General Grant assumes Command in Virginia.--Positions of the
Armies.--Plans of Campaign open to Grant's Choice.--The Rapidan
crossed.--Battle of the Wilderness.--Danger of Lee.--The Enemy
driven back.--Flank Attack.--Longstreet wounded.--Result of the
Contest.--Rapid Flank Movement of Grant.--Another Contest.--
Grant's Reënforcements.--Hanover Junction.--The Enemy moves in
Direction of Bowling Green.--Crosses the Pamunkey.--Battle at Cold
Harbor.--Frightful Slaughter.--The Enemy's Soldiers decline to
renew the Assault when ordered.--Loss.--Asks Truce to bury the
Dead.--Strength of Respective Armies.--General Pemberton.--The
Enemy crosses the James.--Siege of Petersburg begun.
It was in March, 1864, that Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, having
been appointed lieutenant-general, assumed command of the armies of
the United States. He subsequently proceeded to Culpeper and assumed
personal command of the Army of the Potomac, although nominally that
army remained under the command of General Meade. Reënforcements were
gathered from every military department of the United States and sent
to that army.
On May 3d General Lee held the south bank of the Rapidan River, with
his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run and his left extending
to Liberty Mills, on the road from Gordonsville to the Shenandoah
Valley. Ewell's corps was on the right, Hill's on the left, and two
divisions of Longstreet's corps, having returned from East Tennessee,
were encamped in the rear near Gordonsville. The army of General
Grant had occupied the north bank of the Rapidan, with the main body
encamped in Culpeper County and on the Rappahannock River.
While Grant with his immense and increasing army was thus posted,
Lee, with a comparatively small force, and to which few
reënforcements could be furnished, confronted him on a line
stretching from near Somerville Ford to Gordonsville. To Grant was
left the choice to move directly on Lee and attempt to defeat his
army, the only obstacle to the capture of Richmond, and which his
vast means rendered supposable, or to cross the Rapidan above or
below Lee's position. The second would fulfill the condition, so
imperatively imposed on McClellan, of covering the United States
capital; the third would be in the more direct line toward Richmond.
Of the three he chose the last, and so felicitated himself on his
unopposed passage of the river as to suppose that he had, unobserved,
turned the flank of Lee's army, got between it and Richmond, and
necessitated the retreat of the Confederates to some point where they
might resist his further advance. So little could he comprehend the
genius of Lee, that he expected him to be surprised, as appears from
his arrangements contemplating only combats with the rear-guard
covering the retreat. Lee, dauntless as he was sagacious, seized the
opportunity, which the movement of his foe offered, to meet him where
his artillery would be least available, where his massive columns
would be most embarrassed in their movements, and where Southern
individuality and self-reliance would be specially effective. Grant's
object was to pass through "the Wilderness" to the roads between Lee
and Richmond. Lee resolved to fight him in those pathless woods,
where mind might best compete with matter.
Providence held its shield over the just cause, and heroic bands
hurled back the heavy battalions shattered and discomfited, as will
be now briefly described.
In order to cross the Rapidan, Grant's army moved on May 3d toward
Germania Ford, which was ten or twelve miles from our right. He
succeeded in seizing the ford and crossing. The direct road from this
ford to Richmond passed by Spottsylvania Court-House, and, when Grant
had crossed the river, he was nearer than General Lee to Richmond.
From Orange Court-House there are two nearly parallel roads running
eastwardly to Fredericksburg. The one nearest the river is called the
"Stone Turnpike," and the other the "Plank-road." The road from the
ford to Spottsylvania Court-House crosses the Old Stone Turnpike at
the "Old Wilderness Tavern," and, two or three miles farther on, it
crosses the plank-road.
