General Buell's March.--Object of General Johnston.--His Force.--
Advance from Corinth.-Line of Battle.--Telegram.--The Time of the
Battle of Shiloh.--Results of the First Day's Battle.--One
Encampment not taken.--Effects.--Reports on this Failure.--Death
of General Johnston.--Remarks.
General Buell, who was to make a junction with General Grant, deemed
it best that his army should march through by land, as it would
facilitate the occupation of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
through north Alabama, where General Mitchell had been assigned.
Accordingly, Buell commenced his march from Nashville on March 15th,
with a rapid movement of cavalry, followed by a division of infantry,
to seize the bridges. The bridge over Duck River being destroyed, it
was the 31st before his army crossed. His advance arrived at Savannah
on Saturday, April 5th, and our attack on Grant at Pittsburg Landing
was made on the next day, the 6th of April. The advance of General
Buell anticipated his orders by two days, and likewise the
calculations of our commanders.
It had been the object of General Johnston, since falling back from
Nashville, to concentrate his army at Corinth, and fight the enemy in
detail--Grant first, and Buell afterward. The army of General Polk
had been drawn back from Columbus. The War Department ordered General
Bragg from Pensacola, with his well-disciplined army, to the aid of
Johnston. A brigade was sent by General Lovell from Louisiana, and
Chalmers and Walker were already on the line of the Memphis and
Charleston road with considerable commands. These forces collected at
Corinth, and to them were added such new levies as the Governors had
in rendezvous, and a few regiments raised in response to General
Beauregard's call. General Bragg, in a sketch of the battle of
Shiloh, thus speaks of General Johnston's army:
[Picture of General Braxton Bragg]
"In a period of four weeks, fragments of commands from Bowling Green,
Kentucky, under Hardee; Columbus, Kentucky, under Polk; and
Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans, under Bragg, with such new levies
as could be hastily raised, all badly armed and equipped, were united
at and near Corinth, and, for the first time, organised as an army.
It was a heterogeneous mass, in which there was more enthusiasm than
discipline, more capacity than knowledge, and more valor than
instruction. Rifles, rifled and smooth-bore muskets--some of them
originally percussion, others hastily altered from flint-locks by
Yankee contractors, many with the old flint and steel--and shot-guns
of all sizes and patterns, held place in the same regiments. The task
of organizing such a command in four weeks, and supplying it,
especially with ammunition, suitable for action, was simply
appalling. It was undertaken, however, with a cool, quiet
self-control, calling to his aid the best knowledge and talent at his
command, which not only inspired confidence, but soon yielded the
natural fruits of system, order, and discipline."
This force, about forty thousand of all arms, was divided into four
corps, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and
Hardee, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge. General Beauregard was
second in command under General Johnston. General Beauregard says, "A
want of general officers needful for the proper organization of
divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together, and
other difficulties in the way of effective organization, delayed the
movements until the night of April 2d."
About one o'clock on the morning of April 3d preliminary orders were
issued to hold the troops in readiness to move at a moment's notice,
with five days' provisions and a hundred rounds of ammunition. The
orders for march and battle were issued in the afternoon. At that
time General Hardee led the advance, the Third Corps, from Corinth,
by the northernmost route, known as the Ridge road. Bivouacking that
night on the way, he arrived next morning at Mickey's, a house about
eighteen miles from Corinth and four or five miles from Pittsburg.
The Second Corps, under Bragg, marched by the direct road to
Pittsburg through Monterey, which it reached about 11 A.M. on the
4th, and bivouacked that night near Mickey's in the rear of Hardee's
corps. The First Corps, under General Polk, consisted of two
divisions, under Cheatham and Clark. The latter was ordered to follow
Hardee on the Ridge road at an interval of half an hour, and to halt
near Mickey's, so as to allow Bragg's corps to fall in behind Hardee,
at a thousand yards' interval, and form a second line of battle.
