CAPTURE OF FORT WASHINGTON AND GARRISON.--RETREAT THROUGH NEW JERSEY.
On the morning of the 12th of November, Washington crossed the Hudson
to the ferry below Stony Point, with the residue of the troops
destined for the Jerseys. Far below were to be descried the Phoenix,
the Roebuck, and the Tartar, at anchor in the broad waters of
Haverstraw Bay and the Tappan Sea, guarding the lower ferries. The
army, thus shut out from the nearer passes, was slowly winding its way
by a circuitous route through the gap in the mountains, which Lord
Stirling had secured. Leaving the troops which had just landed to
pursue the same route to the Hackensack, Washington, accompanied by
Colonel Reed, struck a direct course for Fort Lee, being anxious about
affairs at Fort Washington. He arrived there on the following day, and
found, to his disappointment, that General Greene had taken no
measures for the evacuation of that fortress; but on the contrary had
reinforced it with a part of Colonel Durkee's regiment and the
regiment of Colonel Rawlings, so that its garrison now numbered
upwards of two thousand men; a great part, however, were militia.
Washington's orders for its evacuation had, in fact, been
discretionary, leaving the execution of them to Greene's judgment, "as
being on the spot." The latter had differed in opinion as to the
policy of such a measure; and Colonel Magaw, who had charge of the
fortress, was likewise confident it might be maintained. The fort was
now invested on all sides but one; and the troops under Howe, which
had been encamped at Dobbs' Ferry, were said to be moving down toward
it.
{Illustration: VIEW FROM THE SITE OF FORT WASHINGTON. Vol. II.}
Washington was much perplexed. The main object of Howe was still a
matter of doubt with him. He could not think that Sir William was
moving his whole force upon that fortress, to invest which, a part
would be sufficient. He suspected an ulterior object, probably a
Southern expedition, as he was told a large number of ships were
taking in wood and water at New York. He resolved, therefore, to
continue a few days in this neighborhood, during which he trusted the
designs of the enemy would be more apparent; in the meantime he would
distribute troops at Brunswick, Amboy, Elizabethtown and Fort Lee, so
as to be ready at these various points to check any incursions into
the Jerseys.
Washington was mistaken in his conjecture as to Sir William Howe's
design. The capture of Fort Washington was, at present, his main
object; and he was encamped on Fordham Heights, not far from King's
Bridge, until preliminary steps should be taken. In the night of the
14th, thirty flat-bottomed boats stole quietly up the Hudson, passed
the American forts undiscovered, and made their way through Spyt den
Duivel Creek into Harlem River. The means were thus provided for
crossing that river and landing before unprotected parts of the
American works.
Apprised by Colonel Magaw of his peril, General Greene sent over
reinforcements, with an exhortation to him to persist in his defence;
and despatched an express to Washington, who was at Hackensack, where
the troops which had crossed from Peekskill were encamped. It was
nightfall when Washington arrived at Fort Lee. Greene and Putnam were
over at the besieged fortress. He threw himself into a boat, and had
partly crossed the river, when he met those generals returning. They
informed him of the garrison's having been reinforced, and assured him
that it was in high spirits and capable of making a good defence. It
was with difficulty, however, they could prevail on him to return with
them to the Jersey shore, for he was excessively excited.
Early the next morning (16th), Magaw made his dispositions for the
expected attack. His forces, with the recent addition, amounted to
nearly three thousand men. As the fort could not contain above a third
of that number, most of them were stationed about the outworks.
Colonel Lambert Cadwalader, with eight hundred Pennsylvanians, was
posted in the outer lines, about two miles and a half south of the
fort, the side menaced by Lord Percy with sixteen hundred men. Colonel
Rawlings, of Maryland, with a body of troops, many of them riflemen,
was stationed by a three-gun battery, on a rocky, precipitous hill,
north of the fort, and between it and Spyt den Duivel Creek. Colonel
Baxter, of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, with his regiment of militia,
was posted east of the fort, on rough, woody heights bordering the
Harlem River, to watch the motions of the enemy, who had thrown up
redoubts on high and commanding ground on the opposite side of the
river, apparently to cover the crossing and landing of troops.
