Advance of General E. K. Smith.--Advance of General Bragg.--Retreat
of General Buell to Louisville.--Battle at Perryville, Kentucky.--
General Morgan at Hartsville.--Advance of General Rosecrans.--
Battle of Murfreesboro.--General Van Dorn and General Price.--
Battle at Iuka.--General Van Dorn.--Battle of Corinth.--General
Little.--Captures at Holly Springs.--Retreat of Grant to Memphis.--
Operations against Vicksburg.--The Canal.--Concentration.--Raid of
Grierson.--Attack near Port Gibson.--Orders of General Johnston.--
Reply of General Pemberton.--Baker's Creek.--Big Black Bridge.--
Retreat to Vicksburg.--Siege.--Surrender.--Losses.--Surrender of
Port Hudson.--Some Movements for its Relief.
Operations in the West now claim attention. General Bragg, soon after
taking command, as has been previously stated, advanced from Tupelo
and occupied Chattanooga. Meantime General E. K. Smith with his force
held Knoxville, in East Tennessee. Subsequently, in August, he moved
toward Kentucky, and entered that State through Big Creek Gap, some
twenty miles south of Cumberland Gap. After several small and
successful affairs, he reached Richmond in the afternoon of August
30th. Here a force of the enemy had been collected to check his
progress, but it was speedily routed, with the loss of some hundred
killed and several thousand made prisoners, and a large number of
small-arms, artillery, and wagons were captured. Lexington was next
occupied; thence he advanced to Frankfort; and, moving forward toward
the Ohio River, a great alarm was created in Cincinnati, then so
little prepared for defense that, had his campaign been an
independent one, he probably could and would have crossed the Ohio
and captured that city. His division was but the advance of General
Bragg's, and his duty to coöperate with it was a sufficient reason
for not attempting so important a movement.
General Bragg marched from Chattanooga on September 5th, and, without
serious opposition, entered Kentucky by the eastern route, thus
passing to the rear of General Buell in Middle Tennessee, who,
becoming concerned for his line of communication with Nashville and
Louisville, and especially for the safety of the latter city,
collected all his force and retreated rapidly to Louisville. This was
a brilliant piece of strategy on the part of General Bragg, by which
he manoeuvered the foe out of a large and to us important territory.
By it north Alabama and Middle Tennessee were relieved from the
presence of the enemy, without necessitating a single engagement.
General Buell in his retreat followed the line of the railroad from
Nashville to Louisville. General Bragg moved more to the eastward, so
as to unite with the forces under General E. K. Smith, which was
subsequently effected when the army was withdrawing from Kentucky.
On September 18th General Bragg issued an address to the citizens of
Kentucky. Some recruits joined him, and an immense amount of supplies
was obtained, which he continued to send to the rear until he
withdrew from the State. The enemy, having received reënforcements,
as soon as our army began to retire, moved out and pressed so heavily
on its rear, under Major-General Hardee, that he halted and checked
them near Perryville. General Bragg then determined there to give
battle.
Concentrating three of the divisions of his old command, then under
Major-General Polk, he directed him to attack on the morning of
October 8th. The two armies were formed on opposite sides of the
town. The action opened at 12.30 P.M., between the skirmishers and
artillery on both sides. Finding the enemy indisposed to advance,
General Bragg ordered him to be assailed vigorously. The engagement
became general soon after, and was continued furiously until dark.
Although greatly outnumbered, our troops did not hesitate to engage
at any odds, and, though the battle raged with varying fortune, our
men eventually carried every position, and drove the Federals about
two miles. The intervention of night terminated the action. Our force
captured fifteen pieces of artillery, killed one and wounded two
brigadier-generals and a very large number of inferior officers and
men, estimated at no lees than four thousand, and captured four
hundred prisoners. Our loss was twenty-five hundred killed, wounded,
and missing.
Ascertaining that the enemy was heavily reënforced during the night,
General Bragg on the next morning withdrew his troops to Harrodsburg.
General Smith arrived the next day with most of his forces, and the
whole were then withdrawn to Bryantsville, the foe following slowly
but not closely. General Bragg finally took position at Murfreesboro,
and the hostile forces concentrated at Nashville, General Buell
having been superseded by General Rosecrans.
Meantime, on November 30th, General Morgan with thirteen hundred men
made an attack on a brigade of the enemy at Hartsville. It was found
strongly posted on a hill in line of battle. Our line was formed
under fire, and the advance was made with great steadiness. The enemy
was driven from his position, through his camps, losing a battery of
Parrott guns, and finally hemmed in on the river-bank, where he
surrendered. The contest was severe, and lasted an hour and a half.
The prisoners numbered twenty-one hundred.
Late in the month of December General Rosecrans commenced his advance
from Nashville upon the position of General Bragg at Murfreesboro.
His movement began on December 26th by various routes, but such was
the activity of our cavalry as to delay him four days in reaching the
battle-field, a distance of twenty-six miles. On the 29th General
Wheeler with his cavalry brigade gained the rear of Rosecrans's army,
and destroyed several hundreds of wagons loaded with supplies and
baggage. After clearing the road, he made the circuit of the enemy
and joined our left. Their strength, as we have ascertained, was
65,000 men. The number of fighting men we had on the field on
December 31st was 35,000, of which 30,000 were infantry and artillery.
Our line was formed about two miles from Murfreesboro, and stretched
transversely across Stone River, which was fordable from the Lebanon
pike on the right to the Franklin road on the left. As General
Rosecrans made no demonstration on the 30th, General Bragg determined
to begin the conflict early on the morning of the 31st by the advance
of his left. The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and his
right was steadily driven until his line was thrown entirely back at
a right angle to his first position and near to the railroad, along
which he had massed reserves. Their resistance after the first
surprise was most gallant and obstinate. At night he had been forced
from every position except the one on his extreme left, which rested
on Stone River, and was strengthened by a concentration of artillery,
and now seemed too formidable for assault.
On the next day (January 1st) the cannonading opened on the right
center about 8 A.M., and after a short time subsided. The enemy had
withdrawn from the advanced position occupied by his left flank; one
or two short contests occurred on the 3d, but his line was unchanged.
Our forces had now been in line of battle five days and nights, with
little rest, as there were no reserves. Their tents had been packed
in the wagons, which were four miles to the rear. The rain was
continuous, and the cold severe. Intelligence was received that heavy
reënforcements were coming to Rosecrans by a rapid transfer of all
the troops from Kentucky, and for this and the reasons before stated
General Bragg decided to fall back to Tullahoma, and the army was
withdrawn in good order.
In the series of engagements near Murfreesboro we captured over 6,000
prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, 6,000 small-arms, a number of
ambulances, horses, and mules, and a large amount of other property.
Our losses exceeded 10,000, and that of the enemy was estimated at
over 25,000.
After the battle of Shiloh, West Tennessee and north Mississippi were
occupied by a force under General Grant. Subsequently this force was
increased, and General Rosecrans assigned to its command. Many
positions were held in West Tennessee and north Mississippi,
extending from Memphis to the northeastern part of the State of
Mississippi, with garrisons aggregating about 42,000 men. The most
important of these positions was that of the fortified town of
Corinth. As part of the plan to subjugate the Southwestern States,
extensive preparations were made for an advance through Mississippi
and an attack on Vicksburg by combined land and naval forces. A large
number of troops occupied Middle Tennessee and north Alabama. To
defeat their general plan, and to relieve the last-mentioned places
of the presence of the enemy, General Bragg moved his army into
Kentucky, which, by this time, the Federal Government thought it
needless to overawe by the presence of garrisons. General Van Dorn
and General Price commanded the Confederate troops then in north
Mississippi. General Bragg, when he advanced into Kentucky, had left
them with instructions to operate against the Federals in that
region, and especially to guard against their junction with Buell in
Middle Tennessee. Though Van Dorn was superior in rank, he had no
power to command General Price, unless they should happen to join in
the field and do duty together. General Price on this as on other
occasions manifested his entire willingness to make a junction with
his superior officer, and about the last of August proposed to
General Van Dorn to join him, but at that time Van Dorn's available
force for the field had been sent with General Breckinridge in his
campaign against Baton Rouge. After that force had rejoined General
Van Dorn, he wrote to Price, inviting him to unite with him, that,
with their two divisions, they might make an attack upon Corinth, by
the capture of which main position of the enemy in that section of
the country he hoped to be subsequently able to drive him from north
Mississippi and West Tennessee. Price felt constrained by his
instructions to observe and if possible to prevent Rosecrans's forces
in Mississippi from effecting a junction with Buell's in Tennessee;
therefore the invitation was unfortunately postponed to a future time.
