Situation in the Shenandoah Valley.--March of General Early.--The
Object.--At Lynchburg.--Staunton.--His Force.--Enters Maryland.--
Attack at Monocacy.--Approach to Washington.--The Works.--
Recrosses the Potomac.--Battle at Kernstown.--Captures.--Outrages
of the Enemy.--Statement of General Early.--Retaliation on
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.--Battle near Winchester.--Sheridan's
Force routed.--Attack subsequently renewed with New Forces.--
Incapacity of our Opponent.--Early falls back.--The Enemy
retires.--Early advances.--Report of a Committee of Citizens on
Losses by Sheridan's Orders.--Battle at Cedar Creek.--Losses,
Subsequent Movements, and Captures.--The Red River Campaign.--
Repulse and Retreat of General Banks.--Capture of Fort Pillow.
Before the opening of the campaign of 1864, the lower Shenandoah
Valley was held by a force under General Sigel, with which General
Grant decided to renew the attempt which had been made by Crook and
Averill to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad west of
Lynchburg as a means to his general purpose of isolating Richmond;
and a prompt movement of General Morgan had defeated those attempts
and driven off the invaders. Sigel, with about fifteen thousand men,
commenced his movement up the Valley of the Shenandoah. Major-General
Breckinridge, commanding in southwestern Virginia, was notified, on
the 4th of May, of the movement of Sigel, and started immediately
with two brigades of infantry to Staunton, at which place he arrived
on the 9th. The reserves of Augusta County, under Colonel Harmon,
were called out, numbering several hundred men, and the cadets of the
Military Institute at Lexington, numbering two hundred, voluntarily
joined him. With this force Breckinridge decided to march to meet
Sigel. General Imboden, with a cavalry force of several hundred, had
been holding, as best he might, the upper Valley, and joined
Breckinridge in the neighborhood of New Market, informing him that
Sigel then occupied that place. Breckinridge having marched so
rapidly from Staunton that it was probable that his advance was
unknown to the enemy, he determined to make an immediate attack. His
troops were put in motion at one o'clock, and by daylight was in line
of battle two miles south of New Market. Sigel seems to have been
unconscious of any other obstruction to the capture of Staunton than
the small cavalry force under Imboden. At this time Lee was engaged
with the vastly superior force of Grant, which had crossed the
Rapidan, and Sigel's was a movement to get upon our flank, and thus
coöperate with Grant in his attempt to capture Richmond. Breckinridge
had an infantry force not much exceeding three thousand. The hazard
of an attack was great, but the necessity of the case justified it.
Breckinridge's force was only enough to form one line of battle in
two ranks, the cadets holding the center between the two brigades.
There were no reserves, and Colonel Harmon's command formed the guard
for the trains. Skirmish lines were promptly engaged, and soon
thereafter the enemy fell back beyond New Market, where Sigel,
assuming the defensive, took a strong position, in which to wait for
an attack. Our artillery was moved forward, and opened with effect
upon the enemy's position; then our infantry advanced, "with the
steadiness of troops on dress parade, the precision of the cadets
serving well as a color-guide for the brigades on either side to
dress by. . . . The Federal line had the advantage of a stone wall
which served as a breastwork." [102] Sigel's cavalry attempted to turn
our right flank, but was repulsed disastrously, and in a few moments
the enemy was in full retreat, crossing the Shenandoah and burning
the bridge behind him.
Breckinridge captured five pieces of artillery and over five hundred
prisoners, exclusive of the wounded left on the field. Our loss was
several hundred killed and wounded. General Lee, after receiving
notice of this, ordered Breckinridge to transfer his command as
rapidly as possible to Hanover Junction. The battle was fought on the
15th, and the command reached Hanover Junction on the 20th of May.
Before General Breckinridge left the Valley, he issued an order
thanking his troops, "particularly the cadets, who, though mere
youths, had fought with the steadiness of veterans."
Brigadier-General W. E. Jones had, with a small cavalry force, come
from southwestern Virginia to the Valley after Breckinridge's
departure, and this, with the command of Imboden, only sufficient for
observation, was all that remained in the Valley when the Federal
General David Hunter, with a larger force than Sigel's, succeeded the
latter. Jones, with his cavalry and a few infantry, encountered this
force at Piedmont, was defeated and killed. Upon the receipt of this
information, Breckinridge with his command was sent back to the
Valley.
