At the end of February 1915 Sir John French had come to a happy decision
and that was to attack the enemy at some selected point. I cannot enter
here into the reasons, or discuss the general military situation;
suffice it to say that the centre of the objective was to be the village
of Neuve Chapelle, and that it was the good fortune of the Indian Corps
to be in this line, with its left or northern flank resting opposite to
it. Amongst the reasons assigned by him was one which was particularly
apposite to the occasion, viz. “the need of fostering the offensive
spirit in the troops after the trying and possibly enervating
experiences which they had gone through of a severe winter in the
trenches.”
This, in itself, was indeed a very weighty reason for giving all ranks
an opportunity of stretching their limbs. For over five months on and
off we had lived a tedious life. Our reveille was the morning hate; our
weary day, a long-drawn-out and slow process of avoiding shells, which
we could seldom reply to for there was little ammunition to do it with;
our evenings, an interminable gloom lighted up by German Véry lights and
other fireworks, and our nights a long vigil of tired men, waiting in
muddy trenches for the dawn. No wonder then that the prospect of an
advance, preceded by what we knew must be a sharp fight, cheered all
ranks and revived their spirits. Nothing struck me more during my year
in France than their evident delight when they became aware that the
inertia of the trenches was to give place to something more active. As a
Sikh native officer said to me on the day preceding the battle, “Sahib,
we shall have a chance of proving that the Indian Army can fight and not
only do sentry-go in the _khandak_ (trenches). We shall again be able to
cry, _Fateh_ (victory).”
Our left rested on the right of Rawlinson’s Fourth Corps, on the La
Bassée-Estaires road, and our right on the Chocolat Menier Corner, from
which point the line was carried on by the First Corps past Givenchy.
Since those early days of the war so many attacks have been made on a
colossal scale, and such detailed accounts of them have been published,
illustrated, and placed on the stage, that it would be superfluous to
describe what was done by way of preparation. But it is an erroneous
idea to imagine that in those days details were neglected or only
cursorily gone into. Nothing could have been more minutely arranged to
the very smallest item; no Staffs ever more thoroughly studied, checked,
and elaborated essentials than did those of the Corps. From the big guns
down to the men’s boots nothing was neglected by the Staff, commanders,
and other regimental officers. Indeed, as I now study the orders issued
I realise that, although frequently making bricks with but scanty straw,
each blade of that straw was utilised to the greatest advantage.
Times gradually changed, until the British Army was equipped as no army
ever was before or probably will be again, but the improvements were
gradual, the Staff work enlarged with the experience gained, time was
given officers and men to go into the battle-line after a thorough
training in the requirements of trench or open warfare, and everything
improved until there was little room for improvement left. In the Neuve
Chapelle days, with all our shortage of shells, grenades, etc., there
was no shortage of endeavour, and in that respect indeed there was even
more need to husband our resources and make the best use of them. Even
so, and considering that we had been at war for seven months, it reads
strangely in the official reports of the Indian Corps that in the case
of two Territorial battalions attached to our brigades, and both of whom
fought splendidly, “Owing to the —— and —— battalions having only just
arrived, and not being in possession of any telephone equipment or
trained signallers, communication during the battle had to be carried on
by messengers alone.”
Yes, times indeed changed, but there never was any difference in the
fighting spirit of the officers and men; they remained as they were from
Mons to the Marne, from Ypres to La Bassée; the same immortal souls, if
anything, even braver, in the hour of sore trial, outnumbered and
outgunned, than in the later days of triumph when the Huns at last began
to realise that
This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror.
The object of the operations, as laid down in the First Army operation
orders, was “to force the enemy’s lines in the vicinity of Neuve
Chapelle, and drive back any hostile forces from the line
Aubers-Ligny-le-Grand, with the object of cutting off the enemy’s troops
which are now holding the front between Neuve Chapelle and La Bassée.”
The orders of the First Army were always clear and distinct, and I never
experienced any difficulty in thoroughly recognising their object. It
was sometimes the execution, with the very limited number of guns and
ammunition, that was the difficulty. At Neuve Chapelle, however, we were
locally and temporarily superior in both guns and men, and had we
succeeded in gaining more than our first objective we could have
advanced our line to the Aubers Ridge. Suppose we had done this, the
question arises, was it possible to retain the advantage? Judging from
what immediately followed the battle we certainly could not have done
so.
