Siege of Petersburg.--Violent Assault upon our Position.--A Cavalry
Expedition.--Contest near Ream's Station.--The City invested with
Earthworks.--Position of the Forces.--The Mine exploded, and an
Assault made.--Attacks on our Lines.--Object of the Enemy.--Our
Strength.--Assault on Fort Fisher.--Evacuation of Wilmington.--
Purpose of Grant's Campaign.--Lee's Conference with the
President.--Plans.--Sortie against Fort Steadman.--Movements of
Grant farther to Lee's right.--Army retires from Petersburg.--The
Capitulation.--Letters of Lee.
After the battle of Cold Harbor, the geography of the country no
longer enabled General Grant, by a flank movement to his left, to
keep himself covered by a stream, and yet draw nearer to his
objective point, Richmond. He had now reached the Chickahominy, and
to move down the east bank of that stream would be to depart further
from the prize he sought, the capital of the Confederacy. His
overland march had cost him the loss of more men than Lee's army
contained at the beginning of the campaign. He now, from
considerations which may fairly be assumed to have been the result of
his many unsuccessful assaults on Lee's army, or from other
considerations which I am not in a position to suggest, decided to
seek a new base on the James River, and to attempt the capture of our
capital by a movement from the south. With this view, on the night of
June 12th he commenced a movement by the lower crossings of the
Chickahominy toward the James River. General Lee learned of the
withdrawal on the next morning, and moved to our pontoon-bridge above
Drury's Bluff. While Grant's army was making this march to James
River, General Smith, with his division, which had arrived at Bermuda
Hundred, was, on the night of the 14th, directed to move against
Petersburg, with an additional force of two divisions, it being
supposed that this column would be sufficient to effect what General
Butler's previous attempts had utterly failed to accomplish, the
capture of Petersburg and the destruction of the Southern Railroad.
On the morning of the 15th the attack was made, the exterior redoubts
and rifle-pits were carried, and the column advanced toward the inner
works, but the artillery was used so effectively as to impress the
commander of the assailants with the idea that there must be a large
supporting force of infantry, and the attack was suspended so as to
allow the columns in rear to come up.
Hancock's corps was on the south side of the James River, before the
attack on Petersburg commenced, and was ordered to move forward, but
not informed that an attack was to be made, nor directed to march to
Petersburg until late in the afternoon, when he received orders to
move to the aid of General Smith. It being night when the junction
was made, it was deemed prudent to wait until morning. Had they known
how feeble was the garrison, it is probable that Petersburg would
have been captured that night; but with the morning came another
change, as marked as that from darkness to light. Lee crossed the
James River on the 15th, and by a night march his advance was in the
entrenchments of Petersburg before the morning for which the enemy
was waiting. The artillery now had other support than the old men and
boys of the town.
The Confederates promptly seized the commanding points and rapidly
strengthened their lines, so that the morning's reconnaissance
indicated to the enemy the propriety of postponing an attack until
all his force should arrive.
On the 17th an assault was made with such spirit and force as to gain
a part of our line, in which, however, the assailants suffered
severely. Lee had now constructed a line in rear of the one first
occupied, having such advantages as gave to our army much greater
power to resist. On the morning of the 18th Grant ordered a general
assault, but finding that the former line had been evacuated, and a
new one on more commanding ground had been constructed, the assault
was postponed until the afternoon; then attacks were made by heavy
columns on various parts of our line, with some partial success, but
the final result was failure everywhere, and with extraordinary
sacrifice of life.
With his usual persistence, he had made attack after attack, and for
the resulting carnage had no gain to compensate. The eagerness
manifested leads to the supposition that it was expected to capture
the place while Lee with part of his force was guarding against an
advance on Richmond by the river road. The four days' experience
seems to have convinced Grant of the impolicy of assault, for
thereafter he commenced to lay siege to the place. On the 21st a
heavy force of the enemy was advanced more to our right, in the
vicinity of the Weldon Railroad, which runs southward from
Petersburg. But General Lee, observing an interval between the left
of the Second and right of the Sixth of the enemy's corps, sent
forward a column under General A. P. Hill, which, entering the
interval, poured a fire into the flank of one corps on the right and
the other on the left, doubling their flank divisions up on their
center, and driving them with disorder and with heavy loss. Several
entire regiments, a battery, and many standards were captured, when
Hill, having checked the advance which was directed against the
Weldon Railroad, withdrew with his captures to his former position,
bringing with him the guns and nearly three thousand prisoners.
On the same night, a cavalry expedition, consisting of the divisions
of Generals Wilson and Kautz, numbering about six thousand men, was
sent west to cut the Weldon, Southside, and Danville Railroads, which
connected our army with the south and west. This raid resulted in
important injury to our communications. The enemy's cavalry tore up
large distances of the tracks of all three of the railroads, burning
the wood-work and laying waste the country around. But they were
pursued and harassed by a small body of cavalry under General W. H.
F. Lee, and, on their return near Ream's Station, were met, near
Sapponey Church, by a force of fifteen hundred cavalry under General
Hampton. That officer at once attacked. The fighting continued
fiercely throughout the night, and at dawn the enemy's cavalry
retreated in confusion. Near Ream's Station, at which point they
attempted to cross the Weldon Railroad, they were met by General
Fitzhugh Lee's horsemen and a body of infantry under General Mahone,
and the force completed their discomfiture. After a brief attempt to
force their way, they broke in disorder, leaving behind them twelve
pieces of artillery, and more than a thousand prisoners, and many
wagons and ambulances. The railroads were soon repaired, and the
enemy's cavalry was for the time rendered unfit for service.
