The attack of the Dehra Dun Brigade was to have been renewed at 7 A.M.
on the 11th March and all orders had been issued. By 6.30 A.M. the
Jalandar Brigade had commenced to arrive at Neuve Chapelle in support of
Dehra Dun, but there was still no sign of any advance by the British
Brigade on our left.
At 8 A.M. General Jacob himself visited the Rifle Brigade, but was
informed by the C.O. that “he had distinct orders not to attack without
further orders.” The 2/39th Garhwalis, who had been detailed to move to
the right to protect the flank of the Brigade as it advanced, reported
themselves in position, and that the enemy was crowding into the
trenches straight to their front, whilst the houses and edge of the wood
were manned with machine-guns and men.
The 2nd Gurkhas were being enfiladed from their left, and the 9th
Gurkhas facing the Germans at 100 yards with the river between them,
were held up. The mist during the morning made observation very
difficult, and it was not possible to bring artillery fire to bear on
the points whence the attack was being retained.
During the morning of 11th March Jemadar Shibdhoj Mal of the 1/9th
Gurkhas won the Indian Order of Merit for bringing in, with the help of
some of his men, several wounded, under very heavy fire.
By 12 noon on the 11th it was found that the attack of the Dehra Dun
Brigade could not continue under the conditions, and I issued orders for
it to be renewed on the Bois du Biez at 2.15 P.M., with the Jalandar
Brigade in support. Both Brigades got into preparatory formation, but
the same causes prevented an advance. As it gradually became apparent
that nothing further could be done that afternoon, fresh orders were
issued for the relief of the Dehra Dun Brigade and for the attack to be
renewed on 12th; the Sirhind Brigade of the Lahore Division being placed
at the disposal of the Meerut Division for the purpose. This Brigade had
been ordered up at 7.45 A.M. to Richebourg St. Vaast.
The Dehra Dun Brigade eventually moved back after nightfall to the
vicinity of Lestrem, in Army reserve, and the Ferozepore Brigade was
directed on Richebourg, to arrive there on morning of 12th. The First
Army had sent a message saying that the Indian Corps should keep in
touch with Eighth Division, but this had, as already explained, been
done all along, the 9th Gurkhas being in touch with the right of the
Rifle Brigade, which corps was directly behind their left. Some
confusion existed as to the dividing line between them, the two attacks
overlapping, both Brigades having been given two common objectives.
Throughout this day the Dehra Dun Brigade had been subjected to constant
shell-fire and suffered considerably. Whilst this delay was being
caused, some platoons of the 4th Seaforths rose up and doubled forward,
and in doing so had to pass through a heavy machine-gun fire, but
nothing ever dismayed that gallant Corps, which was reported by the
Brigadier as advancing during the battle “with a confidence and
self-reliance that left little to be desired.”
The C.O., Lieut.-Colonel MacFarlane, and the Second in Command, Major
Cuthbert, were both severely wounded. I can see them now as I first saw
them in France: two gallant gentlemen who at once gave me the impression
of being real “cool-headed Scots,” who would enjoy nothing more than a
tough scrap with a good few Boches.
I will revert to the Bareilly Brigade, which, as already narrated, was
holding our original front trenches, and had divided their line into two
sub-sections. Before the opening of the battle, advanced picquets had
been withdrawn and all houses in the Rue du Bois evacuated, in case they
should be shelled by the enemy. The main line of defences had been fully
manned, and Brigade reserves were in position by 4 A.M. on the morning
of 10th March.
Port Arthur was evacuated by the garrison for the period of our obstacle
and wire-cutting bombardment, but rifle and machine-gun fire was
maintained. A German aeroplane which had made an early trip over our
lines had spotted the gathering of troops, and shortly after a rain of
shells was poured into the redoubt, and caused many casualties. The
Leicesters and 1/39th suffered somewhat severely, and the 2nd Black
Watch also had over thirty.