Events have since proved that, given sufficient gun power and good
troops, it is always possible to capture the enemy’s first and
supporting lines, but subsequently you must have unlimited munitions to
hold your gains or push on farther. We had not got the munitions, and
did not receive them till long after, and hence any advance up to or
beyond the Aubers Ridge would have resulted in a Pyrrhic victory. In
this connection it makes one think how different were our ideas in those
days, compared with those formed after two years of war, and when
experience had proved that bravery without munitions may enable an Army
to hold its own even against immense odds, but it cannot turn defence
into the offensive, except on a local and minute scale. As I write this
three years have elapsed since the battle of Neuve Chapelle, but our
trenches are still on the very same spot we gained that day, and our
gallant fellows, though but few, if any, of those who fought are still
there, look out on the very same ridge and the remnants of that same
Bois du Biez which cost us dear to attack but which we never reached.
Nevertheless it will ever remain a great day and a great memory, for if
we did not get as far as we had hoped to do, we taught the Huns a very
sharp lesson, and, as far as the Indians were concerned, they learned
that alongside the British soldier they could enter the jaws of death
and triumph.
The objective assigned to us was the Bois du Biez, a wood of
considerable size, lying just beyond and to the south-east of Neuve
Chapelle, whilst Rawlinson’s Fourth Corps was directed on Aubers and La
Cliqueterie Farm. Farther to the south the First Corps was to assault
the enemy’s lines north-east of Givenchy, and the Canadian Division was
to co-operate by a fire attack along the entire front. The map will show
how the river Des Layes formed a considerable obstacle between the
village and the Bois du Biez, being from six to ten feet wide and from
three to five feet deep, and along this stream the Germans had
constructed strong bridge-heads and trenches.
At Neuve Chapelle we were to experience for the first time the
scientific employment of 18-pounders for wire cutting, and three
Brigades were detailed for this purpose. The success achieved by the
guns in demolishing these obstacles was in those days a revelation to
us; nothing could have been better done, and wherever the Infantry took
the right line as laid down, the attack succeeded up to all expectation.
The G.O.C. First Army had frequently impressed this on me and he was
right. The pioneers and sappers and miners had done their work very
thoroughly under the direction of Brigadier-General Nanton and every
preparation had been completed before the battle opened.
Surgeon-General Treherne, who had served with me on the Indian
Frontiers, had arranged the medical side of the operations with a
thoroughness that could not have been exceeded, and which earned the
gratitude of the Indian soldiers; and last, but not least, my Chief of
Staff, General Hudson, had worked out all plans and orders with such
scrupulous care that when the battle commenced I felt it was already
half over, for each and all knew what was to be their share in it.
A readjustment of our line had been carried out during the night of 28th
February/1st March, whereby the front of the Corps extended from
Chocolat Menier Corner through Port Arthur to the La Bassée-Estaires
road. This front was occupied by the Meerut Division with one Brigade,
the two others being in reserve. The Lahore Division, less one Brigade
in Army reserve, was in Corps reserve.
About this time the heavy artillery of the Indian Corps (excepting the
2nd Siege Battery, 6-inch howitzers), and with certain additions, was
grouped under Brigadier-General Franks, R.A., as No. 1 Group G.H.Q.
Artillery. This group was ordered to support the operations of the
Indian Corps. The remainder of the Artillery of both Divisions was
gradually brought into action into positions selected by
Brigadier-General Scott, R.A., attached to Corps Headquarters. The moves
were completed by the evening of 7th March.
The system under which the artillery was disposed was as follows:
3 18-pr. Brigades to cut wire on front to be assaulted.
2 18-pr. Brigades to cover the southern section, which was not
attacking.
1 18-pr. Brigade partly building curtain of fire on roads and
approaches from the Bois du Biez, and partly in observation.
1 Brigade 4·5-inch Howitzers destroying enemy trenches.
1 Brigade 6-inch Howitzer destroying enemy trenches.
Siege Battery destroying enemy trenches.
1 Section 2·75 inch actually in fire trenches for close support of
Infantry attack.
The above were the objectives for necessarily the first phase, but the
subsequent objectives laid down did not involve a change of position for
the batteries.
Considerable engineering preparations had been made in advance, such as
provision of cover for the assaulting Brigade to form up in,
improvements to communications, and provision of light bridges, etc.,
for crossing obstacles.