Sir William Howe had planned four simultaneous attacks; one on the
north by Knyphausen, who was encamped on the York side of King's
Bridge, within cannon shot of Fort Washington, but separated from it
by high and rough hills, covered with almost impenetrable woods. He
was to advance in two columns, formed by detachments made from the
Hessians of his corps, the brigade of Rahl, and the regiment of
Waldeckers. The second attack was to be by two battalions of light
infantry and two battalions of guards, under Brigadier-general Mathew,
who was to cross Harlem River in flat-boats, under cover of the
redoubts above mentioned, and to land on the right of the fort. This
attack was to be supported by the first and second grenadiers, and a
regiment of light infantry under command of Lord Cornwallis. The third
attack, intended as a feint to distract the attention of the
Americans, was to be by Colonel Sterling, with the 42d regiment, who
was to drop down the Harlem River in bateaux to the left of the
American lines, facing New York. The fourth attack was to be on the
south, by Lord Percy, with the English and Hessian troops under his
command, on the right flank of the American intrenchments.
About noon, a heavy cannonade thundering along the rocky hills, and
sharp volleys of musketry, proclaimed that the action was commenced.
Knyphausen's division was pushing on from the north in two columns, as
had been arranged. The right was led by Colonel Rahl, the left by
himself. Rahl essayed to mount a steep, broken height called Cock
Hill, which rises from Spyt den Duivel Creek, and was covered with
woods. Knyphausen undertook a hill rising from the King's Bridge road,
but soon found himself entangled in a woody defile, difficult to
penetrate, and where his Hessians were exposed to the fire of the
three-gun battery, and Rawlings' riflemen.
While this was going on at the north of the fort, General Mathew, with
his light infantry and guards, crossed the Harlem River in the
flat-boats, under cover of a heavy fire from the redoubts. He made
good his landing, after being severely handled by Baxter and his men,
from behind rocks and trees, and the breastworks thrown up on the
steep river bank. A short contest ensued. Baxter, while bravely
encouraging his men, was killed by a British officer. His troops,
overpowered by numbers, retreated to the fort. General Mathew now
pushed on with his guards and light infantry to cut off Cadwalader.
That officer had gallantly defended the lines against the attack of
Lord Percy, until informed that Colonel Sterling was dropping down
Harlem River in bateaux to flank the lines and take him in the rear.
He sent off a detachment to oppose his landing. They did it manfully.
About ninety of Sterling's men were killed or wounded in their boats,
but he persevered, landed, and forced his way up a steep height, which
was well defended, gained the summit, forced a redoubt, and took
nearly two hundred prisoners. Thus doubly assailed, Cadwalader was
obliged to retreat to the fort. He was closely pursued by Percy with
his English troops and Hessians, but turned repeatedly on his
pursuers. Thus he fought his way to the fort, with the loss of several
killed and more taken prisoners; but marking his track by the number
of Hessians slain.
The defence on the north side of the fort was equally obstinate and
unsuccessful. Rawlings with his Maryland riflemen and the aid of the
three-gun battery, had for some time kept the left column of Hessians
and Waldeckers under Knyphausen at bay. At length Colonel Rahl, with
the right column of the division, having forced his way directly up
the north side of the steep hill at Spyt den Duivel Creek, came upon
Rawlings' men, whose rifles, from frequent discharges, had become foul
and almost useless, drove them from their strong post, and followed
them until within a hundred yards of the fort, where he was joined by
Knyphausen, who had slowly made his way through dense forest and over
felled trees. Here they took post behind a large stone house, and sent
in a flag with a summons to surrender.
[Washington had been an anxious spectator of the battle from the
opposite side of the Hudson. The action about the lines to the south
lay open to him. When he saw Cadwalader assailed in flank, the line
broken, and his troops overpowered by numbers, he gave up the game as
lost. Seeing the flag from Knyphausen's division go into the fort, he
wrote a note to Magaw, telling him that if he could hold out until
evening and the place could not be maintained, he would endeavor to
bring off the garrison. Captain Gooch offered to be the bearer of the
note. He crossed in a small boat, landed on the bank, ran up to the
fort and delivered the message. It came too late.] "The fort was so
crowded by the garrison and the troops which had retreated into it
that it was difficult to move about. The enemy, too, were in
possession of the little redoubts around, and could have poured in
showers of shells and ricochet balls that would have made dreadful
slaughter." It was no longer possible for Magaw to get his troops to
man the lines: he was compelled, therefore, to yield himself and his
garrison prisoners of war. The only terms granted them were that the
men should retain their baggage and the officers their swords.