Communication trenches to connect our own line with the captured German
works had been pushed forward, and three companies of the 4th Black
Watch moved up to take over the _points d’appui_ which were being
established. Shortly afterwards this battalion was withdrawn, but it
reads strangely, in the light of after events, that “it was found
difficult to keep proper communication with this unit as it had no
telephone equipment.”
I must digress a moment. “No telephone equipment!” Think of it, those
who later on fought so bravely but under what different conditions. The
Indian battalions at least had their ordinary equipment, though at first
on a very meagre scale, and if we owed nothing else to the parsimony of
the Indian Government in connection with all things militant, we
nevertheless owed them one debt of gratitude, and that was, that perhaps
of all the troops in the field in France during the winter of 1914–15,
the Indian Corps felt least the lack of necessaries, simply because it
never realised that a shortage existed; for when things were at their
very lowest ebb they still were in excess of anything we had been
accustomed to in India, even in our palmiest and most festal Durbar
days.
Before this war I never discussed with Indian officers the policy of the
Government of India in regard to the Army. They knew the position fairly
well, but with an inborn good feeling they seldom ventured to do
anything more than touch casually on what was notoriously the intense
stinginess practised towards the soldiery. If any of those high
dignitaries yclept Members of Council should read anything I write, they
may perhaps feel a passing shame in the thought that whilst they
themselves, to use a slang phrase, always “did themselves well,”
soldiers of all ranks below at any rate that of Major-General were
treated as outcasts in a financial point of view, at all and every large
political or social gathering, at which the civilians lived in luxury,
sometimes casting an eye of patronage on their military “brethren,”
whilst the latter, who had perhaps been undergoing very severe training
at manœuvres, and had only arrived in Durbar camps at the eleventh hour
(in order to make a show in scarlet and gold for the glorification of
the aforesaid civilians), were consigned to some outlying sandhills and
told to shift for themselves: no water supply prepared, no wood at hand
for fires, and no preparations for sanitation.
Yes, I have in my mind some very vivid recollections of many such
scenes, and they are recalled to me by the remembrance of incidents at
Neuve Chapelle. On this occasion the fault lay not with India, but that
it passed almost unnoticed in the Corps was, as I have said, because the
members of that Corps had been bred in an atmosphere of civilian
selfishness so abysmal that they failed to realise they were no longer
in the shiny East, but were actually considered as good as their
fellows, and would be so treated.
During the fighting, 10th to 11th March, the Dehra Dun Brigade sustained
over 570 casualties. General Jacob and Colonel Widdicombe, 1/9th
Gurkhas, were given the C.B., and Major Boileau, 2/2nd Gurkhas, was
promoted to Brevet Lieut.-Colonel.
The attack on 11th March was to have been supported by the Jalandar
Brigade, but, as already described, it could not be carried out, and the
Jalandars in consequence remained out in the preparatory positions they
had assumed for the advance, under a heavy shell and rifle fire. Brigade
Headquarters here had no luck: three different tumbledown houses
selected were shelled in turn, till at last four of the signalling
section were wounded by one projectile which plumped into the room they
were working in.
This Brigade underwent a two days’ fiery ordeal, both in support and in
moving up to Neuve Chapelle. They had been very exposed and subjected to
a ceaseless fire from big and light guns, in addition to machine-guns
and rifles, and nearly 600 casualties resulted. Some of the units became
much disorganised and broken up, but in Brigadier-General Strickland
they fortunately possessed a commander whom no losses could deter. I
remember well his quiet verbal description of the whole incidents, and
his unfaltering faith in his Brigade, happen what might. Included in
this was his own battalion of Manchesters, a model Corps.
At 8.30 P.M., 11th March, the situation was as follows:
MEERUT DIVISION.—At original Report Centre at Vieille Chapelle.
_Dehra Dun Brigade._—Marching back to La Couture.
_Garhwal Brigade._—Holding line gained on the first day.
_Bareilly Brigade._—Holding original line on the Rue du Bois.