Subsequently General Price learned that Rosecrans was moving to cross
the Tennessee and join Buell; he therefore marched from Tupelo and
reached Iuka on the 19th of September. His cavalry advance found the
place occupied by a force, which retreated toward Corinth, abandoning
a considerable amount of stores. On the 24th Van Dorn renewed in
urgent terms his request for Price to come with all his forces to
unite with him and make an attack upon Corinth. On the same day Price
received a letter from General Ord, informing him that "Lee's army
had been destroyed at Antietam; that, therefore, the rebellion must
soon terminate, and that, in order to spare the further effusion of
blood, he gave him this opportunity to lay down his arms." Price
replied, correcting the rumor about Lee's army, thanked Ord for his
kind feeling, and promised to "lay down his arms whenever Mr. Lincoln
should acknowledge the independence of the Southern Confederacy, and
not sooner." On that night General Price held a council of war, at
which it was agreed on the next morning to fall back and make a
junction with Van Dorn, it being now satisfactorily shown that the
enemy was holding the line on our left instead of moving to reënforce
Buell. The cavalry pickets had reported that a heavy force was moving
from the south toward Iuka on the Jacinto road, to meet which General
Little had advanced with his Missouri brigade, an Arkansas battalion,
the Third Louisiana Infantry, and the Texas Legion. It proved to be a
force commanded by General Rosecrans in person. A bloody contest
ensued, and the latter was driven back, with the loss of nine guns.
Our own loss was very serious. General Maury states that the Third
Louisiana regiment lost half its men, that Whitfield's legion
suffered heavily, and adds that these two regiments and the Arkansas
battalion of about a hundred men had charged and captured the enemy's
guns. In this action General Henry Little fell, an officer of
extraordinary merit, distinguished on many fields, and than whom
there was none whose loss could have been more deeply felt by his
Missouri brigade, as well as by the whole army, whose admiration he
had so often attracted by gallantry and good conduct. It was
afterward ascertained that this movement of Rosecrans was intended to
be made in concert with one by Grant moving from the west, but the
former had been beaten before the latter arrived. Before dawn Price
moved to make the proposed junction with Van Dorn, which was effected
at Ripley on the 28th of September, at which time Van Dorn in his
report says: "Field returns showed my strength to be about 22,000.
Rosecrans at Corinth had about 15,000, with about 8,000 additional
men at outposts from twelve to fifteen miles distant." In addition to
this force, the enemy had at Memphis, under Sherman, about 6,000 men;
at Bolivar, under Ord, about 8,000; at Jackson, Tennessee, under
Grant, about 3,000; at bridges and less important points, 2,000 or
3,000--making an aggregate of 42,000 in West Tennessee and north
Mississippi.
Corinth, though the strongest, was from its salient position the
point it was most feasible to attack, and, under the circumstances,
the most important to gain. Van Dorn, therefore, decided to move so
rapidly upon it as to take it by surprise, and endeavor to capture it
before reënforcements could arrive. In a previous chapter notice has
been taken of the character and conduct of General Price; here it is
proposed in like manner to say something of General Van Dorn,
rendered the more appropriate because of the criticism to which his
attack upon Corinth has been subjected. He was an educated soldier,
had served with marked distinction in the war with Mexico; indeed,
had been quite as often noticed in official reports for gallantry and
good conduct as any officer who served in that war. After its close
he had served on the Western frontier, and in Indian warfare
exhibited a like activity and daring as that shown in the greater
battles with Mexico. Immediately on the secession of his native
State, Mississippi, he resigned from the United States Army, and,
together with his veteran commander in Texas, General Twiggs,
commenced recruiting men for the anticipated war. He was among the
first to leave the service of the United States, and came to offer
his sword to Mississippi. In the military organization there
authorized, he was appointed a brigadier-general, and, when the State
troops were transferred to the Confederacy, he entered its service.
Gentle as he was brave, and generous, freely sharing all the dangers
and privations to which his troops were subjected, he possessed, like
his associate Price, both the confidence and affection of his men.
Without entering into details of the disposition of his troops in the
attack on the works at Corinth, the result shows that they were
skillfully made, and, though final success did not crown the effort,
the failure was due to other causes than the defect of plan or want
of energy and personal effort on the part of Van Dorn. His opponent,
Rosecrans, was an engineer of high ability, and proved himself one of
the best generals in the United States Army. He had materially
strengthened the works around Corinth, and had interposed every
possible obstacle to an assault. Our army had moved rapidly from
Ripley, its point of junction, had cut the railroad between Corinth
and Jackson, Tennessee, and at daybreak on the 3d of March was
deployed for attack. By ten o'clock our force confronted the enemy
inside his intrenchments. In half an hour the whole line of outer
works was carried, the obstructions passed, and the battle opened in
earnest; the foe, obstinately disputing every point, was finally
driven from his second line of detached works, and at sunset had
retreated to the innermost lines.
The battle had been mainly fought by Price's division on our left.
The troops had made a quick march of ten miles over dusty roads
without water; the line of battle had been formed in forests with
undergrowth; the combats of the day had been so severe that General
Price thought his troops unequal to further exertion on that day, and
it was decided to wait until morning. Of this, General Van Dorn says:
"I saw with regret the sun sink behind the horizon as the last shot
of our sharpshooters followed the retreating foe into their innermost
lines. One hour more of daylight, and victory would have soothed our
grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not
dishonored field."
During the night batteries were put in position to open on the town
at 4 A.M. At daybreak the action was to begin on the left, to be
immediately followed by an advance on the extreme right. The order
was not executed, the commander of the wing which was to make the
attack failed to do so, and another officer was sent to take his
place. In the mean time the center became engaged, and the action
extended to the left. The plan had been disarranged; nevertheless,
the center and left pushed forward and planted their colors on the
last stronghold of the enemy; his "heavy guns were silenced, and all
seemed about to be ended, when a heavy fire from fresh troops that
had succeeded in reaching Corinth was poured into our thin ranks,"
and, with this combined assault on Price's exhausted corps, which had
sustained the whole conflict, those gallant troops were driven back.
The day was lost. The enemy, reënforced, was concentrated against our
left, and Lovell's division, which was at this time advancing,
pursuant to orders, and was on the point of assaulting the works, was
ordered to move to the left to prevent a sortie, and cover their
retreat. Our army retired during the day to Chewalla without pursuit,
and rested for the night free from molestation.
Our loss was very heavy of gallant men and officers. In the fierce
conflicts the officers displayed not only daring, but high military
skill, their impetuous charges being marked by judicious selection of
time and place. Colonel William S. Barry, who, as commander of the
burial party, visited General Rosecrans, was courteously received by
that officer, who, while declining to admit the command within his
lines, sent assurance to General Van Dorn that "every becoming
respect should be shown to his dead and wounded. . . . He had the
grave of Colonel Rodgers, who led the Second Texas sharpshooters,
inclosed and marked with a slab, in respect to the gallantry of his
charge. Rodgers fell before Gates called on me to reënforce him on
the edge of the ditch of Battery Robbinet." [75] This officer, W. P.
Rodgers, was a captain in the First Regiment of Mississippi Rifles in
the war with Mexico, and the gallantry which attracted the admiration
of the enemy at Corinth was in keeping with the character he acquired
in the former service referred to. Of this retreat, that able soldier
and military critic, General Dabney H. Maury, in a contribution to
the "Annals of the War," wrote:
"Few commanders have ever been so beset as Van Dorn was in the forks
of the Hatchie, and very few would have extricated a beaten army as
he did then. One, with a force stated at ten thousand men, headed him
at the Hatchie Bridge; while Rosecrans, with twenty thousand men, was
attacking his rear at the Tuscumbia Bridge, only five miles off. The
whole road between was occupied by a train of nearly four hundred
wagons, and a defeated army of about eleven thousand muskets. But Van
Dorn was never for a moment dismayed. He repulsed Ord, and punished
him severely; while he checked Rosecrans at the Tuscumbia, until he
could turn his train and army short to the left, and cross the
Hatchie by the Boneyard road, without the loss of a wagon."
He then moved near Holly Springs, Mississippi, to await farther
developments. In the mean time General Grant massed a heavy force,
estimated at eighty thousand men, at various points on the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad. Thence he moved south, through the interior
of Mississippi, until he encamped near Water Valley. The country was
teeming with great quantities of breadstuffs and forage, and he
accumulated an immense depot of supplies at Holly Springs, and
hastened every preparation necessary to continue his advance
southward. Unless his progress was arrested, the interior of the
State, its capital, Jackson, Vicksburg, and its railroads, would fall
into his possession. As we had no force in front sufficient to offer
battle, our only alternative was to attack his communications. For
this purpose. General Van Dorn, on the night of December 15th,
quietly withdrew our cavalry, amounting to less than twenty-five
hundred men, from the enemy's front, and marched for Holly Springs.
That place was occupied by a brigade of infantry and a portion of the
Seventh Illinois Cavalry. The movement of Van Dorn was so rapid that
early on the morning of the 19th he surprised and captured the
garrison, and before eight o'clock was in quiet possession of the
town. The captured property, amounting to millions of dollars, was
burned before sunset, with the exception of the small quantity used
in arming and equipping his command. General Grant was thus forced to
abandon his campaign and to retreat hastily from the State.
After the battle of Murfreesboro, which closed in the first days of
1863, there was a cessation of active operations in that portion of
Tennessee, and attention was concentrated upon the extensive
preparations which were in progress for a campaign into Mississippi,
with Vicksburg as the objective point. The plan, as it was developed,
was for a combined movement by land and river, the former passing
through the interior of Mississippi to approach Vicksburg in rear,
the latter to descend the Mississippi River and attack the city in
front. General Pemberton, with the main body of his command, held the
position on the Tallahatchie and Yazoo Rivers, and among the various
devices to turn that position was one more ingenious than ingenuous.