On June 13th Major-General Early, with the Second Corps of Lee's
army, numbering a little over eight thousand muskets and two
battalions of artillery, commenced a march to strike Hunter's force
in the rear, and, if possible, destroy it; then to move down the
Valley, cross the Potomac, and threaten Washington. On the 17th he
reached Lynchburg, and Hunter arrived at the same time. Preparations
were made for the attack of Hunter on the 19th, when he began to
retreat, and was pursued with much loss, until he was disposed of by
taking the route to the Kanawha River. On the 27th Early's force
reached Staunton on its march down the Valley. It now amounted to ten
thousand infantry and about two thousand cavalry, having been joined
by Breckinridge, and Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, with a battalion of
Maryland cavalry. The advance was rapid. Railroad bridges were
burned, the track destroyed, and stores captured. The Potomac was
crossed on the 5th and 6th of June, and the move was made through the
gaps of South Mountain to the north of Maryland Heights, which were
occupied by a hostile force. A brigade of cavalry was sent north of
Frederick to strike the railroads from Baltimore to Harrisburg and
Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gunpowder, and to cut the
railroad between Washington and Baltimore, and threaten the latter
place. The other troops moved forward toward Monocacy Junction, where
a considerable body of Federal troops under General Wallace was found
posted on the eastern bank of the Monocacy, with an earthwork and two
block-houses commanding both bridges. The position was attacked in
front and on the flank, and it was carried and the garrison put to
flight. Between six and seven hundred unwounded prisoners fell into
our hands, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater
than ours, which was about seven hundred.
An advance was made on the 10th nearly to Knoxville, on the
Georgetown Pike. On the next day it was continued to Washington, with
the hope of getting into the fortifications before they could be
manned. But the heat and the dust impeded the progress greatly. Fort
Stevens was approached soon after noon, and appeared to be lightly
manned, but, before our force could get into the works, a column of
the enemy from Washington filed into them on the right and left,
skirmishers were thrown out in front, and an artillery-fire was
opened on us from a number of batteries. An examination was now made
to determine if it were practicable to carry the defenses by assault.
"They were found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what
appeared to be inclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of
lower works in front of each, pierced for an immense number of guns,
the whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and
strengthened by palisades and abatis. The timber had been felled
within cannon-range all around and left on the ground, making a
formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by
artillery." As far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be
of the same impregnable character. The exhaustion of our force, the
lightness of its artillery, and the information that two corps of the
enemy's forces had just arrived in Washington, in addition to the
veteran reserves and hundred-days-men, and the parapets lined with
troops, led us to refrain from making an assault, and to retire
during the night of the 12th. On the morning of the 14th General
Early recrossed the Potomac, bringing off the prisoners captured at
Monocacy and everything else in safety, including a large number of
beef-cattle and horses. There was some skirmishing in the rear
between our cavalry and that which was following us, and on the
afternoon of the 14th there was artillery-firing across the river at
our cavalry watching the fords. Meantime General Hunter had arrived
at Harper's Ferry and united with Sigel, and some skirmishing took
place; but General Early determined to concentrate near Strasburg, so
as to enable him to put the trains in safety, and mobilize his
command to make an attack. On the 22d he moved across Cedar Creek
toward Strasburg, and so posted his force as to cover all the roads
from the direction of Winchester. Learning on the next day that a
large portion of the column sent after him from Washington was
returning, and that the Army of West Virginia, under Crook, including
Hunter's and Sigel's forces, with Averill's cavalry, was at
Kernstown, he determined to attack at once.
After the enemy's skirmishers had been driven in, it was discovered
that his left flank was exposed, and General Breckinridge was ordered
to move Echols's division undercover of some ravines on our right and
attack that flank. The attacking division struck the enemy's left
flank in open ground, doubling it up and throwing his whole line into
great confusion. The other divisions then advanced, and his rout
became complete. He was pursued by the infantry and artillery beyond
Winchester. Our loss was very light; his loss in killed and wounded
was severe. The whole defeated force crossed the Potomac, and took
refuge at Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. The road was strewed
with debris of the rapid retreat--twelve caissons and seventy-two
wagons having been abandoned, and most of them burned.
On the 26th the Confederate force moved to Martinsburg:
"While at Martinsburg," says General Early in his memoir, "it was
ascertained beyond all doubt that Hunter had been again indulging in
his favorite mode of warfare, and that, after his return to the
Valley, while we were near Washington, among other outrages, the
private residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia
Senate, Mr. Alexander R. Boteler, an ex-member of the Confederate
Congress, as well as of the United States Congress, and Edmund I.