Every attempt made to force General Lee's lines having proved
unsuccessful, General Grant determined upon the method of slow
approaches, and proceeded to confront the city with a line of
earthworks, and, by gradually extending the line to his left, he
hoped to reach out toward the Weldon and Southside Railroads. To
obtain possession of these roads now became the special object with
him, and all his movements had regard to that end. Petersburg is
twenty-two miles south of Richmond, and is connected with the south
and west by the Weldon and Southside Railroads, the latter of which
crosses the Danville Railroad, the main line of communication between
Richmond and the Gulf States. With the enemy once holding these roads
and those north of the city, Richmond would be isolated, and it would
have been necessary for the Confederate army to evacuate eastern
Virginia.
It will be seen from what has been written that, though the
operations against Petersburg have been ordinarily called a siege, it
could not in strictness of language be so denominated, as the
communications in the rear, as well as to the north and south, were
still open. It was really a conflict between opposing intrenchments.
General Grant had crossed a force into Charles City, on the north
bank of the James, and thus menaced Richmond with an assault from
that quarter. His line extended thence across the neck of the
peninsula of Bermuda Hundred, and east and south of Petersburg, where
it gradually stretched westward, approaching nearer and nearer to the
railroads bringing the supplies for our army and for Richmond. The
line of General Lee conformed to that of General Grant. In addition
to the works east and southeast of Richmond, an exterior line of
defense had been constructed against the hostile forces at Deep
Bottom, and, in addition to a fortification of some strength at
Drury's Bluff, obstructions were placed in the river to prevent the
ascent of the Federal gunboats. The lines thence continued facing
those of the enemy north of the Appomattox, and, crossing that
stream, extended around the city of Petersburg, gradually moving
westward with the works of the enemy. The struggle that ensued
consisted chiefly of attempts to break through our lines. These it is
not my purpose to notice _seriatim_; some of them, however, it is
thought necessary to mention. While at Petersburg, the assaults of
the enemy were met by a resistance sufficient to repel his most
vigorous attacks; our force confronting Deep Bottom was known to be
so small as to suggest an attempt to capture Richmond by a movement
on the north side of the James. On the 26th of July a corps of
infantry was sent over to Deep Bottom to move against our
pontoon-bridges near to Drury's Bluff, so as to prevent Lee from
sending reënforcements to the north side of the James, while Sheridan
with his cavalry moved to the north side of Richmond to attack the
works which, being poorly garrisoned, it was thought might be taken
by assault. Lee, discovering the movement after the enemy had gained
some partial success, sent over reënforcements, which drove him back
and defeated the expedition. On the night of the 28th the infantry
corps (Hancock's) was secretly withdrawn from the north side of the
river, to coöperate in the grand assault which Grant was preparing to
make upon Lee's intrenchments. The uniform failure, as has been
stated, of the assaults upon our lines had caused the conclusion that
they could only succeed after a breach had been made in the works.
For that purpose a subterranean gallery for a mine was run under one
of our forts. General Burnside, who conducted the operation, thus
describes the work:
"The main gallery of the mine is five hundred and twenty-two feet in
length, the side-galleries about forty feet each. My suggestion is
that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries, two at each
end, say a few feet apart, at right angles to the side-gallery, and
two more in each of the side-galleries, similarly placed by pairs,
situated equidistant from each other, and the end of the galleries,
thus:
[Illustration: Mine Galleries]
"I proposed to put in each of the eight magazines from twelve to
fourteen hundred pounds of powder, the magazines to be connected by a
trough of powder instead of a fuse."
It appears that it was decided that the charge should be eight
thousand pounds instead of the larger amount proposed.[119] Between
four and five o'clock on the morning of the 30th of July the mine was
exploded, and simultaneously the enemy's batteries commenced firing,
when, as previously arranged, the column of attack moved forward to
the breach, with instructions to rush through it and seize the crest
of a ridge in rear of our fort, so as to interpose a force between
our troops and in rear of our batteries. A question had arisen as to
whether the assaulting column should consist of white or negro
troops; of each, there were brigades in General Burnside's division,
which occupied that part of the line nearest to the mine, and
therefore seems to have been considered as the command from which the
troops to constitute the storming column must be selected. The
explosion was destructive to our artillery and its small supporting
force immediately above the mine.
An opening, one hundred and fifty feet long, sixty feet wide, and
thirty feet deep, suddenly appeared in the place of the earthworks,
and the division of the enemy selected for the charge rushed forward
to pierce the opening. A Southern writer[120] thus describes what
ensued:
"The white division charged, reached the crater, stumbled over the
_debris_, were suddenly met by a merciless fire of artillery
fusillading them right and left and of infantry fusillade them in
front; faltered, hesitated, were badly led, lost heart, gave up the
plan of seizing the crest in rear, huddled into the crater man on top
of man, company mingled with company; and upon this disordered,
unstrung, quivering mass of human beings, white and black--for the
black troops had followed--was poured a hurricane of shot, shell,
canister, musketry, which made the hideous crater a slaughter-pen,
horrible and frightful, beyond the power of words. All order was
lost; all idea of charging the crest abandoned. Lee's infantry was
seen concentrating for the carnival of death; his artillery was
massing to destroy the remnants of the charging divisions; those who
deserted the crater, to scramble over the debris and run back, were
shot down; then all that was left to the shuddering mass of blacks
and whites in the pit was to shrink lower, evade the horrible
_mitraille_, and wait for a charge of their friends to rescue them or
surrender."
