Advance of General McClellan toward Centreville; his Report.--Our
Forces ordered to the Peninsula.--Situation at Yorktown.--Siege by
General McCellan.--General Johnston assigned to Command; his
Recommendation.--Attack on General Magruder at Yorktown.--Movements
of McClellan.--The Virginia.--General Johnston retires.--Delay at
Norfolk.--Before Williamsburg.--Remark of Hancock.--Retreat up the
Peninsula.--Sub-terra Shells used.-Evacuation of Norfolk.--Its
Occupation by the Enemy.
In a previous chapter the retreat of our army from Centreville has
been described, and reference has been made to the anticipation of
the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that the enemy would soon
advance to attack that position. Since the close of the war we have
gained information not at that time to us attainable, which shows
that, as early as the 31st of January, 1862, the commanding General
of the enemy's forces presented to his President an argument against
that line of operations, setting forth the advantages of a movement
by water-transports down the Chesapeake into the Rappahannock; and
that in the following February, by the direction of President
Lincoln, General McClellan held a council with twelve of the generals
of that army, who decided in favor of the movement by way of
Annapolis, and thence to the Rappahannock, to which their President
gave his assent. When General McClellan, then in the city of
Washington, heard that our army had retired, he ordered a general
movement of his troops toward the position we had lately occupied. A
detachment was sent to make reconnaissance as far as the line of the
Rappahannock, by which it was ascertained that our troops had passed
beyond that river. His account of this movement was given in the
following report:
"FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, _March 11, 1862,_ 8.30 P.M.
"I have just returned from a ride of more than forty miles. Have
examined Centreville, Union Mills, Blackburn's Ford, etc. The rebels
have left all their positions, and, from the information obtained
during our ride to-day, I am satisfied that they have fallen behind
the Rapidan, holding Fredericksburg and Gordonsville. Their movement
from here was very sudden. They left many wagons, some caissons,
clothing, ammunition, personal baggage, etc. Their winter-quarters
were admirably constructed, many not yet quite finished. The works at
Centreville are formidable; more so than at Manassas. Except the
turnpike, the roads are horrible. The country entirely stripped of
forage and provisions. Having fully consulted with General McDowell,
I propose occupying Manassas with a portion of Banks's command, and
then at once throwing all forces I can concentrate upon the line
agreed upon last week. The Monitor justifies this course. I
telegraphed this morning to have the transports brought to
Washington, to start from there. I presume you will approve this
course. Circumstances may keep me out here some little time
longer.[20]
"G. B. MCCLELLAN, _Major-General_.
"Hon. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_."
The reference to the Monitor is to be explained by the condition
previously made in connection with the proposition of going to
Fortress Monroe, that the Merrimac, our Virginia, should first be
neutralized. The order to bring the "transports" to Washington was
due to the fact that they had not dared to run by our batteries on
the Potomac, and intended to avoid them by going to Annapolis for
embarkation. The withdrawal of our batteries from the banks of the
Potomac had removed the objection to going down that river, and the
withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the
programme of landing on that river, and marching to Richmond before
our forces could be in position to resist an attack on the capital.
Notwithstanding the assurance given that the destruction of railroads
and bridges proved that our army could not intend to advance,
apprehension was still entertained of an attack upon Washington.
As soon as we ascertained that the enemy was concentrating his forces
at Fortress Monroe, to advance upon our capital by that line of
approach, all our disposable force was ordered to the Peninsula,
between the James and York Rivers, to the support of General John B.
Magruder, who, with a force of seven to eight thousand men, had, by
availing himself of the Warwick River, a small stream which runs
through a low, marshy country, from near Yorktown to the James River,
constructed an intrenched line across the Peninsula, and with equal
skill and intrepidity had thus far successfully checked every attempt
to break it, though the enemy was vastly superior in numbers to the
troops under General Magruder's command. Having a force entirely
inadequate to occupy and defend the whole line, over thirteen miles
long, he built dams in the Warwick River, so as to form pools, across
which the enemy, without bridges, could not pass, and posted
detachments at each dam to prevent the use of them by attacking
columns of the enemy. To defend the left of his line, where the
stream became too small to present a serious obstacle to the passage
of troops, redoubts were constructed, with curtains connecting them.