It was an offer to furnish, at prices lower than ruled in our
markets, provisions of which we stood in need, to be sent through the
Yazoo Pass and transported in boats through to the Yazoo River if we
should desire. I had, some time before, directed that cypress rafts,
as far as practicable, of sinking timber, should be thrown into the
main channel leading down from the Yazoo Pass; and saw that, if it
was not the purpose of the proposer, the effect of accepting the
proposition would be to open a water line of approach from the
Mississippi, below Memphis, then in the hands of the enemy, to the
interior in rear of Vicksburg: for that reason, I resisted much
importunity in favor of allowing the supplies to be brought in that
manner.
In the latter part of December General Sherman, having descended the
Mississippi River, entered the Yazoo with four divisions of land
troops and five gunboats, the object being to reduce our work at
Haines's Bluff and turn Vicksburg so as to attack it in rear. The
first point at which the range of hills extending from Vicksburg up
the Yazoo approaches near to the river is at Haines's Bluff, some
twenty miles by the course of the Yazoo from the Mississippi River.
Here the troops were landed the 26th of December to attack the
redoubts which had been built upon the bluff.
On the 27th little progress was made. On the 28th the attempt, by one
division, to approach the causeway north of the Chickasaw Bayou, was
repulsed with heavy loss. The troops were withdrawn and moved down
the river to a point below the bayou, there to unite with the rest of
the command. At daylight on the 29th the attack was resumed and
continued throughout the most of the day; the enemy were again
repulsed with heavy loss. On the next day there was firing on both
sides without conclusive results. On the 31st General Sherman sent in
a flag of trace to bury the dead.
[Illustration: Map of action of December 26-31]
Thereafter nothing important occurred until the latter part of
January, when the troops under General Grant embarked at Memphis and
moved down the Mississippi River to Young's Point, on the Louisiana
shore, a few miles above Vicksburg. The expected coöperation by his
forces with those of Sherman had been prevented by the brilliant
cavalry expedition under Van Dorn, which captured and destroyed the
vast supplies collected at Holly Springs for the use of Grant's
forces in the land movement referred to. This compelled Grant to
retreat to Memphis, and frustrated the combined movement which had
been projected, in connection with the river campaign, by Sherman,
and a new plan of operations resulted therefrom, in which, however,
still prominently appears the purpose of turning Vicksburg on the
north. After General Grant, descending the Mississippi from Memphis,
arrived (2d of February, 1863) in the neighborhood of Vicksburg and
assumed command of the enemy's forces, an attempt was made, by
removing obstructions to the navigation of the Yazoo Pass and Cold
Water, small streams which flow from the Mississippi into the
Tallahatchie River, to pass to the rear of Fort Pemberton at the
mouth of the latter. The never-to-be-realized hope was to reduce that
work, and thus open the way down the Yazoo River to the right flank
of the defenses of Vicksburg.
[Illustration: Map of action north of Vicksburg]
At the same time another attempt was made, by means of the network of
creeks and bayous on the north side of the Yazoo, to pass around and
enter the Yazoo above Haines's Bluff; but our sharpshooters, availing
themselves of every advantageous position, picked off the men upon
the boats, and Colonel (afterward General) Ferguson, with a few men
and a section of field-pieces, so harassed and beset them that they
were driven back utterly discomfited.
Admiral Porter had, with his fleet, gone some distance up Deer Creek,
and, but for the land-forces sent to sustain him, would probably
never have returned, an adventurous party having passed in below him
with axes to fell trees so as to prevent his egress. He is described
as follows:[76]
"I soon found Admiral Porter, who was on the deck of one of his
ironclads, with a shield made of the section of a smoke-stack, and I
doubt if he was ever more glad to meet a friend than he was to see
me. He explained that he had almost reached the Rolling Fork, when
the woods became full of sharpshooters, who, taking advantage of
trees, stumps, and the levee, would shoot down every man that poked
his nose outside the protection of their armor. . . . He informed me
at one time things looked so critical that he had made up his mind to
blow up the gunboats, and to escape with his men through the swamp to
the Mississippi River."
This attempt to get through to Yazoo, above Haines's Bluff, had so
signally failed, that the expedition was ordered back to the
Louisiana shore above Vicksburg, where they arrived on the 27th of
March, 1863. General Grant was now in command of a large army,
holding various positions on the Mississippi River opposite to
Vicksburg, extending from Milliken's Bend above to New Carthage
below, with a fleet of gunboats in the river above Vicksburg, and
another some eight miles below. Lieutenant-General Pemberton's
military district included Vicksburg, and Major-General Gardner was
in command at Port Hudson. These posts, as long as they could be
maintained, gave us some control over the intermediate space of the
river, about two hundred and sixty miles in length, and to that
extent secured our communication with the trans-Mississippi. The
enemy, after his repeated and disastrous attempts to turn the right
flank of Vicksburg, applied his attention to the opposite direction.
General Grant first endeavored to divert the Mississippi from its
channel, by cutting a canal across the peninsula opposite to
Vicksburg, so as to make a practicable passage for transport-vessels
from a point above to one below the city. His attempt was quite
unsuccessful, and, whatever credit may be awarded to his enterprise,
none can be given to his engineering skill, as the direction given to
his ditch was such that, instead of being washed out by the current
of the river, it was filled up by its sediment.
[Illustration: Map of area north of Vicksburg]
Another attempt to get into the Mississippi, without passing the
batteries at Vicksburg, was by digging a canal to connect the river
with the bayou in rear of Milliken's Bend, so as to have water
communication by way of Richmond to New Carthage. These indications
of a purpose to get below Vicksburg caused General Pemberton, early
in February, 1863, to detach Brigadier-General John S. Bowen, with
his Missouri Brigade, to Grand Gulf, near the mouth of the Big Black,
and establish batteries there to command the mouth of that small
river, which might be used to pass to the rear of Vicksburg, and also
by their fire to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi.
On the 19th of March the flag-ship of Admiral Farragut, with one
gunboat from the fleet at New Orleans, passed up the river in
defiance of our batteries; but, on the 25th, four gunboats from the
upper fleet attempted to pass down and were repulsed, two of them
completely disabled.
On the 16th of April a fleet of ironclads with barges in tow, Admiral
Porter commanding, under cover of the night ran the Vicksburg
batteries. One of the vessels was destroyed, and another one
crippled, but towed out of range. Subsequently, on the night of the
26th, a fleet of transports with loaded barges was floated past
Vicksburg. One or more of them was sunk, but enough escaped to give
the enemy abundant supplies below Vicksburg and boats enough for
ferriage uses. On the 20th of April the movement of the enemy
commenced through the country on the west side of the river to their
selected point of crossing below Grand Gulf.
On the 29th the enemy's gunboats came down and took their stations in
front of our batteries and rifle-pits at Grand Gulf. A furious
cannonade was continued for many hours, and the fleet withdrew,
having one gunboat disabled, and otherwise receiving and inflicting
but little damage. Among the casualties on our side was that of
Colonel William Wade, the chief of artillery, an officer of great
merit, alike respected and beloved, whose death was universally
regretted.
In a short time the fleet reappeared from behind a point which had
concealed them from view. The gunboats now had transports lashed to
their farther side, and, protected by their iron shields, ran by our
batteries at full speed, losing but one transport on the way.
On the evening of the 29th of April the enemy commenced ferrying over
troops from the Louisiana to the Mississippi shore to a landing just
below the mouth of Bayou Pierre. General Green with his brigade moved
thither, and, when the enemy on the night of the 30th commenced his
advance, General Green attacked him with such impressive vigor as to
render their march both cautious and slow. As additional forces came
up, Green retired, skirmishing. In the mean time Generals Tracy and
Baldwin, with their brigades, had by forced marches joined General
Green, and about daylight a more serious conflict occurred, lasting
some two hours and a half, during which General Tracy, a
distinguished citizen of Alabama, of whom patriotism made a soldier,
fell while gallantly leading his brigade in the unequal combat in
which it was engaged. Step by step, disputing the ground, Green
retired to the range of hills three miles southwest of Port Gibson,
where General Bowen joined him and arranged a new line of battle. The
enemy's forces were steadily augmented by the arrival of
reënforcements from the rear. Our troops continued most valiantly to
resist until, between nine and ten o'clock, outflanked both on our
right and left, their condition seemed almost hopeless, when, by a
movement to which desperation gave a power quite disproportionate to
the numbers, the right wing of the enemy was driven back, and our
forces made good their retreat across the bridge over Bayou Pierre.
General Cockerell, commanding our left wing, led this forlorn hope in
person, and to the fortune which favors the brave must be attributed
the few casualties which occurred in a service so hazardous. General
Bowen promptly intrenched his camp on the east side of Bayou Pierre
and waited for future developments. The relative forces engaged in
the battle of the 1st of May were, as nearly as I have been able to
learn, fifty-five hundred Confederates and twenty thousand Federals.
