Subjugation the Object of the Government of the United States.--The
only Terms of Peace offered to us.--Rejection of all Proposals.--
Efforts of the Enemy.--Appearance of Jacques and Gilmore
at Richmond.--Proposals.--Answer.--Commissioners sent to Canada.--
The Object.--Proceedings.--Note of President Lincoln.--Permission
to visit Richmond granted to Francis P. Blair.--Statement of my
Interview with him.--My Letter to him.--Response of President
Lincoln.--Three Persons sent by me to an Informal Conference.--
Their Report.--Remarks of Judge Campbell.--Oath of President
Lincoln.--The Provision of the Constitution and his Proclamation
compared.--Reserved Powers spoken of in the Constitution.--What are
they, and where do they exist?--Terms of Surrender offered to our
Soldiers.
That it was the purpose of the Government of the United States to
subjugate the Southern States and the Southern people, under the
pretext of a restoration of the Union, is established by the terms
and conditions offered to us in all the conferences relative to a
settlement of differences. All were comprehended in one word, and
that was subjugation. If the purpose had been an honorable and
fraternal restoration of the Union as was avowed, methods for the
adjustment of difficulties would have been presented and discussed;
propositions for reconciliation with concessions and modifications
for grievances would have been kindly offered and treated; and a way
would have been opened for a mutual and friendly intercourse. How
unlike this were all the propositions offered to us, will be seen in
the proceedings which took place in the conferences, and in the terms
of surrender offered to our soldiers. It should be remembered that
mankind compose one uniform order of beings, and thus the language of
arbitrary power has the same signification in all ages. When Major
Pitcairn marched the British soldiers upon the common, at Lexington,
in Massachusetts, on April 19, 1775, and, drawing his sword, rushed
upon the little line of Continentals, exclaiming: "Disperse, ye
rebels! throw down your arms and disperse!" he expressed the same
conditions which were offered to us in all our negotiations with the
President of the United States and his generals. Does any one doubt
that Major Pitcairn meant subjugation, or that Great Britain meant
subjugation? Let them as dispassionately construe the Government of
the United States in its declarations to us.
Several efforts were made by us to communicate with the authorities
at Washington without success. Commissioners were sent before
hostilities were begun, and the Government of the United States
refused to receive them, or hear what they had to say. A second time
I sent a military officer with a communication addressed by myself to
President Lincoln. The letter was received by General Scott, who did
not permit the officer to see Mr. Lincoln, but promised that an
answer would be sent. No answer was ever received. The third time a
gentleman was sent whose position, character, and reputation were
such as to insure his reception, if the enemy had not been determined
to receive no proposals whatever from our Government. Vice-President
Stephens made a patriotic tender of his services, in the hope of
being able to promote the cause of humanity; and, although little
belief was entertained of his success, I cheerfully yielded to his
suggestions, that the experiment should be tried. The enemy refused
to let him pass through their lines or to hold any conference with
him. He was stopped before he reached Fortress Monroe.
If we would break up our Government, dissolve the Confederacy,
disband our armies, emancipate our slaves, take an oath of
allegiance, binding ourselves to obedience to it and to disloyalty to
our own States, the Government of the United States proposed to
pardon us, and not to deprive us of anything more than the property
already robbed from us, and such slaves as still remained. In order
to render the proposals so insulting as to secure their rejection,
the President of the United States joined to them a promise to
support with his army one tenth of the people of any State who would
attempt to set up a government over the other nine tenths; thus
seeking to sow discord among the people of the several States, and to
excite them to civil war in furtherance of his ends.
