RETREAT ACROSS THE DELAWARE.--BATTLE OF TRENTON.
Notwithstanding the repeated and pressing orders and entreaties of the
commander-in-chief, Lee did not reach Peekskill until the 30th of
November. In a letter of that date to Washington, who had complained
of his delay, he simply alleged difficulties which he would explain
_when both had leisure_. It was not until the 4th of December that Lee
crossed the Hudson and began a laggard march, though aware of the
imminent peril of Washington and his army--how different from the
celerity of his movements in his expedition to the South! [Lee
evidently considered Washington's star in the decline, and his own in
the ascendant. The loss of Fort Washington had been made a text by him
to comment in his letters about the "indecision of the
commander-in-chief." Instead now of heartily co-operating with
Washington he was devising side-plans of his own, and meditating, no
doubt, on his chances of promotion to the head of the American
armies.]
In the meantime, Washington, who was at Trenton, had profited by a
delay of the enemy at Brunswick, and removed most of the stores and
baggage of the army across the Delaware; and, being reinforced by
fifteen hundred of the Pennsylvania militia, procured by Mifflin,
prepared to face about, and march back to Princeton with such of his
troops as were fit for service, there to be governed by circumstances
and the movements of General Lee. Accordingly, on the 5th of December,
he sent about twelve hundred men in the advance to reinforce Lord
Stirling, and the next day set off himself with the residue. While on
the march, Washington received a letter from Greene, who was at
Princeton, informing him of a report that Lee was "at the heels of the
enemy." "I should think," adds Greene, "he had better keep on the
flanks than the rear, unless it were possible to concert an attack at
the same instant of time in front and rear.... I think General Lee
must be confined within the lines of some general plan, or else his
operations will be independent of yours." Lee had no idea of
conforming to a general plan; he had an independent plan of his own,
and was at that moment at Pompton, indulging speculations on military
greatness, and the lamentable want of it in his American
contemporaries.
While Lee was thus loitering and speculating, Cornwallis, knowing how
far he was in the rear, and how weak was the situation of Washington's
army, and being himself strongly reinforced, made a forced march from
Brunswick, and was within two miles from Princeton. Stirling, to avoid
being surrounded, immediately set out with two brigades for Trenton.
Washington, too, receiving intelligence by express of these movements,
hastened back to that place, and caused boats to be collected from all
quarters, and the stores and troops transported across the Delaware.
He himself crossed with the rear-guard on Sunday morning, and took up
his quarters about a mile from the river; causing the boats to be
destroyed, and troops to be posted opposite the fords.
The rear-guard, says an American account, had barely crossed the
river, when Lord Cornwallis "came marching down with all the pomp of
war, in great expectation of getting boats, and immediately pursuing."
Not one was to be had there or elsewhere; for Washington had caused
the boats, for an extent of seventy miles up and down the river, to be
secured on the right bank. His lordship was effectually brought to a
stand. He made some moves with two columns, as if he would cross the
Delaware above and below, either to push on to Philadelphia, or to
entrap Washington in the acute angle made by the bend of the river
opposite Bordentown. An able disposition of American troops along the
upper part of the river, and of a number of galleys below, discouraged
any attempt of the kind. Cornwallis, therefore, gave up the pursuit,
distributed the German troops in cantonments along the left bank of
the river, and stationed his main force at Brunswick, trusting to be
able before long to cross the Delaware on the ice.
On the 8th, Washington wrote to the President of Congress: "There is
not a moment's time to be lost in assembling such a force as can be
collected, as the object of the enemy cannot now be doubted in the
smallest degree. Indeed, I shall be out in my conjecture, for it is
only conjecture, if the late embarkation at New York is not for
Delaware River, to co-operate with the army under General Howe, who, I
am informed from good authority, is with the British troops, and his
whole force upon this route."
In further letters to Lee, Washington urged the peril of Philadelphia.
"Do come on," writes he; "your arrival may be fortunate, and, if it
can be effected without delay, it may be the means of preserving a
city, whose loss must prove of the most fatal consequence to the cause
of America." Putnam was now detached to take command of Philadelphia,
and put it in a state of defence, and General Mifflin to have charge
of the munitions of war deposited there. By their advice Congress
hastily adjourned on the 12th of December, to meet again on the 20th
at Baltimore.
Washington's whole force at this time was about five thousand five
hundred men. Gates, however, he was informed, was coming on with seven
regiments detached by Schuyler from the Northern department;
reinforced by these and the troops under Lee, he hoped to be able to
attempt a stroke upon the enemy's forces, which lay a good deal
scattered, and to all appearances, in a state of security.
