A New Phase to our Military Problem.--General Johnston's Position.--
Defenses of James River.--Attack on Fort Drury.--Johnston crosses
the Chickahominy.--Position of McClellan.--Position of McDowell.--
Strength of Opposing Forces.--Jackson's Expedition down the
Shenandoah Valley.--Panic at Washington and the North.--Movements
to intercept Jackson.--His Rapid Movements.--Repulses Fremont.--
Advance of Shields.--Fall of Ashby.--Port Republic, Battle of.--
Results of this Campaign.
The withdrawal of our army to the Chickahominy, the abandonment of
Norfolk, the destruction of the Virginia, and opening of the lower
James River, together with the fact that McClellan's army, by
changing his base to the head of York River, was in a position to
cover the approach to Washington, and thus to remove the objections
which had been made to sending the large force, retained for the
defense of that city, to make a junction with McClellan, all combined
to give a new phase to our military problem.
Soon after, General Johnston took position on the north side of the
Chickahominy; accompanied by General Lee, I rode out to his
headquarters in the field, in order that by conversation with him we
might better understand his plans and expectations. He came in after
we arrived, saying that he had been riding around his lines to see
how his position could be improved. A long conversation followed,
which was so inconclusive that it lasted until late in the night, so
late that we remained until the next morning. As we rode back to
Richmond, reference was naturally made to the conversation of the
previous evening and night, when General Lee confessed himself, as I
was, unable to draw from it any more definite purpose than that the
policy was to improve his position as far as practicable, and wait
for the enemy to leave his gunboats, so that an opportunity might be
offered to meet him on the land.
In consequence of the opening of the James River to the enemy's
fleet, the attempts to utilize this channel for transportation, so as
to approach directly to Richmond, soon followed. We had then no
defenses on the James River below Drury's Bluff, about seven miles
distant from Richmond. There an earthwork had been constructed and
provided with an armament of four guns. Rifle-pits had been made in
front of the fort, and obstructions had been placed in the river by
driving piles, and sinking some vessels. The crew of the Virginia,
after her destruction, had been sent to this fort, which was then in
charge of Commander Farrand, Confederate States Navy.
On the 15th of April the enemy's fleet of five ships of war, among
the number, their much-vaunted Monitor, took position and opened fire
upon the fort between seven and eight o'clock. Our small vessel, the
Patrick Henry, was lying above the obstruction, and coöperated with
the fort in its defense--the Monitor and ironclad Galena steamed up
to about six hundred yards' distance; the others, wooden vessels,
were kept at long range.
The armor of the flag-ship Galena was badly injured, and many of the
crew killed or wounded. The Monitor was struck repeatedly, but the
shot only bent her plates. At about eleven o'clock the fleet
abandoned the attack, returning discomfited whence they came. The
commander of the Monitor, Lieutenant Jeffers, in his report, says
that "the action was most gallantly fought against great odds, and
with the usual effect against earthworks." . . . He adds, "It was
impossible to reduce such works, except with the aid of a land
force." The enemy in their reports recognized the efficiency of our
fire by both artillery and riflemen, the sincerity of which was made
manifest in the failure to renew the attempt.
[Illustration: The Davis House, at Richmond.]
The small garrison at Fort Drury, only adequate to the service it had
performed, that of repelling an attempt by the fleet to pass up James
River, was quite insufficient to prevent the enemy from landing below
the fort, or to resist an attack by infantry. To guard against its
sudden capture by such means, the garrison was increased by the
addition of Bryan's regiment of Georgia Rifles.
After the repulse of the enemy's gunboats at Drury's Bluff, I wrote
to General Johnston a letter to be handed to him by my aide, Colonel
G. W. C. Lee, an officer of the highest intelligence and reputation--
referring to him for full information in regard to the affair at
Drury's Bluff, as well as to the positions and strength of our forces
on the south side of the James River. After some speculations on the
probable course of the enemy, and expressions of confidence, I
informed the General that my aide would communicate freely to him and
bring back to me any information with which he might be intrusted.
