Assignment of General J. E. Johnston to the Command of the Army of
Tennessee.--Condition of his Army.--An Offensive Campaign
suggested.--Proposed Objects to be accomplished.--General
Johnston's Plans.--Advance of Sherman.--The Strength of the
Confederate Position.--General Johnston expects General Sherman to
give Battle at Dalton.--The Enemy's Flank Movement via Snake Creek
Gap to Resaca.--Johnston falls back to Resaca.--Further Retreat to
Adairsville.--General Johnston's Reasons.--Retreat to Cassville.--
Projected Engagement at Kingston frustrated.--Retreat beyond the
Etowah River.--Strong Position at Alatoona abandoned.--Nature of
the Country between Marietta and Dallas.--Engagements at New Hope
Church.--Army takes Position at Kenesaw.--Senator Hill's Letter.--
Death of Lieutenant-General Polk.--Battle at Kenesaw Mountain.--
Retreat beyond the Chattahoochee.--Results reviewed.--Popular
Demand for Removal of General Johnston.--Reluctance to remove him.--
Reasons for Removal.--Assignment of General J. B. Hood to the
Command.--He assumes the Offensive.--Battle of Peach-tree Creek.--
Death of General W. H. T. Walker.--Sherman's Movement to
Jonesboro.--Defeat of Hardee.--Evacuation of Atlanta.--Sherman's
Inhuman Order.--Visit to Georgia.--Suggested Operations.--Want of
coöperation by the Governor of Georgia.--Conference with Generals
Beauregard, Hardee, and Cobb, at Augusta.--Departure from Original
Plan.--General Hood's Movement against the Enemy's Communications.--
Partial Successes.--Withdrawal of the Army to Gadsden and Movement
against Thomas.--Sherman burns Atlanta and begins his March to the
Sea.--Vandalism.--Direction of his Advance.--General Wheeler's
Opposition.--His Valuable Service.--Sherman reaches Savannah.--
General Hardee's Command.--The Defenses of the City.--Assault and
Capture of Fort McAlister.--The Results.--Hardee evacuates Savannah.
On December 16, 1863, I directed General J. E. Johnston to transfer
the command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana to
Lieutenant-General Polk, and repair to Dalton, Georgia, to assume
command of the Army of Tennessee, representing at that date an
effective total of 43,094. My information led me to believe that the
condition of that army, in all that constitutes efficiency, was
satisfactory, and that the men were anxious for an opportunity to
retrieve the loss of prestige sustained in the disastrous battle of
Missionary Ridge. I was also informed that the enemy's forces, then
occupying Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson, with a detached
force at Knoxville, were weaker in numbers than at any time since the
battle of Missionary Ridge, and that they were especially deficient
in cavalry and in artillery and train-horses. I desired, therefore,
that prompt and vigorous measures be taken to enable our troops to
commence active operations against the enemy as early as practicable.
It was important to guard against the injurious results to the morale
of the troops, which always attend a prolonged season of inactivity;
but the recovery of the territory in Tennessee and Kentucky, which we
had been compelled to abandon, and on the supplies of which the
proper subsistence of our armies mainly depended, imperatively
demanded an onward movement. I believed that, by a rapid
concentration of our troops between the scattered forces of the
enemy, without attempting to capture his intrenched positions, we
could compel him to accept battle in the open field, and that, should
we fail to draw him out of his intrenchments, we could move upon his
line of communications. The Federal force at Knoxville depended
mainly for support on its connection with that at Chattanooga, and
both were wholly dependent on uninterrupted communication with
Nashville. Could we, then, by interposing our force, separate these
two bodies of the enemy, and cut off his communication from Nashville
to Chattanooga by destroying the railroad, both conditions were
fulfilled. Of the practicability of this movement I had little doubt;
of its expediency, if practicable, there could be none. I impressed
repeatedly upon General Johnston by letter, and by officers of my
staff and others, sent to him by me for the purpose of putting him in
possession of these views, the importance of a prompt aggressive
movement by the Army of Tennessee. The following were among the
considerations presented to General Johnston, at my request, by
Brigadier-General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery of the Army of
Northern Virginia, on April 16, 1864:
1. To take the enemy at disadvantage while weakened, it is believed,
by sending troops to Virginia, and having others still absent on
furlough.
2. To break up his plans by anticipating and frustrating his
combinations.
3. So to press him in his present position as to prevent his heavier
massing in Virginia.
4. To defeat him in battle, and gain great consequent strength in
supplies, men, and productive territory.
5. To prevent the waste of the army incident to inactivity.
6. To inspirit the troops and the country by success, and to
discourage the enemy.
7. To obviate the necessity of falling back, which might probably
occur if our antagonist be allowed to consummate his plans without
molestation.
General Johnston cordially approved of an aggressive movement, and
informed me of his purpose to make it as soon as reënforcements and
supplies, then on the way, should reach him. He did not approve the
proposed advance into Tennessee. He believed that the Federal forces
in Tennessee were not weaker, but if anything stronger, than at
Missionary Ridge; that defeat beyond the Tennessee would probably
prove ruinous to us, resulting in the loss of his army, the
occupation of Georgia by the enemy, the "piercing of the Confederacy
in its vitals," and the loss of all the southwestern territory. He
proposed, therefore, to stand on the defensive until strengthened,
"to watch, prepare, and strike" as soon as possible. As soon as
reënforced, he declared his purpose to advance to Ringgold, attack
there, and, if successful, as he expected to be, to strike at
Cleveland, cut the railroad, control the river, and thus isolate East
Tennessee, and, as a consequence, force his antagonist to give battle
on this side of the Tennessee River. Simultaneously with, and in aid
of, this movement, General Johnston proposed that a large cavalry
force should be sent to Middle Tennessee, in the rear of the enemy.
These operations, he thought, would result in forcing the Federal
army to evacuate the Tennessee Valley, and make an advance into the
heart of the State safely practicable.
The irreparable loss of time in making any forward movement as
desired having sufficed for the combinations which rendered an
advance across the Tennessee River no longer practicable, I took
prompt measures to enable General Johnston to carry out immediately
his own proposition to strike first at Ringgold and then at
Cleveland, proposing that General Buckner should threaten Knoxville,
General Forrest advance into or threaten Middle Tennessee, and
General Roddy hold the enemy in northern Alabama, and thus prevent
his concentration in our front. This movement, although it held out
no such promise as did the plan of advance before the enemy had had
time to make his combinations, might have been attended with good
results had it been promptly executed. But no such movement was made
or even attempted. General Johnston's belief that General Grant would
be ready to assume the offensive before he could be prepared to do
so, proved too well founded, while his purpose, if the Federal army
did not attack, that we should prepare and take the initiative
ourselves, was never carried out.[105]
On the morning of May 2, 1864, General Johnston discovered that the
enemy, under the command of General Sherman, was advancing against
him, and two days subsequently it was reported that he had reached
Ringgold (about fifteen miles north of Dalton) in considerable force.
At this date the official returns show that the effective strength of
the Army of Tennessee, counting the troops actually in position at
Dalton and those in the immediate rear of that place, was about fifty
thousand. When to these is added General Polk's command (then _en
route_), and the advance of which joined him at Resaca, the effective
strength of General Johnston's army was not less than 68,620 men of
all arms, excluding from the estimate the thousands of men employed
on extra duty, amounting, as General Hood states, to ten thousand
when he assumed command of the army.
Army at Dalton, May 1, 1864, according to General
Johnston's estimates[106] . . . . . . . . . . . . 37,652 infantry.
2,812 artillery.
2,392 cavalry.
Mercer's brigade, joined May 2d . . . . . . . . . 2,000 infantry.
