Invitation of General Johnston to a Conference.--Its Object.--Its
Result.--Provisions on the Line of Retreat.--Notice of President
Lincoln's Assassination.--Correspondence between Johnston and
Sherman.--Terms of the Convention.--Approved by the Confederate
Government.--Rejected by the United States Government.--
Instructions to General Johnston.--Disobeyed.--Statements of
General Johnston.--His Surrender.--Movements of the President
South.--His Plans.--Order of General E. E. Smith to his Soldiers.--
Surrender.--Numbers paroled.--The President overtakes his Family.--
His Capture.--Taken to Hampton Roads, and imprisoned in Fortress
Monroe.
The invitation to General Johnston for a conference, noticed in a
previous chapter, was as follows:
"GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, _April 11 1865--12 M._
"General J. E. JOHNSTON, _headquarters, via Raleigh:_
"The Secretary of War did not join me at Danville. Is expected here
this afternoon.
"As your situation may render best, I will go to your headquarters
immediately after the arrival of the Secretary of War, or you can
come here; in the former case our conference must be without the
presence of General Beauregard. I have no official report from
General Lee. The Secretary of War may be able to add to information
heretofore communicated.
"The important question first to be solved is, At what point shall
concentration be made, in view of the present position of the two
columns of the enemy, and the routes which they may adopt to engage
your forces before a proposed junction with General Walker and
others. Your more intimate knowledge of the data for the solution of
the problem deters me from making a specific suggestion on that
point.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
In compliance with this request, General J. E. Johnston came up from
Raleigh to Greensboro, and with General Beauregard met me and most of
my Cabinet at my quarters in a house occupied by Colonel J. Taylor
Wood's family. Though I was fully sensible of the gravity of our
position, seriously affected as it was by the evacuation of the
capital, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the
consequent discouragement which these events would produce, I did not
think we should despair. We still had effective armies in the field,
and a vast extent of rich and productive territory both east and west
of the Mississippi, whose citizens had evinced no disposition to
surrender. Ample supplies had been collected in the railroad depots,
and much still remained to be placed at our disposal when needed by
the army in North Carolina.
The failure of several attempts to open negotiations with the Federal
Government, and notably the last by commissioners who met President
Lincoln at Hampton Roads, convinced me of the hopelessness under
existing circumstances to obtain better terms than were then offered,
i. e., a surrender at discretion. My motive, therefore, in holding an
interview with the senior generals of the army in North Carolina was
not to learn their opinion as to what might be done by negotiation
with the United States Government, but to derive from them
information in regard to the army under their command, and what it
was feasible and advisable to do as a military problem.
The members of my Cabinet were already advised as to the object of
the meeting, and, when the subject was introduced to the generals in
that form, General Johnston was very reserved, and seemed far less
than sanguine. His first significant expression was that of a desire
to open correspondence with General Sherman, to see if he would agree
to a suspension of hostilities, the object being to permit the civil
authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the
existing war. Confident that the United States Government would not
accept a proposition for such negotiations, I distinctly expressed My
conviction on that point, and presented as an objection to such an
effort that, so far as it should excite delusive hopes and
expectations, its failure would have a demoralizing effect both on
the troops and the people. Neither of them had shown any disposition
to surrender, or had any reason to suppose that their Government
contemplated abandoning its trust--the maintenance of the
Constitution, freedom, and independence of the Confederate States.
From the inception of the war, the people had generally and at all
times expressed their determination to accept no terms of peace that
did not recognize their independence; and the indignation manifested
when it became known that Mr. Lincoln had offered to our
commissioners at Hampton Roads a surrender at discretion as the only
alternative to a continuance of the war assured me that no true
Confederate was prepared to accept peace on such terms. During the
last years of the war the main part of the infantry in the Army of
Northern Virginia was composed of men from the farther South. Many of
these, before the evacuation of Petersburg and especially about the
time of Lee's surrender, had absented themselves to go homeward, and,
it was reported, made avowal of their purpose to continue the
struggle. I had reason to believe that the spirit of the army in
North Carolina was unbroken, for, though surrounded by circumstances
well calculated to depress and discourage them, I had learned that
they earnestly protested to their officers against the surrender
which rumor informed them was then in contemplation. If any shall
deem it a weak credulity to confide in such reports, something may be
allowed to an intense love for the Confederacy to a thorough
conviction that its fall would involve ruin, both material and moral,
and to a confidence in the righteousness of our cause, which, if
equally felt by my compatriots, would make them do and dare to the
last extremity.
But if, taking the gloomiest view, the circumstances were such as to
leave no hope of maintaining the independence of the Confederate
States--if negotiations for peace must be on the basis of reunion
and the acceptance of the war legislation--it seemed to me that
certainly better terms for our country could be secured by keeping
organized armies in the field than by laying down our arms and
trusting to the magnanimity of the victor.
For all these considerations I was not at all hopeful of any success
in the attempt to provide for negotiations between the civil
authorities of the United States and those of the Confederacy,
believing that, even if Sherman should agree to such a proposition,
his Government would not ratify it; but, after having distinctly
announced my opinion, I yielded to the judgment of my constitutional
advisers, of whom only one held my views, and consented to permit
General Johnston, as he desired, to hold a conference with General
Sherman for the purpose above recited.
Then, turning to what I supposed would soon follow, I invited General
Johnston to an expression of his choice of a line of retreat toward
the southwest. He declared a preference for a different route from
that suggested by me, and, yielding the point, I informed him that I
would have depots of supplies for his army placed on the route he had
selected. The commissary-general, St. John, executed the order, as
shown in his report published in the "Southern Historical Society
Papers," vol. viii, pp. 103-107.