The Lahore Division had moved forward on 7th March and concentrated in
the area Calonne-Lestrem-Robecq, the Meerut Division concentrating its
troops still farther forward in order to provide the necessary
accommodation.
By the morning of 9th March the Corps was disposed as follows:
CORPS HEADQUARTERS. Report Centre, La Cix Marmuse.
MEERUT DIVISION. Report Centre, Vieille Chapelle.
Dehra Dun Brigade, La Couture.
Garhwal Brigade, Richebourg St. Vaast.
Bareilly Brigade, Holding front line.
LAHORE DIVISION. Report Centre, Lestrem.
Ferozepore, Farther back.
Jalandar, Farther back.
and Sirhind Brigades. Farther back.
The Artillery of both Divisions was in action under the orders of the
Meerut Division. The Cavalry, Sappers, and Pioneers were with their
respective Divisions.
The 125th Rifles and 1 Company 34th Pioneers had been placed temporarily
at the disposal of the Fourth Corps for the road work which would be
necessitated by an advance. The recent addition of some battalions of
the Territorial Force had necessitated a reconstitution of Infantry
Brigades.
On the 10th March the composition was as under:
LAHORE DIVISION
Major-General KEARY (Indian Army).
SIRHIND BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Walker, V.C. (Indian Army)
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th Liverpools (Special Reserve).
15th Sikhs.
1/1st Gurkhas.
1/4th Gurkhas.
JALANDAR BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Strickland, Manchester Regiment.
1st Manchesters.
4th Suffolks (Territorials).
47th Sikhs.
59th Rifles (Frontier Force).
FEROZEPORE BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Egerton (Indian Army).
1st and 2nd Connaught Rangers (one unit).
4th Londons (Territorials).
9th Bhopal Infantry.
57th Rifles (Frontier Force).
129th Baluchis.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.—
15th Lancers.
34th Sikh Pioneers.
20th and 21st Companies Sappers and Miners.
MEERUT DIVISION
Lieut.-General ANDERSON, late R.A.
GARHWAL BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Blackader, Leicestershire Regiment.
2nd Leicesters.
3rd Londons (Territorials).
1st and 2nd Battalions 39th Garhwal Rifles (one unit).
2/3rd Gurkhas.
2/8th Gurkhas.
BAREILLY BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Southey (Indian Army).
2nd Black Watch.
4th Black Watch (Territorials).
41st Dogras.
58th Rifles.
125th Rifles.
DEHRA DUN BRIGADE.—Brigadier-General Jacob (Indian Army).
1st Seaforths.
4th Seaforths (Territorials).
6th Jats.
2/2nd Gurkhas.
1/9th Gurkhas.
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.—
4th Cavalry.
107th Pioneers.
Nos. 3 and 4 Companies Sappers and Miners.
Aeroplanes and flying machines in general were few and far between in
those days as compared with later times; nevertheless our airmen had
even then shown what these neoteric implements could achieve in the
hands of brave men in war. The Germans were completely taken by surprise
when our attack began, and this was in a very great measure due to the
fearless daring and persistence of our aviators, who had left nothing to
chance. Although I have little to tell in this book of the Air Service
as it then was, it is a fact that the Sepoys, when they first realised
the objects and witnessed the extraordinary daring of aeroplanes, felt
that their epic of the Mahabharat (Great War) was about to be repeated.
And so the Indian soldiers were, for the first time in history, on the
eve of an offensive battle against the most highly trained and organised
army of Europe.
For those who merely looked on an attack in force as an incident of the
Great War, the coming battle may have been only a new phase in the
struggle; for me as Commander of the Corps it meant much more. I was
standing on the brink of an experiment which might have momentous
consequences. I was responsible, in my own way, for important issues; I
was, on a very small scale it is true, but nevertheless in a somewhat
similar position to the first Japanese General who met and overthrew his
Russian opponents. It was a question of the East versus the West, and
although I felt sure of my brave men, it remained to be proved how the
East would take it.
The night of 9th March 1915 will ever remain one of my most inspiriting
recollections. I can recall every moment of it; I did not sleep long,
but I thought a lot; I did not doubt, but the thing had to be made good.
Many beside myself thought much that night, but I wonder if one felt a
greater joy than I did as I realised that a life’s work was to be
tested. That life had been mostly spent in India, amongst Indian
soldiers, and when dawn proclaimed that the supreme moment was at hand,
I walked into the small garden of my dwelling and felt with Thomas
Jefferson
That all men are created equal.
