Inactivity in Tennessee.--Capture of Colburn's Expedition.--Capture
of Streight's Expedition.--Advance of Rosecrans to Bridgeport.--
Burnside in East Tennessee.--Our Force at Chattanooga.--Movement
against Burnside.--The Enemy moves on our Rear near Ringgold.--
Battle at Chickamauga.--Strength and Distribution of our Forces.--
The enemy withdraws.--Captures.--Losses.--The Enemy evacuates Passes
of Lookout Mountain.--His Trains captured.--Failure of General Bragg
to pursue.--Reënforcements to the Enemy, and Grant to command.--His
Description of the Situation.--Movements of the Enemy.--Conflict at
Chattanooga.
After the battle at Murfreesboro, in Tennessee, a period of
inactivity ensued between the large armed forces, which was disturbed
only by occasional expeditions by small bodies on each side. On March
5, 1863, an expedition of the enemy, under Colonel Colburn, was
captured at Spring Hill, ten miles south of Franklin, by Generals Van
Dorn and Forrest. Thirteen hundred prisoners were taken. In April
another expedition, under Colonel Streight, into northern Georgia,
was captured near Rome by our vigilant, daring cavalry leader,
Forrest. This was one of the most remarkable, and, to the enemy,
disastrous raids of the war. Seventeen hundred prisoners were taken.
In June some movements were made by General Rosecrans, which were
followed by the withdrawal of our forces from Middle Tennessee, and a
return to the occupation of Chattanooga. At this time General Buckner
held Knoxville and commanded the district of East Tennessee; General
Samuel Jones commanded the district of southwest Virginia, his
headquarters at Arlington, Virginia. Between the two was Cumberland
Gap, the well-known pass by which the first pioneer, Daniel Boone,
went into Kentucky, and the only one in that region through which it
was supposed an army, with the usual artillery and wagon-train, could
march from the north into East Tennessee or southwest Virginia. It
was, therefore, occupied and partially fortified, which, with the
precipitous heights flanking it on the right and left, would, it was
hoped, suffice against an attack in front, and prove an adequate
barrier to an advance on our important line of communication in its
rear, which Buckner and Jones were relied on to defend.
On the 20th of August Brigadier-General I. W. Frazier, an educated
soldier in whom I had much confidence, assumed, by assignment, the
command of this position, and energetically commenced to perfect the
defenses, and ingeniously though unsuccessfully endeavored to bring a
supply of water into the fortifications. He reported his force to
amount to seventeen hundred effective infantry and artillery, and
about six hundred cavalry; the supply of ammunition was deficient,
and some of it damaged by a badly constructed magazine.
About August 20th it was ascertained that the army under General
Rosecrans had crossed the mountains to Stevenson and Bridgeport. His
force of infantry and artillery amounted to seventy thousand men,
divided into four corps. About the same time General Burnside
advanced from Kentucky, crossed, by using pack-mules, the rugged
mountains west of Cumberland Gap, and, about the 1st of September,
approached Knoxville, East Tennessee, with a force estimated at over
twenty-five thousand men. General Buckner, therefore, evacuated
Knoxville, and took position at Loudon, with a force of about five
thousand infantry, artillery, and cavalry; this rendered the
occupation of Cumberland Gap hazardous to the garrison, and
comparatively of little value to us, but, when its surrender was
demanded by a force which might be resisted, General Frazier promptly
refused to comply with the demand. Subsequently, General Burnside
advanced with a large body of troops, and, approaching from the
south, renewed the demand, when General Frazier, recognizing the
inutility as well as futility of resistance, surrendered on the 9th
of September, 1863.[78] The main body of our army was encamped near
Chattanooga, while the cavalry force was recruiting from fatigue and
exhaustion near Rome, Georgia. The enemy first attempted to strike
Buckner in the rear, but failing, commenced a movement against our
left and rear. On the last of August he had crossed his main force
over the Tennessee River at Carpenter's Ferry, near Stevenson. Our
effective force of infantry and artillery was about thirty-five
thousand. By active reconnaissance of our cavalry, which had been
brought forward, it was ascertained that Rosecrans's general movement
was toward our left and rear, in the direction of Dalton and Rome,
keeping Lookout Mountain between us. The want of supplies in the
country and the force under Burnside on our right rendered hazardous
a movement on the rear of the former with our force. General Lee,
with commendable zeal for the public welfare and characteristic
self-denial, had consented to remain for a time on the defensive for
the purpose of reenforcing Bragg's army, and General Longstreet had
been detached with his corps for that purpose. These troops were to
come by rail from Atlanta, and might soon be expected to arrive. It
was, therefore, determined to retire toward our expected
reënforcements, as well as to meet the foe in front when he should
emerge from the mountain-gorges.