Thirty-seventh Mississippi Regiment, _en route_ 400 "
Dibrell's and Harrison's brigades in rear,
recruiting their horses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,336 cavalry.
Martin's division at Cartersville . . . . . . . . 1,700 "
------
49,292
Polk's command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,330
------
Total effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68,620
To enable General Johnston to repulse the hostile advance and assume
the offensive, no effort was spared on the part of the Government.
Almost all the available military strength of the south and west, in
men and supplies, was pressed forward and placed at his disposal. The
supplies of the commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance departments
of his army were represented as ample and suitably located. The
troops, encouraged by the large accessions of strength which they saw
arriving daily, and which they knew were marching rapidly to their
support, were eager to advance, and confident in their power to
achieve victory and recover the territory which they had lost. Their
position was such as to warrant the confident expectation of
successful resistance at least. Long mountain-ranges, penetrated by
few and difficult roads and paths, and deep and wide rivers, seemed
to render our position one from which we could not be dislodged or
turned, while that of the enemy, dependent for his supplies upon a
single line of railroad from Nashville to the point where he was
operating, was manifestly perilous. The whole country shared the hope
which the Government entertained, that a decisive victory would soon
be won in the mountains of Georgia, which would free the south and
west from invasion, would open to our occupation and the support of
our armies the productive territory of Tennessee and Kentucky, and so
recruit our army in the West as to render it impracticable for the
enemy to accumulate additional forces in Virginia.
On May 6th the Confederate forces were in position in and near
Dalton, which point General Johnston believed that General Sherman
would attack with his whole force. This belief seems to have been
held by General Johnston until the evening of May 12th, when, having
previously learned the proximity of the advance of Lieutenant-General
Polk's command, and that the rest of his troops were hurrying forward
to reënforce him, but discovering that the main body of Sherman's
army was moving round his left flank, via Snake-Creek Gap to Resaca,
under cover of Rocky-Face Mountain, he withdrew his troops from
Dalton and fell back on Resaca, situated on the Western and Atlantic
Railroad, eighteen miles south of Dalton on a peninsula formed by the
junction of the Oostenaula and Conasauga Rivers. The Confederate
position at this place was strengthened by continuous rifle-pits and
strong field-works, by which it was protected on the flanks on the
above-named rivers, and a line of retreat across the Oostenaula
secured. Information, on May 15th, that the right of the Federal army
was crossing the Oostenaula near Calhoun (four miles south of
Resaca), thus threatening his line of communications, induced General
Johnston to fall back from Resaca toward Adairsville, thirteen miles
south on the railroad. General Johnston, in accounting for his
abandonment of his strong position at Dalton, and of his subsequent
position at Resaca, states that he was dislodged from the first
position--that in front of Dalton--by General Sherman's movement to
his right through Snake-Creek Gap, threatening our line of
communication at Resaca; and from the position taken at Resaca to
meet that movement, by a similar one on the part of the Federal
General toward Calhoun--the second being covered by the river, as
the first had been by the mountains.
After abandoning Resaca, General Johnston hoped to find a good
position near Calhoun; but, finding none, he fell back to a position
about a mile north of Adairsville, where the valley of the Oothcaloga
was supposed from the map to be so narrow that his army, formed in
line of battle across it, could hold the heights on both flanks. On
reaching this point, however, it was found that the valley was so
much broader than was supposed, that the army, in line of battle,
could not obtain the anticipated advantage of ground. Hence a further
retreat to Cassville was ordered, seventeen miles farther south, and
a few miles to the east of the railroad. Here, supposing that the
Federal army would divide, one column following the railroad through
Kingston and the other the direct road to the Etowah Railroad Bridge
through Cassville, General Johnston hoped that the opportunity would
be offered him to engage and defeat one of the enemy's columns before
it could receive aid from the other, and, as the distance between
them would be greatest at Kingston, he determined to attack at this
point. The coming battle was announced in orders to each regiment of
the army.
The battle, for causes which were the subject of dispute, did not
take place as General Johnston had originally announced, and, instead
of his attacking the divided columns of the enemy, the united Federal
army was preparing to attack him. Here our army occupied a position
which General Johnston describes as "the best that he saw during the
war," but owing, as he represents, to an expressed want of confidence
on the part of lieutenant-Generals Hood and Polk in their ability to
resist the enemy, the army was again (May 19, 1864) ordered to
retreat beyond the Etowah.
General Hood, in his official report, and in a book written by him
since the war, takes a very different view of the position in rear of
Cassville, and states that he and General Polk explained that their
corps were on ground commanded and enfiladed by the batteries of the
enemy, therefore wholly unsuited for defense, and, unless it was
proposed to attack, that the position should be abandoned. General
Shoup, a scientific and gallant soldier, confirms this opinion of the
defects of the position, as does Captain Morris, chief-engineer of
the Army of Mississippi, and others then on duty there.[107]
The next stand of our army was at Alatoona, in the Etowah Mountains,
and south of the river of that name; but the reported extension of
the Federal army toward Dallas, threatening Marietta, was deemed to
necessitate the evacuation of that strong position. The country
between Dallas and Marietta, eighteen miles wide, and lying in a due
westerly direction from the latter place, constitutes a natural
fortress of exceptional strength. Densely wooded, traversed by ranges
of steep hills, seamed at intervals by ravines both deep and rugged,
with very few roads, and those ill constructed and almost impassable
to wheels, it is difficult to imagine a country better adapted for
defense, where the advantages of numerical superiority in an invading
army were more thoroughly neutralized, or where, necessarily ignorant
of the topography, it was compelled to advance with greater caution.
The engagements at New Hope Church, June 27th and 28th, though severe
and marked by many acts of gallantry, did not result in any advantage
to our army. Falling back slowly as the enemy advanced to Acworth
(June 8th), General Johnston made his next stand in that mountainous
country that lies between Acworth and Marietta, remarkable for the
three clearly defined eminences: Kenesaw Mountain, to the west of the
railroad, and overlooking Marietta; Lost Mountain, half-way between
Kenesaw and Dallas, and west of Marietta; and Pine Mountain, about
half a mile farther to the north, forming, as it were, the apex of a
triangle, of which Kenesaw and Lost Mountains form the base. These
heights are connected by ranges of lower heights, intersected by
numerous ravines, and thickly wooded. The right of our army rested on
the railroad, the line extending four or five miles in a westerly
direction, protected by strong earthworks, with abatis on every
avenue of approach. While the enemy, feeling his way slowly, was
skirmishing on the right of our position, our army, our country, and
mankind at large, sustained an irreparable loss on June 13th in the
death of that noble Christian and soldier, Lieutenant-General Polk.
Having accompanied Generals Johnston and Hardee to the Confederate
outpost on Pine Mountain, in order to acquaint himself more
thoroughly with the nature of the ground in front of the position
held by his corps, he was killed by a shot from a Federal battery six
or seven hundred yards distant, which struck him in the chest,
passing from left to right. Since the calamitous fall of General
Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh and of General T. J. Jackson at
Chancellorsville, the country sustained no heavier blow than in the
death of General Polk.
On June 18th, heavy rains having swollen Nose's Creek on the left of
our position so that it became impassable, the Federal army, under
cover of this stream, extended its lines several miles beyond
Johnston's left flank toward the Chattahoochee, causing a further
retrograde movement by a portion of his force. For several days brisk
fighting occurred at various points of our line.
The cavalry attack on Wheeler's force on the 20th, the attack upon
Hardee's position on the 24th, and the general assault upon the
Confederate position on the 27th were firmly met and handsomely
repulsed. On the 4th of July, it having been reported by General G.
