Exchange of Prisoners.--Signification of the Word "loyal."--Who is
the Sovereign?--Words of President Lincoln.--The Issue for which we
fought.--Position of the United States Government.--Letters of
Marque granted by us.--Officers and Crew First Prisoners of the
Enemy.--Convicted as "Pirates."--My Letter to President Lincoln.--
How received.--Act of Congress relating to Prisoners.--Exchanges,
how made.-Answer of General Grant.--Request of United States
Congress.--Result.--Commissioners sent.--Agreement.--Disputed
Points.--Exchange arranged.--Order to pillage issued.--General
Pope's Order.--Proceedings.--Letter of General Lee relative to
Barbarities.--Answer of General Halleck.--Case of Mumford.--Effect
of Threatened Retaliation.--Mission of Vice-President Stephens.--A
Failure.--Excess of Prisoners.--Paroled Men.--Proposition made by
us.--No Answer.--Another Arrangement.--Stopped by General Grant.--
His words, "Put the Matter offensively."--Exchange of Slaves.--
Proposition of Lee to Grant.--Reply of Grant.--Further Reply.--His
Dispatch to General Butler.--Another Proposition made by us.--No
Answer.--Proposition relative to Sick and Wounded.--Some
exchanged.--The Worst Cases asked for to be photographed.--
Proposition as to Medicines.--No Answer.--A Final Effort.--
Deputation of Prisoners sent to Washington.--A Failure.--
Correspondence between Ould and Butler.--Order of Grant.--Report of
Butler.--Responsibility of Grant for Andersonville.--Barbarities of
the United States Government.--Treatment of our Men in Northern
Prisons.--Deaths on Each Side.
Perhaps there was no question in the treatment of which the true
character and intentions of the Government of the United States was
so clearly exposed as in the exchange of prisoners. That we should
dare to resort to arms for the preservation of our rights, and "to
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," was
regarded by our enemies as most improbable. Their aspirations for
dominion and sovereignty, through the Government of the Union, had
become so deep-seated and apparently real as to cause that
Government, at its first step, to assume the haughtiness and
imperiousness of an absolute sovereign. "I appeal to all loyal
citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort," said President
Lincoln, in the first proclamation, calling for seventy-five thousand
men. The term "loyal" has no signification except as applied to the
sovereign of an empire or kingdom. In a republic the people are the
sovereign, and the term "loyal" or its opposite can have no
signification except in relation to the true sovereign. To say,
therefore, that the agent of the sovereign people, the representative
of the system they have organized to conduct their common affairs,
composed the real sovereign, and that loyalty or disloyalty is of
signification in relation to this sovereign alone, is not only a
perversion of language, but an error, that leads straight to the
subversion of all popular government and the establishment of the
monarchical or consolidated form. The Government of the United States
is now the sovereign here, says President Lincoln in this
proclamation, and loyalty consists in the maintenance of that
sovereignty against all its foes. The sovereignty of the people and
of the several and distinct States, in his mind, was only a weakness
and enthusiasm of the fathers. The States and the people thereof had
become consolidated into a national Union. "I appeal," says President
Lincoln, "to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this
effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our
national Union."
The Confederate States refused thus "to favor, facilitate, and aid
this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence
of a national Union." They not only refused to aid, but they took up
arms to defeat the consummation of such a monstrous usurpation of
popular rights and popular sovereignty. It was evident that, if no
efforts for a rescue were made, the time would soon come when the
rights of all the States might be denied, and the hope of mankind in
constitutional freedom be for ever lost. This was the usurpation.
This lay at the foundation of the war. Every subsequent act of the
Government was another step in the same direction, all tending
palpably to supremacy for the Government of the United States, the
subjugation of the States, and the submission of the people.
This was the adversary with whom we had to struggle, and this was the
issue for which we fought. That we dared to draw our swords to
vindicate the rights and the sovereignty of the people, that we dared
to resist and deny all sovereignty as inherently existing in the
Government of the United States, was adjudged an infamous crime, and
we were denounced as "rebels." It was asserted that those of us "who
were captured should be hung as rebels taken in the act." Crushing
the corner-stone of the Union, the independence of the States, the
Federal Government assumed toward us a position of haughty arrogance,
refused to recognize us otherwise than as insurrectionists and
"rebels," who resisted and denied its usurped sovereignty, and who
were entitled to no amelioration from the punishment of death, except
such as might proceed only from the promptings of mercy.
On April 17, 1861, I issued a proclamation in which I offered to
grant letters of marque and reprisal to seamen. On April 19th
President Lincoln issued a counter-proclamation, declaring that, "if
any person, under the pretended authority of said States, or under
any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or
the persons or cargo on board of her, such person shall be held
amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and
punishment of piracy," which was death.
Some small vessels obtained these letters of marque and were
captured. Their officers and crew constituted the first prisoners
that fell into the hands of the enemy. They were immediately
imprisoned, and held for trial as pirates. The trial came on later in
the year. A report of it states that "the views of all the judges
seemed to center upon the one point, that these men were taken in
arms against the Government of the United States, and that, inasmuch
as the laws of that Government did not recognize the authority under
which the men acted, there was no course but to condemn them."
As soon as the treatment of these prisoners was known in Richmond,
before their trial and as early as July 6, 1861, I sent by a special
messenger a communication to President Lincoln, in substance as
follows:
"Haying learned that the schooner Savannah, a private armed vessel in
the service and sailing under a commission issued by the authority of
the Confederate States of America, had been captured by one of the
vessels forming the blockading squadron off Charleston Harbor, I
directed a proposition to be made to the commanding officer of the
squadron for an exchange of officers and crew of the Savannah for
prisoners of war held by this Government, 'according to number and
rank.' To this proposition, made on the 19th ultimo, Captain Mercer,
the officer in command of the blockading squadron, made answer, on
the same day, that 'the prisoners' (referred to) 'are not on board
any of the vessels under my command.'
"It now appears, by statements made without contradiction in
newspapers published in New York, that the prisoners above mentioned
were conveyed to that city, and have been treated not as prisoners of
war, but as criminals; that they have been put in irons, confined in
jail, brought before courts of justice on charges of piracy and
treason; and it is even rumored that they have been convicted of the
offenses charged, for no other reason than that they bore arms in
defense of the rights of this Government and under the authority of
its commission.