Although the night of the 9th March had been cloudless up till about
midnight, the morning broke cold, damp, and misty. I stood in the
drizzle with my friend Khwaja Mahomed Khan, A.D.C., and as the watch
marked the hour for the intense bombardment, I said to him, “This is a
great hour in Indian history. Praise be to Allah.” And he replied,
“Allah is with us, the Germans’ turn for a thrashing has arrived.”
The Lahore Division during the early morning of the 10th March moved up
to Vieille Chapelle-La Couture and the area La Tombe Willot-Les
Lobes-Zelobes, the Ferozepore Brigade remaining in Army reserve at
Calonne.
After some preliminary registration the previously arranged Artillery
bombardment commenced at 7.30 A.M. For the first ten minutes three
Brigades of 18-pounders fired at the enemy’s wire entanglements, which
they succeeded in demolishing pretty completely, as we afterwards found.
For the remaining twenty-five minutes of the first phase of the
bombardment the 18-pounders (eighteen batteries) were covering the area
held by the enemy and the southern flank, so as to prevent the arrival
of reinforcements. During this same period of twenty-five minutes the
4·5-inch and 6-inch howitzers shelled the trenches which were to be
assaulted.
The frontage attacked was 600 yards, the obstacles being _chevaux de
frise_, thickly wired, generally in one but sometimes in two rows, and a
certain amount of low wire entanglement. The depth of the obstacles
varied from 6 to 15 yards, but owing to their being opposite one side of
a salient only a limited number of batteries could be brought into
action, so that the line of fire was direct. The 9th and 13th Brigades
took position at ranges averaging 1800 yards. The 4th Brigade was
disposed at an average range of 2500 yards, the line of fire being
oblique.
The method of attack was that in each battery of the 9th and 13th
Brigades fire was concentrated on numbers 2 and 5 guns, whereby two
lanes per battery, or twelve in all, were to be formed.
The 4th Brigade concentrated three guns on each alternate lane position.
The allowance of ammunition was 50 rounds per gun, and was fired in ten
minutes.
Thus twelve lanes were formed, six by having 150 rounds and six by
having 300 rounds expended on them.
The Garhwal Brigade, which had the honour of being detailed to carry out
the first assault, was commanded by a fine soldier, Brigadier-General
Blackader. I had first met him when he commanded his battalion of
Leicesters in India, and from that day onwards I had learned to respect
him and to trust in his judgement. The manner in which he handled his
Brigade at Neuve Chapelle was good to see, and his report on the three
days’ fighting is concise, and written as brave and modest men write.
In support of the Garhwal was the Dehra Dun Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier-General Jacob.
The Bareilly Brigade continued to hold the original trenches, and in
command of it was Brigadier-General Southey, Indian Army, in whom I
reposed the utmost confidence.
Whatever the qualifications of other brigade commanders in France, I
certainly was fortunate in those who directed their brigades at Neuve
Chapelle.
And all is now ready for the great attack. In such moments men think and
act according to their own peculiar natures; the Oriental’s thoughts are
generally quite different from our own. I asked a sepoy I had known for
years, and who came out of the battle scatheless, how he felt just
before the assault. This was his reply: “My right-hand comrade had been
looking at a rough map with the names of the villages and trenches
marked in Hindustani. I could read the names, but did not understand the
map; so just before we started I made up my mind to go to my British
officer after the battle and get him to teach me. I had no time to think
of anything else, for just then we advanced.” Splendid fellow! I am glad
I was not the first German who came across his path; but his simple
story impressed me much. He was not wondering what was going to happen;
he was just going to death, if Ishwar so ordained, and if he lived he
was going to improve his military value.
The half-ruined village of Neuve Chapelle, about to be turned into a
shambles for the third time, lay but a few hundred yards to the front;
boggy fields, torn hedges, and numerous ditches blocked the passages of
the attackers, and the Aubers Ridge beyond looked down on the dead level
country, so soon to mark the triumph of the Asiatic over the Teuton.
At 8.5 A.M. precisely the Garhwal Brigade rushed to the assault of the
enemy’s trenches opposite the front he had been holding along the La
Bassée road. The order of battalions from right to left was:
1/39th Garhwal Rifles (Colonel Swiney).