Referring to the period which followed the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, General I. M. St. John, Commissary-General
Confederate States Army, writes:
"The bureau headquarters were continued in North Carolina until the
surrender of that military department. During the interval
preparations were made for the westward movement of forces as then
contemplated. In these arrangements the local depots were generally
found so full and supplied so well in hand, from Charlotte southwest,
that the commissary-general was able to report to the Secretary of
War that the requisitions for which he was notified to prepare could
all be met. The details of this service were executed, and very ably,
by Major J. H. Claiborne, then, and until the end, assistant
commissary-general."
Major Claiborne, in his report, writes:
"Being placed under orders as assistant commissary-general, I
forwarded supplies from South Carolina to General J. E. Johnston's
army, and also collected supplies at six or seven named points in
that State for the supposed retreat of General Johnston's army
through the State. This duty, with a full determination at the
evacuation of this city [Richmond] to follow the fortunes of our
cause, gave me opportunity of ascertaining the resources of the
country for my department. The great want was that of transportation,
and specially was it felt by all collecting commissaries for a few
months before the surrender."
It will thus be seen that my expectations, referred to above, caused
adequate provision to be made for the retreat of our army, if that
result should become necessary by the failure of the attempt to open
negotiations for an honorable peace. I had never contemplated a
surrender, except upon such terms as a belligerent might claim, as
long as we were able to keep the field, and never expected a
Confederate army to surrender while it was able either to fight or to
retreat. Lee had only surrendered his army when it was impossible for
him to do either one or the other, and had proudly rejected Grant's
demand, in the face of overwhelming numbers, until he found himself
surrounded and his line of retreat blocked by a force much larger
than his own.
After it had been decided that General Johnston should attempt
negotiation with General Sherman, he left for his army headquarters;
and I, expecting that he would soon take up his line of retreat,
which his superiority in cavalry would protect from harassing
pursuit, proceeded with my Cabinet and staff toward Charlotte, North
Carolina. While on the way, a dispatch was received from General
Johnston announcing that General Sherman had agreed to a conference,
and asking that the Secretary of War, General J. C. Breckinridge,
should return to coöperate in it. The application was complied with,
and the Postmaster-General, John H. Reagan, also went at my request.
He, however, was not admitted to the conference.
We arrived at Charlotte on April 18, 1865, and I there received, at
the moment of dismounting, a telegram from General Breckinridge
announcing, on information received from General Sherman, that
President Lincoln had been assassinated. An influential citizen of
the town, who had come to welcome me, was standing near me, and,
after remarking to him in a low voice that I had received sad
intelligence, I handed the telegram to him. Some troopers encamped in
the vicinity had collected to see me; they called to the gentleman
who had the dispatch in his hand to read it, no doubt supposing it to
be army news. He complied with their request, and a few, only taking
in the fact, but not appreciating the evil it portended, cheered, as
was natural at news of the fall of one they considered their most
powerful foe. The man, who invented the story of my having read the
dispatch with exultation, had free scope for his imagination, as he
was not present, and had no chance to know whereof he bore witness,
even if there had been any foundation of truth for his fiction.
For an enemy so relentless in the war for our subjugation, we could
not be expected to mourn; yet, in view of its political consequences,
it could not be regarded otherwise than as a great misfortune to the
South. He had power over the Northern people, and was without
personal malignity toward the people of the South; his successor was
without power in the North, and the embodiment of malignity toward
the Southern people, perhaps the more so because he had betrayed and
deserted them in the hour of their need. The war had now shrunk into
narrow proportions, but the important consideration remained to so
conduct it that, if failing to secure our independence, we might
obtain a treaty or _quasi_-treaty of peace which would secure to the
Southern States their political rights, and to the people thereof
immunity from the plunder of their private property.
I found some cavalry at Charlotte, and soon had the satisfaction to
increase them to five brigades, They had been on detached service,
and were much reduced in numbers. Among the troopers who assembled
there was the remnant of the command which had spread terror north of
the Ohio, under the command of their dauntless leader, General John
Hunt Morgan. Their present chief, worthy to be the successor of that
hero, was General Basil Duke. Among the atrocious, cowardly acts of
vindictive malice which marked the conduct of the enemy, none did or
could surpass the brutality with which the dying and dead body of
Morgan was treated. Hate, the offspring of fear, they might feel for
the valorous soldier while he lived, but even the ignoble passion,
vengeance, might have been expected to stop when life was extinct.
On April 13, 1865, General Johnston wrote to General Sherman as
follows:
"The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the
relative military condition of the belligerents. I am therefore
induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, to stop
the further effusion of blood and the devastation of property, you
are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations;
. . . the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into
the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war."
General Sherman replied, on the 14th:
"I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the
suspension of hostilities between the armies commanded by you and
those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to
that end," etc., etc.[124]
In the same volume, at page 327, General Sherman describes an
interview with Mr. Lincoln, held at City Point on the 27th and 28th
of March preceding, in which he says:
"Mr. Lincoln distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and
the people of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel armies laid
down their arms, and resumed their civil pursuits, they would at once
be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common country; and
that, to avoid anarchy, the State governments then in existence, with
their civil functionaries, would be recognized by him as the
government _de facto_ till Congress could provide others."
In a letter of D. D. Porter, vice-admiral, written in 1866, giving
his recollections of that interview, in the same volume, page 330, is
found the following paragraph:
"The conversation between the President and General Sherman, about
the terms of surrender to be allowed Joe Johnston, continued. Sherman
energetically insisted that he could command his own terms, and that
Johnston would have to yield to his demands; but the President was
very decided about the matter, and insisted that the surrender of
Johnston's army must be obtained on any terms."
Hence it appears that Sherman was authorized to say that he was fully
empowered to arrange for the suspension of hostilities; and,
moreover, that he was instructed by Mr. Lincoln to give "any terms"
to obtain the surrender of Johnston's army.