Between Yorktown and Gloucester Point, on the opposite shore, the
York River is contracted to less than a mile in width, and General
Magruder had constructed batteries at both places, which, by their
cross fire, presented a formidable obstacle to the accent of ordinary
vessels. The fortifications at Norfolk and the navy-yard, together
with batteries at Sewell's Point and Craney Island, in conjunction
with the navy, offered means of defense against any attempt to land
troops on the south side of James River. After the first trial of
strength with our Virginia, there had been an evident disinclination
on the part of the enemy's vessels to encounter her, so that, as long
as she floated, the deep water of the roads and mouth of James River.
was not likely to be invaded by ships of war.
As a second line of defense, a system of detached works had been
constructed by General Magruder near to Williamsburg, where the width
of the Peninsula, available for the passage of troops, was only three
or four miles. The advantage thus secured to his forces, if they
should be compelled to retreat, will be readily appreciated. I am not
aware that torpedoes had been placed in York River to prevent the
entrance of the enemy's vessels; indeed, at that time, but little
progress had been made in the development of that means of harbor and
river defense. General Rains, as will be seen hereafter, had matured
his invention of sensitive fuse-primers for sub-terra shells, and
proposed their use for floating torpedoes. Subsequently he did much
to advance knowledge in regard to making torpedoes efficient against
the enemy's vessels.
Such was the condition of the Virginia Peninsula between the York and
James Rivers when General McClellan embarked the mass of the army he
commanded in northern Virginia and proceeded to Fortress Monroe; and
when the greater part of our army, under the command of General J. E.
Johnston, was directed to move for the purpose of counteracting this
new plan of the enemy.
Early in April, General McClellan had landed about one hundred
thousand men at or near Fortress Monroe.[21] At this time General
Magruder occupied the lower Peninsula with his force of seven or
eight thousand men. Marshes, creeks, and dense wood gave to that
position such advantage that, in his report, made at a subsequent
period, he expressed the belief that with twenty or twenty-five
thousand men he could have held it against any supposable attack.
When McClellan advanced with his immense army, Magruder fell back to
the line of Warwick River, which has been imperfectly described, and
there checked the enemy; and the vast army of invasion, repulsed in
several assaults by the most heroic conduct of our troops, commenced
a siege by regular approaches. After the first advance of the enemy,
General Magruder was reënforced by some troops from the south side of
James River and General Wilcox's brigade, which had been previously
detached from the army under General Johnston. On the 9th of April
General Magruder's command, thus reënforced, amounted to about twelve
thousand. On that day General Early joined with his division from the
Army of Northern Virginia. It had gone by rail to Richmond and thence
down the York and James Rivers in vessels towed by tugs--except the
trains and artillery, which moved by land. This division had about
eight thousand officers and men for duty. General Magruder's force
was thus increased to about twenty thousand. This was the first
detachment from the Army of Northern Virginia which arrived on the
Peninsula.
General McClellan, in a cipher dispatch of the 7th of April, two days
previous, informed Secretary Stanton that prisoners stated that
General J. E. Wharton (no doubt, Johnston) had the day before arrived
in Yorktown with strong reënforcements, and adds: "It seems clear
that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands, probably
not less than one hundred thousand men, and possibly more. . . . When
my present command all joins, I shall have about eighty-five thousand
men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards,
escort, etc." After some remarks about the strength of our
intrenchments, and his conviction that the great battle which would
decide the existing contest would be fought there, he urges as
necessary for his success that there should be an attack on the rear
of Gloucester Point, and adds: "My present strength will not admit of
a detachment for this purpose without materially impairing the
efficiency of this column. Commodore Goldsborough thinks the work too
strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester." [22]
In the cipher dispatch of the 7th of April to President Lincoln,
General McClellan acknowledges a telegram of the previous day, and
adds, "In reply, I have the honor to state that my entire force for
duty only amounts to about eighty-five thousand men." [23] He then
mentions the fact that General Wool's command is not under his
orders, etc.
Subsequent correspondence clearly shows that General McClellan would
not risk making a detachment from his army to turn the position at
Gloucester Point, and that the navy would not attempt to operate
against the battery at that place. He therefore urgently pressed for
reënforcements to act on the north side of York River.
General Magruder had, up to and after the time of receiving the
reënforcements before mentioned, worked day and night in constructing
and strengthening his defenses. His small force had been assisted in
this work by a considerable body of negro laborers, and an active
participant and competent judge, General Early, thus wrote of his
conduct:
"The assuming and maintaining this line by Magruder, with his small
force, in the face of such overwhelming odds, was one of the boldest
exploits ever performed by a military commander; and he had so
manoeuvred his troops, by displaying them rapidly at different
points, as to produce the impression on his opponent that he had a
large army."