LAHORE DIVISION.—Headquarters at La Couture.
_Ferozepore Brigade._—South of Lestrem.
_Jalandar Brigade._—Vicinity of Rue des Berceaux.
_Sirhind Brigade._—In Neuve Chapelle.
During the night Neuve Chapelle was heavily bombarded by the enemy.
The Jalandar Brigade did not long remain in their new situation, as at
midnight they were warned to be in position by 7 A.M. on 12th March, to
carry out a fresh attack in conjunction with the Sirhind Brigade.
Before relating the story of this advance I must tell of a great
counter-attack made by the enemy. About 5.30 A.M. on the morning of 12th
March, as darkness began to give place to light, the Germans launched an
attack, which covered the whole front of the Garhwal Brigade and
partially enveloped its right. Preceded by a heavy shell-fire on Roomes
trench and almost immediately after on the Crescent and Port Arthur, the
massed enemy came on. The 5th and 18th Brigades R.F.A. soon found their
targets, and masses of Germans were literally mown down by their fire
and that of every rifle and machine-gun in the vicinity. The garrison of
the “Orchard” also opened fire. The waves came on until within 100 yards
of our trenches, when they melted away, leaving many hundreds of dead
and more wounded strewing the ground in front of the Brigade. On this
day the Indian troops had a real taste of killing, and a sepoy said to
me, “It was like a hot-weather dust storm in India and looked as if it
must pass over us; but at the very moment of reaching us it was as if a
fierce rain had suddenly extinguished it.”
Captain Lodwick, 2/3rd Gurkhas, the machine-gun officer of the Garhwal
Brigade, was awarded the D.S.O. for personal bravery and the manner in
which he had used his massed guns.
On the right of the 1/39th the Germans tried to work up the trenches and
eventually came into the open; here they again met with a tempest of
fire and were literally wiped out. Lieut. Mankelow, machine-gun
commander of this battalion, was in great measure responsible for their
repulse. He was awarded the Military Cross.
The enemy consisted of various units of the 6th Bavarian Reserve
Division and troops from the XIXth Corps, who had been rushed up from
Roubaix and hastily pushed into the counter-attack. Another attempt made
by them about 9 A.M. was also repulsed.
At 7.15 A.M., 12th March, Captain J. Inglis, 2nd Black Watch, had by a
very smart local attack from the Crescent rushed and captured seventy
prisoners.
During the 11th-12th March, the 2/8th Gurkhas were employed in carrying
ammunition from the Brigade reserve to forward depots in close proximity
to the trenches. General Blackader reported that this duty was admirably
performed under heavy shell-fire. I am glad to record this here, as this
battalion had met with very ill-luck immediately it entered the war zone
in October 1914, and was again in September to go through a thrilling
experience, one which practically destroyed it but has perpetuated its
name.
Another instance of the shortage of war material in those days I can
recall. The 4th Londons, when pushed up on one occasion to replace the
41st Dogras, had to move up into the trenches without telephones or
operators, and communications had to be maintained by orderlies alone.
By 6.10 A.M., 12th March, headquarters of the Jalandar Brigade were
established in Neuve Chapelle, and units gradually arrived there. As
already told, they had suffered very heavy losses, and it speaks well
for these gallant officers and men that, with nearly 600 killed and
wounded out of 2600 actually engaged, and having had to take their
punishment whilst in a semi-passive state themselves, they were ready,
nay eager, for the attack which was now at hand.
The final orders to the Meerut Division had been issued at 3 A.M. on
12th, directing the attack on the Bois du Biez to be resumed at 11 A.M.;
the Jalandar and Sirhind Brigades of the Lahore Division being placed at
the disposal of General Anderson.