As we could not thus hold Chattanooga, our army, on September 7th and
8th, took position from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette, on the
road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of
Lookout Mountain. The forces on the Hiawassee and at Chickamauga
Station took the route by Ringgold. A small cavalry force was left in
observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry at Ringgold to
cover the railroad.
The enemy immediately moved the corps that threatened Buckner into
Chattanooga, and, shortly after, it commenced to move on our rear by
the roads to Lafayette and Ringgold. Another corps was nearly
opposite the head of McLemore Cove, in Will's Valley, and one at
Colonel Winston's opposite Alpine. During the 9th it was ascertained
that a column, between four and five thousand, had crossed Lookout
Mountain by Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps into McLemore's Cove. An
effort was made by General Bragg to capture this column, with intent
then to turn upon the others, and beat each in succession. But, some
delay having occurred in the advance of our forces through the gap,
the enemy took advantage of it and retreated to the mountain-passes.
He then withdrew his corps from the route toward Alpine to unite with
the one near McLemore's Cove, which was gradually extended toward Lee
and Gordon's Mills. It was now determined to turn upon the Third
Corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of Chattanooga.
The forces sent toward the Cove were accordingly withdrawn to
Lafayette, and Polk's and Walker's corps were moved immediately in
the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills, Lieutenant-General Polk
commanding. He was ordered to attack early the next morning, as the
enemy's corps was known to be divided, and it was hoped by successive
attacks to crush his army in detail; but the expectation was not
realized, as his forces withdrew and formed a junction. Our trains
and supplies were then put in a safe position, and all our forces
were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the opposing
force in front. Major-General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry,
occupied the extreme left, vacated by Hill's corps, and was directed
to press the enemy in McLemore's Cove; to divert his attention from
the real movement, General Forrest covered the movement on our front
and right; General B. R. Johnson was moved from Ringgold to the
extreme right of the line; Walker's corps formed on his left opposite
Alexander's Bridge, Buckner's next, near Tedford Ford, Polk opposite
Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Hill on the extreme left. Orders were
issued to cross the Chickamauga at 6 A.M., commencing by the extreme
right.
The movements were unexpectedly delayed by the difficulty of the
roads and the resistance of the enemy's cavalry. The right column did
not effect its crossing until late in the afternoon of the 18th; at
this time, Major-General Hood, from the Army of Northern Virginia,
arrived and assumed command of the column. General W. H. T, Walker
had a severe skirmish at Alexander's Bridge, from which he finally
drove the enemy, but not before he had destroyed it; General Walker,
however, found a ford, crossed, and Hood united with him after night.