As soon as it was definitely ascertained that General McClellan, with
his main army, was on the Peninsula, General J. E. Johnston was
assigned to the command of the Department of the Peninsula and
Norfolk, and directed to proceed thither to examine the condition of
affairs there. After spending a day on General Magruder's defensive
line, he returned to Richmond, and recommended the abandonment of the
Peninsula, and that we should take a defensive position nearer to
Richmond. The question was postponed, and an appointment made for its
discussion, to which I proposed to invite the Secretary of War,
General Randolph, and General Lee, then stationed in Richmond, and in
general charge of army operations. General Johnston asked that he
might invite General Longstreet and General G. W. Smith to be
present, to which I assented.
At this meeting. General Johnston announced his plan to be, the
withdrawal of General Magruder's troops from the Peninsula, and of
General Huger's from Norfolk, to be united with the main body of the
Army of Northern Virginia, and the withdrawal of the troops from
South Carolina and Georgia, his belief being that General Magruder's
line was indefensible with the forces we could concentrate there;
that the batteries at Gloucester Point could not be maintained; that
the enemy would turn the position at Yorktown by ascending the York
River, if the defensive line there should possibly be maintained. To
this plan the Secretary of War objected, because the navy-yard at
Norfolk offered our best if not our only opportunity to construct in
any short time gunboats for coastwise and harbor defense. General
Lee, always bold in his views and unusually sagacious in penetrating
the designs of the enemy, insisted that the Peninsula offered great
advantages to a smaller force in resisting a numerically superior
assailant, and, in the comprehensive view which he usually took of
the necessities of other places than the one where he chanced to be,
objected to withdrawing the troops from South Carolina and Georgia,
as involving the probable capture of Charleston and Savannah. By
recent service in that section he was well informed as to the
condition of those important ports. General G. W. Smith, as well as I
remember, was in full accord with General Johnston, and General
Longstreet partially so.
After hearing fully the views of the several officers named, I
decided to resist the enemy on the Peninsula, and, with the aid of
the navy, to hold Norfolk and keep the command of the James River as
long as possible. Arrangements were made, with such force as our
means permitted, to occupy the country north of Richmond, and the
Shenandoah Valley, and, with the rest of General Johnston's command,
to make a junction with General Magruder to resist the enemy's forces
on the Peninsula. Though General J. E. Johnston did not agree with
this decision, he did not ask to be relieved, and I had no wish to
separate him from the troops with whom he was so intimately
acquainted, and whose confidence I believed he deservedly possessed.
To recur to General Magruder: soon after the landing of the enemy,
skirmishes commenced with our forces, and the first vigorous attempt
was made to break the line at Lee's Mills, where there were some
newly constructed defenses. The enemy was so signally repulsed that
he described them as very strong works, and thereafter commenced the
construction of parallels and regular approaches, having an
exaggerated idea as well of the number of our troops as of the
strength of our works at that time. General Magruder, in his report,
notices a serious attempt to break his line of the Warwick at Dam No.
1, about the center of the line, and its weakest point. Opening with
a heavy bombardment at nine in the morning, which continued until
three P.M., heavy masses of infantry then commenced to deploy, and,
with musketry-fire, were thrown forward to storm our six-pounder
battery, which had been effectively used, and was the only artillery
we had there in position. A portion of the column charged across the
dam, but Brigadier-General Howell Cobb met the attack with great
firmness, the enemy was driven with the bayonet from some of our
rifle-pits of which he had gained possession, and the assaulting
column recoiled with loss from the steady fire of our troops.
The enemy's skirmishers pressed closely in front of the redoubts on
the left of our line, and with their long-range rifles had a decided
advantage over our men, armed with smooth-bore muskets. In addition
to the rifle-pits they dug, they were covered by a dwelling-house and
a large peach-orchard which extended to within a few hundred yards of
our works. On the 11th of April General Magruder ordered sorties to
be made from all the main points of his line. General Wilcox sent out
a detachment from Wynne's Mill which encountered the advance of the
enemy in his front and drove it back to the main line. Later in the
day General Early sent out from Redoubt No. 5 Colonel Ward's Florida
regiment and the Second Mississippi Battalion, under Colonel Taylor.