Polk's corps was to form the left wing of the third line of battle;
and Breckinridge's reserve the right wing. The other division of
Polk, under Cheatham, was on outpost duty, at and near Bethel, on the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, about as far from Mickey's as Corinth was.
He was ordered to assemble his forces at Purdy, and pursue the route
to Monterey. He effected his junction on the afternoon of the 5th,
and took position on the left wing of Polk's corps. Breckinridge's
reserve corps moved from Burnsville early on April 4th, by way of
Farmington toward Monterey, distant fourteen miles. It did not effect
its junction with the other corps until late on the afternoon of
Saturday the 5th, being delayed by the rains on Friday and Saturday.
At daylight on the 5th Hardee moved, and by seven o'clock was
sufficiently out of the way to allow Bragg to advance. Before ten
o'clock Hardee's corps had reached the outposts and developed the
lines of the enemy. The corps was immediately deployed into line of
battle about a mile and a half west of Shiloh church, where Lick
Creek and Owl Creek approach most nearly, and are about three miles
apart. Gladden's brigade, of Bragg's corps, was on the right of
Hardee's corps, which was not sufficiently strong to occupy the whole
front. This line extended from creek to creek. Before seven o'clock
Bragg's column was in motion, and the right wing of his line of
battle formed about eight hundred yards in the rear of Hardee's line.
But the division on the left was nowhere to be seen. Even as late as
half-past twelve the missing column had not appeared, nor had any
report from it been received. General Johnston, "looking first at his
watch, then glancing at the position of the sun, exclaimed: 'This is
not _war_! Let us have our horses!' He rode to the rear until he
found the missing column standing stock-still, with its head some
distance out in an open field. General Polk's reserves were ahead of
it, with their wagons and artillery blocking up the road. General
Johnston ordered them to clear the road, and the missing column to
move forward. There was much chaffering among those implicated as to
who should bear the blame. . . . It was about four o'clock when the
lines were completely formed--too late, of course, to begin the
battle then." [13]
The road was not clear until 2 P.M. General Polk got Clark's division
of his corps into line of battle by four o'clock; and Cheatham, who
had come up on the left, promptly followed. Breckinridge's line was
then formed on Polk's right. Thus was the army arrayed in three lines
of battle late Saturday afternoon.[14]
The purpose of General Johnston to attack promptly is evinced in the
correspondence already introduced; it is further shown in his
telegram of April 3d, as follows:
"To the PRESIDENT, _Richmond._
"General Buell in motion, thirty thousand strong, rapidly from
Colombia by Clifton to Savannah. Mitchell behind him, with ten
thousand. Confederate forces forty thousand; ordered forward to offer
battle near Pittsburg.
"Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from
Burnsville, converging to-morrow, near Monterey, on Pittsburg.
"Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center,
Hardee the right wing, Breckinridge the reserve.
"Hope engagement before Buell can form junction." [15]
On the 6th of April I sent a telegram as follows:
"GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON: Your dispatch of yesterday received. I
hope you will be able to close with the enemy before his two
columns unite."
[Map: Battle of Shiloh Part II]
Though much inquiry has been made, I have not been able to recover
that dispatch "of yesterday" the 4th. It was anxiously sought
because, in cipher (private between us), he explained distinctly his
plan of battle, as the previous one had his proposed order of march.
It was in every respect important to attack at the earliest moment
after the advance of Buell's command became known. Every delay diminished
the chances of surprising the enemy, and increased the probability of his
being reënforced. Had the attack been made a day sooner, not only would
Buell's army have been absent, but there would have been no prospect
of their timely arrival; and who can measure the moral effect this
would have produced? It would be useless to review the controversies
as to who was responsible for the confusion and consequent detentions
on the march, the evil of which might have been greater if the
vigilance of the enemy had been equal to his self-sufficiency.