Fresh troops were reported to be joining Grant's army, and one of his
corps had been sent to cross by a ford above so as to get in rear of
our position. The reënforcements which were _en route_ to Bowen had
not yet approached so near as to give him assurance of coöperation.
To divert notice from this movement to get in the rear of Bowen, on
the morning of the 2d, Grant ordered artillery-fire to be opened on
our intrenchments across Bayou Pierre. It was quite ineffectual, and
probably was not expected to do more than occupy attention. During
the forenoon Bowen sent a flag of truce to ask suspension of
hostilities for the purpose of burying the dead. This was refused,
and a demand made for surrender. That was as promptly as decidedly
rejected, and, as the day wore away without the arrival of
reënforcement, Bowen, under cover of night, commenced a retreat, his
march being directed toward Grand Gulf. General Loring with his
division soon joined him. Directions were sent to the garrison at
Grand Gulf to dismantle the fortifications and evacuate the place. On
the morning of the 3d General Grant commenced a pursuit of the
retreating force, which, however, was attended with only unimportant
skirmishes; Bowen, with the reënforcements which were marching to his
support, recrossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry, and all, under
the orders of General Pemberton, were assigned to their respective
positions in the army he commanded.
While the events which have just been narrated were transpiring,
Colonel Grierson with three regiments of cavalry made a raid from the
northern border of Mississippi through the interior of the State, and
joined General Banks at Baton Rouge in Louisiana. Among the
expeditions for pillage and arson this stands prominent for savage
outrages against defenseless women and children, constituting a
record alike unworthy a soldier and a gentleman.
Grant with his large army was now marching into the interior of
Mississippi, his route being such as might either be intended to
strike the capital (Jackson) or Vicksburg. The country through which
he had to pass was for some distance composed of abrupt hills, and
all of it poorly provided with roads. There was reasonable ground to
hope that, with such difficult communications with his base of
supplies, and the physical obstacles to his progress, he might be
advantageously encountered at many points and be finally defeated. In
such warfare as was possible, that portion of the population who were
exempt or incapable of full service in the army could be very
effective as an auxiliary force. I therefore wrote to the Governor,
Pettus, a man worthy of all confidence, as well for his patriotism as
his manhood, requesting him to use all practicable means to get every
man and boy, capable of aiding their country in its need, to turn
out, mounted or on foot, with whatever weapons they had, to aid the
soldiers in driving the invader from our soil. The facilities the
enemy possessed in river transportation and the aid which their
iron-clad gunboats gave to all operations where land and naval forces
could be combined were lost to Grant in this interior march which he
was making. Success gives credit to military enterprises; had this
failed, as I think it should, it surely would have been pronounced an
egregious blunder. Other efforts made to repel the invader will be
noticed in the course of the narrative.
After the retreat of Bowen which has been described. General
Pemberton, anticipating an attack on Vicksburg from the rear,
concentrated all the troops of his command for its defense. All
previous demonstrations indicated the special purpose of the enemy to
be its capture. Its strategic importance justified the belief that he
would concentrate his efforts upon that object, and this opinion was
enforced by the difficulty of supplying his army in the region into
which he was marching, and the special advantages of Vicksburg as his
base. The better mode of counteracting his views, whatever they might
be, it would be more easy now to determine than it was when General
Pemberton had to decide that question. The superior force of the
enemy enabled him at the same time, while moving the main body of his
troops through Louisiana to a point below Vicksburg, to send a corps
to renew the demonstration against Haines's Bluff. Finding due
preparation made to resist an attack there, this demonstration was
merely a feint, but, had Pemberton withdrawn his troops, that feint
could have been converted into a real attack, and the effort so often
foiled to gain the heights above Vicksburg would have become a
success. When that corps retired, and proceeded to join the rest of
Grant's army which had gone toward Grand Gulf, Pemberton commenced
energetically to prepare for what was now the manifest object of the
enemy. From his headquarters at Jackson, Mississippi, he, on the 23d
of April, directed Major-General Stevenson, commanding at Vicksburg,
"that communications, at least for infantry, should be made by the
shortest practicable route to Grand Gulf. The indications now are
that the attack will not be made on your front or right, and all
troops not absolutely necessary to hold the works at Vicksburg should
be held as a movable force for either Warrenton or Grand Gulf." On
the 28th Brigadier-General Bowen, commanding at Grand Gulf, reported
that "transports and barges loaded down with troops are landing at
Hard-Times on the west bank." Pemberton replied by asking: "Have you
force enough to hold your position? If not, give me the smallest
additional number with which you can." At this time the small cavalry
force remaining in Pemberton's command compelled him to keep infantry
detachments at many points liable to be attacked by raiding parties
of the enemy's mounted troops, a circumstance seriously interfering
with the concentration of the forces of his command. Instructions
were sent to all the commanders of his cavalry detachments to move
toward Grand Gulf, to harass the enemy in flank and rear,
obstructing, as far as might be, communications with his base. A
dispatch was sent to Major-General Buckner, commanding at Mobile,
asking him to protect the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, as Pemberton
required all the troops he could spare to strengthen General Bowen. A
dispatch was also sent to General J. E. Johnston, at Tullahoma,
saying that the Army of Tennessee must be relied on to guard the
approaches through north Mississippi. To Major-General Stevenson, at
Vicksburg, he sent a dispatch: "Hold five thousand men in readiness
to move to Grand Gulf, and, on the requisition of Brigadier-General
Bowen, move them; with your batteries and rifle-pits manned, the city
front is impregnable." At the same time the following was sent to
General Bowen: "I have directed General Stevenson to have five
thousand men ready to move on your requisition, but do not make
requisition unless absolutely necessary for your position. I am also
making arrangements for sending you two or three thousand men from
this direction in case of necessity."
The policy was here manifested of meeting the enemy in the hills east
of the point of his debarkation, yet all unfriendly criticism has
treated General Pemberton's course on that occasion as having been
voluntarily to withdraw his troops to within the intrenchments of
Vicksburg. His published reports show what early and consistent
efforts he made to avoid that result.
After General J. E. Johnston had recovered from the wound received at
Seven Pines, he was on the 24th of November, 1862, by special order
No. 275, assigned to the command of a geographical department
including the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and parts of
Louisiana, Georgia, and North Carolina. The order gives authority to
establish his headquarters wherever, in his judgment, will best
secure facilities for ready communication with the troops of his
command; and provides that he "will repair to any part of said
command whenever his presence may for the time be necessary or
desirable." While the events which have been described were occurring
in Pemberton's command, he felt seriously the want of cavalry, and
was much embarrassed by the necessity for substituting portions of
his infantry to supply the deficiency of cavalry.
These embarrassments and the injurious consequences attendant upon
them were frequently represented. In his report he states, after
several other applications for cavalry, that on March 25th he wrote
to General Johnston, commanding department, "urgently requesting that
the division of cavalry under Major-General Van Dorn, which had been
sent to the Army of Tennessee for special and temporary purposes,
might be returned." He gives the following extract from General
Johnston's reply of April 3d to his request:
"In the present aspect of affairs, General Van Dorn's cavalry is much
more needed in this department than in that of Mississippi and East
Louisiana, and can not be sent back as long as this state of things
exists. You have now in your department five brigades of the troops
you most require, viz., infantry, belonging to the Army of Tennessee.
This is more than a compensation for the absence of General Van
Dorn's cavalry command."
To this Pemberton rejoined that cavalry was dispensable, stating the
positions where the enemy was operating on his communications, and
the impossibility of defending the railroads by infantry. Referring
to the advance of the enemy from Bruinsburg, Pemberton, in his
report, makes the following statement:
"With a moderate cavalry force at my disposal, I am firmly convinced
that the Federal army under General Grant would have been unable to
maintain its communication with the Mississippi River, and that the
attempt to reach Jackson and Vicksburg would have been as signally
defeated in May, 1863, as a like attempt from another base had, by
the employment of cavalry, been defeated in December, 1862."
Pemberton commenced, after the retreat of Bowen, to concentrate all
his forces for the great effort of checking the invading army, and on
the 6th of May telegraphed to the Secretary of War that the
reënforcements sent to him were very insufficient, adding: "The stake
is a great one; I can see nothing so important." On the 12th of May
he sent a telegram to General J. E. Johnston, and a duplicate to the
President, announcing his purpose to meet the enemy then moving with
heavy force toward Edwards's Depot, and indicated that as the
battle-field; he urgently asked for more reënforcements: "Also, that
three thousand cavalry be at once sent to operate on this line. I
urge this as a positive necessity. The enemy largely outnumbers me,
and I am obliged to hold back a large force at the ferries on Big
Black." This was done to prevent the foe passing to his rear.
Large bodies of troops continued to descend the river, land above
Vicksburg, and, to avoid our batteries at that place, to move on the
west side of the river to reënforce General Grant. This seemed to
justify the conclusion that the main effort in the West was to be
made by that army, and, supposing that General Johnston would be
convinced of the fact if he repaired to that field in person, as well
as to avail ourselves of the public confidence felt in his military
capacity, he was ordered, on the 9th of May, 1863, to "proceed at
once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces, giving to
those in the field, as far as practicable, the encouragement and
benefit of your personal direction. Arrange to take, for temporary
service, with you, or to be followed without delay, three thousand
good troops," etc.
