The indirect influence of religion on manners and morality. Nowhere is

marriage so much respected and the relations of the sexes so well

ordered. The universal acceptance of Christianity, an acceptance which

imposes silence even on the few sceptics who may be supposed to exist

there as everywhere, steadies and restrains men’s minds. ‘No one

ventures to proclaim that everything is permissible in the interests of

society. Impious maxim, which seems to have been invented in an age of

liberty in order to give legitimacy to all tyrants to come.’ The

Americans themselves cannot imagine liberty without Christianity. And

the chief cause why religion is so powerful among them is because it is

entirely separated from the State[178].

-----

Footnote 178:

I do not profess to summarize in these few lines all that Tocqueville

says of the character and influence of Christianity in the United

States, for he devotes many pages to it, and they are among the wisest

and most permanently true that he has written.

-----

The intelligence of the people, and their education, but especially

their practical experience in working their local politics. However,

though everybody has some education, letters and culture do not

flourish. The Americans regard literature properly so called with

disfavour: they are averse to general ideas. They have no great

historian, not a single poet, legal commentators but no publicists, good

artisans but very few inventors[!].

Of all these causes, the most important are those which belong to the

character and habits of the people. These are infinitely more important

sources of well-being than the laws, as the laws are in turn more

important than the physical conditions[179].

-----

Footnote 179:

Like most of his contemporaries, Tocqueville failed to appreciate the

enormous influence of physical environment, which has, however,

doubtless increased, so far as America is concerned, through the

scientific discoveries made since the date of his journey.

-----

Whether democracy will succeed in other parts of the world is a question

which a study of America does not enable the observer confidently to

answer. Her institutions, however suitable to her position in a world of

her own, could not be transferred bodily to Europe. But the peace and

prosperity which the Union enjoys under its democratic government do

raise a strong presumption in favour of democracy even in Europe. For

the passions and vices which attack free government are the same in

America as in Europe, and as the legislator has overcome many of them

there, combating envy by the idea of rights, and the presumptuous

ignorance of the crowd by the practice of local government, he may

overcome them here in Europe likewise.

One may imagine institutions for a democracy other than those the

Americans have adopted, and some of them better ones. Since it seems

probable that the peoples of Europe will have to choose between

democracy and despotism, they ought at least to try the former, and may

be encouraged by the example of America.

A concluding chapter is devoted to speculations on the future of the

three races which inhabit the territories of the United States. I need

not transcribe what he says of the unhappy Indian tribes. Their fate was

then already certain: the process which he saw passing in Alabama and

Michigan afterwards repeated itself in California and Oregon.

The presence of the blacks is the greatest evil that threatens the

United States. They increase, in the Gulf States, faster than do the

whites. They cannot be kept for ever in slavery, since the tendencies of

the modern world run strongly the other way. They cannot be absorbed

into the white population, for the whites will not intermarry with them,

not even in the North where they have been free for two generations.

Once freed, they would be more dangerous than now, because they would

not long submit to be debarred from political rights. A terrible

struggle would ensue. Hence the Southern Americans, even those who

regret slavery, are forced to maintain it, and have enacted a harsh code

which keeps the slave as near as possible to a beast of burden,

forbidding him to be taught and making it difficult for him to be

manumitted. No one in America seems to see any solution. The North

discusses the problem with noisy inquietude. The South maintains an

ominous silence. Slavery is evidently economically mischievous, for the

free States are far more prosperous: but the South holds to slavery as a

necessity.

As to the Federal Union, it shows many signs of weakness. The States

have most of the important powers of government in their hands; they

have the attachment of the people; they act with vigour and promptitude,

while the Federal authority hesitates and argues. In every struggle that

has heretofore arisen the Federal Government has given way, and it

possesses neither the material force to coerce a rebellious State nor a

clear legal right to retain a member wishing to dissolve the Federal

tie. But although the Union has no national patriotism to support it

(for the professions of such patriotism one hears in America are but

lip-deep), it is maintained by certain interests—those material

interests which each part of the country has in remaining politically

united with the rest. Against these one finds no strong interests making

for material severance, but one does find diversities, not indeed of

opinion—for opinions and ideas are wonderfully similar over the whole

country—but of character, particularly between Northern and Southern

men, which increase the chances of discord. And in the rapid growth of

the Union there lies a real source of danger. Its population doubles

every twenty-two years. Before a century has passed its territory will

be covered by more than a hundred millions of people and divided into

forty States[180]. Now all partnerships are more difficult to keep

together the more the number of partners increases[181]. Even admitting,

therefore, that this hundred millions of people have similar interests

and are benefited by remaining united, still the mere fact that they

will then form forty nations, distinct and unequally powerful, will make

the maintenance of the Federal Government only a happy accident. ‘I

cannot believe in the duration of a government whose task is to hold

together forty different peoples spread over a surface equal to the half

of Europe, to avoid rivalries, ambitions, and struggles among them, and

to unite the action of their independent wills for the accomplishment of

the same plans[182].’