The forces of the enemy finally succeeded in making their way back,
with a loss of about four thousand prisoners, and General Lee, whose
casualties were small, reestablished his line without interruption.
This affair was subsequently investigated by a committee of the
Congress of the United States, and their report declared that "the
first and great cause of the disaster was the employment of white
instead of black troops to make the charge."
Attacks continued to be made on our lines during the months of August
and September, but, as in former instances, they were promptly
repulsed. On August 18th the enemy seized on a portion of the Weldon
Railroad near Petersburg, and on the 25th this success was followed
up by an attempt, under General Hancock, to take possession of
Reams's Station on the same road, farther south. He was defeated by
Heth's division and a portion of Wilcox's, under the direction of
General A. P. Hill, and, having lost heavily, was compelled to
retreat. These events did not, however, materially affect the general
result. The enemy's left gradually reached farther and farther
westward, until it had passed the Vaughan, Squirrel Level, and other
roads running southwestward from Petersburg, and in October was
established on the left bank of Hatcher's Run. The movement was
designed to reach the Southside Railroad. A heavy column crossed
Hatcher's Run, and made an obstinate attack on our lines, in order to
break through to the railroad. This column was met in front and flank
by Generals Hampton and W. H. F. Lee, with dismounted sharpshooters.
Infantry was hastened forward by General Lee, and the enemy was
driven back. This closed for the winter active operations against our
lines at Petersburg.
When the campaign opened on the Rapidan, General Lee's effective
strength was in round numbers sixty thousand of all arms; that of
General Grant at the same time one hundred and forty thousand. In the
many battles fought before the close of the campaign. Grant's loss
had been a multiple of that sustained by Lee; but the large
reënforcements he had received, both before and after he crossed the
James River, repaired his losses, and must have increased the
numerical disparity between the two armies; yet, notwithstanding the
great superiority in the number of his force, the long-projected
movement for the reduction of Fort Fisher and the capture of
Wilmington was delayed, because of Grant's unwillingness to detach
any of his troops for that purpose until after active operations had
been suspended before Petersburg.
It was proposed to make a combined land and naval attack--
Major-General B. F, Butler to command the land-forces, and Admiral D.
D. Porter the fleet. The enemy seems about this time to have
conceived a new means of destroying forts; it was, to place a large
amount of powder in a ship, and, having anchored off the fort, to
explode the powder and so destroy the works and incapacitate the
garrison as to enable a storming party to capture them. How near to
Fort Fisher it was expected to anchor the ship I do not know, nor
have I learned how far it was supposed the open atmosphere could be
made to act as a projectile. General Whiting, the brave and highly
accomplished soldier, who was in command of the defenses of
Wilmington, stated that the powder-ship did not come nearer to Fort
Fisher than twelve or fifteen hundred yards. He further stated that
he heard the report of the explosion at Wilmington, and sent a
telegram to Colonel Lamb, the commanding officer at the fort, to
inquire what it meant, and was answered, "Enemy's gunboat blown up."
No effect, as might have been anticipated, was produced on the
fort.[121] From the same source it is learned that the combined force
of this expedition was about six thousand five hundred land-troops
and fifty vessels of war of various sizes and classes, several
ironclads, and the ship charged with two hundred and thirty-five tons
of powder. Some of the troops landed, but after a reconnaissance of
the fort, which then had a garrison of about six thousand five
hundred men, the troops were reembarked, and thus the expedition
ended.
On January 15, 1865, the attempt was renewed with a larger number of
troops, amounting, after the arrival of General Schofield, to
twenty-odd thousand. Porter's fleet also received additional vessels,
making the whole number fifty-eight engaged in the attack. The
garrison of Fort Fisher had been increased to about double the number
of men there on the 24th of December. The iron-clad vessels of the
enemy approached nearer the fort than on a former occasion, and the
fire of the fleet was more concentrated and vastly more effective.
Many of the guns in the fort were dismounted, and the parapets
seriously injured, by the fire. The garrison stood bravely to their
guns, and, when the assault was made, fought with such determined
courage as to repulse the first column, and obstinately contended
with another approaching from the land-side, continuing the fight
long after they had got into the fort. Finally, overwhelmed by
numbers, and after the fort and its armament had been mainly
destroyed by a bombardment--I believe greater than ever before
concentrated upon a fort--the remnant of the garrison surrendered.
The heroic and highly gifted General Whiting was mortally, and the
gallant commander of the fort, Colonel Lamb, was seriously, wounded.
They both fell into the hands of the enemy. General Hoke,
distinguished by brilliant service on other fields, had been ordered
down to support the garrison, and under the directions of General
Bragg, commanding the department, had advanced to attack the
investing force, but a reconnaissance convinced them both that his
command was too weak to effect the object. The other forts, of
necessity, fell with the main work, Fisher, and were abandoned. Hoke,
with his small force retiring through Wilmington, after destroying
the public vessels and property, to prevent them from falling into
the hands of the enemy, slowly fell back, fighting at several points,
and seeking to find in the separation of the vastly superior army
which was following him opportunity to attack a force the number of
which should not greatly exceed his own, and finally made a junction
with General Johnston, then opposing Sherman's advance through North
Carolina.