"I could not, without grave discourtesy, have made the newspaper
statements above referred to the subject of this communication, if
the threat of treating as pirates the citizens of this Confederacy,
armed for its service on the high-seas, had not been contained in
your proclamation of the 19th of April last. That proclamation,
however, seems to afford a sufficient justification for considering
these published statements as not devoid of probability.
"It is the desire of this Government so to conduct the war now
existing as to mitigate its horrors as far as may be possible, and,
with this intent, its treatment of the prisoners captured by its
forces has been marked by the greatest humanity and leniency
consistent with public obligation. Some have been permitted to return
home on parole, others to remain at large, under similar conditions,
within this Confederacy, and all have been furnished with rations for
their subsistence, such as are allowed to our own troops. It is only
since the news has been received of the treatment of the prisoners
taken on the Savannah, that I have been compelled to withdraw these
indulgences, and to hold the prisoners taken by us in strict
confinement.
"A just regard to humanity and to the honor of this Government now
requires me to state explicitly that, painful as will be the
necessity, this Government will deal out to the prisoners held by it
the same treatment and the same fate as shall be experienced by those
captured on the Savannah; and, if driven to the terrible necessity of
retaliation by your execution of any of the officers or crew of the
Savannah, that retaliation will be extended so far as shall be
requisite to secure the abandonment of a practice unknown to the
warfare of civilized man, and so barbarous as to disgrace the nation
which shall be guilty of inaugurating it.
"With this view, and because it may not have reached you, I now renew
the proposition made to the commander of the blockading squadron, to
exchange for the prisoners taken on the Savannah an equal number of
those now held by us according to rank."
This communication was taken by Colonel Thomas Taylor, who was
permitted to visit Washington, but was refused an audience with
President Lincoln. He was obliged to content himself with a verbal
reply from General Winfield Scott that the communication had been
delivered to President Lincoln, and that he would reply in writing as
soon as possible. No answer ever came. We were compelled to select by
lot from among the prisoners in our hands a number to whom we
proposed to mete out the same fate which might await the crew of the
Savannah. These measures of retaliation arrested the cruel and
illegal purposes of the enemy.
Meantime, as early as May 21, 1861, the Confederate Congress passed
an act which provided that--
"All prisoners of war taken, whether on land or sea, during the
pending hostilities with the United States, shall be transferred by
the captors from time to time, and as often as convenient, to the
Department of War; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War,
with the approval of the President, to issue such instructions to the
quartermaster-general and his subordinates as shall provide for the
safe custody and sustenance of prisoners of war, and the rations
furnished prisoners of war shall be the same in quantity and quality
as those furnished to enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy."
This law of Congress was embodied in the orders issued from the War
Department and from the headquarters in the field, and no order was
ever issued in conflict with its humane provisions.
Nevertheless, the Government of the United States, forgetful of the
conduct of Great Britain toward her revolted colonies, apparently
refused all consideration of the question of exchange of prisoners,
as if impressed with the idea that it would derogate from the dignity
of its position to accept any interchange of courtesy. An exchange
was therefore occasionally made by the various commanders of troops
under flags of truce, while the Federal Government made the paltry
pretense of not knowing it. We released numbers at different points
on parole, and the matter was compromised in various ways.
Fifty-seven wounded soldiers were unconditionally released at
Richmond and sent home. In response, twenty of our soldiers, mostly
North Carolinians, were released from Bedloe's Island, New York, and
sent to Fortress Monroe, to be discharged on condition of taking the
oath, so called, of loyalty to the United States Government.
Thirty-seven confined in the military prison at Washington were
released on taking the oath. On September 3d an exchange was made
between General Pillow and Colonel Wallace, of the United States
Army. Whereupon General Polk proposed an exchange to General Grant,
who replied, on October 14th:
"I can, of my own accordance, make none. I recognize no 'Southern
Confederacy' myself, but will communicate with higher authorities
for their views."
An exchange was made on October 23d between General McClernand and
General Polk. Subsequently, on November 8th, General Grant offered to
surrender to General Polk certain wounded men and invalids
unconditionally. To this proposition General Polk replied:
"My own feelings would prompt me to waive again the unimportant
affectation of declining to recognize these States as belligerents in
the interest of humanity; but my Government requires all prisoners to
be placed at the disposal of the Secretary Of War."
On November 1st General Fremont made an agreement with General Price,
in Missouri, by which certain persons named were authorized to
negotiate for the exchange of any persons who might be taken
prisoners of war, upon a plan previously arranged. General Hunter,
who succeeded General Fremont, on November 7th, repudiated this
agreement. A proposition made in the Confederate Congress to return
the prisoners captured by us at first Manassas, without any formality
whatever, would doubtless have prevailed but for the difficulty in
reference to the crew of the Savannah.
But this determination of the United States Government, not to meet
us on the equal footing consistent with the modern usages of war and
exchange prisoners, thus far prevented any general arrangement for
that object. In consequence, however, of the clamors of the Northern
people for the restoration of their friends, both Houses of Congress
united in a request to President Lincoln to take immediate steps for
a general exchange. Instead of complying with this request, two
respectable commissioners were, however, appointed to visit the
prisoners we held, relieve their necessities, and provide for their
comfort at the expense of the United States. It is impossible to
conceive any reason for such conduct, unless it was to exasperate and
"fire up the Northern heart," as it was expressed, and thus cause the
people to make greater efforts for our devastation. This action on
the part of the Government was at a later day known by the expression
"waving the bloody shirt."