2nd Battalion Leicesters (Lieut.-Colonel Gordon).
2/3rd Gurkha Rifles (Lieut.-Colonel Ormsby).
2/39th Garhwal Rifles (Lieut.-Colonel Drake-Brockman).
The 3rd London Regiment was in Brigade reserve.
The assaulting infantry (except the 1/39th Garhwalis) reached their
first objective without a check, and by 8.30 had pushed through to the
east side of the road joining Port Arthur with Neuve Chapelle.
The 2/39th, the left battalion of the Brigade, and therefore the one
nearest the right of the 8th British Division, which was attacking on
our left, was met by some rifle and machine-gun fire but had soon
reached the fourth German trench. Scouts were at once sent forward, and
the consolidation of the position commenced. Simultaneously the advance
was continued to the outskirts of Neuve Chapelle, where three
machine-guns and 300 prisoners fell into their hands.
In this advance Naik Jaman Sing Bisht won the Indian Order of Merit by
fine leading, and Havildar Buta Sing Negi was awarded the same
decoration. Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi received the Victoria Cross for
conspicuous bravery and under circumstances so similar to those which
had won it for his Garhwal comrade of the 1st battalion, viz. Naik
Darwan Sing Negi, on the 23rd November 1914, near Festubert, that it
would appear the soldiers from Garhwal firmly believe that the bayonet
is the best weapon for use in the trenches. He was the leading man of
the bayonet detachment which accompanied the bombing party; was first to
rush each traverse, and besides himself bayoneting several Germans drove
back many more who finally all surrendered. Death claimed him before he
could receive the Cross which he had so bravely won, but it was awarded
posthumously, and his family get the monetary award; whilst his name
will remain a beacon to attract for years his fellow hillmen to the
2/39th Garhwal Rifles.
Jemadar Ghantu Sing Negi was killed and over 130 casualties were
suffered by the battalion.
The 2/3rd Gurkhas carried the trenches to their front and secured two
machine-guns. Having arranged for one company each from the 2/39th and
Londons to consolidate the line gained, the Gurkhas pushed on, wheeled
to the right, crossed the Rue du Bois and reached the old British trench
east of Neuve Chapelle. Quickly entrenching they gained touch with the
Rifle Brigade of the Fourth Corps on their left. Major A. Tillard on his
own initiative carried the attack still farther forward towards the
brewery and captured several prisoners. The Indian Order of Merit was
conferred on Subadar Bhim Sing Thapa, Lance-Naik Harak Sing Gharti,
Subadar Major Gambhir, Sing Gurung, Havildar Bahadur Thapa, and Rifleman
Gane Gurung. This latter gallant fellow was the hero of a melodramatic
affair. The 2nd Rifle Brigade from the Fourth Army Corps met the Gurkhas
in the village, and the first thing seen was my friend Gane Gurung, with
his bayonet very close to the stern of a German, who with seven others
were being driven off as prisoners, having surrendered _en bloc_ in a
house to the little Gurkha. Lieut.-Colonel Ormsby was made a C.B.
The 2nd Leicesters also advanced without a check and by 8.30 A.M. had
gained the road parallel to and east of the Estaires-La Bassée road,
where the battalion began to entrench itself. It was found, for reasons
which will be related, that between their right and the left of the
1/39th a considerable gap existed. Captain Romilly, using his revolver
freely and followed by a platoon of the Leicesters, bombed back the Huns
for over a hundred yards of trench and then with the assistance of
Captain Hobart, R.E., and some sappers who came up opportunely, erected
a barricade. Hobart was awarded the Military Cross, Sapper Sheikh Abdul
Rahman the I.O.M., and Colour-Havildar Chagatta, who had previously won
the I.O.M., was given the Russian Cross of St. George.
Romilly received a well-earned D.S.O., and Captain D. L. Weir, also of
the same battalion, a Military Cross. The Leicesters are all brave, but
conspicuous amongst them on this day was Private William Buckingham,
who, regardless of an inferno of fire, carried in several badly wounded
men. In doing this he received two severe wounds himself but escaped
with his life and was awarded the Victoria Cross. Poor fellow! he no
longer lives to enjoy his reward; he has added one more to the immortal
dead along the Somme. Several D.C.M.’s were also awarded to N.C.O.’s and
men of this fine fighting Corps.