Not receiving any definite reply, I soon thereafter rode out to visit
General Johnston at his headquarters, and was surprised in the
suburbs of Richmond, viz., on the other side of Gillis's Creek, to
meet a portion of light artillery, and to learn that the whole army
had crossed the Chickahominy.
General Johnston's explanation to this (to me) unexpected movement
was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy unhealthy, and had
directed the troops to cross and halt at the first good water on the
southern side, which he supposed would be found near to the river. He
also adverted to the advantage of having the river in front rather
than in the rear of him--an advantage certainly obvious enough, if
the line was to be near to it on either of its banks.
The considerations which induced General McClellan to make his base
on the York River had at least partly ceased to exist. From the corps
for which he had so persistently applied, he had received the
division which he most valued, and the destruction of the Virginia
had left the James River open to his fleet and transports as far up
as Drury's Bluff, and the withdrawal of General Johnston across the
Chickahominy made it quite practicable for him to transfer his army
to the James River, the south side of which had then but weak
defenses, and thus by a short march to gain more than all the
advantages which, at a later period of the war, General Grant
obtained at the sacrifice of a hecatomb of soldiers.
Referring, again, to the work of the Comte de Paris, who may be
better authority in regard to what occurred in the army of the enemy
than when he writes about Confederate affairs, it appears that this
change of base was considered and not adopted because of General
McClellan's continued desire to have McDowell's corps with him. The
Count states:
"The James River, which had been closed until then by the presence of
the Virginia, as York River had been by the cannon of Yorktown, was
opened by the destruction of that ship, just as York River had been
by the evacuation of the Confederate fortress. But it was only open
as far as Drury's Bluff; in order to overcome this last obstacle
interposed between Richmond and the Federal gunboats, the support of
the land forces was necessary. On the 19th of May Commodore
Goldsborough had a conference with General McClellan regarding the
means to be employed for removing that obstacle. . . . General
McClellan, as we have stated above, might have continued to follow
the railway line, and preserved his depots at Whitehouse, on the
Pamunkey, . . . but he could also now go to reestablish his base of
operations on James River, which the Virginia had hitherto prevented
him from doing. By crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, and
some other fords situated lower down, . . . could have reached the
borders of the James in two or three days. . . . This flank march
effected at a sufficient distance from the enemy, and covered by a
few demonstrations along the upper Chickahominy, offered him great
advantages without involving any risk. . . . If McClellan could have
foreseen how deceptive were the promises of reënforcement made to him
at the time, he would undoubtedly have declined the uncertain support
of McDowell, to carry out the plan of campaign which offered the best
chances of success with the troops which were absolutely at his
disposal." [33]
Without feeling under any obligations for kind intentions on the part
of the Government of the North, it was fortunate for us that it did,
as its friend the Comte de Paris represents, deceive General
McClellan, and prevent him from moving to the south side of the James
River, so as not only to secure the coöperation of his gunboats in an
attack upon Richmond, but to make his assault on the side least
prepared for resistance, and where it would have been quite possible
to cut our line of communication with the more Southern States on
which we chiefly depended for supplies and reënforcements.
It is hardly just to treat the failure to fulfill the assurance given
by President Lincoln about reënforcements as "deceptive promises,"
for, as will be seen, the operations in the Valley by General
Jackson, who there exhibited a rapidity of movement equal to the
unyielding tenacity which had in the first great battle won for him
the familiar name "Stonewall," had created such an alarm in
Washington, as, if it had been better founded, would have justified
the refusal to diminish the force held for the protection of their
capital. Indeed, our cavalry, in observation near Fredericksburg,
reported that on the 24th McDowell's troops started southward, but
General Stuart found that night that they were returning. This
indicated that the anticipated junction was not to be made, and of
this the Prince of Joinville writes:
"It needed only an effort of the will: the two armies were united,
and in the possession of Richmond certain! Alas! this effort was not
made. I can not recall those fatal moments without a real sinking of
the heart." [34]
General McClellan, in his testimony December 10, 1862, before the
court-martial in the case of General McDowell, said:
"I have no doubt, for it has ever been my opinion, that the Army of
the Potomac would have taken Richmond had not the corps of General
McDowell been separated from it. It is also my opinion that, had the
command of General McDowell joined the Army of the Potomac in the
month of May, by the way of Hanover Court-House, from Fredericksburg,
we would have had Richmond within a week after the junction." [35]
Let us first inquire what was the size of this army so crippled for
want of reënforcement, and then what the strength of that to which it
was opposed. On the 30th of April, 1862, the official report of
McClellan's army gives the aggregate present for duty as 112,392;[36]
that of the 20th of June--omitting the army corps of General Dix,
then, as previously, stationed at Fortress Monroe, and including
General McCall's division, which had recently joined, the strength of
which was reported to be 9,514--gives the aggregate present for
duty as 105,825, and the total, present and absent, as 156,838.[37]
Two statements of the strength of our army under General J. E.