The commissioners arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, but were not allowed
to proceed any farther. A readiness on our part to negotiate for a
general exchange was manifested, and agreed to by them. This was
subsequently approved at Washington. Shortly afterward, on February
14, 1862, an arrangement was made between General Howell Cobb on our
part and General Wool, the commander at Fortress Monroe, by the terms
of which the prisoners of war in the hands of each Government were to
be exchanged man for man, the officers being assimilated as to rank;
our privateersmen were to be exchanged on the footing of prisoners of
war; any surplus remaining on either side was to be released; and
during the continuance of hostilities prisoners taken on either side
should be paroled. The exchange proceeded, and about three hundred in
excess had been delivered, when it was discovered that not one of our
privateersmen had been released, and that our men taken prisoners at
Fort Donelson, instead of being paroled, had been sent into the
interior. Some of the hostages we held for our privateersmen had gone
forward, but the remainder were retained. Being informed of this
state of affairs, I recommended to Congress that all of our men who
had been paroled by the United States Government should be released
from the obligations of their parole so as to bear arms in our
defense, in consequence of this breach of good faith on the part of
that Government. It was subsequently said, on behalf of the United
States Government, that the detention of our privateersmen had been
intended to be only temporary, to make it certain that the hostages
were coming forward.
It is further stated that the only unadjusted point between Generals
Cobb and Wool was, that the latter was unwilling that each party
should agree to pay the expenses of transporting their prisoners to
the frontier, and this he promised to refer to his Government. At a
second interview, on March 1, 1862, General Wool informed General
Cobb that his Government would not consent to pay these expenses, and
thereupon General Cobb promptly receded from his demand, and agreed
to the terms proposed by the other side. But General Wool, who had
said at the beginning of the negotiation, "I am clothed with full
power for the purpose of arranging for the exchange of prisoners,"
was now under the necessity of stating that "his Government had
changed his instructions." And thus the negotiations were abruptly
broken off, and the matter left where it was before.[112] After these
negotiations had begun, the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson had
given to the United States a considerable preponderance in the number
of prisoners held by them, and they at once returned to their
original purpose of an equal treatment.
A suspension of exchange for some months ensued. Finally, a storm of
indignation beginning to arise among the Northern people at the
conduct of their Government, it was forced to yield its absurd
pretensions, and, on July 22, 1862, a cartel for the exchange of
prisoners was executed, based on the cartel of 1812 between the
United States and Great Britain. In accordance with these terms an
exchange commenced, and by the middle of August most of the officers
of rank on either side, who had been for any long period in
captivity, were released.
On the same day on which the cartel was signed, an order was issued
by the Secretary of War, in Washington, under instructions from
President Lincoln, empowering the military commanders in Virginia and
elsewhere "to seize and use any property, real or personal, which may
be necessary or convenient for their several commands for supplies or
for other military purposes," and "to keep accounts sufficiently
accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts and from whom
it shall come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in
proper cases." This was simply a system of plunder, for no
compensation would be made to any person unless he could prove his
fidelity to the Government of the United States.
On the next day, Major-General Pope, in command of the United States
forces near Washington,[113] issued a general order directing the
murder of our peaceful inhabitants as spies, if found quietly tilling
the farms in his rear, even outside of his lines; and one of his
brigadier-generals seized upon innocent and peaceful inhabitants to
be held as hostages, to the end that they might be murdered in cold
blood if any of his soldiers were killed by some unknown persons,
whom he designated as "bushwhackers." Under this state of facts, I
issued a general order, recognizing General Pope and his commissioned
officers to be in the position which they had chosen for themselves--
that of robbers and murderers, and not that of public enemies,
entitled, if captured, to be considered as prisoners of war. Some of
the military authorities of the United States seemed to suppose that
better success would attend a savage war, in which no quarter was to
be given and no age or sex to be spared, than had hitherto been
secured by such hostilities as were alone recognized to be lawful by
civilized men. We renounced our right of retaliation on the innocent,
and continued to treat the soldiers of General Pope's army as
prisoners of war, confining our repressive measures to the punishment
only of commissioned officers as were willing participants in such
crimes. General Pope was soon afterward removed from command.
In August a letter involving similar principles was addressed by
General R. E. Lee to the commanding General at Washington, General
Halleck, making inquiries as to the truth of the case of William B.
Mumford, reported to have been murdered at New Orleans by
Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, and of Colonel John Owens, reported
to have been murdered in Missouri by order of Major-General Pope. I
had also been credibly informed that numerous other officers of the
army of the United States within the Confederacy had been guilty of
felonies and capital offenses, which are punishable by all laws human
and divine. Inquiries were made by letter relative to a few of the
best-authenticated cases. It was announced that Major-General Hunter
had armed slaves for the murder of their masters, and had thus done
all in his power to inaugurate a servile war, which is worse than
that of the savage, inasmuch as it super-adds other horrors to the
indiscriminate slaughter of all ages, sexes, and conditions.
In a letter, dated Port Royal, South Carolina, June 23, 1862, General
Hunter said:
"It is my hope to have organized by the end of next fall, and to be
able to present to the Government, from forty-eight to fifty thousand
of these hardy and devoted soldiers."
Brigadier-General Phelps was reported to have initiated at New
Orleans the example set by General Hunter in South Carolina.
Brigadier-General G. N. Fitch was stated in the public journals to
have murdered in cold blood two peaceful citizens, because one of his
men, when invading our country, was killed by some unknown person
while defending his home. General Lee was further directed by me to
say that, if a reply was not received in fifteen days, it would be
assumed that the alleged facts were true, and were sanctioned by the
Government of the United States, and on that Government would rest
the responsibility of retaliatory measures. The reply of the
commanding General (Halleck) at Washington was in these words:
"As these papers are couched in language insulting to the Government
of the United States, I most respectfully decline to receive them."
On August 20, 1862, I issued an order threatening retaliation for the
lives of peaceable citizens reported to have been executed by
Brigadier-General Fitch. That report was afterward ascertained to be
untrue. On the next day I issued another order, which, after reciting
the principal facts, directed that Major-General Hunter and
Brigadier-General Phelps should be no longer held and treated as
public enemies of the Confederate States, but as outlaws; and that in
the event of the capture of either of them, or that of any other
commissioned officer employed in drilling, organizing, or instructing
slaves, with a view to their armed service in this war, he should not
be regarded as a prisoner of war, but held in close confinement for
execution as a felon, at such time and place as may be ordered.
In the case of William B. Mumford, a letter was received from General
Halleck, dated August 7, 1862, stating sufficient causes for a
failure to make an earlier reply to the letter of July 6th; asserting
that "no authentic information had been received in relation to the
execution of Mumford, but measures will be immediately taken to
ascertain the facts of the alleged execution," and promising that
General Lee should be duly informed thereof. Subsequently, on
November 25, 1862, our agent for the exchange of prisoners, Mr.
