Retirement of the Army.--Remnants of Grant's Army.--Its
Reënforcements.--Strength of our Army.--Strength of Grant's Army.--
Reorganization.--Corinth.--Advance of General Halleck.--Siege of
Corinth.--Evacuation.--Retreat to Tupelo.--General Beauregard
retires.-General Bragg in Command.--Positions on the Mississippi
River occupied by the Enemy.--New Madrid.--Island No. 10.--Fort
Pillow.--Memphis.--Attack at Hatteras Inlet.--Expedition of the
Enemy to Port Royal.--Expeditions from Port Royal.--System of Coast
Defenses adopted by us.--Fort Pulaski.
At the ensuing nightfall our victorious army retired from the front
and abandoned its vantage-ground on the bluffs, which had been won at
such a cost of blood. The enemy thereby had room and opportunity to
come out from their corner, reoccupy the strong positions from which
they had been driven, and dispose their troops on much more favorable
ground. Called off by staff-officers, who gave no specific
instructions, our brigades, according to circumstances, bivouacked on
the battle-field, marched to the rear, or made themselves comfortable
on the profuse spoils of the enemy's encampments. General Buell says:
"Of the army of not less than fifty thousand effective men, which
Grant had on the west bank of the Tennessee River, not more than five
thousand were in ranks and available on the battlefield at nightfall
on the 6th, exclusive of Lew Wallace's division, say eight thousand
five hundred men that only came up during the night. The rest were
either killed, wounded, captured, or scattered in inextricable and
hopeless confusion for miles along the banks of the river."
In addition to the arrival of Wallace's division, the entire
divisions of Nelson and Crittenden got across the river during the
night, and by daylight that of McCook began to arrive; all but the
first named belonged to Buell's army. The work of reorganization of
fragments of Grant's force also occupied the night. In the morning
the arrival of reënforcements to the enemy continued.
On the morning of the 7th the enemy advanced about six o'clock, and
opened a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, such as gave assurance
that the reënforcements had arrived, to anticipate which the battle
of the 6th had been fought. A series of combats ensued, in which the
Confederates showed their usual valor; but, after the junction had
been effected between Grant and Buell, which Johnston's movement was
made to prevent, our force was unequal to resist the combined armies,
and retreat was a necessity.
The field return of the Army of Mississippi before and after the
battle of Shiloh was as follows: infantry and artillery, effective
before the battle, 35,953; cavalry, 4,382; total, 40,335. Infantry
and artillery, effective after the battle, 25,555; cavalry, 4,081;
total, 29,636. Difference, 10,699. Casualties in battle: killed,
1,728; wounded, 8,012; missing, 959.
The effective force of General Grant's army engaged in the battles of
April 6th and 7th at Shiloh was 49,314; reënforcements of General
Buell, 21,579; total, 70,893. The casualties in the battle of April
6th in Grant's force were as follows: killed, 1,500; wounded, 6,634;
missing, 3,086; total, 11,220; leaving, for duty on the 7th, 59,673.
On April 9th Major-General H. W, Halleck left St. Louis and proceeded
to Pittsburg Landing to assume command of the enemy's forces in the
field. A reorganization was made, in which General Grant's divisions
formed the right wing, those of General Buell the center, and those
of General Pope, brought from the west side of the Mississippi, the
left wing; and an advance on Corinth was commenced.
Corinth, the position from which our forces had advanced to Shiloh or
Pittsburg Landing, and to which they had now retired, was a small
village in the northeast corner of the State of Mississippi. It was
ninety miles east of Memphis and twenty or twenty-two west of the
Tennessee River. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad ran from west to
east through it, and the Mobile and Ohio road from south to north.
The country between it and the Tennessee River was quite rugged,
broken into ridges, and covered with a heavy forest. The position
itself was flat, the water poor. Being the point at which two
principal railroads crossed, it served admirably for the
concentration of our forces.
Corinth was a strategic point of importance, and it was intended to
be held as long as circumstances would permit; but it was untenable
in the face of a largely superior force, owing to the ease with which
the railroad communications in the rear could be cut by the enemy's
cavalry. The small streams and contiguous flats in its front formed
some obstacles which were not passed by the enemy until after the
retreat of our army. The defenses were slight, consisting of
rifle-pits and earthworks of little elevation or strength.