War has been called a fickle goddess, and its results attributed to
chance. The great soldier of our century said, "Fortune favors the
heavy battalions"; but is it not rather exact calculation than chance
which controls the events of war, and the just determination of the
relation of time, space, and motion in the application of force,
which decides the effective weight of battalions? Had the battle of
Shiloh opened a day sooner, it would have been better; had it been
postponed a day, to attack then would have been impracticable. Had
the several columns moved on different roads, converging toward the
field of battle, the movements of some could not have been obstructed
by others, so that the troops would have been in position and the
battle have been commenced on Saturday morning. The programme and
purpose of General Johnston appear from his dispatch of the 3d, and
from the disappointment evinced by him at the failure of a portion of
the command to be present on the field on the morning of the 5th
(Saturday), as he expected.
General Bragg, in a monograph on the battle of Shiloh, says:
"During the afternoon of the 5th, as the last of our troops were
taking position, a casual and partly accidental meeting of general
officers occurred just in rear of our second line, near the bivouac
of General Bragg. The Commander-in-Chief, General Beauregard, General
Polk, General Bragg, and General Breckinridge, are remembered as
present. In a discussion of the causes of the delay and its
incidents, it was mentioned that some of the troops, now in their
third day only, were entirely out of food, though having marched with
five days' rations. General Beauregard, confident our movement had
been discovered by the enemy, urged its abandonment, a return to our
camps for supplies, and a general change of programme. In this
opinion no other seemed fully to concur; and when it was suggested
that 'the enemy's supplies were much nearer, and could be had for the
taking,' General Johnston quietly remarked, 'Gentlemen, we shall
attack at daylight to-morrow.' The meeting then dispersed upon an
invitation of the commanding general to meet at his tent that
evening. At that meeting a further discussion elicited the same
views, and the same firm, decided determination. The next morning,
about dawn of day, the 6th, as the troops were being put in motion,
several generals again met at the camp-fire of the general-in-chief.
The discussion was renewed. General Beauregard again expressing his
dissent; when, rapid firing in the front indicating that the attack
had commenced, General Johnston closed the discussion by remarking:
'The battle has opened, gentlemen; it is too late to change our
dispositions.' He prepared to move to the front, and his subordinates
promptly joined their respective commands, inspired by his coolness,
confidence, and determination. Few men have equaled him in the
possession and display, at the proper time, of these great qualities
of the soldier."
The results of the first day of the famous battle thus began are very
summarily presented in the following brief report of General
Beauregard:
"At 5 A.M., on the 6th instant, a reconnoitering party of the enemy
having become engaged with our advanced pickets, the commander of the
forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined
upon, except that Trabue's brigade of Breckinridge's division was
detached and advanced to support the left of Bragg's corps and line
of battle then menaced by the enemy; and the other two brigades were
directed to advance by the road to Hamburg to support Bragg's right;
and at the same time Maney's regiment of Polk's corps was advanced by
the same road to reënforce the regiment, of cavalry and battery of
four pieces, already thrown forward to watch and guard Grier's,
Tanner's, and Borland's Fords of Lick Creek.
"Thirty minutes after 5 A.M., our lines and columns were in motion,
all animated evidently by a promising spirit. The front line was
engaged at once, but advanced steadily, followed in due order, with
equal resolution and steadiness, by the other lines, which were
brought successively into action with rare skill, judgment, and
gallantry by the several corps commanders, as the enemy made a stand
with his masses rallied for the struggle for his encampments. Like an
Alpine avalanche our troops moved forward, despite the determined
resistance of the enemy, until after 6 P.M., when we were in
possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but
one; nearly all of his field-artillery, about thirty flags, colors,
and standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division
commander (General Prentiss), and several brigade commanders,
thousands of small-arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage,
and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation,
all the substantial fruits of a complete victory--such, indeed, as
rarely have followed the most successful battles, for never was an
army so well provided as that of our enemy.
"The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the
immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns
of his iron-clad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his
well-selected, admirably provided cantonments, after our twelve hours
of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them
and the contiguous covert, but only by the sustained onset of all the
men we could bring into action."