On the 12th, the same day General Pemberton had applied for
reënforcements, he instructed Major-General Stevenson as follows:
"From information received, it is evident that the enemy is advancing
in force on Edwards's Depot and Big Black Bridge; hot skirmishing has
been going on all the morning, and the enemy are at Fourteen-Mile
Creek. You must move with your whole division to the support of
Loring and Bowen at the bridge, leaving Baldwin's and Moore's
brigades to protect your right."
In consequence of that information, Brigadier-General Gregg, who was
near Raymond, received cautionary instruction; notwithstanding which,
he was attacked by a large body of the enemy's forces, and his single
brigade, with great gallantry and steadiness, held them in check for
several hours, and then retired in such good order as to attract
general admiration. Meantime, bodies of the enemy's troops were sent
into the interior villages, and much damage was done in them, and to
the defenseless, isolated homes in the country.
General Johnston arrived at Jackson on the 13th of May, 1863, and
telegraphed to J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War, as follows:
"I arrived this evening, finding the enemy in force between this
place and General Pemberton, cutting off the communication. I am too
late."
In the order assigning General Johnston to the geographical
Department of the West, he was directed to repair in person to any
part of his command, whenever his presence might be for the time
necessary or desirable. On the 9th of May, 1863, he was ordered to
proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces
in the field.
When he reached Jackson, learning that the enemy was between that
place and the position occupied by General Pemberton's forces, about
thirty miles distant, he halted there and opened correspondence with
Pemberton, from which a confusion with consequent disaster resulted,
which might have been avoided had he, with or without his
reënforcements, proceeded to Pemberton's headquarters in the field.
What that confusion or want of co-intelligence was, will best appear
from citing the important part of the dispatches which passed between
them. On May 13th General Johnston, then at Jackson, sent the
following dispatch to General Pemberton, which was received on the
14th:
"I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is
between us, with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to
reestablish communications, that you may be reënforced. If
practicable, come up in his rear at once--to beat such a detachment
would be of immense value. Troops here could coöperate. All the
troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is
all-important."
On the same day, the 14th, General Pemberton, then at Bovina, replied:
"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication. I
moved at once with whole available force, about sixteen thousand,
leaving Vaughan's brigade, about fifteen hundred, at Big Black
Bridge; Tilghman's brigade, fifteen hundred, now at Baldwin's Ferry,
I have ordered to bring up the rear of my column; he will be,
however, from fifteen to twenty miles behind it. Baldwin's Ferry will
be left, necessarily, unprotected. To hold Vicksburg are Smith's and
Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's Mills to Warrenton,
numbering effectives seven thousand eight hundred men. . . . I do not
think that you fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg will be
left in; but I comply at once with your order."
On the same day, General Pemberton, after his arrival at Edwards's
Depot, called a council of war of all the general officers present.
He placed General Johnston's dispatch before them, and stated his own
views against the propriety of an advance, but expressed the opinion
that the only possibility of success would be by a movement on the
enemy's communications. A majority of the officers present expressed
themselves favorable to the plan indicated by General Johnston. The
others, including Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson, "preferred a
movement by which the army might attempt to cut off the enemy's
supplies from the Mississippi River." General Pemberton then sent the
following dispatch to General Johnston:
EDWARDS'S DEPOT, _May 14, 1863._
"I shall move as early to-morrow morning as practicable, with a
column of seventeen thousand men, to Dillon's, situated on the main
road leading from Raymond to Port Gibson, seven and a half miles
below Raymond, and nine and a half miles from Edwards's Depot. The
object is to cut the enemy's communication and to force him to attack
me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on
the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson. At
this point your nearest communication would be through Raymond."
The movement commenced about 1 P.M. on the 15th, General Pemberton
states that the force at Clinton was an army corps, numerically
greater than his whole available force in the field; that--
"The enemy had at least an equal force to the south, on my right
flank, which would be nearer Vicksburg than myself, in case I should
make the movement proposed. I had, moreover, positive information
that he was daily increasing his strength. I also learned, on
reaching Edwards's Depot, that one division of the enemy (A. J.
Smith's) was at or near Dillon's."
On the morning of the 16th, about 6.30 o'clock, Colonel Wirt Adams,
commanding the cavalry, reported to General Pemberton that his
pickets were skirmishing with the enemy on the Raymond road in our
front. At the same moment a courier arrived and delivered the
following dispatch from General Johnston:
"CANTON ROAD, TEN MILES FROM JACKSON,
"_May 15, 1863, 8.30_ o'clock A.M.
"Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable.
The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to
Clinton and informing me, that we may move to that point with about
six thousand."
Pemberton reversed his column to return to Edwards's Depot and take
the Brownsville road, so as to proceed toward Clinton on the north
side of the railroad, and sent a reply to General Johnston to notify
him of the retrograde movement and the route to be followed. Just as
the reverse movement commenced, the enemy drove in the cavalry
pickets and opened fire with artillery.
The continuance of the movement was ordered, when, the demonstrations
of the enemy becoming more serious, orders were issued to form a line
of battle, with Loring on the right, Bowen in the center, and
Stevenson on the left. Major-General Stevenson was ordered to make
the necessary dispositions for protecting the trains on the Clinton
road and the crossing of Baker's Creek. The line of battle was
quickly formed in a position naturally strong, and the approaches
from the front well covered. The enemy made his first demonstration
on the right, but, after a lively artillery duel for an hour or more,
this attack was relinquished, and a large force was thrown against
the left, where skirmishing became heavy. About ten o'clock the
battle began in earnest along Stevenson's entire front. About noon
Loring was ordered to move forward and crush the enemy in his front,
and Bowen to coöperate. No movement was made by Loring; he said the
force was too strongly posted to be attacked, but that he would seize
the first opportunity to assault if one should offer. Stevenson soon
found that unless reënforced he would be unable to resist the heavy
and repeated attacks along his line. Aid was sent to him from Bowen,
and for a time the tide of battle turned in our favor. The enemy
still continued to move troops from his left to his right, thus
increasing on that flank his vastly superior forces. General
Pemberton, feeling assured that there was no important force in front
of Loring, again ordered him to move to the left as rapidly as
possible. To this order, the answer was given that the enemy was in
strong force and endeavoring to turn his flank. As there was no
firing on the right, the order was repeated. Much time was lost in
exchanging these messages. At 4 P.M. a part of Stevenson's division
broke badly and fell back. Some assistance finally came from Loring,
but it was too late to save the day, and the retreat was ordered. Had
the left been promptly supported when it was first so ordered, it is
not improbable that the position might have been maintained and the
enemy possibly driven back, although his increasing numbers would
have rendered it necessary to withdraw during the night to save our
communications with Vicksburg unless promptly reënforced. The
dispatch of the 15th from General Johnston, in obedience to which
Pemberton reversed his order of march, gave him the first
intelligence that Johnston had left Jackson; but, while making the
retrograde movement, a previous dispatch from Johnston, dated "May
14, 1863, camp seven miles from Jackson," informed Pemberton that the
body of Federal troops, mentioned in his dispatch of the 13th, had
compelled the evacuation of Jackson, and that he was moving by the
Canton road; he refers to the troops east of Jackson as perhaps able
to prevent the enemy there from drawing provisions from that
direction, and that his command might effect the same thing in regard
to the country toward Panola, and then asks these significant
questions:
"Can he supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off
from it? Above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of
supplies, beat him? As soon as the reënforcements are all up, they
must be united to the rest of the army. . . . If prisoners tell the
truth, the force at Jackson must be half of Grant's array. It would
decide the campaign to beat it, which can only be done by
concentrating, especially when the remainder of the eastern troops
arrive. They are to be twelve or thirteen thousand."
From Pemberton's communication it is seen that he did not feel his
army strong enough to attack the corps in position at Clinton, and
that he hoped by the course adopted to compel the enemy to attack our
force in position. Whether the movement toward Dillon's was well or
ill advised, it was certainly a misfortune to reverse the order of
march in the presence of the enemy, as it involved the disadvantage
of being attacked in rear. As has been described, the dispositions
for battle were promptly made, and many of the troops fought with a
gallantry worthy of all praise. Though defeated, they were not routed.
Stevenson's single division for a long time resisted a force
estimated by him at "more than four times" his own. In the afternoon
he was reënforced by the unfaltering troops of Bowen's division.
Cockerell, commanding the First Missouri Brigade, fought with like
fortitude under like disadvantage. When Pemberton saw that the masses
assailing his left and left center by their immense numbers were
pressing our forces back into old fields, where the advantages of
position would be in his adversary's favor, he directed his troops to
retire, and sent to Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman instructions to
hold the Raymond road to protect the retreat. General Pemberton says
of him:
"It was in the execution of this important duty, which could not have
been confided to a fitter man, that the lamented General bravely lost
his life."
He was the officer whose devoted gallantry and self-sacrificing
generosity were noticed in connection with the fall of Fort Henry.
This severe battle was signalized by so many feats of individual
intrepidity that its roll of honor is too long for the limits of
these pages.