In regard to the memorandum or basis of agreement, Sherman states, in
the same volume, page 353, that, while in consultation with General
Johnston, a messenger brought him a parcel of papers from Mr. Reagan,
Postmaster-General; that Johnston and Breckinridge looked over them,
and handed one of them to him, which he found inadmissible, and
proceeds:
"Then, recalling the conversation with Mr. Lincoln at City Point, I
sat down at the table and wrote off the terms which I thought
concisely expressed his views and wishes."
But, while these matters were progressing, Mr. Lincoln had been
assassinated, and a vindictive policy had been substituted for his,
which avowedly was, to procure a speedy surrender of the army upon
any terms. His evident wish was to stop the further shedding of
blood; that of his successors, like Sherman's, to extract all which
it was possible to obtain. From the memoranda of the interview
between Mr. Lincoln and Sherman it is clearly to be inferred that,
but for the untimely death of Mr. Lincoln, the agreement between
Generals Sherman and Johnston would have been ratified; and the
wounds inflicted on civil liberty by the "reconstruction" measures
might not have left their shameful scars on the United States.
General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," vol. ii, page 349, referring to a
conversation between himself and General Johnston at their first
meeting, writes:
"I told him I could not believe that he or General Lee, or the
officers of the Confederate army, could possibly be privy to acts of
assassination, but I would not say as much for Jeff Davis, George
Saunders, and men of that stripe."
On this I have but two remarks to make: First, that I think there
were few officers in the Confederate army who would have permitted
such a slanderous imputation to be made by a public enemy against the
chief executive of their Government; second, that I could not value
the good opinion of the man who, in regard to the burning of
Columbia, made a false charge against General Wade Hampton, and,
having left it to circulate freely for ten years, then in his
published memoirs makes this disgraceful admission:
"In my official report of this conflagration, I distinctly charged it
to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did so pointedly, to shake the
faith of his people in him," etc.
"Memorandum, or basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A.
D. 1865, near Durham Station, and in the State of North Carolina, by
and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate
army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding the army of the
United States in North Carolina, both present:
"1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain their _status
quo_, until notice is given by the commanding General of either one
to its opponents, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.
"2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and
conducted to the several State capitals, there to deposit their arms
and public property in the State Arsenal, and each officer and man to
execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and abide
the action of both Federal and State authorities. The number of arms
and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at
Washington City, subject to future action of the Congress of the
United States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain
peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.
"3. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the
several State governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking
the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and,
where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the
legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
"4. The reestablishment of all Federal courts in the several States,
with powers as defined by the Constitution and laws of Congress.
"5. The people and inhabitants of all States to be guaranteed, so far
as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well
as their rights of person and property, as defined by the
Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.
"6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States
not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long
as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed
hostility, and obey laws in existence at any place of their residence.
"7. In general terms, war to cease, a general amnesty, so far as the
Executive power of the United States can command, or on condition of
the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms,
and resumption of peaceful pursuits by officers and men, as hitherto
composing said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective
principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially
pledge ourselves to promptly obtain necessary authority, and to carry
out the above programme.
"W. T. SHERMAN, _Major-General, etc., etc._
"J. E. JOHNSTON, _General, etc., etc._"
The reader will not fail to observe that the proposition for a
suspension of hostilities to allow the civil authorities to
negotiate, was not even entertained; that the agreement was, in fact,
a military convention, in which all reference to the civil
authorities was excluded, except by the admission that the
negotiators respectively had principals from whom they must obtain
authority, i. e., ratification of the agreement into which they had
entered. There seemed to be a special dread on the part of the United
States officials lest they should do something which would be
construed as the recognition of the existence of a government which
for four years they had been vainly trying to subdue. Now, as on
previous occasions, I cared little for the form, and therefore only
gave my consideration to the substance of the agreement. In
consideration of the disbandment of our armies it provided for the
recognition of the several State governments, guaranteed to the
people of the States their political rights and franchises, as well
as their rights of person and property as defined by the Constitution
of the United States and other States respectively; promised not to
disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, and generally
indicated that the United States Government was to be restricted to
the exercise of the powers delegated in the Constitution.
Though this convention, if ratified, would not have all the binding
force of a treaty, it secured to our people the political rights and
safety from pillage, to obtain which I proposed to continue the war.
I, therefore, with the concurrence of my constitutional advisers,
addressed General Johnston as follows:
"CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA, _April 24, 1865._
"General J. E. JOHNSTON, _Greensboro, North Carolina._
"The Secretary of War has delivered to me the copy you handed to him
of the basis of an agreement between yourself and General Sherman.
Your action is approved. You will so inform General Sherman; and, if
the like authority be given by the Government of the United States to
complete the arrangement, you will proceed on the basis adopted.
"Further instructions will be given after the details of the
negotiation and the methods of executing the terms of agreement when
notified by you of the readiness on the part of the General
commanding United States forces to proceed with the arrangement.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
From the terms of this letter it will be seen that I doubted whether
the agreement would be ratified by the United States Government. The
opinion I entertained in regard to President Johnson and his venomous
Secretary of War, Stanton, did not permit me to expect that they
would be less vindictive after a surrender of our army had been
proposed than when it was regarded as a formidable body defiantly
holding its position in the field. Whatever hope others entertained
that the existing war was about to be peacefully terminated, was soon
dispelled by the rejection of the basis of agreement on the part of
the Government of the United States, and a notice from General
Sherman of termination of the armistice in forty-eight hours after
noon of the 24th of April, 1865.