Johnston during the month of May--in which General McClellan
testified that he was greatly in need of McDowell's corps--give the
following results: First, the official return, 21st May, 1862, total
effective of all arms, 53,688; subsequently, five brigades were
added, and the effective strength of the army under General Johnston
on May 31, 1862, was 62,696.[38]
I now proceed to inquire what caused the panic at Washington.
On May 23d, General Jackson, with whose force that of General Ewell
had united, moved with such rapidity as to surprise the enemy, and
Ewell, who was in advance, captured most of the troops at Front
Royal, and pressed directly on to Winchester, while Jackson, turning
across to the road from Strasburg, struck the main column of the
enemy in flank and drove it routed back to Strasburg. The pursuit was
continued to Winchester, and the enemy, under their commander-in-chief,
General Banks, fled across the Potomac into Maryland. Two thousand
prisoners were taken in the pursuit. General Banks in his report says,
"There never were more grateful hearts in the same number of men, than
when, at mid-day on the 26th, we stood on the opposite shore."
When the news of the attack on Front Royal, on May 23d, reached
General Geary, charged with the protection of the Manassas Gap
Railroad, he immediately moved to Manassas Junction. At the same
time, his troops, hearing the most extravagant stories, burned their
tents and destroyed a quantity of arms. General Duryea, at Catlett's
Station, becoming alarmed on hearing of the withdrawal of Geary, took
his three New York regiments, leaving a Pennsylvania one behind,
hastened back to Centreville, and telegraphed to Washington for aid.
He left behind a large quantity of army stores. The alarm spread to
Washington, and the Secretary of War, Stanton, issued a call to the
Governors of the "loyal" States for militia to defend that city.
[Illustration: Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson.]
The following is the dispatch sent to the Governor of Massachusetts:
"WASHINGTON, _Sunday, May 25, 1862._
"_To the Governor of Massachusetts._
"Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in
great force are marching on Washington. You will please organize and
forward immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your State.
"EDWIN M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_."
This alarm at Washington, and the call for more troops for its
defense, produced a most indescribable panic in the cities of the
Northern States on Sunday the 25th, and two or three days afterward.
The Governor of New York on Sunday night telegraphed to Buffalo,
Rochester, Syracuse, and other cities, as follows:
"Orders from Washington render it necessary to send to that city all
the available militia force. What can you do?
"E. D. MORGAN."
Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, issued the following order:
"(GENERAL ORDER, No. 23.)
"HEADQUARTERS OF PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA,
"Harrisburg, _May 26, 1862._
"On pressing requisition of the President of the United States in the
present emergency, it is ordered that the several major-generals,
brigadier-generals, and colonels of regiments throughout the
Commonwealth muster without delay all military organizations within
their respective divisions or under their control, together with all
persons willing to join their commands, and proceed forthwith to the
city of Washington, or such other points as may be designated by
future orders. By order:
"A. G. CURTIN,
"_Governor and Commander-in-Chief._"
The Governor of Massachusetts issued the following proclamation:
"_Men of Massachusetts!_
"The wily and barbarous horde of traitors to the people, to the
Government, to our country, and to liberty, menace again the national
capital. They have attacked and routed Major-General Banks, are
advancing on Harper's Ferry, and are marching on Washington. The
President calls on Massachusetts to rise once more for its rescue and
defense.