W. Smith, in command of about a thousand militia, and occupying the
extreme left of our army, that the enemy's "cavalry was pressing him
in such force that he would be compelled to abandon the ground he had
been holding and retire before morning to General Shoup's line of
redoubts," [108] constructed on the high ground near the Chattahoochee
and covering the approaches to the railroad-bridge and Turner's
Ferry, General Johnston deemed it necessary to abandon his position
at Kenesaw on July 5th and fall back to the line constructed by
General Shoup, as the enemy's position covered one of the main roads
to Atlanta, and was nearer to that city than the main body of General
Johnston's force. On the 9th, Sherman having crossed the
Chattahoochee with two corps on the day previous, the Confederate
army crossed that river and established itself two miles in its rear.
Thus, from Dalton to Resaca, from Resaca to Adairsville, from
Adairsville to Alatoona (involving by the evacuation of Kingston the
loss of Rome, with its valuable mills, foundries, and large
quantities of military stores), from Alatoona to Kenesaw, from
Kenesaw to the Chattahoochee, and then to Atlanta; retreat followed
retreat, during seventy-four days of anxious hope and bitter
disappointment, until at last the Army of Tennessee fell back within
the fortifications of Atlanta. The Federal army soon occupied the arc
of a circle extending from the railroad between Atlanta and the
Chattahoochee River to some miles south of the Georgia Railroad (from
Atlanta to Augusta) in a direction north and northeast of Atlanta. We
had suffered a disastrous loss of territory.
Whether the superior numerical strength of the enemy, by enabling him
to extend his force beyond the flank of ours, did thereby necessitate
the abandonment of every position taken by our army, and whether the
enemy, declining to assault any of our intrenched camps, would have
ventured to leave it in rear, upon his only line of communication and
supply, or whether we might have obtained more advantageous results
by a vigorous and determined effort to attack him in detail during
some of his many flank movements--are questions upon which there has
been a decided conflict of opinion, and upon which it would be for me
now neither useful nor pleasant to enter. When it became known that
the Army of Tennessee had been successfully driven from one strong
position to another, until finally it had reached the earthworks
constructed for the exterior defense of Atlanta, the popular
disappointment was extreme. The possible fall of the "Gate City,"
with its important railroad communication, vast stores, factories for
the manufacture of all sorts of military supplies, rolling-mill and
foundries, was now contemplated for the first time at its full value,
and produced intense anxiety far and wide. From many quarters,
including such as had most urged his assignment, came delegations,
petitions, and letters, urging me to remove General Johnston from the
command of the army, and assign that important trust to some officer
who would resolutely hold and defend Atlanta. While sharing in the
keen sense of disappointment at the failure of the campaign which
pervaded the whole country, I was perhaps more apprehensive than
others of the disasters likely to result from it, because I was in a
position to estimate more accurately their probable extent. On the
railroads threatened with destruction, the armies then fighting the
main battles of the war in Virginia had for some time to a great
degree depended for indispensable supplies, yet I did not respond to
the wishes of those who came in hottest haste for the removal of
General Johnston; for here again, more fully than many others, I
realized how serious it was to change commanders in the presence of
the enemy. This clamor for his removal commenced immediately after it
became known that the army had fallen back from Dalton, and it
gathered volume with each remove toward Atlanta. Still I resisted the
steadily increasing pressure which was brought to bear to induce me
to revoke his assignment, and only issued the order relieving him
from command when I became satisfied that his declared purpose to
occupy the works at Atlanta with militia levies and withdraw his army
into the open country for freer operations, would inevitably result
in the loss of that important point, and where the retreat would
cease could not be foretold. If the Army of Tennessee was found to be
unable to hold positions of great strength like those at Dalton,
Resaca, Etowah, Kenesaw, and on the Chattahoochee, I could not
reasonably hope that it would be more successful in the plains below
Atlanta, where it would find neither natural nor artificial
advantages of position. As soon as the Secretary of War showed me the
answer which he had just received in reply to his telegram to General
Johnston, requesting positive information as to the General's plans
and purposes, I gave my permission to issue the order relieving
General Johnston and directing him to turn over to General Hood the
command of the Army of Tennessee. I was so fully aware of the danger
of changing commanders of an army while actively engaged with the
enemy, that I only overcame the objection in view of an emergency,
and in the hope that the impending danger of the loss of Atlanta
might be averted.
The following extracts are made from a letter of the Hon. Benjamin H.
Hill, of Georgia, written at Atlanta, October 12, 1878, and handed to
me by the friend to whom it was addressed:
* * * * *
"On Wednesday or Thursday, I think the 28th or 29th of June, 1864, a
messenger came to my house, sent, as he said, by General Johnston,
Senator Wigfall, of Texas, and Governor Brown, of Georgia.
"The purpose of his mission, as he explained, was to persuade me to
write a letter to President Davis urging him to order either Morgan
or Forrest with five thousand men into Sherman's rear, etc. . . .
"The result of this interview was a determination on my part to go at
once to see General Johnston, and place myself at his service. I
reached his headquarters near Marietta, on the line of the Kenesaw,
on Friday morning, which was the last day of June or the first day of
July. We had a full and free interview, and I placed myself
unreservedly at his disposal.
"He explained at length that he could not attack General Sherman's
army in their intrenchments, nor could he prevent Sherman from
ditching round his (Johnston's) flank and compelling his retreat.
"The only method of arresting Sherman's advance was to send a force
into his rear, cut off his supplies, and thus compel Sherman either
to give battle on his (Johnston's) terms or retreat. In either case,
he thought, he could defeat Sherman, and probably destroy his army.
"I said to him, 'As you do not propose to attack General Sherman in
his intrenchments, could you not spare a sufficient number of your
present army, under Wheeler or some other, to accomplish this work?'
"He said he could not--that he needed all the force he had in front.
"He then said that General Morgan was at Arlington, Virginia, with
five thousand cavalry, and, if the President would so order, this
force could be sent into Sherman's rear at once.
"He also said that Stephen D. Lee had sixteen thousand men under him
in Mississippi, including the troops under Forrest and Roddy, and
that, if Morgan could not be sent, five thousand of those under
Forrest could do the work. Either Morgan or Forrest, with five
thousand men, could compel Sherman to fight at a disadvantage or
retreat, and there was no reason why either should not be sent if the
President should give the order. He explained that he (General
Johnston) had had a consultation with Senator Wigfall and Governor
Brown, the result of which was the messenger to me to secure my
coöperation to influence President Davis to make the order. I
repelled the idea that any influence with the President was needed,
and stated that, if the facts were as General Johnston reported them,
the reënforcement would be sent on his request.
[Illustration: J. E. Johnston]
"But the situation was so critical, involving, as I believed and
explained at length to General Johnston, the fate of the Confederacy,
that I said I would go in person to Richmond and lay all the facts
before the President, and I did not doubt he would act promptly.
"I then said to General Johnston: 'How long can you hold Sherman
north of the Chattahoochee River? This is important, because I must
go to Richmond, and Morgan must go from Virginia or Forrest from
Mississippi, and this will take some time, and all must be done
before Sherman drives you to Atlanta.' General Johnston did not
answer this question with directness, but gave me data which
authorized me to conclude that he could hold Sherman north of the
Chattahoochee River at least fifty-four days, and perhaps sixty days.
I made this calculation with General Johnston's data in his presence,
and told him the result, and he assented to it. When this result was
stated, General Hood, who was present, said, 'Mr. Hill, when we leave
our present line, we will, in my judgment, cross the Chattahoochee
River very rapidly.' 'Why, what makes you think that?' said General
Johnston, with some interest. 'Because,' answered General Hood, 'this
line of the Kenesaw is the strongest line we can get in this country.
If we surrender this to Sherman, he can reconnoiter from its summit
the whole country between here and Atlanta, and there is no such line
of defense in the distance.'