The movement of General Halleck against this position commenced from
Pittsburg Landing on April 28th with a force exceeding eighty-five
thousand effectives. On May 3d he had reached within eight miles of
Corinth, and on the 21st his batteries were within three miles. This
slow progress was probably the result of a conviction that our force
was very large, rather than of the bad state of the roads. So great
were his precautions, that every night his army lay in an intrenched
camp, and by day it was assailed by skirmishers from our army in more
or less force.
General Sherman, in his report of May 30th, says:
"My division has constructed seven distinct intrenched camps since
leaving Shiloh, the men working cheerfully and well all the time,
night and day. Hardly had we finished one camp before we were called
on to move forward and build another. But I have been delighted at
this feature in the character of my division, and take this method of
making it known. Our intrenchments near Corinth and at Russell's,
each built substantially in one night, are stronger works of art than
the much-boasted forts of the enemy at Corinth."
The line of railroad on the north and east had been cut by the enemy,
and an attempt made on the south. But so well was his apprehension of
our strength maintained, that he continued his intrenched approaches
until within one thousand yards of our main works.
General Sherman says:
"By 9 A.M. of the 29th our works were substantially done, and our
artillery in position, and at 4 P.M. the siege-train was brought
forward. . . . So near was the enemy that we could hear the sound of
his drums and sometimes of voices in command; and the railroad-cars
arriving and departing at Corinth were easily distinguished. For some
days and nights cars have been arriving and departing very
frequently, especially in the night; but last night (the 29th) more
so than usual, and my suspicions were aroused. Before daybreak I
instructed the brigade commanders and the field-officer of the day to
feel forward as far as possible; but all reported the enemy's pickets
still in force in the dense woods to our front. But about 6 A.M. a
curious explosion, sounding like a volley of large siege-pieces,
followed by others, singly, and in twos and threes, arrested our
attention, and soon after a large smoke arose from the direction of
Corinth, when I telegraphed to General Halleck to ascertain the
cause. He answered that he could not explain it, but ordered me to
advance my division and feel the enemy, if still in my front. I
immediately put in motion two regiments of each brigade, by different
roads, and soon after followed with the whole division--infantry,
artillery, and cavalry. General M. L. Smith's brigade moved rapidly
down the main road, entering the first redoubt of the enemy at 7 A.M.
It was completely evacuated, and by 8 A.M. all my division was at
Corinth and beyond."
The force of General Beauregard was less than forty-five thousand
effective men. He estimated that of the enemy to be between
eighty-five and ninety thousand men. All the troops of the enemy in
reserve in Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, and Illinois were brought
forward, except the force of Curtis, in Arkansas, and placed in front
of our position. No definite idea of their number was formed. In the
opinion of Beauregard, a general attack was not to be hazarded; but
on May 3d an advance was made to attack the corps of General Pope,
when only one of his divisions was in position, and that gave way so
rapidly it could not be overtaken. Again, on May 9th, an advance was
made, hoping to surprise the enemy. But a division, which should have
been in position at three o'clock in the morning, or early dawn, was
detained until three in the afternoon by the mistakes of the guide.
The enemy thus became informed of the movement, and no surprise could
be effected. General Beauregard commenced the removal of his sick,
preparatory to an evacuation, on May 26th; on the next day
arrangements for falling back were made, and the work completed on
the 29th. So complete was the evacuation, that not only was the army
successfully withdrawn, but also every piece of ordnance, only a
quantity of damaged ammunition being left behind. The retreat was
continued to Tupelo, without any serious conflict with the enemy; but
during the retreat seven locomotives were reported to be lost by the
burning of a bridge, and a number of cars, most of which were loaded
with stores, were ordered to be burned.
On June 14th orders were sent to General Bragg, from Richmond, to
proceed to Jackson, Mississippi, and temporarily to assume command of
the department then under command of General Lovell. The order
concluded as follows:
"After General Magruder joins, your further services there may be
dispensed with. The necessity is urgent and absolute.
"J. DAVIS."
On application to General Beauregard for the necessary order, he
replied:
"You can not possibly go. My health does not permit me to remain in
charge alone here. This evening my two physicians were insisting that
I should go away for one or two weeks, furnishing me with another
certificate for that purpose, and I had concluded to go--intending
to see you to-morrow on the subject, and leave you in command."