The sight of the American flag hauled down, and the British flag
waving in its place, told Washington of the surrender. His instant
care was for the safety of the upper country, now that the lower
defences of the Hudson were at an end. Before he knew anything about
the terms of capitulation, he wrote to General Lee, informing him of
the surrender, and calling his attention to the passes of the
Highlands and those which lay east of the river; begging him to have
such measures adopted for their defence as his judgment should suggest
to be necessary. Lee, in reply, objected to removing from his actual
encampment at Northcastle. "It would give us," said he, "the air of
being frightened; it would expose a fine, fertile country to their
ravages; and I must add, that we are as secure as we could be in any
position whatever." After stating that he should deposit his stores,
etc., in a place fully as safe, and more central than Peekskill, he
adds: "As to ourselves, light as we are, several retreats present
themselves. In short, if we keep a good look-out, we are in no danger;
but I must entreat your Excellency to enjoin the officers posted at
Fort Lee, to give us the quickest intelligence, if they observe any
embarkation on the North River." As to the affair of Fort Washington,
all that Lee observed on the subject was: "Oh, general, why would you
be over-persuaded by men of inferior judgment to your own? It was a
cursed affair."{1}
{Footnote 1: [Colonel Reed, in a letter to General Lee, at this
juncture had allowed himself, notwithstanding the devotion he had
hitherto manifested for the commander-in-chief, to express himself
with great critical freedom on the loss of Fort Lee. After alluding to
the fact that Washington's own judgment was averse to the attempt of
holding the fort, but that Greene's advice to the contrary had kept
his mind in a state of suspense, he exclaims, "Oh, general! an
indecisive mind is one of the greatest misfortunes that can befall an
army; how often have I lamented it this campaign." Some days later a
letter from General Lee came to head-quarters addressed to Colonel
Reed, who at the time was absent. Washington supposing it to be on
official business, opened it, as he was in the habit of doing on like
occasions. To his surprise he discovered it to be a private note, the
tenor of which indicated that he was the subject of critical
correspondence between a member of his military family and one of his
generals. He immediately enclosed the letter to Colonel Reed,
explaining how it had been opened, but without further comment. Reed
endeavored to explain away the remarks in Lee's letter; but
Washington's affectionate confidence in him as a sympathizing friend
had received a severe wound. Reed deeply grieved over the error he had
committed, and his earnest appeals to Washington at a later date,
restored, in a great measure, their relations of friendly
confidence.]}
With the capture of Fort Washington, the project of obstructing the
navigation of the Hudson, at that point, was at an end. Fort Lee,
consequently, became useless, and Washington ordered all the
ammunition and stores to be removed, preparatory to its abandonment.
This was effected with the whole of the ammunition and a part of the
stores, and every exertion was making to hurry off the remainder,
when, early in the morning of the 20th, intelligence was brought that
the enemy, with two hundred boats, had crossed the river and landed a
few miles above. General Greene immediately ordered the garrison under
arms, sent out troops to hold the enemy in check, and sent off an
express to Washington, at Hackensack.
The enemy had crossed the Hudson, on a very rainy night, in two
divisions, one diagonally upward from King's Bridge, landing on the
west side, about eight o'clock; the other marched up the east bank,
three or four miles, and then crossed to the opposite shore. The whole
corps, six thousand strong, and under the command of Lord Cornwallis,
were landed, with their cannon, by ten o'clock, at a place called
Closter Dock, five or six miles above Fort Lee, and under that line of
lofty and perpendicular cliffs known as the Palisades. "The seamen,"
says Sir William Howe, "distinguished themselves remarkably on this
occasion, by their readiness to drag the cannon up a very narrow road
for nearly half a mile to the top of a precipice, which bounds the
shore for some miles on the west side."
Washington arrived at the fort in three quarters of an hour. Being
told that the enemy were extending themselves across the country, he
at once saw that they intended to form a line from the Hudson to the
Hackensack, and hem the whole garrison in between the two rivers.
Nothing would save it but a prompt retreat to secure the bridge over
the Hackensack. No time was to be lost. The troops sent out to check
the enemy were recalled. The retreat commenced in all haste. There was
a want of horses and wagons; a great quantity of baggage, stores and
provisions, therefore, was abandoned. So was all the artillery
excepting two twelve-pounders. Even the tents were left standing, and
camp-kettles on the fire. With all their speed they did not reach the
Hackensack River before the vanguard of the enemy was close upon them.
