General Lee advises the Evacuation of Richmond.--Withdrawal of the
Troops.--The Naval Force.--The Conflagration in Richmond.--
Telegram of Lee to the President.--The Evacuation complete.--The
Charge of the Removal of Supplies intended for Lee's Army.--The
Facts.--Arrangement with General Lee.--Proclamation.--Reports of
Scouts.
When, on the morning of the 2d of April, the main line of the
defenses of Petersburg was broken, and our forces driven back to the
inner and last line, General Lee sent the telegram, to which
reference has been already made, and advised that Richmond should be
evacuated simultaneously with the withdrawal of his troops that
night. This left little time for preparation, especially in the
matter of providing transportation for the troops holding the eastern
defenses of Richmond. To supply the cavalry, artillery, and
army-wagons with horses, had so exhausted the stock of Virginia as to
leave the quartermaster's department little ability to supplement the
small transportation possessed, or required by troops regarded as a
stationary defense. The consequence was, that their withdrawal had to
be made under circumstances which involved unusual embarrassments
upon the march; but soldiers, sailors, and citizens, constituting the
"reserves," vied with each other in the performance of the hard duty
to which they were called--a night march over unknown roads, to join
a retreating army, pursued by a powerful enemy having large bodies of
cavalry. The opposing lines of intrenchment north of the James were
so near to each other, that our forces could only withdraw when it
was too dark for observation; this required that the movement should
be postponed until the moon went down, which was at a late hour of
the night.
The circumstances attending the withdrawal of Ewell's corps were such
as to make its safety the subject of special solicitude. It was small
in comparison to that retiring from Petersburg, had a greater
distance to march before a junction could be made with the main body,
and most of the men were unused to marching. From reports received
long after the event, I am able to give the principal occurrences of
their campaign.
General G. W. C. Lee moved his division from Chapin's Bluff across
the James River, on the Wilton Bridge; the wagons having been loaded
under the preparatory order, were sent up in the afternoon to cross
at Richmond, and the division moved on to a short distance beyond
Tomahawk Church, where it encamped on the night of the 3d. General
Kershaw's division, with dismounted men of Gary's cavalry brigade,
crossed at Richmond and moved on to the same encampment. Having
ascertained that the Appomattox could not be crossed on the route
they were pursuing, the column was turned up to the railroad-bridge
at the Mattoax Station, which was prepared for the passage of
artillery and troops, and the two divisions, with their trains,
crossed on the night of the 4th and encamped on the hills beyond the
river. On the next day the column moved on to Amelia Court-House; it
was now joined by the Naval Battalion, under Commodore Tucker, and
the artillery battalion of Major Frank Smith, which had been
withdrawn from Howlett's Bluff; both of these were added to G. W. C.
Lee's division. The supply-train not being able to cross the
Appomattox River near Meadville, went farther up, and, having
effected a crossing, proceeded with safety until about four miles
from Amelia Court-House, where it was destroyed by a detachment of
the enemy's cavalry on the morning of the 5th, with the baggage of G.
W. C. Lee's division and about twenty thousand good rations.
At Amelia Court-House Ewell's corps made a junction with Lee's army,
but forced marches with men most of whom were untrained by previous
campaign had greatly reduced the number of Ewell's command, and the
want of rations now was impairing their efficiency. From that place
his corps moved in rear of Anderson's, followed by the train of Lee's
army, which was covered in rear by Gordon's corps. The march was much
impeded by the wagon-trains, consequently slow, and, from frequent
halts, fatiguing. About noon of the 6th, after crossing a small
stream within several miles of Sailor's Creek, the enemy's cavalry
made an attack at the point where the wagon-train turned off to the
right. Skirmishers from Lee's division were thrown out, and soon
repelled the attack; but it was thought necessary to retain these
troops in that position until the trains had passed. General Gordon,
who protected the rear, had frequent combats with the pursuers. As
soon as the trains were out of the way, Ewell's troops moved on after
Anderson's corps. On crossing Sailor's Creek, General Ewell reports
that he met General Fitzhugh Lee, from whom he learned that a large
force of cavalry held the road in front of Anderson, and was so
strongly posted that he had halted. Lee's and Kershaw's divisions
moved on to close upon Anderson; but Gordon having followed the wagon
and artillery train, the enemy's cavalry and also infantry appeared
in the rear, and commenced an attack upon Kershaw's division.