Though some gave way in confusion, and others failed to respond when
called on, the heroism of the rest shed luster on the field, and "the
main body of the troops retired in good order." The gallant brigades
of Green and Cockerell covered the rear.
The topographical features of the position at the railroad-bridge
across the Big Black were such as, with the artificial strength given
to it, made it quite feasible to defend it against a direct approach
even of an army as much superior in numbers to that of Pemberton as
was that of Grant; but the attack need not be made by a direct
approach. The position could be turned by moving either above or
below by fords and ferries, and thus advancing upon Vicksburg by
other and equally eligible routes. From what has already been quoted,
it will be understood that General Pemberton considered the
occupation of Vicksburg vitally important in connection with the
command of the Mississippi River, and the maintenance of
communication with the country beyond it. It was therefore that he
had been so reluctant to endanger his connection with that point as
his base. Pressed as he was by the enemy, whose object, it had been
unmistakably shown, was to get possession of Vicksburg and its
defenses, the circumstances made it imperative that he should abandon
a position, the holding of which would not effect his object, and
that he should withdraw his forces from the field to unite them with
those within the defenses of Vicksburg, and endeavor, as speedily as
possible, to reorganize the depressed and discomfited troops.
One of the immediate results of the retreat from Big Black was the
necessity of abandoning our defenses on the Yazoo, at Snyder's Mills;
this position and the line of Chickasaw Bayou were no longer tenable.
All stores that could be transported were ordered to be sent into
Vicksburg as rapidly as possible, the rest, including heavy guns, to
be destroyed. During the night of the 17th nothing of importance
occurred. On the morning of the 18th the troops were disposed from
right to left on the defenses. On the entire line, one hundred and
two pieces of artillery of different caliber, principally field-guns,
were placed in position at such points as were deemed most suitable
to the character of the gun. Instructions had been given from Bovina
that all the cattle, sheep, and hogs, belonging to private parties,
and likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, should be driven
within our lines. Grant's army appeared on the 18th.
The development of the intrenched line from our extreme right was
about eight miles, the shortest defensible line of which the
topography of the country admitted. It consisted of a system of
detached works, redans, lunettes, and redoubts, on the prominent and
commanding points, with the usual profile of raised field-works,
connected in most cases by rifle pits. To hold the entire line there
were about eighteen thousand five hundred infantry, but these could
not all be put in the trenches, as it was necessary to keep a reserve
always ready to reënforce any point heavily threatened.
The campaign against Vicksburg had commenced as early as November,
1862, and reference has been made to the various attempts to capture
the position both before and after General Grant arrived and took
command in person. He had now by a circuitous march reached the rear
of the city, established a base on the Mississippi River a few miles
below, had a fleet of gunboats in the river, and controlled the
navigation of the Yazoo up to Haines's Bluff, and was relieved from
all danger in regard to supplying his army. We had lost the
opportunity to cut his communications while he was making his long
march over the rugged country between Bruinsburg and the vicinity of
Vicksburg. Pemberton had by wise prevision endeavored to secure
supplies sufficient for the duration of an ordinary siege, and, on
the importance which he knew the Administration attached to the
holding of Vicksburg, he relied for the coöperation of a relieving
army to break any investment which might be made. Disappointed in the
hope which I had entertained that the invading army would be unable
to draw its supplies from Bruinsburg or Grand Gulf, and be driven
back before crossing the Big Black, it now only remained to increase
as far as possible the relieving army, and depend upon it to break
the investment. The ability of the Federals to send reënforcements
was so much greater than ours, that the necessity for prompt action
was fully realized; therefore, when General Johnston on May 9th was
ordered to proceed to Mississippi, he was directed to take from the
Army of Tennessee three thousand good troops, and informed that he
would find reënforcements from General Beauregard. On May 12th a
dispatch was sent to him at Jackson, stating, "In addition to the
five thousand men originally ordered from Charleston [Beauregard],
about four thousand more will follow. I fear more can not be spared
to you." On May 22d I sent the following dispatch to General Bragg,
at Tullahoma, Tennessee:
"The vital issue of holding the Mississippi at Vicksburg is dependent
on the success of General Johnston in an attack on the investing
force. The intelligence from there is discouraging. Can you aid him?"
To this he replied on the 23d of May, 1863:
"Sent thirty-five hundred with the General, three batteries of
artillery and two thousand cavalry since; will dispatch six thousand
more immediately."
In my telegram to General Bragg, after stating the necessity, I
submitted the whole question to his judgment, having full reliance in
the large-hearted and comprehensive view which his self-denying
nature would take of the case, and I responded to him:
"Your answer is in the spirit of patriotism heretofore manifested by
you. The need is sore, but you must not forget your own necessities."
On the 1st of June General Johnston telegraphed to me that the troops
at his disposal available against Grant amounted to twenty-four
thousand one hundred, not including Jackson's cavalry command and a
few hundred irregular cavalry. Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War, replied
to him stating the force to be thirty-two thousand. In another
dispatch, of June 5th, the Secretary says his statement rested on
official reports of numbers sent, regrets his inability to promise
more, as we had drained our resources even to the danger of several
points, and urged speedy action. "With the facilities and resources
of the enemy time works against us." Again, on the 16th, Secretary
Seddon says:
"If better resources do not offer, you must hazard attack."
On the 18th, while Pemberton was inspecting the intrenchments along
which his command had been placed, he received by courier a
communication from General Johnston, dated "May 17, 1863, camp
between Livingston and Brownsville," in answer to Pemberton's report
of the result of the battles of Baker's Creek and Big Black, and the
consequent evacuation of Snyder's Mills. General Johnston wrote:
"If Haines's Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and can not
be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must
ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing
both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it
is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march
to the northeast."
Pemberton, in his report, remarks:
"This meant the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi
River, and the severance of the Confederacy."
He recurs to a former correspondence with myself in which he had
suggested the possibility of the investment of Vicksburg by land and
water, and the necessity for ample supplies to stand a siege, and
says his application met my favorable consideration, and that
additional ammunition was ordered. Confident in his ability, with the
preparations which had been made, to stand a siege, and firmly
relying on the desire of the President and of General Johnston to
raise it, he "felt that every effort would be made, and believed it
would be successful." He, however, summoned a council of war,
composed of all his general officers, laid before them General
Johnston's communication, and desired their opinion on "the question
of practicability," and on the 18th replied to General Johnston that
he had placed his instructions before the general officers of the
command, and that "the opinion was unanimously expressed that it was
impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale
and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy." He then
announces his decision to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, and
expresses the hope that he may be assisted in keeping this
obstruction to the enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi River.
He closes his letter thus:
"I still conceive it to be the most important point in the
Confederacy."
While the council of war was assembled, the guns of the enemy opened
on the works, and the siege proper commenced.
Making meager allowance for a reserve, it required the whole force to
be constantly in the trenches, and, when they were all on duty, it
did not furnish one man to the yard of the _developed line_. On the
19th two assaults were made at the center and left. Both were
repulsed and heavy loss inflicted; our loss was small. At the game
time the mortar-fleet of Admiral Porter from the west side of the
peninsula kept up a bombardment of the city.
Vicksburg is built upon hills rising successively from the river. The
intrenchments were upon ridges beyond the town, only approaching the
river on the right and left flanks, so that the fire of Porter's
mortar-fleet was mainly effective upon the private dwellings, and the
women, the children, and other noncombatants.
The hills on which the city is built are of a tenacious calcareous
clay, and caves were dug in these to shelter the women and children,
many of whom resided in them during the entire siege. From these
places of refuge, heroically facing the danger of shells incessantly
bursting over the streets, gentlewomen hourly went forth on the
mission of humanity to nurse the sick, the wounded, and to soothe the
dying of their defenders who were collected in numerous hospitals.
Without departing from the softer character of their sex, it was
often remarked that, in the discharge of the pious duties assumed,
they seemed as indifferent to danger as any of the soldiers who lined
the trenches.
During the 20th, 21st, and the forenoon of the 22d, a heavy fire of
artillery and musketry was kept up by the besiegers, as well as by
the mortar- and gun-boats in the river. On the afternoon of the 22d
preparation was made for a general assault. The attacking columns
were allowed to approach to within good musket-range, when every
available gun was opened with grape and canister, and our infantry,
"rising in the trenches, poured into their ranks volley after volley
with so deadly an effect that, leaving the ground literally covered
in some places with their dead and wounded, they [the enemy]
precipitately retreated." One of our redoubts had been breached by
their artillery previous to the assault, and a lodgment made in the
ditch at the foot of the redoubt, on which two colors were planted.
General Stevenson says in his report:
"The work was constructed in such a manner that the ditch was
commanded by no part of the line, and the only means by which they
could be dislodged was to retake the angle by a desperate charge, and
either kill or compel the surrender of the whole party by the use of
hand-grenades. A call for volunteers for this purpose was made, and
promptly responded to by Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. Pettus, Twentieth
Alabama Regiment, and about forty men of Waul's Texas Legion. A more
gallant feat than this charge has not illustrated our arms during the
war. The preparations were quietly and quickly made, but the enemy
seemed at once to divine our intentions, and opened upon the angle a
terrible fire of shot, shell, and musketry. Undaunted, this little
band, its chivalrous commander at its head, rushed upon the work,
and, in less time than it required to describe it, the flags were in
our possession. Preparations were then quickly made for the use of
hand-grenades, when the enemy in the ditch, being informed of our
purpose, immediately surrendered.