The advance was resumed at daylight on the 19th, when Buckner's corps
with Cheatham's division of Polk's corps crossed the Chickamauga, and
our line of battle was thus formed: Buckner's left rested on the bank
of the stream about one mile below Lee and Gordon's Mills; on his
right came Hood with his own and Johnson's divisions, and Walker's
formed the extreme right; Forrest with his cavalry was in advance to
the right. He soon became engaged with such a large force that two
brigades were sent from Walker's division to his support. Forrest,
here fighting with his usual tenacity, desperately held in check the
comparatively immense force which he was resisting. General Walker,
being ordered to commence the attack on the right, boldly advanced,
and soon developed opposing forces greatly superior to his own; he,
however, drove them handsomely, capturing several batteries of
artillery, by dashing charges. As he pressed back the force in his
front, it rested upon such heavy masses in the rear, that he was in
turn repulsed. Cheatham's division was ordered to his support; it
came too late. Before it could reach him, assailed on both flanks, he
had been forced back to his first position, but the two commands
united, though yet greatly outnumbered, and, by a spirited attack,
recovered our advantage. These movements on our right were in such
direction as to create an opening between the left of Cheatham's
division and the right of Hood's. To fill this, Stewart's division,
the reserve of Buckner's corps, was ordered up, and soon became
engaged, as now did Hood's whole front. The enemy had transferred
forces from his extreme right so as to concentrate his main body on
his left, acutely perceiving the probability of an effort on our part
to gain his rear, and cut off his communication with his base at
Chattanooga. The main part of the battle, therefore, was fought on
the opposite flank from that where both armies had probably expected
it. Lieutenant-General Polk was now directed to move the remainder of
his corps across the stream, and to assume command in person; Hill's
corps was also directed to move to our right. Stewart, by a gallant
assault, broke the enemy's center, and pushed forward until he became
exposed to an enfilading fire. Hood steadily advanced, driving the
force in his front until night. Cleburne, of Hill's corps,
immediately on reaching the right, closed so impetuously with the
enemy as to create surprise, and drove him in great disorder. From
prisoners and otherwise, the commanding General became satisfied that
his antagonist had by marching night and day succeeded in
concentrating his whole force, and that it had that day been fought
on the field of Chickamauga. A part of the forces on our extreme left
had not reached the field of actual conflict in time to participate
in the engagement of that day; they, together with the remainder of
Longstreet's corps, were brought up and put in position to renew the
battle in the morning. Our troops slept upon the field they had so
bravely contested. The Confederate troops engaged on the right were
as follows:
General W. H. T. Walker's division . . . . . 5,500
Cheatham's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,000
A. P. Stewart's division . . . . . . . . . . 4,040
Cleburne's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,115
Hood's, B. R. Johnson's, and Trigg's troops 8,428
Forrest's and Pegram's cavalry . . . . . . . 3,500
------
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,583
General Wheeler with his cavalry had been in observation on the left,
and for a fortnight, daily skirmishing with the enemy. On the 17th he
was ordered to move into McLemore's Cove to make a demonstration in
that direction, where, after a severe engagement, he developed a
force too large to be dislodged. On the 18th he was directed to hold
the gap in Pigeon Mountain, so as to prevent the enemy from moving on
our left. As appeared subsequently, General Rosecrans, by forced
marches, had made a _détour_, and formed a junction of his forces in
front of ours, so that it was no longer needful to hold the passes of
the Pigeon Mountain, and Wheeler with his cavalry was called to take
position on the left of our line.
On the night of the 19th, the whole force having been assembled,
including the five thousand effective infantry sent for temporary
service from Virginia, the command was organized as two corps, the
one on the right to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk; the
other, on the left, to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
These corps consisted respectively as follows: Polk's right wing, of
Breckenridge's, Cleburne's, Cheatham's, and Walker's divisions, and
Forrest's cavalry--aggregate, 22,471; Longstreet's left wing, of
Preston's, Hindman's, Johnson's (Hood's), Law's, Kershaw's, Stewart's
divisions, and Wheeler's cavalry--aggregate, 24,850: grand aggregate
of both wings, 47,321, The forces under Rosecrans, as has been
subsequently learned, consisted of McCook's corps, 14,345; Thomas's,
24,072; Crittenden's, 13,975; Granger's, about 5,000; cavalry, 7,000:
whole number, 64,392. On the night of the 19th General Bragg gave his
instructions orally, to the general officers whom he had summoned to
his camp-fire, as to the position of the different commands; and the
order of battle was that the attack should commence on the right at
daybreak, and be taken up successively to the left. From a
combination of mishaps, it resulted that the attack was not commenced
until nine or ten o'clock in the day, and, what was much more
important, the troops from right to left did not in rapid succession
engage, so as to have that effectiveness which would have resulted
from concert of action. Prodigies of valor were performed, many
partial successes were gained in the beginning of the battle, but in
the first operations the troops so frequently moved to the assault
without the necessary cohesion in a charging line, that nearly all
early assaults by our right wing were successively repulsed with
loss. Though at first invariably successful, our troops were
subsequently compelled to retire before the heavy reënforcements
constantly brought.