Lee, a distant relative of General Lee, all in Jefferson County, with
their contents, had been burned by his orders, only time enough being
given for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns in
the South, as well as private country-houses, had been burned by
Federal troops, and the accounts had been heralded forth in some of
the Northern papers in terms of exaltation, and gloated over by their
readers, while they were received with apathy by others. I now came
to the conclusion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough,
and that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to
its enormity by an example in the way of retaliation. I did not
select the cases mentioned as having more merit or greater claims for
retaliation than others, but because they had occurred within the
limits of the country covered by my command, and were brought more
immediately to my attention.[103]
"The town of Chambersburg was selected as the one on which
retaliation should be made, and McCausland was ordered to proceed
with his brigade and that of Johnson's and a battery of artillery to
that place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum of one
hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hundred thousand dollars in
United States currency, as a compensation for the destruction of the
houses named and their contents; and in default of payment to lay the
town in ashes, in retaliation for the burning of those houses and
others in Virginia, as well as for the towns which had been burned in
other Southern States. A written demand to that effect was also sent
to the municipal authorities, and they were informed what would be
the result of a failure or a refusal to comply with it. I desired to
give the people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town,
by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped that
the payment of such a sum would have the desired effect, and open the
eyes of people of other towns at the North to the necessity of urging
upon their Government the adoption of a different policy.
"On July 30th McCausland reached Chambersburg, and made the demand as
directed, reading to such of the authorities as presented themselves
the paper sent by me. The demand was not complied with, the people
stating that they were not afraid of having their town burned, and
that a Federal force was approaching. The policy pursued by our army
on former occasions had been so lenient that they did not suppose the
threat was in earnest at this time, and they hoped for speedy relief.
McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out his orders, and the
greater part of the town was laid in ashes. He then moved in the
direction of Cumberland, but found it defended by a strong force. He
then withdrew and crossed the Potomac, near the mouth of the South
Branch, capturing the garrison and partly destroying the
railroad-bridge. Averill pursued from Chambersburg, and surprised and
routed Johnson's brigade, and caused a loss of four pieces of
artillery and about three hundred prisoners from the whole command."
Meantime a large force, consisting of the Sixth, Nineteenth, and
Crook's corps, of the Federal army, had concentrated at Harper's
Ferry under Major-General Sheridan. After various manoeuvres, both
armies occupied positions in the neighborhood of Winchester. Early
had about eight thousand five hundred infantry fit for duty, nearly
three thousand mounted men, three battalions of artillery, and a few
pieces of horse-artillery. Sheridan's force, according to the best
information, consisted of ten thousand cavalry, thirty-five thousand
infantry, and artillery that greatly outnumbered ours both in men and
guns.
On the morning of September 19th, the enemy began to advance in heavy
force on Ramseur's position, on an elevated plateau between Abraham's
Creek and Red Bud Run, about a mile and a half from Winchester, on
the Berryville road. Nelson's artillery was posted on Ramseur's line,
covering the approaches as far as practicable; and Lomax, with
Jackson's cavalry and a part of Johnson's, was on the right, watching
the valley of Abraham's Creek and the Front Royal road beyond, while
Fitzhugh Lee was on the left, across the Red Bud, with cavalry,
watching the interval between Ramseur's left and the Red Bud. These
troops held the enemy's main force in check until Gordon's and
Rodes's divisions arrived, a little after 10 A.M. Gordon was placed
under cover in rear of a piece of woods, behind the interval between
Ramseur's line and the Red Bud. Rodes was directed to form on
Gordon's right, in rear of another piece of woods. Meanwhile, we
discovered very heavy columns, that had been massed under cover
between the Red Bud and the Berryville road, moving to attack Ramseur
on his left flank, while another force pressed him in front. Rodes
and Gordon were immediately hurled upon the flank of the advancing
columns. But Evans's brigade, of Gordon's division, on the extreme
left of our infantry, was forced back through the woods from behind
which it had advanced by a column, which followed to the rear of the
woods and within musket-range of seven pieces of Braxton's artillery.
Braxton's guns stood their ground and opened with canister. The fire
was so well directed that the column staggered, halted, and commenced
falling back. Just then Battle's brigade moved forward and swept
through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans's brigade
was rallied and coöperated. Our advance was resumed, and the enemy's
attacking columns, the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, were thrown into
great confusion and fled from the field. General Early exclaims, "It
was a grand sight to see this immense body hurled back in utter
disorder before my two divisions, numbering very little over five
thousand muskets!" This affair occurred about 11 A.M., and a splendid
victory had been gained. But the enemy still had a fresh corps which
had not been engaged, and there remained his heavy force of cavalry.