"From this time forward, although on several occasions their
demonstrations seemed to indicate other intentions, the enemy
relinquished all idea of assaulting us, and confined himself to the
more cautious policy of a system of gradual approaches and mining."
His force was not less than sixty thousand men. Thus affairs
continued until July 1st, when General Pemberton thus describes the
causes which made capitulation necessary:
"It must be remembered that, for forty-seven days and nights, those
heroic men had been exposed to burning suns, drenching rains, damp
fogs, and heavy dews, and that during all this period they never had,
by day or by night, the slightest relief. The extent of our works
required every available man in the trenches, and even then they were
in many places insufficiently manned. It was not in my power to
relieve any portion of the line for a single hour. Confined to the
narrow limits of trench, with their limbs cramped and swollen,
without exercise, constantly exposed to a murderous storm of shot and
shell. . . . Is it strange that the men grew weak and attenuated? . . .
They had held the place against an enemy five times their number,
admirably clothed and fed, and abundantly supplied with all the
appliances of war. Whenever the foe attempted an assault, they drove
him back discomfited, covering the ground with his killed and
wounded, and already had they torn from his grasp five stands of
colors as trophies of their prowess, none of which were allowed to
fall again into his hands."
Under these circumstances, he says, he became satisfied that the time
had arrived when it was necessary either to evacuate the city by
cutting his way out or to capitulate. Inquiries were made of the
division commanders respecting the ability of the troops to make the
marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful
sortie and force their way through the enemy; all of whom reported
their several commands quite unequal to the performance of such all
effort. Therefore, it was resolved to seek terms of capitulation.
These were obtained, and the city was surrendered on July 4th.
The report of General Pemberton contains this statement:
"Knowing the anxious desire of the Government to relieve Vicksburg, I
felt assured that, if within the compass of its power, the siege
would be raised; but, when forty-seven days and nights had passed,
with the knowledge I then possessed that no adequate relief was to be
expected, I felt that I ought not longer to place in jeopardy the
brave men whose lives had been intrusted to my care. Hence, after the
suggestion of the alternative of cutting my way out, I determined to
make terms, not because my men were starved out, not because I could
not hold out yet a little longer, but because they were overpowered
by numbers, worn down with fatigue, and each day saw our defenses
crumbling beneath their feet. . . . With an unlimited supply of
provisions, the garrison could, for the reasons already given, have
held out much longer."
At the close of General Pemberton's report he notices two officers,
whose gallant services have been repeatedly mentioned in the
foregoing pages, as follows:
"I can not close this report without brief tribute to the memory of
two of the best soldiers in the Confederate service. I refer to
Major-General John S. Bowen and Brigadier-General Martin E. Green.
Always faithful, zealous, and brave, they fell, as became them, in
the discharge of their duty. General Green died upon the lines he had
so long and so gallantly defended. General Bowen, having passed
scathless through the bloody scenes of Shiloh, Iuka, Corinth, Grand
Gulf, Port Gibson, Baker's Creek, and Vicksburg, perished by disease
after the capitulation."
With an unlimited supply of provisions the garrison could not, for
the reasons already given, have held out much longer. Our loss in
killed, wounded, and missing, from the landing of the enemy on the
east to the capitulation, was 5,632; that of the enemy, according to
his own statement, was 8,875. The number of prisoners surrendered, as
near as I can tell, did not exceed 28,000.
In addition to the efforts made to relieve Vicksburg by an attack on
Grant's army in the rear, instructions were sent to General Kirby
Smith, commanding on the west side of the river, to employ a part of
his forces in coöperation with our troops on the east side. From
General Richard Taylor's work, "Destruction and Reconstruction," I
learn that--
"the Federal army withdrew from Alexandria [a town on Red River,
Louisiana] on the 13th of May, and on the 23d crossed the Mississippi
and proceeded to invest Port Hudson. . . . A communication from
General Kirby Smith informed me that Major-General Walker, with a
division of infantry and three batteries, four thousand strong, was
on the march from Arkansas, and would reach me within the next few
days; and I was directed to employ Walker's force to relieve
Vicksburg, now invested by General Grant, who had crossed the
Mississippi on the 1st of May."
General Taylor states that his view was that this force might be best
employed for the relief of Vicksburg by a movement to raise the siege
of Port Hudson, which he regarded as feasible, while a direct
movement toward Vicksburg he considered would be unavailing, because
the peninsula opposite to that city was partially occupied by the
enemy and commanded by the gunboats in the river; he states, however,
that he was overruled, and proceeded with Walker's division to cross
the Tensas and attack two Federal camps on the bank of the
Mississippi, the one ten and the other fourteen miles above
Vicksburg, but that, after driving the troops over the levee, the
gunboats in the river protected them from any further assault. Then,
being convinced that nothing useful could be effected in that
quarter, he, in conformity with his original idea, ordered General
Walker to retire to Alexandria, intending to go thence to the Têche.
He says this order was countermanded and the division kept in the
region between the Tensas and the Mississippi until the fall of
Vicksburg. Taylor had left Mouton's and Green's brigades in the
country west of the Têche, and thither he went in person. At
Alexandria he found three regiments of Texan mounted men, about six
hundred and fifty aggregate, under the command of Colonel (afterward
Brigadier-General) Major, and these were ordered to Morgan's Ferry on
the Atchafalaya. Taylor then proceeded to the camps of Mouton and
Green, on the lower Têche. After giving instructions preparatory to
an attack on a work which the Federals had constructed at Berwick's
Bay, Taylor returned to join Colonel Major's command on the
Atchafalaya, and with it moved down the Fardoche and Grossetete to
Fausse Rivière, opposite to Port Hudson. Here the noise of the
bombardment then in progress could be distinctly heard, and here he
learned that the Federal force left in New Orleans did not exceed one
thousand men.
It was now the 10th of June. He was about one hundred miles from the
Federal force at Berwick's Bay. He furnished Colonel Major with
guides, informed him that he must be at Berwick's Bay on the morning
of the 23d, as Mouton and Green would attack at dawn on that day.
Taylor then hastened to the camp of Mouton and Green. The country
through which Major was to march was in possession of the enemy,
therefore secrecy and celerity were alike required for success. The
men carried their rations, and the wagons were sent back across the
Atchafalaya. In his rapid march. Major captured seventy prisoners and
burned two steamers, and the combined movements of Mouton, Green, and
Major, all reached their goal at the appointed time, of which General
Taylor says: "Although every precaution had been taken to exclude
mistakes and insure coöperation, such complete success is not often
attained in combined military movement; and I felt that sacrifices
were due to fortune."
At Berwick's Bay the Federals had constructed works to strengthen a
position occupied as a depot of supplies. The effective garrison was
small, the principal number of those present being sick and
convalescents. The works mounted twelve guns, thirty-twos and
twenty-fours, and a gunboat was anchored in the bay. Our object was
to capture Berwick's Bay, and thence proceed to the execution of the
plan above indicated. For this purpose, having arrived on the Têche,
a short distance above Berwick's Bay, some small boats (skiffs) and a
number of sugar-coolers were collected, in which the men were
embarked. Major Hunter, of the Texas regiment, and Major Blair, of
the Second Louisiana, were placed in command, and detachments were
drawn from the forces. They embarked at night, and paddled down the
Têche to the Atchafalaya and Grand Lake. They had about twelve miles
to go, and were expected to reach the northeast end of the island, a
mile from Berwick's, before daylight, where they were to remain until
they heard the guns of our force on the west side of the bay. At dawn
on June 23d our guns opened on the gunboat and speedily drove it
away. Fire was then directed on the earthworks, and the enemy
attempted to reply, when a shout was heard in the rear, and Hunter
with his party came rushing on. Resistance ceased at once. The spoils
of Berwick's were of vast importance. Twelve thirty-two- and
twenty-four-pounder guns, many small arms and accouterments, great
quantities of quartermaster's and commissary's, ordnance, and medical
stores, and seventeen hundred prisoners were taken. Then, as promptly
as circumstances would permit, Taylor, with three thousand men of all
arms, proceeded, with the guns and munitions he had acquired, to the
execution of the object of his campaign--to raise the siege of Port
Hudson, by cutting Banks's communication with New Orleans and making
a demonstration which would arouse that city. "Its population of two
hundred thousand was bitterly hostile to Federal rule, and the
appearance of a Confederate force on the opposite bank of the river
would raise such a storm as to bring Banks from Port Hudson, the
garrison of which could then unite with General Joseph Johnston in
the rear of General Grant."