They drove the sharpshooters from their rifle-pits and pursued them
to the main road from Warwick Court-House, encountered a battery
posted at an earthwork, and compelled it precipitately to retire. On
the approach of a large force of the enemy's infantry, Colonel Ward
returned to our works, after having set fire to the dwelling-house
above mentioned. These affairs developed the fact that the enemy was
in strong force, both in front of Wynne's Mill and Redoubts Nos. 4
and 5. On the next night General Early sent out Colonel Terry's
Virginia regiment to cut down the peach-orchard and burn the rest of
the houses which had afforded shelter to the assailants; and on the
succeeding night Colonel McRae, with his North Carolina regiment,
went farther to the front and felled the cedars along the main road
which partially hid the enemy's movements, and subsequently our men
were not annoyed by the sharpshooters. About the middle of April a
further reënforcement of two divisions from the Army of Northern
Virginia was added to our forces on the Peninsula, which amounted,
when General Johnston assumed command, to something over fifty
thousand.
The work of strengthening the defenses was still continued. On the
16th of April an assault was made on our line, to the right of
Yorktown, which was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, and such
serious discomfiture that henceforward his plan seemed to be to rely
upon bombardment, for which numerous batteries were prepared.
The views of the enemy, as revealed by the testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, were that he could gain
possession of Gloucester Point only by reënforcements operating on
the north side of York River, or by the previous reduction of
Yorktown. In addition to the answer given by General McClellan, I
quote from the testimony of General Keyes. He said, "The possession
of Gloucester Point by the enemy retarded the taking of Yorktown, and
it also enabled the enemy to close the river at that point," and
added, "Gloucester must have fallen upon our getting possession of
Yorktown, and the York River would then have been open." [24]
With the knowledge possessed by us, General McClellan certainly might
have sent a detachment from his army which, after crossing the York
River, could have turned the position at Gloucester Point and have
overcome our small garrison at that place; but this is but one of the
frequent examples of war in which the immunity of one army is derived
from the mistakes of the other.
An opinion has existed among some of our best-informed officers that
Franklin's division was kept on transports for the purpose of landing
on the north side of York River to capture our battery at Gloucester
Point, and thus open the way to turn our position by ascending the
York River. Upon the authority of Swinton, the fairest and most
careful of the Northern writers on the war, it appears that
Franklin's division had disembarked before the evacuation of
Yorktown; and, upon the authority of the Prince de Joinville, serving
on the staff of General McClellan, it appears that his commanding
general was not willing to intrust that service to a single division,
and plaintively describes the effect produced by the refusal of
President Lincoln to send McDowell's corps to reënforce McClellan. He
writes thus:
"The news was received by the Federal army with dissatisfaction,
although the majority could not then foresee the deplorable
consequences of an act performed, it must be supposed, with no
evil intention, but with inconceivable recklessness. . . . It was
the mainspring removed from a great work already begun. It
deranged everything. Among the divisions of the corps of McDowell,
there was one--that of Franklin--which was regretted more than all
the rest. . . . He [the commander-in-chief] held it in great esteem,
and earnestly demanded its restoration. It was sent back to him
without any explanation, in the same manner as it had been withheld.
This splendid division, eleven thousand strong, arrived, and for a
moment the commander thought of intrusting to it alone the storming
of Gloucester, but the idea was abandoned."
On the 28th of April General J. E. Johnston wrote to Flag-Officer
Tatnall, commanding the naval forces in the James River, requesting
him, if practicable, to proceed with the Virginia to York River for
the purpose of destroying the enemy's transports, to which Commodore
Tatnall replied that it could only be done in daylight, when he would
be exposed to the fire of the forts, and have to contend with the
squadron of men-of-war stationed below them, and that, if this should
be safely done, according to the information derived from the pilots,
it would not be possible for the Virginia to reach the enemy's
transports at Poquosin, while the withdrawal of the Virginia would be
to abandon the defense of Norfolk, and to remove the obstacles she
opposed to "the enemy's operations in the James River." [25]
Meanwhile, the brilliant movements of the intrepid Jackson created
such apprehension of an attack upon Washington City by the Army of
the Shenandoah, that President Lincoln refused the repeated requests
of General McClellan to send him McDowell's corps to operate on the
north side of the York River against our battery at Gloucester Point.