General Johnston communicated to me the substance of the above
information received by him from General Sherman, and asked for
instructions. I have neither his telegram nor my reply, but can give
it substantially from memory. It was that he should retire with his
cavalry, and as many infantry as could be mounted upon draught-horses,
and some light artillery, the rest of the infantry to be disbanded,
and a place of rendezvous appointed. It was unnecessary to say anything
of the route, as that had been previously agreed on, and supplies
placed on it for his retreating army. This order was disobeyed, and he
sought another interview with Sherman, to renew his attempt to reach an
agreement for a termination of hostilities. Meantime, General Hampton,
commanding the cavalry of Johnston's army, came to me at Charlotte,
told me that he feared the army was to be surrendered, and wished
permission to withdraw his part of it and report to me. I gave the
permission, extending it to all the cavalry, which was in accordance
with the instructions I had sent to General Johnston. He returned
immediately, but I have since learned from him that the cavalry had
been included in a proposition to surrender, before he reached them.
After the expiration of the armistice, I rode out of Charlotte,
attended by the members of my Cabinet (except Attorney-General Davis,
who had gone to see his family, residing in that section, and the
Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Trenholm, who was too ill to accompany
me), my personal staff, and the cavalry which had been concentrated
from different, and some of them distant, fields of detached service.
The number was about two thousand, and they represented six brigade
organizations; though so much reduced in numbers, they were in a good
state of efficiency, and among their officers were some of the best
in our service. To the troops of this command, whose gallantly had
been displayed on many fields, there is due from me a special
acknowledgment for the kind consideration shown to me on the marches
from Charlotte, when the dark shadows which gathered round us
foretold the coming night. General Hampton, finding his troops had
been included in the surrender, endeavored to join me to offer his
individual service, and to share my fate whatever it might be. He
accidentally failed to meet me.
I must now recur to two extraordinary statements made by General J.
E. Johnston in regard to myself while at Charlotte, North Carolina,
on pages 408 and 409, Johnston's "Narrative." The first is that at
Greensboro, on the 19th of April--
"Colonel Archer Anderson, adjutant-general of the army, gave me two
papers, addressed to me by the President. The first directed me to
obtain from Mr. J. N. Hendren, Treasury Agent, thirty-nine thousand
dollars in silver, which was in his hands, subject to my order, and
to use it as the military chest of the army. The second, received
subsequently by Colonel Anderson, directed me to send this money to
the President at Charlotte. This order was not obeyed, however. As
only the military part of our Government had then any existence, I
thought that a fair share of the fund still left should be
appropriated to the benefit of the army."
And so, as revealed in his "Narrative," he took the money, and
divided it among the troops.
When my attention was called to this statement by one who had read
the "Narrative," I wrote to Colonel Anderson, referred to book and
page, and inquired what letters from me as there described he had
received. He responded:
"I do not remember anything connected with the subject, except that
there was a payment of silver coin to the army at Greensboro, and I
have no papers which would afford information."
My letter-book contains no such correspondence, but has a letter
which renders more than doubtful the assertion that I wrote others
such as described. The only letter found in my letter-book on the
subject of the funds in charge of Hendren is the following:
"GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, _April 15, 1865._
"Mr. HENDREN, _C. S. Treasurer, Greensboro, North Carolina._
"SIR: You will report to General Beauregard with the treasure in your
possession, that he may give to it due protection as a military chest
to be moved with his army train. For further instructions you will
report to the Secretary of the Treasury.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS.
"Official: F. R. LUBBOCK, _Colonel and A. D. C._"
From the above it will be seen that, while I exercised authority to
assign officers to their posts or places of duty, I assumed no
control over the public Treasury; but in that connection referred the
subordinate to his chief, the Secretary of the Treasury, by whom
alone could warrants be drawn against the public funds. How very
improbable, then, it is, that I wrote to have the money in the hands
of a treasurer sent to me personally! Yet this is what General
Johnston claims to have resisted, when without any lawful authority
he distributed the money himself. The second statement is:
"As there was reason to suppose that the Confederate Executive had a
large sum in specie in its possession, I urged it earnestly, in
writing, to apply a part of it to the payment of the army. This
letter was intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Mason, who was instructed
to wait for an answer. Its receipt was acknowledged by telegraph, and
an answer promised. After waiting several days to no purpose. Colonel
Mason returned without one."
Not recollecting to have met Colonel Mason at Charlotte, I wrote to
him, calling his attention to the statement, and asking what was the
fact. Not receiving a reply, I renewed the inquiry, but, though
considerable time has elapsed, he has not answered. It is quite
possible that I might have met the gentleman without recollecting it,
but not at all probable that I should have received such a letter and
have forgotten it. Such intrusion of advice as to what should be done
with the money in the Treasury, and the speculative opinion as to the
amount there, I must suppose would have been very promptly rejected
if it had been presented to me. For years there had been irregularity
and delay in the payment of the troops, and surely no one regretted
it more than myself, or had for years tried more sedulously to
correct it; but, expecting the army to continue in the field, it was
indispensable to have the means of obtaining the necessary supplies
for it.
The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Trenholm, was ill before we
reached Charlotte, and quite so during our stay there, but he knew
there was not a large sum of specie in the Treasury, and with
patriotic desire had been using it to supply the troops after
Confederate money became unavailable for purchases. He did not
contemplate the abandonment of our cause, and it would not have taken
him a minute to answer that more than all the money he had would be
needed in future military operations.
On the 26th, the day on which the armistice terminated, General
Johnston again met General Sherman, who offered the same terms which
had been made with General Lee, and he says, "General Johnston,
without hesitation, agreed to, and we executed the following," which
was the surrender of General Johnston's troops, with the condition of
their being paroled and the officers being permitted to retain their
side-arms, private horses, and baggage.
It is true that these were the terms accepted by Lee, but the
condition of the two armies was very different. Lee's supplies had
been cut off, his men were exhausted by fatigue and hunger; he had no
reënforcements in view; notwithstanding the immense superiority in
numbers and equipments of the enemy pursuing, he had from point to
point fought them in rear and on both flanks, and had, the day before
his line of retreat was closed, rejected the demand for surrender,
and only yielded to it after his starving little army had been
surrounded by masses through which he tried to, but could not, cut
his way.
