WASHINGTON AT PEEKSKILL.--THE NORTHERN ARMY.
Various were the speculations at head-quarters on the sudden movement
of the enemy. Washington writes to General William Livingston (now
governor of the Jerseys): "They have gone towards the North River and
King's Bridge. Some suppose they are going into winter quarters, and
will sit down in New York without doing more than investing Fort
Washington. I cannot subscribe wholly to this opinion myself. That
they will invest Fort Washington, is a matter of which there can be no
doubt; and I think there is a strong probability that General Howe
will detach a part of his force to make an incursion into the Jerseys,
provided he is going to New York. He must attempt something on account
of his reputation, for what has he done as yet with his great army?"
In the same letter he expressed his determination, as soon as it
should appear that the present manoeuvre was a real retreat, and not a
feint, to throw over a body of troops into the Jerseys to assist in
checking Howe's progress. In a letter of the same date, he charged
General Greene, should Howe invest Fort Washington with part of his
force, to give the garrison all possible assistance. On the following
day (Nov. 8), Colonel Tilghman, writes to General Greene from
head-quarters: "The enemy are at Dobbs' Ferry with a great number of
boats, ready to go into Jersey, _or proceed up the river_." Greene
doubted any intention of the enemy to cross the river; it might only
be a feint to mislead; still, as a precaution, he had ordered troops
up from the flying camp and was posting them opposite Dobbs' Ferry,
and at other passes where a landing might be attempted; the whole
being under the command of General Mercer.
Affairs at Fort Washington soon settled the question of the enemy's
intention with regard to it. Lord Percy took his station with a body
of troops before the lines to the south. Knyphausen advanced on the
north. The Americans had previously abandoned Fort Independence, burnt
its barracks, and removed the stores and cannon. Crossing King's
Bridge, Knyphausen took a position between it and Fort Washington. The
approach to the fort, on this side, was exceedingly steep and rocky;
as, indeed, were all its approaches excepting that on the south, where
the country was more open, and the ascent gradual. The fort could not
hold within its walls above one thousand men; the rest of the troops
were distributed about the lines and outworks. While the fort was thus
menaced, the chevaux-de-frise had again proved inefficient. On the
night of the 5th, a frigate and two transports, bound up to Dobbs'
Ferry with supplies for Howe's army, had broken through; though,
according to Greene's account, not without being considerably
shattered by the batteries.
Informed of these facts, Washington wrote to Greene on the 8th: "If we
cannot prevent vessels from passing up the river, and the enemy are
possessed of all the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it
answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I
am, therefore, inclined to think, that it will not be prudent to
hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but, as you are on the
spot, I leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount
Washington as you may judge best, and so far revoking the orders given
to Colonel Magaw, to defend it to the last."
Accounts had been received at head-quarters of a considerable movement
on the preceding evening (Nov. 7th) among the enemy's boats at Dobbs'
Ferry, with the intention, it was said, of penetrating the Jerseys,
and falling down upon Fort Lee. Washington, therefore, in the same
letter directed Greene to have all the stores not necessary to the
defence removed immediately. Greene, in reply, (Nov. 9th) adhered with
tenacity to the policy of maintaining Fort Washington. "The enemy,"
said he, "must invest it with double the number of men required for
its defence. They must keep troops at King's Bridge, to cut off all
communication with the country, and in considerable force for fear of
an attack."
It is doubtful when or where Washington received this letter, as he
left the camp at Northcastle at eleven o'clock on the following
morning. There being still considerable uncertainty as to the
intentions of the enemy, all his arrangements were made accordingly.
All the troops belonging to the States west of the Hudson were to be
stationed in the Jerseys, under command of General Putnam. Lord
Stirling had already been sent forward with the Maryland and Virginia
troops to Peekskill, to cross the river at King's Ferry. Another
division, composed of Connecticut and Massachusetts troops, under
General Heath, was to co-operate with the brigade of New York militia,
under General George Clinton, in securing the Highland posts on both
sides of the river. The troops which would remain at Northcastle after
the departure of Heath and his division, were to be commanded by Lee.
On the 10th of November, Washington left the camp at Northcastle, at
11 o'clock, and arrived at Peekskill at sunset, whither General Heath
with his division had preceded him by a few hours. Lord Stirling was
there likewise, having effected the transportation of the Maryland and
Virginia troops across the river, and landed them at the ferry south
of Stony Point; though a better landing was subsequently found north
of the point. His lordship had thrown out a scouting party in the
advance, and a hundred men to take possession of a gap in the
mountain, through which a road passed toward the Jerseys. Washington
was now at the entrance of the Highlands, that grand defile of the
Hudson, the object of so much precaution and solicitude. On the
following morning, accompanied by Generals Heath, Stirling, James and
George Clinton, Mifflin, and others, he made a military visit in boats
to the Highland posts. Fort Montgomery was in a considerable state of
forwardness, and a work in the vicinity was projected to co-operate
with it. Fort Constitution commanded a sudden bend of the river, but
Lord Stirling, in his report of inspection, had intimated that the
fort itself was commanded by West Point opposite. A glance of the eye,
without going on shore, was sufficient to convince Washington of the
fact. A fortress subsequently erected on that point, has been
considered the Key of the Highlands.