While cheering himself with these hopes, and trusting to speedy aid
from Lee, that wayward commander, though nearly three weeks had
elapsed since he had received Washington's orders and entreaties to
join him with all possible despatch, was no farther on his march than
Morristown, in the Jerseys; where with militia recruits, his force was
about four thousand men. [Lee was secretly planning an independent
attack on the enemy. Hearing that three regiments detached under Gates
from the Northern army had arrived at Peekskill, he sent orders for
them to join him at Morristown. "I am in hopes," he writes, "to
reconquer the Jerseys." In the meantime Washington wrote urging his
speedy junction with him. Boats were gathered at Tinicum to facilitate
his passage across the Delaware. "I have so frequently," wrote
Washington, "mentioned our situation and the necessity of your aid,
that it is painful for me to add a word on the subject." On the 12th,
Lee moved from Morristown, but marched no further than Vealtown, eight
miles distant. There he left Sullivan with his troops, while he took
up his quarters three miles off, at a tavern at Baskingridge.
Intelligence of his exposed and insecure position reached the enemy, a
body of dragoons were detached, and guided by a tory, came upon Lee in
his quarters without warning. The few guards about the house were soon
dispersed, and Lee, bare-headed and in his slippers, was compelled in
haste to mount a horse and accompany his captors. This capture gave
great exultation to the enemy; for they considered Lee the most
scientific and experienced of the rebel generals. General Sullivan now
being in command, immediately pressed forward with the troops to join
the commander-in-chief.]
The loss of Lee was a severe shock to the Americans, many of whom, as
we have shown, looked to him as the man who was to rescue them from
their critical and well-nigh desperate situation. General Wilkinson,
in his memoirs, [who was at that time brigade-major under General
Gates,] points out what he considers the true secret of Lee's conduct.
His military reputation, originally very high, had been enhanced of
late by its being generally known that he had been opposed to the
occupation of Fort Washington; while the fall of that fortress and
other misfortunes of the campaign, though beyond the control of the
commander-in-chief, had quickened the discontent which, according to
Wilkinson, had been generated against him at Cambridge, and raised a
party against him in Congress. "It was confidently asserted at the
time," adds he, "but is not worthy of credit, that a motion had been
made in that body tending to supersede him in the command of the army.
In this temper of the times, if General Lee had anticipated General
Washington in cutting the cordon of the enemy between New York and the
Delaware, the commander-in-chief would probably have been superseded.
In this case, Lee would have succeeded him."
What an unfortunate change would it have been for the country! Lee was
undoubtedly a man of brilliant talents, shrewd sagacity, and much
knowledge and experience in the art of war; but he was wilful and
uncertain in his temper, self-indulgent in his habits, and an egoist
in warfare; boldly dashing for a soldier's glory rather than warily
acting for a country's good. He wanted those great moral qualities
which, in addition to military capacity, inspired such universal
confidence in the wisdom, rectitude and patriotism of Washington,
enabling him to direct and control legislative bodies as well as
armies; to harmonize the jarring passions and jealousies of a wide and
imperfect confederacy, and to cope with the varied exigencies of the
Revolution.
Congress, prior to their adjournment, had resolved that "until they
should otherwise order, General Washington should be possessed of all
power to order and direct all things relative to the department and to
the operations of war." Thus empowered, he proceeded immediately to
recruit three battalions of artillery. To those whose terms were
expiring he promised an augmentation of twenty-five per cent. upon
their pay, and a bounty of ten dollars to the men for six weeks'
service. "It was no time," he said, "to stand upon expense; nor in
matters of self-evident exigency to refer to Congress at the distance
of a hundred and thirty or forty miles. If any good officers will
offer to raise men upon continental pay and establishment in this
quarter, I shall encourage them to do so, and regiment them when they
have done it."
The promise of increased pay and bounties had kept together for a time
the dissolving army. The local militia began to turn out freely.
Colonel John Cadwalader, a gentleman of gallant spirit, and cultivated
mind and manners, brought a large volunteer detachment, well equipped,
and composed principally of Philadelphia troops. Washington, who held
Cadwalader in high esteem, assigned him an important station at
Bristol, with Colonel Reed, who was his intimate friend, as an
associate. They had it in charge to keep a watchful eye upon Count
Donop's Hessians, who were cantoned along the opposite shore from
Bordentown to the Black Horse.