Johnston's line of retreat was open, and supplies had been placed
upon it. His cavalry was superior to that of the enemy, as had been
proved in every conflict between them. Maury and Forrest and Taylor
still had armies in the field--not large, but strong enough to have
collected around them the men who had left Johnston's army and gone
to their homes to escape a surrender, as well as those who under
similar circumstances had left Lee. The show of continued resistance,
I then believed, as I still do, would have overcome the depression
which was spreading like a starless night over the country, and that
the exhibition of a determination not to leave our political future
at the mercy of an enemy which had for four years been striving to
subjugate the States would have led the United States authorities to
do, as Mr. Lincoln had indicated--give any terms which might be
found necessary speedily to terminate the existing war.
Those who look back upon the period when the States were treated as
subject provinces, and the Congress left to legislate at its will--
when a war professedly waged to bring the seceding States back to the
Union, with all the rights and privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution, was followed by the utter disregard of those rights,
and the miscalled peace was a state of vindictive hostility--will
probably think continued war was not the greatest of evils.
I quote again from the "Memoirs" of Sherman, vol. ii, p. 349.
Referring to the first interview, he writes:
"I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could not
oppose my army, and that, since Lee had surrendered, he could do the
same with honor and propriety. He plainly and repeatedly admitted
this, and added that any further fighting would be '_murder_'; but he
thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, we might arrange
terms that would embrace _all_ the Confederate armies."
Sherman further writes that he told Johnston that the terms given to
General Lee's army were most generous and liberal, which he states
Johnston "admitted, but always recurred to the idea of a universal
surrender, embracing his own army, that of Dick Taylor, in Louisiana
and Texas, and of Maury, Forrest, and others, in Alabama and
Georgia." Considering the character of the authority cited, and the
extraordinary proposition to provide for a universal surrender by a
district commander, it may be well supposed to require confirmation.
I therefore quote from General Richard Taylor, "Destruction and
Reconstruction," page 224:
"Intelligence of the Johnston-Sherman convention reached us, and
Canby and I were requested by the officers making it to conform to
its terms until the civil authorities acted."
The advice may have been well enough, but, as there was an
established channel of communication, and an order of responsibility
necessary for effective coöperation in the public service, something
more than courtesy required that the Executive should have been
advised if not consulted. I had left Charlotte with no other sure
reliance against any cavalry movement of the enemy than the force
which was with me; that, however, I believed to be sufficient for any
probable exigency, if the reënforcements hoped for should not join us
on the way. We proceeded at easy stages; some of the command thought
we went too slow. After making two halts of about half a day each, we
reached the Savannah River. I crossed early in the morning of the 4th
of May, with a company, which had been detailed as my escort, and
rode some miles to a farmhouse, where I halted to get breakfast and
have our horses fed. Here I learned that a regiment of the enemy were
moving upon Washington, Georgia, which was one of our depots of
supplies, and I sent back a courier with a pencil-note addressed to
General Vaughn, or the officer commanding the advance, requesting him
to come on and join me immediately. After waiting a considerable
time, I determined to move on with my escort, trusting that the
others would overtake us, and that, if not, we should arrive in
Washington in time to rally the citizens to its defense. When I
reached there, scouts were sent out on the different roads, and my
conclusion was that we had had a false alarm. The Secretary of State,
Mr. Benjamin, being unaccustomed to traveling on horseback, parted
from me, at the house where we stopped to breakfast, to take another
mode of conveyance and a different route from that which I was
pursuing, with intent to rejoin me in the trans-Mississippi
Department. At Washington, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory,
left me temporarily to attend to the needs of his family. The
Secretary of War, Mr. Breckinridge, had remained with the cavalry at
the crossing of the Savannah River. During the night after my arrival
in Washington, he sent in an application for authority to draw from
the treasure, under the protection of the troops, enough to make to
them a partial payment. I authorized the acting Secretary of the
Treasury to meet the requisition by the use of the silver coin in the
train. When the next day passed without the troops coming forward, I
sent a note to the Secretary of War, showing the impolicy of my
longer delay, having there heard that General Upton had passed within
a few miles of the town on his way to Augusta to receive the
surrender of the garrison and military material at that place, in
conformity with orders issued by General Johnston. This was my first
positive information of his surrender. Not receiving an immediate
reply to the note addressed to the Secretary of War, General
Breckinridge, I spoke to Captain Campbell, of Kentucky, commanding my
escort, explained to him the condition of affairs, and telling him
that his company was not strong enough to fight, and too large to
pass without observation, asked him to inquire if there were ten men
who would volunteer to go with me without question wherever I should
choose. He brought back for answer that the whole company volunteered
on the terms proposed. Gratifying as this manifestation was, I felt
it would expose them to unnecessary hazard to accept the offer, and
told him, in any manner he might think best, to form a party of ten
men. With these. Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Barnwell, of South
Carolina, Colonels F. E. Lubbock, John Taylor Wood, and William
Preston Johnston, of my personal staff, I left Washington. Secretary
Reagan remained for a short time to transfer the treasure in his
hands, except a few thousand dollars, and then rejoined me on the
road. This transfer of the treasure was made to Mr. Semple, a bonded
officer of the navy, and his assistant, Mr. Tidball, with
instructions, as soon as it could be safely done, to transport it
abroad and deliver it to the commercial house which had acted as the
financial agent of the Confederate Government, and was reported to
have incurred liabilities on its account.