Anderson had proposed to Ewell that, if he would hold the enemy in
check who was coming up on the rear, he would attack the cavalry in
front, to open our line of march in that direction. Lee's and
Kershaw's divisions were therefore formed in line of battle faced to
the rear. Anderson made the attack, but failed. Meantime an
artillery-fire was opened on Kershaw's and Lee's divisions; they,
having no artillery to reply, were subjected to the severe trial of
standing under a fire which they could not return. In their praise,
it was said they unflinchingly bore the test. Supposing probably that
their artillery-fire had demoralized our troops, the enemy's infantry
advanced. They were repulsed, and that portion which attacked G. W.
C. Lee's artillery brigade was charged by it, and driven back across
Sailor's Creek. The enemy had now turned the flank of Kershaw's
division and obliged it to retire. Ewell, while seeking some route by
which his command might be extricated, was captured, and the enemy
closed in on Lee's division, surrounding it on every side. Firing
ceased, and the division was captured. A like fate befell the
division of Kershaw. A portion of Anderson's corps escaped, but
Ewell's was all captured. This corps, when it left Richmond, numbered
about six thousand men. At the battle of Sailor's Creek there
remained about three thousand. The fatigue of constant marching for
days and nights to men unaccustomed to such service might
sufficiently explain the diminution; but to this must be added the
want of rations for the last two days of their campaign. Twenty-eight
hundred were taken prisoners, and about a hundred and fifty killed
and wounded. From General Ewell's report, I learn that the force of
the enemy engaged at Sailor's Creek amounted to thirty thousand men.
In closing his report be says:
"The discipline preserved by General G. W. C. Lee in camp and on the
march, and the manner in which he handled his troops in action, fully
justified the request I had made for his promotion. General Kershaw,
who had only been a few days under my command, behaved with his usual
coolness and judgment."
Lest any should suppose, from the remark of General Ewell, that I had
been unwilling or reluctant to promote my aide-de-camp. Colonel G. W.
C. Lee, it is proper to state that the only obstacle to be overcome
was Lee's objection to receiving promotion. With refined delicacy he
shrank from the idea of superseding men who had been actively serving
in the field, and in one case where the objection did not seem to me
to have any application, he so decidedly preferred to remain with me,
that I yielded to his wishes; but gave him additional rank to command
the local troops for the defense of Richmond. His valuable services
in that capacity, on various occasions, sustained my high opinion of
him as a soldier, and his conduct on that retreat, and in the battle
of "Sailor's Creek," for which he is commended, was only what I
anticipated.
Of the forces constituting the defense of Richmond on the 2d of
April, it only remains to account for the naval force in the James.
After General Ewell had withdrawn his command, Admiral Semmes
embarked the crews of his gunboats on some small steamers, set fire
to his war-vessels, and proceeded up the river to the landing
opposite Richmond. Here he found no land transportation awaiting him,
and the last railroad train had left at early dawn. He, however, with
the energy and capacity so often elsewhere displayed by him, on
finding the railroad station deserted, commenced a search for
material which, with his steam engineers, he could make available. He
states that a few straggling passenger-cars lay uncoupled along the
track, and that there was also a small engine, but no fire, and no
fuel to make one. They coupled the cars together, his marine sappers
and miners cut up a fence for steam-fuel, and thus he got under way,
but the engine proved insufficient to draw the train, and at an
up-grade he was brought to a halt immediately after starting. One of
his engineers, however, found in the workshops another engine; with
the two he was able to proceed, and thus to transport his sailors to
Danville, the best mode known to him to execute the order sent to him
by the Secretary of the Navy, "You will join General Lee in the field
with all your forces." [123] When General Longstreet was withdrawn
from the north side of the James, Colonel Shipp, Commandant of the
Virginia Institute, with the Battalion of Cadets, youths whose
gallantry at the battle of New Market has been heretofore noticed,
and such convalescents in Richmond as were able to march, moved down
to supply the vacancy created by the transfer of Longstreet's force
to Petersburg. General Ewell, in command at Richmond, had for its
defense the naval force at Drury's Bluff under Commander Tucker,
which was organized as a regiment and armed with muskets. On the
north side of the James were General Kershaw's division of
Confederate troops and General G. W. C, Lee's division, composed
mostly of artillery-men armed as infantry, and the "reserves," or
"local troops," coöperating with these was Admiral Semmes's naval
force on the James. On the night of the 2d of April these forces were
withdrawn, and took up their line of march to join General Lee's army
on its retreat.