Robert Ould, under my instructions, addressed the agent of the United
States, informing him that the explanation promised on August 7th had
not been received; and that, if no answer was sent within fifteen
days, it would be considered that an answer was declined. On December
3d our agent, Mr. Ould, was apprised by the agent of the United
States that his letter had been forwarded to the Secretary of War at
Washington, and no answer was returned, which was regarded as a tacit
admission of the charge. Besides, I had received evidence fully
establishing the fact that the said Mumford, a citizen of the
Confederacy, was actually and publicly executed in cold blood by
hanging after the occupation of New Orleans by the forces under
General Benjamin F. Butler, when said Mumford was an unresisting and
non-combatant captive, and for no offenses even alleged to have been
committed by him subsequent to the date of the occupation of the
city. It appeared that the silence of the Government of the United
States and its maintenance of Butler in high office, under its
authority, afforded evidence too conclusive that it sanctioned his
conduct, and was determined that he should remain unpunished for
these crimes. I therefore pronounced and declared the said Butler a
felon, deserving capital punishment, and ordered that he be no longer
considered and treated as a public enemy of the Confederate States,
but as an outlaw and common enemy of mankind; and that, in the event
of his capture, the officer in command should cause him to be
immediately executed by hanging.
These measures of retaliation were in conformity with the usages of
war, and were adapted to check and punish the cruelties of our
adversary.
At length, so many difficulties were raised and so many complaints
made in the execution of the cartel, that, for the sake of the
unfortunate prisoners, I resolved to seek an adjustment through the
authorities at Washington. For this purpose Vice-President Stephens
offered his services as a commissioner. The following papers will
show the proposition we were prepared to make, and illustrate the
disposition with which our humane designs were regarded by the enemy:
"RICHMOND, _July 2, 1863._
"Hon. ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, _Richmond, Virginia._
"SIR: Having accepted your patriotic offer to proceed as a military
commissioner under flag of truce to Washington, you will receive
herewith your letter of authority to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States. The letter is signed by me, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate land and naval forces.
"You will perceive from the terms of the letter that it is so worded
as to avoid any political difficulties in its reception. Intended
exclusively as one of those communications between belligerents which
public law recognizes as necessary and proper between hostile forces,
care has been taken to give no pretext for refusing to receive it on
the ground that it would involve a tacit recognition of the
independence of the Confederacy. Your mission is simply one of
humanity, and has no political aspect.
"If objection is made to receiving your letter on the ground that it
is not addressed to Abraham Lincoln as President, instead of
Commander-in-Chief, etc., then you will present the duplicate letter
which is addressed to him as President and signed by me as President.
To this latter, objection may be made on the ground that I am not
recognized to be President of the Confederacy. In this event you will
decline any further attempt to confer on the subject of your mission,
as such conference is admissible only on the footing of perfect
equality.
"My recent interviews with you have put you so fully in possession of
my views, that it is scarcely necessary to give you any detailed
instructions, even were I at this moment well enough to attempt it.
My whole purpose is in one word to place this war on the footing of
such as are waged by civilized people in modern times, and to divest
it of the savage character which has been impressed on it by our
enemies, in spite of all our efforts and protests. War is full enough
of unavoidable horrors under all its aspects, to justify and even to
demand of any Christian rulers who may be unhappily engaged in
carrying it on, to seek to restrict its calamities and to divest it
of all unnecessary severities. You will endeavor to establish the
cartel for the exchange of prisoners on such a basis as to avoid the
constant difficulties and complaints which arise, and to prevent for
the future what we deem the unfair conduct of our enemies in evading
the delivery of the prisoners who fall into their hands; in retarding
it by sending them on circuitous routes, and by detaining them
sometimes for months in camps and prisons; and in persisting in
taking captives non-combatants.
"Your attention is also called to the unheard-of conduct of Federal
officers in driving from their homes entire communities of women and
children, as well as of men, whom they find in districts occupied by
their troops, for no other reason than because these unfortunates are
faithful to the allegiance due to their States, and refuse to take an
oath of fidelity to their enemies.
"The putting to death of unarmed prisoners has been a ground of just
complaint in more than one instance; and the recent execution of
officers of our army in Kentucky, for the sole cause that they were
engaged in recruiting service in a State which is claimed as still
one of the United States, but is also claimed by us as one of the
Confederate States, must be repressed by retaliation if not
unconditionally abandoned, because it would justify the like
execution in every other State of the Confederacy; and the practice
is barbarous, uselessly cruel, and can only lead to the slaughter of
prisoners on both sides--a result too horrible to be contemplated
without making every effort to avoid it.
"On these and all kindred subjects you will consider your authority
full and ample to make such arrangements as will temper the present
cruel character of the contest, and full confidence is placed in your
judgment, patriotism, and discretion that, while carrying out the
objects of your mission, you will take care that the equal rights of
the Confederacy be always preserved."
"HEADQUARTERS, RICHMOND, _July 2, 1863._
"SIR: As Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces now waging
war against the United States, I have the honor to address this
communication to you, as Commander-in-Chief of their land and naval
forces.
"Numerous difficulties and disputes have arisen in relation to the
execution of the cartel of exchange heretofore agreed on by the
belligerents, and the commissioners for the exchange of prisoners
have been unable to adjust their differences. Their action on the
subject of these differences is delayed and embarrassed by the
necessity of referring each subject as it arises to superior
authority for decision. I believe that I have just grounds of
complaint against the officers and forces under your command for
breach of the terms of the cartel, and, being myself ready to execute
it at all times in good faith, I am not justified in doubting the
existence of the same disposition on your part.
"In addition to this matter, I have to complain of the conduct of
your officers and troops in many parts of the country, who violate
all the rules of war, by carrying on hostilities, not only against
armed foes, but against non-combatants, aged men, women, and
children; while others not only seize such property as is required
for the use of your forces, but destroy all private property within
their reach, even agricultural implements; and openly avow the
purpose of seeking to subdue the population of the districts where
they are operating, by the starvation that must result from the
destruction of standing crops and agricultural tools.