In none of these assaults so far had any serious check been caused by
the enemy’s wire entanglements, these obstacles having been destroyed by
the artillery, and only in the case of the 2/39th had any considerable
fire been met before the first trench was reached.
The 1/39th Garhwalis did not fare so well; their assault unfortunately
took a wrong initial direction, and instead of keeping their left as
ordered on the Rivière des Layes, swung away to the right. Nevertheless,
in face of a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire they reached close up to
the German trenches, but the obstacles had not been destroyed by our
artillery, as they were not included in the marked zone, and
consequently the impetus of the rush was broken.
During this check the battalion suffered considerable casualties in
British officers and Indian ranks. But although the initial error cost
them dear, it was the occasion for proving the grand material of which
these fine Garhwal Rifles are made. On no occasion in the history of the
Indian Corps in France was it better proved what Indians led by British
officers will assuredly achieve, provided the men have been properly
trained. The capture of the enemy’s trenches here became a terrible
struggle, but the 39th would take no denial. Captains Owen, J. E.
Murray, R. J. Clarke, and Sparrow were killed, whilst Captain Kenny and
Lieut. Welchman actually reached and entered the trenches before they
also shared the same fate. Six out of the total of twelve British
officers gave their lives in a few short moments, and Major MacTier of
the 2nd Battalion, who had been sent to replace Colonel Swiney
(wounded), was also killed later on.
Faithful unto death.
The check created a gap between the left of the 1/39th and the right of
the Leicesters. In this gap the Germans held out, and it took much time
and was not without considerable losses that their trenches were finally
captured.
The Leicesters seeing how matters stood immediately set to work to clear
up the situation, and a party under Captain Romilly, as already related,
using bayonets and hand-grenades, gradually forced the enemy back along
his trenches. Lieut. G. A. Cammell, R.F.A., on forward observation duty,
seeing the British officers were being mown down and that some
hesitation was occurring in the advance, and his telephone communication
having been destroyed, dashed forward and headed the charge, with some
Garhwalis by his side; he and a few of the Riflemen were almost
immediately wounded, and fell, but here again another gallant soldier,
Corporal V. Thompson, 2nd Black Watch, was quickly on the scene to save
the officer, and carried him back, being himself wounded while doing so.
It is pleasant to record that the D.S.O. and D.C.M. were promptly
bestowed.
Colonel Swiney, the Commander of the 1/39th, who himself related to me
the doings of his Corps on this day, a brave and modest gentleman, was
also severely wounded during the morning; but what he did not tell me
was that he remained on for many long and weary hours, till loss of
blood forced him to leave his command. Subadar Kedar Sing Rawat and
other Garhwali officers did very fine work after the British officers
had been killed and wounded.
Further help was needed before the end could be attained, and this came
from the Dehra Dun Brigade, whose G.O.C. placed two companies of the 1st
Seaforths at the disposal of the Garhwal Brigade, and these, together
with two companies of the 3rd Londons and one company of the 1/39th from
Port Arthur, finally succeeded in carrying the trenches.
The Seaforth advance was brilliantly seconded by the 3rd Londons and a
company of the 39th, who carried out a frontal attack with the bayonet
in a most dashing style, but of course with heavy loss. The 3rd Londons,
especially in this their first fight, literally covered themselves with
honour, and I never heard their name mentioned thereafter except in
terms of the highest praise by all ranks of the Army Corps.
The 1st Seaforths carried out its advance, as it always did, with the
_élan_ and thoroughness of the pick of the “Old Contemptibles.” Captain
Wicks, once on my Staff in India, was wounded, one of the very best
all-round men I ever knew. Captain R. Murray was wounded and died the
next day. 2nd Lieut. C. H. Kirkaldy was killed, and in this short attack
the battalion suffered over seventy casualties. Three N.C.O.’s and men
received the D.C.M.
I recall a story of the Seaforths during one of my expeditions on the
North-West frontiers of India in 1908. A brigade, after carrying out
some punitive measures on a large village, was retiring over an open
plain scored by deep nullahs. The Seaforths formed the rearguard. The
Afridis, as usual, were following and firing whenever opportunity
offered, but on such ground they had no chance and were kept at a
respectful distance. After the expedition was over the chiefs all came
in to hear the terms of our Government. I asked an old warrior why they
had not followed us more closely on that day. His answer was: “We did
not like those Highlanders; they looked as if they wanted us to come on,
and we had no intention of obliging them.” He was right; the Seaforths
moved deliberately throughout as if they were spoiling for a fight. It
was on this same day that my gallant friend Major Hon. Forbes Sempill,
their C.O., was killed, and the battalion would have given a good deal
to have had its revenge.