Mr. Reagan overtook me in a few hours, but I saw no more of General
Breckinridge, and learned subsequently that he was following our
route, with a view to overtake me, when he heard of my capture, and,
turning to the east, reached the Florida coast unmolested. On the way
he met J. Taylor Wood, and, in an open boat, they crossed the straits
to the West Indies. No report reached me at that time, or until long
afterward, in regard to the cavalry command left at the Savannah
River; then it was to the effect that paroled men from Johnston's
army brought news of its surrender, and that the condition of
returning home and remaining unmolested embraced all the men of the
department who would give their parole, and that this had exercised a
great influence over the troops, inclining them to accept those
terms. Had General Johnston obeyed the order sent to him from
Charlotte, and moved on the route selected by himself, with all his
cavalry, so much of the infantry as could be mounted, and the light
artillery, he could not have been successfully pursued by General
Sherman. His force, united to that I had assembled at Charlotte,
would, it was believed, have been sufficient to vanquish any troops
which the enemy had between us and the Mississippi River.
Had the cavalry with which I left Charlotte been associated with a
force large enough to inspire hope for the future, instead of being
discouraged by the surrender in their rear, it would probably have
gone on, and, when united with the forces of Maury, Forrest, and
Taylor, in Alabama and Mississippi, have constituted an army large
enough to attract stragglers, and revive the drooping spirits of the
country. In the worst view of the case it should have been able to
cross the trans-Mississippi Department, and there uniting with the
armies of E. K. Smith and Magruder to form an army, which in the
portion of that country abounding in supplies, and deficient in
rivers and railroads, could have continued the war until our enemy,
foiled in the purpose of subjugation, should, in accordance with his
repeated declaration, have agreed, on the basis of a return to the
Union, to acknowledge the Constitutional rights of the States, and by
a convention, or _quasi_-treaty, to guarantee security of person and
property. To this hope I persistently clung, and, if our independence
could not be achieved, so much, at least, I trusted might be gained.
Those who have endured the horrors of "reconstruction," who have,
under "carpet-bag rule," borne insult, robbery, and imprisonment
without legal warrant, can appreciate the value which would have
attached to such limited measure of success.
When I left Washington, Georgia, with the small party which has been
enumerated, my object was to go to the south far enough to pass below
the points reported to be occupied by Federal troops, and then turn
to the west, cross the Chattahoochee, and then go on to meet the
forces still supposed to be in the field in Alabama. If, as now
seemed probable, there should be no prospect of a successful
resistance east of the Mississippi, I intended then to cross to the
trans-Mississippi Department, where I believed Generals E. K. Smith
and Magruder would continue to uphold our cause. That I was not
mistaken in the character of these men, I extract from the order
issued by General E. K. Smith to the soldiers of the trans-Mississippi
Army on the 21st of April, 1865:
"Great disasters have overtaken us. The Army of Northern Virginia and
our General-in-Chief are prisoners of war. With you rest the hopes of
our nation, and upon you depends the fate of our people. . . . Prove
to the world that your hearts have not failed in the hour of
disaster. . . . Stand by your colors--maintain your discipline. The
great resources of this department, its vast extent, the numbers, the
discipline, and the efficiency of the army, will secure to our
country terms that a proud people can with honor accept."
General Magruder, with like heroic determination, invoked the troops
and people of Texas not to despond, and pointed out their ability in
the interior of that vast State to carry on the war indefinitely.
General D. H. Maury, after his memorable defense of Mobile, withdrew
his forces on the 12th of April, at the last moment, and moved toward
Meridian. Commodore Farrand, commanding our navy at Mobile Bay,
withdrew his armed vessels and steamers up the Tombigbee River, and
planted torpedoes in the Alabama below. Forrest and Maury had about
eight thousand men, but these were veterans, tried in many hard
engagements, and trained to the highest state of efficiency. Before
Maury withdrew from Mobile, news had been received of Lee's
surrender. Taylor says the news was soon disseminated through his
army, but that the men remained steadfast, and manifested a
determination to maintain the honor of our aims to the last. On pages
224 and 225 of his book, he gives an account of the intelligence
received of the Johnston-Sherman convention of the 18th of April, and
of the meeting between Canby and himself to arrange terms for his
army, and an agreement that there should be an armistice; but he
says, two days after that meeting, news was received of Johnston's
surrender, and the capture of President Davis. The latter was untrue,
and he does not say who communicated it, but that he was at the same
time notified that the Johnston-Sherman convention had been disavowed
by the United States Government, and notice given for the termination
of the armistice. Under these circumstances he asked General Canby to
meet him again, and on the 8th of May, two days before I was actually
captured, but which he supposed had already occurred, he agreed with
Canby on terms for the surrender of the land and naval forces in
Mississippi and Alabama. These terms were similar to those made
between Johnston and Sherman; the mounted men were to retain their
horses, being their private property.
On the 26th of May, the chief of staff of General E. Kirby Smith, and
the chief of staff of General Canby, at Baton Rouge, arranged similar
terms for the surrender of the troops in the trans-Mississippi
Department. On May 11th, after the last army east of the Mississippi
had surrendered, but before Kirby Smith had entered into terms, the
enemy sent an expedition from the Brazos Santiago against a little
Confederate encampment some fifteen miles above. The camp was
captured and burned, but, in the zeal to secure the fruits of
victory, they remained so long collecting the plunder, that General
J. E. Slaughter heard of the expedition, moved against it, and drove
it back with considerable loss, sustaining very little injury to his
command. This was, I believe, the last armed conflict of the war,
and, though very small in comparison to its great battles, it
deserves notice as having closed the long struggle--as it opened--
with a Confederate victory.
The total number of prisoners paroled at Greensboro, North Carolina,
as reported by General Schofield, was 36,817; in Georgia and Florida,
as reported by General Wilson, 52,543; aggregate surrender under the
capitulation of General J. E. Johnston, 89,270.[125] How many of this
last number were men who left General Johnston's army to avoid the
surrender, or were on detached service from the armies of Virginia
and North Carolina, I have no means of ascertaining.