"The whole active militia will be summoned by a general order, issued
from the office of the adjutant-general, to report on Boston Common
to-morrow. They will march to relieve and avenge their brethren and
friends, and to oppose, with fierce zeal and courageous patriotism,
the progress of the foe. May God encourage their hearts and
strengthen their arms, and may he inspire the Government and all the
people!
"Given at headquarters, Boston, eleven o'clock, this (Sunday)
evening. May 25, 1862.
"JOHN A. ANDREW."
The Governor of Ohio issued the following proclamation:
"COLUMBUS, Ohio, _May 26, 1862._
"_To the gallant men of Ohio._
"I have the astounding intelligence that the seat of our beloved
Government is threatened with invasion, and am called upon by the
Secretary of War for troops to repel and overwhelm the ruthless
invaders. Rally, then, men of Ohio, and respond to this call, as
becomes those who appreciate our glorious Government! . . . The
number wanted from each county has been indicated by special
dispatches to the several military committees.
"DAVID TOD, _Governor._"
At the same time the Secretary of War at Washington caused the
following order to be issued:
"WASHINGTON, _Sunday, May 25, 1862._
"_Ordered:_ By virtue of the authority vested by an act of Congress,
the President takes military possession of all the railroads in the
United States from and after this date, and directs that the
respective railroad companies, their officers and servants, shall
hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of troops and
munitions of war, as may be ordered by the military authorities, to
the exclusion of all other business.
"By order of the Secretary of War:
"M. C. MEIGS,
"_Quartermaster-General_."
At the first moment of the alarm, the President of the United States
issued the following order:
"WASHINGTON, _May 24 1862_.
"Major-General MCDOWELL.
"General Fremont has been ordered by telegraph to move to Franklin
and Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks and capture or destroy
Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for
the present the movement on Richmond, to put twenty thousand men in
motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line or in advance
of the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to
capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in coöperation with
General Fremont, or, in case want of supplies or transportation has
interfered with his movement, it is believed that the force which you
move will be sufficient to accomplish the object alone. The
information thus far received here makes it probable that, if the
enemy operates actively against General Banks, you will not be able
to count upon much assistance from him, but may have even to release
him. Reports received this morning are that Banks is fighting with
Ewell, eight miles from Harper's Ferry.
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."
When the panic thus indicated in the headquarters of the enemy had
disseminated itself through the military and social ramifications of
Northern society, the excitement was tumultuous. Meanwhile, General
Jackson, little conceiving the alarm his movements had caused in the
departments at Washington and in the offices of the Governors of
States, in addition to the diversion of McDowell from coöperation in
the attack upon Richmond, after driving the enemy out of Winchester,
pressed eagerly on, not pausing to accept the congratulations of the
overjoyed people at the sight of their own friends again among them,
for he learned that the enemy had garrisons at Charlestown and
Harper's Ferry, and he was resolved they should not rest on Virginia
soil. General Winder's brigade in the advance found the enemy drawn
up in line of battle at Charlestown. Without waiting for
reënforcements, he engaged them, and after a short conflict drove
them in disorder toward the Potomac. The main column then moved on
near to Harper's Ferry, where General Jackson received information
that Fremont was moving from the west, and the whole or a part of
General McDowell's corps from the east, to make a junction in his
rear and thus cut off his retreat. At this time General Jackson's
effective force was about fifteen thousand men, much less than either
of the two armies which were understood to be marching to form a
junction against him. We now know that General McDowell had been
ordered to send to the relief of General Banks in the Valley twenty
to thirty thousand men. The estimated force, of General Fremont when
at Harrisonburg was twenty thousand. General Jackson had captured in
his campaign down the Valley a very large amount of valuable stores,
over nine thousand small-arms, two pieces of artillery, many horses,
and, besides the wounded and sick, who had been released on parole,
was said to have twenty-three hundred prisoners. To secure these, as
well as to save his army, it was necessary to retreat beyond the
point where his enemies could readily unite. The amount of captured
stores and other property which he was anxious to preserve were said
to require a wagon-train twelve miles long. This, under the care of a
regiment, was sent forward in advance of the army, which promptly
retired up the Valley.