"Still, again, others of your officers in different districts have
recently taken the lives of prisoners who fell into their power, and
justify their act by asserting a right to treat as spies the military
officers and enlisted men under my command, who may penetrate for
hostile purposes into States claimed by me to be engaged in the
warfare now waged against the United States, and claimed by the
latter as having refused to engage in such warfare.
"I have heretofore, on different occasions, been forced to make
complaint of these outrages, and to ask from you that you should
either avow or disclaim having authorized them, and have failed to
obtain such answer as the usages of civilized warfare require to be
given in such cases.
"These usages justify, and indeed require, redress by retaliation, as
the proper means of repressing such cruelties as are not permitted in
warfare between Christian peoples. I have, notwithstanding, refrained
from the exercise of such retaliation, because of its obvious
tendency to lead to a war of indiscriminate massacre on both sides,
which would be a spectacle so shocking to humanity and so disgraceful
to the age in which we live and the religion we profess, that I can
not contemplate it without a feeling of horror that I am disinclined
to doubt you would share.
"With the view, then, of making one last solemn attempt to avert such
calamities, and to attest my earnest desire to prevent them, if it be
possible, I have selected the bearer of this letter, the Hon.
Alexander H. Stephens, as a military commissioner to proceed to your
headquarters under flag of truce, there to confer and agree on the
subjects above mentioned; and I do hereby authorise the said
Alexander H. Stephens to arrange and settle all differences and
disputes which may have arisen or may arise in the execution of the
cartel for exchange of prisoners of war, heretofore agreed on between
our respective land and naval forces; also to agree to any just
modification that may be found necessary to prevent further
misunderstandings as to the terms of said cartel; and finally to
enter into such arrangement or understanding about the mode of
carrying on hostilities between the belligerents as shall confine the
severities of the war within such limits as are rightfully imposed,
not only by modern civilization, but by our common Christianity. I
am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"JEFFERSON DAVIS,
"_Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces of the Confederate
States._
"To ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
"_Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval fores of the United
States._"
On July 3, 1863, Mr. Stephens proceeded down the James River under a
flag of truce, and when near Newport News his further progress was
arrested by the orders of the Admiral of the enemy's fleet. The
object of his mission, with a request for permission to go to
Washington, was made known to that officer, who, by telegraph,
communicated with the Government at Washington. The reply of that
Government was:
"The request is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are
adequate for all needful military communications and conference
between the United States forces and the insurgents."
This was all the notice ever taken of our humane propositions. We
were stigmatized as insurgents, and the door was shut in our faces.
Does not this demonstrate an intent to subjugate our States?
From the correspondence of our exchange commissioner, Judge Ould, it
appears that, from the date of the cartel on July 22, 1862, until the
summer of 1863, we had an excess of prisoners. During the interval
deliveries were made as fast as the enemy furnished transportation.
Indeed, upon more than one occasion they were urged to send increased
means of transportation. It was never alleged that we failed or
neglected to make prompt deliveries of prisoners who were not held
under charges when they had the excess. On the other hand, the cartel
was openly and notoriously violated by the Washington authorities.
Officers and men were kept in confinement, sometimes in irons or
doomed to cells, without charge or trial. Many officers were kept in
confinement even after the notices published by the enemy had
declared them to be exchanged.
In the summer of 1863 the authorities at Washington insisted upon
exchanges limited to such as were held in confinement on either side.
This was resisted as in violation of the cartel. Such a construction
not only kept in confinement the excess on either side, but ignored
all paroles which were held by the Confederate Government. These were
very many, being the paroles of officers and men who had been
released on capture. The authorities at Washington at that time held
few or no paroles. They had all, or nearly all, been surrendered. We
gave prisoners as an equivalent for them. As long as we had the
excess of prisoners, matters went on smoothly enough; but, as soon as
the posture of affairs in that respect was changed, the cartel could
no longer be observed. So long as the United States Government held
the paroles of Confederate officers and men, they were respected and
made the basis of exchange; but when equivalents were obtained for
them, and no more were in hand, they would not recognize the paroles
which were held by us. In consequence of the position thus assumed by
the Government of the United States, the requirement of the cartel
that all prisoners should be delivered within ten days was
practically nullified. The deliveries which were afterward made were
the results of special agreements.
The wish of the Confederate Government, which it was hoped had been
accomplished by the cartel, was the prompt release of all prisoners
on both sides, either by exchange or parole. When, in 1864, the
cartel was so disregarded by the enemy as to indicate that prisoners
would be held long in confinement, Andersonville, in Georgia, was
selected for the location of a principal prison. The site was chosen
because of its supposed security from raids, together with its
salubrity, the abundance of water and timber, and the productive
farming country around it. General Howell Cobb, then commanding in
Georgia, employed a large number of negro laborers in the
construction of a stockade and temporary shelter for the number of
prisoners it was expected would be assembled there. The number,
however, rapidly increased, and, by the middle of May, gangrene and
scurvy made their appearance. General John H. Winder, who had been
stationed in Richmond in charge of the police and local guards, as
well as the general control of prisoners, went to Andersonville in
June, and found disease prevailing to such an extent that, to abate
the pestilence, he immediately advised the removal of prisoners to
other points. As soon as arrangements could be made, he was
instructed to disperse them to Millen and elsewhere, as in his
judgment might be best for their health, comfort and safety. In July
he made arrangements to procure vegetables, recommended details of
men to cultivate gardens, and that hospital accommodations should be
constructed outside of the prison; all of which recommendations were
approved, and as far as practicable executed. In September General
Winder, with the main body of the prisoners, removed first to Millen,
Georgia, and then to Florence, South Carolina.
Major Wirz thereafter remained in command at Andersonville, and the
testimony of Chief-Surgeon Stevenson, of the hospital at
Andersonville, bears testimony to the success with which Wirz
improved the post, and the good effect produced upon the health of
the prisoners. This unfortunate man--who, under the severe
temptation to which he was exposed before his execution, exhibited
honor and fidelity strongly in contrast with his tempters and
persecutors--it now appears, was the victim of men whom, in his
kindness, he paroled to take care of their sick comrades, and who,
after having violated their parole, appeared to testify against him.