It will be readily understood by all soldiers that in a battle of this
nature the mixing up of brigades and their transfer temporarily from one
division to another, was unavoidable. The objective remained almost
always the same; the Divisional Headquarters were more or less fixed,
and the necessity of relieving tired units was imperative, and so long
as the objective had not been obtained it was essential that unity of
command should not be broken. Later in the battle, as will be seen, the
main attack was placed under General Keary’s orders, who by that time
had his whole Division (Lahore) under his own command.
The combined attack of these two Brigades was made under the orders of
Brigadier-General Walker, V.C., Indian Army, then in command of the
Sirhind Brigade. He was an old 4th Gurkha officer, had served his life
with that race of men, and wore the Victoria Cross for conspicuous
gallantry in Somaliland.
The formations ordered were as follows. The attack was to be made on a
two-brigade front, Sirhind on the right, with the 1st Highland Light
Infantry and the 1/4th Gurkhas in front line, and the 1/1st Gurkhas and
15th Sikhs in support. The Jalandar Brigade on the left of the Sirhind
had on its own left the 1st Manchesters, in touch with the 25th Brigade,
8th Division, Fourth Army Corps; next on the right was the 47th Sikhs,
fine fighters always; and on the right of all, the remnants of the
Suffolks and 59th Rifles; leaving no troops to form a Brigade reserve.
The frontage allotted to the Brigade made a total of about 900 yards.
The hour for the attack had been fixed for 11 A.M., but an order from
the First Army postponed it for two hours, on account of the
difficulties of registration due to the misty atmosphere.
Bavarian prisoners of the 16th and 21st Regiments who had surrendered,
stated that the enemy in the Bois du Biez had been strongly reinforced
that morning; however, Germans kept coming in all day and surrendering
in small parties; they stated they had had no food, and looked cold and
hungry.
I several times personally interviewed German prisoners during my year
in France, but I seldom came across the truculent specimens one reads
of; most of those I saw appeared very glad to be on the British side of
the trenches, and of one, at least, after this battle, I have an amusing
story to tell.
About 11 A.M., 12th March, the Brigadier received a report from one of
his battalions, the 4th Suffolks, that this unit then consisted of but
140 rank and file, and at the same time the 59th Rifles reported a total
strength of 125 men. The shortage had been caused largely by the
casualties both battalions had suffered, but also by the fact that many
of the men were wandering about dazed by the intense shell-fire, and
unable to follow their units. Some gradually rejoined, but meantime, as
the hour for the attack was nearing, Strickland was obliged to readjust
his formations, reducing frontage and bringing his reserve battalion,
the 59th Rifles, into the first line, thus dispensing with a Brigade
reserve altogether.
No reserve! and two battalions numbering 270 men between them: the Corps
was often expected to make bricks without straw. This reminds me of a
native of India who once explained to me, that the reason why the old
Mogul emperors used very small bricks for all the monuments round Delhi,
was that they cost less than large ones. Perhaps he was thinking of the
Government of modern India.
At 1 P.M., 12th March, it was reported that the attack of the 25th
British Brigade on our left had progressed 100 yards. Just previously
about a hundred Germans hurried across from their lines and surrendered.
By 2.10 P.M. the Jalandar Brigade was held up, as it found itself in
advance of the British Brigade on its left, and was now under a severe
enfilade and oblique fire from machine-guns and rifles.
Nevertheless, some 200 yards had been gained, but any further advance
became impossible, as the left flank was entirely exposed to a hail of
bullets. The right of the Brigade made slightly more progress, but to no
appreciable extent. In two lines the Manchesters pushed through a heavy
fire and reached our most advanced positions, losing considerably _en
route_.
The 47th Sikhs, next on the right, advanced with their usual stoicism.
Six British officers were wounded in quick succession, but the officers
of this good Khalsa regiment feared nothing; perhaps more caution was
needed (?) but praise be to God, such men are not uncommon in the Indian
Army. Subadar Harnam Singh and Captain A. M. Brown were killed. The
I.O.M. was the award of two gallant men, Sepoy Rur Singh and Havildar
Gajjan Singh. The Subadar was posthumously awarded the Order of British
India.