On his retreat, General Jackson received information confirmatory of
the report of the movements of the enemy, and of the defeat of a
small force he had left at Front Royal in charge of some prisoners
and captured stores--the latter, however, the garrison before
retreating had destroyed. Strasburg being General Jackson's objective
point, he had farther to march to reach that position than either of
the columns operating against him. The rapidity of movement which
marked General Jackson's operations had given to his command the
appellation of "foot cavalry"; and never had they more need to show
themselves entitled to the name of Stonewall.
On the night of the 31st of May, by a forced march, General Jackson
arrived with the head of his column at Strasburg, and learned that
General Fremont's advance was in the immediate vicinity. To gain time
for the rest of his army to arrive, General Jackson decided to check
Fremont's march by an attack in the morning. This movement was
assigned to General Ewell, General Jackson personally giving his
attention to preserving his immense trains filled with captured
stores. The repulse of Fremont's advance was so easy that General
Taylor describes it as offering a temptation to go beyond General
Jackson's orders and make a serious attack upon Fremont's army, but
recognizes the justice of the restraint imposed by the order, "as we
could not waste time chasing Fremont," for it was reported that
General Shields was at Front Royal with troops of a different
character from those of Fremont's army, who had been encountered near
Strasburg, _id est_, the corps "commanded by General O. O. Howard,
and called by both sides 'the flying Dutchmen.'" This more formidable
command of General Shields therefore required immediate attention.
Leaving Strasburg on the evening of June 1st, always intent to
prevent a junction of the two armies of the enemy, Jackson continued
his march up the Valley. Fremont followed in pursuit, while Shields
moved slowly up the Valley via Luray, for the purpose of reaching New
Market in advance of Jackson. On the morning of the 5th Jackson
reached Harrisonburg, and, passing beyond that town, turned toward
the east in the direction of Port Republic. General Ashby had
destroyed all the bridges between Front Royal and Port Republic, to
prevent Shields from crossing the Shenandoah to join Fremont. The
troops were now permitted to make shorter marches, and were allowed
some halts to refresh them after their forced marches and frequent
combats. Early on the 6th of June Fremont's reënforced cavalry
attacked our cavalry rear-guard under General Ashby. A sharp conflict
ensued, which resulted in the repulse of the enemy and the capture of
Colonel Percy Wyndham, commanding the brigade, and sixty-three
others. General Ashby was in position between Harrisonburg and Port
Republic, and, after the cavalry combat just described, there were
indications of a more serious attack. Ashby sent a message to Ewell,
informing him that cavalry supported by infantry was advancing upon
his position. The Fifty-eighth Virginia and the First Maryland
Regiments were sent to his support. Ashby led the Fifty-eighth
Virginia to attack the enemy, who were under cover of a fence.
General Ewell in the mean time had arrived, and, seeing the advantage
the enemy had of position, directed Colonel Johnson to move with his
regiment so as to approach the flank instead of the front of the
enemy, and he was now driven from the field with heavy loss. Our loss
was seventeen killed, fifty wounded, and three missing. Here fell the
stainless, fearless cavalier, General Turner Ashby, of whom General
Jackson in his report thus forcibly speaks:
"As a partisan officer I never knew his superior. His daring was
proverbial; his power of endurance almost incredible; his tone of
character heroic; and his sagacity almost intuitive in divining the
purposes and movements of the enemy."
The main body of General Jackson's command had now reached Port
Republic, a village situated in the angle formed by the junction of
the North and South Rivers, tributaries of the South Fork of the
Shenandoah. Over the North River was a wooden bridge, connecting the
town with Harrisonburg. Over the South River there was a ford.
Jackson's immediate command was encamped on the high ground north of
the village and about a mile from the river. Ewell was some four
miles distant, near the road leading from Harrisonburg to Port
Republic. General Fremont had arrived with his forces in the vicinity
of Harrisonburg, and General Shields was moving up the east side of
the Shenandoah, and had reached Conrad's Store. Each was about
fifteen miles distant from Jackson's position. To prevent a junction,
the bridge over the river, near Shields's position, had been
destroyed.