The fixed purpose of General Grant's campaign of 1864 was the capture
of Richmond, the Confederate capital. For this he had assembled the
large army with which he crossed the Rapidan and fought the numerous
battles between there and the James River. For this he had moved
against Petersburg, the capture of which in itself was not an object
so important as to have justified the effort made to that end. It was
only valuable because it was on the line of communication with the
more southern States, and offered another approach to Richmond. In
his attack upon Petersburg it will be seen from the events already
described that he adopted neither of the two plans which were open to
him: the one, the concentration of all his efforts to break the line
covering Petersburg; the other, to move his army round it and seize
the Weldon and Southside Railroads, so as to cut off the supplies of
Lee's army and compel the evacuation of both Petersburg and Richmond.
Had there been approximate equality between his army and that of Lee,
he could not wisely have ventured upon the latter movement against a
soldier so able as his antagonist; but the vast numerical superiority
of Grant's army might well have induced him to invite Lee to meet him
in the open field. He did, however, neither the one nor the other,
but something of both.
In the opening of the campaign of 1865, he continued, as he had done
in 1864, to extend his line to the left, seeking, after having gained
the Weldon Railroad, to reach still farther to that connecting
Petersburg with the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Lee, with a
well-deserved confidence in his troops and his usual intrepidity,
drew from his lines of defense men enough to enable him for a long
time to defeat the enemy in these efforts, by extension to turn his
right flank. After Grant's demonstration on the north side of the
James by sending over Hancock's corps had been virtually abandoned by
its withdrawal, Longstreet's corps, which had been sent to oppose it,
remained for a long time on the north side of the James. Finally,
General Ewell with a few troops, the Richmond reserves, and a
division of the navy under Admiral Semmes, held the river and land
defenses on the east side of Richmond.
General A. R. Lawton, who had become the quartermaster-general of the
Confederate army, ably supported by Lewis E. Harvie, President of the
Richmond and Danville Railroad, increased the carrying capacity of
that line so as to compensate for our loss of the use of the Weldon
Railroad. At the same time, General St. John, chief of the
commissariat, by energetic efforts and the use of the Virginia Canal,
kept up the supplies of General Lee's army, so as to secure from him
the complimentary acknowledgment, made about a month before the
evacuation of Petersburg, that the army there had not been so well
supplied for many months.
During the months of February and March, Lee's army was materially
reduced by the casualties of battle and the frequency of absence
without leave. I will not call these absentees deserters, because
they did not leave to join the enemy, and again, because in some
instances where the facts were fully developed, they had gone to
their necessitous families with intent to return and resume their
places in the line of battle. His cavalry force had been also
diminished by the absence of General Hampton's division, to which
permission had been given to go to their home, South Carolina, to get
fresh horses, and also to fill up their ranks. Long, arduous, and
distant service had rendered both necessary.
In the early part of March, as well as my memory can fix the date,
General Lee held with me a long and free conference. He stated that
the circumstances had forced on him the conclusion that the
evacuation of Petersburg was but a question of time. He had early and
fully appreciated the embarrassment which would result from losing
the workshops and foundry at Richmond, which had been our main
reliance for the manufacture and repair of arms as well as the
preparation of ammunition. The importance of Richmond in this regard
was, however, then less than it had been by the facilities which had
been created for these purposes at Augusta, Selma, Fayetteville, and
some smaller establishments; also by the progress which was being
made for a large armory at Macon, Georgia. To my inquiry whether it
would not be better to anticipate the necessity by withdrawing at
once, he said that his artillery and draught horses were too weak for
the roads in their then condition, and that he would have to wait
until they became firmer. There naturally followed the consideration
of the line of retreat. A considerable time before this General Hood
had sent me a paper, presenting his views and conclusion that, if it
became necessary for the Army of Northern Virginia to retreat, it
should move toward Middle Tennessee. The paper was forwarded to
General Lee and returned by him with an unfavorable criticism, and
the conclusion that, if we had to retreat, it should be in a
southwardly direction toward the country from which we were drawing
supplies, and from which a large portion of our forces had been
derived. In this conversation the same general view was more
specifically stated, and made to apply to the then condition of
affairs. The programme was to retire to Danville, at which place
supplies should be collected and a junction made with the troops
under General J. E. Johnston, the combined force to be hurled upon
Sherman in North Carolina, with the hope of defeating him before
Grant could come to his relief. Then the more southern States, freed
from pressure and encouraged by this success, it was expected, would
send large reënforcements to the army, and Grant, drawn far from his
base of supplies into the midst of a hostile population, it was
hoped, might yet be defeated, and Virginia be delivered from the
invader. Efforts were energetically continued, to collect supplies in
depots where they would be available, and, in furtherance of the
suggestion of General Lee as to the necessary improvement in the
condition of his horses, the quartermaster-general was instructed to
furnish larger rations of corn to the quartermaster at Petersburg.
Though of unusually calm and well-balanced judgment, General Lee was
instinctively averse to retiring from his enemy, and had so often
beaten superior numbers that his thoughts were no doubt directed to
every possible expedient which might enable him to avoid retreat. It
thus fell out that, in a week or two after the conference above
noticed, he presented to me the idea of a sortie against the enemy
near to the right of his line. This was rendered the more feasible,
from the constant extension of Grant's line to the left, and the
heavy bodies of troops he was employing to turn our right. The
sortie, if entirely successful, so as to capture and hold the works
on Grant's right, as well as three forts on the commanding ridge in
his rear, would threaten his line of communication with his base,
City Point, and might compel him to move his forces around ours to
protect it; if only so far successful as to cause the transfer of his
troops from his left to his right, it would relieve our right, and
delay the impending disaster for the more convenient season for
retreat.