On the 28th of the following June, Mr. Lincoln, noticing what he
regarded as ungenerous complaint, wrote to General McClellan: "If you
have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the
enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy
concentrated on you." [26]
The month of April was cold and rainy, and our men poorly provided
with shelter, and with only the plainest rations; yet, under all
these discomforts, they steadily labored to perfect the defenses,
and, when they were not on the front line, were constantly employed
in making traverses and epaulments in the rear. Whether General
McClellan, under the pressure from Washington, would have made an
early assault,[27] or have adhered to the policy of regular
approaches, and, relying on his superiority in artillery, have waited
to batter our earthworks in breach, and whether all which had been
done, or which it was practicable under the circumstances to do, to
strengthen the main line would have made it sufficiently strong to
resist the threatened bombardment, is questionable; and how soon that
bombardment would have commenced is now indeterminate. A telegram
from President Lincoln to General McClellan is suggestive on this
point. It reads thus:
"WASHINGTON, _May 1, 1862._
"Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me--chiefly
because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be
done?" [28]
By the following telegram sent by me to General J. E. Johnston,
commanding at Yorktown, the contents of that which I had received
from him, and of which I am not now possessed, will be readily
inferred:
"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _May 1, 1862._
"General J. E. JOHNSTON, _Yorktown, Virginia_.
"Accepting your conclusion that you must soon retire, arrangements
are commenced for the abandonment of the navy-yard and removal of
public property both from Norfolk and Peninsula. Your announcement
to-day that you would withdraw to-morrow night takes us by surprise,
and must involve enormous losses, including unfinished gunboats. Will
the safety of your army allow more time?
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
My next step was to request the Secretary of War, General Randolph,
and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory, to proceed to Yorktown
and Norfolk to see whether the evacuation could not be postponed, and
to make all practicable arrangements to remove the machinery,
material, ordnance, and supplies for future use. At the suggestion of
the Secretary of War, I agreed that he should first go with the
Secretary of the Navy to Norfolk and thence pass over to Yorktown.
On the next morning they left for Norfolk. General Randolph, in his
testimony before a joint special committee of the Confederate
Congress, said:
"A few hours after we arrived in Norfolk, an officer from General
Johnston's army made his appearance, with an order for General Huger
to evacuate Norfolk immediately. . . . As that would have involved
heavy losses in stores, munitions, and arms, I took the
responsibility of giving General Huger a written order to delay the
evacuation until he could remove such stores, munitions, and arms as
could be carried off. . . . Mr. Mallory was with me and gave similar
instructions to the commandant of the navy yard. . . . The evacuation
was delayed for about a week. . . . When the council of war met [the
conference with the President heretofore referred to], it was
supposed that, if the enemy assaulted our army at the Warwick River
line, we should defeat them; but that, if instead of assaulting they
made regular approaches to either flank of the line and took
advantage of their great superiority of heavy artillery, the
probability would be that one flank or both of the army would be
uncovered, and thus the enemy, ascending the York and James Rivers in
transports, could turn the flank of the army and compel it to
retreat. . . . They made regular approaches, mounted the
largest-sized guns, such as we could not compete with, and made the
position of Yorktown untenable. Nearly all of our heavy rifled guns
burst during the siege. The remainder of the heavy guns were in the
water-batteries," etc.
The permanent occupation of Norfolk after our army withdrew from the
lower Peninsula and the enemy possessed it was so obviously
impossible as not to require explanation; but, while the enemy was
engaged in the pursuit of our retreating columns, it was deemed
justifiable to delay the evacuation of Norfolk for the purposes
indicated in the above answer of the Secretary of War. The result
justified the decision.
The order for the withdrawal of the army from the line of the Warwick
River on the night of the 2d of April was delayed until the next
night, because, as I have been informed, some of the troops were not
ready to move. Heavy cannonading, both on the night of the 2d and 3d,
concealed the fact of the purpose to withdraw, and the evacuation was
made so successfully, as appears by the testimony before the United
States Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the
enemy was surprised the next morning to find the lines unoccupied.
The loss of public property, as was anticipated, was great, the
steamboats expected for its transportation not having arrived before
the evacuation was made. From a narrative by General Early I make the
following extract:
"A very valuable part of the property so lost, and which we stood
much in need of, consisted of a very large number of picks and
spades, many of them entirely new. All of our heavy guns, including
some recently arrived and not mounted, together with a good deal of
ammunition piled up on the wharf, had to be left behind."
The land transportation was quite deficient. General Magruder's
troops had scarcely any, and others of the more recent organizations
were in a like condition; as no supplies had been accumulated at
Williamsburg, this want of transportation would necessarily involve
want of rations in the event of delays on the retreat.