The total number in the Department of Alabama and Mississippi paroled
by General Canby, under agreement with General Richard Taylor, of the
8th of May, 1865, as reported, was 42,293,[126] to which may be added
of the navy a small force--less than 150. The number surrendered by
General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the trans-Mississippi Department,
as reported, was 17,686.[127] To this small dimension had General
Smith's army been reduced when he accepted the terms to which a
reference has already been made. This reduction resulted from various
causes, but it is believed was mainly due to the reluctance of a
large part of his army to accept a parole, preferring to take
whatever hazard belonged to absenting themselves without leave and
continuing their character of belligerents. A few, but so far as I
know very few, even went to the extent of expatriating themselves,
and joined Maximilian in Mexico. Against no one as much as myself did
the hostility of our victorious enemy manifest itself, but I was
never willing to seek the remedy of exile, and always advised those
who consulted me against that resort. The mass of our people could
not go; the few who were able to do so were most needed to sustain
the others in the hour of a common adversity. The example of Ireland
after the Treaty of Limerick, and of Canada after its conquest by
Great Britain, were instructive as to the duty of the influential men
to remain and share the burden of a common disaster.
With General E. K. Smith's surrender the Confederate flag no longer
floated on the land; but one gallant sailor still unfurled it on the
Pacific. Captain Waddell, commanding the Confederate cruiser
Shenandoah, swept the ocean from Australia nearly to Behring's
Straits, making many captures in the Okhobak Sea and Arctic Ocean. In
August, 1865, he learned from the captain of a British ship that the
Confederacy, as an independent Government, had ceased to exist. With
the fall of his Government his right to cruise was of course
terminated; he therefore sailed for the coast of England, entered the
Mersey, and on November 6, 1865, and in due form, surrendered his
vessel to the British Government. She was accepted and subsequently
transferred to the United States.
After leaving Washington in the manner and for the purpose heretofore
described, I overtook a commissary and quartermaster's train, having
public papers of value in charge, and, finding that they had no
experienced woodsman with it, I gave them four of the men of my small
party, and went on with the rest. On the second or third day after
leaving Washington, I heard that a band of marauders, supposed to be
stragglers and deserters from both armies, were in pursuit of my
family, whom I had not seen since they left Richmond, but of whom I
heard, at Washington, that they had gone with my private secretary
and seven paroled men, who generously offered their services as an
escort, to the Florida coast. Their route was to the east of that I
was pursuing, but I immediately changed direction and rode rapidly
across the country to overtake them. About nightfall the horses of my
escort gave out, but I pressed on with Secretary Reagan and my
personal staff. It was a bright moonlight night, and just before day,
as the moon was sinking below the tree-tops, I met a party of men in
the road, who answered my questions by saying they belonged to an
Alabama regiment; that they were coming from a village not far off,
on their way homeward. Upon inquiry being made, they told me they had
passed an encampment of wagons, with women and children, and asked me
if we belonged to that party. Upon being answered in the affirmative,
they took their leave.
After a short time I was hailed by a voice which I recognized as that
of my private secretary, who informed me that the marauders had been
hanging around the camp, and that he and others were on post around
it, and were expecting an assault as soon as the moon went down. A
silly story had got abroad that it was a treasure-train, and the
_auri sacra fames_ had probably instigated these marauders, as it
subsequently stimulated General J. H. Wilson, to send out a large
cavalry force to capture the same train. For the protection of my
family I traveled with them two or three days, when, believing that
they had passed out of the region of marauders, I determined to leave
their encampment at nightfall, to execute my original purpose. My
horse and those of my party proper were saddled preparatory to a
start, when one of my staff, who had ridden into the neighboring
village, returned and told me that he had heard that a marauding
party intended to attack the camp that night. This decided me to wait
long enough to see whether there was any truth in the rumor, which I
supposed would be ascertained in a few hours. My horse remained
saddled and my pistols in the holsters, and I lay down, fully
dressed, to rest. Nothing occurred to rouse me until just before
dawn, when my coachman, a free colored man, who faithfully clung to
our fortunes, came and told me there was firing over the branch, just
behind our encampment. I stepped out of my wife's tent and saw some
horsemen, whom I immediately recognized as cavalry, deploying around
the encampment. I turned back and told my wife these were not the
expected marauders, but regular troopers. She implored me to leave
her at once. I hesitated, from unwillingness to do so, and lost a few
precious moments before yielding to her importunity. My horse and
arms were near the road on which I expected to leave, and down which
the cavalry approached; it was therefore impracticable to reach them.
I was compelled to start in the opposite direction. As it was quite
dark in the tent, I picked up what was supposed to be my "raglan," a
water-proof, light overcoat, without sleeves; it was subsequently
found to be my wife's, so very like my own as to be mistaken for it;
as I started, my wife thoughtfully threw over my head and shoulders a
shawl. I had gone perhaps fifteen or twenty yards when a trooper
galloped up and ordered me to halt and surrender, to which I gave a
defiant answer, and, dropping the shawl and raglan from my shoulders,
advanced toward him; he leveled his carbine at me, but I expected, if
he fired, he would miss me, and my intention was in that event to put
my hand under his foot, tumble him off on the other side, spring into
his saddle, and attempt to escape. My wife, who had been watching,
when she saw the soldier aim his carbine at me, ran forward and threw
her arms around me. Success depended on instantaneous action, and,
recognizing that the opportunity had been lost, I turned back, and,
the morning being damp and chilly, passed on to a fire beyond the
tent. Our pursuers had taken different roads, and approached our camp
from opposite directions; they encountered each other and commenced
firing, both supposing they had met our armed escort, and some
casualties resulted from their conflict with an imaginary body of
Confederate troops. During the confusion, while attention was
concentrated upon myself, except by those who were engaged in
pillage, one of my aides, Colonel J. Taylor Wood, with Lieutenant
Barnwell, walked off unobserved. His daring exploits on the sea had
made him, on the part of the Federal Government, an object of special
hostility, and rendered it quite proper that he should avail himself
of every possible means of escape. Colonel Pritchard went over to
their battle-field, and I did not see him for a long time, surely
more than an hour after my capture. He subsequently claimed credit,
in a conversation with me, for the forbearance shown by his men in
not shooting me when I refused to surrender.
