Movement to draw forth the Enemy.--Advance to Culpeper
Court-House.--Cavalry Engagement at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords.--
Movement against Winchester.--Milroy's Force captured.--
Prisoners.--The Enemy retires along the Potomac.--Maryland
entered.--Advance into Pennsylvania.--The Enemy driven back toward
Gettysburg.--Position of the Respective Forces.--Battle at
Gettysburg.--The Army Retires.--Prisoners.--The Potomac swollen.--
No Interruption by the Enemy.--Strength of our Force.--Strength of
the Enemy.--The Campaign closed.--Observations.--Kelly's Ford.--
Attempt to surprise our Army.--System of Breastworks.--Prisoners.
In the spring of 1863 the enemy occupied his former position before
Fredericksburg. He was in great strength, and, so far as we could
learn, was preparing on the grandest scale for another advance
against Richmond, which in political if not military circles was
regarded as the objective point of the war. The consolidated report
of the Army of the Potomac, then under the command of Major-General
Hooker, states the force present on May 10, 1863, to be 136,704.
General Lee's forces had been reorganized into three army corps,
designated the First, Second, and Third Corps. In the order named,
they were commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and A.
P. Hill.
The zeal of our people in the defense of their country's cause had
brought nearly all of the population fit for military service to the
various armies then in the field, so that but little increase could
be hoped for by the Army of Northern Virginia. Under these
circumstances, to wait until the enemy should choose to advance was
to take the desperate hazard of the great inequality of numbers, as
well as ability to reënforce, which he possessed. In addition to the
army under General Hooker, a considerable force occupied the lower
part of the Valley of the Shenandoah.
It was decided by a bold movement to attempt to transfer hostilities
to the north side of the Potomac, by crossing the river and marching
into Maryland and Pennsylvania, simultaneously driving the foe out of
the Shenandoah Valley. Thus, it was hoped, General Hooker's army
would be called from Virginia to meet our advance toward the heart of
the enemy's country. In that event, the vast preparations which had
been made for an advance upon Richmond would be foiled, the plan for
his summer's campaign deranged, and much of the season for active
operations be consumed in the new combinations and dispositions which
would be required. If, beyond the Potomac, some opportunity should be
offered so as to enable us to defeat the army on which our foe most
relied, the measure of our success would be full; but, if the
movement only resulted in freeing Virginia from the presence of the
hostile army, it was more than could fairly be expected from awaiting
the attack which was clearly indicated.
Actuated by these and other considerations, the campaign was
commenced on June 3, 1863. Our forces advanced to Culpeper
Court-House, leaving A. P. Hill to occupy the lines in front of
Fredericksburg. On the 5th Hooker, having discovered our movement,
crossed an army corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, but, as
this was apparently for observation, it was not thought necessary to
oppose it.
On the 9th a large force of the enemy's cavalry crossed at Beverly's
and Kelly's Fords and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement
ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the
afternoon, when Stuart forced his assailant to recross the river with
heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of
artillery, and several stands of colors in our hands.
Meantime, General Jenkins with a cavalry brigade had been ordered to
advance toward Winchester, to coöperate with an infantry expedition
into the lower Valley, and General Imboden made a demonstration
toward Romney to cover the movement against Winchester, and prevent
reënforcements from the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both
these officers were in position when Ewell left Culpeper Court-House
on the 6th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, Rodes's
division went to Berryville to dislodge the force stationed there,
and cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac.
General Ewell, on the 13th of June, advanced directly upon
Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town. On the
next day he stormed the works, and the whole army of General Milroy
was captured or put to flight. Most of those who attempted to escape
were intercepted and made prisoners. Unfortunately, among the
exceptions, was their commander, who had been guilty of most
unpardonable outrages upon defenseless non-combatants.
General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, entering the
latter place on the 14th, and capturing seven hundred prisoners, five
pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores. These
operations cleared the Valley of the enemy. More than four thousand
prisoners, twenty-nine pieces of artillery, two hundred and seventy
wagons and ambulances, with four hundred horses, were captured,
besides a large amount of military stores. Our loss was small. On the
night that Ewell appeared at Winchester, the enemy at Fredericksburg
recrossed the Rappahannock, and on the next day disappeared behind
the hills of Stafford.