At Williamsburg, about twelve miles from Yorktown, General Magruder,
as has been mentioned, had constructed a line of detached works. The
largest of these, Fort Magruder, was constructed at a point a short
distance beyond where the Lee's Mill and Yorktown roads united, and
where the enemy in his pursuit first encountered our retiring forces,
and were promptly repulsed. General Magruder, whose arduous service
and long exposure on the Peninsula has been noticed, was compelled by
illness to leave his division. His absence at this moment was the
more to be regretted, as it appears that the positions of the
redoubts he had constructed were not all known to the commanding
General, and some of them being unoccupied were seized by the enemy,
and held subsequently to our disadvantage. General McClellan, in his
official report from "bivouac in front of Williamsburg, May 5, 1862,"
says, "General Hancock has taken two redoubts and repulsed Early's
rebel brigade by a real charge of the bayonet, taking one colonel and
one hundred and fifty other prisoners," etc. As this is selected for
the brilliant event in the affair before Williamsburg, I will extract
fully from General Early's report:
"LYNCHBURG, June 9, 1862.
"In accordance with orders received the evening before, my brigade
was in readiness to take up the line of march from its camp west of
Williamsburg toward Richmond on the 5th of May. . . . I was directed
by Major-General D. H. Hill not to move my infantry, and in a short
time I was ordered by him to march back, and report with my regiments
to Major-General Longstreet at Williamsburg. . . . Between three and
four o'clock, P.M., I was ordered by General Longstreet to move to
the support of Brigadier-General Anderson of his division, at or near
Fort Magruder. . . . Before my command had proceeded far toward its
destination, I received an order from General Longstreet to send him
two regiments. . . . With the remainder of my command, being my
brigade proper, I proceeded, as near as practicable, to the position
designated by General Longstreet on the left and rear of Fort
Magruder. . . . In a short time Major-General Hill arrived, and,
having ascertained that the enemy had a battery in front of us, he
informed me that he wished me to attack and capture the battery with
my brigade, but before doing so he must see General Longstreet on the
subject. . . . General Hill being on the right and accompanying the
brigade, I placed myself on the left with the Twenty-fourth Virginia
Regiment for the purpose of directing its movements, as I was
satisfied from the sound of the enemy's guns that this regiment would
come directly on the battery. . . . In an open field, in view of Fort
Magruder, at the end farthest from the fort, the enemy had taken
position with a battery of six pieces . . . supported by a brigade of
infantry under the command of Brigadier-General Hancock. In this
field were two or three redoubts, previously built by our troops, of
one, at least, of which the enemy had possession, his artillery being
posted in front of it, near some farmhouses, and supported by a body
of infantry, the balance of the infantry being in the redoubt, and in
the edge of the woods close by. The Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment,
as I had anticipated, came directly upon the battery. . . . This
regiment, without pausing or wavering, charged upon the enemy under a
heavy fire, and drove back his guns and the infantry supporting them
to the cover of the redoubt. ... I sent orders to the other regiments
to advance; these orders were anticipated by Colonel McRae of the
Fifth North Carolina Regiment, who was on the extreme right of my
brigade, and marched down to the support of the Twenty-fourth,
traversing the whole front that should have been occupied by the
other two regiments."
General Early, having received a severe wound, soon after the
Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment charged the battery, was compelled by
exhaustion from loss of blood and intense pain to leave the field
just as the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, led by its gallant
colonel, charged on the enemy's artillery and infantry. Of that
charge General Early writes:
"This North Carolina Regiment, in conjunction with the Twenty-fourth
Virginia Regiment, made an attack upon the vastly superior forces of
the enemy, which for its gallantry is unsurpassed in the annals of
warfare: their conduct was such as to elicit from the enemy himself
the highest praise."
This refers to the chivalric remark made by General Hancock to Dr.
Cullen, left in charge of our wounded, viz., "The Fifth North
Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia deserve to have the word immortal
inscribed on their banners." Colonel McRae, who succeeded to the
command after General Early retired, states in his report that he
sent to General Hill for reënforcements in order to advance, and in
reply received an order to retire: that his men were holding the
enemy to his shelter in such way that they were not at all suffering,
but, when he commenced retiring, the enemy rose and fired upon his
men, doing the greatest damage that was done. Some of them obliqued
too far to the right in going back, and met a regiment of the enemy
concealed in the woods, and were thus captured. General Early writes:
"The two regiments that united in the assault were not repulsed at
all. They drove the enemy to the cover of the redoubt and the shelter
of the woods near it, where he was held at bay by my two regiments,
which had suffered comparatively little at that time." He confidently
expresses the opinion that, had his attack been supported promptly
and vigorously, the enemy's force there engaged must have been
captured, as it had crossed over to that point on a narrow mill-dam,
and had only that way to escape.