-----

Footnote 180:

There are now forty-five, with a population of nearly eighty millions.

Footnote 181:

No proof is given of this proposition, which is by no means

self-evident, and which has indeed all the air of a premiss laid down

by a schoolman of the thirteenth century.

Footnote 182:

He has, however, nowhere attempted to prove that the States deserve to

be called ‘nations’ or ‘peoples.’

-----

The greatest danger, however, which the Union incurs as it grows is the

transference of forces which goes on within its own body. The Northern

States increase more rapidly than the Southern, those of the Mississippi

Valley more rapidly still. Washington, which when founded was in the

centre of the Union, is now at one end of it. The disproportionate

growth of some States menaces the independence of others. Hence the

South has become suspicious, jealous, irritable. It fancies itself

oppressed because outstripped in the race of prosperity and no longer

dominant. It threatens to retire from a partnership whose charges it

bears, but whose profits it does not share[183].

-----

Footnote 183:

The protective tariff was felt as a grievance by the South, being

imposed in the interest of the Northern and Middle States. No doubt,

the North got more pecuniary gain out of the Union than the South did.

-----

Besides the danger that some States may withdraw from the Union (in

which case there would probably be formed several federations, for it is

highly unlikely that the original condition of State isolation would

reappear), there is the danger that the central Federal authority may

continue to decline till it has become no less feeble than was the old

Confederation. Although Americans fear, or pretend to fear, the growth

of centralization and the accumulation of powers in the hands of the

Federal Government, there can be little doubt that the central authority

has been growing steadily weaker, and is less and less able to face the

resistance of a refractory State. The concessions of public territory

made to the States, the hostility to the United States Bank, the

(virtual) success of South Carolina in the Nullification struggle, are

all proofs of this truth. General Jackson, now (1832) President, is at

this moment strong, but only because he flatters the majority and lends

himself to its passions. His personal power may increase, but that of

the President declines. ‘Unless I am strangely mistaken, the Federal

Government of the United States tends to become daily weaker; it draws

back from one kind of business after another, it more and more restricts

the sphere of its action. Naturally feeble, it abandons even the

appearance of force. On the other side, I think I perceive that in the

United States the sentiment of independence becomes more and more lively

in the States, and the love of provincial government more and more

pronounced. People wish to keep the Union, but to keep it reduced to a

shadow: they would like to have it strong for some purposes and weak for

the rest—strong in war and almost non-existent in peace—forgetting that

such alternations of strength and weakness are impossible.’

Nevertheless the time when the Federal power will be extinguished is

still distant, for the continuance of the Union is desired, and when the

weakness of the Government is seen to threaten the life of the Union,

there may be a reaction in its favour.

Whatever may be the future of the Federation, that of republicanism is

well assured. It is deeply rooted not only in the laws, but in the

habits, the ideas, the sentiments, even the religion of the people. It

is indeed just possible that the extreme instability of legislation and

administration may some day disgust the Americans with their present

government, and in that case they will pass rapidly from republicanism

to despotism, not stopping by the way in the stage of limited monarchy.

An aristocracy, however, such as that of the old countries of Europe,

can never grow up. Democratic equality will survive, whatever be the

form which government may take.

This brief summary, which conveys no impression of the elegance and

refinement of Tocqueville’s reasonings, need not be pursued to include

his remarks on the commercial and maritime greatness of the United

States, nor his speculations on the future of the Anglo-American race.

Still less shall I enter on the second part of the book, for (as has

been observed already) it deals with the ideas of democracy and equality

in a very abstract and sometimes unfruitful way, and it would need a

separate critical study.

But before passing on to consider how far the United States now differs

from the republic which the French philosopher described, we must pause

to ask ourselves whether his description was complete.

It is a salutary warning to those who think it easy to get to the bottom

of the political and social phenomena of a nation, to find that so keen

and so industrious an observer as Tocqueville, who seized with

unrivalled acuteness and described with consummate art many of the minor

features of American politics, omitted to notice several which had

already begun to show their heads in his day, and have since become of

the first importance. Among these are—

The system of party organization. It was full grown in some States (New

York for instance), and spreading quickly through the rest.

The influence of commercial growth and closer commercial relations in

binding together different States of the Union and breaking down the

power of State sentiment. He does in one passage refer to this

influence, but is far from appreciating the enormous force it was

destined to exercise, and must have exercised even without railways.