In like manner has calumny pursued the memory of General John H.
Winder, a man too brave to be cruel to anything within his power, too
well bred and well born to be influenced by low and sordid motives. I
have referred only to a few of the facts illustrative of his kindness
to the prisoners after he went to Georgia, and they were in keeping
with his conduct toward the prisoners at Richmond. This latter fact,
together with his sterling integrity and soldierly character, had
caused his selection for the chief control of Confederate prisons.
The Adjutant-General, Samuel Cooper, a man as pure in heart as he was
sound in judgment, was the classmate of Winder; their lives had been
passed in the array in frequent intercourse; and General Cooper, in a
letter of July 9, 1871, wrote that "General Winder, who had the
control of the Northern prisoners, was an honest, upright, and humane
gentleman, and as such I had known him for many years. He had the
reputation, in the Confederacy, of treating the prisoners confided to
his general supervision with great kindness and consideration."
In January, 1864, and even earlier, it became manifest that, in
consequence of the complication in relation to exchanges, the large
mass of prisoners on both sides would remain in captivity for many
long and weary months, if not for the duration of the war. In order
to alleviate the hardships of confinement on both sides, our
commissioner, on January 24, 1863, addressed a communication to
General E. A. Hitchcock, United States commissioner of exchange, in
which he proposed that all prisoners on each side should be attended
by a proper number of their own surgeons, who, under rules to be
established, should be permitted to take charge of their health and
comfort.
It was also proposed that these surgeons should act as commissaries,
with power to receive and distribute such contributions of money,
food, clothing, and medicines as might be forwarded for the relief of
the prisoners. It was further proposed that these surgeons should be
selected by their own Government, and that they should have full
liberty at any and all times, through the agents of exchange, to make
reports, not only of their own acts, but of any matters relating to
the welfare of the prisoners.
To this communication no reply of any kind was ever made.
Again, Commissioner Ould, in a communication published in August,
1868, further says:
"About the last of March, 1864, I had several conferences with
General B. F. Butler, then agent of exchange at Fortress Monroe, in
relation to the difficulties attending the exchange of prisoners, and
we reached what we both thought a tolerably satisfactory basis. The
day that I left there General Grant arrived. General Butler says he
communicated to him the state of the negotiations, and 'most emphatic
verbal directions were received from the Lieutenant-General not to
take any step by which another able-bodied man should be exchanged
until further orders from him'; and that on April 30, 1864, he
received a telegram from General Grant 'to receive all the sick and
wounded the Confederate authorities may send you, but send no more in
exchange.' Unless my recollection fails me, General Butler also, in
an address to his constituents, substantially declared that he was
directed, in his management of the question of exchange with the
Confederate authorities, to put the matter _offensively, for the
purpose of preventing an exchange_."
The signification of the word "offensively," in the preceding line,
relates to the exchange of negro soldiers. The Government of the
United States contended that the slaves in their ranks were such no
longer; that it was bound to accord to them, when made prisoners, the
same protection that it gave all other soldiers. We asserted the
slaves to be property, under the Constitution of the United States
and that of the Confederate States, and that property recaptured from
the enemy in war reverts to its owner, if he can be found, or it may
be disposed of by its captor.
On October 1st, when the number of prisoners was large on either
side. General Lee addressed a note to General Grant, saying:
"With a view of alleviating the sufferings of our soldiers, I have
the honor to propose an exchange of the prisoners of war belonging to
the armies operating in Virginia, man for man, or upon the basis
established by the cartel."
On the next day General Grant replied:
"I could not of a right accept your proposition further than to
exchange those prisoners captured within the last three days, and who
have not yet been delivered to the commanding General of prisoners.
Among those lost by the armies operating against Richmond were a
number of colored troops. Before further negotiations are had upon
the subject, I would ask if you propose delivering these men the same
as white soldiers."
On the next day General Lee said, in rejoinder:
"In my proposition of the 1st inst., to exchange the prisoners of war
belonging to the armies operating in Virginia, I intended to include
all captured soldiers of the United States, of whatever nation and
color, under my control. Deserters from our service and negroes
belonging to our citizens are not considered subjects of exchange,
and were not included in my proposition. If there are any such among
those stated by you to have been captured around Richmond, they can
not be returned."
On October 20th General Grant finally answered, saying;
"I shall always regret the necessity of retaliating for wrong done
our soldiers, but regard it my duty to protect all persons received
into the army of the United States, regardless of color or
nationality; when acknowledged soldiers of the Government are
captured, they must be treated as prisoners of war, or such treatment
as they receive inflicted upon an equal number of prisoners held by
us."
This was "putting the matter offensively, for the purpose of
preventing an exchange," as recommended by General Grant for the
adoption of General Butler.
But let us return to the progress of negotiations. In a dispatch from
General Grant to General Butler, dated City Point, August 18, 1864,
the former says:
"On the subject of exchange, however, I differ from General
Hitchcock. It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to
exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight
our battles. Every man released on parole, or otherwise, becomes an
active soldier against us at once, either directly or indirectly. If
we commence a system of exchange, which liberates all prisoners
taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is
exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than
dead men. At this particular time to release all rebel prisoners
North would insure Sherman's defeat, and would compromise our safety
here."
We now proposed to the Government of the United States to exchange
the prisoners respectively held, officer for officer and man for man.
We had previously declined this proposal, and insisted on the terms
of the cartel, which required the delivery of the excess on either
side on parole. At the same time we sent a statement of the mortality
prevailing among the prisoners at Andersonville.
As no answer had been received relative to this proposal, a
communication was sent, on August 22, 1864, to Major-General E. A.
Hitchcock, United States commissioner of exchange, containing the
same proposal which had been before delivered to the assistant
commissioner, and a request was made for its acceptance.
No answer was received to either of these letters, and on August 31st
the assistant commissioner stated that he had no communication on the
subject from the United States Government, and that he was not
authorized to make an answer.
This offer, which would have released every soldier of the United
States confined in our prisons, was not even noticed. Indeed, the
United States Government had, at that time, a large excess of
prisoners, and the effect of the proposal, if carried out, would have
been to release all the prisoners belonging to it, while a large
number of ours would have remained in prison awaiting the chances of
the capture of their equivalents.