There are two words in this report which, if they could have been
truthfully omitted, it would have been worth to us the surrender of
all "the substantial fruits of a complete victory." It says: "Our
troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy,
until after 6 P.M., when we were in possession of all his encampments
between Owl and lick Creeks _but one_." It was that "one" encampment
that furnished a foothold for all the subsequent reënforcements sent
by Buell, and gave occasion for the final withdrawal of our forces;
whereas, if that had been captured, and the "waters of the Tennessee"
reached, as General Johnston designed, it was not too much to expect
that Grant's army would have surrendered; that Buell's forces would
not have crossed the Tennessee; but with a skillful commander, like
Johnston, to lead our troops, the enemy would have sought safety on
the north bank of the Ohio; that Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri
would have been recovered, the Northwest disaffected, and our armies
filled with the men of the Southwest, and perhaps of the Northwest
also.
Let us turn to reports and authorities. The author of "The Life of
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston" says:
"Of the two armies, one was now an advancing, triumphant host, with
arm uplifted to give the mortal blow; the other, a broken, mangled,
demoralized mob, paralyzed and waiting for the stroke. While the
other Confederate brigades, which had shared most actively in
Prentiss's capture, were sending back the prisoners and forming again
for a final attack, two brigades, under Chalmers and Jackson, on the
extreme right, had cleared away all in front of them, and, moving
down the river-bank, now came upon the last point where even a show
of resistance was made. Being two very bold and active brigadiers,
they at once closed with the enemy in their front, crossing a deep
ravine and difficult ground to get at him. Here Colonel Webster, of
Grant's staff, had gathered all the guns he could find from
batteries, whether abandoned or still coherent, and with
stout-hearted men, picked up at random, had prepared a resistance.
Some infantry, similarly constituted, had been got together; and
Ammen's brigade, the van of Nelson's division of Buell's corps, had
landed, and was pushing its way through the throng of pallid
fugitives at the landing to take up the battle where it had fallen
from the hands of Grant and Sherman. It got into position in time to
do its part in checking the unsupported assaults of Chalmers and
Jackson."
General Chalmers, describing this final attack in his report, says:
"It was then about four o'clock in the evening, and, after
distributing ammunition, we received orders from General Bragg to
drive the enemy into the river. My brigade, together with that of
Brigadier-General Jackson, filed to the right and formed facing the
river, and endeavored to press forward to the water's edge; but in
attempting to mount the last ridge we were met by a fire from a whole
line of batteries, protected by infantry and assisted by shells from
the gunboats."
In a subsequent memorandum General Chalmers writes:
"One more resolute movement forward would have captured Grant and
his whole army, and fulfilled to the letter the battle-plan of the
great Confederate general, who died in the belief that victory was
ours. . . ."--("The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," p. 637.)
Brigadier-General Jackson, in his report, says:
"My brigade was ordered to change direction again, face toward
Pittsburg, where the enemy appeared to have made his last stand, and
to advance upon him, General Chalmers's brigade being again on my
right, and extending to the swamp of the Tennessee River. Without
ammunition, and with only their bayonets to rely on, steadily my men
advanced under a heavy fire from light batteries, siege-pieces, and
gunboats. Passing through the ravine, they arrived near the crest of
the opposite hill, upon which the enemy's batteries were, but could
not be urged farther without support. Sheltering themselves against
the precipitous sides of the ravine, they remained under this fire
for some time. Finding an advance without support impracticable,
remaining there under fire useless, and believing that any further
forward movement should have been made simultaneously along our whole
line, I proceeded to obtain orders from General Withers, but, after
seeing him, was ordered by a staff-officer to retire. This order was
communicated to me as coming from General Beauregard."