Fort Steadman was the point against which the sortie was directed;
its distance from our lines was less than two hundred yards, but an
abatis covered its front. For this service, requiring equal daring
and steadiness, General John B. Gordon, well proved on many
battle-fields, was selected. His command was the remnant of Ewell's
corps, troops often tried in the fiery ordeal of battle, and always
found true as tempered steel. Before daylight, on the morning of the
25th of March, Gordon moved his command silently forward. His
pioneers were sent in advance to make openings through the
obstructions, and the troops rushed forward, surprised and captured
the garrison, then turned the guns upon the adjacent works and soon
drove the enemy from them. A detachment was now sent to seize the
commanding ground and works in the rear, the batteries of which,
firing into the gorges of the forts on the right and left, would soon
make a wide opening in Grant's line. The guides to this detachment
misled it in the darkness of a foggy dawn far from the point to which
it was directed. In the mean time the enemy, recovering from his
surprise and the confusion into which he had been extensively thrown,
rallied and with overwhelming power concentrated both artillery and
infantry upon Gordon's command. The supporting force which was to
have followed him, notwithstanding the notice which was given by the
victorious cheer of his men when they took Fort Steadman, failed to
come forward, and Gordon's brilliant success, like the Dead Sea
fruit, was turned to ashes at the moment of possession. It was
hopeless, with his small force unsupported, to retain the position he
had gained. It only remained as far as practicable to withdraw his
command to our line, and this the valiant soldier promptly proceeded
to do; some of his men were killed on the retreat, many became
prisoners--I believe all, or nearly all, of those who had been
detached to seize other works, and had not rejoined the main body.
The following letter from General Gordon furnishes some important
details of the attack:
"ATLANTA, GEORGIA, _October 16, 1880._
"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The attack upon Fort Steadman was made on the
night of the 25th March, or rather before light on the morning of the
26th March, 1865. A conference had been held between General Lee and
myself at his headquarters the 10th of March, which resulted in
General Lee's decision to transfer my corps from the extreme right of
our army to the trenches in and around Petersburg, with the purpose
of enabling me to carefully examine the enemy's lines, and report to
him my belief as to the practicability of breaking them at any point.
Within a week after being transferred to this new position, I decided
that Fort Steadman could be taken by a night assault, and that it
might be possible to throw into the breach thus made in Grant's lines
a sufficient force to disorganize and destroy the left wing of his
army before he could recover and concentrate his forces, then lying
beyond the James and Appomattox Rivers. Fort Steadman was the point
at which the earthworks of General Grant most nearly approached our
own. This fort was located upon what was known as Hare's Hill, and
was in front of the city of Petersburg, and of the point on our lines
known as Colquitt's Salient. The two hostile lines could not have
been more than two hundred to two hundred and fifty yards apart at
this point; and the pickets were so close together that it was
difficult to prevent constant conversation between those of the
Confederate and Federal armies. Fort Steadman was upon the main line
of General Grant's works, and flanked on either side by a line of
earthworks and other forts, which completely commanded every foot of
the intervening space between the hostile lines. In rear of Fort
Steadman were three other forts, two of which, and perhaps all three,
could command Fort Steadman, in case of its capture by our forces.
These forts in rear of Steadman were protected by an almost
impenetrable abatis, while, in front of Fort Steadman itself, and of
the main line of which it was a part, was a line of sharpened
fence-rails, with the lower ends buried deeply in the ground, their
middle resting upon horizontal poles and wrapped with
telegraph-wires, and their upper ends sharpened and elevated to the
height of four and a half or five feet. These rails, which formed the
obstruction in front of General Grant's lines at Fort Steadman and
along the flanking works, were, as I said, wrapped with
telegraph-wire where they rested on the horizontal poles, so as to
prevent an attacking force from pressing them apart, and buried in
the ground too deeply to be pulled up, and, sharpened at the upper
end, were too high to be mounted by my men. This obstruction,
therefore, had to be cut away with axes before the attacking force
could enter the fort or lines.
"General Lee, after considering the plan of assault and battle which
I submitted to him, and which I shall presently describe, gave me
orders to prepare for the movement, which was regarded by both of us
as a desperate one, but which seemed to give more promise of good
results than any other hitherto suggested. General Lee placed at my
disposal, in addition to my own corps, a portion of A. P, Hill's and
a portion of Longstreet's, and a detachment of cavalry--in all,
about one half of the army.
"The general plan of the assault and battle was this: To take the
fort by a rush across the narrow space that lay between it and
Colquitt's Salient, and then surprise and capture, by a stratagem,
the commanding forts in the rear, thus opening a way for our troops
to pass to the rear, and upon the bank of the left wing of Grant's
army, which was to be broken to pieces by a concentration of all the
forces at my command moving upon that flank. During the night of the
25th my preparations were made for the movement before daylight. I
placed three officers in charge of three separate bodies of men, and
directed them, as soon as the lines of Fort Steadman should be
carried by the assaulting column, to rush through the gap thus
produced to the three rear forts--one of these officers and bodies
of men to go to each fort, and to approach them from their rear by
the only avenue left open and seize those forts. A guide was placed
with each of these officers, who was to conduct him and his troops to
the rear of the front, which he was to surprise. A body of the most
stalwart of my men was organized to move in advance of all the
troops, armed with axes, with which they were to cut down the
obstruction of sharpened and wire-fastened rails in front of the
enemy's lines.