On the 20th of December arrived General Sullivan in camp, with the
troops recently commanded by the unlucky Lee. They were in a miserable
plight; destitute of almost everything; many of them fit only for the
hospital, and those whose terms were nearly out, thinking of nothing
but their discharge. On the same day arrived General Gates, with the
remnants of four regiments from the Northern army.
The time seemed now propitious for the _coup de main_ which Washington
had of late been meditating. Everything showed careless confidence on
the part of the enemy. Howe was in winter quarters at New York. His
troops were loosely cantoned about the Jerseys, from the Delaware to
Brunswick, so that they could not readily be brought to act in concert
on a sudden alarm. The Hessians were in the advance, stationed along
the Delaware, facing the American lines, which were along the west
bank. Cornwallis, thinking his work accomplished, had obtained leave
of absence, and was likewise at New York, preparing to embark for
England. Washington had now between five and six thousand men fit for
service; with these he meditated to cross the river at night, at
different points, and make simultaneous attacks upon the Hessian
advance posts.
He calculated upon the eager support of his troops, who were burning
to revenge the outrages on their homes and families, committed by
these foreign mercenaries. They considered the Hessians mere
hirelings; slaves to a petty despot, fighting for sordid pay, and
actuated by no sentiment of patriotism or honor. They had rendered
themselves the horror of the Jerseys, by rapine, brutality, and
heartlessness. At first, their military discipline had inspired awe,
but of late they had become careless and unguarded, knowing the broken
and dispirited state of the Americans, and considering them incapable
of any offensive enterprise. A brigade of three Hessian regiments,
those of Rahl, Lossberg, and Knyphausen, was stationed at Trenton.
Colonel Rahl had the command of the post at his own solicitation, and
in consequence of the laurels he had gained at White Plains and Fort
Washington. We have before us journals of two Hessian lieutenants and
a corporal, which give graphic particulars of the colonel and his
post. According to their representations, he, with all his bravery,
was little fitted for such an important command. He lacked the
necessary vigilance and forecast. One of the lieutenants speaks of him
in a sarcastic vein, and evidently with some degree of prejudice.
According to his account, there was more bustle than business at the
post. He was a boon companion; made merry until a late hour in the
night, and then lay in bed until nine o'clock in the morning. And then
he took no precautions against the possibility of being attacked. A
veteran officer, Major Von Dechow, proposed that some works should be
thrown up, where the cannon might be placed ready against any assault.
The colonel made merry with the very idea. "An assault by the rebels!
Let them come! We'll at them with the bayonet."
Such was the posture of affairs at Trenton at the time the _coup de
main_ was meditated. Whatever was to be done, however, must be done
quickly, before the river was frozen. An intercepted letter had
convinced Washington of what he had before suspected, that Howe was
only waiting for that event to resume active operations, cross the
river on the ice, and push on triumphantly to Philadelphia. He
communicated his project to Gates, and wished him to go to Bristol,
take command there, and co-operate from that quarter. Gates, however,
pleaded ill health, and requested leave to proceed to Philadelphia.
The request may have surprised Washington, considering the spirited
enterprise that was on foot; but Gates, as has before been observed,
had a disinclination to serve immediately under the commander-in-chief;
like Lee, he had a disparaging opinion of him, or rather an impatience
of his supremacy. He had, moreover, an ulterior object in view. Having
been disappointed and chagrined in finding himself subordinate to
General Schuyler in the Northern campaign, he was now intent on making
interest among the members of Congress for an independent command.
Washington urged that on his way to Philadelphia he would at least stop
for a day or two at Bristol to concert a plan of operations with Reed
and Cadwalader, and adjust any little questions of etiquette and
command that might arise between the continental colonels who had gone
thither with Lee's troops and the volunteer officers stationed there.
He does not appear to have complied even with this request. According
to Wilkinson's account, he took quarters at Newtown, and set out thence
for Baltimore on the 24th of December, the very day before that of the
intended _coup de main_. The projected attack upon the Hessian posts
was to be threefold: 1st. Washington was to cross the Delaware with a
considerable force, at McKonkey's Ferry (now Taylorsville), about nine
miles above Trenton, and march down upon that place, where Rahl's
cantonment comprised a brigade of fifteen hundred Hessians, a troop of
British light-horse, and a number of chasseurs. 2d. General Ewing, with
a body of Pennsylvania militia, was to cross at a ferry about a mile
below Trenton; secure the bridge over the Assunpink creek, a stream
flowing along the south side of the town, and cut off any retreat of
the enemy in that direction. 3d. General Putnam, with the troops
occupied in fortifying Philadelphia, and those under General
Cadwalader, was to cross below Burlington and attack the lower posts
under Count Donop. The several divisions were to cross the Delaware at
night, so as to be ready for simultaneous action by five o'clock in the
morning.