Wheeler with his cavalry struck boldly at the enemy's extreme right
and center, and with such effect that, in the Federal battle reports,
it appears the attack was mistaken for a flank movement by General
Longstreet.
Rosecrans having transferred his main strength to our right, the
attack of the left met with less resistance, and was successfully and
vigorously followed up. About 4 P.M. a general assault was made by
the right, and the attack was pressed from right to left until the
enemy gave way at different points, and, finally, about dark, yielded
along the whole line. Our army bivouacked on the ground it had so
gallantly won. The foe, though driven from his lines, continued to
confront us when the action closed. But it was found the next morning
that he had availed himself of the night to withdraw from our front,
and that his main body was soon in position within his lines at
Chattanooga. We captured over eight thousand prisoners, fifty-one
pieces of artillery, fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and
quantities of ammunition, with wagons, ambulances, teams, and
medicines with hospital stores in large quantities. From the
appearance of the field the enemy's losses must have largely exceeded
ours, and the victory was complete; but these results could not
console us for the lives they cost. Pride in the gallantry of our
heroes, rejoicing at the repulse of the invader, was subdued by the
memory of our fallen brave.
After General Rosecrans's retreat to Chattanooga, he withdrew his
forces from the passes of Lookout Mountain, which covered his line of
supplies from Bridgeport. These commanding positions were immediately
occupied by our troops, and a cavalry force was sent across the
Tennessee, which destroyed a large wagon-train in the Sequatchie
Valley, captured McMinnsville and other points on the railroad, and
thus temporarily cut off the source of supplies for the army at
Chattanooga.
The reasons why General Bragg did not promptly pursue are stated in
his report thus:
"Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced, the railroad having
been constantly occupied in transporting troops, prisoners, and our
wounded, and the bridges having been destroyed to a point two miles
south of Ringgold. These supplies were ordered to be replenished,
and, as soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted, the army was
moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had
with his supplies in the rear. His important road, and the shortcut
by half to his depot at Bridgeport, lay along the south bank of the
Tennessee. The holding of this all-important route was confided to
Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and its possession forced
the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains,
by wagon transportation. At the same time, our cavalry, in large
force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and
difficult route. These dispositions, faithfully sustained, insured
the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and
forage."
These reverses caused the enemy to send forward reënforcements from
the army at Vicksburg, and also to assign General Grant to the
command in Tennessee. As early as September 23d the Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were detached, and sent
under General Hooker to Tennessee, and assigned to protect
Rosecrans's line of communication from Bridgeport to Nashville. It
was on October 23d that General Grant arrived at Chattanooga, and
only in time to save their army from starvation or evacuation. The
investment by General Bragg had been so close and their
communications had been so destroyed that Bragg was on the point of
realizing the evacuation of Chattanooga, which he had anticipated.
The report of Grant thus describes the situation on his arrival:
"Up to this period our forces in Chattanooga were practically
invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee River, above
Chattanooga, to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain,
below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed nearly
to Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley,
at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a
brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country
north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the
most impracticable roads to army supplies.
"The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation
that they could not have been relied upon for moving anything. An
attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such
supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost
certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within
gunshot of and overlooking our very fortifications, would
unquestionably have pursued retreating forces. Already more than ten
thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops
by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to
Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied
another week."