Our lines were now formed across from Abraham's Creek to Red Bud, and
were very attenuated. There was still seen in front a formidable
force, and away to the right a division of cavalry massed, with some
artillery overlapping us at least a mile. Late in the afternoon, two
divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force that had
been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's corps, which
had not been engaged, advanced at the same time on the north side of
Red Bud and forced back our brigade of infantry and cavalry. A
considerable force of cavalry then swept along the Martinsburg road
to the skirts of Winchester, thus getting in the rear of our left
flank. This was soon driven back by two of Wharton's brigades, and
subsequently another charge of cavalry was also repulsed. But many of
the men in the front line, hearing the fire in the rear, and thinking
they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced to fall back. At
the same time Crook's corps advanced against our left, and Evans's
brigade was thrown into line to meet it, but, after an obstinate
resistance, that brigade also retired. The whole front line had now
given way, but was rallied and formed behind some old breastworks,
and with the aid of artillery the progress of the enemy's infantry
was arrested. Their cavalry afterward succeeded in getting around on
our left, producing great confusion, for which there was no remedy.
We now retired through Winchester, a new line was formed, and the
hostile advance checked until nightfall. We then retired to Newton
without serious molestation. Our trains, stores, sick, and wounded
that could be removed had been sent to Fisher's Hill. This battle,
beginning with the skirmishing in Ramseur's front, had lasted from
daylight until dark, and, at the close of it, we had been forced back
two miles, after having repulsed the first attack with great
slaughter, and subsequently contested every inch of ground with
unsurpassed obstinacy. We deserved the victory, and would have gained
it but for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry. In his memoir
General Early says:
"When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from
utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent."
Our loss was severe for the size of our force, but only a fraction of
that ascribed to us by the foe, while his was very heavy, and some
prisoners fell into our hands.
On the 22d, after two days spent in reconnoitering, the enemy
prepared to make an attack upon our position at Fisher's Hill; but,
as our force was not strong enough to resist a determined assault,
orders were given to retire after dark. Before sunset, however, an
advance was made against Ramseur's left by Crook's corps. The
movement to put Pegram's brigades into line successively to the left
produced some confusion, when the enemy advanced along his entire
line, and, after a brief contest, our force retired in disorder. We
fell back to a place called Narrow Passage, all the trains being
removed in safety. Some skirmishing ensued as we withdrew up the
Valley, but without important result.
On October 1st our force was in position between Mount Sidney and
North River, and the enemy's had been concentrated around
Harrisonburg and on the north bank of the river. On the 5th we were
reënforced by General Rosser with six hundred mounted men, and
Kershaw's division, numbering twenty-seven hundred muskets, with a
battalion of artillery. On the morning of the 6th it was discovered
that the foe had retired down the Valley. General Early then moved
forward and arrived at New Market with his infantry on the 7th.
Rosser pushed forward on the back and middle roads in pursuit of the
cavalry, which was engaged in burning houses, mills, barns, and
stacks of wheat and hay, and had several skirmishes with it.
A committee, consisting of thirty-six citizens and the same number of
magistrates, appointed by the County Court of Rockingham County, for
the purpose of making an estimate of the losses of that county by the
execution of General Sheridan's orders, made an investigation, and
reported as follows:
"Dwelling-houses burned, 30; barns burned, 450; mills burned, 31;
fences destroyed (miles), 100; bushels of wheat destroyed, 100,000;
bushels of corn destroyed, 50,000; tons of hay destroyed, 6,233;
cattle carried off, 1,750; horses carried off, 1,750; sheep carried
off, 4,200; hogs carried off, 3,350; factories burned, three;
furnaces burned, one. In addition there was an immense amount of
farming utensils of every description destroyed, many of them of
great value, such as reapers and thrashing-machines; also, household
and kitchen furniture, and money, bonds, plate, etc., pillaged."
General Early, having learned that Sheridan was preparing to send a
part of his troops to Grant, moved down the Valley again on the 12th,
and reached Fisher's Hill. The enemy was found on the north bank of
Cedar Creek in strong force. He gave no indication of an intention to
move, nor did he evince any purpose of attacking us, though the two
positions were in sight of each other. At the same time it became
necessary for us to move back for want of provisions and forage, or
to attack him in his position with the hope of driving him from it.
An attack was determined upon by General Early, and, as he was not
strong enough to assault the fortified position in front, he resolved
to get around one of the enemy's flanks and attack him by surprise.