In the 59th Rifles the C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Eliott-Lockhart, was wounded
whilst moving up to the trenches, and died of his wounds. He had done
his service in that fine corps the Guides, and had only recently got his
new command. He was one of the most refined, gallant, and attractive men
you could meet. In him we lost a tower of strength, and his battalion
deeply felt the blow. Captains P. Hore and T. Reed shared the fate of
their colonel. The first-class Order of Merit (a very rare decoration)
was conferred on Sepoy Zarif Khan. I knew Zarif well.
The 4th Suffolks on the two days 11th and 12th March lost Captain S.
Garrett, Lieut. H. Row, and twenty-six men killed, while four officers
and 174 other ranks were wounded. When I first saw the Territorial
battalions which were sent to the Corps, I wondered how they would get
on with Indians. After their very first fights, wherever they took
place, I ceased to wonder. I then knew very well, for there is no one
the sepoy more quickly likes than a fighting Englishman, and he found
them in plenty.
The attack of the Sirhind Brigade was made with two battalions in front
line, 1/4th Gurkhas and 1st Highland Light Infantry, supported by 15th
Sikhs and 1/1st Gurkhas, the last in reserve. The 4th Liverpools were
held in hand for any special work.
The H.L.I. swept over the open ground, nor stayed their advance until
they were in the German trenches after a sharp bayonet duel, capturing
nearly 200 prisoners. The losses of this battalion at Neuve Chapelle
were very heavy. Of the officers eight were killed, five wounded, and
among other ranks there were 240 casualties. Sergeant-Major A. G. House
and a few N.C.O.’s and men were awarded Distinguished Conduct Medals,
and they were indeed well earned. I mentioned six officers in my
despatch, but was unfortunate in not being able to procure any rewards
to mark their gallantry, although I made every effort to do so. Of these
Captain W. Stewart had already been awarded the D.S.O. at Givenchy in
December 1914.
The 4th Gurkhas did not have full opportunity on this occasion of
showing their mettle, but in the performance of very gallant deeds Major
D. Young was killed, and Rifleman Wazir Sing Burathoki and Jemadar
Gangabir Gurung earned the I.O.M. Captain Collins was awarded the D.S.O.
for conspicuous bravery, when with his company he rushed a German
trench, accounting for a large number of prisoners, besides many killed.
The 1/1st Gurkhas lost their Adjutant, Captain G. S. Kennedy, and
suffered a total of seventy casualties.
In the 15th Sikhs an old comrade of mine, Subadar Gajjan Singh, was
killed.
In writing the story of any action in which one has been in command of a
part of the attacking troops, it is only natural to try and confine
criticism to one’s own restricted front; but in order to explain matters
it is also necessary to refer to those who were co-actors in the drama.
In this battle there is no sort of doubt that the advance of the Indian
Corps, after the initial success in rushing our objectives in Neuve
Chapelle, was severely handicapped by the inability of the Eighth
British Division of the Fourth Corps to make more rapid progress. All I
know is that the most gallant attempts to advance of the Brigade on our
immediate left, after the capture of the ground gained in their first
assault, proved unavailing; and in consequence, for long hours, running
even into days, we were unable to push our advantage.
This is not the opinion of one person, but the verdict of every
Brigadier of the Indian Corps engaged in this part of the battlefield;
explicit reports which I have in my possession give the exact hours in
explanation of my statement.
It was a pity it was so, for had the troops on our left been able to
push on, the First Army might have made a greater success of Neuve
Chapelle than it turned out to be, and it is well to point out that the
Indian Corps, during its year in France, did occasionally carry out its
instructions, but did not always receive the credit in its own Army.
Read the remarks of First Army attached to the Order of the Day issued
by the Commander-in-Chief after Neuve Chapelle, and compare it with
similar Orders of later times. But the Indian Corps had not come from
the Dominions! Did the words “British soldiers” include Indians? I
wonder.