As the advance of General Shields approached on the 8th, the brigades
of Taliaferro and Winder were ordered to occupy positions immediately
north of the bridge. The enemy's cavalry, accompanied by artillery,
then appeared, and, after directing a few shots toward the bridge,
crossed South River, and, dashing into the village, planted one of
their pieces at the southern entrance of the bridge. Meantime our
batteries were placed in position, and, Taliaferro's brigade having
approached the bridge, was ordered to dash across, capture the piece,
and occupy the town. This was gallantly done, and the enemy's cavalry
dispersed and driven back, abandoning another gun. A considerable
body of infantry was now seen advancing, when our batteries opened
with marked effect, and in a short time the infantry followed the
cavalry, falling back three miles. They were pursued about a mile by
our batteries on the opposite bank, when they disappeared in a wood.
This attack of Shields had scarcely been repulsed when Ewell became
seriously engaged with Fremont, moving on the opposite side of the
river. The enemy pushed forward, driving in the pickets, which, by
gallant resistance, checked their advance until Ewell had time to
select his position on a commanding ridge, with a rivulet and open
ground in front, woods on both flanks, and the road to Port Republic
intersecting his line. Trimble's brigade was posted on the right, the
batteries of Courtney, Lusk, Brockenbrough, and Rains in the center,
Stuart's brigade on the left, and Elzey's in rear of the center. Both
wings were in the woods. About ten o'clock the enemy posted his
artillery opposite our batteries, and a fire was kept up for several
hours, with great spirit on both sides. Meantime a brigade of the
enemy advanced, under cover, upon General Trimble, who reserved his
fire until they reached short range, when he poured forth a deadly
volley, under which they fell back; Trimble, supported by two
regiments of Elzey's reserve, now advanced, with spirited
skirmishing, more than a mile from his original line, driving the
opposing force back to its former position. Ewell, finding no attack
on his left was designed by the enemy, advanced and drove in their
skirmishers, and at night was in position on ground previously
occupied by the foe. This engagement has generally been known as the
battle of Cross Keys.
As General Shields made no movement to renew the action of the 8th,
General Jackson determined to attack him on the 9th. Accordingly,
Ewell's forces were moved at an early hour toward Port Republic, and
General Trimble was left to hold Fremont in check, or, if hard
pressed, to retire across the river and burn the bridge, which
subsequently was done, under orders to concentrate against Shields.
Meanwhile the enemy had taken position about two miles from Port
Republic, their right on the river-bank, their left on the slope of
the mountain which here threw out a spur, between which and the river
was a smooth plain of about a thousand yards wide. On an elevated
plateau of the mountain was placed a battery of long-range guns to
sweep the plain over which our forces must pass to attack. In front
of that plateau was a deep gorge, through which flowed a small
stream, trending to the southern side of the promontory, so as to
leave its northern point in advance of the southern. The
mountain-side was covered with dense wood.
Such was the position which Jackson must assail, or lose the
opportunity to fight his foe in detail--the object for which his
forced marches had been made, and on which his best hopes depended.
General Winder's brigade moved down the river to attack, when the
enemy's battery upon the plateau opened, and it was found to rake the
plain over which we must approach for a considerable distance in
front of Shields's position. Our guns were brought forward, and an
attempt made to dislodge the battery of the enemy, but our fire
proved unequal to theirs; whereupon General Winder, having been
reënforced, attempted by a rapid charge to capture it, but
encountered such a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms as to
compel his command, composed of his own and another brigade, with a
light battery, to fall back in disorder. The enemy advanced steadily,
and in such numbers as to drive back our infantry supports and render
it necessary to withdraw our guns. Ewell was hurrying his men over
the bridge, and there was no fear, if human effort would avail, that
he would come too late. But the condition was truly critical. General
Taylor describes his chief at that moment thus: "Jackson was on the
road, a little in advance of his line, where the fire was hottest,
with reins on his horse's neck, seemingly in prayer. Attracted by my
approach, he said, in his usual voice, 'Delightful excitement.'" He
then briefly gave Taylor instructions to move against the battery on
the plateau, and sent a young officer from his staff as a guide. The
advance of the enemy was checked by an attack on his flank by two of
our regiments, under Colonel Scott; but this was only a temporary
relief, for this small command was soon afterward driven back to the
woods, with severe loss. Our batteries during the check were all
safely withdrawn except one six-pounder gun.