In obedience to a law of the Congress, General Ewell had made
arrangements to burn the tobacco at Richmond whenever the evacuation
of the city should render the burning necessary, to prevent the
tobacco from falling into the hands of the enemy. Orders were also
given to destroy certain property of the Confederate States,
exceptions being made as in the case of the arsenal, the burning of
which would endanger the city. To prevent the possibility of a
general conflagration he had advised with the Mayor and City Council,
and the necessary precautions were believed to have been taken.
General Ewell's report, December 20, 1865, published in the
"Historical Society Papers" (vol. i, p. 101), satisfactorily
establishes the fact that the conflagration in Richmond of April 3,
1865, did not result from any act of the public authorities. The
burning of the tobacco was only resorted to when the alternative was
to burn or allow it to fall into the hands of the enemy, who, there
was no doubt, would take it without making compensation to the
owners. It was a disagreeable necessity, and therefore every
opportunity was allowed to the owners of that and other articles of
export to place them, if possible, beyond the danger of being applied
to the use of the hostile Government. There is no similitude between
the destruction of public property made by us and the like act of the
invader in our country. The property we destroyed belonged to the
Confederate States only. Armories and ship-yards destroyed by them--
those, for instance, at Harper's Ferry and Norfolk--were the
property of the States in common, which the Federal Government had
emphatically declared it was its bounden duty to preserve, and which
was its first plea in justification of the act of sending an armed
force against the Southern States.
The conflagration at Richmond occurred on the morning of the 3d of
April, after I had left the city, and I therefore have only such
knowledge in regard to it as was subsequently acquired from others.
Those who would learn specifically the facts and speculations in
regard to it are referred to the report of General Ewell, which has
been above cited. Suffice it to say, the troops of neither army were
considered responsible for that calamity.
On Sunday, the 2d of April, while I was in St. Paul's church. General
Lee's telegram, announcing his speedy withdrawal from Petersburg, and
the consequent necessity for evacuating Richmond, was handed to me. I
quietly rose and left the church. The occurrence probably attracted
attention, but the people of Richmond had been too long beleaguered,
had known me too often to receive notice of threatened attacks, and
the congregation of St. Paul's was too refined, to make a scene at
anticipated danger. For all these reasons, the reader will be
prepared for the announcement that the sensational stories which have
been published about the agitation caused by my leaving the church
during service were the creations of fertile imaginations. I went to
my office and assembled the heads of departments and bureaus, as far
as they could be found on a day when all the offices were closed, and
gave the needful instructions for our removal that night,
simultaneously with General Lee's withdrawal from Petersburg. The
event was not unforeseen, and some preparation had been made for it,
though, as it came sooner than was expected, there was yet much to be
done. My own papers were disposed as usual for convenient reference
in the transaction of current affairs, and as soon as the principal
officers had left me the executive papers were arranged for removal.
This occupied myself and staff until late in the afternoon. By this
time the report that Richmond was to be evacuated had spread through
the town, and many who saw me walking toward my residence left their
houses to inquire whether the report was true. Upon my admission of
the painful fact, qualified, however, by the expression of my hope
that we would under better auspices again return, the ladies
especially, with generous sympathy and patriotic impulse, responded,
"If the success of the cause requires you to give up Richmond, we are
content."
The affection and confidence of this noble people in the hour of
disaster were more distressing to me than complaint and unjust
censure would have been.
In view of the diminishing resources of the country on which the Army
of Northern Virginia relied for supplies, I had urged the policy of
sending families as far as practicable to the south and west, and had
set the example by requiring my own to go. If it was practicable and
desirable to hold the south side of the James, then, even for merely
material considerations, it was important to hold Richmond, and this
could best have been done if there had been none there save those who
could aid in its defense. If it was not practicable and desirable to
hold the south side of the James, then Richmond would be isolated,
and if it could have been defended, its depots, foundries, workshops,
and mills could have contributed nothing to the armies outside, and
its possession would no longer have been to us of military
importance. Ours being a struggle for existence, the indulgence of
sentiment would have been misplaced.
Being alone in Richmond, the few arrangements needful for my personal
wants were soon made after reaching home. Then, leaving all else in
care of the housekeeper, I waited until notified of the time when the
train would depart; then, going to the station, started for Danville,
whither I supposed General Lee would proceed with his army.