The assault of the 3rd Londons was, as I have already said, a “most
dashing” one. Officers and men vied with one another to be first into
the German trenches. Wherever they all came from I cannot say, but
blessed indeed is the city that can pour forth such men at the call of
their country. 170 casualties marked their share in the battle. Captain
Moore received the Military Cross, and a few N.C.O.’s were awarded the
D.C.M.
The result of all these operations was that the gap in our advance was
closed, and many wounded Germans surrendered.
The 1/39th Garhwalis paid dearly on this day. By the time they had
reached the objective assigned to them in the assault the battalion had
been severely mauled, and its subsequent losses brought its total
casualties to 330 out of a strength which did not exceed 600 all told.
Every British officer was either killed or wounded before the fighting
at Neuve Chapelle ended.
Captain J. Taylor, I.M.S., in medical charge of the battalion, was
awarded the D.S.O. on Colonel Swiney’s special recommendation for
gallant conduct and devotion to duty.
During the attack of the Garhwal Brigade the Dehra Dun Brigade had moved
up in close support. At 10.45 A.M. the Jalandar Brigade also was ordered
to move to Richebourg St. Vaast, and later, at 2.30 P.M., the Sirhind
Brigade was ordered to Vieille Chapelle and La Couture.
By 11 A.M. the Dehra Dun Brigade (less 1st Seaforths, detailed to assist
the 1/39th Garhwalis’ advance) was ready to issue from the trenches
along the La Bassée road and to advance to the attack of the Bois du
Biez. Since, however, at that hour the enemy was still holding out in
the trenches between the Leicesters and the 1/39th Garhwalis (who were
isolated) this attack was postponed. The delay was most unfortunate, as
had it been carried out on the heels of the first assault, great results
might have been achieved.
As will be seen later, even as it was the Bois du Biez might have fallen
to us, but the inability of the British Brigade of the Eighth Division,
on our left, to advance prevented it, and on this and the following days
for the same cause an advance into the Bois du Biez became an
impossibility, as our left flank was entirely enfiladed.
As I stood that morning expectantly by the telephone, awaiting the first
news of the results of our assault, it seemed as if ages were rolling
by, but when the news came, it was one of the moments I often live
again. “Practically all our first objectives captured.” “Hurrah!” I
shouted, and with such energy that, as the French women at the back of
the house afterwards told me, they thought a bomb had burst inside. And
so it had! The bomb was the birth of a new life for India; the story
that the cables would bear throughout the world, viz. that the Indians,
led by British officers, could drive Germans from their own deliberately
selected entrenchments. That the men who had fought against us from
Seringapatam to Assaye, at Moodkee and Chillianwala, at Delhi, Lucknow,
and Tirah, all classes, creeds, and clans, had banded together under the
Union Jack, and trusting in the inviolable word of England’s King and
the proven valour of their white leaders, had inaugurated a new era in
the history of Hindustan.
At 3.15 P.M. orders were received from the First Army to push on to the
Bois du Biez, and instructions were issued for the Dehra Dun Brigade to
advance, supported by two battalions of the Jalandar Brigade (the 1st
Manchesters and 47th Sikhs), which had now come under the orders of the
Meerut Division. The deployment for attack along the road running
south-west from Neuve Chapelle was not completed until 4.30 P.M., and it
was nearly dark by the time the troops reached the line of the river
Layes. By 6.30 P.M. a portion of the Brigade had reached the western
edge of the wood, guided in the pitch darkness by a burning house on its
extreme north-west corner.
The leading companies of the 2nd Gurkhas under Major Watt and Captain
Dallas Smith crossed the road, occupied some houses, and commenced to
dig in at the edge of the wood. Major H. Nicolay was killed during this
operation. A portion of the 9th Gurkhas on the left of the 2nd Gurkhas
also reached the wood. In this advance both battalions moved with the
greatest steadiness under rifle and machine-gun fire from both flanks,
but although suffering casualties, had soon placed portable bridges
across the Layes river and reached the farthest limit attained during
the battle. Subadar Mehar Sing Khattri, 9th Gurkhas, was awarded the
I.O.M. for his daring leading, and Major Watt was gazetted a D.S.O. Of
the conduct of the 4th Seaforths, who were in support of the Gurkhas,
General Jacob wrote: “The 4th Seaforths (Territorials) showed itself to
be the equal of any Regular Regiment.”