The next movement relating to the accommodation of differences
occurred in July, 1864, and consisted in the appearance at Richmond
of Colonel James F. Jacques, of the Seventy-eighth Illinois Infantry,
and James R. Gilmore, of Massachusetts, soliciting an interview with
me. They stated that they had no official character or authority,
"but were fully possessed of the views of the United States
Government, relative to an adjustment of the differences existing
between the North and the South," and did not doubt that a free
interchange of views would open the way to official negotiations,
etc. They had crossed our lines through a letter of General Grant to
Colonel Ould, commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. The
Secretary of State, Mr. Benjamin, to whom they were conducted,
accompanied them to my office. Colonel Jacques expressed the ardent
desire he felt, in common with the men of their army, for a
restoration of peace, using such emphatic terms as that the men would
go home in double-quick time if they could only see peace restored.
Mr. Gilmore addressed me, and in a few minutes conveyed the
information that the two gentlemen had come to Richmond impressed
with the idea that the Confederate Government would accept a peace on
the basis of a reconstruction of the Union, the abolition of slavery,
and the grant of an amnesty to the people of the States as repentant
criminals. In order to accomplish the abolition of slavery, it was
proposed that there should be a general vote of all the people of
both federations, in mass, and the majority of the vote thus taken
was to determine that as well as all other disputed questions. These
were stated to be Mr. Lincoln's views. The impudence of the remarks
could only be extenuated because of the ignorance displayed and the
profuse avowal of the kindest motives and intentions.
I answered that, as these proposals had been prefaced by the remark
that the people of the North were a majority, and that a majority
ought to govern, the offer was, in effect, a proposal that the
Confederate States should surrender at discretion, admit that they
had been wrong from the beginning of the contest, submit to the mercy
of their enemies, and avow themselves to be in need of pardon for
their crimes; that extermination was preferable to dishonor. I stated
that, if they were themselves so unacquainted with the form of their
own government as to make such propositions, Mr. Lincoln ought to
have known, then giving them his views, that it was out of the power
of the Confederate Government to act on the subject of the domestic
institutions of the several States, each State having exclusive
jurisdiction on that point, still less to commit the decision of such
a question to the vote of a foreign people. Having no disposition to
discuss questions of state with such persons, especially as they bore
no credentials, I terminated the interview, and they withdrew with
Mr. Benjamin.
The opening of the spring campaign of 1864 was deemed a favorable
conjuncture for the employment of the resources of diplomacy. To
approach the Government of the United States directly would have been
in vain. Repeated efforts had already demonstrated its inflexible
purpose--not to negotiate with the Confederate authorities.
Political developments at the North, however, favored the adoption of
some action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile
section. The aspect of the peace party was quite encouraging, and it
seemed that the real issue to be decided in the Presidential election
of that year, was the continuance or cessation of the war. A
commission of three persons, eminent in position and intelligence,
was accordingly appointed to visit Canada, with a view to negotiation
with such persons in the North as might be relied upon to aid the
attainment of peace. The commission was designed to facilitate such
preliminary conditions as might lead to formal negotiations between
the two Governments, and they were expected to make judicious use of
any political opportunity that might be presented.
The commissioners--Messrs. Clay, of Alabama; Holcombe, of Virginia;
and Thompson, of Mississippi--established themselves at Niagara
Falls in July, and on the 12th commenced a correspondence with Horace
Greeley, of New York. Through him they sought a safe-conduct to
Washington. Mr. Lincoln at first appeared to favor an interview, but
finally refused on the ground that the commissioners were not
authorized to treat for peace. His final announcement to them was the
following:
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C, _July 18, 1864._
"_To whom it may concern:_
"Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the
integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery, and
which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now
at war against the United States, will be received and considered by
the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by
liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the
bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."
This movement, like all others which had preceded it, was a failure.
On December 30, 1864, I received a request from Mr. Francis P. Blair,
a distinguished citizen of Montgomery County, Maryland, for
permission to visit Richmond for certain personal objects, which was
conceded to him. On January 12, 1865, he visited me, and the
following statement of our interview was immediately afterward
prepared:
"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _January 12, 1865._
"_Memorandum of a confidential conversation held this day with F.