"'I differ with your conclusion,' said General Johnston. 'I admit
this is a strong line of defense, but I have two more strong lines
between this and the river, from which I can hold Sherman a long
time.'
"I was delayed _en route_ somewhat, and reached Richmond on Sunday
morning week, which I think was the 9th day of July. I went to the
hotel, and in a few moments was at the Executive mansion.
"This interview with Mr. Davis I can never forget.
"I laid before him carefully, and in detail, all the facts elicited
in the conversation with General Johnston, and explained fully the
purpose of my mission. When I had gone through, the President took up
the facts, one by one, and fully explained the situation. I remember
very distinctly many of the facts, for the manner as well as matter
stated by Mr. Davis was impressive. 'Long ago,' said the President,
'I ordered Morgan to make this movement upon Sherman's rear, and
suggested that his best plan was to go directly from Abingdon through
East Tennessee. But Morgan insisted that, if he were permitted to go
through Kentucky and around Nashville, he could greatly recruit his
horses and his men by volunteers. I yielded, and allowed him to have
his own way. He undertook it, but was defeated, and has retreated
back, and is now at Abingdon with only eighteen hundred men, very
much demoralized, and badly provided with horses.' He next read a
dispatch from General Stephen D. Lee, to the effect that A. J, Smith
had left Memphis with fifteen thousand men, intended either as a
reënforcement for Sherman or for an attack on Mobile; that, to meet
this force, he (Lee) had only seven thousand men, including the
commands of Forrest and Roddy. He would like to have reënforcements,
but anyhow, with or without reënforcements, 'he should meet Smith,
and whip him, too.' 'Ah! there is a man for you,' said Mr. Davis. And
he did meet Smith with his inferior force, and whipped him, too. He
next read a dispatch from a commander at Mobile (who, I think, was
General Maury), to the effect that Canby was marching from New
Orleans with twenty thousand men, and A. J. Smith from Memphis with
fifteen thousand, intending to make a combined attack on Mobile. To
meet this force of thirty-five thousand men he had four thousand, and
Lee, with Forrest and Roddy, seven thousand, making eleven thousand
in all. He asked for reënforcements.
"After going fully through this matter, and showing how utterly
General Johnston was at fault, as to the numbers of troops in the
different commands, the President said, 'How long did you understand
General Johnston to say he could hold Sherman north of the
Chattahoochee River?' From fifty-four to sixty days I said, and
repeated the facts on that subject as above stated. Thereupon the
President read me a dispatch from General Johnston, announcing that
he had crossed or was crossing the Chattahoochee River."
* * * * *
"The next day (Monday), Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, called to
see me. He asked me to reduce my interview with General Johnston to
writing, for the use of the Cabinet, and I did so, and gave it to
him. Mr. Seddon said he was anxious for General Johnston's removal,
and he was especially anxious because, he said, he was one of those
who was responsible for his appointment. He had urged his appointment
very earnestly, but it was a great mistake, and he desired to do all
he could, even at this late day, to atone for it. The President, he
said, was averse to the removal. He made the appointment against his
own convictions, but thought it a very hazardous thing to remove him
now, and he would not do it, if he could have any assurance that
General Johnston would not surrender Atlanta without a battle.
"Other members of the Cabinet, I know, had views similar to those
expressed by Mr. Seddon. The question, or rather the situation, was
referred to General Lee, but he declined to give any positive advice,
and expressed regret that so grave a movement as the removal of
General Johnston, under the circumstances existing, should be found
to be necessary." [109]
* * * * *
"During all the time, a telegraphic correspondence was kept up with
General Johnston--the object being to ascertain if he would make a
determined fight to save Atlanta. His answers were thought to be
evasive. Finally, the question was put to General Johnston
categorically to this effect: 'Will you surrender Atlanta without a
fight?' To this the answer was regarded as not only evasive, but as
indicating the contemplated contingency of surrendering Atlanta, on
the ground that the Governor of the State had not furnished, as
expected, sufficient State troops to man the city while the army was
giving battle outside. 'This evasive answer to a positive inquiry,'
said one of the Cabinet to me, 'brought the President over. He
yielded very reluctantly.' I was informed of the result at once, and
was also informed that Mr. Davis was the last man in the Cabinet to
agree to the order of removal.". . .
General Hood assumed command on the 18th of July. In his report of
the operations of the army while under his command, he states that
the effective strength of his force on that day was forty-eight
thousand seven hundred and fifty men of all arms.
Feeling that the only chance of holding Atlanta consisted in assuming
the offensive by forcing the enemy to accept battle, General Hood
determined, on the 20th of July, to attack the corps of Generals
Thomas and Schofield, who were in the act of crossing Peachtree
Creek, hoping to defeat Thomas before he could fortify himself, then
to fall on Schofield, and finally to attack McPherson's corps, which
had reached Decatur, on the Georgia Railroad, driving the enemy back
to the creek and into the narrow space included between that stream
and the Chattahoochee River. Owing to an unfortunate misapprehension
of the order of battle and the consequent delay in making the attack,
the movement failed. On the 21st, finding that McPherson's corps was
threatening his communications, General Hood resolved to attack him
at or near Decatur, in front and on flank, turn his left, and then,
following up the movement from the right to the left with his whole
army, force the enemy down Peachtree Creek. This engagement was the
hottest of the campaign, but it failed to accomplish any other
favorable result than to check General McPherson's movement upon the
communications of our army, while it cost heavily in the loss of many
officers and men, foremost among whom was that _preux_ chevalier and
accomplished soldier, Major-General W. H. T. Walker, of Georgia.
Beyond expeditions by the enemy, for the most part by cavalry, to
destroy the lines of railroad by which supplies and reënforcements
could reach Atlanta, and successful efforts on our part to frustrate
their movements, resulting in the defeat and capture of General
Stoneman and his command near Macon, the utter destruction of the
enemy's cavalry force engaged by General Wheeler at Newnan, and the
defeat of Sherman's design to unite his cavalry at the Macon and
Western Railroad, and effectually destroy that essential avenue for
the conveyance of stores and ammunition for our army, no movement of
special importance took place between July 22d and August 26th, at
which latter date it was discovered that Sherman had abandoned his
works upon our right, and, leaving a considerable force to hold his
intrenched position at the railroad-bridge over the Chattahoochee,
was marching his main body to the south and southwest of Atlanta, to
use it, as he himself has expressed it, "against the communications
of Atlanta, instead of against its intrenchments." On the 30th, it
being known that he was moving on Jonesboro, the county town of
Clayton County, about twenty miles south of Atlanta, General Hood
sent two corps under General Hardee to confront him at that point, in
the hope that he could drive him across Flint River, oblige him to
abandon his works on the left, and then be able to attack him
successfully in flank. The attack at Jonesboro was unsuccessful.
General Hardee was obliged, on September 1st, to fall back to
Lovejoy's, seven miles south of Jonesboro, on the Macon and Western
Railroad. Thus, the main body of the Federal army was between Hardee
and Atlanta, and the immediate evacuation of that city became a
necessity. There was an additional and cogent reason for that
movement. Owing to the obstinately cruel policy which the United
States Government had pursued for some time, of refusing on any terms
to exchange prisoners of war, upward of thirty thousand prisoners
were at Andersonville in southwestern Georgia at this time. To guard
against the release and arming of these prisoners, General Hood
thought it necessary to place our army between them and the enemy,
and abandon the project, which he thought feasible, of moving on
Sherman's communications and destroying his depots of supplies at
Marietta.
Upon abandoning Atlanta, Hood marched his army in a westerly
direction, and formed a junction with the two corps which had been
operating at Jonesboro and Lovejoy's under General Hardee.
