavigate the globe, one was obliged to use a greater number

of languages, and the journey was incomparably more dangerous. Before

steamboats plied on rivers, and trains ran on railways, three or four

weeks at least were consumed in reaching Missouri from Maine. Now one

goes in six days of easy travelling right across the continent.

Nor has the increased number of States bred more dissensions. The

forty-five States of to-day are not as Tocqueville assumes, and this is

the error which vitiates his reasonings, forty-five nations. The

differences in their size and wealth have become greater, but they work

more harmoniously together than ever heretofore, because neither the

lines which divide parties nor the substantial issues which affect men’s

minds coincide with State boundaries. The Western States are now, so far

as population goes, the dominant section of the Union, and become daily

more so. But their interests link them more closely than ever to the

North Atlantic States, through which their products pass to Europe, and

the notion once entertained of moving the capital from Washington to the

Mississippi valley has been quietly dropped.

VIII. CONCLUDING SUMMARY.

Before bidding farewell to our philosopher, let us summarize his

conclusions.

He sees in the United States by far the most successful and durable form

of democratic government that has yet appeared in the world.

Its merits are the unequalled measure of freedom, freedom of action, but

not of thought, which it secures to the ordinary citizen, the material

and social benefits it confers on him, the stimulus it gives to all his

practical faculties.

These benefits are likely to be permanent, for they rest upon the

assured permanence of

Social equality;

Local self-government;

Republican institutions;

Widely diffused education.

It is true that these benefits would not have been attained so quickly

nor in such ample measure but for the extraordinary natural advantages

of the New World. Nevertheless, these natural advantages are but

subsidiary causes. The character of the people, trained to freedom by

experience and by religion, is the chief cause, their institutions the

second, their material conditions only the third; for what have the

Spaniards made of like conditions in Central and South America[188]?

-----

Footnote 188:

The conditions of most parts of the tropical regions of South and

Central America are in reality quite different from those of the

American Union taken as a whole.

-----

Nevertheless, the horizon is not free from clouds.

What are these clouds?

Besides slavery and the existence of a vast negro population they are—

The conceit and ignorance of the masses, perpetually flattered by their

leaders, and therefore slow to correct their faults.

The withdrawal from politics of the rich, and inferior tone of ‘the

governors,’ _i.e._ the politicians.

The tyranny of the majority, which enslaves not only the legislatures,

but individual thought and speech, checking literary progress, and

preventing the emergence of great men.

The concentration of power in the legislatures (Federal and State),

which weakens the Executive, and makes all laws unstable.

The probable dissolution of the Federal Union, either by the secession

of recalcitrant States or by the slow decline of Federal authority.

There is therefore warning for France in the example of America. But

there is also encouragement—and the encouragement is greater than the

warning.

Of the clouds which Tocqueville saw, one rose till it covered the whole

sky, broke in a thunderstorm, and disappeared. Others have silently

melted into the blue. Some still hang on the horizon, darkening parts of

the landscape.

Let us cast one glance back at the course which events have actually

taken as compared with that which Hamilton first, and Tocqueville

afterwards, expected.

The Republic fared far otherwise than as Hamilton and his friends either

hoped or feared. In this there is nothing to impeach their wisdom. They

saw the dangers of their own time, and like wise and patriotic men

provided the best remedies which existing conditions permitted. Some

dangers they overcame so completely, particularly the financial

misdoings of State legislatures, that these have now passed out of

memory. They could not foresee what the power of money would become,

because there was then little money in the country. They could not

foresee the astonishing development of party machinery, because it is a

perfectly new thing in the history of the world: and human imagination

never does more, at any rate in the field of politics and sociology,

than body forth things a little bigger than, or in some other wise a

little varying from, what they have been before. It cannot create

something out of nothing. Least of all could they divine what the

results would be of the coexistence of the money power and the party

machine. Nor did even Tocqueville, writing half a century later, when

wealth had already appeared and the party machine was in places

beginning to work, perceive what both had in store.

How would Tocqueville amend his criticisms were he surveying the

phenomena of to-day?

He would add to his praise of the United States that its people

re-established their government on firm foundations after a frightful

civil war, that their army went back to its peaceful occupations, that

they paid off their debt, that they have continued to secure a free

field for an unparalleled industrial development and to maintain a

hitherto unattained standard of comfort, that the level of knowledge and

intellectual culture has risen enormously. He would admit that he had

overrated the dangers to be feared from a tyrannical majority and had

underrated the strength of the Union. But he would stand aghast, as

indeed all the best citizens in the United States do now, at the

mismanagement and corruption of city governments. He would perceive that

the party organizations have now become the controlling force in the

country, more important than the Legislature or the Executive. He would

recognize the evils incident to the habit of regarding public office as

a means of private advantage to its holder and the bestowal of it as a

reward for party services. And he would, while gladly owning that the

older forms of faction had ceased to be alarming, note a new development

which the spirit of faction has taken in the tendency to look at and

deal with both legislation and foreign affairs from the point of view of

party advantage. Want of foresight or insight in those who direct the

affairs of a mighty nation is at all times a misfortune: but when

foresight and insight are set aside for the sake of some transitory

party gain, the results may be even more serious.