The whole army of General Hooker, in retiring, pursued the roads near
the Potomac, offering no favorable opportunity for attack. His
purpose seemed to be to take a position which would enable him to
cover the approaches to Washington City. To draw him farther from his
base, and to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who had left for the
Valley, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and
occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. The cavalry under General Stuart
was in front of Longstreet to watch the enemy, and encountered his
cavalry on the 17th near Aldie, and drove it back. The engagement was
renewed on the next day, but the cavalry of the latter being now
strongly supported by infantry, Stuart was compelled to retire. He
had, however, taken in these engagements about four hundred prisoners
and a considerable number of horses and arms.
Meantime, General Ewell, with the advance of his corps, had entered
Maryland. Jenkins, with his cavalry, penetrated as far as
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. As these demonstrations did not cause the
hostile army to leave Virginia, nor did it seem disposed to advance
upon Longstreet's position, he was withdrawn to the west side of the
Shenandoah. General Hill had already reached the Valley. General
Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and observe the
movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede
as much as possible should he attempt to cross the Potomac, In that
event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the
Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should
seem best, and take position on the right of our column as it
advanced. General Longstreet says:
"General Stuart held the gap for a while, and then hurried around
beyond Hooker's army, and we saw nothing more of him until the
evening of July 2d, when he came down from York and joined us, having
made a complete circuit of the Federal army."
Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac, to be within supporting
distance of Ewell, and advanced into Pennsylvania, encamping near
Chambersburg on the 27th of June. The cavalry, under Colonel White,
advanced to the Susquehanna.
On the night of the 27th information was received that General Hooker
had crossed the Potomac, and was advancing northward, and that the
head of the column had reached South Mountain. This menaced our
communications, and it was resolved to prevent his further progress
by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountain.
Accordingly, the different commands were ordered to proceed to
Gettysburg. This march was conducted more slowly than it would have
been had the movements of Hooker been known. Heth's, the leading
division of Hill's corps, met the enemy in front of Gettysburg on the
morning of July 1st, driving him back to within a short distance of
the town; the advance there encountered a larger force, with which
two of Hill's divisions became engaged. Ewell, coming up with two of
his divisions, joined in the engagement; and the opposing force was
driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about five
thousand prisoners and several pieces of artillery.
Under the instructions given to them not to bring on a general
engagement, these corps bivouacked on the ground they had won.
In an address delivered at Lexington, Virginia, on January 17, 1873,
General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery, makes the following
statement:
"The ground southwest of the town was carefully examined by me after
the engagement on July 1st. Being found much less difficult than the
steep ascent fronting the troops already up, its practicable
character was reported to our commanding General. He informed me that
he had ordered Longstreet to attack on that front at sunrise the next
morning. And he added to myself, 'I want you to be out long before
sunrise so as to reexamine and save time.' He also desired me to
communicate with General Longstreet as well as with himself. The
reconnaissance was accordingly made, as soon as it was light enough
on the 2d, and made through a long distance--in fact, very close to
what there was of the enemy's line. No insuperable difficulty
appearing, and the marching up--far off, the enemy's reenforcing
columns being seen--the extreme desirableness of immediate attack
there, was at once reported to the commanding General; and, according
to his wish, message was also sent to the intrepid but deliberate
corps commander whose sunrise attack there had been ordered. There
was, however, unaccountable delay. My own messages went repeatedly to
General Lee, and his, I know, was urgently pressed on General
Longstreet, until, as I afterward learned from officers who saw
General Lee, as I could not at the time, he manifested extreme
displeasure with the tardy corps commander. That hard-fighting
soldier, to whom it had been committed there to attack early in the
day, did not, in person, reach the commanding General, and with him
ride to a position whence to view the ground and see the enemy's
arriving masses, until twelve o'clock; and his column was not up and
ready for the assault until 4 P.M. All this, as it occurred under my
personal observation, it is nothing short of imperative duty that I
should thus fairly state."
For the reasons set forth by General Pendleton, whose statement, in
regard to a fact coming under his personal observation, none who know
him will question, preparations for a general engagement were
unfortunately delayed until the afternoon, instead of being made at
sunrise; then troops had been concentrated, and "Round-Top," the
commanding position, unoccupied in the morning, had received the
force which inflicted such disaster on our assaulting columns. The
question as to the responsibility for this delay has been so fully
discussed in the Southern Historical Society papers as to relieve me
from the necessity of entering into it.