As soon as Grant's movement was known, Lee's troops were put in
motion. Swell's corps moved on the Stone Turnpike, and Hill's corps
on the plank-road, into which Longstreet's force also came from his
camp near Gordonsville. Ewell's corps crossed Mine Run, and encamped
at Locust Grove, four miles beyond, on the afternoon of the 4th. On
the morning of the 5th it was again in motion, and encountered
Grant's troops in heavy force at a short distance from the Old
Wilderness Tavern, and Jones's and Battle's brigades were driven back
in some confusion. Early's division was ordered up, formed across the
pike, and moved forward. It advanced through a dense pine-thicket,
and, with other brigades of Rodes's division, drove the enemy back
with heavy loss, capturing several hundred prisoners and gaining a
commanding position on the right. Meantime, Johnson's division, on
the left of the pike, and extending across the road to Germania Ford,
was heavily engaged in front, and Hays's brigade was sent to his left
to participate in a forward movement. It advanced, encountered a
large force, and, not meeting with the expected coöperation, was
drawn back. Subsequently, Pegram's brigade took position on Hays's
left, and just before night an attack was made on their front, which
was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy. During the afternoon
there was hot skirmishing along the whole line, and several attempts
were made by the foe to regain the position from which he had been
driven. At the close of the day, Ewell's corps had captured over a
thousand prisoners, besides inflicting on the enemy very severe
losses in killed and wounded. Two pieces of artillery had been
abandoned and were secured by our troops.
A. P. Hill, on the 4th, with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions of his
corps, moved eastwardly along the plank-road. They bivouacked at
night near Verdiersville, and resumed their march on the 5th with
Heth in advance. About 1 P.M. musketry firing was heard in front; the
sound indicated the presence of a large body of infantry. Kirkland's
brigade deployed on both sides of the plank-road, and the column
proceeded to form in line of battle on its flanks. Hill's advance had
followed the plank-road, while Ewell's pursued the Stone turnpike.
These parallel movements were at this time from three to four miles
apart. The country intervening and round about for several miles is
known as the "Wilderness," and, having very little open ground,
consists almost wholly of a forest of dense undergrowth of shrubs and
small trees. In order to open communication with Ewell, Wilcox's
division moved to the left, and effected a junction with Gordon's
brigade on Ewell's extreme right. The line of battle thus completed
extended from the right of the plank-road through a succession of
open fields and dense forest to the left of the Stone turnpike. It
presented a line of six miles, and the thicket that lay along the
whole front of our army was so impenetrable as to exclude the use of
artillery save only at the roads. Heth's skirmishers were driven in
about 3 P.M. by a massive column that advanced, firing rapidly. The
straggle thus commenced in Hill's front continued for two or three
hours unabated. Heth's ranks were greatly reduced, when Wilcox was
ordered to his support, but the bloody contest continued until night
closed over our force in the position it had originally taken. This
stubborn and heroic resistance was made by the divisions of Heth and
Wilcox, of Hill's corps, fifteen thousand strong, against the
repeated and desperate assaults of five divisions--four divisions of
Hancock's and one of Sedgwick's corps, numbering about forty-five
thousand men. Our forces completely foiled their adversaries, and
inflicted upon them most serious loss.[95] During the day the Ninth
Corps of the enemy under General Burnside, had come on the field. The
third division of Hill's corps, under General Anderson, and the two
divisions of Longstreet's corps, did not reach the scene of conflict
until dawn of day on the morning of the 6th. Simultaneously the
attack on Hill was renewed with great vigor. In addition to the force
he had so successfully resisted on the previous day, a fresh division
of the enemy's Fifth Corps had secured position on Hill's flank, and
coöperated with the column assaulting in front. After a severe
contest, the left of Heth's division and the right of Wilcox's were
overpowered before the advance of Longstreet's column reached the
ground, and were compelled to return. The repulsed portions of the
divisions were in considerable disorder. General Lee now came up,
and, fully appreciating the impending crisis, dashed amid the
fugitives, calling on the men to rally and follow him.
"The soldiers, seeing General Lee's manifest purpose to advance with
them, and realizing the great danger in which he then was, begged him
to go to the rear, promising that they would soon have matters
rectified. The General waved them on with some words of cheer." [96]
The assault was checked.
Longstreet, having come up with two divisions, deployed them in line
of battle, and gallantly advanced to recover the lost ground. The
enemy was driven back over the ground he had gained by his assault on
Hill's line, but reformed in the position previously held by him.
About mid-day an attack on his left flank and rear was ordered by
Longstreet. For this purpose three brigades were detached, and,
moving forward, were joined by General J. R. Davis's brigade, which
had been the extreme right of Hill's line. Making a sufficient _détour_
to avoid observation, and, rushing precipitately to attack the foe in
flank and reverse while he was preparing to resist the movement in
his front, he was taken completely by surprise. The assault resulted
in his utter rout, with heavy loss on that part of his line.