The certificate of the physicians was as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
"TUPELO, _June 14, 1862._
"We certify that, after attendance on General Beauregard for the past
four months, and treatment of his case, in our professional opinion
he is incapacitated physically for the arduous duties of his present
command, and we urgently recommend rest and recreation.
"R. L. Brodie, Surgeon, P. A. C. S.
"Sam Choppin, Surgeon, P. A. C. S."
These facts were telegraphed to me at once by General Bragg. Soon
after, I sent a second dispatch to him, renewing the order, and
expressing my surprise that he should have hesitated to obey, when
the original order stated "the necessity is urgent and absolute."
Before this second dispatch was received by General Bragg, General
Beauregard had transferred the command to him, and had departed for
Bladen Springs. General Bragg thus describes the subsequent
proceedings:
"Prepared to move, I telegraphed back to the President that the
altered conditions induced me to await his further orders. In reply
to this, I was immediately notified by telegraph of my assignment to
the 'permanent command of the army,' and was directed to send General
Van Dorn to execute my first instructions."
From this statement it appears--1. That General Beauregard was not,
as has been alleged, harshly deprived of his command, but that he
voluntarily surrendered it, after being furnished with medical
certificates of his physical incapacity for its arduous duties. 2.
That he did not even notify his Government, still less ask permission
to retire. 3. That the order, assigning another to the command he had
abandoned, could not be sent through him, when he had departed and
gone to a place where there was no telegraph, and rarely a mail. 4.
That it is neither customary nor proper to send orders to the
commander of an army through a general on sick-leave; and in this
case it would have been very objectionable, as a similar order had
just been sent and disobeyed.
Meanwhile some other events had occurred in the Western Department
which should be mentioned. The movement of the forces of the enemy up
the Tennessee River, as has been stated, thus flanking some of our
positions on the Mississippi River, was followed by his fitting out a
naval fleet to move down that river. This fleet, consisting of seven
ironclads and one gun-boat, ten mortar-boats, each carrying a
thirteen-inch mortar, a coal-barge, two ordnance-steamers, and two
transports with troops, left Cairo on March 14th, and arrived at
Hickman that evening. A small force of our cavalry left upon its
approach. Columbus, as has been stated, had previously been evacuated
by our forces and occupied by the enemy. In the morning the fleet
continued down toward Island No. 10. This island is situated in that
bend of the river which touches the border of Tennessee, a few miles
further up the river than New Madrid, although nearly southeast of
that point.
In the latter part of February a large force of the enemy under
Major-General Pope left Commerce, Missouri, and moved south about
fifty miles to New Madrid, with the object of capturing that place.
Aided by the gunboats of Commander Hollins, our small force repulsed
the assaults of the enemy three times, but such was the disparity of
numbers that it soon became manifest that our forces could not
successfully hold the position, and it was evacuated on the night of
March 13th. Its defenses consisted of two earthworks, in which about
twenty guns were mounted. These were spiked and rendered unfit for
use.
The bombardment of Island No. 10, above described, commenced on March
15th, and was continued night and day. Up to April 1st the enemy
fired several thousand thirteen-inch and rifle shells. On March 17th
a general attack with five gunboats and four mortar-boats was made,
and continued nine hours, without any serious result. Finally, the
forces of the enemy were greatly increased, and began to occupy both
banks of the river, and also the river above and below the island,
when a portion of our force retired, and about April 7th the
remainder surrendered.
The fleet, on April 12th, proceeded next to Fort Pillow, about a
hundred and eighty miles below Island No. 10, and a bombardment was
commenced on the next day. This was continued without effect until
the night of June 4th, when both Forts Pillow and Randolph, the
latter some twelve miles below the former, were evacuated--these
positions having become untenable in consequence of the withdrawal of
our forces from Corinth and the adjacent portion of Tennessee.
Nothing now remained to oppose the enemy's fleet but our gunboats at
Memphis, which were, say, seventy miles farther down the river. The
gallantry and efficiency displayed by our improvised river navy at
New Madrid and Island No. 10 gave rise to hopes scarcely justified by
the number of our vessels or their armament. Our boats had fewer guns
than those of the enemy, and they were less substantially
constructed, but their officers and crews took counsel of their
country's need rather than of their own strength. They manfully
engaged the enemy, and disabled one of his rams, but after an hour's
conflict were compelled to retire.