The position at Gettysburg was not the choice of either side. South
from the town an irregular, interrupted line of hills runs, which is
sometimes called the "Gettysburg Ridge." This ridge, at the town,
turns eastward and then southward. At the turn eastward is Cemetery
Hill and at the turn southward Culps's Hill. From Cemetery Hill the
line runs southward about three miles in a well-defined ridge, since
the battle called Cemetery Ridge, and terminates in a high, rocky,
and wooded peak named Round-Top, which was the key of the enemy's
position, as it flanked their line. The less elevated portion, near
where the crest rises into Round-Top, is termed "Little Round-Top," a
rough and bold spur of the former. Thus, while Cemetery and Culps's
Hills require the formation of a line of battle to face northward,
the direction of Cemetery Ridge requires the line to face westward.
The crest has a good slope to the rear, while to the west it falls
off in a cultivated and undulating valley, which it commands. About a
mile distant is a parallel crest, known as Seminary Ridge, and which
our forces occupied during the battle. Longstreet, with the divisions
of Hood and McLaws, faced Round-Top and a good part of Cemetery
Ridge; Hill's three divisions continued the line from the left of
Longstreet, fronting the remainder of Cemetery Ridge; while Ewell,
with his three divisions, held a line through the town, and, sweeping
round the base of Cemetery Hill, terminated the left in front of
Culps's Hill.
These were the positions of the three corps after the arrival of
General Longstreet's troops.
The main purpose of the movement across the Potomac was to free
Virginia from the presence of the enemy. If this could be done by
manoeuvering merely, a most important result would be cheaply
obtained. The contingency of a battle was of course deemed probable,
and, with any fair opportunity, the Army of Northern Virginia was
considered sure to win a victory.
[Illustration: Lieutenant-General James Longstreet]
It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance
as Gettysburg from our base, unless attacked; but, being unexpectedly
confronted by the opposing army, it became a matter of difficulty to
withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same
time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the
presence of the main army of the enemy, as he was enabled to restrain
our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with
both regular and local troops. Encouraged by the successful issue of
the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results
that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade (who
had succeeded General Hooker), General Lee thought it preferable to
renew the attack.
General Meade held the high ridge above described, along which he had
massed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied the left
of our line, General Hill the center, and General Longstreet the
right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position, from
which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could gain
the more elevated ground (Round-Top) beyond, and thus enable our guns
to rake the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor
to carry this position, while General Ewell attacked directly the
high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially
fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the center of the
line, in order to prevent reënforcements to either wing, and to avail
himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack. After
a severe struggle Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and
holding the ground in his immediate front. Ewell also carried some of
the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to
lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the
force in his front. The battle ceased at dark. These partial
successes determined Lee to continue the assault on the next day.
Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet on the
following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the
position gained by him on the day before. The general plan of attack
was unchanged, except that one division and two brigades of Hill's
corps were ordered to support Longstreet.
General Meade, in the mean time, had strengthened his line with
earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and
the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d, and raged with
great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the
advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his
batteries; but, our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition,
the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the
numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most
determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their
advantage and fall back to their original positions with severe loss.
Owing to the strength of the enemy's position and the exhaustion of
our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded,
and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to
continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as could be
removed and a part of the arms collected on the field were ordered to
Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at
night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it
about four thousand prisoners. Nearly two thousand had been
previously paroled; but the numerous wounded that had fallen into our
hands after the first and second day's engagements were left behind.
Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which
greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not
leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th.
The march was continued during that day without interruption by the
enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the
afternoon, when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. The army,
after a tedious march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached
Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th of July.
The Potomac was so much swollen by the rains, that had fallen almost
incessantly since our army entered Maryland, as to be unfordable. A
pontoon-train had been sent from Richmond, but the rise in the river
gave to it a width greater than was expected, so that additional
boats had to be made by the army on its retreat. Our communication
with the south side was thus interrupted, and it was found difficult
to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty
being enhanced by the high water impeding the working of the mills.
The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to wait at
Williamsport for the subsiding of the river or the construction of
additional pontoon-boats. The enemy had not yet made his appearance,
but, as he was in a condition to obtain large reënforcements and our
want of supplies was daily becoming more embarrassing, it was deemed
advisable to recross the river. By the 13th a good bridge was thrown
over at Falling Waters. On the 12th Meade's army approached. A
position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from
Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that
and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two
armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in
fortifying his own lines.