General Hardee, who commanded the first line, says in his report:
"Upon the death of General Johnston, the command having devolved upon
General Beauregard, the conflict was continued until near sunset, and
the advance divisions were within a few hundred yards of Pittsburg,
where the enemy were huddled in confusion, when the order to withdraw
was received. The troops were ordered to bivouac on the field of
battle."
General Polk's report says:
"We had one hour or more of daylight still left, were within one
hundred and fifty to four hundred yards of the enemy's position, and
nothing seemed wanting to complete the most brilliant victory of the
war but to press forward and make a vigorous assault on the
demoralized remnant of his forces."
General Gilmer, the chief engineer of the Confederate States Army, in
a letter to Colonel William Preston Johnston, dated September 17,
1872, writes as follows:
"It is my well-considered opinion that if your father had survived
the day he would have crushed and captured General Grant's army
before the setting of the sun on the 6th. In fact, at the time your
father received the mortal wound, advancing with General
Breckinridge's command, the day was ours. The enemy having lost all
the strong positions on that memorable field, his troops fell back in
great disorder on the banks of the Tennessee. To cover the confusion,
rapid fires were opened from the gunboats the enemy had placed in the
river; but the shots passed entirely over our devoted men, who were
exultant and eager to be led forward to the final assault, which must
have resulted in a complete victory, owing to the confusion and
general disorganization of the Federal troops. I knew the condition
of General Grant's army at the moment, as I had reached a high,
projecting point on the bank of the river, about a mile above
Pittsburg Landing, and could see the hurried movements to get the
disordered troops across to the right bank. Several thousand had
already passed, and a confused mass of men crowded to the landing to
get on the boats that were employed in crossing. I rode rapidly to
General Bragg's position to report what I had seen, and suggested
that, if he would suspend the fire of his artillery and marshal his
infantry for a general advance, the enemy must surrender. General
Bragg decided to make the advance, and authorized me and other
officers to direct the commanders of the batteries to cease firing.
"In the midst of the preparations, orders reached General Bragg from
General Beauregard directing the troops to be withdrawn and placed in
camp for the night--the intention being to resume the contest in the
morning. This was fatal, as it enabled General Buell and General
Wallace to arrive on the scene of action; that is, they came up in
the course of the night. Had General Beauregard known the condition
of the enemy as your father knew it when he received the fatal shot,
the order for withdrawal would certainly not have been given, and,
without such order, I know the enemy would have been crushed." [16]
To General Gilmer's opinion as a scientific engineer, a soldier of
long experience, and a man of resolute will as well as calm judgment,
the greatest respect will be accorded by those who knew him in the
United States Army, as well as his associates in the Confederate Army.
General Bragg, in his official report, says:
"As soon as our troops could be again put in motion, the order was
given to move forward at all points and sweep the enemy from the
field. . . . Our troops, greatly exhausted by twelve hours' incessant
fighting without food, mostly responded to the order with alacrity,
and the movement commenced with every prospect of success, though a
heavy battery in our front and the gunboats on our right seemed
determined to dispute every inch of ground. Just at this time an
order was received from the commanding General to withdraw the forces
beyond the enemy's fire."
In addition to the statements and opinions cited above, I will
introduce from a recent publication by Thomas Worthington, late
colonel of the Forty-sixth Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, two
statements showing the relative condition of the two armies in the
afternoon of the day of battle. It may be proper to say that Colonel
Worthington was regularly educated as a soldier, and had seen service
in Mexico.
He quotes Colonel Geddes, of the Eighth Iowa Volunteers, as follows:
"About 3 P.M. all communications with the river (landing) ceased, and
it became evident to me that the enemy was turning the right and left
flanks of our army. . . . About 2 P.M. the whole Union right,
comprising the Forty-sixth Ohio, which had held that flank two hours
or more, was driven back in disorder, and the Confederate flanking
force cut the center off from the landing, as stated by Colonel
Geddes, soon after General Johnston's fall."