His plan of attack is thus stated by him:
"I determined to send the three divisions of the Second Corps, to
wit, Gordon's, Ramseur's, and Pegram's, under General Gordon, to the
enemy's rear, to make the attack at 5 A.M., which would be a little
before daybreak on the 19th; to move myself with Kershaw's and
Wharton's divisions and all the artillery along the pike through
Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left flank, as soon
as Gordon should become engaged, and for Bosser to move with his own
and Wickham's brigade on the back road across Cedar Creek, and attack
the enemy's cavalry simultaneously with Gordon's attack, while Lomax
should move by Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the Valley
pike, so as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which he was
to judge by the sound of the firing."
Gordon moved at the appointed time. At 1 A.M. Kershaw and Wharton,
accompanied by General Early, advanced. At Strasburg, Kershaw moved
to the right on the road to Bowman's Mill, and Wharton moved along
the pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions not to display his forces,
but to avoid notice until the attack began, when he was to move
forward, support the artillery when it came up, and send a force to
get possession of the bridge on the pike over the creek. Kershaw's
division got in sight of the enemy at half-past three o'clock. He was
directed to cross his division at the proper time over the creek as
quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did
so, and advance in that manner against the left breastwork, extending
to the right or left as might be necessary. At half-past four he was
ordered forward, and, a very short time after he started, the firing
from Bosser on our left and the picket-firing at the ford at which
Gordon was crossing were heard. Kershaw crossed the creek without
molestation and formed his division as directed, and precisely at
five o'clock his leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over
the left work, capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the
enemy. At the same time Wharton and the artillery were just arriving
at Hupp's Hill, and a very heavy fire of musketry was heard in the
rear from Gordon's column. Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to
the creek, capturing some prisoners, but the foe still held the works
on our left of the pike, commanding that road and the bridge, and
opened with his artillery on us. Our artillery was at once brought
into action, and opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated his
works, and our men from the other columns rushed into them. Wharton
was immediately ordered forward, Kershaw's division had swept along
the enemy's works on the right of the pike, which were occupied by
Crook's corps, and he and Gordon had united at the pike, and their
divisions had pushed across it in pursuit. A delay of an hour at the
river had occurred in Gordon's movement, which enabled Sheridan
partially to form his lines after the alarm produced by Kershaw's
attack; and Gordon's, which was after daylight, was therefore met
with greater obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise have
encountered, and the fighting had been severe. Gordon, however,
pushed his advance with such energy, that the Nineteenth and Crook's
corps were in complete rout, and their camps, with a number of pieces
of artillery and a considerable quantity of small-arms, abandoned.
The Sixth Corps, which was on the right, and some distance from the
point attacked, had had time to get under arms and take position so
as to arrest our progress. A fog which had prevailed soon rose
sufficiently for us to see the Sixth Corps' position on a ridge to
the west of Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one. The
enemy had not advanced, but opened on us with artillery, and orders
were given to concentrate all our guns on him. In the mean time a
force of cavalry was moving along the pike, through the fields to the
right of Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in great danger.
Wharton was ordered to form his division at once, and take position
to hold that cavalry in check. Discovering that the Sixth Corps could
not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, because the
approach in that direction was through an open flat and across a
boggy stream with high banks, Gordon in conjunction with Kershaw was
ordered to assail the right flank, while a heavy fire of artillery
was opened from our right. In a short time eighteen or twenty guns
were concentrated on the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Ramseur
and Pegram advanced at once to the position from which he was driven,
and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on the right,
and Pegram's division was ordered to move to the north of Middletown
and take position across the pike against the cavalry. As soon as
Pegram moved, Kershaw was ordered from the left to supply his place.
Bosser had attacked the enemy promptly at the appointed time, but had
not been able to surprise him, as he was found on the alert on that
flank. There was now one division of cavalry threatening our right
flank, and two were on the left near the Back road, held in check by
Bosser. His force was so weak he could only watch.
After he had been driven from his second position, the enemy had
taken a new one about two miles north of Middletown. An advance by
Gordon and Kershaw and Ramseur was ordered, but, after it had been
made for some distance, Gordon's skirmishers came back, reporting a
line of battle in front, behind breastworks, and an attack was not
made.
"It was now apparent that it would not do," says General Early, "to
press my troops farther. They had been up all night and were much
jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy at dawn their
own ranks had been much disordered and the men scattered, and it had
required time to reform them. Their ranks were much thinned by the
absence of the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps."
It was determined, therefore, to try to hold what had been gained,
and orders were given to carry off the captured and abandoned
artillery, small-arms, and wagons. A number of bold attempts were
made, during the subsequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry,
to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed.