Expecting a brush, the greater part hurried over the bridge, others
crossed at the ferry and some higher up. The enemy, however, did not
dispute the passage of the river.
From Hackensack, Colonel Grayson, one of Washington's aides-de-camp,
wrote instantly, by his orders, to General Lee; informing him that the
enemy had crossed into the Jerseys, and, as was reported, _in great
numbers_. "His Excellency," adds Grayson, "thinks it would be
advisable in you to remove the troops under your command on this side
of the North River, and there wait for further commands."
At Hackensack the army did not exceed three thousand men, and they
were dispirited by ill success, and the loss of tents and baggage.
They were without intrenching tools, in a flat country, where there
were no natural fastnesses. Washington resolved, therefore, to avoid
any attack from the enemy, though, by so doing, he must leave a fine
and fertile region open to their ravages; or a plentiful store-house,
from which they would draw voluntary supplies. A second move was
necessary, again to avoid the danger of being enclosed between two
rivers. Leaving three regiments, therefore, to guard the passes of the
Hackensack, and serve as covering parties, he again decamped, and
threw himself on the west bank of the Passaic, in the neighborhood of
Newark.
His army, small as it was, would soon be less. The term of enlistment
of those under General Mercer, from the flying camp, was nearly
expired; and it was not probable that, disheartened as they were by
defeats and losses, exposed to inclement weather, and unaccustomed to
military hardships they would longer forego the comforts of their
homes, to drag out the residue of a ruinous campaign. In addition,
too, to the superiority of the force that was following him, the
rivers gave the enemy facilities, by means of their shipping, to throw
troops in his rear. In this extremity he cast about in every direction
for assistance. Colonel Reed was despatched to Burlington with a
letter to Governor William Livingston, describing his hazardous
situation, and entreating him to call out a portion of the New Jersey
militia; and General Mifflin was sent to Philadelphia to implore
immediate aid from Congress and the local authorities.
His main reliance for prompt assistance, however, was upon Lee. On the
24th came a letter from that general, addressed to Colonel Reed.
Washington opened it, as he was accustomed to do, in the absence of
that officer, with letters addressed to him on the business of the
army. Lee was at his old encampment at Northcastle. He had no means,
he said, of crossing at Dobbs' Ferry, and the round by King's Ferry
would be so great that he could not get there in time to answer any
purpose. "I have therefore," added he, "ordered General Heath, who is
close to the only ferry which can be passed, to detach two thousand
men to apprise his Excellency, and await his further orders; a mode
which I flatter myself will answer better what I conceive to be the
spirit of the orders than should I move the corps from hence.
Withdrawing our troops from hence would be attended with some very
serious consequences, which at present would be tedious to enumerate;
as to myself," adds he, "I hope to set out to-morrow."
On the following day he writes to Washington: "I have received your
orders, and shall endeavor to put them in execution, but question
whether I shall be able to carry with me any considerable number; not
so much from a want of zeal in the men as from their wretched
condition, with respect to shoes, stockings, and blankets, which the
present bad weather renders more intolerable. I sent Heath orders to
transport two thousand men across the river, apprise the general, and
wait for further orders; but that great man (as I might have expected)
intrenched himself within the letter of his instructions, and refused
to part with a single file, though I undertook to replace them with a
part of my own."
Scarce had Lee sent this letter when he received one from Washington,
informing him that he had mistaken his views in regard to the troops
required to cross the Hudson; it was his (Lee's) division that he
wanted to have over. The force under Heath must remain to guard the
posts and passes through the Highlands, the importance of which was so
infinitely great that there should not be the least possible risk of
losing them. Lee's reply explained that his idea of detaching troops
from Heath's division was merely for expedition's sake, intending to
replace them from his own. The want of carriages and other causes had
delayed him. From the force of the enemy remaining in Westchester
County, he did not conceive the number of them in the Jerseys to be
near so great as Washington was taught to believe. He had been making
a sweep of the country to clear it of the tories. Part of his army had
now moved on, and he would set out on the following day.
The situation of the little army was daily becoming more perilous. In
a council of war, several of the members urged a move to Morristown,
to form a junction with the troops expected from the Northern army.