"Next to these were to come three hundred men, armed with bayonets
fixed and empty muskets, who were to mount and enter the fort as the
axemen cut away the obstruction of sharpened rails, bayoneting the
pickets in front and gunners in the fort if they resisted, or sending
them to our rear if they surrendered. Next were to cross the three
officers and their detachments, who were to capture the three rear
forts. Next, a division of infantry was to cross, moving by the left
flank, so as to be in position when halted, and fronted to move
without any confusion or delay immediately down General Grant's
lines, toward his left, capturing his troops, or forcing them to
abandon their works and form under our advancing fire at right angles
to his line of works.
"Next was to cross the cavalry, who were to ride to the rear, cut the
enemy's telegraph-lines, capture his pontoons, and prevent or delay
the crossing of reënforcements from beyond the Appomattox. Next, my
whole force was to swell the column of attack. Then, as the front of
our lines were cleared of the enemy's troops, our divisions were to
change front and join in pressing upon the enemy and driving him
farther from the other wing of General Grant's army, and widening the
breach. Strips of white cloth were tied around the shoulders of our
men, so as to designate them in the darkness.
"Just before daylight, when all was ready, I gave the signal, and the
axemen rushed across, followed by the bodies armed with bayonets and
empty muskets, who captured and sent to the rear the enemy's pickets.
The axemen cut away the sharpened rails so rapidly as scarcely to
cause a halt of the troops following, who mounted the enemy's works
and seized his guns and gunners in the fort, clearing the way and
giving safe passage to detachments and larger bodies which were to
follow and which did follow. The fort and most of the lines between
the fort and the river were captured with the loss of but one man, so
far as I could learn. We captured eleven heavy guns, nine mortars,
about seven hundred prisoners, as I now recollect, among whom was the
brigadier commanding that portion of the line, General McLaughlin.
"Everything was moving as well as I could have desired, when, one
after another, all three of the officers, sent to the rear to capture
by stratagem the rear forts, sent messengers to inform me that they
had passed successfully through the lines of the enemy's reserves in
rear of Fort Steadman, and were certainly beyond the rear forts, but
that their guides had been lost or had deserted, and that they could
not find the forts.
"Although I heard nothing afterward of these guides, yet I did learn
of the fate of the three officers and their commands. Some were shot
down after daylight, some were captured, and a few, very few, made
their way back to our lines. The failure of that portion of the
programme left, of course, these three forts manned by the enemy, and
his heavy guns made it impossible to carry out literally the details
of the plan. Then a large body of the troops sent by General Lee from
General Longstreet's corps were delayed by the breaking down of
trains, or by some other cause, and did not arrive at the appointed
hour, which caused so great a delay that we did not get in the fort
and upon the enemy's flank at as early an hour as was expected, and
daylight found us with the plan only half executed. At daylight, all
the commanding forts in the rear, which we had failed to capture,
opened upon Fort Steadman and that portion of the enemy's lines held
by our troops. Reënforcements were rapidly brought up, so that it
became too hazardous, as General Lee thought, to go forward or
attempt it. So he ordered me back (I may say here that I entirely
approved of this decision of General Lee). Up to this hour we had
lost but few men, and these had been killed or wounded mainly by
artillery. But now the enemy's infantry came up and made several
assaults. They were repulsed by our troops in Fort Steadman and in
the enemy's works on its flanks. It was in the effort to withdraw the
troops that our principal loss occurred. A raking tire was kept up
across the intervening space over which we had moved in capturing the
fort, I was wounded in recrossing to Colquitt's Salient, and many of
our men were killed and wounded in making the same passage back to
our works.
"As I said at the outset, this attack was regarded by both General
Lee and myself as very hazardous; but it seemed necessary to do more
than sit quietly waiting for General Grant to move upon our right,
while each day was diminishing our strength by disease and death.
"Let me also add that the movement made at Hare's Hill mast have
proved a great success but for the unforeseen and unavoidable
miscarriages to which I have referred.
"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. B. GORDON.
"Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS, _Mississippi_."
Immediately following, and perhaps in consequence of this sortie, an
extensive attack was made upon our lines to the left of Fort
Steadman, but without any decisive results. On the 27th of March the
main part of Grant's forces confronting Richmond were moved over to
the lines before Petersburg, and his left was on the same day joined
by Sheridan's division of cavalry. It will be remembered that Lee had
sent Longstreet to the north side of the James as soon as he
discovered that Grant had sent a corps across with the supposed
purpose of attacking Richmond from that side. It was intended that
Longstreet should return whenever the enemy withdrew his main force
from the north side of the James; but it appears that this was so
secretly done as to conceal the fact from General Longstreet, and
that both Hancock and Ord had joined Grant, to swell his forces by
two corps before our troops returned to join Lee. Grant, thus
strengthened, made a more determined movement to gain the right of
Lee's position; before, however, he was ready to make his assault,
Lee marched with a comparatively very small force, took the
initiative, and on the 31st struck the enemy's advance, and repulsed
him in great confusion, following until confronted by the heavy
masses formed in open ground in the rear, when Lee withdrew his men
back to their intrenchments.