General Sherman, desisting from any further aggressive movement in
the field, returned to Atlanta, which had been formally surrendered
by the Mayor on September 2d, with the promise, as reported, on the
part of the Federal commander, that non-combatants and private
property should be respected. Shortly after his arrival, the
commanding General of the Federal forces, forgetful of this promise,
and on the pretense that the exigencies of the service required that
the place should be used exclusively for military purposes, issued an
order directing all civilians living in Atlanta, male and female, to
leave the city within five days from the date of the order (September
5th). Since Alva's atrocious cruelties to the noncombatant population
of the Low Countries in the sixteenth century, the history of war
records no instance of such barbarous cruelty as that which this
order designed to perpetrate. It involved the immediate expulsion
from their homes and only means of subsistence of thousands of
unoffending women and children, whose husbands and fathers were
either in the army, in Northern prisons, or had died in battle. In
vain did the Mayor and corporate authorities of Atlanta appeal to
Sherman to revoke or modify this inhuman order, representing in
piteous language "the woe, the horror, and the suffering, not to be
described by words," [110] which its execution would inflict on
helpless women and infant children. His only reply was:
"I give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be
occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, because my
orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case."
At the time appointed, the women and children were expelled from
their houses, and, before they were passed within our lines,
complaint was generally made that the Federal officers and men who
were sent to guard them had robbed them of the few articles of value
they had been permitted to take from their homes. The cowardly
dishonesty of its executioners was in perfect harmony with the temper
and spirit of the order.
During the month of September the Federal army in and around Atlanta
made no movement beyond strengthening its defenses and collecting
within it large quantities of military supplies. General Hood,
meantime, held his troops in the vicinity of Jonesboro. His reports
to the War Department represented the morale of his army as "greatly
impaired by the recurrence of retreat," decreasing in numbers day by
day, and the surrounding country devoid of natural strength or any
advantageous position upon which he could retire. With a view to
judge better the situation, and then determine after personal
inspection the course which should seem best to pursue, I visited
General Hood's headquarters at Palmetto. The crisis was grave. It was
not to be expected that General Sherman would remain long inactive.
The rapidity with which he was collecting recruits and supplies at
Atlanta indicated that he contemplated a movement farther south,
making Atlanta a secondary base. To rescue Georgia, save the Gulf
States, and retain possession of the lines of communication upon
which we depended for the supplies of our armies in the field, an
effort to arrest the further progress of the enemy was necessary; and
to this end the railroads in his rear must be effectually torn up,
the great railroad-bridge over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport
destroyed, and the communication between Atlanta, Chattanooga, and
Nashville completely cut off. Could this be accomplished, all the
fruits of Sherman's successful campaign in Georgia would be blighted,
his capture of Atlanta would become a barren victory, and he would
probably be compelled to make a retreat toward Tennessee, at every
mile of which he might be harassed by our army. Or, should he,
relying on Atlanta as a base, push forward through Georgia to the
Atlantic coast, our army, having cut his communications north of
Atlanta, could fall upon his rear, and, with the advantages of a
better knowledge of the country, of the surrounding devoted
population, of the auxiliary force to be expected under the
circumstances, and our superiority in cavalry, it was not
unreasonable to hope that retributive justice might overtake the
ruthless invader.
My first object was to fill up the depleted ranks of the army, to
bring the absentees and deserters back to the ranks, and induce the
Governor and State officials to coöperate heartily and earnestly with
the Confederate Government in all measures that might be found
necessary to give the proposed movement a reasonable prospect of
success.
The avowed objection of the Governor of Georgia to the acts of
Congress providing for raising troops by conscription, and his
persistent opposition to the authority of the Confederate Executive
to appoint the generals and staff officers of the volunteer
organizations received from the States to form the provisional army
of the Confederacy, caused him frequently to obstruct the Government
officials in the discharge of their duty, to withhold the assistance
which he might be justly expected to render, and, in the
contemplation of his own views of the duties and obligations of the
Executive and legislative departments of the General Government, to
lose sight of those important objects, the attainment of which an
exalted patriotism might have told him depended on the coöperation of
the State and Confederate governments. The inordinate exemption from
military service as State officials of men between the ages of
eighteen and forty-live (it was estimated that the number of exempts
in November, 1864 amounted to fifteen thousand) was an abuse which I
endeavored in vain to correct. Were the majority of the men thus
exempted, and who remained at home "that the army might be fed,"
really engaged in that important service, the end might be said to
justify the means; but, for any less exigent demand, patriotism and
humane consideration for the brave men at the front required that the
number of these exempts should be reduced to the minimum, if, indeed,
the number of those unfit for military duty was not sufficient to
perform this service. After a thorough inspection of the Army of
Tennessee at Palmetto, after conference with several prominent
Georgians, and notably with that pure patriot and distinguished
statesman and soldier. General Howell Cobb, whose brain and heart and
means and energies were all at the service of his country, I
proceeded to Augusta during the first week of October, in order, with
Generals Hardee and Cobb and other officers of prominence, to meet
and confer with General Beauregard, whom I had just assigned to the
command of the Military Division of the West, and to impart to him my
views as to the exigencies of the occasion, and how I thought that
they might be most advantageously met.
Before this time General Hood had already crossed the Chattahoochee
with his entire force, moving against the enemy's line of
communication. General Forrest, with a strong force of cavalry, had
been ordered to Tennessee to strike the railroad from Nashville to
Chattanooga. During my visit to Hood's army, I learned that the
morale of it had been partially restored, many absentees had returned
to duty, and the waning hope of the people was beginning to revive.
The plan of operations which I had discussed with General Hood while
at his headquarters was fully explained to General Beauregard at
Augusta, and by him cordially approved. It comprised the occupation
of a strong position on the enemy's line of communication by the
railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, the capture of his depots
of supplies and the small garrisons left to guard them. If this, as
was probable, should cause Sherman to move to attack as in position,
in that case, if the tone of the troops justified it, a battle should
be joined; otherwise, he should retreat toward Gadsden, where
supplies would be collected, and, should Sherman follow him so far,
then there, on the dividing line of the States of Georgia and
Alabama, the largest practicable number of militia and home-guards of
both States would be assembled as an auxiliary force, and there a
final stand should be made for a decisive battle. If victorious, as
under the circumstances it was hoped we should be, the enemy could
not retreat through the wasted country behind him, and must surrender
or disperse. If Sherman should not pursue our retiring army to
Gadsden, but return to Atlanta to march toward the seacoast, he was
to be pursued, and, by our superiority in cavalry, to be prevented
from foraging on the country, which, according to our information as
to his supplies on hand at Atlanta, and as to his inadequate means of
transportation, would be indispensable for the support of his troops.
Should Sherman, contrary to that information, have supplies and
transportation sufficient to enable him to march across the country,
and he should start toward the seacoast, the militia, the local
troops, and others who could be employed, should obstruct the roads
and fords in his front by felling trees, and, by burning bridges and
other available means, delay his progress until his provisions should
be consumed and absolute want should deplete if not disintegrate his
army. It was supposed that Augusta, on account of our principal
powder-manufactory and some important workshops being located there,
would be the first objective point of Sherman, should he march toward
the east. General Hood's calculation was that, taking a route north
of Sherman, where he would have smaller streams to cross, he could
reach Augusta as soon as Sherman.
General Cobb, the local commander in Georgia, in addition to
obstructing roads, etc., was, in the last supposed contingency, to
assemble at Augusta the invalid soldiers, the militia, and others to
defend the place. General George W. Rains, an accomplished soldier
and military engineer, was instructed to enlarge and strengthen the
defenses of the place, and General G. R. Rains, the author of the
system of defense by sub-terra shells, was, on the coming of the
enemy, to apply his invention to the threatened approaches of the
town. There was another contemplated contingency, viz., that Sherman,
emboldened by his recent successes, would move against Hood with such
overweening confidence as might offer to the latter the opportunity
to strike in detail.