Preparations were now made to follow up the advantages gained by a
forward movement of the whole line under General Longstreet's
personal direction. When advancing at the head of Jenkins's brigade,
with that officer and others, a body of Confederates in the wood on
the roadside, supposing the column to be a hostile force, fired into
it, killing General Jenkins, distinguished alike for civil and
military virtue, and severely wounding General Longstreet. The
valuable services of General Longstreet were thus lost to the army at
a critical moment, and this caused the suspension of a movement which
promised the most important results; and time was thus afforded to
the enemy to rally, reënforce, and find shelter behind his
intrenchments. Under these circumstances the commanding General
deemed it unadvisable to attack.
On the morning of the 6th the contest was renewed on the left, and a
very heavy attack was made on the front, occupied by Pegram's
brigade, but it was handsomely repulsed, as were several subsequent
attacks at the same point. In the afternoon an attack was made on the
enemy's right flank, resting in the woods, when Gordon's brigade,
with Johnson's in the rear and followed by Pegram's, succeeded in
throwing it into great confusion, doubling it up and forcing it back
some distance, capturing two brigadier-generals and several hundred
prisoners. Darkness closed the contest. On the 7th an advance was
made which disclosed the fact that Grant had given up his line of
works on his right. During the day there was some skirmishing, but no
serious fighting. The result of these battles was the infliction of
severe loss upon the foe, the gain of ground, and the capture of
prisoners, artillery, and other trophies. The cost to us, however,
was so serious as to enforce, by additional considerations, the
policy of Lee to spare his men as much as was possible.
A rapid flank movement was next made by Grant to secure possession of
Spottsylvania Court-House. General Lee comprehended his purpose, and
on the night of the 7th a division of Longstreet's corps was sent as
the advance to that point. Stuart, then in observation on the flank,
and ever ready to work or to fight as the one or the other should
best serve the cause of his country, dismounted his troopers, and, by
felling trees, obstructed the roads so as materially to delay the
march of the enemy. The head of the opposing forces arrived almost at
the same moment on the 8th; theirs, being a little in advance, drove
back our cavalry, but in turn was quickly driven from the strategic
point by the arrival of our infantry. On the 9th the two armies, each
forming on its advance as a nucleus, swung round and confronted each
other in line of battle.
The 10th and 11th passed in comparative quiet. On the morning of the
12th the enemy made a very heavy attack on Ewell's front, and broke
the line where it was occupied by Johnson's division. At this time
and place the scene occurred of which Mississippians are justly
proud. Colonel Tenable, of General Lee's staff, states that, on the
receipt of one of the messages from General Rodes for more troops, he
was sent by General Lee to bring Harris's Mississippi brigade from
the extreme right; that General Lee met the brigade and rode at its
head until under fire, when a round shot passed so near to him that
the soldiers invoked him to go back; and when he said, "If you will
promise me to drive those people from our works, I will go back," the
brigade shouted the promise, and Colonel Venable says:
"As the column of Mississippians came up at a double quick an
aide-de-camp came up to General Rodes with a message from Ramseur
that he could hold out only a few minutes longer unless assistance
was at hand. Your brigade was thrown instantly into the fight, the
column being formed into line under a tremendous fire and on very
difficult ground. Never did a brigade go into fiercer battle under
greater trials; never did a brigade do its duty more nobly." [97]
A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson's line to
Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt movement on that flank.
Several brigades sent to Ewell's assistance were carried into action
under his orders, and they all suffered severely. Subsequently, on
the same day, some brigades were thrown to the front, for the purpose
of moving to the left and attacking the flank of the column which
broke Ewell's line, to relieve the pressure on him, and recover the
part of the line which had been lost. These, as they moved, soon
encountered the Ninth Corps, under Burnside, advancing to the attack.
They captured over three hundred prisoners and three battle-flags,
and their attack on the enemy's flank, taking him by surprise,
contributed materially to his repulse.
Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee," says that Lee, having
detected the weakness of "the salient" occupied by the division of
General Edward Johnson, of Ewell's corps, directed a second line to
be constructed across its base, to which he proposed to move the
troops occupying the angle. Suspecting another flank movement by
Grant, before these arrangements were quite completed, he ordered
most of the artillery at this portion of the lines to be withdrawn so
as to be available. Toward dawn on the 12th, Johnson, discovering
indications of an impending assault, ordered the immediate return of
the artillery, and made other preparations for defense. But the
unfortunate withdrawal was so partially and tardily restored, that a
spirited assault at daybreak overran that portion of the lines before
the artillery was put in position, and captured most of the division,
including its brave commander.