In a previous chapter I promised to expose the fiction which imputed
to me the removal of supplies intended for Lee's army at Amelia
Court-House, Though manufactured without one fiber of truth, it has
been copied into so many books, formed the staple of so many
jeremiads, and pointed so many malignant reflections, that I deem it
proper for myself and others concerned now to present the evidence
which will overthrow this baseless fabric.
General I. M. St. John, Commissary-General of the Confederate Army,
was requested by me, after the close of the war, to prepare a report
in reply to the widely circulated story that Lee's army had been
compelled to evacuate Petersburg, and subsequently to surrender
because the Administration had failed to provide food for their
support. On the 14th of July, 1873, General St. John addressed to me
a report of the operations and condition of the commissariat
immediately preceding the surrender of Lee's and Johnston's armies.
That report, together with confirmatory statements, will be found in
the "Southern Historical Society Papers" for March, 1877. From it and
the accompanying documents I propose to make brief extracts.
General St. John says that in February, 1865, when he took charge of
the commissary bureau, on account of the military status he
"found that the Army of Northern Virginia was with difficulty
supplied day by day with reduced rations. . . . I at once proceeded
to organize a system of appeal and of private contribution as
auxiliary to the regular operations of the commissary service. With
the earnest and very active aid of leading citizens of Virginia and
North Carolina, this effort was attended with results exceeding
expectation. . . . On or before March 15, 1865, the
Commissary-General was able to report to the Secretary of War that,
in addition to the daily issue of rations to the Army of Northern
Virginia, there lay in depot along the railroad between Greensboro,
North Carolina, Lynchburg, Staunton, and Richmond, at least ten days'
rations of bread and meat, collected especially for that army, and
subject to the requisition of its chief commissary officer; also that
considerably over 300,000 rations were held in Richmond as a special
reserve. . . . There was collected by April 1, 1865, in depot,
subsistence stated in detail as follows:
"At Richmond, Virginia, 300,000 rations bread and meat; at Danville,
500,000 rations bread; at Danville, 1,500,000 rations meat; at
Lynchburg, 180,000 rations bread and meat; at Greensboro, North
Carolina, and vicinity, 1,500,000 rations bread and meat.
"In addition, there were considerable supplies of tea, coffee, and
sugar carefully reserved for hospital issues chiefly. These returns
did not include the subsistence collections by the field-trains of
the Army of Northern Virginia, under orders from its own
headquarters, nor the depot collections at Charlottesville, Staunton,
and other points upon the Virginia Central Railroad, to meet
requisitions from the Confederates operating in the Valley and
western Virginia. South and west of Greensboro, North Carolina, the
depot accumulations were reserved first to meet requisitions for the
forces operating in the Carolinas, and the surplus for Virginia
requisitions. . . ."
The report then refers to a conference between the Secretary of War
(Breckinridge) and the General commanding (Lee) with the
Quartermaster-General (Lawton) and the Commissary-General (St. John).
After a general discussion of the wants of the army in clothing,
forage, and subsistence, to an inquiry by General Lee, General St.
John replied:
"That a daily delivery by cars and canal-boats, at or near Richmond,
of about five hundred tons of commissaries' stores was essential to
provide for the Richmond siege reserve and other accumulations
desired by the General commanding; that the depot collections were
already sufficient to assure the meeting of these requisitions, and,
if the then existing military lines could be held, the
Commissary-General felt encouraged as to the future of his own
immediate department."
The procuring of supplies was only one of the difficulties by which
we were beset. The deteriorated condition of the railroads and the
deficiency of rolling-stock embarrassed transportation, and there was
yet another: the cavalry raids of the enemy frequently broke the
railroads and destroyed trains. General Lawton, with great energy and
good judgment, under the heavy pressure of the circumstances,
improved the railroad transportation. I quote again from the report
of General St. John:
"Upon the earliest information of the approaching evacuation,
instructions were asked from the War Department and the General
commanding for the final disposition of the subsistence reserve in
Richmond, then reported by Major Claiborne, post commissary, to
exceed in quantity 350,000 rations. The reply, 'Send up the Danville
Railroad if Richmond is not safe,' was received from the army
headquarters, April 2, 1865, and too late for action, as all railroad
transportation had then been taken up, by superior orders, for the
archives, bullion, and other Government service, then deemed of prior
importance. All that remained to be done was to fill every accessible
army-wagon; and this was done, and the trains were hurried southward."