Thus, having ascertained that exchanges could not be made, either on
the basis of the cartel, or officer for officer and man for man, we
offered to the United States Government their sick and wounded
without requiring any equivalents. On these terms, we agreed to
deliver from ten to fifteen thousand at the mouth of the Savannah
River; and we further added that, if the number for which
transportation might be sent could not be readily made up from sick
and wounded, the difference should be supplied with well men.
Although the offer was made in the summer, the transportation did not
arrive until November. And as the sick and wounded were at points
distant from Georgia, and could not be brought to Savannah within a
reasonable time, five thousand well men were substituted. In return,
some three thousand sick and wounded were delivered to us at the same
place. The original rolls showed that some thirty-five hundred had
started from Northern prisons, and that death had reduced the number
during the passage to about three thousand.
On two occasions we were specially asked to send the very sick and
desperately wounded prisoners, and a particular request was made for
men who were so seriously sick that it was doubtful whether they
would survive a removal a few miles down James River. Accordingly,
some of the worst cases, contrary to the judgment of our surgeons,
but in compliance with the piteous appeals of the sick prisoners,
were sent away, and after being delivered they were taken to
Annapolis, Maryland, and there photographed as specimen prisoners.
The photographs at Annapolis were terrible indeed, but the misery
they portrayed was surpassed by some of those we received in exchange
at Savannah. Why was there this delay between the summer and November
in sending vessels for the transportation of sick and wounded, for
whom no equivalents were asked? Were Federal prisoners left to
suffer, and afterward photographed "to aid in firing the popular
heart of the North"?
In the summer of 1864, in consequence of certain information
communicated to our commissioner, Mr. Ould, by the Surgeon-General of
the Confederate States, as to the deficiency of medicines. Mr. Ould
offered to make purchases of medicines from the United States
authorities, to be used exclusively for the relief of the Union
prisoners. He offered to pay gold, cotton, or tobacco for them, and
even two or three prices if required. At the same time he gave
assurances that the medicines would be used exclusively for the
treatment of Union prisoners; and moreover agreed, on behalf of the
Confederate States, if it were insisted on, that such medicines might
be brought into the Confederate lines by the United States surgeons,
and dispensed by them. Incredible as it may appear, it is,
nevertheless, strictly true that no reply was ever received to this
offer.
One final effort was now made to obtain an exchange. This consisted
in my sending a delegation from the prisoners at Andersonville to
plead their cause before the authorities at Washington. It was of no
avail. President Lincoln refused to see them. They were made to
understand that the interests of the Government of the United States
required that they should return to prison and remain there. They
carried back the sad tidings that their Government held out no hope
of their release.
"We have a letter from the wife of the chairman of that delegation
(now dead) in which she says that her husband always said that he was
more contemptuously treated by Secretary of War Stanton than he ever
was at Andersonville." [114]
Another prisoner, Henry M. Brennan, writes:
"I was at Andersonville when the delegation of prisoners spoken of by
Jefferson Davis left there to plead our cause with the authorities at
Washington; and nobody can tell, unless it be a shipwrecked and
famished mariner, who sees a vessel approaching and then passing on
without rendering the required aid, what fond hopes were raised, and
how hope sickened into despair, waiting for the answer that never
came. In my opinion, and that of a good many others, a good part of
the responsibility for the horrors of Andersonville rests with
General U. S. Grant, who refused to make a fair exchange of
prisoners."
The following extracts are from the official report of Major-General
Butler to "the Committee on the Conduct of the War," which was
appointed by a joint resolution of Congress, during the war:
"Mr. Ould left on the 31st of March, 1864, with the understanding
that I would get authority and information from my Government, by
which all disputed points could be adjusted, and would then confer
with him further, either meeting him at City Point or elsewhere for
that purpose. In the mean time exchanges of sick and wounded, and
special exchanges, should go on.
"General Grant visited Fortress Monroe on April 1st, being the first
time I had ever met him. To him the state of the negotiations as to
exchange[115] was verbally communicated; and most emphatic directions
were received from the Lieutenant-General not to take any step by
which another able-bodied man should be exchanged, until further
orders from him."
General Butler next gives the following from General Mulford, United
States assistant agent of exchange, addressed to him:
"GENERAL: The Confederate authorities will exchange prisoners on the
basis heretofore proposed by our Government--that is, man for man.
This proposition was proposed formally to me after I saw you."
General Butler's report continues as follows:
"Accident prevented my meeting the rebel commissioner, so that
nothing was done; but after conversation with General Grant, in reply
to the proposition of Mr. Ould to exchange all prisoners of war on
either side held, man for man, officer for officer, I wrote an
argument showing our right to our colored soldiers. This argument set
forth our claims in the most offensive form possible, consistently
with ordinary courtesy of language, for the purpose of carrying out
the wishes of the Lieutenant-General that no prisoners of war should
be exchanged. This paper was published so as to bring a public
pressure by the owners of slaves upon the rebel Government, in order
to forbid their exchange."
The report continues:
"In case the Confederate authorities took the same view as General
Grant, believing that an exchange 'would defeat Sherman and imperil
the safety of the Armies of the Potomac and the James,' and therefore
should yield to the argument, and formally notify me that their
former slaves captured in our uniform would be exchanged as other
soldiers were, and that they were ready to return us all our
prisoners at Andersonville and elsewhere in exchange for theirs, then
I had determined, with the consent of the Lieutenant-General, as a
last resort to prevent exchange, to demand that the outlawry against
me should formally be reversed and apologized for, before I would
further negotiate the exchange of prisoners. But the argument was
enough, and the Confederates never offered to me afterward to
exchange the colored soldiers who had been slaves, held in prison by
them."
Further on in the report General Butler gives the history of some
naval exchanges, in the course of which colored prisoners were
delivered, and concludes his observations on that head as follows:
"It will be observed that the rebels had exchanged all the naval
colored prisoners, so that the negro question no longer impeded the
exchange of prisoners; in fact, if we had demanded the exchange of
all, man for man, officer for officer, they would have done it."