Late in the afternoon, his infantry advanced against Ramseur's,
Kershaw's, and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ramseur's and
Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed; but a portion of the
assailants had penetrated an interval which was between Evans's
brigade on the extreme left and the rest of the line, when that
brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed. General
Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men and lead them
back, but without avail. This affair was soon known with
exaggerations along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their men,
fearing to be flanked, began to fall back in disorder, though no
force was pressing them. At the same time the enemy's cavalry,
observing the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our
right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to rally the
men, but the mass of them continued to resist all appeals. Ramseur
succeeded in retaining with him two or three hundred men of his
division, and about the same number was retained by Major Goggin from
Conner's brigade; these, aided by several pieces of artillery, held
the whole force on our left in check for one hour and a half until
Ramseur was shot down, and the ammunition of the artillery was
exhausted. While the latter was being replaced by other guns, the
force that had continued steady gave way also. Pegram's and Wharton's
divisions and Wofford's brigade had remained steadfast on the right,
and resisted every effort of the cavalry, but no portion of this
force could be moved to the left without leaving the pike open to the
cavalry, which would have destroyed all hope at once. Every effort to
rally the men in the rear having failed, these troops were ordered to
retire. The disorder soon extended to them. The greater part of the
infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill, and Rosser, whose command had
retired in good order on the Back road, was ordered to that point
with his cavalry to cover the retreat, and hold that position until
the troops were beyond pursuit. He fell back on the forenoon of the
20th, when the enemy had not advanced to that place. The troops were
halted at Newmarket, seven miles from Mount Jackson. Our loss in the
battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three pieces of artillery, some
ordnance, and medical wagons and ambulances, about 1,860 killed and
wounded, and something over a thousand prisoners; 1,500 prisoners
were captured from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed
and wounded was very heavy. We had in this battle about 8,500 muskets
and a little over forty pieces of artillery. Sheridan's cavalry
numbered 8,700, and his infantry force was fully as large as at
Winchester.
Subsequently General Early confronted Sheridan's whole force north of
Cedar Creek for two days, November 11th and 12th, without an attack
being made upon him. On November 27th the fortified post at New Creek
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was surprised and captured by
General Rosser. Two regiments of Federal cavalry with their arms and
colors were taken, and eight pieces of artillery and a very large
amount of ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary stores fell into
our hands. Eight hundred prisoners, four pieces of artillery, and
some wagons and horses were brought off. When the campaign closed,
the invader held precisely the same position in the Valley which he
held before the opening of the campaign in the spring.
In the Red River country of Louisiana, it became certain in February,
1864, that the enemy was about to make an expedition against our
forces under General Richard Taylor, not so much to get possession of
the country as to obtain the cotton in that region. Their forces were
to be commanded by Major-General Banks, and to consist of his
command, augmented by a part of Major-General Sherman's army from
Vicksburg, and accompanied by a fleet of gunboats under Admiral
Porter. With these the force under General Steele, in Arkansas, was
to coöperate. Taylor's forces at this time consisted of Harrison's
mounted regiment with a four-gun battery, in the north toward Monroe;
Mouton's brigade, near Alexandria; Polignac's, at Trinity, on the
Washita, fifty-five miles distant; Walker's division, at Marksville
and toward Simmsport, with two hundred men detached to assist the
gunners at Fort De Russy, which, though still unfinished, contained
eight heavy guns and two field-pieces. Three companies of mounted men
were watching the Mississippi, and the remainder of a regiment was on
the Têche.
On March 12th Admiral Porter, with nineteen gunboats and ten thousand
men of Sherman's army, entered the Red River. A detachment on the
14th marched to De Russy and took possession of it. On the 15th the
advance of Porter reached Alexandria, and on the 19th General
Franklin left the lower Têche with eighteen thousand men to meet him.
General Steele, in Arkansas, reported his force at seven thousand
men. The force of General Taylor at this time had increased to five
thousand and three hundred infantry, five hundred cavalry, and three
hundred artillerymen; and Liddel on the north had about the same
number of cavalry and a four-gun battery. Some reënforcements were
soon received. On March 31st Banks's advance reached Natchitoches,
and Taylor moved toward Pleasant Hill, arriving on the next day. On
April 4th and 5th. He moved to Mansfield, concentrating his force in
that vicinity. There two brigades of Missouri infantry and two of
Arkansas, numbering four thousand and four hundred muskets, joined
him. On April 7th the enemy were reported from Pleasant Hill to be
advancing in force, but their progress was arrested by a body of our
cavalry.