P. BLAIR, of Montgomery County, Maryland._
"Mr. Blair stated that, not receiving an answer to his application
for permission to visit Richmond, which had been sent from the
headquarters of General Grant's army, he returned to Washington and
there received the reply which had been made to his application, but
by some means had been withheld from him and been forwarded after
having been opened; that he had originally obtained permission to
visit Richmond from Mr. Lincoln, after stating to him that he (Mr.
Blair) had for many years held friendly relations with myself. Mr.
Lincoln stopped him, though he afterward gave him permission to visit
me. He stated, in explanation of his position, that he, being a man
of Southern blood, felt very desirous to see the war between the
States terminated, and hoped by an interview with me to be able to
effect something to that end; that, after receiving the pass which
had been sent to him by my direction, he sought before returning to
have a conversation with Mr. Lincoln; had two appointments for that
purpose, but on each occasion was disappointed, and, from the
circumstances, concluded that Mr. Lincoln avoided the interview, and
therefore came not only without credentials but without such
instructions from Mr. Lincoln as enabled him to speak for him. His
views, therefore, were to be regarded merely as his own, and said
they were perhaps merely the dreams of an old man, etc. He said,
despairing of being able to see me, he had determined to write to me,
and had the rough draft of a letter which he had prepared, and asked
permission to read it. Soon after commencing to do so, he said
(pleasantly) that he found his style was marked by his old pursuit,
and that the paper appeared too much like an editorial. He omitted,
therefore, portions of it, reading what he considered the main points
of his proposition. He had recognized the difference of our positions
as not entitling him to a response from me to the arguments and
suggestions which he desired to offer. I therefore allowed him to
read without comment on my part. When he had finished, I inquired as
to his main proposition, the cessation of hostilities and the union
of the military forces for the common purpose of maintaining the
'Monroe doctrine'--how that object was to be reached. He said that
both the political parties of the United States asserted the Monroe
doctrine as a cardinal point of their creed; that there was a general
desire to apply it to the case of Mexico. For that purpose a secret
treaty might be made, etc. I called his attention to my past efforts
for negotiation, and my inability to see--unless Mr. Lincoln's
course in that regard should be changed--how we were to take the
first step. He expressed the belief that Mr. Lincoln would now
receive commissioners, but subsequently said he could not give any
assurance on that point, and proposed to return to Washington to
explain his project to Mr. Lincoln, and notify me, if his hope proved
well founded, that Mr. Lincoln would now agree to a conference for
the purpose of entering into negotiations. He affirmed that Mr.
Lincoln did not sympathize with the radical men who desired the
devastation and subjugation of the Southern States, but that he was
unable to control the extreme party, which now had great power in the
Congress, and would at the next session have still more; referred to
the existence of two parties in the Cabinet, to the reluctant
nomination of Mr. Chase to be Chief-Justice, etc. For himself, he
avowed an earnest desire to stop the further effusion of blood, as
one every drop of whose blood was Southern. He expressed the hope
that the pride, the power, and the honor of the Southern States
should suffer no shock; looked to the extension of Southern territory
even to the Isthmus of Darien, and hoped, if his views found favor,
that his wishes would be realized; reiterated the idea of State
sovereignty, with illustrations, and accepted the reference I made to
explanation given in the 'Globe,' when he edited it, of the
proclamation of General Jackson.
"When his attention was called to the brutal atrocities of their
armies, especially the fiendish cruelty shown to helpless women and
children, as the cause of a deep-seated hostility on the part of our
people, and an insurmountable obstacle to an early restoration of
fraternal relations, he admitted the necessity for providing a new
channel for the bitter waters, and another bond than that of former
memories and interests. This was supposed to be contained in the
proposed common effort to maintain the 'Monroe doctrine' on the
American Continent. It was evident that he counted on the
disintegration of the Confederate States if the war continued, and
that in any event he regarded the institution of slavery as doomed to
extinction. I thought any remark by me on the first proposition would
lead to intimations in connection with public men which I preferred
not more distinctly to hear than as manifested in his general
remarks; on the latter point, for the reason stated, the inequality
of his responsibility and mine, I preferred to have no discussion.