A strategic position of recognized importance was that known as Five
Forks. Lee had stationed there Major-General Pickett with his
division, and some additional force. On the next day, the 1st of
April, this position was assaulted, and our troops were driven from
it in confusion. The unsettled question of time was now solved.
Grant's massive columns, advancing on right, left, and center,
compelled our forces to retire to the inner line of defense, so that,
on the morning of the 2d, the enemy was in a condition to besiege
Petersburg in the true sense of that term. Battery Gregg made an
obstinate defense, and, with a garrison of about two hundred and
fifty men, held a corps in check for a large part of the day. The
arrival of Longstreet's troops, and the strength of the shorter line
now held by Lee, enabled him to make several attempts to dislodge his
assailant from positions he had gained. In one of these, the
distinguished soldier whose gallantry and good conduct it has
frequently been my pleasure to notice, Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill,
who had so often passed unscathed through storms of shot and shell,
yielded up the life he had, in the beginning of the war, consecrated
to the Confederate cause; and his comrades, while mourning his loss,
have drawn consolation from the fact that he died before our flag was
furled in defeat.
Retreat was now a present necessity. All that could be done was to
hold the inner lines during the day, and make needful preparations to
withdraw at night. In the forenoon of Sunday, the 2d, I received,
when in church, a telegram announcing that the army would retire from
Petersburg at night, and I went to my office to give needful
directions for the evacuation of Richmond, the greatest difficulty of
which was the withdrawal of the troops who were on the defenses east
of the city, and along the James River.
The event had come before Lee had expected it, and the announcement
was received by us in Richmond with sorrow and surprise; for, though
it had been foreseen as a coming event which might possibly, though
not probably, be averted, and such preparation as was practicable had
been made to meet the contingency when it should occur, it was not
believed to be so near at hand.
At nightfall our army commenced crossing the Appomattox, and, before
dawn, was far on its way toward Amelia Court-House, Lee's purpose
being, as previously agreed on in conference with me, to march to
Danville, Virginia. By a reference to the map, it will be seen that
General Grant, starting from the south side of the Appomattox, had a
shorter line to Danville than that which General Lee must necessarily
follow, and, if Grant directed his march so as to put his forces
between Danville and those of Lee, it was quite possible for him to
effect it. This was done, and thus Lee was prevented from carrying
out his original purpose, and directed his march toward Lynchburg.
The enemy, having first placed himself across the route to Danville,
at Jetersville, subsequently took up the line of Lee's retreat. His
large force of cavalry, and the exhausted condition of the horses of
our small number of that arm, gave the pursuing foe a very great
advantage; but, worn and reduced in numbers as Lee's army was, the
spirit it had always shown flashed out whenever it was pressed. A
division would turn upon a corps and drive it; and General Fitzhugh
Lee, the worthy successor of the immortal Stuart, with a brigade of
our emaciated cavalry, would drive a division of their pursuers.
These scenes were repeatedly enacted during the long march from
Petersburg to Appomattox Court-House, and have been so vividly and
fully described by others that I will pass to the closing event.
Lee had never contemplated surrender. He had, long before, in
language similar to that employed by Washington during the
Revolution, expressed to me the belief that in the mountains of
Virginia he could carry on the war for twenty years, and, in
directing his march toward Lynchburg, it may well be that as an
alternative he hoped to reach those mountains, and, with the
advantage which the topography would give, yet to baffle the hosts
which were following him. On the evening of the 8th General Lee
decided, after conference with his corps commanders, that he would
advance the next morning beyond Appomattox Court-House, and, if the
force reported to be there should prove to be only Sheridan's
cavalry, to disperse it and continue the march toward Lynchburg; but,
if infantry should be found in large force, the attempt to break
through it was not to be made, and the correspondence which General
Grant had initiated on the previous day should be reopened by a flag,
with propositions for an interview to arrange the terms of
capitulation. Gordon, whose corps formed the rear-guard from
Petersburg, and who had fought daily for the protection of the
trains, had now been transferred to the front. On the next morning,
before daylight, Lee sent Colonel Venable, one of his staff, to
Gordon, commanding the advance, to learn his opinion as to the
chances of a successful attack, to which Gordon replied, "My old
corps is reduced to a frazzle, and, unless I am supported by
Longstreet heavily, I do not think we can do anything more." When
Colonel Venable returned with this answer to General Lee, he said,
"Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant."
At that time Longstreet, covering the rear, was threatened by Meade,
so that there was no ability to reënforce Gordon, and thus to explain
why General Lee then realized that the emergency had arisen for the
surrender of his army which, in his note to General Grant of the
previous day, he had said he did not believe to exist. Colonel
Venable, at early dawn, had left Gordon with about five thousand
infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee with about fifteen hundred cavalry, and
Colonel Carter's battalion of artillery, forming his line of battle
to attack the enemy, which, so far as then known, consisted of
Sheridan's cavalry, which had got in front of our retreating column.
The assault was made with such vigor and determination as to drive
Sheridan for a considerable distance; and, if this had been the only
obstacle, the road would have been opened for Lee to resume his march
toward Lynchburg. After Gordon had advanced nearly a mile, he was
confronted by a large body of infantry, subsequently ascertained to
be about eighty thousand. To attack that force was, of course,
hopeless, and Gordon commenced falling back, and simultaneously the
enemy advanced, but suddenly came to a halt. Lee had sent a flag to
Grant, who had consequently ordered a suspension of hostilities.