The results of the principle proclaimed definitely just before his

visit, and already operative in some places, that public office was to

be bestowed as a reward for political service, and held only so long as

the party which bestowed it remained in power.

The assertion by President Monroe of the intention of the United States

to regard as unfriendly (_i.e._ to do their best to resist) any

extension of the ‘European system’ to the American Continent, and any

further colonization thereof or intrusion by European powers thereon.

The rise of the Abolitionists (they had begun to organize themselves

before 1830, and formed a National Anti-Slavery Society in 1833) and the

intense hostility they aroused in the South.

The growth of the literary spirit, and the beginnings of literary

production. The society which produced Washington Irving, Fenimore

Cooper, Channing, Hawthorne, Emerson, Longfellow, Thoreau, Prescott,

Ticknor, Margaret Fuller, Holmes, Lowell, Parkman—not to add some almost

equally famous later names—deserved mention as a soil whence remarkable

fruits might be expected which would affect the whole nation. Yet it is

not once referred to, although one can perceive that Tocqueville had

spent some time in Boston, for many of his views are evidently due to

the conversations he held with the leading Whigs of that day there.

The influence of money on politics. It might surely have been foretold

that in a country with such resources, and among a people whose restless

commercial activity would be able to act on a vast scale, great piles of

wealth would soon be accumulated, that this wealth would perceive

objects which it might accomplish by legislative aid, would seek to

influence governments, and would find ample opportunities for doing so.

But of the dangers that must thence arise we do not hear a word.

VII. EXAMINATION OF TOCQUEVILLE’S VIEWS.

Such was the aspect of the United States in 1832, such the predictions

which an unusually penetrating and philosophic mind formed of its

future. I will not attempt to inquire how far the details of the picture

are accurate, because it would be unprofitable to contest statements

without assigning one’s own reasons, while to assign them would lead me

into a historical disquisition. A shorter and simpler course will be to

inquire in what respects things have changed since his time, for thus we

shall be in a position to discern which of the tendencies he noted have

proved permanent, what new tendencies have come into being, what are the

main tendencies which are now controlling the destinies of the Republic.

I have noted at the end of last section the phenomena which, already

existing in Tocqueville’s day, he omitted to notice or to appraise at

their due value. Let us see what time has brought forward since his day

to alter the conditions of the problem as he saw it.

The great events that have befallen since 1834 are these:—

The annexation of Texas in 1845.

The war with Mexico in 1846, leading to the enlargement of the United

States by the vast territories which are now California, Nevada, Utah,

Idaho, Arizona, and New Mexico.

The making of railways over the whole country, culminating with the

completion of four or five great Trans-Continental roads (the first in

1869).

The establishment of lines of swift ocean steamers between America and

Europe.

The immigration from Ireland (immensely increased after the famine of

1846), and from Germany (beginning somewhat later), and from

Scandinavia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia (later still).

The War of Secession, 1861-65; together with the extinction of Slavery.

The laying of submarine cables to Europe, and the extension of

telegraphic communication over the whole Union.

The settlement of the Alabama claims, an event scarcely less important

in American history than in English, because it greatly diminished the

likelihood of a war between the two countries. In Tocqueville’s time the

hatred of Americans to England was rancorous.

The growth of great cities. In 1830, only two had a population exceeding

100,000. There are now (census of 1900) thirty-eight which exceed that

population[184].

-----

Footnote 184:

In 1790 there were only six cities with populations of at least 8,000.

There are now 545. The percentage of urban to rural population (taking

urban as that of a city of 8,000) was then 3·4 and is now 33·1.

-----

The growth of great fortunes, and of wealthy and powerful trading

corporations; the extension of mining, especially silver and gold

mining; the stupendous development of speculation, not to say gambling,

in stocks and produce.

The growth of the universities and of many kindred literary and

scientific institutions.

The war with Spain in 1898, and consequent annexation of Hawaii (which

might probably not have been taken but for naval needs supposed to have

been disclosed by the war), of Puerto Rico, and of the Philippine Isles.

These are events which have told directly or indirectly upon politics. I

go on to enumerate the political changes themselves of the same

sixty-seven years.

Democratization of State Constitutions, total abolition of property

qualifications, choice of judges (in most States) by popular vote and

for terms of years, restrictions on the power of State Legislatures,

more frequent use of the popular vote or so-called Referendum[185].

-----

Footnote 185:

Especially in the form of the amendment of particular provisions of

State Constitutions.

-----

Development of the Spoils System, consequent degradation of the

increasingly large and important civil service, both Federal, State, and

Municipal.

Perfection and hierarchical consolidation, on nominally representative

but really oligarchic lines, of party organizations; consequent growth

of Rings and Bosses, and demoralization of city government.