After the full conversation with General Beauregard above noticed,
General Hardee was called in and asked to give his opinion on the
plan, which I regarded as entitled to great consideration, not only
because of his high capacity as a soldier, but also because of his
long connection with the Army of Tennessee, and minute knowledge of
the country in which it was proposed to operate. He had previously
been made fully aware of the plans and purposes discussed between
General Hood and myself, and stated to General Beauregard
substantially that, while he could not say the plan would succeed, he
was confident it was the best which we could adopt, and that, if it
failed, none other with our means would succeed. General Beauregard
left for General Hood's headquarters, as I supposed, to aid in the
execution of the proposed plan, to the success of which the larger
command with which he was invested, it was hoped, would contribute.
General Hood moved as was expected upon the enemy's line of
communication, and his successes at Big Shanty and Acworth, in
capturing those stations and thoroughly destroying the railroad
between them, and his partial success at Allatoona, caused Sherman,
leaving one corps to garrison Atlanta, to move out with his main body
to restore his communications. Hood further succeeded in destroying
the railroad from Resaca to Tunnel Hill, capturing the enemy's posts
at Tilton, Dalton, and Mill-Creek Gap; but, not deeming his army in
condition to risk a general engagement, withdrew his forces in a
southwesterly direction toward Gadsden, which place he reached
October 20th, finding there supplies adequate for the wants of his
troops. Sherman had turned back toward Atlanta, and Hood, instead of
hanging on his rear, not allowing him to repair the damage to the
railroad, and otherwise harassing him in his march as much as
possible, after conference with General Beauregard, decided to
continue his march into Tennessee.[111] His reasons for this change
of plan are elaborately and forcibly presented in his book, "Advance
and Retreat," published since the war, and in which he emphatically
contradicts the attempt which has been made to represent that
campaign into Tennessee as one projected by me. The correspondence of
General Sherman, published in the same work, shows that Hood was not
far wrong in the supposition that Sherman would follow the movement
made on his line of communication; the only error being that he could
thus draw him beyond the limits of Georgia. After my return to
Richmond, a telegram from General Beauregard informed me of the
change of programme. My objection to that movement remained, and,
though it was too late to regain the space and time which had been
lost, I replied promptly on November 30, 1864, as follows:
"General BEAUREGARD, care of Colonel W. M. Browne, _Augusta, Georgia._
"Yours of 24th received. It is probable that the enemy, if short of
supplies, may move directly for the coast. When that is made
manifest, you will be able to concentrate your forces upon the one
object, and I hope, if you can not defeat his attempt, that you may
reduce his army to such condition as to be inefficient for further
operations.
"Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy, he can scarcely
change the plans for Sherman's or Grant's campaigns. They would, I
think, regard the occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky as of minor
importance.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
To the arguments offered to show that our army could not, after it
had reached the Tennessee River, have effectually pursued Sherman in
his march through southern Georgia, it is only needful to reply that
the physical difficulties set forth would not have existed, had our
army commenced the pursuit from Gadsden.
To make the movement into Tennessee a success, even so far as to
recover that country, it was necessary that it should be executed so
promptly as to anticipate the concentration of the enemy's forces,
but unforeseen and unavoidable delays occurred, which gave full time
for preparation. After having overcome many vexatious detentions,
Hood on the 20th of November completed his crossing of the Tennessee
River at Gunter's Landing, and moved forward into Tennessee on the
route to Nashville, whither Sherman had sent General Thomas for the
protection of his depots and communications against an apprehended
attack by cavalry under General Forrest.
Most unwilling to criticise the conduct of that very gallant and
faithful soldier who, battle-scarred and mutilated, survived the war,
and whose recent death our country has so much deplored, I must say
after the event, as I did before it, that I consider this movement
into Tennessee ill-advised.
Thomas having been sufficiently reënforced in Tennessee to enable him
to hold Hood in check, and Sherman relieved from the necessity of
defending himself against an active army, and of protecting a long
line of railroad communication with a fortified base in his rear,
resolved upon his march to the sea, abandoning Atlanta, after having
first utterly destroyed that city by fire. Not a single house was
spared, not even a church. Similar acts of vandalism marked the
progress of the Federal army at Rome, Kingston, Acworth, Marietta,
and every town or village along its route, thus carrying out General
Sherman's order "to enforce a devastation more or less relentless"
along the line of his march, where he only encountered helpless women
and children. The arson of the dwelling-houses of non-combatants and
the robbery of their property, extending even to the trinkets worn by
women, made the devastation as relentless as savage instincts could
suggest.
On November 16th Sherman left his intrenchments around Atlanta, and,
dividing his army into two bodies, each from twenty-five to thirty
thousand strong, the one followed the Georgia Railroad in the
direction of Augusta, and the other took the line of the Macon and
Western Railroad to Jonesboro. Avoiding Macon and Augusta, they
passed through central Georgia, taking Milledgeville on the way,
marching in compact column, and advancing with extreme caution,
although only opposed by detachments of Wheeler's cavalry and a few
hastily formed regiments of raw militia. Partial efforts were made to
obstruct and destroy the roads in the front and on the flanks of the
invading army, and patriotic appeals by prominent citizens were made
to the people, to remove all provisions from its path, but no
formidable opposition was made, except at the railroad-bridge over
the Oconee, where Wheeler, with a portion of his command and a few
militia, held the enemy in check for two or three days. With his
small force, General Wheeler daringly and persistently harassed, and,
when practicable, delayed the enemy's advance, attacking and
defeating exposed detachments, deterring his foragers from venturing
far from the main body, defending all cities and towns along the
railroad lines, and affording protection to depots of supplies,
arsenals, and other important Government works. The report of his
operations from November 14th to December 20th displays a dash,
activity, vigilance, and consummate skill, which justly entitle him
to a prominent place on the roll of great cavalry leaders. By his
indomitable energy, operating on all sides of Sherman's columns, he
was enabled to keep the Government and commanders of our troops
advised of the enemy's movements, and, by preventing foraging parties
from leaving the main body, he saved from spoliation all but a narrow
tract of country, and from the torch millions worth of property which
would otherwise have been certainly consumed.
It soon became manifest that Savannah was General Sherman's objective
point. That city was occupied by General W. J. Hardee with about
eighteen thousand men, a considerable portion of which was composed
of militia, local troops, reserves, and hastily organized regiments
and battalions made up of convalescents from the hospitals and
artisans from the Government shops. On the 10th of December the
enemy's columns reached the immediate vicinity of Savannah, and on
the 12th they occupied a semicircular line extending from the
Savannah River to the Savannah and Gulf Railroad. The defenses of the
city were strong, the earthworks and other fortifications were
flanked by inundated rice-swamps extending across the peninsula
formed by the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, and the causeways leading
through them were well fortified by works mounting heavy guns. With a
sufficient force to occupy his long lines of defense, General Hardee
could have sustained a protracted siege. The city was amply supplied,
and its lines of communication were still open. Although Sherman had
reached Savannah, he had not yet opened communication with the
Federal fleet. Fort McAllister, situated on the right bank of the
Ogeechee, about six miles from Ossabaw Sound, was a serious obstacle
in his way, as it was a work of considerable strength, mounting
twenty-one heavy guns, a deep and wide ditch extending along its
front, with every avenue of approach swept by the guns mounted upon
its bastions. The fort was held by a garrison of two hundred and
fifty men under the command of experienced officers. The work was
attacked on the evening of the 13th, and carried by assault after a
short and feeble resistance. In consequence of the loss of this fort,
Sherman speedily opened communication with the fleet, and became
perfectly secure against any future want of supplies. This also
enabled him to obtain heavy ordnance for use against the city. He
proceeded immediately to take measures to invest Savannah, and in a
few days had succeeded in doing so on every side of the city except
that fronting the river. While Hardee's troops had not yielded a
single position or lost a foot of ground, with the exception of Fort
McAllister, when, on December 20th, he discovered that Sherman had
put heavy siege-guns in position near enough to bombard the city, and
that the enemy was threatening Union Causeway, which extends across
the large swamps that lie between Savannah and Charleston, and
offered the only practicable line of retreat, he determined to
evacuate the place rather than expose the city and its inhabitants to
bombardment. He also thought holding it had ceased to be of any
special importance, and that his troops could do more valuable
service in the field. Accordingly, on the night of December 20th,
having destroyed the navy-yard, the ironclads, and other Government
property, and razed the fortifications below the city, he withdrew
his army and reached Hardeeville on the evening of the 22d, without
hindrance or molestation on the part of the enemy.