General Taylor then selected his position in which to wait for an
attack expected on the next day. It was in the edge of a wood,
fronting an open field eight hundred yards in width and twelve
hundred in length, through the center of which the road to Pleasant
Hill passed. On the opposite side of the field was a fence separating
it from the pine-forest, which, open on the higher ground and filled
with underwood on the lower, spread over the country. The position
was three miles in front of Mansfield, and covered a cross-road
leading to the Sabine. On each side of the main Mansfield-Pleasant
Hill road at two miles' distance, was a road parallel to it, and
these were connected by this Sabine cross-road.
On the 8th General Taylor disposed, on the right of the road to
Pleasant Hill, Walker's infantry division of three brigades with two
batteries; on the left, Mouton's two brigades and two batteries. As
the horsemen came in from the front, they took position, dismounted,
on Mouton's left. A regiment of horsemen was posted on each of the
parallel roads, and cavalry with a battery held in reserve on the
main road. Taylor's force amounted to 5,300 infantry, 3,000 mounted
men, and 500 artillerymen; total, 8,800. Banks left Grand Ecore with
an estimated force of 25,000.
As the enemy showed no disposition to advance, a forward movement of
the whole line was made. On the left our forces crossed the field
under a heavy fire and entered the wood, where a bloody contest
ensued, which resulted in gradually turning their right, which was
forced back with loss of prisoners and guns. On the right little
resistance was encountered until the wood was entered. Finding that
our force outflanked the opponent's left, the right brigade was kept
advanced, and we swept everything before us.
His first line, consisting of all the mounted force and one division
of the Thirteenth Corps, was in full flight, leaving prisoners, guns,
and wagons in our hands. Two miles to the rear of the first position,
the Second Division of the Federal Thirteenth Corps was brought up,
but was speedily routed, losing guns and prisoners. The advance was
continued. Four miles from the original position, his Nineteenth Army
Corps was found drawn up on a ridge overlooking a small stream. Sharp
work followed, but, as our force persisted, his fell back at
nightfall. Twenty-five hundred prisoners, twenty pieces of artillery,
several stands of colors, many thousands of small-arms, and two
hundred and fifty wagons, were taken.
On the next morning the enemy was found about a mile in front of
Pleasant Hill, which occupies a plateau a mile wide from west to east
along the Mansfield road. His lines extended across the plateau from
the highest ground on the west, his left, to a wooded height on the
right of the Mansfield road. Winding along in front of this position
was a dry gully cut by winter rains, bordered by a thick growth of
young pines. This was held by his advanced infantry, his main line
and guns being on the plateau. The force of General Taylor--
Churchill's brigade having joined him now--amounted to twelve
thousand five hundred men against eighteen thousand of General Banks,
among them the fresh corps of General A. J. Smith. The action
commenced about 4.30 P.M. It was the plan of General Taylor, as no
offensive movement on the part of the enemy was anticipated, to turn
both his flanks and subject him to a concentric fire and overwhelm
him. The right was successfully turned, but our force on his left did
not proceed far enough to outflank him. An obstinate contest ensued,
with much confusion, and failure to execute the plan of battle. Night
ended the conflict on our right, and both sides occupied their
original positions. General Banks made no attempt to recover the
ground from which his right and center had been driven. During the
night he retreated, leaving four hundred wounded, and his dead
unburied. On the next morning he was pursued twenty miles before his
rear was overtaken, and on the road were found stragglers, and
burning wagons and stores. Our loss in the two actions of Mansfield
and Pleasant Hill was twenty-two hundred. At Pleasant Hill the loss
was three guns and four hundred and twenty-six prisoners. The loss of
the enemy in killed and wounded was larger than ours. We captured
twenty guns and twenty-eight hundred prisoners, not including
stragglers. Their campaign was defeated. In the second volume of the
"Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War," page 239, a
report of Admiral Porter, dated Grand Ecore, April 14, 1864, says:
"The army here has met with a great defeat, no matter what the
generals try to make of it," etc.
On April 21st General Banks retreated from Grand Ecore to Alexandria,
harassed by a small cavalry force. A large part of our forces had
been taken by General E. K. Smith to follow General Steele. On April
28th Porter's fleet was lying above the falls, then impassable, and
Banks's army was in and around Alexandria behind earthworks. On May
13th both escaped from Alexandria, and on May 19th Banks crossed the
Atchafalaya, and the campaign closed at the place where it began.
Porter was able to extricate his eight ironclads and two wooden
gunboats by building a dam with transports, as shown in the adjoining
cut. General Banks boasted that the army obtained ten thousand bales
of cotton, to which Admiral Porter added five thousand more as
collected by the navy. This was the compensation reported for the
loss of many lives, much public property, and a total defeat. Even
for the booty as well as for the escape of their fleet, they were
probably indebted to the unfortunate withdrawal of a large part of
Taylor's force, as mentioned above.[104]
On April 12, 1864, an attack was made by two brigades of General N.