The above mentioned attacking column advanced, under cover of a
pine-thicket, to within a very short distance of a salient defended
by Walker's brigade. A heavy fire of musketry and artillery, from a
considerable number of guns on Heth's line, opened with tremendous
effect upon the column, and it was driven back with severe loss,
leaving its dead in front of our works.[98]
Several days of comparative quiet ensued. During this time the army
of General Grant was heavily reënforced from Washington.
"In numerical strength his army so much exceeded that under General
Lee that, after covering the entire Confederate front with double
lines of battle, he had in reserve a large force with which to extend
his flank and compel a corresponding movement on the part of his
adversary, in order to keep between him and his coveted prize--the
capital of the Confederacy." [99]
On the 18th another assault was made upon our lines, but it produced
no impression. On the 20th of May, after twelve days of skirmish and
battle at Spottsylvania against a superior force, General Lee's
information led him to believe that the enemy was about to attempt
another flanking movement, and interpose his army between the
Confederate capital and its defenders. To defeat this purpose
Longstreet was ordered to move at midnight in the direction of
Hanover Junction, and on the following day and night Swell's and
Hill's corps marched for the same point.
The Confederate commander, divining that Grant's objective point was
the intersection of the two railroads leading to Richmond at a point
two miles south of the North Anna River, crossed his army over that
stream and took up a line of battle which frustrated the movement.
Grant began his flanking movement on the night of the 20th, marching
in two columns, the right, under General Warren, crossing the North
Anna at Jericho Ford without opposition. On the 23d the left, under
General Hancock, crossing four miles lower down, at the Chesterfield
or County Bridge, was obstinately resisted by a small force, and the
passage of the river was not made until the 24th. After crossing the
North Anna, Grant discovered that his movement was a blunder, and
that his army was in a position of much peril.
The Confederate commander established his line of battle on the south
side of the river, both wings refused so as to form an obtuse angle,
with the apex resting on the river between the two points of the
enemy's crossing, Longstreet's and Hill's corps forming the two
sides, and Little River and the Hanover marshes the base. Ewell's
corps held the apex or center.
The hazard of Grant's position appears not to have been known to him
until he attempted to unite his two columns, which were four miles
apart, by establishing a connecting line along the river. Foiled in
the attempt, he discovered that the Confederate army was interposed
between his two wings, which were also separated by the North Anna,
and that the one could give no support to the other except by a
double crossing of the river. That the Confederate commander did not
seize the opportunity to strike his embarrassed foe and avail himself
of the advantage which his superior generalship had gained, may have
been that, concluding from past observation of Grant's tactics, he
felt assured that the "continuous hammering" process was to be
repeated without reference to circumstances or position. If Lee acted
on this supposition, he was mistaken, as the Federal commander,
profiting by the severe lessons of Spottsylvania and the Wilderness,
with cautious, noiseless movement, withdrew under cover of the night
of the 26th to the north side of the North Anna, and moved eastward
down to the Pamunkey River.
At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of
Longstreet's corps, which had been on detached service in North
Carolina, and by a small force under General Breckinridge from
southwestern Virginia, twenty-two hundred strong. Hoke's brigade, of
Early's division, twelve hundred strong, which had been on detached
duty at the Junction, here also rejoined its division. On the 29th
the whole of Grant's army was across the Pamunkey, while General
Lee's army on the next day was in line of battle with his left at
Atlee's Station. By another movement eastward the two armies were
brought face to face at Cold Harbor on June 3d. Here fruitless
efforts were made by General Grant to pierce or drive back the forces
of General Lee. Our troops were protected by temporary earthworks,
and while under cover of these were assailed by the enemy:
"But in vain. The assault was repulsed along the whole line, and the
carnage on the Federal side was fearful. I[100] well recall having
received a report, after the assault, from General Hoke--whose
division reached the army just previous to this battle--to the
effect that the ground in his entire front, over which the enemy had
charged, was literally covered with their dead and wounded; and that
up to that time he had not had a single man killed. No wonder that,
when the command was given to renew the assault, the Federal soldiers
sullenly and silently declined. 'The order[101] was issued through
the officers to their subordinate commanders, and from them descended
through the wonted channels; but no man stirred, and the immobile
lines pronounced a verdict, silent yet emphatic, against further
slaughter. The loss on the Union side in this sanguinary action was
over thirteen thousand, while on the part of the Confederates it is
doubtful whether it reached that many hundreds.' After some
disingenuous proposals, General Grant finally asked a truce to enable
him to bury his dead. Soon after this he abandoned his chosen line of
operations, and moved his army so as to secure a crossing to the
south side of James River. The struggle from the Wilderness to this
point covered a period of over one month, during which time there had
been an almost daily encounter of arms, and the Army of Northern
Virginia had placed _hors de combat_, of the army under General
Grant, a number exceeding the entire numerical strength, at the
commencement of the campaign, of Lee's army, which, notwithstanding
its own heavy losses and the reinforcements received by the enemy,
still presented an impregnable front to its opponent."