[Illustration: General John B. Hood]
Having heretofore stated my objections to the plan of sending Hood's
army into Tennessee after the fall of Atlanta, I will now follow it
in that campaign, relying for the facts on the official report of
General Hood of the 15th of February, 1865. The fidelity and
gallantry of that officer and the well-known magnanimity of his
character are a sufficient guarantee of the impartiality of his
narration.
He reported the arrival of his army at Gadsden on the 20th of
October, 1864, where he was joined by General P. G. T. Beauregard,
commanding the military department. He writes that, after withdrawing
from Atlanta, his hope had been that Sherman in following might offer
an opportunity to strike him in detail, but in this he was
disappointed. Hood reported that the morale of his army, though
improved, was not such as, in the opinion of his corps commanders,
would justify a general engagement while the enemy remained united.
At Gadsden he found a thorough supply of shoes and other stores, but,
after a full and free conference with General Beauregard at
Tuscumbia, he decided to cross the Tennessee and move against Thomas,
who with his corps had been detached by Sherman and sent into Middle
Tennessee. General Beauregard had sent orders to General Forrest to
move with his cavalry into Tennessee; the main body of Hood's cavalry
had been sent to follow Sherman. As the orders to Forrest were
accidentally delayed, and Hood had not cavalry enough to protect his
trains, he was compelled to wait for the coming of Forrest, and, to
hasten the meeting, moved down the river as far as Florence, where he
arrived on the 31st of October. This unfortunate delay gave the enemy
time to repair the railroad to Chattanooga, and accumulate supplies
at Atlanta for a march thence toward the Atlantic coast. Forrest's
cavalry joined on the 21st of November, and the movement began. The
enemy's forces at that time were concentrated at Pulaski and at
Lawrenceburg. Hood endeavored to place his army between these forces
and Nashville, but our cavalry, having driven off the enemy at
Lawrenceburg, gave notice of our advance, and on the 23d he evacuated
Pulaski and moved rapidly by the turnpike and railroad to Columbia.
On the evening of the 27th of November our army took position in
front of the works at that place. During the night the town was
evacuated, and a strong position was taken on the opposite side of
the river, about a mile and a half distant. On the evening of the
28th General Forrest crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia,
and in the morning of the 29th Stewart's and Cheatham's corps
followed the cavalry, leaving Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee's
corps confronting the enemy at Columbia. The cavalry and the two
infantry corps moved in light marching order, the object being, by
advancing rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin
turnpike at or near Spring Hill, to cut off that portion of the foe
at Columbia. The movement having been discovered after Hood's forces
had got well on the flank of the enemy, he began to retreat along the
turnpike toward Spring Hill. About noon of that day the cavalry
attacked his trains, but found them too strongly guarded to be
captured. The retreat was rapidly conducted along the turnpike, with
flankers thrown out to protect the main column. Near Spring Hill
Major-General Cheatham, being in the advance, commenced to come in
contact with the retreating column about two miles from Spring Hill.
He was ordered to attack vigorously, and get possession of the
turnpike. This was so feebly executed that he failed to attain the
object, and the enemy passed on toward Spring Hill. Though the golden
opportunity had passed with daylight, Hood did not abandon the hope
of effecting by a night movement the end he sought. Accordingly,
Lieutenant-General Stewart was furnished with a guide, and ordered to
move his corps beyond Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond
Spring Hill. In the dark and confusion, he did not succeed in getting
the position desired. About midnight, ascertaining that the enemy was
moving in disorder, with artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed,
Hood sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of
skirmishers, still further to impede the retreat. This was not
accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and
confusion nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity for
striking him for which we had labored so long--the greatest this
campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war.
Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, left in front of the enemy at Columbia,
was instructed to press him the moment he abandoned his position at
that point. He did not abandon his works until dark, showing that his
trains obstructed the road for fifteen miles during the day and a
great part of the night. At daylight Hood pursued the enemy so
rapidly as to compel him to burn a number of his wagons. On the hills
about four miles south of Franklin, he made demonstration as if to
give battle, but, when our forces deployed for the attack, he retired
to Franklin.
From dispatches captured at Spring Hill, Hood learned that Schofield
was instructed by Thomas to hold that position until Franklin could
be made secure, and thus knew that it was important to attack
Schofield promptly, and concluded that, if he should escape at
Franklin, he would gain the fortifications about Nashville. Hood
reports that "the nature of the position was such as to render it
inexpedient to attempt any other flank movement, and I therefore
determined to attack him in front and without delay."
As this was one of the bloodiest battles of the war, and its results
materially affected the future, before entering on an account of it,
I pause for some general reflections. It is not quite easy to
determine what my gallant friend Hood meant by the expression, "the
nature of the position." It may have referred to the probability that
the enemy, if he attempted a flank movement, would retreat rapidly,
as he had done from Columbia, and it is now known that a part of his
troops and a large part of his train had already been sent across the
Harpeth River. Thomas's dispatch indicated a purpose to hold
Franklin; and its relation to Murfreesboro, where a garrison was
maintained, would seem to render this a probable part of a plan to
maintain communication with Chattanooga. Franklin had to us, as a
mere _military_ question, no other value than that the road to
Nashville led through it. Whether it would have been possible to turn
the position so promptly as to strike the enemy's line of retreat is
a question which no doubt General Hood considered and decided in the
negative, otherwise he would surely have preferred to attack the
enemy on the march rather than in his intrenchments, especially as
these were so near to the town that Hood was restrained from using
his artillery on account of the women and children resident in it.
The position itself was favorable for defense; the Harpeth River by a
short bend flows on two sides of the town, and the works in front had
the center so boldly salient, their flanks resting on the river, as
to inclose the town in something like a square, two sides being river
and two sides intrenchment. The exterior line of defense had been
recently and hastily constructed; the interior line was much
stronger. Behind the town there were two bridges, one on the main
road leading through it, and the other a pontoon-bridge a short
distance above it. Hood had served with distinction under Lee and
Jackson, and his tactics were of that school. If he had, by an
impetuous attack, crushed Schofield's army, without too great a loss
to his own, and Forrest could have executed his orders to capture the
trains when Schofield's army was crushed, we should never have heard
complaint because Hood attacked at Franklin, and these were the hopes
with which he made his assault.