On the morning of the 12th, at an early hour, Washington rode out with
General Heath to reconnoitre the east side of the Hudson, at the gorge
of the Highlands. Henry Wisner, in a report to the New York
Convention, had mentioned a hill to the north of Peekskill, so
situated, with the road winding along the side of it, that ten men on
the top, by rolling down stones, might prevent ten thousand from
passing. Near Robinson's Bridge, in this vicinity, about two miles
from Peekskill, Washington chose a place where troops should be
stationed to cover the south entrance into the mountains; and here,
afterwards, was established an important military depot called
Continental Village. Having made all these surveys and arrangements,
he placed Heath in the general command of the Highlands, with written
instructions to fortify the passes with all possible despatch, and
directions how the troops were to be distributed on both sides of the
river.
During his brief and busy sojourn at Peekskill, Washington received
important intelligence from the Northern army; especially that part of
it on Lake Champlain, under the command of General Gates. The
preparations for the defence of Ticonderoga, and the nautical service
on the lake, had met with difficulties at every step. At length, by
the middle of August, a small flotilla was completed, and the command
given by Gates to Arnold, in compliance with the advice of Washington.
Sir Guy Carleton, in the meantime, was straining every nerve for the
approaching conflict. Vessels were brought from England in pieces and
put together at St. Johns, boats of various kinds and sizes were
transported over land, or dragged up the rapids of the Sorel. In
despite of every exertion, three months elapsed before his armament
was completed. By the month of October, between twenty and thirty sail
were afloat and ready for action. The flag-ship (the Inflexible)
mounted eighteen twelve-pounders; the rest were gunboats, a gondola
and a flat-bottomed vessel called a radeau, and named the _Thunderer_;
carrying a battery of six twenty-four and twelve six-pounders, besides
howitzers. The gunboats mounted brass field-pieces and howitzers.
Captain Pringle conducted the armament, but Sir Guy Carleton was too
full of zeal, and too anxious for the event, not to head the
enterprise; he accordingly took his station on the deck of the
flag-ship. They made sail early in October, in quest of the American
squadron, which was said to be abroad upon the lake. [Arnold had taken
his post under cover of Valcour Island, in the channel between that
island and the mainland. The British discovered Arnold's flotilla on
the morning of the 11th, and attempted to beat up into the channel.
The wind did not permit the largest of them to enter. About twelve
o'clock a brisk fire was opened on the American vessels, and the
action soon became severe and sanguinary. The enemy landed Indians on
the island, who kept up a galling fire upon the Americans. The
Congress, on board of which was Arnold, was hulled several times, and
many of her crew were killed or wounded. The ardor of Arnold increased
with the danger. He cheered on his men by voice and example, often
pointing the guns with his own hands. At night the contest was still
undecided, and the enemy drew off, anchoring their whole squadron in a
line to prevent the escape of the Americans. But Arnold, aware that
with his crippled and inferior force further resistance could not be
maintained, took advantage of a dark, cloudy night and a strong north
wind to slip silently through the enemy's line without being
discovered. The next day Arnold's galley, the Congress, the Washington
galley and four gondolas, which had suffered severely in the fight,
fell astern; and on the following morning, as a fog, which had covered
the lake, lifted, the enemy were discerned within a few miles of them
in full chase. By noon the Washington was overtaken and captured.
Arnold meanwhile maintained a desperate running fight with the
advanced vessels of the enemy's fleet, until finding resistance in
vain, the crippled vessels were run on shore, fired, and the crews set
off through the woods to Crown Point.] Two schooners, two galleys, one
sloop and one gondola, the remnant which had escaped of this squadron,
were at anchor at the Point, and General Waterbury and most of his men
[who had been captured in the Washington galley] arrived there the
next day on parole. Seeing that the place must soon fall into the
hands of the enemy, they set fire to the houses, destroyed everything
they could not carry away, and embarking in the vessels made sail for
Ticonderoga. The loss of the Americans in these two actions is said to
have been between eighty and ninety men; that of the British about
forty. The conduct of Arnold in these naval affairs gained him new
laurels.
Sir Guy Carleton took possession of the ruined works at Crown Point,
where he was soon joined by the army. He made several movements by
land and water, as if meditating an attack upon Ticonderoga. General
Gates, in the meantime, strengthened his works with incessant
assiduity, and made every preparation for an obstinate defence. A
strong easterly wind prevented the enemy's ships from advancing to
attack the lines, and gave time for the arrival of reinforcements of
militia to the garrison. It also afforded time for Sir Guy Carleton to
cool in ardor, and calculate the chances and the value of success. The
post, from its strength, could not be taken without great loss of
life. If taken, the season was now too far advanced to think of
passing Lake George, and exposing the army to the perils of a winter
campaign in the inhospitable and impracticable wilds to the southward.
Ticonderoga, too, could not be kept during the winter, so that the
only result of the capture would be the reduction of the works and the
taking of some cannon; all which damage the Americans could remedy
before the opening of the summer campaign. If, however, the defence
should be obstinate, the British army, even if successful, might
sustain a loss sufficient to cripple its operations in the coming
year. These, and other prudential reasons, induced Carleton to give up
all attempt upon the fortress at present; wherefore, re-embarking his
troops, he returned to St. Johns, and cantoned them in Canada for the
winter.