The Germans, realising the position, now made a special effort to turn
our left flank, but the 9th Gurkhas were equally determined that the
attempt should fail, and Lieut. Murray, with a machine-gun, very
opportunely stopped the movement. He received the Military Cross for his
gallant conduct on this and subsequent days.
At 8.7 P.M., 10th March, Jacob, after a consultation with his Battalion
Commanders, decided to withdraw from the wood to the line of the Layes.
This operation was rendered necessary by the fact that the British
Brigade on our left was unable to make any further advance beyond the
line of the old British trench, which they had captured earlier in the
day. The left flank of the Dehra Dun Brigade was therefore entirely in
the air and exposed to machine-gun fire, and to have held on to the wood
would only have meant being cut off and adding another long list to the
“missing.”
The First Army Commander considered that Jacob should have held on, but
he was not in a position to judge, and the decision to get back to the
Layes was, in the opinion of all those cognisant of the real state of
affairs, a correct one.
The position was in fact somewhat similar to that of the 8th Gurkhas six
months later at the fight near Mauquissart during the battle of Loos. In
this case the 8th gallantly held on till it was too late to retire, and
paid a terribly heavy toll.
During the move back from the wood the following riflemen of the 2nd
Gurkhas behaved with great courage and received the I.O.M.: Hastobir
Roka, Partiman Gurung, Ujir Sing Gurung, Manjit Gurung, and Jagtia Pun.
At the time the point regarding the position in the wood was much
discussed, and it is only fair to the battalions concerned to say that
they did all they were asked to do. If any man could have remained,
without quite needlessly undue risk, that man was General Jacob. I quote
from his report: “If the Eighth Division had been able to co-operate
with me, I would have been able to maintain myself on the edge of the
wood. As it was I found myself with my left flank enfiladed. The right
flank of the Brigade was also in the air. My information showed me that
the wood was held by the enemy.” He then states that he intended to
continue the advance next morning and had issued his orders for this
advance, but that it was impracticable unless the Brigade on his left
also co-operated.
The situation at 9 P.M., 10th March, was as follows:
MEERUT DIVISION
_Dehra Dun Brigade_ (less 1st Seaforths).—On line of river Layes
south-east of the village of Neuve Chapelle. Both flanks in the air.
_Garhwal Brigade_ (plus 1st Seaforths).—Holding and strengthening a
line parallel to and about 200 yards east of the road running from
Neuve Chapelle to Port Arthur, with the right practically on the La
Bassée road.
_Bareilly Brigade._—In original trenches along the Rue du Bois.
LAHORE DIVISION
_Jalandar Brigade_ (temporarily at the disposal of Meerut
Division).—In and about the Rue des Berceaux and in Neuve Chapelle.
_Sirhind Brigade._—Vieille Chapelle and La Couture.
_Ferozepore Brigade._—Calonne.
The night of 10th March passed without any particular incident, but work
went on incessantly in strengthening all positions gained.
The Garhwal Brigade, divided into three sections, had its left in touch
with the Rifle Brigade on our left, which battalion was, however, some
200 yards farther to the rear. The left section was commanded by
Lieut.-Colonel Ormsby, 2/3rd Gurkhas, a soldier who loved his battalion
but had the great virtue of never concealing any faults of his men, and
from him I often obtained the greatest assistance in matters of
discipline.
Lieut.-Colonel Gordon, 2nd Leicesters, had charge of the centre section,
and where that Corps was stationed there was never any chance for the
enemy.
Lieut.-Colonel Ritchie, 1st Seaforths, commanded the right section,
consisting of his own battalion, the 3rd Londons, and the 1/39th Garhwal
Rifles. Ritchie was a most reliable officer, and in a short report
written on the spot, the Brigadier had added: “I am much indebted to
Colonel Ritchie for the efficient organisation and command of his
section.”
Orders had been issued from First Army at 3.45 P.M. placing one
battalion of the First Corps at our disposal. This battalion was to be
employed in working down the enemy’s trenches, parallel to the Rue du
Bois, starting from near Port Arthur, but for various reasons this order
was cancelled at 12.45 A.M. on the 11th.