This, however, is a tendency inherent in all schemes of government by

party. It is familiar and formidable in European countries also.

VII

TWO SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS[189]

I. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THESE CONSTITUTIONS AROSE.

The old Greek saying, ‘Africa is always bringing something new[190],’

finds an unexpected application in the fact that there exist in South

Africa two Dutch republics possessing constitutions diverse in type from

any of those which we find subsisting in other modern States. The system

established by these two South African instruments resembles neither the

English, or so-called ‘Cabinet,’ system of government,—which has been

more or less imitated by the other free countries of Europe, and has

been reproduced in the self-governing British colonies,—nor the

American, or so-called ‘Presidential,’ system, as it exists in the

United States and the several States of the American Union. And although

it bears some resemblance to the constitution of the Swiss Confederation

and to the constitutions of the cantons of Switzerland, this resemblance

is not a close one, and is evidently not due to conscious imitation, but

to a certain similarity of phenomena suggesting similar devices. The

constitutions of these two Dutch republics are the product, the pure and

original product, of African conditions, having drawn comparatively

little from the experience of older countries, or from the models their

schemes of government afford. Moreover, these South African

constitutions grew up upon a perfectly virgin soil. There was no

pre-existing political organization, such as the old feudal polities

supplied in some countries of Europe, out of which these Republics could

develop themselves. There were no charters of guilds or companies, such

as those which gave their earliest form to the governments of several of

the older American States. Nor was there any home pattern to be copied,

as the British colonies have, by the aid of statutes of the Imperial

Parliament, copied the constitution of the United Kingdom.

-----

Footnote 189:

This Essay was composed early in 1896, and describes the Constitutions

of the Orange Free State and South African Republic as they stood in

December 1895, the month when the fatal invasion of the latter

Republic by the police of the British S. Africa Company took place. I

have left it, for obvious reasons, substantially unchanged, save that

here and there I have corrected what seemed to be errors, have added

one or two references to recent events, and have explained some

constitutional points with more fullness. In its original form, the

Essay appeared in the _Forum_ in April 1896.

Footnote 190:

Λέγεταί τις παροιμία ὅτι ἀεὶ φέρει Λιβύη τι καινόν. Arist. _Hist.

Anim._ viii. 28.

-----

This is one of the most interesting features of these Constitutions.

They are not specifically Dutch. Neither are they English. Nothing is

more uncommon in history than an institution starting _de novo_, instead

of being naturally evolved out of some earlier form. The simple farmers

who drafted the documents which I propose to describe, knew little about

the systems either of Europe or of America. Few possessed any

historical, still fewer any legal, knowledge. Many were uneducated men,

though with plenty of rough sense and mother wit. They would have liked

to get on without any government, and were resolved to have as little as

possible. Circumstances, however, compelled them to form some sort of

organization; and in setting to work to form one, with little except

their recollections of the local arrangements of Cape Colony to guide or

to assist them, they came as near as any set of men ever have come to

the situation which philosophers have so often imagined, but which has

so rarely in fact occurred—that of free and independent persons uniting

in an absolutely new social compact for mutual help and defence, and

thereby creating a government whose authority has had, and can have had,

no origin save in the consent of the governed.

A few preliminary words are needed to explain the circumstances under

which the constitutions of the Orange Free State and of the South

African Republic (commonly called the Transvaal) were drawn up.

As early as 1820 a certain number of farmers, mostly of Dutch origin,

living in the north-eastern part of Cape Colony, were in the habit of

driving their flocks and herds into the wilderness north of the Orange

River, where they found good fresh pasture during and after the summer

rains. About 1828 a few of these farmers established themselves

permanently there, still of course remaining subjects of the British

Crown, which had acquired Cape Colony first by conquest and then by

purchase in 1806 and 1814. In 1835-6, however, a much greater number of

farmers migrated from the colony; some in larger, some in smaller

bodies. They had various grievances against the British Government, some

dating back as far as 1815: and they desired to live by themselves in

their own way, untroubled by the Governors whom it sent to rule the

country[191]. Between 1835 and 1838 a considerable number of these

emigrants moved into the country beyond the Orange River, some remaining

there, others pushing still further to the north-east into the hitherto

unknown regions beyond the Vaal River, while a third body, perhaps the

largest, moved down into what was then a thinly peopled Kafir land, and

is now the British colony of Natal. This is not the place in which to

relate the striking story of their battles with the Zulu king and of

their struggle with the British Government for the possession of Natal.