In this critical condition of Winder's command, General Taylor made a
successful attack on the left and rear of the enemy, which diverted
attention from the front, and led to a concentration of his force
upon him. Moving to the right along the mountain acclivity, he was
unseen before he emerged from the wood, just as the loud cheers of
the enemy proclaimed their success in front. Although opposed by a
superior force in front and flank, and with their guns in position,
with a rush and shout the gorge was passed, impetuously the charge
was made, and the battery of six guns fell into our hands. Three
times was this battery lost and won in the desperate and determined
efforts to capture and recover it, and the enemy finally succeeded in
carrying off one of the guns, leaving both caisson and limber. Thus
occupied with Taylor, the enemy halted in his advance, and formed a
line facing to the mountain. Winder succeeded in rallying his
command, and our batteries were replaced in their former positions.
At the same time reënforcements were brought by General Ewell to
Taylor, who pushed forward with them, assisted by the well-directed
fire of our artillery.
Of this period in the battle, than which there has seldom been one of
greater peril, or where danger was more gallantly met, I copy a
description from the work of General Taylor:
"The fighting in and around the battery was hand-to-hand, and many
fell from bayonet-wounds. Even the artillerymen used their rammers in
a way not laid down in the manual, and died at their guns. I called
for Hayes, but he, the promptest of men, and his splendid regiment
could not be found. Something unexpected had occurred, but there was
no time for speculation. With a desperate rally, in which I believe
the drummer-boys shared, we carried the battery for the third time,
and held it. Infantry and riflemen had been driven off, and we began
to feel a little comfortable, when the enemy, arrested in his advance
by our attack, appeared. He had countermarched, and, with left near
the river, came into full view of our situation. Wheeling to the
right, with colors advanced, like a solid wall he marched straight
upon us. There seemed nothing left but to set our back to the
mountain and die hard. At the instant, crashing through the
underwood, came Ewell, outriding staff and escort. He produced the
effect of a reënforcement, and was welcomed with cheers. The line
before us halted and threw forward skirmishers. A moment later a
shell came shrieking along it, loud Confederate cheers reached our
delighted ears, and Jackson, freed from his toils, rushed up like a
whirlwind." [39]
The enemy, in his advance, had gone in front of the plateau where his
battery was placed, the elevation being sufficient to enable the guns
without hazard to be fired over the advancing line; so, when he
commenced retreating, he had to pass by the position of this battery,
and the captured guns were effectively used against him--that
dashing old soldier, "Ewell, serving as a gunner." Mention was made
of the inability to find Hayes when his regiment was wanted. It is
due to that true patriot, who has been gathered to his fathers, to
add Taylor's explanation: "Ere long my lost Seventh Regiment, sadly
cut up, rejoined. This regiment was in rear of the column when we
left Jackson to gain the path in the woods, and, before it filed out
of the road, his thin line was so pressed that Jackson ordered Hayes
to stop the enemy's rush. This was done, for the Seventh would have
stopped a herd of elephants--but at a fearful cost."
The retreat of the enemy, though it was so precipitate as to cause
him to leave his killed and wounded on the field, was never converted
into a rout. "Shields's brave 'boys' preserved their organization to
the last; and, had Shields himself, with his whole command, been on
the field, we should have had tough work indeed."
The pursuit was continued some five miles beyond the battle-field,
during which we captured four hundred and fifty prisoners, some
wagons, one piece of abandoned artillery, and about eight hundred
muskets. Some two hundred and seventy-five wounded were paroled in
the hospitals near Port Republic. On the next day Fremont withdrew
his forces, and retreated down the Valley. The rapid movements of
Jackson, the eagle-like stoop with which he had descended upon each
army of the enemy, and the terror which his name had come to inspire,
created a great alarm at Washington, where it was believed he must
have an immense army, and that he was about to come down like an
avalanche upon the capital. Milroy, Banks, Fremont, and Shields were
all moved in that direction, and peace again reigned in the patriotic
and once happy Valley of the Shenandoah.