The claim of the enemy to have achieved a victory at Williamsburg is
refuted by the fact that our troops remained in possession of the
field during the night, and retired the next morning to follow up the
retreat, which was only interrupted by the necessity of checking the
enemy until our trains could proceed far enough to be out of danger.
The fact of our wounded being left at Williamsburg was only due to
our want of ambulances in which to remove them.
Though General McClellan at this time estimated our force as
"probably greater a good deal" than his own, the fact is, it was
numerically less than half the number he had for duty. Severe
exposure and fatigue must, by sickness, have diminished our force
more than it was increased by absentees returning to duty after the
middle of April, so that at the end of the month the number was
probably less than fifty thousand present for duty. General
McClellan's report on the 30th of April, 1862, as shown by the
certified statement, gives the aggregate present for duty at one
hundred and twelve thousand three hundred and ninety-two.[29]
When the Confederates evacuated Yorktown, General Franklin's division
had just been disembarked from the transports. It was reembarked, and
started on the morning of the 6th up the York River.[30]
After the battle of Williamsburg our army continued its retreat up
the Peninsula. Here, for the first time, sub-terra shells were
employed to check a marching column. The event is thus described by
General Rains, the inventor:
"On the day we left Williamsburg, after the battle, we worked hard to
get our artillery and some we had captured over the sloughs about
four miles distant. On account of the tortuous course of the road, we
could not bring a single gun to bear upon the enemy who were pursuing
us, and shelling the road as they advanced. Fortunately, we found in
a mud-hole a broken-down ammunition-wagon containing five loaded
shells. Four of these, armed with a sensitive fuse-primer, were
planted in our rear, near some trees cut down as obstructions to the
road. A body of the enemy's cavalry came upon these sub-terra shells,
and they exploded with terrific effect.
"The force behind halted for three days, and finally turned off from
the road, doubtless under the apprehension that it was mined
throughout. Thus our rear was relieved of the enemy. No soldier will
march over mined land, and a corps of sappers, each man having two
ten-inch shells, two primers, and a mule to carry them, could stop
any army."
Accounts, contemporaneously published at the North, represent the
terror inspired by these shells, extravagantly describe the number of
them, and speak of the necessity of leaving the road to avoid them.
The next morning after the battle of the 5th, at Williamsburg,
Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions, being those there engaged,
followed in the line of retreat, Stuart's cavalry moving after them--
they marched that day about twelve miles. In the mean time Franklin's
division had gone up the York River, and landed a short distance
below West Point, on the south side of York River, and moved into a
thick wood in the direction of the New Kent road, thus threatening
the flank of our line of march. Two brigades of General G. W. Smith's
division, Hampton's and Hood's, were detached under the command of
General Whiting to dislodge the enemy, which they did after a short
conflict, driving him through the wood to the protection of his
gunboats in York River.
On the next morning the rear divisions joined those in advance at
Barhamsville, and the retreat of the whole army was resumed--Smith's
and Magruder's divisions moving by the New Kent Court-House to the
Baltimore Cross Roads, and Longstreet's and Hill's to the Long
Bridge, where the whole army remained in line facing to the east for
five days.
The retreat had been successfully conducted. In the principal action,
that at Williamsburg, our forces, after General Hill's division had
been brought back to the support of General Longstreet, did not
exceed, probably was not equal to, one half that of the enemy. Yet,
as has been seen, the position was held as long as was necessary for
the removal of our trains, and our troops slept upon the field of
battle. The loss of the enemy greatly exceeded our own, which was
about twelve hundred; while General Hooker, commanding one division
of the Federal army, in his testimony stated the loss in his division
to have been seventeen hundred.[31]
Among the gallant and much regretted of those lost by us, was Colonel
Ward, of Florida, whose conduct at Yorktown has been previously
noticed, and of whom General Early, in his report of the battle of
Williamsburg, says:
"On the list of the killed in the Second Florida Regiment is found
the name of its colonel, George T. Ward, as true a gentleman and as
gallant a soldier as has drawn a sword in this war, and whose conduct
under fire it was my fortune to witness on another occasion. His loss
to his regiment, to his State, and to the Confederacy can not be
easily compensated."