Wilson and others have uttered many falsehoods in regard to my
capture, which have been exposed in publications by persons there
present--by Secretary Reagan, by the members of my personal staff,
and by the colored coachman, Jim Jones, which must have been
convincing to all who were not given over to believe a lie. For this
reason I will postpone, to some other time and more appropriate
place, any further notice of the story and its variations, all the
spawn of a malignity that shames the civilization of the age. We
were, when prisoners, subjected to petty pillage, as described in the
publications referred to, and in others; and to annoyances such as
military _gentlemen_ never commit or permit.
On our way to Macon we received the proclamation of President Andrew
Johnson offering a reward for my apprehension as an accomplice in the
assassination of the late President A. Lincoln. Some troops by the
wayside had the proclamation, which was displayed with vociferous
demonstrations of exultation over my capture. When we arrived at
Macon I was conducted to the hotel where General Wilson had his
quarters. A strong guard was in front of the entrance, and, when I
got down to pass in, it opened ranks, facing inward, and presented
arms.
A commodious room was assigned to myself and family. After a while
the steward of the hotel called and inquired whether I would dine
with General Wilson or have dinner served with myself and family in
my room. I chose the latter. After dinner I received a message from
General Wilson, asking whether he should wait upon me, or whether I
would call upon him. I rose and accompanied the messenger to General
Wilson's presence. We had met at West Point when he was a cadet, and
I a commissioner sent by the Congress to inquire into the affairs of
the Academy. After some conversation in regard to former times and
our common acquaintance, he referred to the proclamation offering a
reward for my capture. Taking it for granted that any significant
remark of mine would be reported to his Government, and fearing that
I might never have another opportunity to give my opinion to A.
Johnson, I told him there was one man in the United States who knew
that proclamation to be false. He remarked that my expression
indicated a particular person. I answered that I did, and the person
was the one who signed it, for he at least knew that I preferred
Lincoln to himself. Some other conversation then occurred in regard
to the route on which we were to be carried. Having several small
children, one of them an infant, I expressed a preference for the
easier route by water, supposing then, as he seemed to do, that I was
to go to Washington City. He manifested a courteous, obliging temper,
and, either by the authority with which he was invested or by
obtaining it from a higher power, my preference as to the route was
accorded. I told him that some of the men with me were on parole, and
that they all were riding their own horses--private property--that
I would be glad they should be permitted to retain them, and I have a
distinct recollection that he promised me it should be done; but I
have since learned that they were all deprived of their horses, and
some who were on parole, viz., Major Moran, Captain Moody, Lieutenant
Hathaway, Midshipman Howell, and Private Messec, who had not violated
their obligations of parole, but had been captured because they were
found voluntarily traveling with my family to protect them from
marauders, were sent with me as prisoners of war, and all
incarcerated, in disregard of the protection promised when they
surrendered. At Augusta we were put on a steamer, and there met
Vice-President Stephens; Hon. C. C. Clay, who had voluntarily
surrendered himself upon learning that he was included in the
proclamation for the arrest of certain persons charged with
complicity in the assassination of Mr. Lincoln; General Wheeler, the
distinguished cavalry officer, and his adjutant, General Ralls. My
private secretary, Burton N. Harrison, had refused to be left behind,
and, though they would not allow him to go in the carriage with me,
he was resolved to follow my fortunes, as well from sentiment as the
hope of being useful. His fidelity was rewarded by a long and
rigorous imprisonment. At Port Royal we were transferred to a
sea-going vessel, which, instead of being sent to Washington City,
was brought to anchor at Hampton Roads. One by one all my companions
in misfortune were sent away, we knew not whither, leaving on the
vessel only Mr. Clay and his wife and myself and family. After some
days' detention, Clay and myself were removed to Fortress Monroe, and
there incarcerated in separate cells. Not knowing that the Government
was at war with women and children, I asked that my family might be
permitted to leave the ship and go to Richmond or Washington City, or
to some place where they had acquaintances, but this was refused. I
then requested that they might be permitted to go abroad on one of
the vessels lying at the Roads. This was also denied; finally, I was
informed that they must return to Savannah on the vessel by which we
came. This was an old transport-ship, hardly seaworthy. My last
attempt was to get for them the privilege of stopping at Charleston,
where they had many personal friends. This also was refused--why, I
did not then know, have not learned since, and am unwilling to make a
supposition, as none could satisfactorily account for such an act of
inhumanity. My daily experience as a prisoner shed no softer light on
the transaction, but only served to intensify my extreme solicitude.
Bitter tears have been shed by the gentle, and stern reproaches have
been made by the magnanimous, on account of the needless torture to
which I was subjected, and the heavy fetters riveted upon me, while
in a stone casemate and surrounded by a strong guard; but all these
were less excruciating than the mental agony my captors were able to
inflict. It was long before I was permitted to hear from my wife and
children, and this, and things like this, was the power which
education added to savage cruelty; but I do not propose now and here
to enter upon the story of my imprisonment, or more than merely to
refer to other matters which concerns me personally, as distinct from
my connection with the Confederacy.
[Footnote 124: "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol. ii, pp. 346,
347.]
[Footnote 125: "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol. ii, p. 370.]
[Footnote 126: "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1865, p. 11.]
[Footnote 127: Ibid.]