It will be seen from this statement that the reply was only directed
to the removal of the subsistence reserve if Richmond was not safe.
It can not be supposed that such a reply emanated from General Lee,
as he surely never contemplated an attempt to hold Richmond after
Petersburg was evacuated. General St. John then adds:
"On March 31st, or possibly the morning of April 1st, a telegram was
received at the bureau in Richmond, from the commissary officer of
the Army of Northern Virginia, requesting breadstuffs to be sent to
Petersburg. Shipment was commenced at once, and was pressed to the
extreme limit of transportation permitted by the movement of General
Longstreet's corps (then progressing southward). No calls, by letter
or requisition, from the General commanding, or from any other
source, official or unofficial, had been received either by the
Commissary-General or the Assistant Commissary-General; nor (as will
be seen by the appended letter of the Secretary of War) was any
communication transmitted through the department channels to the
bureau of subsistence, for the collection of supplies at Amelia
Court-House. Had any such requisition or communication been received
at the bureau as late as the morning of April 1st, it could have been
met from the Richmond reserve with transportation on south-bound
trains, and most assuredly so previous to General Longstreet's
movement."
On the morning of the 3d the Commissary-General left Richmond and
joined General R. E. Lee at Amelia Springs. There were at that time
about eighty thousand rations at Farmville, "there held on trains for
immediate use." On the morning of the 6th the Commissary-General
asked General Lee whether he should send those rations down the
railroad or hold them at Farmville. Not receiving instructions, the
rations remained at Farmville, and on the 7th the army passing there
took a portion of them. On the morning of the 8th the subsistence
trains on the railroad at Pamphlin's Station, twenty miles west of
Farmville, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry and captured, or
burned to avoid capture. The surrender followed on the subsequent
day. The foregoing extracts, I think, prove unquestionably that no
orders were received to place supplies for Lee's army at Amelia
Court-House; that sufficient supplies were in depot to answer the
immediate wants of the army, and that the failure to distribute them
to the troops on their retreat was due to the active operations of
the enemy on all our lines of communication; hence, when the
Commissary-General applied to General Lee for instructions as to
where supplies should be placed, he says, "General Lee replied in
substance that the military situation did not permit an answer."
Lest, however, what has been given should not seem conclusive to
others, I add confirmatory testimony. General John C. Breckinridge,
in a letter to General I. M. St. John, of date May 16, 1871, wrote:
"A few days before the evacuation of Richmond you reported to me that
besides supplies accumulated at different distant points in Virginia
and North Carolina, you had ten days' rations accessible by rail to
[General Lee] and subject to the orders of his chief commissary. I
have no recollection of any communication from General Lee in regard
lo the accumulation of rations at Amelia Court-House. . . . The
second or third day after the evacuation, I recollect you said to
General Lee in my presence that you had a large number of rations (I
think eighty thousand) at a convenient point on the railroad, and
desired to know where you should place them. The General replied that
the military situation made it impossible to answer."
In a letter of the date of September, 1865, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas
G. Williams, assistant commissary-general, wrote to General St. John,
and from his letter I make the following extract:
"On the morning of April 2, 1865, the chief commissary of General
Lee's army was asked by telegram what should be done with the stores
in Richmond. No reply was received until night; he then suggested
that, if Richmond was not safe, they might be sent up on the
Richmond and Danville Railroad. As the evacuation of Richmond was
then actively progressing, it was impracticable to move those
supplies. . . . In reply to your question with regard to the
establishment of a depot of supplies at Amelia Court-House, I have
to say that I had no information of any such requisition or demand
upon the bureau."
Major J. H. Claiborne, assistant commissary-general, in a letter to
General I. M. St. John, from Richmond, June 3, 1873, wrote:
"No order was received by me, and (with full opportunities of
information if it had been given) I had no knowledge of any plan to
send supplies to Amelia Court-House. Under such circumstances, with
transportation afforded, there could readily have been sent about
three hundred thousand rations, with due regard to the demand upon
this post."