The only difficulty which he spoke of as insurmountable was that of
existing engagements between European powers and the Confederate
States. This point, when referred to a second time as the dreaded
obstacle to a secret treaty which would terminate the war, was met by
me with a statement that we had now no such complication, were free
to act as to us should seem best, and desired to keep state policy
and institutions free from foreign control. Throughout the conference
Mr. Blair appeared to be animated by a sincere desire to promote a
pacific solution of the existing difficulty, but claimed no other
power than that of serving as a medium of communication between those
who had thus far had no intercourse, and were therefore without the
co-intelligence which might secure an adjustment of their
controversy. To his hopeful anticipation in regard to the restoration
of fraternal relations between the sections, by the means indicated,
I replied that a cessation of hostilities was the first step toward
the substitution of reason for passion, of sense of justice for a
desire to injure, and that, if the people were subsequently engaged
together to maintain a principle recognized by both, if together they
should bear sacrifices, share dangers, and gather common renown, that
new memories would take the place of those now planted by the events
of this war, and might, in the course of time, restore the feelings
which preexisted. But it was for us to deal with the problems before
us, and leave to posterity questions which they might solve, though
we could not; that, in the struggle for independence by our colonial
fathers, had failure instead of success attended their effort, Great
Britain, instead of a commerce which has largely contributed to her
prosperity, would have had the heavy expense of numerous garrisons,
to hold in subjection a people who deserved to be free and had
resolved not to be subject. Our conference ended with no other result
than an agreement that he would learn whether Mr. Lincoln would adopt
his (Mr. Blair's) project, and send or receive commissioners to
negotiate for a peaceful solution of the questions at issue; that he
would report to him my readiness to enter upon negotiations, and that
I knew of no insurmountable obstacle to such a treaty of peace as
would secure greater advantage to both parties than any result which
arms could achieve.
"_January 14, 1865._
"The foregoing memorandum of conversation was this day read to Mr.
Blair, and altered in so far as he desired, in any respect, to change
the expressions employed.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
The following letter was given by me to Mr. Blair:
"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _January 12, 1865._
"F. P. BLAIR, Esq.
"SIR: I have deemed it proper and probably desirable to you to give
you in this form the substance of remarks made by me to be repeated
by you to President Lincoln, etc., etc.
"I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing
now, as heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of
peace, am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to
suppose it will be received, or to receive a commission if the United
States Government shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding the
rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that a
commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint one
immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference with a
view to secure peace to the two countries.
"Yours, etc., JEFFERSON DAVIS."
"WASHINGTON, _January 18, 1865._
"F. P. BLAIR, Esq.
"SIR: You having shown me Mr. Davis's letter to you of the 12th
instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and
shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he or any other
influential person now resisting the national authority may
informally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people
of our one common country.
"Yours, etc., A. LINCOLN."
When Mr. Blair returned and gave me this letter of Mr. Lincoln of
January 18th, it being a response to my note to Mr. Blair of the
12th, he said it had been a fortunate thing that I gave him that
note, as it had created greater confidence in Mr. Lincoln regarding
his efforts at Richmond. Further reflection, he said, had modified
the views he formerly presented to me, and that he wanted to have my
attention for a different mode of procedure.
He had, as he told Mr. Lincoln, held friendly relations with me for
many years; they began as far back as when I was a schoolboy at
Lexington, Kentucky, and he a resident of that place. In later years
we had belonged to the same political party, and our views had
generally coincided. There was much, therefore, to facilitate our
conference. He then unfolded to me the embarrassment of Mr. Lincoln
on account of the extreme men in Congress and elsewhere, who wished
to drive him into harsher measures than he was inclined to adopt;
whence it would not be feasible for him to enter into any arrangement
with us by the use of political agencies; that, if anything
beneficial could be effected, it must be done without the
intervention of the politicians. He, therefore, suggested that
Generals Lee and Grant might enter into an arrangement by which
hostilities would be suspended, and a way paved for the restoration
of peace. I responded that I would willingly intrust to General Lee
such negotiation as was indicated.