Colonel Ward, with his regiment, had been detached from General
Early's command in the early part of the action. I regret that I have
not access to the report of General Longstreet, where, no doubt, may
also be found due notice of Colonel Christopher Mott, whom I knew
personally. In his youth he served in the regiment commanded by me
during the war with Mexico. He was brave, cheerful, prompt, and equal
to every trial to which he was subjected, giving early promise of
high soldierly capacity. He afterward held various places of honor
and trust in civil life, and there were many in Mississippi who, like
myself, deeply lamented his death in the height of his usefulness.
General Huger, commanding at Norfolk, and Captain Lee, commanding the
navy-yard, by the authority of the Secretaries of War and Navy,
delayed the evacuation of both, as stated by General Randolph,
Secretary of War, for about a week after General Johnston sent orders
to General Huger to leave immediately. While he was employed in
removing the valuable stores and machinery, as we learn from the work
of the Comte de Paris, President Lincoln and his Secretary of War
arrived at Fortress Monroe, and on the 8th of May an expedition
against Norfolk by the troops under General Wool was contemplated. He
writes:
"Being apprised by the columns of smoke which rose on the horizon
that the propitious moment had arrived, Wool proposed to the
President to undertake an expedition against Norfolk. Max Weber's
brigade was speedily embarked, and, to protect his descent, Commodore
Goldsborough's fleet was ordered to escort it. But the Confederate
batteries, not yet having been abandoned, fired a few shots in reply,
while the Virginia, which, since the wounding of the brave Buchanan,
had been commanded by Commodore Tatnall, showed her formidable shell,
and the expedition was countermanded. Two more days were consumed in
waiting. Finally, on the morning of the 10th, Weber disembarked east
of Sewell's Point. This time the enemy's artillery was silent. There
was found an intrenched camp mounting a few guns, but absolutely
deserted. General Wool reached the city of Norfolk, which had been
given up to its peaceful inhabitants the day previous, and hastened
to place a military governor there." [32]
Reposing on these cheaply won laurels, the expedition returned to
Fortress Monroe, leaving Brigadier-General Viele, with some troops
brought from the north side of the river, to hold the place. The
navy-yard and workshops had been set on fire before our troops
withdrew, so as to leave little to the enemy save the glory of
capturing an undefended town. The troops at Fortress Monroe were
numerically superior to the command of General Huger, and could have
been readily combined, with the forces at and about Roanoke Island,
for a forward movement on the south side of the James River. In view
of this probability, General Huger, with the main part of his force,
was halted for a time at Petersburg, but, as soon as it was
ascertained that no preparations were being made by the enemy for
that campaign, so palpably advantageous to him, General Huger's
troops were moved to the north side of the James River to make a
junction with the army of General Johnston.
Previously, detachments had been sent from the force withdrawn from
Norfolk to strengthen the command of Brigadier-General J. B.
Anderson, who was placed in observation before General McDowell, then
at Fredericksburg, threatening to advance with a force four or five
times as great as that under General Anderson, and another detachment
had been sent to the aid of Brigadier-General Branch, who, with his
brigade, had recently been brought up from North Carolina and sent
forward to Gordonsville, for the like purpose as that for which
General Anderson was placed near Fredericksburg.
[Footnote 20: See "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, pp. 10-12,
309-311.]
[Footnote 21: See "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 319. Letter of
President Lincoln to General McClellan, April 6, 1862.]
[Footnote 22: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 320.]
[Footnote 23: Ibid., p. 321.]
[Footnote 24: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, pp. 601, 602.]
[Footnote 25: "Life of Commodore Tatnall," pp. 166, 167.]
[Footnote 26: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 340.]
[Footnote 27: On April 6, 1862, President Lincoln wrote to General
McClellan as follows: "You now have over one hundred thousand troops
with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you had better
break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. They will
probably use time as advantageously as you can."--("Report on the
Conduct of the War," pp. 319, 320.)]
[Footnote 28: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 324.]
[Footnote 29: "Report on the Conduct of the War," pp. 323, 324.]
[Footnote 30: "Army of the Potomac," Swinton, p. 117.]
[Footnote 31: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 579.]
[Footnote 32: "History of the Civil War in America," Comte de Paris, vol.
ii, p. 30.]