By the report of the United States Secretary of War (Stanton), Grant
had, on the 1st of May, 1864, two days before he crossed the Rapidan,
120,380 men, and in the Ninth Army Corps 20,780, or an aggregate with
which he marched against Lee of 141,160. To meet this vast force, Lee
had on the Rapidan less than 50,000 men. By the same authority it
appears that Grant had a reserve upon which he could draw of 137,672.
Lee had practically no reserve, for he was compelled to make
detachments from his army for the protection of West Virginia and
other points, about equal to all the reënforcements which he
received. In the "Southern Historical Papers," vol. vi, page 144,
upon the very reliable authority of the editor, there appears the
following statement:
"Grant says he lost, in the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold
Harbor, 39,000 men; but Swinton puts his loss at over 60,000, and a
careful examination of the figures will show that his real loss was
nearer 100,000. In other words, he lost about twice as many men as
Lee had, in order to take a position which he could have taken at
first without firing a gun or losing a man."
On June 12th the movement was commenced by Grant for crossing the
James River. Pontoon-bridges were laid near Wilcox's Wharf for the
passage of his army. J. C. Pemberton, who, after the fall of
Vicksburg, was left without a command corresponding to his rank of
lieutenant-general in the provisional army, in order that he might
not stand idle, nobly resigned that commission, and asked to be
assigned to duty according to his rank in the regular army, which was
that of lieutenant-colonel. Ho was accordingly directed to report to
General Lee for service with the Army of Northern Virginia. Being a
skillful artillerist, he was directed to find a position where he
could place a mortar so as to throw shells on the enemy's bridge when
it should be put into use. By a daring reconnaissance and exact
calculation, he determined a point from which the desired effect
might be produced by vertical fire, over a wood. At the proper moment
he opened upon the bridge, and his expectations were verified by the
shells falling on the troops harassingly. This, his first service
with the Army of Northern Virginia, was interrupted by the failure to
send promptly a cohering force to protect the mortar, the position of
which was disclosed by its fire. The injury it inflicted caused the
Federal commander to send a detachment which drove away the gunners
and captured the mortar.
On the 14th and 15th of June the crossing of Grant's army was
completed. It will be remembered that he had crossed the Rapidan on
the 3d of May. It had therefore taken him more than a month to reach
the south side of the James. In his campaign he had sacrificed a
hecatomb of men, a vast amount of artillery, small-arms, munitions of
war, and supplies, to reach a position to which McClellan had already
demonstrated there was an easy and inexpensive route. It is true that
the Confederate army had suffered severely, and, though the loss was
comparatively small to that of its opponents, it could not be
repaired, as his might be, from the larger population and his
facility for recruiting in Europe. To those who can approve the
policy of attrition without reference to the number of lives it might
cost, this may seem justifiable, but it can hardly be regarded as
generalship, or be offered to military students as an example worthy
of imitation. After an unsuccessful attempt, by a surprise, to
capture Petersburg, General Grant concentrated his army south of the
Appomattox River and commenced the operations to be related hereafter.
[Footnote 95: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 96: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 97: Letter from Colonel C. S Venable, "Southern Historical
Society Papers," vol. viii, p. 106, March, 1880.]
[Footnote 98: "Memoir of the Last Year," etc, by General Early.]
[Footnote 99: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 100: Taylor, "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 101: Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 487.]