The conference then ended, and, to report to Mr. Lincoln the result
of his visit, Mr. Blair returned to Washington. He subsequently
informed me that the idea of a military convention was not favorably
received at Washington, so it only remained for me to act upon the
letter of Mr. Lincoln.
I determined to send, as commissioners or agents for the informal
conference, Messrs. Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John
A. Campbell.
A letter of commission or certificate of appointment for each was
prepared by the Secretary of State in the following form:
"In compliance with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing
is a copy, you are hereby requested to proceed to Washington City for
conference with him upon the subject to which it relates," etc.
This draft of a commission was, upon perusal, modified by me so as to
read as follows:
"RICHMOND, _January 28, 1865._
"In conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing
is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington City for an
informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the existing
war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries."
Some objections were made to this commission by the United States
officials, because it authorized the commissioners to confer for the
purpose "of securing peace to the two countries"; whereas the letter
of Mr. Lincoln, which was their passport, spoke of "securing peace to
the people of our one common country." But these objections were
finally waived.
The letter of Mr. Lincoln expressing a willingness to receive any
agent I might send to Washington City, a commission was appointed to
go there; but it was not allowed to proceed farther than Hampton
Roads, where Mr. Lincoln, accompanied by Mr. Seward, met the
commissioners. Seward craftily proposed that the conference should be
confidential, and the commissioners regarded this so binding on them
as to prevent them from including in their report the discussion
which occurred. This enabled Mr. Seward to give his own version of it
in a dispatch to the United States Minister to the French Government,
which was calculated to create distrust of, if not hostility to, the
Confederacy on the part of the power in Europe most effectively
favoring our recognition.
Why Mr. Lincoln changed his purpose, and, instead of receiving the
commissioners at Washington, met them at Hampton Roads, I can not, of
course, explain. Several causes may be conjecturally assigned. The
commissioners were well known in Washington, had there held high
positions, and, so far as there was any peace party there, might have
been expected to have influence with its members; but a more
important inquiry is: If Mr. Lincoln previously had determined to
hear no proposition for negotiation, and to accept nothing less than
an unconditional surrender, why did he propose to receive informally
our agent? If there was nothing to discuss, the agent would have been
without functions.
I think the views of Mr. Lincoln had changed after he wrote the
letter to Mr. Blair of June 18th, and that the change was mainly
produced by the report which he made of what he saw and heard at
Richmond on the night he staid there. Mr. Blair had many
acquaintances among the members of the Confederate Congress; and all
those of the class who, of old, fled to the cave of Adullam,
"gathered themselves unto him."
Mr. Hunter, in a published article on the peace commission, referring
to Mr. Blair's visit to Richmond, says: "He saw many old friends and
party associates. Here his representations were not without effect
upon his old confederates, who for so long had been in the habit of
taking counsel with him on public affairs." He then goes on to
describe Mr. Blair as revealing dangers of such overwhelming disaster
as turned the thoughts of many Confederates toward peace more
seriously than ever before. That Mr. Blair saw and noted this serious
inclining of many to thoughts of peace, scarcely admits of a doubt;
and, if he believed the Congress to be infected by a cabal
undermining the Executive in his efforts successfully to prosecute
the war, Mr. Lincoln may be naturally supposed thence to have reached
the conclusion that he should accept nothing but an unconditional
surrender, and that he should not allow a commission from the
Confederacy to visit the United States capital.