B. Forrest's force, under Brigadier-General J. R. Chalmers, upon Fort
Pillow. This was an earthwork on a bluff on the east side of the
Mississippi, at the mouth of Coal Creek. It was garrisoned by four
hundred men and six pieces of artillery. General Chalmers promptly
gained possession of the outer works and drove the garrison to their
main fortifications. The fort was crescent-shaped, the parapet eight
feet in height and four feet across the top, surrounded by a ditch
six feet deep and twelve feet in width. About this time General
Forrest arrived and soon ordered his forces to move up. The brigade
of Bell, on the northeast, advanced until it gained a position in
which the men were sheltered by the conformation of the ground, which
was intersected by a ravine. The other brigade, under McCulloch,
carried the intrenchments on the highest part of the ridge,
immediately in front of the southeastern face of the fort, and
occupied a cluster of cabins on its southern face and about sixty
yards from it. The line of investment was now short and complete,
within an average distance of one hundred yards. It extended from
Coal Creek on the north, which was impassable, to the river-bank
south of the fort. In the rear were numerous sharpshooters, well
posted on commanding ridges, to pick off the garrison whenever they
exposed themselves. At the same time, our forces were so placed that
the artillery could not be brought to bear upon them with much effect
except by a fatal exposure of the gunners. During all this time a
gunboat in the river kept up a continuous fire in all directions, but
without effect. General Forrest, confident of his ability to take the
fort by assault, which it seemed must be perfectly apparent to the
garrison, and desiring to prevent further loss of life, sent a demand
for an unconditional surrender, with the assurance that they should
be treated as prisoners of war. The answer was written with a pencil
on a slip of paper, "Negotiations will not attain the desired
object." Meantime, three boats were seen to approach, the foremost of
which was apparently loaded with troops, and, as an hour's time had
been asked for to communicate with the officers of the gunboat, it
seemed to be a pretext to gain time for reënforcements. General
Forrest, understanding also that the enemy doubted his presence and
had pronounced the demand to be a trick, declared himself, and
demanded an answer within twenty minutes whether the commander would
fight or surrender. Meanwhile, the foremost boat indicated an
intention to land, but a few shots caused her to withdraw to the
other side of the river, along which they all passed up. The answer
from the fort was a positive refusal to surrender. Three companies on
the left were now placed in an old rifle-pit and almost in the rear
of the fort, and on the right a portion of Barton's regiment of
Bell's brigade was also under the bluff and in the rear of the fort.
On the signal, the works were carried without a halt. As the troops
poured into the fortification the enemy retreated toward the river,
arms in hand and firing back, and their colors flying, doubtless
expecting the gunboats to shell us away from the bluff and protect
them until they could be taken off or reënforced. As they descended
the bank an enfilading and deadly fire was poured in upon them from
right and left by the forces in rear of the fort, of whose presence
they were ignorant. To this was now added the destructive fire of the
regiments that had stormed the fort. Fortunately some of our men cut
down the flag, and the firing ceased. Our loss was twenty killed and
sixty wounded. Of the enemy two hundred and twenty-eight were buried
that evening and quite a number next day. We captured six pieces of
artillery and about three hundred and fifty stand of small-arms. The
gunboat escaped up the river.
[Footnote 102: I. Stoddard Johnston, "Southern Historical Society
Papers," June, 1879, p. 258, _et seq_.]
[Footnote 103: "I had often seen delicate ladies who had been plundered,
insulted, ind rendered desolate by the acts of our most atrocious
enemies, and, while they did not call for it, yet in the anguished
expressions of their features while narrating their misfortunes,
there was a mute appeal to every manly sentiment of my bosom for
retribution, which I could no longer withstand. On my passage through
the lower Valley into Maryland, a lady had said to me, with tears in
her eyes: 'Our lot is a hard one, and we see no peace; but there are
a few green spots in our lives, and they are when the Confederate
soldiers come along and we can do something far them.' May God defend
and bless these noble women of the Valley, who so often ministered to
the wounded, sick, and dying Confederate soldiers, and gave their
last morsel of bread to the hungry! They bore with heroic courage the
privations, sufferings, persecutions, and dangers to which the war,
which was constantly waged in their midst, exposed them, and upon no
portion of the Southern people did the disasters, which finally
befell our army and country, fall with more crushing effect than on
them."]
[Footnote 104: "Destruction and Reconstruction," Taylor, p. 162, _et.
seq_.]