The material results of this very remarkable campaign are thus
summarily stated by one who had special means of information:
"In three months Jackson had marched six hundred miles, fought four
pitched battles, seven minor engagements, and daily skirmishes; had
defeated four armies, captured seven pieces of artillery, ten
thousand stand of arms, four thousand prisoners, and a very great
amount of stores, inflicting upon his adversaries a known loss of two
thousand men, with a loss upon his own part comparatively small." [40]
The general effect upon the affairs of the Confederacy was even more
important, and the motives which influenced Jackson present him in a
grander light than any military success could have done. Thus, on the
20th of March, 1862, he learned that the large force of the enemy
before which he had retired was returning down the Valley, and,
divining the object to be to send forces to the east side of the
mountain to coöperate in the attack upon Richmond, General Jackson,
with his small force of about three thousand infantry and two hundred
and ninety cavalry, moved with his usual celerity in pursuit. He
overtook the rear of the column at Kernstown, attacked a very
superior force he found there, and fought with such desperation as to
impress the enemy with the idea that he had a large army; therefore,
the detachments, which had already started for Manassas, were
recalled, and additional forces were also sent into the Valley. Nor
was this all. McDowell's corps, under orders to join McClellan, was
detained for the defense of the Federal capital.
Jackson's bold strategy had effected the object for which his
movement was designed, and he slowly retreated to the south bank of
the Shenandoah, where he remained undisturbed by the enemy, and had
time to recruit his forces, which, by the 28th of April, amounted to
six or seven thousand men. General Banks had advanced and occupied
Harrisonburg, about fifteen miles from Jackson's position. Fremont,
with a force estimated at fifteen thousand men, was reported to be
preparing to join Banks's command.
The alarm at Washington had caused McDowell's corps to be withdrawn
from the upper Rappahannock to Fredericksburg. Jackson, anxious to
take advantage of the then divided condition of the enemy, sent to
Richmond for reënforcements, but our condition there did not enable
us to furnish any, except the division of Ewell, which had been left
near Gordonsville in observation of McDowell, now by his withdrawal
made disposable, and the brigade of Edward Johnson, which confronted
Schenck and Milroy near to Staunton. Jackson, who, when he could not
get what he wanted, did the best he could with what he had, called
Ewell to his aid, left him to hold Banks in check, and marched to
unite with Johnson; the combined forces attacked Milroy and Schenck,
who, after a severe conflict, retreated in the night to join Fremont.
Jackson then returned toward Harrisonburg, having ordered Ewell to
join him for an attack on Banks, who in the mean time had retreated
toward Winchester, where Jackson attacked and defeated him,
inflicting great loss, drove him across the Potomac, and, as has been
represented, filled the authorities at Washington with such dread of
its capture as to disturb the previously devised plans against
Richmond, and led to the operations which have already been
described, and brought into full play Jackson's military genius. In
all these operations there conspicuously appears the self-abnegation
of a devoted patriot. He was not seeking by great victories to
acquire fame for himself; but, always alive to the necessities and
dangers elsewhere, he heroically strove to do what was possible for
the general benefit of the cause he maintained. His whole heart was
his country's, and his whole country's heart was his.
[Footnote 33: "History of the Civil War in America," Comte de Paris,
vol. ii, pp. 32-34.]
[Footnote 34: "Campaign on the Peninsula," Prince de Joinville, 1862.]
[Footnote 35: Court-Martial of General McDowell, Washington, December
10, 1862.]
[Footnote 36: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 322.]
[Footnote 37: Ibid., p. 337.]
[Footnote 38: "Four Years with General Lee," by Walter H. Taylor, p. 50.]
[Footnote 39: "Destruction and Reconstruction" pp. 75, 76.]
[Footnote 40: "Stonewall Jackson," military biography by John Esten
Cooke, p. 194.]