The possession of Memphis being no longer disputed, its occupation by
the enemy promptly followed.
At an early period of the war the Government of the United States
organized some naval and military expeditions, with a view to capture
our harbors, to occupy an extensive tract of country in their
vicinity, and especially to obtain possession of a portion of our
cotton-crop. The first movement of this kind was by a fleet of naval
vessels and transports which appeared off Hatteras Inlet on August
27, 1861. This inlet is a gap in the sandy barrier that lines the
coast of North Carolina about eighteen miles southwest of Cape
Hatteras. It was the principal entrance to Pamlico Sound, a large
body of water lying between the sandy beach and the mainland. The
channel of the entrance had about seven feet of water, and was
protected by two small forts constructed on the sand. Our forces were
under the command of Captain Samuel Barron, an officer of
distinction, formerly in the United States Navy. After a short
bombardment, which developed the strength of the enemy and his own
comparative weakness, he capitulated.
A much larger fleet of naval vessels and transports, carrying fifteen
thousand men, appeared off the harbor of Port Royal, South Carolina,
on November 4, 1861. This harbor is situated midway between the
cities of Charleston and Savannah. It is a broad estuary, into which
flow some two or three streams, the interlacing of which with creeks
forms a group of numerous islands. The parish, of which these are the
greater part, constituted the richest agricultural district in the
State; its staples being sea-island cotton and rice. The principal
defenses were Fort Walker, a strong earthwork on Hilton Head, and
Fort Beauregard on Philip's Island. The attack was made by the enemy
on the 7th, by a fleet consisting of eight steamers and a
sloop-of-war in tow. Some of the steamers were of the first class, as
the Wabash and the Susquehanna. The conflict continued for four
hours, when the forts, because untenable, were abandoned.
In the early part of 1862 several reconnaissances were sent out from
Port Royal, and subsequently an expedition visited Darien and
Brunswick in Georgia, and Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine
in Florida. Its design was to take and keep under control this line
of seacoast, especially in Georgia. Some small steamers and other
vessels were captured, and some ports were occupied.
The system of coast defenses which was adopted and the preparations
which had been at that time made by the Government to resist these
aggressions of the enemy should be stated. By reference to the
topography of our coast, it will be seen that, in the State of North
Carolina, are Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, penetrating far into the
interior; then the Cape Fear River, connecting with the ocean by two
channels, the southwest channel being defended by a small inclosed
fort and a water-battery. On the coast of South Carolina are
Georgetown and Charleston Harbors. A succession of islands extends
along the coast of South Carolina and Georgia, separated from the
mainland by a channel which is navigable for vessels of moderate
draft from Charleston to Fernandina, Florida. There are fewer
assailable points on the Gulf than on the Atlantic. Pensacola,
Mobile, and the mouth of the Mississippi were defended by works that
had hitherto been regarded as sufficiently strong to repulse any
naval attack that might be made upon them. Immediately after the
bombardment of Fort Sumter, the work of improving the seacoast
defense was begun and carried forward as rapidly as the limited means
of the Government would permit.
The work that was now done has been so summarily and satisfactorily
described by General A. L. Long, chief of artillery, in a paper
contributed to the Southern Historical Society, that I avail myself
of a few extracts:[18]
"Roanoke Island and other points on Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds were
fortified. Batteries were established on the southeast entrance of
Cape Fear River, and the works on the southwest entrance
strengthened. Defenses were constructed at Georgetown, and at all
assailable points on the northeast coast of South Carolina. The works
of Charleston Harbor were greatly strengthened by earthworks and
floating batteries. The defenses from Charleston down the coast of
South Carolina and Georgia were confined chiefly to the islands and
salient points bearing upon the channels leading inland. Defensive
works were erected at all important points along the coast. Many of
the defenses, being injudiciously located and hastily erected,
offered but little resistance to the enemy when attacked. These
defeats were not surprising, when we take into consideration the
inexperience of the engineers, and the long line of seacoast to be
defended. As soon as a sufficient naval force had been collected, an
expedition under the command of General E. F. Butler was sent to the
coast of North Carolina, and captured several important points. A
second expedition, under Admiral Dupont and General Thomas W.