The report of the commissioners, dated February 5, 1865, was as
follows:
"_To the President of the Confederate States:_
"SIR: Under your letter of appointment of the 28th ult. We proceeded
to seek 'an informal conference' with Abraham Lincoln, President of
the United States, upon the subject mentioned in the letter. The
conference was granted and took place on the 30th ult., on board of a
steamer anchored in Hampton Roads, where we met President Lincoln and
the Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States. It
continued for several hours, and was both full and explicit. We
learned from them that the message of President Lincoln to the
Congress of the United States, in December last, explains clearly and
distinctly his sentiments as to the terms, conditions, and method of
proceeding by which peace can be secured to the people, and we were
not informed that they would be modified or altered to obtain that
end. We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty,
or agreement looking to an ultimate settlement, would be entertained
or made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States,
because that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate
power, which under no circumstances would be done; and, for a like
reason, that no such terms would be entertained by him for the States
separately; that no extended truce or armistice (as at present
advised) would be granted or allowed without a satisfactory assurance
in advance of the complete restoration of the authority of the
Constitution and laws of the United States over all places within the
States of the Confederacy; that whatever consequences may follow from
the reestablishment of that authority must be accepted; but that
individuals subject to pains and penalties under the laws of the
United States might rely upon a very liberal use of the power
confided to him to remit those pains and penalties if peace be
restored.
"During the conference, the proposed amendment to the Constitution of
the United States adopted by Congress on the 31st ultimo was brought
to our notice.
"This amendment provides that neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except for crime, should exist within the United States,
or any place within their jurisdiction, and that Congress should have
power to enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation. Very
respectfully, etc.,
"ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS,
"R. M. T. HUNTER,
"JOHN A. CAMPBELL."
Thus closed the conference, and all negotiations with the Government
of the United States for the establishment of peace. Says Judge
Campbell, in his memoranda:
"In conclusion, Mr. Hunter summed up what seemed to be the result of
the interview: that there could be no arrangements by treaty between
the Confederate States and the United States, or any agreements
between them; that there was nothing left for them but unconditional
submission."
By reference to the message of President Lincoln of December 6, 1864,
which is mentioned in the report, it appears that the terms of peace
therein stated were as follows:
"In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national
authority on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable
condition to ending the war on the part of the Government, I retract
nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made
a year ago, that 'while I remain in my present position I shall not
attempt to retract or modify the emancipation proclamation, nor shall
I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that
proclamation, or by any act of Congress.'
"If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an
executive duty to reënslave such persons, another, and not I, must be
their instrument to perform it."
On the 4th of March, 1861, President Lincoln appeared on the western
portico of the Capitol at Washington, and in the presence of a great
multitude of witnesses took the following oath:
"I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of
President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability,
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."
The first section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the
United States is in these words:
"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or
regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but
shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or
labor may be due."
The intelligent reader will observe that the words of this section,
"in consequence of any law or regulation therein," embrace a
President's emancipation proclamation, as well as any other
regulation therein. Thus the Constitution itself nullified Mr.
Lincoln's proclamation, and made it of no force whatever. Yet he
assumed and maintained, with all the military force he could command,
that it set every slave free. Which is the higher authority, Mr.
Lincoln and his emancipation proclamation or the Constitution? If the
former, then what are constitutions worth for the protection of
rights?
Again he says:
"Nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of
that proclamation or by an act of Congress."
But the Constitution says he shall return them--
"but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service
is due."
Who shall decide? Which is sovereign, Mr. Lincoln and his
proclamation or the Constitution? The Constitution says:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land."
Was it thus obeyed by Mr. Lincoln as the supreme law of the land? It
was not obeyed, but set aside, subverted, overturned by him. But he
said in his oath:
"I do solemnly swear that I will, to the best of my ability,
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."
Did he do it? Is such treatment of the Constitution the manner to
preserve, protect, and defend it? Of what value, then, are paper
constitutions and oaths binding officers to their preservation, if
there is not intelligence enough in the people to discern the
violations, and virtue enough to resist the violators?
Again the report says:
"We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty or
agreement looking to an ultimate settlement would be entertained or
made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States, because
that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate power,
which under no circumstances would be done; and, for a like reason,
that no such terms would be entertained by him for the States
separately."