It was different with the Commander-in-Chief, who did us the honour of
specifically mentioning the “Indian Corps” by name in his despatch of
5th April 1915.
The only comment made to me by the First Army Commander regarding the
battle was, that if the Brigadier in front of the Bois du Biez had been
a tactician, he would never have left the wood once he had gained a
footing in it. Perhaps his vast experience since those early days may
make him take a more lenient view of our shortcomings in 1915. In any
case that same Brigadier rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General in
France.
To resume my story. At 4.40 P.M. on the 12th March General Strickland
was informed by Walker that there would be another artillery bombardment
from 5 to 5.15 P.M., at which hour the infantry would again attack.
During this period the O.C. 47th Sikhs reported that his unit then
consisted of but five British and seven Indian officers, and about 130
men “as far as he could ascertain”; whilst the Manchesters reported the
battalion as “very much reduced.”
By 5.45 P.M. on the 12th it was rumoured that the Sirhind Brigade had
reached the Layes river, and it was enjoined on all units that the
attack should be carried out “vigorously,” as the British Brigade on our
left was to assault at the same hour. For various reasons the
bombardment did not take place, in fact, till later, and at 6.5 P.M. the
Jalandar and Sirhind Brigades made their attempt to advance. Meantime,
General Keary, commanding the Lahore Division, had taken over all the
troops of his Division, and issued orders for the capture of the Bois du
Biez “at all costs.” Still no advance was made on our left, and after
covering a very short distance the forward rush was again stayed by the
deadly oblique and machine-gun fire from the German trenches. Casualties
were accumulating, and the wearied troops were getting done up after
their trials of two whole days without rest.
However, I received fresh orders at 7.20 P.M. for an attack by the whole
of the Lahore Division. Without going into details which would interest
no one, these orders were found to be impracticable during the hours of
darkness, over unknown ground, and I most reluctantly felt obliged to
hold them in abeyance. I feel sure the G.O.C. First Army when he found
what the situation really was, agreed with my decision. At 10 P.M.
orders were received to suspend further forward operations and to
consolidate our gains. The Jalandar Brigade was withdrawn to the Rue de
Berceaux, where it had already once moved back the previous day.
The battle was fought and won. We had not done all that was hoped for;
we had not captured the Aubers Ridge (nor did we succeed in doing so
until three years later), but as far as the Corps was concerned we had
shown that Indians will face any enemy.
How changed are some of our notions regarding the enemy, and how
different became our orders as the war went on, from those which
prevailed before Neuve Chapelle. I recall how, after a conference held
before the battle, I left with the impression that Army Headquarters
would shortly, in all probability, be advanced some miles. Places were
named; the _moral_ of the Germans was placed at a low ebb; and perhaps
to encourage all ranks, perhaps because the higher authorities really
believed it, the general impression left on me was that the Hun was on
the eve of receiving a blow so severe that it would be with difficulty
he could recover. Second Ypres, Loos, the Somme, Verdun, Amiens, and
other mighty battles had not then been fought.
As an indication I will quote only one message received by me during the
battle. It was issued at 3.6 P.M., 12th March, by the First Army:
Information indicates that enemy in our front are much demoralised.
Fourth Corps and Indian Corps must push forward at once regardless of
the enemy’s fire, using reserves as may be required. Fifth Cavalry
Brigade has been ordered on Piètre. Second Cavalry Division has been
ordered up.
How often was that splendid cavalry “ordered up”; but although always
ready to do or die, the day was still far distant when the sabre and
lance could be used to destroy the “much demoralised” enemy.
Neuve Chapelle was the biggest battle up to that time in which Indians,
as a body, had ever taken a share. It marks the beginning of a new era
in the history of that wondrous land; it proved the solidarity of our
Empire in the East; it opened new fields to the peoples of Hindustan,
and it was a living proof of the genius of our race to weld into one
Imperial whole, people so diverse in colour, race, and creed. Are we on
the eve of undoing our own great work? Are we, in our desire to grant
equality to all and every race, rushing towards the goal of an ultimate
dissolution? In the words of the African proverb I would say,
Softly, softly, catchee monkey.