In the first week in July, twelve guns were placed on the river below
Donaldsonville. Fire was opened and one transport destroyed and
several turned back. Gunboats attempted to dislodge our batteries,
but were driven away by dismounted men, protected by the levee. For
three days the river was closed to transports, and mounted scouts
were pushed down to a point opposite Kenner, sixteen miles above New
Orleans. A few hours more, and there would have been great excitement
in the city. But, by the surrender of Port Hudson on July 9th, the
enemy were in sufficient force, not only to arrest Taylor's
movements, but to require a withdrawal from the exposed position
which this little command had assumed for the great object of
relieving that place, and thus giving of its garrison, perhaps about
five thousand men, as a reënforcement to break the investment of
Vicksburg.
Port Hudson, which thus capitulated, was situated on a bend of the
Mississippi, about twenty-two miles above Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and
one hundred and forty-seven above New Orleans. The defenses in front,
or on the water-side, consisted of three series of batteries situated
on a bluff and extending along the river above the place. Farther up
was an impassable marsh forming a natural defense, and in the rear
the works were strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments
and rifle-pits, with heavy trees felled in every direction. General
Banks with a large force landed on May 21, 1863, and on the 27th an
assault was made on the works, and repulsed. A bombardment from the
river was then kept up for several days, and on June 14th another
unsuccessful assault was made. This was their last assault, but the
enemy, resorting to mines and regular approaches, was slowly
progressing with these when the news of the surrender of Vicksburg
was received. Major-General Gardner, who was in command, then made a
proposal to General Banks to capitulate, which was accepted by the
latter, and the position was yielded to him on the next day. The
surrender included about six thousand persons all told, fifty-one
pieces of artillery, and a quantity of ordnance stores. Our loss in
killed and wounded in the assaults was small compared to that of the
enemy, and by the fall of Vicksburg the position of Port Hudson had
ceased to have much importance.
[Illustration: Map of Port Hudson]
More than six weeks the garrison, which had resisted a vastly
superior force attacking by both land and water, had cheerfully
encountered danger and fatigue without a murmur, had borne famine and
had repulsed every assault, and yielded Port Hudson only when the
fall of Vicksburg had deprived the position of its importance. A
chivalric foe would have recognized the gallantry of the defense in
the terms usually given under like circumstances; such, for instance,
as were granted to Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, or, at the least,
have paroled the garrison.
I had regarded it of vast importance to hold the two positions of
Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Though gunboats had passed the batteries
of both, they had found it hazardous, and transport-vessels could not
prudently risk it. The garrisons of both places had maintained them
with extraordinary gallantry, inspired no doubt as well by
consciousness of the importance of their posts as by the soldierly
character common to Confederate troops. Taylor on the 10th received
intelligence of the fall of Port Hudson, and some hours later learned
that Vicksburg had surrendered. His batteries and outposts were
ordered in to the Lafourche, and Mouton was sent to Berwick's to
cross the stores to the west side of the bay. On the 13th a force of
six thousand men followed his retreat down the Lafourche; but Green,
with fourteen hundred dismounted men and a battery, attacked the
Federals so vigorously as to drive them into Donaldsonville,
capturing two hundred prisoners, many small-arms, and two guns.
Undisturbed thereafter, Taylor continued his march, removed all the
stores from the fortification at Berwick's, and on the 21st of July
moved up the Têche. The pickets left at Berwick's reported that the
enemy's scouts only reached the bay twenty-four hours after Taylor's
troops had withdrawn.
In the recital of those events connected with the sieges of Port
Hudson and Vicksburg, enough has been given to show the great anxiety
of the Administration to retain those two positions as necessary to
continued communication between the Confederate States on the east
and west sides of the Mississippi River. The reader will not have
failed to observe that General Johnston, commanding the department,
and General Pemberton, the district commander, entertained quite
different views. The former considered the safety of the garrisons of
such paramount importance, that the position should be evacuated
rather than the loss of the troops hazarded; the latter regarded the
holding of Vicksburg as of such vital consequence that an army should
be hazarded to maintain its possession. When General Pemberton and
his forces were besieged in Vicksburg, every effort was made to
supply General Johnston with an army which might raise the siege.
While General Johnston was at Jackson, preparing to advance against
the army investing Vicksburg, the knowledge that the enemy was
receiving large reënforcements made it evident that the most prompt
action was necessary for success; of this General Johnston manifested
a dear perception, for on the 25th of May he sent Pemberton the
following message:
"Bragg is sending a division; when it comes, I will move to you."
After all the troops which could be drawn from other points had been
sent to him, it was suggested that he might defeat the force
investing Port Hudson, and unite the garrison with his troops at
Jackson, but he replied:
"We can not relieve Port Hudson without giving up Jackson, by which
we should lose Mississippi."
On June 29th General Johnston reports that--
"Field transportation and other supplies having been obtained, the
army marched toward the Big Black, and on the evening of July 1st
encamped between Brownsville and the river."
The 2d and 3d of July were spent in reconnaissance, from which the
conclusion was reached that an attack on the north side of the
railroad was impracticable, and examinations were commenced on the
south side of the railroad. On the 3d a messenger was sent to General
Pemberton that an attempt would be made about the 7th, by an attack
on the enemy, to create a diversion which might enable Pemberton to
cut his way out. The message was not received, and Pemberton,
despairing of aid from the exterior, capitulated on the 4th.
General Grant, in expectation that an attack in his rear would be
made by General J. E. Johnston, formed a provisional corps by taking
brigades from several corps, and assigned General Sherman to command
it. He was sent in the direction of Big Black. Colonel Wilson, then
commanding the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, was sent to the Big Black
River to watch for the expected advance of Johnston, when Sherman was
to be notified, so that he might meet and hold Johnston in check
until additional reënforcements should arrive. Wilson never sent the
notice. An officer of Grant's army, whose rank and position gave
opportunity for accurate information, writes:
"It was always a matter of surprise to Grant and his commanders that
Johnston failed to make the attempt to break up the siege of
Vicksburg, of which from the long line and consequent weakness of the
army of the North there seemed a fair chance of accomplishment."
General Johnston, being informed on the 5th of the surrender of
Vicksburg, fell back to Jackson, where his army arrived on the 7th.
"On the morning of the 9th the enemy appeared in heavy force in front
of the works thrown up for the defense of the place; these,
consisting of a line of rifle-pits prepared at intervals for
artillery, . . . were badly located and constructed, presenting but a
slight obstacle to a vigorous assault." [77]
The weather was hot, deep dust covered the country roads, and for
about ten miles there was no water to supply the troops who were
advancing in heavy order of battle from Clinton; and the circumstances
above mentioned caused General Johnston, as he states, to expect that
the enemy "would be compelled to make an immediate assault." Sherman,
in command of the attacking column, did not, however, elect to assault
the intrenchments, but moved the left of his line around so as to rest
upon Pearl River above, and then, extending his right so as to reach the
river below, commenced intrenching a line of investment. As early as
May 27th Brigadier-General J. G. Rains had been directed to report to
General Johnston in connection with torpedoes and sub-terra shells, and
a request had been made for "all reasonable facilities and aid in the
supply of men or material for the fair trial of his torpedoes and
shells." There could scarcely have been presented a better opportunity
for their use than that offered by the heavy column marching against
Jackson, and the enemy would have been taken at great disadvantage if
our troops had met them midway between Jackson and Clinton. As the
defenses of Jackson had not been so corrected in location and increased
in strength as to avail against anything other than a mere assault, it
is greatly to be regretted that the railroad-bridge across Pearl River
was not so repaired that the large equipments of the Central road might
have been removed for use elsewhere and at other times. One of the
serious embarrassments suffered in the last two years of the war was
from the want of rolling-stock, with which to operate our railroads, as
required for the transportation of troops and supplies. On the 12th of
July a heavy cannonade was opened, and the missiles reached all parts of
the town. An assault was also made on Major-General Breckinridge's
position on our extreme left. His division, with the aid of Cobb's
and Slocum's batteries, repulsed it, inflicting severe loss, and
capturing two hundred prisoners, besides the wounded, and taking
three regimental colors. On the 15th General Johnston was assured
that the remainder of Grant's army was moving from Vicksburg to
Jackson, and on the night of the 16th he, having previously sent
forward his sick and wounded, successfully withdrew his army across
the Pearl River, and moved toward Brandon, and continued the march as
far as Morton, about thirty-five miles from Jackson. The enemy
followed no farther than Brandon, which was reached on the 19th, and
manifested no higher purpose than that of arson, which was exhibited
on a still larger scale at Jackson.
Thus, within the first half of July, our disasters had followed close
upon the heels of one another. Though not defeated at Gettysburg, we
had suffered a check, and an army, to which nothing was considered
impossible, had been compelled to retire, leaving its opponent in
possession of the field of battle. The loss of Vicksburg and Port
Hudson was the surrender of the Mississippi to the enemy. It was true
that gunboats had run by our batteries, but not with impunity, and
some of them had been sunk in the attempt. Transports for troops,
supplies, and merchandise could not, except at great risk, use the
river while our batteries at those two points remained effective, and
gunboats cruising between them would have but a barren field.
Moreover, they needed to be very numerous to prevent intercourse
between the two sides of the river, which, thus far, they had never
been able to effect.
[Footnote 75: General D. H. Maury.]
[Footnote 76: "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol i, pp. 310, 311.]
[Footnote 77: General Johnston's "Report of Operations in Mississippi
and East Louisiana," pp. 12, 13.]