On the 30th of November he formed his line of battle. At 4 P.M. he
gave the order to advance; his troops moved gallantly forward,
carried the first line, and advanced against the interior works; here
the engagement was close and fierce; the combatants occupied the
opposite sides of the intrenchments, our men carrying them in some
places, many being killed entirely inside the enemy's works. Some of
the Tennesseeans, after years of absence, saw again their homes, and
strove with desperation to expel the invader from them; the contest
continued till near midnight, when the enemy abandoned his works and
crossed the river, leaving his dead and wounded behind him, We had
won a victory, but it was purchased at fearful cost. General Hood, in
his letter of December 11, 1864, written near Nashville, reported his
entire loss at about four thousand five hundred, and among them was
Major-General Cleburne, Brigadier-Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl,
and Granberry, all well known to fame, and whose loss we could ill
afford to bear. Around Cleburne thickly lay the gallant men who, in
his desperate assault, followed him with the implicit confidence that
in another army was given to Stonewall Jackson; and in the one case,
as in the other, a vacancy was created which could never be filled.
Hood reported that the number of dead left on the field by the enemy
indicated that his loss was equal to or near our own; that those of
our men who were captured were inside the enemy's works.
The next morning at daylight, the wounded being cared for and the
dead buried, Hood moved forward toward Nashville, about eighteen
miles distant, and Forrest with his cavalry closely pursued the
enemy. On the 2d of December our army took position in front of
Nashville about two miles from the city, Lieutenant-General Lee's
corps in the center resting on the Franklin turnpike, Cheatham's on
the right, Stewart's on the left, and the cavalry on each flank. Hood
then commenced to construct detached works to cover the flanks,
should offensive movements be attempted against our flank and rear.
The enemy still held Murfreesboro with a garrison of about six
thousand, strongly fortified; he also had small forces at Chattanooga
and Knoxville. It was supposed that he would soon have to take the
offensive to relieve his garrisons at those points, or cause them to
be evacuated, in which latter case Hood hoped to capture the forces
at Murfreesboro, and thus open communication with Georgia and
Virginia; and he thought, if attacked in position, that he could
defeat Thomas, gain possession of Nashville with its abundant
supplies, and thus get the control of Tennessee. The people of the
country, in the mean time, were able and willing to furnish our army
with supplies, and we had captured rolling-stock to put the railroad
to Pulaski in successful operation.
Hood sent Major-General Forrest with the greater part of his cavalry
and a division of infantry against Murfreesboro. The infantry did not
fulfill expectation, and it was withdrawn. Mercer's and Palmer's
brigades of infantry were sent to replace the division. Nothing of
importance occurred until the morning of the 15th, and the enemy,
having been reënforced by about fifteen thousand men from the
trans-Mississippi, attacked simultaneously both flanks of our line.
On our right he was repulsed with heavy loss; but on our left, toward
evening, he earned some of the partially completed redoubts. During
the night of the 15th our line was shortened and strengthened, the
left being thrown back and dispositions made to meet any renewed
attack. The corps of Major-General Cheatham was transferred from our
right to the left. Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a
general attack on our lines, accompanied by a heavy fire of
artillery. All his assaults were repulsed with heavy loss until 3.30
P.M., when a portion of our line to the left of the center suddenly
gave way. Up to this time no battle ever progressed more favorably--
the troops in excellent spirits, waving their colors and bidding
defiance to the enemy; but the position he then gained being such as
to enfilade us, caused our entire line to give way in a few moments
and our troops to retreat in the direction of Franklin, most of them
in great confusion. Confidence in the ability to hold the line had
caused the artillery-horses to be sent to the rear for safety, and
the abandonment of the position was so unexpected and sudden that it
was not possible to bring forward the horses to remove the guns which
had been placed in position, and fifty-four of them were consequently
lost. Our loss in killed and wounded was small. At Brentwood, about
four miles from the field of battle, the troops were partially
rallied, and Lieutenant-General S. D, Lee took command of the
rear-guard and encamped for the night. On leaving the field, Hood
sent one of his staff-officers to inform General Forrest of our
defeat, and to direct him to rejoin the army with as little delay as
possible, but heavy rains had so swollen the creeks that he was
unable to effect the junction with his main force until it reached
Columbia. During the 17th the enemy's cavalry pressed boldly on the
retreating column, the open character of the country being favorable
to cavalry operations. Lieutenant-General Lee, commanding the
covering force, was severely wounded, but not until after he and the
corps he commanded had rendered such service as to receive the
special commendation of the General commanding the army.
Hood reports that when he left the field before Nashville he had
hoped to be able to remain in Tennessee, on the line of Duck River;
but, after arriving at Colombia, he became convinced that the
condition of the army made it necessary to recross the Tennessee
without delay. On the 21st he resumed his march for Pulaski, leaving
Major-General Walthall, with five infantry brigades, and General
Forrest, with the main body of his cavalry, at Columbia, to cover the
movements of the army. The retreat continued, and on the 25th, 26th,
and 27th, the army, including the rear-guard, crossed the Tennessee
River at Bainbridge. The enemy had followed the rear-guard with all
his cavalry and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, and thence the
cavalry continued the pursuit to the Tennessee River. After crossing
the river, the army moved by easy marches to Tupelo, Mississippi.
General Hood reported his losses in the Tennessee campaign to have
been about ten thousand men, including prisoners, and that when he
arrived at Tupelo he had 18,500 infantry and artillery, and 2,306
cavalry. I again quote from General Hood's report:
"Here, finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country, as, in
my judgment, greatly to impair, if not destroy, my usefulness, and
counteract my exertions, and with no desire but to serve my country,
I asked to be relieved, with the hope that another might be assigned
to the command who might do more than I could hope to accomplish.
Accordingly, I was so relieved on the 23d of January, by authority of
the President."
Though, as General Hood states in his book, page 273, I was "averse
to his going into Tennessee," he might well assume that I "was not,
as General Beauregard and himself, acquainted with the true condition
of the army" when they decided on the Tennessee campaign. Of the
manner in which he conducted it, Isham G. Harris, the Governor of
Tennessee, a man of whose judgment, integrity, and manhood I had the
highest opinion, wrote to me, on the 25th of December, 1864:
". . . I have been with General Hood from the beginning of this
campaign, and beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able
to see anything that General Hood has done that he should not, or
neglected any thing that he should, have done, . . . and regret to
say that, if all had performed their parts as well as he, the results
would have been very different."
To this I will only add that General Hood was relieved at his
reiterated request, made from such creditable motives as are
expressed in the extract above, taken from his official report, and
that it was in no wise due to a want of confidence in him on my part.
[Footnote 105: It was during this time, i. e.. in March and April, 1864,
that Forrest made his extraordinary expedition from north Mississippi
across Tennessee to Paducah, Kentucky, and continued his operations
against depots of supplies, lines of communication, and troops moving
to reënforce Sherman--having, on June 11th, a severe action in
Tishemingo with a force estimated at eight or nine thousand, supposed
to be on their way to join Sherman. The energy, strategy, and high
purposes of Forrest, during all this period, certainly entitle him to
higher military rank than that of a partisan, and enroll him in the
list of great cavalry commanders. Some of his other expeditions are
elsewhere mentioned in these pages.]
[Footnote 106: "Narrative," p. 302.]
[Footnote 107: "Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, pp. 98-116.]
[Footnote 108: Johnston's "Narrative," p. 346.]
[Footnote 109: Mr. Seddon, ex-Secretary of War, in a letter written to
me on the 10th of February, 1879, states, in regard to his interview
with General Lee, that it was held after the determination had been made
"to remove General Johnston from his command at Atlanta," and says of
the purpose of the interview with General Lee: "It was designed
merely to secure General Lee's estimate of qualifications in the
selection of a successor for the command."]
[Footnote 110: Mayor Calhoun's Petition to General Sherman, September 11,
1864.]
[Footnote 111: "Advance and Retreat," by General J. B. Hood; letter of
General Beauregard to President Davis, p. 278, _et seq_.]