The total casualties of the British Army in the battle amounted to
nearly 13,000 officers and men; of which the Indian Corps sustained a
loss in killed of forty-one British and twenty-two Indian officers, 364
British and 408 Indian other ranks. Wounded, ninety-one British and
thirty-six Indian officers, 1461 British and 1495 Indian soldiers;
whilst the total reported as “Missing” numbered 315. When the actual
numbers engaged are calculated it will be seen that the Indian Corps
bore its full share of the losses.
The net result of the operations was to advance the line held by the
Indian Corps by about 1000 yards at its northern extremity, and to
straighten out the dangerous salient known as Port Arthur—a point which
had always been a considerable source of anxiety to the various Corps
who had been responsible for holding it. The losses inflicted on the
enemy by the Indian Corps amounted to five machine-guns captured, twelve
officers and 617 men prisoners. Their losses in dead amounted to 2000 on
the front captured by the Indian Corps. After the battle I viewed the
ground to our immediate front, from a ruined tower near the trenches,
and in places it was thick with bodies.
Every Brigadier engaged brought prominently to notice the excellent
spirit that had prevailed throughout all ranks, and it was a great
pleasure to me to visit every unit, combatant and non-combatant, that
had in any degree shared in winning our first Indian offensive victory.
The delight of the men was very visible, and the toils and hardships of
the long weary winter were soon effaced.
Of the units engaged, some I have not so far in this book
particularised. The 41st Dogras was serving its maiden campaign. Raised
at Jalandar in 1900, by an old brother officer of my own, as the 41st
(Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, the battalion received its present
title in 1903. It was a class regiment, and suffered very heavy losses
only eight weeks after Neuve Chapelle.
The 107th Pioneers was originally raised in 1788, as the 4th Battalion
of Bombay Sepoys. In 1900 it was turned into a Pioneer Corps and became
the 107th Pioneers in 1903. Mysore, Seringapatam, and other famous names
record its war services.
The 9th Gurkhas was raised in 1817. Till 1894 it bore the name of the
Bengal Infantry in one shape or form, but in that year became Gurkha
Rifles, and its present designation dates from 1904, in which year also
a second battalion was added. Amongst their battle honours are Bhurtpore
and Sobraon.
The 15th Lancers (Cureton’s Multanis), the Lahore Divisional Cavalry
regiment, was raised in 1858 by Captain Cureton and was then known as
the “Multani Regiment of Cavalry,” and received its present designation
in 1903. It was composed of four squadrons of Musalmans from the Derajat
and Cis-Indus. The regiment fought in Afghanistan 1878–80.
During the fighting many acts of distinguished bravery besides those I
have described could be recorded had I space, but a few must be
mentioned. Naik Khan Zaman of the Lahore Divisional Signalling Company
was brought to notice for his extraordinary coolness in repairing
telephone lines under very heavy fire. Lieutenant Steven, 4th Black
Watch, most gallantly headed a successful charge on a German redoubt. He
received the Military Cross. Corporal W. Gurdon of the Calcutta
Volunteer Rifles proved himself a very gallant soldier. He was doing
duty with the Meerut Signal Company and was awarded the D.C.M. Private
Duffy of the Highland Light Infantry brought in several wounded under a
very galling fire, and received the D.C.M.
The Fourth Army Corps, which with the Indian Corps carried out the
attack on Neuve Chapelle, was then commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Henry
Rawlinson. Of all the Corps Commanders I knew him best, and working with
him was a real pleasure. He is so straight and fearless, two unsurpassed
qualities in a great leader, and such he has indeed proved himself in
the Great War.
[Illustration: NEUVE CHAPELLE 10^{th} TO 13^{th} MARCH 1915.]