A leader less resolute, an army less heroically resisting fatigue,
constant watching, and starvation, would long since have reached the
conclusion that surrender was a necessity. Lee had left Petersburg
with not more than twenty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry,
and four thousand artillery. Men and horses all reduced below the
standard of efficiency by exposure and insufficient supplies of
clothing, food,[122] and forage, only the mutual confidence between
the men and their commander could have sustained either under the
trials to which they were subjected. It is not a matter of surprise
that the army had wasted away to a mere remnant, but rather that it
had continued to exist as an organized body still willing to do
battle. All the evidence we have proves that the proud, cheerful
spirit both of the army and its leader had resisted the extremes of
privation and danger, and never sunk until confronted by surrender.
General Grant, in response to a communication under a white flag made
by General Lee, as stated above, came to Appomattox, where a suitable
room was procured for their conference, and, the two Generals being
seated at a small table. General Lee opened the interview thus:
"General, I deem it due to proper candor and frankness to say at the
very beginning of this interview that I am not willing even to
discuss any terms of surrender inconsistent with the honor of my
army, which I am determined to maintain to the last."
General Grant replied:
"I have no idea of proposing dishonorable terms, General, but I would
be glad if you would state what you consider honorable terms."
General Lee then briefly stated the terms upon which he would be
willing to surrender. Grant expressed himself as satisfied with them,
and Lee requested that he would formally reduce the propositions to
writing.
To present a full and satisfactory account of the circumstances and
terms of the surrender, as well as the events immediately preceding
the evacuation of Petersburg, and the retreat thence to Appomattox
Court-House, I annex the subjoined letters:
"APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, _April 9, 1865._
"General R. E. LEE, _commanding Confederate States Army:_
"In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th
inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia on the following terms, to wit:
"Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy
to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained
by such officers as you may designate.
"The officers to give their individual parole not to take arms
against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged,
and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for
the men of their commands.
"The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked
and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them.
"This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their
private horses or baggage.
"This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their
homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authority so long as
they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside.
"Very respectfully,
"U. S. GRANT, _Lieutenant-General._"
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, _April 9, 1865._
"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the
terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by
you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your
letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to
designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"R. E. LEE."
"PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA, 3 P.M., _April 2, 1865._
"His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, _Richmond, Virginia._
"MR. PRESIDENT: Your letter of the 1st is just received. I have been
willing to detach officers to recruit negro troops, and sent in the
names of many who are desirous of recruiting companies, battalions,
or regiments, to the War Department. After receiving the general
orders on that subject establishing recruiting depots in the several
States, I supposed that this mode of raising the troops was
preferred. I will continue to submit the names of those who offer for
the service, and whom I deem competent, to the War Department; but,
among the numerous applications which are presented, it is difficult
for me to decide who are suitable for the duty. I am glad your
Excellency has made an appeal to the Governors of the States, and
hope it will have a good effect. I have a great desire to confer with
you upon our condition, and would have been to Richmond before this,
but, anticipating movements of the enemy which have occurred, I felt
unwilling to be absent. I have considered our position very critical;
but have hoped that the enemy might expose himself in some way that
we might take advantage of, and cripple him. Knowing when Sheridan
moved on our right that our cavalry would be unable to resist
successfully his advance upon our communications, I detached
Pickett's division to support it. At first Pickett succeeded in
driving the enemy, who fought stubbornly; and, after being reënforced
by the Fifth Corps (United States Army), obliged Pickett to recede to
the Five Forks on the Dinwiddie Court-House and Ford's road, where,
unfortunately, he was yesterday defeated. To relieve him, I had to
again draw out three brigades under General Anderson, which so
weakened our front line that the enemy last night and this morning
succeeded in penetrating it near the Cox road, separating our troops
around the town from those on Hatcher's Run. This has enabled him to
extend to the Appomattox, thus inclosing and obliging us to contract
our lines to the city. I have directed the troops from the lines on
Hatcher's Run, thus severed from us, to fall back toward Amelia
Court-House, and I do not see how I can possibly help withdrawing
from the city to the north side of the Appomattox to-night. There is
no bridge over the Appomattox above this point nearer than Goode's
and Bevil's over which the troops above mentioned could cross to the
north side, and be made available to us; otherwise I might hold this
position for a day or two longer, but would have to evacuate it
eventually; and I think it better for us to abandon the whole line on
James River to-night, if practicable. I have sent preparatory orders
to all the officers, and will be able to tell by night whether or not
we can remain here another day; but I think every hour now adds to
our difficulties. I regret to be obliged to write such a hurried
letter to your Excellency, but I am in the presence of the enemy,
endeavoring to resist his advance.
"I am most respectfully and truly yours,
"R. E. LEE, _General._"
[Footnote 119: Testimony of General Burnside, "Report of Committee on
the Conduct of the War," vol. i, pp. 16, 17, 1865.]
[Footnote 120: John Esten Cooke, "Life of General R. E. Lee."]
[Footnote 121: "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War" 1865,
vol. ii, pp. 106, 107.]
[Footnote 122: Falsehood and malignity have combined to invent and
circulate a baseless story to the effect that food ordered to Amelia
Court-House for Lee's troops, was by the Administration at Richmond
diverted from its destination, and the soldiers thus left to needless
suffering. A further notice will be taken of this slander in a subsequent
chapter, and that it had not one atom of truth in it will be shown by
conclusive testimony.]