General Beauregard reports as follows:
"It was after 6 P.M. when the enemy's last position was carried, and
his force finally broke and sought refuge behind a commanding
eminence covering Pittsburg Landing, not more than half a mile
distant, and under the guns of the gunboats, which opened on our
eager columns a fierce and annoying fire with shot and shell of the
heaviest description. Darkness was close at hand. Officers and men
were exhausted by a combat of over twelve hours, without food, and
jaded by the march of the preceding day through mud and water; it
was, therefore, impossible to collect the rich and opportune spoils
of war scattered broadcast on the field left in our possession, and
impracticable to make any effective dispositions for their removal to
the rear.
"I accordingly established my headquarters at the church of Shiloh,
in the enemy's encampment, with Major-General Bragg, and directed our
troops to sleep on their arms in such positions in advance and rear
as corps commanders should determine, hoping, from news received by a
special dispatch, that delays had been encountered by General Buell
in his march from Columbia, and that his main forces, therefore,
could not reach the field of battle in time to save General Grant's
shattered fugitives from capture or destruction on the following day."
Such are the representations of those having the best means of
information relative to the immediate causes of the failure to drive
the enemy from his last foothold, and gain possession of it. Some of
the more remote causes of this failure may be noticed. The first was
the death of General Johnston, which is thus described by his son:
"General Johnston had passed through the ordeal (the charge upon the
enemy) seemingly unhurt. His noble horse was shot in four places;
his clothes were pierced by missiles; his boot-sole was cut and torn
by a Minie ball; but, if he himself had received any severe wound, he
did not know it. At this moment Governor Harris rode up from the
right, elated with his own success, and with the vindication of his
Tennesseeans. After a few words. General Johnston sent him with an
order to Colonel Statham, which, having delivered, he speedily
returned. In the mean time knots and groups of Federal soldiers kept
up an angry discharge of firearms as they retreated upon their
supports, and their last line, now yielding, delivered volley after
volley as they retreated. By the chance of war a Minie ball from one
of these did its fatal work As General Johnston, on horseback, sat
there, knowing that he had crushed in the arch which had so long
resisted the pressure of his forces, and waiting until they could
collect sufficiently to give the final stroke, he received a mortal
wound. It came in the moment of victory and triumph from a flying
foe. It smote him at the very instant when he felt the full
conviction that the day was won."
His wound consisted in the cutting of the artery that runs down
through the thigh and divides at the knee, and passes along the
separate bones of the lower part of the leg. The wound was just above
the division or branch of the artery. It was fatal only because the
flow of blood was not stopped by a tourniquet. The narrative
continues:
"General Beauregard had told General Johnston that morning as he rode
off, that if it should be necessary to communicate with him or for
him to do anything, he would be found in his ambulance in bed.
Governor Harris, knowing this, and how feeble General Beauregard's
health was, went first to his headquarters--just in the rear of
where the army had deployed into line the evening before. Beauregard
and his staff were gone on horseback in the direction of Shiloh
Church. He found them there. The Governor told General Beauregard
that General Johnston had been killed. Beauregard expressed regret,
and then remarked, 'Everything else seems to be going on well on the
right.' Governor Harris assented. 'Then,' said Beauregard, 'The
battle may as well go on.' The Governor replied that he certainly
thought it ought. He offered his services to Beauregard, and they
were courteously accepted. General Beauregard then remained where he
was, waiting the issue of events." [17]
Sidney Johnston fell in sight of victory; the hour he had waited for,
the event he had planned for, had arrived. His fame was vindicated,
but far dearer than this to his patriotic spirit was it with his
dying eyes to behold his country's flag, so lately drooping in
disaster, triumphantly advancing. In his fall the great pillar of the
Southern Confederacy was crushed, and beneath its fragments the best
hope of the Southwest lay buried. A highly educated and richly
endowed soldier, his varied experience embraced also civil affairs,
and his intimate knowledge of the country and people of the Southwest
so highly qualified him for that special command that it was not
possible to fill the place made vacant by his death. Not for the
first time did the fate of an army depend upon a single man, and the
fortunes of a country hang, as in a balance, on the achievements of a
single army. To take an example far from us, in time and place, when
Turenne had, after months of successful manoeuvring, finally forced
his enemy into a position which gave assurance of victory, and had
marshaled his forces for a decisive battle, he was, when making a
preliminary reconnaissance, killed by a chance shot; then his
successor, instead of attacking, retreated, and all which the one had
gained for France, the other lost.