The conclusion of the report is as follows:
"I have felt it my duty to give an account with this particular
carefulness of my participation in the business of exchange of
prisoners, the orders under which I acted, and the negotiations
attempted, which comprises a faithful narration of all that was done,
so that all may become a matter of history. The great importance of
the questions; the fearful responsibility for the many thousands of
lives which, by the refusal to exchange, were sacrificed by the most
cruel forms of death, from cold, starvation, and pestilence of the
prison-pens of Raleigh and Andersonville, being more than all the
British soldiers killed in the wars of Napoleon; the anxiety of
fathers, brothers, sisters, mothers, wives, to know the exigency
which caused this terrible, and perhaps, as it may have seemed to
them, useless and unnecessary, destruction of those dear to them, by
horrible deaths, each and all have compelled me to this exposition,
so that it may be seen that those lives were spent as a part of the
system of attack upon the rebellion, devised by the wisdom of the
General-in-Chief of the armies, to destroy it by depletion, depending
upon our superior numbers to win the victory at last. The loyal
mourners will doubtless derive solace from this fact, and appreciate
all the more highly the genius which conceived the plan, and the
success won at so great a cost."
Sufficient facts have been presented to satisfy every intelligent and
candid mind of our entire readiness to surrender, for exchange, all
the prisoners in our possession, whenever the Government of the
United States would honestly meet us for that purpose. At any hour
perfect arrangements could have been made with us for the restoration
to it of all its soldiers held as prisoners by us, if its authorities
at Washington had consented so to do. On them rests the criminality
for the sufferings of these prisoners.
Further, the Government of the United States, in order to effect our
subjugation, devastated our fields, destroyed our crops, broke up our
railroads, and thus interrupted our means of transportation, and
reduced our people, our armies, and consequently their soldiers, who
were our prisoners, all alike, to the most straitened condition for
food. Our medicines for the sick were exhausted, and, contrary to the
usage of civilized nations, they were made, by our enemy, contraband
of war. After causing these and other distressing events--of which
Atlanta, where the women and children were driven into the fields and
their houses burned, and Columbia, with its smoking and plundered
ruins, were prominent examples--after every effort to excite our
slaves to servile war--this Government of the United States turned
to the Northern people, and, charging us with atrocious cruelties to
their sons, who were our prisoners, appealed to them again and again
to recruit the armies and take vengeance upon us by our abject
subjugation or entire extermination. It was the last effort of the
usurper to save himself.
But there is another scene to be added to these cruelties. During all
this time, Northern prisons were full of our brave and heroic
soldiers, of whom there were about sixty thousand. The privations
which they suffered, the cruelties inspired by the malignant spirit
of the Government, which were inflicted upon them, surpass any
records of modern history: yet we have had no occasion to seek out a
Wirz for public trial before an illegal court, that we might conceal
behind him our own neglect and cruel sacrifice of them. That we might
clothe our brave men in the prisons of the United States Government,
I made an application for permission to send cotton to Liverpool, and
therewith purchase the supplies which were necessary. The request was
granted, but only on condition that the cotton should be sent to New
York and the supplies bought there. This was done by our agent,
General Beale. The suffering of our men in Northern prisons caused
the application; that it was granted, refutes the statement that our
men were comfortably maintained.
Finally, to the bold allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners on our
side, and humane treatment and adequate supplies on that of our
opponents, it is only necessary to offer two facts: First, the report
of the Secretary of War, E. M. Stanton, made on July 19, 1866, shows
that, of all the prisoners in our hands during the war, only 22,576
died; while, of the prisoners in our opponents' hands, 26,246 died.
Second, the official report of Surgeon-General Barnes, an officer of
the United States Government, states that, in round numbers, the
number of Confederate States prisoners in their hands amounted to
220,000, the number of United States prisoners in our hands amounted
to 270,000. Thus, out of the 270,000 in our hands, 22,000 died; while
of the 220,000 of our soldiers in their hands, 26,000 died. Thus,
more than twelve per cent. of the prisoners in our opponents' hands
died, and less than nine per cent. of the prisoners in our hands died.
When, in this connection, it is remembered how much our resources
were reduced, that our supply of medicines required in summer
diseases was exhausted, and that Northern men when first residing at
the South must undergo acclimation, and that these conditions in the
Northern States were the reverse in each particular--the fact that
greater mortality existed in Northern than in Southern prisons can
only be accounted for by the kinder treatment received in the latter.
To present the case in a sentence--we did the best we could for
those whom the fortune of war had placed at our mercy; and the enemy,
in the midst of plenty, inflicted cruel, wanton deprivation on our
soldiers who fell within his power.
In regard to the failure in the exchange of prisoners, General B. F.
Butler has irrefutably fixed the responsibility on the Government at
Washington and on General Grant. The obstacles thus thrown in the way
were not only persistently interposed, but artfully designed to be
insurmountable.
On the other hand, the Confederate Government, through Colonel Ould,
its commissioner of exchanges, sought by all practicable means to
execute the obligations of the cartel, and otherwise to relieve the
suffering of prisoners kept in confinement; through a delegation of
the Federal prisoners at Andersonville, it sought to attract the
notice of their Government to their sufferings; and, finally,
confiding in the chivalry characteristic of soldiers, sought, through
General Lee, to make an arrangement with General Grant for the
exchange of all the prisoners held in their respective commands, and
as many more as General Grant could add in response to all held by
the Confederate Government.[116]
[Footnote 112: "Southern Historical Society Papers," March, 1876.]
[Footnote 113: See chapter xxxiv.]
[Footnote 114: Editor of Southern Historical Society Papers.]
[Footnote 115: "The negotiations as to exchange, to which General Butler
refers, were the points of agreement between General Butler and
myself, under which exchanges of all white and free black soldiers,
man for man and officer for officer, were to go on, leaving the
question as to slaves to be disposed of by subsequent arrangement."--
(Letter of Mr. Ould, June, 1879.)]
[Footnote 116: For full and exact information, compiled from official
records and other documents, the reader is referred to "Treatment of
Prisoners," by J. William Jones, D. D., and to "The Southern Side: or
Andersonville Prison, compiled from Official Documents" by R.
Randolph Stevenson, M. D.]