Seldom is a combined plan carried into full operation. Symptoms of an
insurrection in Philadelphia obliged Putnam to remain with some force
in that city; but he detached five or six hundred of the Pennsylvania
militia under Colonel Griffin, his adjutant-general, who threw himself
into the Jerseys, to be at hand to co-operate with Cadwalader.
Early on the eventful evening (Dec. 25th), the troops destined for
Washington's part of the attack, about two thousand four hundred
strong, with a train of twenty small pieces, were paraded near
McKonkey's Ferry, ready to pass as soon as it grew dark, in the hope
of being all on the other side by twelve o'clock. Washington repaired
to the ground accompanied by Generals Greene, Sullivan, Mercer,
Stephen, and Lord Stirling. Greene was full of ardor for the
enterprise; eager, no doubt, to wipe out the recollection of Fort
Washington. It was, indeed, an anxious moment for all.
Boats being in readiness, the troops began to cross about sunset. The
weather was intensely cold, the wind was high, the current strong, and
the river full of floating ice. Colonel Glover, with his amphibious
regiment of Marblehead fishermen, was in advance. They were men
accustomed to battle with the elements, yet with all their skill and
experience the crossing was difficult and perilous. The night was dark
and tempestuous, the drifting ice drove the boats out of their course,
and threatened them with destruction. It was three o'clock before the
artillery was landed, and nearly four before the troops took up their
line of march. Trenton was nine miles distant; and not to be reached
before daylight. To surprise it, therefore, was out of the question.
There was no making a retreat without being discovered and harassed in
repassing the river. Beside, the troops from the other points might
have crossed, and co-operation was essential to their safety.
Washington resolved to push forward and trust to Providence. He formed
the troops into two columns. The first he led himself, accompanied by
Greene, Stirling, Mercer, and Stephen; it was to make a circuit by the
upper or Pennington road, to the north of Trenton. The other, led by
Sullivan, and including the brigade of St. Clair, was to take the
lower river leading to the west end of the town. Sullivan's column was
to halt a few moments at a cross-road leading to Howland's Ferry to
give Washington's column time to effect its circuit, so that the
attack might be simultaneous. On arriving at Trenton they were to
force the outer guards and push directly into the town before the
enemy had time to form.
It began to hail and snow as the troops commenced their march, and
increased in violence as they advanced, the storm driving the sleet in
their faces. So bitter was the cold that two of the men were frozen to
death that night. The day dawned by the time Sullivan halted at the
cross-road. It was discovered that the storm had rendered many of the
muskets wet and useless. "What is to be done?" inquired Sullivan of
St. Clair. "You have nothing for it but to push on and use the
bayonet," was the reply. While some of the soldiers were endeavoring
to clear their muskets, and squibbing off priming, Sullivan despatched
an officer to apprise the commander-in-chief of the condition of their
arms. He came back half dismayed by an indignant burst of Washington,
who ordered him to return instantly and tell General Sullivan to
"advance and charge."
It was about eight o'clock when Washington's column arrived in the
vicinity of the village. The storm which had rendered the march
intolerable, had kept every one within doors, and the snow had
deadened the tread of the troops and the rumbling of the artillery. As
they approached the village, Washington, who was in front, came to a
man that was chopping wood by the roadside, and inquired, "Which way
is the Hessian picket?" "I don't know," was the surly reply. "You may
tell," said Captain Forest of the artillery, "for that is General
Washington." The aspect of the man changed in an instant. Raising his
hands to heaven, "God bless and prosper you!" cried he. "The picket is
in that house, and the sentry stands near that tree."
The advance guard was led by a brave young officer, Captain William A.
Washington, seconded by Lieutenant James Monroe (in after years
president of the United States). They received orders to dislodge the
picket. Here happened to be stationed the very lieutenant whose
censures of the negligence of Colonel Rahl we have referred to. By his
own account, he was very near being entrapped in the guard-house. His
sentries, he says, were not alert enough; and had he not stepped out
of the picket-house himself and discovered the enemy, they would have
been upon him before his men could scramble to their arms. "Der feind!
der feind! heraus! heraus!" (the enemy! the enemy! turn out! turn
out!) was now the cry. By this time the American artillery was
unlimbered; Washington kept beside it and the column proceeded. The
report of fire-arms told that Sullivan was at the lower end of the
town. Colonel Stark led his advance guard, and did it in gallant
style. The attacks, as concerted, were simultaneous. The outposts were
driven in; they retreated, firing from behind houses. The Hessian
drums beat to arms; the trumpets of the light-horse sounded the alarm;
the whole place was in an uproar. Some of the enemy made a wild and
undirected fire from the windows of their quarters; others rushed
forth in disorder and attempted to form in the main street, while
dragoons, hastily mounted and galloping about, added to the confusion.