During the retreat, supplies were found at Pamphlin's Depot,
Farmville, Danville, Saulsbury, and Charlotte. Major B. P. Noland,
chief commissary for Virginia, wrote to General St. John, April 16,
1874. After saying that he had read with care the report of General
St. John, and expressing the opinion that it was entirely correct, of
which no one in the Confederacy had better opportunities to judge, he
writes:
"I think the plan adopted by your predecessor, Colonel Northrop
(which was continued by you), for obtaining for the use of the army
the products of the country, was as perfect and worked as effectively
as any that could have been devised. . . . I left Richmond at one
o'clock of the night Richmond was evacuated, with orders from you to
make Lynchburg my headquarters, and be ready to forward supplies from
that point to the army. I never heard of any order for the
accumulation of supplies at Amelia Springs."
Lewis E. Harvie, a distinguished citizen of Virginia, and who at the
close of the war was President of the Richmond and Danville and
Piedmont Railroads, wrote to General St. John on January 1, 1876.
From his letter I make the following extracts, referring to the
condition of affairs in 1865. He writes:
"The difficulties of obtaining supplies were very great, particularly
when the roads under my charge were cut, and transportation suspended
on them, which was the case on one or two occasions for several
weeks. Engines and care, and machinery generally, on these roads were
insufficient and inadequate from wear and tear to accomplish the
amount of transportation required for the Government. . . . The
Richmond and Danville and Piedmont Railroads were kept open, and
about that time we added largely to its rolling-stock by procuring
engines and cars from the different roads on the route of the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad west. Starvation had stared the Army
of Northern Virginia in the face; and the commissary department
organized an appeal to the people on the line of the Richmond and
Danville Railroad for voluntary contributions of supplies, and a
number of gentlemen of influence, character, and position, including
the most eminent clergymen of the State, addressed them in several
counties, urging them to furnish the supply wanted.
"No one who witnessed can ever forget the results. Contribution was
universal, and supplies of food sufficient to meet the wants of the
army at the time were at once sent to the depots on the road until
they were packed and groaned under their weight; and I affirm that at
the time of the evacuation of Richmond, the difficulty of delivering
supplies sufficient for the support of the Army of Northern Virginia
under General Lee was solved and surmounted, for I know that abundant
supplies were in reach of transportation on the Richmond and Danville
Railroad, being massed in Danville, Charlotte, and at other points;
and, from the increased motive power above referred to, they could
have been delivered as fast as they were required. . . . At the time
of the evacuation of the city, there were ample supplies in it, as
well as on the railroad west of Amelia Court-House, to have been
delivered at the latter place for the retreating army, if its numbers
had been double what they were. No orders were ever given to any
officers or employee of the Richmond and Danville Railroad to
transport any supplies to Amelia Court-House for General Lee's army,
nor did I ever bear that any such orders were sent to the commissary
department on the occasion of the evacuation of Richmond, until after
the surrender of the army."
Mr. Harvie then recites his interview, held on Saturday, the day
before evacuation, with the Quartermaster-General, the Secretary of
War, and myself, from whom he learned that he might go home for a
fortnight, there being no expectation that Richmond would be
evacuated in the mean time. He adds that the next day he was informed
by telegraph of the proposed evacuation, and returned to Richmond, at
which place he conferred with myself and the Secretary of War about
the route to be taken by the wagon supply-train, and that he had a
long conversation with me on the care, during our night-ride to
Danville.
In regard to sending supplies to Amelia Court-House, he writes:
"I have never believed that any orders to place supplies of food at
Amelia Court-House were received by the commissary department at the
time of the evacuation of the city, because from Richmond, or from
the upper portions of the railroad, if required, they could at once
have been transported without any delay or difficulty. Neither the
road nor the telegraph was cut or disturbed until the day after the
evacuation of the city."
It may perhaps be thought that the amount of evidence adduced is
greater than necessary to disprove the very improbable assertion
that, instead of burden-cars, a passenger train had been loaded with
provisions for Lee's army at Amelia Court-House, and that these
passenger-cars, without being permitted to unload the freight, had,
in reckless disregard of the wants of our worn and hard-pressed
defenders, been ordered to proceed immediately to Richmond, thus
leaving them to starvation, and the necessity to surrender, in order
to enable the executive department to escape; but, as I had no
personal knowledge of the matter, it was necessary to quote those
whose functions brought them into closer communication with the
subject to which the calumny related.
In the night of the 2d, the same on which General Ewell evacuated the
defenses of the capital and General Lee withdrew from Petersburg, I
left Richmond and reached Danville on the next morning.