It is enough to say that this third body ultimately quitted Natal to

join the other emigrants north of the mountains; and that, after many

conflicts between those emigrants and the native tribes, and some

serious difficulties with successive Governors of Cape Colony, the

British Government finally, by a Convention signed at Sand River in

1852, recognized the independence of the settlers beyond the Vaal River,

while, by a later Convention signed at Bloemfontein in 1854, it

renounced the sovereignty it had claimed over the country between the

Orange River and the Vaal River, leaving the inhabitants of both these

territories free to settle their own future form of government for

themselves.

-----

Footnote 191:

A concise account of these grievances and a sketch of the subsequent

history of the emigrants may be found in Dr. Theal’s _Story of South

Africa_ (published by Messrs. Putnam), and in my _Impressions of South

Africa_, chaps. xi and xii. See also Dr. Theal’s larger _History of

the Boers in South Africa_.

-----

These two Conventions are the legal and formal starting-points of the

two republics in South Africa, and from them the history of those

republics, as self-governing states, recognized in the community of

nations by international law, takes its beginning. The emigrant farmers

had, however, already been driven by the force of circumstances to

establish some sort of government among themselves. As early as 1836 an

assembly of one of the largest emigrant groups then dwelling in the

Orange River Territory, elected seven persons to constitute a body with

legislative and judicial power. In 1838 the Natal emigrants established

a Volksraad (council of the people) which consisted of twenty-four

members, elected annually, who met every three months and had the

general direction of the affairs of the community, acting during the

intervals between the meetings by a small committee called the Commissie

Raad. All important measures were, however, submitted to a general

meeting called the Publiek, in which every burgher was entitled to speak

and vote. It was a primary assembly, like the Old English Folk Mot, or

the Landesgemeinde of the older Swiss Cantons. A somewhat similar system

prevailed among the farmers settled in the country beyond the Vaal

River. They too had a Volksraad, or sometimes—for they were from time to

time divided into separate and practically independent republican

communities—several Volksraads; and each district or petty republic had

a commandant-general. Their organization was really more military than

civil, and the commandant-general with his Krygsraad (council of war),

consisting of the commandants and field cornets within the district,

formed the nearest approach to a regular executive. I have unfortunately

been unable to obtain proper materials for the internal political

history, if such a term can be used, of these communities before they

proceeded to enact the constitutions to be presently described, and fear

that such materials as do exist are very scanty. But, speaking broadly,

it may be said that, in all the communities of the emigrant farmers,

supreme power was deemed to be vested in an assembly of the whole male

citizens, usually acting through a council of delegates, and that the

permanent officials were generally a magistrate, called a landrost, in

each village, a field cornet in each ward, and a commandant in each

district. All these officials were chosen by the people[192]. In these

primitive arrangements consisted the materials out of which a

constitutional government had to be built up.

-----

Footnote 192:

I am indebted for most of these facts regarding the early organization

of the emigrants to Dr. G. M. Theal’s _History of the Boers in South

Africa_, a book of considerable merit and interest, which, however,

carries its narrative down only to 1854.

-----

From this point the history of the Orange River Territory, which by the

Convention of 1854 was recognized as the Orange Free State, and that of

the Transvaal Territory begin to diverge. In describing the

constitutions of the republics, I take first that of the Orange Free

State, because it dates from 1854, while the existing constitution of

the Transvaal is four years younger, having been adopted in 1858. The

former is also by far the simpler and shorter document.

When the British Government in 1854 voluntarily divested itself of its

rights over the Orange River Territory, greatly against the will of some

of its subjects there, the inhabitants of that Territory were estimated

at 15,000 Europeans, most of them of Dutch, the rest of British origin.

(The number of native Kafirs was much larger, but cannot now be

estimated.) The great majority were farmers, pasturing their sheep and

cattle on large farms, but five small villages already existed, one of

which, Bloemfontein, has grown to be a town of 5,800 people, and is now

the capital. The Volksraad, or assembly of delegates of the people,

framed, and on April 10, 1854, enacted, a constitution for the new

republic. This constitution was revised and amended in 1866, and again

in 1879, but the main features of the original instrument remain. I

proceed to deal with it as it now stands.

II. CONSTITUTION OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE.

This Constitution, which is in the Dutch language, and is called _De

Constitutie_, is a terse and straightforward document of sixty-two

articles, most of which are only a few lines in length[193]. It begins

by defining the qualifications for citizenship and the exercise of the

suffrage (articles 1 to 4), and incidentally imposes the obligation of

military service on all citizens between the ages of sixteen and sixty.

Only whites can be citizens. Newcomers may obtain citizenship if they

have resided one year in the state and have real property to the value

of at least £150 sterling ($750), or if they have resided three

successive years and have made a written promise of allegiance.

-----

Footnote 193:

My thanks are due to the distinguished Chief Justice of the Free State

(Mr. Melius de Villiers) for much information kindly furnished to me

regarding this Constitution.

-----

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