Enfranchisement of the negroes through amendments to the Constitution.

Intensification of National (as opposed to State) sentiment consequent

on the War of Secession; passion for the national flag; rejection of the

dogmas of State sovereignty and right of nullification.

Increased importance of currency and other financial problems: emergence

of industrial questions as bases for party organization: efforts to

found a Labour Party and a ‘People’s Party.’

To these I add, as powerfully affecting politics, the development not

only of literary, scientific and historical studies, but in particular

of a new school of publicists, who discuss constitutional and economic

questions in a philosophic spirit; closer intellectual relations with

Europe, and particularly with England and Germany; resort of American

students to German Universities; increased interest of the best class of

citizens in politics; improved literary quality of the newspapers and of

periodicals (political and semi-political) generally; growth of a

critical and sceptical spirit in matters of religion and philosophy;

diminished political influence of the clergy.

We may now ask which of Tocqueville’s observations have ceased to be

true, which of his predictions falsified. I follow the order in which

they were presented in the last section.

Although the powers of the several States remain in point of law

precisely what they were (except as regards the Constitutional

amendments presently to be noticed) and the citizen depends as much now

as then upon the State in all that relates to person and property, to

the conduct of family and commercial relations, the National or Federal

Government has become more important to him than it was then. He watches

its proceedings more closely, and, of course, thanks to the telegraph,

knows them sooner and more fully. His patriotism is far more national,

and in case of a conflict between one or more States and the Federal

power, the sympathies of the other States would probably be with the

latter.

Local government has been maintained in its completeness, but it seems

to excite less interest among the people. In the larger cities it has

fallen into the hands of professional politicians, who have perverted it

into a grasping and sordid oligarchy.

There is still, as compared with Continental Europe, little

‘administration,’ though more than in Tocqueville’s time. But the

influence of Federal legislation on the business of the country is far

greater than it was, for the tariff and the currency, matters of

increased consequence ever since the war, are in its hands.

The dignity of the judicial bench has in most States suffered seriously

from the system of popular election for comparatively short terms. In

those States where nomination by the Executive has been retained, and in

the case of the Federal Judges (nominated by the President), the

position is perhaps the highest permanent one open to a citizen.

The President’s authority received a portentous enlargement during the

War of Secession, and although it has now returned to its normal

condition, the sense of its importance has survived. His election is

contested with increasing excitement, for his immense patronage and the

magnitude of the issues he may influence by his veto power give

individuals and parties the strongest grounds for hope and fear.

Experience has, on the whole, confirmed the view that the re-eligibility

of an acting President (_i.e._ the power of electing him for an

immediately succeeding term) might well be dispensed with.

The credit of the Supreme Court suffered somewhat from its pro-slavery

decisions just before the war, and may possibly have suffered slightly

since in respect of its treatment of the Legal Tender question.

Nevertheless it remains respected and influential.

The State Constitutions, nearly all of which have been re-enacted or

largely amended since 1834, remain inferior to the Federal Constitution,

and the State legislatures are, of course (possibly with a very few

exceptions in the New England States), still more inferior to Congress.

Two great parties reappeared immediately after Tocqueville wrote, and

except for a brief interval before the Civil War when the Whig party had

practically expired before its successor and representative the

Republican party had come to maturity, they have continued to divide the

country, making minor parties of slight consequence. Now and then an

attempt is made to start a new party as a national organization, but it

rarely becomes strong enough to maintain itself. The rich and educated

renewed their interest in politics under the impulse of the Slavery and

Secession struggle. After a subsequent interval of apathy they seem to

be again returning to public life. The secret murmurs against democracy,

whereof Tocqueville speaks, are confined to a handful of fashionable

exquisites less self-complacent now than they were in the days when they

learnt luxury and contempt for the people in the Paris of Louis

Napoleon.

Although newspapers are better written than formerly and those of the

great cities travel further over the country, the multitude of

discordant voices still prevents the people from being enslaved by the

press, which however shows an alarming capacity for exciting them. The

habit of association by voluntary societies maintains itself.

The defects of the professional politicians, a term which now more

precisely describes those whom Tocqueville calls by the inappropriate

European name of ‘the governors,’ continue at least as marked as in his

time.

So, too, the House of Representatives continues less influential than

the Senate, but for other reasons than those which Tocqueville assigns,

and to a less degree than he describes. The Senate has not, since 1880,

maintained the character he gives it; and the fact that it is still

chosen in the way which he commended shows that the merits he ascribed

to it were not due to its mode of choice. Indeed in the judgement of

most thoughtful men, popular election in the States would give a better

Senate than election by the State Legislatures now does.

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