Neither the president of the railroad, who was traveling with me, nor
I knew that there was anything which required attention at Amelia
Court-House or other station on the route. Had General Lee's letter
to me, written on the afternoon of the 2d, been received at Richmond,
which I think it was not, the fact that he proposed to march to
Amelia Court-House would have been known; but it would have been
unjust to the officers of the commissary department to doubt that any
requisition made or to be made for supplies had received or would
receive the most prompt and efficient attention. If, however, I had
known that General Lee wanted supplies placed at Amelia Court-House,
I would certainly have inquired as to the time of reaching that
station, and have asked to have the train stopped so as to enable me
to learn whether the supplies were in depot or not. The unfounded
calumny, after perhaps having given it more consideration than it was
worth, is now dismissed.
Though the occupation of Danville was not expected to be permanent,
immediately after arriving there rooms were obtained, and the
different departments resumed their routine labors. Nothing could
have exceeded the kindness and hospitality of the patriotic citizens.
They cordially gave as an "Old Virginia welcome," and with one heart
contributed in every practicable manner to cheer and aid us in the
work in which we were engaged.
The town was surrounded by an intrenchment as faulty in location as
construction. I promptly proceeded to correct the one and improve the
other, while energetic efforts were being made to collect supplies of
various kinds for General Lee's army.
The design, as previously arranged with General Lee, was that, if he
should be compelled to evacuate Petersburg, he would proceed to
Danville, make a new defensive line of the Dan and Roanoke Rivers,
unite his army with the troops in North Carolina, and make a combined
attack upon Sherman; if successful, it was expected that reviving
hope would bring reënforcements to the army, and Grant, being then
far removed from his base of supplies, and in the midst of a hostile
population, it was thought we might return, drive him from the soil
of Virginia, and restore to the people a government deriving its
authority from their consent. With these hopes and wishes, neither
seeking to diminish the magnitude of our disaster nor to excite
illusory expectations, I issued, on the 5th, the following
proclamation, of which, viewed by the light of subsequent events, it
may fairly be said it was over-sanguine:
"The General-in-Chief found it necessary to make such movements of
his troops as to uncover the capital. It would be unwise to conceal
the moral and material injury to our cause resulting from its
occupation by the enemy. It is equally unwise and unworthy of us to
allow our energies to falter and our efforts to become relaxed under
reverses, however calamitous they may be. For many months the largest
and finest army of the Confederacy, under a leader whose presence
inspires equal confidence in the troops and the people, has been
greatly trammeled by the necessity of keeping constant watch over the
approaches to the capital, and has thus been forced to forego more
than one opportunity for promising enterprise. It is for us, my
countrymen, to show by our bearing under reverses, how wretched has
been the self-deception of those who have believed us less able to
endure misfortune with fortitude than to encounter danger with
courage.
"We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from
the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to
move from point to point, to strike the enemy in detail far from his
base. Let us but will it, and we are free.
"Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which never
yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my
purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I
will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of
any of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia--noble State,
whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious
recent history; whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock
of this war; whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so
sublime as to render her illustrious in all time to come--that
Virginia, with the help of the people and by the blessing of
Providence, shall be held and defended, and no peace ever be made
with the infamous invaders of her territory.
"If, by the stress of numbers, we should be compelled to a temporary
withdrawal from her limits or those of any other border State, we
will return until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in
despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves of a people
resolved to be free.
"Let us, then, not despond, my countrymen, but, relying on God, meet
the foe with fresh defiance and with unconquered and unconquerable
hearts.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
While thus employed, little if any reliable information in regard to
the Army of Northern Virginia was received, until a gallant youth,
the son of General Henry A. Wise, came to Danville, and told me that,
learning Lee's army was to be surrendered, he had during the night
mounted his fleet horse, and, escaping through and from the enemy's
cavalry, some of whom pursued him, had come quite alone to warn me of
the approaching event. Other unofficial information soon followed,
and of such circumstantial character as to prove that Lieutenant
Wise's anticipation had been realized.
Our scouts now reported a cavalry force to be moving toward the south
around the west side of Danville, and we removed thence to
Greensboro, passing a railroad-bridge, as was subsequently learned, a
very short time before the enemy's cavalry reached and burned it. I
had telegraphed to General Johnston from Danville the report that Lee
had surrendered, and, on arriving at Greensboro, conditionally
requested him to meet me there, where General Beauregard at the time
had his headquarters, my object being to confer with both of them in
regard to our present condition and future operations.
[Footnote 123: "Memoirs of Service Afloat," Admiral Semmes, pp.
811-815.]