General Meade, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, said that he ordered an attack on our forces on the
morning of the 14th, and, if it had been made, it was his opinion
that "it would have resulted disastrously." When asked the reasons
for that opinion, he replied:
"If I had attacked the enemy in the position which he then
occupied--he having the advantage of position, and being on the
defensive, his artillery in position, and his infantry behind
parapets and rifle-pits--the very same reasons and causes which
produced my success at Gettysburg would have operated in his favor
there, and be likely to produce success on his part."
Our preparations being completed, and the Potomac, though still deep,
being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the
south side on the night of the 13th. Ewell's corps forded the river
at Williamsport, those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the
bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads the troops did not reach
the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not
completed until 1 P.M., when the bridge was removed. General Lee said
that the enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was
attended with no loss of material except a few disabled wagons and
two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through
the deep mud. During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the
midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way
to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the
obscurity of the night, and these, with some stragglers, a few of
Heth's division most remote from the bridge, were captured. On the
following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the vicinity of
which it encamped for several days. Owing to the swollen condition of
the Shenandoah River, the campaign which was contemplated when the
Potomac was recrossed, could not be immediately commenced. Before the
waters had subsided, the movements of the enemy required us to cross
the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock.
The strength of our army at Gettysburg is stated at 62,000 of all
arms.[79] The report of the Army of the Potomac under General Meade,
on June 30, 1863, states the force present at 112,988 men. Before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Meade, in reference to
his force at Gettysburg, said, "Including all arms of the service, my
strength was a little under 100,000 men--about 95,000."
If the strength of General Lee's forces, according to the last
accessible report before the movement northward, be compared with
that made after his return into Virginia, there is a decrease of
nineteen thousand of the brave men who had set the seal of
invincibility upon the Army of Northern Virginia.
General Lee, in his report, noticing the large loss of men and
officers, says:
"I can not speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits
deserve. Some of them are appropriately mentioned in the accompanying
reports, and the memory of all will be gratefully and affectionately
cherished by the people in whose defense they fell.
"The loss of Major-General Pender is severely felt by the army and
the country. . . . Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnet,
and Semmes, died as they had lived, discharging the highest duty of
patriots with devotion that never faltered, and courage that shrank
from no danger."
The testimony of General Meade, above mentioned, contains this
statement respecting his losses:
"On the evening of the 2d of July, after the battle of that day had
ceased, and darkness had set in, being aware of the very heavy losses
of the First and Eleventh Corps on the 1st of July, and knowing how
severely the Third Corps, the Fifth Corps, and other portions of the
army, had suffered in the battle of the 2d of July--in fact, as
subsequently ascertained, out of the twenty-four thousand men killed,
wounded, and missing, which was the amount of my losses and
casualties at Gettysburg--over twenty thousand of them had been put
_hors de combat_ before the night of the 2d of July."
Thus closed the campaign in Pennsylvania. The wisdom of the strategy
was justified by the result. The battle of Gettysburg was
unfortunate. Though the loss sustained by the enemy was greater than
our own, theirs could be repaired, ours could not.
Had General Lee been able to compel the enemy to attack him in
position, I think we should have had a complete victory, and the
testimony of General Meade quoted above shows that he was not at all
inclined to make the experiment. If General Lee, by moving to the
right, would only have led General Meade to fall back on his
preferred position of Pipe Creek, his ability to wait and the
impossibility under such circumstances for General Lee to supply his
army for any length of time seem to me an answer to that point in the
criticism to which our great Captain has been subjected. To compel
Meade to retire would have availed but little to us, unless his army
had first been routed. To beat that army was probably to secure our
independence. The position of Gettysburg would have been worth
nothing to us if our army had found it unoccupied. The fierce battle
that Lee fought there must not be considered as for the position; to
beat the great army of the North was the object, and that it was of
possible attainment is to be inferred from the various successes of
our arms. Had there been a concentrated attack at sunrise on the
second day, with the same gallantry and skill which were exhibited in
the partial assaults, it may reasonably be assumed that the enemy
would have been routed. This, from the best evidence we have, was the
plan and the expectation of General Lee. These having failed, from
whatever cause, and Meade having occupied in force the commanding
position of Round-Top, it must be conceded that it would have been
better to withdraw than to renew the attack on the third day. The
high morale and discipline of our army, together with the unqualified
confidence of the men in their commanding General, excluded the
supposition that they would be demoralized by retreat. Subsequent
events proved how little cause there was to fear it. It is not
admitted that our army was defeated, and the enemy's claim to a
victory is refuted by the fact that, when Lee halted on the banks of
the Potomac, Meade, instead of attacking as a pursuing general would
a defeated foe, halted also, and commenced intrenching.
The Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of an unusual amount of
discussion, and the enemy has made it a matter of extraordinary
exultation. As an affair of arms it was marked by mighty feats of
valor to which both combatants may point with military pride. It was
a graceful thing in President Lincoln if, as reported, when he was
shown the steeps which the Northern men persistently held, he
answered, "I am proud to be the countryman of the men who assailed
those heights."
The consequences of the battle have justified the amount of attention
it has received. It may be regarded as the most eventful struggle of
the war. By it the drooping spirit of the North was revived. Had
their army been there defeated, those having better opportunities to
judge than I or any one who was not among them, have believed it
would have ended the war. On the other hand, a drawn battle, where
the Army of Northern Virginia made an attack, impaired the confidence
of the Southern people so far as to give the malcontents a power to
represent the Government as neglecting for Virginia the safety of the
more southern States.
In all free governments, the ability of its executive branch to
prosecute a war must largely depend upon public opinion; in an infant
republic, this, for every reason, is peculiarly the case. The volume
given to the voice of disaffection was therefore most seriously felt
by us.
Shattered, it is true, but not disheartened, the Army of Northern
Virginia after recrossing the Potomac rose like the son of Terra,
with renewed vigor, and entered on the brilliant campaign hereafter
to be generally described.
Early in October General Lee, with two corps (Ewell's and Hill's),
the First Corps of his army having been temporarily detached for
service in Tennessee, crossed the Rapidan to attack the flank of the
enemy, or to compel him to retreat. It resulted in the capture of
fifteen hundred prisoners, and forced Meade's army back to Alexandria
and Centreville. The campaign was an unbroken success, with the
exception of a rash and ill-conducted affair at Bristoe Station,
where our advance engaged a corps, and was repulsed, losing a number
of men and five guns. Thus, without a general battle, a large portion
of the State was for the time liberated.
On November 7th the enemy advanced upon our force at Kelly's Ford, of
the Rappahannock River, effected a crossing, and, rushing upon two
brigades who were at Rappahannock Station defending the bridges,
overwhelmed and captured most of them, taking between twelve and
fifteen hundred men, and four pieces of artillery. The movements of
the enemy were concealed by the darkness, and his attack was a
surprise.
On November 26th the army under General Meade crossed the Rapidan,
with the intention of interposing between the widely separated wings
of his adversary. Instead of being successful, this movement resulted
in an entire failure. General Meade found Lee's army posted behind
Mine Run, and ready to receive an attack whenever he was disposed to
make it. "Meade declared, it is related, that he could carry the
position with a loss of thirty thousand men; but, as that idea was
frightful, there seemed nothing to do but retreat." [80] Lee had
inaugurated that system of breastworks which did him good service in
his long campaign with General Grant. When the troops were halted in
a wood, the men felled the large trees, heavy logs were dragged
without loss of time to the prescribed line, where they were piled
upon one another in double walls, which were filled in rapidly with
earth; so that, in a short space of time, defenses which would turn a
cannon-shot were often constructed. In front, for some distance, the
felled timber made a kind of abatis. As General Meade did not attack,
General Lee, on the night of December 1st, determined to assail his
adversary on the next morning; but, when the dawn broke over the
hills, his camps were seen to be deserted. General Meade had
abandoned the campaign, and was in full retreat toward the Rapidan.
Pursuit was immediately made, but he had too much the start, and
reached the north side of the Rapidan before he could be overtaken.
Both armies then retired to their original positions. We captured
about seven hundred prisoners, four hundred mules and horses, and
destroyed or secured one hundred and twenty wagons.
[Footnote 79: "Four Years with General Lee."]
[Footnote 80: "Life of General R. E. Lee," by J. E. Cooke.]