Washington advanced with his column to the head of King Street, riding
beside Captain Forest of the artillery. When Forest's battery of six
guns was opened the general kept on the left and advanced with it,
giving directions to the fire. His position was an exposed one, and he
was repeatedly entreated to fall back; but all such entreaties were
useless when once he became heated in action.
The enemy were training a couple of cannon in the main street to form
a battery, which might have given the Americans a serious check; but
Captain Washington and Lieutenant Monroe, with a part of the advance
guard rushed forward, drove the artillerists from their guns, and took
the two pieces when on the point of being fired. Both of these
officers were wounded; the captain in the wrist, the lieutenant in the
shoulder.
While Washington advanced on the north of the town, Sullivan
approached on the west, and detached Stark to press on the lower or
south end of the town. The British light-horse, and about five hundred
Hessians and chasseurs, had been quartered in the lower part of the
town. Seeing Washington's column pressing in front, and hearing Stark
thundering in their rear, they took headlong flight by the bridge
across the Assunpink, and so along the banks of the Delaware towards
Count Donop's encampment at Bordentown. Had Washington's plan been
carried into full effect, their retreat would have been cut off by
General Ewing; but that officer had been prevented from crossing the
river by the ice.
Colonel Rahl, according to the account of the lieutenant who had
commanded the picket, completely lost his head in the confusion of the
surprise. The latter, when driven in by the American advance, found
the colonel on horseback, endeavoring to rally his panic-stricken and
disordered men, but himself sorely bewildered. With some difficulty he
succeeded in extricating his troops from the town, and leading them
into an adjacent orchard. A rapid retreat by the Princeton road was
apparently in his thoughts; but he lacked decision. The idea of flying
before the rebels was intolerable. Some one, too, exclaimed at the
ruinous loss of leaving all their baggage to be plundered by the
enemy. Changing his mind he made a rash resolve. "All who are my
grenadiers, forward!" cried he, and led his grenadiers bravely but
rashly on, when, in the midst of his career, he received a fatal wound
from a musket ball and fell from his horse. His men, left without
their chief, were struck with dismay; heedless of the orders of the
second in command, they retreated by the right up the banks of the
Assunpink, intending to escape to Princeton. Washington saw their
design, and threw Colonel Hand's corps of Pennsylvania riflemen in
their way; while a body of Virginia troops gained their left. Brought
to a stand, and perfectly bewildered, they grounded their arms and
surrendered at discretion.
The number of prisoners taken in this affair was nearly one thousand,
of which thirty-two were officers. Washington's triumph, however, was
impaired by the failure of the two simultaneous attacks. General
Ewing, who was to have crossed before day at Trenton Ferry, and taken
possession of the bridge leading out of the town, over which the
light-horse and Hessians retreated, was prevented by the quantity of
ice in the river. Cadwalader was hindered by the same obstacle. He got
part of his troops over, but found it impossible to embark his cannon,
and was obliged, therefore, to return to the Pennsylvania side of the
river. Had he and Ewing crossed, Donop's quarters would have been
beaten up, and the fugitives from Trenton intercepted.
By the failure of this part of his plan, Washington had been exposed
to the most imminent hazard. The force with which he had crossed,
twenty-four hundred men, raw troops, was not enough to cope with the
veteran garrison, had it been properly on its guard; and then there
were the troops under Donop at hand to co-operate with it. Nothing
saved him but the utter panic of the enemy, their want of proper alarm
places, and their exaggerated idea of his forces. Even now that the
place was in his possession he dared not linger in it. There was a
superior force under Donop below him, and a strong battalion of
infantry at Princeton. His own troops were exhausted by the operations
of the night and morning in cold, rain, snow and storm. They had to
guard about a thousand prisoners, taken in action or found concealed
in houses; there was little prospect of succor, owing to the season
and the state of the river. Washington gave up, therefore, all idea of
immediately pursuing the enemy or keeping possession of Trenton, and
determined to recross the Delaware with his prisoners and captured
artillery.