Washington, however, still cherished the idea of making a stand at
Brunswick on the Raritan, or, at all events, of disputing the passage
of the Delaware; and in this intrepid resolution he was warmly
seconded by Greene. Breaking up his camp once more, therefore, he
continued his retreat towards New Brunswick; but so close was
Cornwallis upon him that his advance entered one end of Newark just as
the American rear-guard had left the other.
From Brunswick, Washington wrote on the 29th to William Livingston,
governor of the Jerseys, requesting him to have all boats and river
craft, for seventy miles along the Delaware, removed to the western
bank out of the reach of the enemy, and put under guard. He was
disappointed in his hope of making a stand on the banks of the
Raritan. All the force he could muster at Brunswick, including the New
Jersey militia, did not exceed four thousand men. Colonel Reed had
failed in procuring aid from the New Jersey legislature. That body,
shifting from place to place, was on the eve of dissolution. The term
of the Maryland and New Jersey troops in the flying camp had expired.
General Mercer endeavored to detain them, representing the disgrace of
turning their back upon the cause when the enemy was at hand; his
remonstrances were fruitless. As to the Pennsylvania levies, they
deserted in such numbers that guards were stationed on the roads and
ferries to intercept them.
Washington lingered at Brunswick until the 1st of December in the vain
hope of being reinforced. The enemy, in the meantime, advanced through
the country, impressing wagons and horses, and collecting cattle and
sheep, as if for a distant march. At length their vanguard appeared on
the opposite side of the Raritan. Washington immediately broke down
the end of the bridge next the village, and after nightfall resumed
his retreat. At Princeton, Washington left twelve hundred men in two
brigades, under Lord Stirling and General Adam Stephen, to cover the
country, and watch the motions of the enemy. Stephen was the same
officer that had served as a colonel under Washington in the French
war, as second in command of the Virginia troops, and had charge of
Fort Cumberland.
The harassed army reached Trenton on the 2d of December. Washington
immediately proceeded to remove his baggage and stores across the
Delaware. In his letters from this place to the President of Congress,
he gives his reasons for his continued retreat: "Nothing but necessity
obliged me to retire before the enemy, and leave so much of the
Jerseys unprotected. Sorry am I to observe that the frequent calls
upon the militia of this State, the want of exertion in the principal
gentlemen of the country, and a fatal supineness and insensibility of
danger, till it is too late to prevent an evil that was not only
foreseen but foretold, have been the causes of our late disgraces."
In excuse for the people of New Jersey, it may be observed that they
inhabited an open, agricultural country, where the sound of war had
never been heard. Many of them looked upon the Revolution as
rebellion; others thought it a ruined enterprise; the armies engaged
in it had been defeated and broken up. They beheld the
commander-in-chief retreating through their country with a handful of
men, weary, wayworn, and dispirited; without tents, without clothing,
many of them barefooted, exposed to wintry weather, and driven from
post to post by a well-clad, well-fed, triumphant force, tricked out
in all the glittering bravery of war. Could it be wondered at that
peaceful husbandmen, seeing their quiet fields thus suddenly overrun
by adverse hosts, and their very hearthstones threatened with outrage,
should, instead of flying to arms, seek for the safety of their wives
and little ones, and the protection of their humble means, from the
desolation which too often marks the course even of friendly armies?
Lord Howe and his brother sought to profit by this dismay and
despondency. A proclamation, dated 30th of November, commanded all
persons in arms against his majesty's government to disband and return
home, and all Congresses to desist from treasonable acts: offering a
free pardon to all who should comply within fifty days. Many who had
been prominent in the cause, hastened to take advantage of this
proclamation. Those who had most property to lose were the first to
submit. The middle ranks remained generally steadfast in this time of
trial.
In this dark day of peril to the cause, and to himself, Washington
remained firm and undaunted. In casting about for some stronghold
where he might make a desperate stand for the liberties of his
country, his thoughts reverted to the mountain regions of his early
campaigns. General Mercer was at hand, who had shared his perils among
these mountains, and his presence may have contributed to bring them
to his mind. "What think you," said Washington, "if we should retreat
to the back parts of Pennsylvania, would the Pennsylvanians support
us?" "If the lower counties give up, the back counties will do the
same," was the discouraging reply.
"We must then retire to Augusta County in Virginia," said Washington.
"Numbers will repair to us for safety, and we will try a predatory
war. If overpowered, we must cross the Alleghanies." Such was the
indomitable spirit, rising under difficulties, and buoyant in the
darkest moment, that kept our tempest-tost cause from foundering.