To take another example, not quite so conclusive, it was
epigrammatically said by Lieutenant Kingsbury, when writing of the
battle of Buena Vista, that if the last shot, fired at the close of
the second day's conflict, had killed General Taylor, the next
morning's sun would have risen upon the strange spectacle of two
armies in full retreat from each other, the field for which they had
fought being in the possession of neither. What material consequences
would have flowed from the supposed event--how the Mexican people
would have been inspired by the retreat of our army, how far it would
have brought out all their resources for war, and to what extent
results might have been thereby affected--are speculative inquiries
on a subject from which time and circumstance have taken the interest
it once possessed.
The extracts which have been given sufficiently prove that, when
General Johnston fell, the Confederate army was so fully victorious
that, had the attack been vigorously pressed, General Grant and his
army would before the setting of the sun have been fugitives or
prisoners.
As our troops drew near to the river, the gunboats of the enemy
became ineffective, because to fire over the bank required such
elevation of the guns that the shot and shell passed high over the
heads of our men, falling far away in the rear.
General Polk described the troops in advance for that reason as quite
safe from the fire of the gunboats, though it might seem terrible to
those far in the rear, and expressed the surprise and regret he felt
at the order to retire.
Grant's army being beaten, the next step of General Johnston's
programme should have followed, the defeat of Buell's and Mitchell's
forces as they successively came up, and a return by our victorious
army through Tennessee to Kentucky. The great embarrassment had been
the want of good military weapons; these would have been largely
supplied by the conquest hoped for, and, in the light of what had
occurred, not unreasonably anticipated.
What great consequences would have ensued must be matter of
conjecture, but that the people of Kentucky and Missouri generously
sympathized with the South was then commonly admitted. Our known want
of preparation for war and numerical inferiority may well have caused
many to doubt the wisdom of our effort for independence, and to these
a signal success would have been the makeweight deciding their course.
I believe that again in the history of war the fate of an army
depended on one man; and more, that the fortunes of a country hung by
the single thread of the life that was yielded on the field of
Shiloh. So great was my confidence in his capacity for organization
and administration, that I felt, when he was assigned to the
Department of the West, that the undeveloped power of that region
would be made sufficient not only for its own safety, but to
contribute support if need be to the more seriously threatened East.
There have been various suppositions as to the neglect of the wound
which caused General Johnston's death. My own opinion, founded upon
the statements of those who were near him, and upon my long
acquaintance with him and close observation of him under trying
circumstances, is, that his iron nerve and extraordinary
concentration of mind made him regardless of his wound, in the fixed
purpose to dislodge the enemy from his last position, and, while thus
struggling to complete the victory within his grasp, he unheedingly
allowed his life-blood to flow away.
It often happens that men do not properly value their richest gifts
until taken away. Those who had erroneously and unjustly censured
Johnston, convicted of their error by the grandeur of his revealed
character, joined in the general lamentation over his loss, and
malignity even was silenced by the devoted manner of his death. My
estimation of him was based on long and intimate acquaintance;
beginning in our youth, it had grown with our growth without check or
variation, and, when he first arrived in Richmond, was expressed to
some friends yet living, in the wish that I had the power, by
resigning, to transfer to him the Presidency of the Confederate
States.
[Footnote 13: Colonel Munford's address at Memphis.]
[Footnote 14: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]
[Footnote 15: Original in the possession of Colonel W. P. Johnston.]
[Footnote 16: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," pp. 635, 636.]
[Footnote 17: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," p. 616.]