Sherman, was sent to make a descent on the coast of South Carolina.
On the 7th of November Dupont attacked the batteries that were
designed to defend Port Royal harbor, as stated above, and almost
without resistance carried them and gained possession of Port Royal.
This is the best harbor in South Carolina, and is the strategic key
to all the South Atlantic coast. Later, Burnside captured Roanoke
Island, and established himself in eastern North Carolina without
resistance. The rapid fall of Roanoke Island and Port Royal Harbor
struck consternation into the hearts of the inhabitants along the
entire coast. The capture of Port Royal gave to the Federals the
entire possession of Beaufort Island, which afforded a secure place
of rest for the army, while the harbor gave a safe anchorage for the
fleet. Beaufort Island almost fills a deep indenture in the main
shore, being separated the greater part of its extent by a narrow
channel, which is navigable its entire circuit. Its northern
extremity extends to within a few miles of the Charleston and
Savannah Railroad. The main road from Port Royal to Pocotaligo
crosses the channel at this point. The evacuation of Hilton Head, on
the southwestern extremity of Beaufort Island, followed the capture
of Port Royal. This exposed Savannah, only about twenty-five miles
distant, to an attack from that direction. At the same time, the
Federals having command of Helena Bay, Charleston was liable to be
assailed from North Edisto or Stono Inlet, and the railroad could
have been reached without opposition by the route from Port Royal to
Pocotaligo.
"Such was the state of affairs when General Lee reached Charleston,
about December 1, 1861, to assume the command of the Department of
North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. His vigorous mind at once
comprehended the situation, and, with his accustomed energy, he met
the difficulties that presented themselves. Directing fortifications
to be constructed on the Stono and the Edisto and the Combahee, he
fixed his headquarters at Coosawhatchee, the point most threatened,
and directed defenses to be erected opposite Hilton Head, and on the
Broad and Salkehatchie, to cover Savannah. These were the points
requiring immediate attention. He superintended in person the works
overlooking the approach to the railroad from Port Royal, and soon
infused into his troops a part of his own energy. The works he had
planned rose with magical rapidity. A few days after his arrival at
Coosawhatchee, Dupont and Sherman sent their first reconnaissance in
that direction, which was met and repulsed by shots from the newly
erected batteries; and now, whether the Federals advanced toward the
railroad or turned in the direction of Charleston or Savannah, they
were arrested by our batteries. The people, seeing the Federals
repulsed at every point, regained their confidence, and with it their
energy.
"The most important points being now secured against immediate
attack, the General proceeded to organize a system of seacoast
defense different from that which had been previously adopted. He
withdrew the troops and material from those works which had been
established on the islands and salient points which he could not
defend to a strong interior line, where the effect of the Federal
naval force would be neutralized. After a careful reconnaissance of
the coast, he designated such points as he considered it necessary to
fortify. The most important positions on this extensive line were
Georgetown, Charleston, Pocotaligo, Coosawhatchee, and Savannah.
Coosawhatchee, being central, could communicate with either
Charleston or Savannah in two or three hours by railroad, and in case
of an attack they could support each other. The positions between
Coosawhatchee and Savannah, and those between the former and
Charleston, could be reënforced from the positions contiguous to
them; there was thus a defensive relation throughout the entire line,
extending from Winyaw Bay to the mouth of St. Mary's River, in
Georgia, a distance of about two hundred miles. These detached and
supporting works covered a most important agricultural country, and
sufficed to defend it from the smaller expeditions made against that
region.
"About March 1st the gunboats of the enemy entered the Savannah River
by way of the channel leading from Hilton Head. Our naval force was
too weak to dispute the possession with them, and they thus cut off
the communication of Fort Pulaski with the city. Soon after, the
enemy landed a force, under General Gillmore, on the opposite side of
the fort. By April 1st they had powerful batteries in position, and
on that day opened fire on the fort. Having no hope of succor, Fort
Pulaski, after striking a blow for honor, surrendered with about five
hundred men." [19]
[Footnote 18: "Seacoast Defenses of the Carolinas and Georgia."]
[Footnote 19: General A. L. Long, in Historical Society Papers.]