The first movement under Grant was, therefore, to establish a new and
shorter line of supplies. For this purpose a night expedition was
sent down the river from Chattanooga, which seized the range of hills
at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and covered the Brown's Ferry road.
By 10 A.M. a bridge was laid across the river at the ferry, which
secured the end of the road nearest to our forces and the shorter
line over which the enemy could move troops. General Hooker also
entered Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie, and took up positions for the
defense of the road from Whiteside's, over which he had marched, and
also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry. General
Palmer crossed from the north side of the river opposite Whiteside's,
and held the road passed over by Hooker. An unsuccessful attack was
made on a portion of Hooker's troops the first night after he entered
the valley. Subsequently, we lost the remaining heights held by us
west of Lookout Creek.
Further operations of the enemy were delayed until the arrival of
Sherman's force from Memphis. After his arrival, on November 23d, an
attempt was made to feel our lines. This was done with so much force
as to obtain possession of Indian Hill and the low range of hills
south of it. That night Sherman began to move to obtain a position
just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and by daylight on the
24th he had eight thousand men on the south side of the Tennessee,
and fortified in rifle-trenches. By noon pontoon-bridges were laid
across the Tennessee and the Chickamauga, and the remainder of his
forces crossed. During the afternoon he took possession of the whole
northern extremity of Missionary Ridge nearly to the railroad-tunnel,
and fortified the position equally with that held by us. A raid was
also made on our line of communication, cutting the railroad at
Cleveland. On the same day Hooker sealed the western slope of Lookout
Mountain. On the 26th he took possession of the mountain-top with a
part of his force, and with the remainder crossed Chattanooga Valley
to Rossville. Our most northern point was assailed by Sherman, and
the attack kept up all day. He was reënforced by a part of Howard's
corps. In the afternoon the whole force of the enemy's center,
consisting of four divisions, was moved to the attack. They got
possession of the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and
commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left, and
continued it until the summit was reached, notwithstanding the
volleys of grape and canister discharged at them. Our forces
retreated from the ridge as the multitudinous assailants neared the
thin line on the crest, and during the night withdrew from the
positions on the plain below. General Grant, after advancing a short
distance from Chattanooga, dispatched a portion of his forces to the
relief of Burnside in East Tennessee, where he was closely besieged
by General Longstreet in Knoxville. Longstreet moved east into
Virginia, and ultimately joined General Lee. He had left the army of
General Lee, and moved to the West with his force, on the condition
that he should return when summoned. This summons had been sent to
him. The loss of the enemy in the conflicts at Chattanooga was 757
killed, 4,529 wounded, and 337 missing; total, 5,616. Our loss in
killed and wounded was much less than theirs.
[Footnote 78: Some of the garrison of Cumberland Gap escaped, and stated
to General Jones that the surrender had been made without resistance, on
the demands of the smaller detachments which had preceded General
Burnside, and I was not advised of the fact that Buckner had
previously retreated toward Chattanooga, and that Burnside was in
possession of Knoxville. In my message of December 12, 1863, I
referred to the event, as reported to the War Department, as follows:
"The country was painfully surprised by the intelligence that the
officer in command of Cumberland Gap had surrendered that important
and easily defensible pass, without firing a shot, upon the summons
of a force still believed to have been inadequate to its reduction,
and when reënforcements were in supporting distance and had been
ordered to his aid. The entire garrison, including its commander,
being still held prisoners by the enemy, I am unable to suggest any
explanation of this disaster which laid open Eastern Tennessee and
Southwestern Virginia to hostile operations."
So far as censure of General Frazier was implied in these remarks, I
am now fully satisfied it was unjust, and I can only regret that the
authentic information recently furnished to me had not been received
at an earlier date, so that I might have relieved General Frazier
from the reflection while I held executive authority. It gives me
pleasure now to say that full and exact information justifies the
high estimate I placed upon him when he was assigned to the separate
command of that important post. Full justice can be done to General
Frazier only when his report and those of his subordinate officers
shall have been published.]