Now the Constitution of the United States says, in Article X:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
Within the purview of this article of the Constitution the States are
independent, distinct, and sovereign bodies--that is, in their
reserved powers they are as sovereign, separate, and supreme as the
Government of the United States in its delegated powers. One of these
reserved powers is the right of the people to alter or abolish any
form of government, and to institute a new one such as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness; that power is
neither "delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to the States." On the contrary, it is guaranteed to
the States by the Constitution itself in these words:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
Mark the words, "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." No one will venture to say that a sovereign State, by the
mere act of accession to the Constitution, delegated the power of
secession. The assertion would be of no validity if it were made; for
the question is one of fact as to the powers delegated or not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution. It is absurd to
ask if the power of secession in a State is delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, or prohibited by it to the States. No
trace of the delegation or prohibition of this power is to be found
in the Constitution. It is, therefore, as the Constitution says,
"reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
The Convention of the State of New York, which ratified the
Constitution of the United States on July 26, 1788, in its resolution
of ratification said:
"We do declare and make known . . . that the powers of Government may
be reassumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to
their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is
not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the
United States, or to the departments of the Government thereof,
remains to the people of the several States, or to their respective
State governments, to whom they may have granted the same. . . .
Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid can
not be abridged or violated," etc., etc., "we, the said delegates, in
the name and in behalf of the people of the State of New York, do, by
these presents, assent to and ratify the said Constitution."
With this and other conditions stated in the resolution of
ratification, it was accepted and approved by the other States, and
New York became a member of the Union. The resolution of Rhode Island
asserts the same reservation in regard to the reassumption of powers.
It is unnecessary to examine here whether this reserved power exists
in the States respectively or in the people; for, when the
Confederate States seceded, it was done by the people, acting
through, or in conjunction with, the State, and by that power which
is expressly reserved to them in the Constitution of the United
States. When Mr. Lincoln, therefore, issued his proclamation calling
for seventy-five thousand men to subjugate certain "combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings," he not only thereby denied the validity of the
Constitution, but sought to resist, by military force, the exercise
of a power clearly reserved in the Constitution, and reaffirmed in
its tenth amendment, to the States respectively or to the people for
their exercise. But, in order to justify his flagrant disregard of
the Constitution, he contrived the fiction of "combinations," and
upon this basis commenced the bloody war of subjugation with all its
consequences. Thus, any recognition of the Confederate States, or of
either of them, in his negotiations, would have exposed the
groundlessness of his fiction. But the Constitution required him to
recognize each of them, for they had simply exercised a power which
it expressly reserved for their exercise. Thus it is seen who
violated the Constitution, and upon whom rests the responsibility of
the war.
It has been stated above that the conditions offered to our soldiers
whenever they proposed to capitulate, were only those of subjugation.
When General Buckner, on February 16, 1862, asked of General Grant to
appoint commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation, he replied:
"No terms, except unconditional and immediate surrender, can be
accepted."
When General Lee asked the same question, on April 9, 1865, General
Grant replied:
"The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the
South laying down their arms, they will hasten that most desirable
event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of
property not yet destroyed."
When General Sherman made an agreement with General Johnston for
formal disbandment of the army of the latter, it was at once
disapproved by the Government of the United States, and Sherman
therefore wrote to Johnston:
"I demand the surrender of your army on the same terms as were given
to General Lee at Appomattox, on April 9th, purely and simply."
It remains to be stated that the Government which spurned all these
proposals for peace, and gave no terms but unconditional and
immediate surrender, was instituted and organized for the purposes
and objects expressed in the following extract, and for no others:
"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for
the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
[Footnote 117: General Hampton's letter to General Sherman, February 27,
1865.]
[Footnote 118: "The Story of the Great March, from the Diary of a Staff
Officer." By Brevet Major George Ward Nichols, Aide-de-Camp to
General Sherman. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1865, pp. 112, _et seq_.]