On the 27th February 1915 I arrived in England on ten days’ leave, my
first from France, and as I had not been home for over two years it was
a pleasant prospect. I did not, however, get my full leave, as I was
recalled on the fourth day, but I could well afford to give it up for it
was in order to receive the decoration of “Grand Officer of the Legion
of Honour” which the French Government had conferred on me. It was very
good of Sir John French to recommend me for this, which I prize as one
of my highest rewards. My four days were very busy ones, and I had the
honour of being summoned to see His Majesty, who made inquiries
regarding his Indian soldiers, and sent them a most encouraging message.
Lord Crewe, then Secretary of State for India, asked my views on many
matters connected with Indians, amongst others the question of granting
them commissions on the same footing as British officers. I have already
written of this. I had the pleasure of a long talk with Mr. Lloyd George
whom I met for the first time. When I left I had, like vast numbers of
his countrymen, no other opinion than that I had conversed with one of
the greatest living men. His assurance that all would be well, and his
magnetic manner, sent me away more convinced than ever that he would be
the man who would eventually guide us to a victorious peace.
Next day I dined with Neil Primrose, who had been serving on my Staff in
France, and there met Colonel Winston Churchill and many others
prominent in politics. Much of the talk turned on the Indians, and all
were most enthusiastic in their admiration of their loyalty. What,
however, struck me most was the note of something approaching pity more
than one of them manifested at their hard lot. Now there were no grounds
for such; the men were, of course, undergoing great hardships, but so
were others, and if the ordeal was harder for them to bear it was only
the luck of war. What I and many others of the seniors in the Corps felt
was that people in England believed that the Indians could not stand the
severe climate. They, like other mortals, were open to criticism, but
did not ask for pity and resented it, and I was always very careful to
keep my lips closed as to this phase of the situation when the native
officers and men asked me (as they always did) what I had heard about
them in England.
The following day I lunched with Winston Churchill, and later had him as
my guest for half a day in France. I had first made his acquaintance
after my return from Ashanti in 1901, and every time I have met him
since I like him better. There is something very taking in his
character; he always appears to be quite sure that whatever he is doing
is the best that can be done, and I think he is generally right. I have
met many others who claim to be like this, but are in reality anything
but sure. It is a treat to talk to him, and if I were a young man with
life before me I would sooner serve with him than almost any one I know.
On the 2nd March I dined with Lord Kitchener; the only other person
present was Colonel FitzGerald and he left immediately dinner was
finished. I had the benefit of a very long talk with the great
Field-Marshal, and some of this I will relate for it is of great
interest. The chief point he dealt with was the shortage of shells and
the necessity for economising ammunition in the field. He urged me to
let it be quietly known to my senior officers that it was criminal to
waste a single round; he said all would be well in due course but at
that time he could not possibly supply the wants. He particularly
pointed out that what we called “registering” and what he called
“shooting into the mist” must be limited to absolute necessity alone. I
was much impressed by this insistence on economy of gun power, and his
clear assurance that we might find ourselves without shells unless this
warning was observed. He made no mystery of it, and as I was leaving
urged me once more to do all in my power to keep down the expenditure
both of ammunition and money. “Each individual can help in his own
degree,” were his parting words. I knew, of course, we were very short
of shells, but after what he said I was more than surprised long
afterwards when I read that he had not let this be understood.
Another subject which Lord Kitchener discussed was the question of
compulsory service. He was entirely in favour of it, but said his great
difficulty lay in the fact that he knew he would never get a fair
chance. “They will exempt hundreds of thousands in what are called
indispensable positions and will only leave me the chaff.” I suggested
that if he once told the country he must have the men, would he not get
them; and he replied, “You little know all I shall have to fight
against. I do.” Judging by all the wrangling that went on before
compulsory service became a reality, his words sound prophetic now.
Regarding the Indians he spoke very fully. He did not say it in so many
words, but his meaning was quite clear, and that was that whoever might
try and get rid of them, he meant to keep an Indian Corps in France in
name at least, if not in numbers, but that he would entirely relieve
units as they dwindled, and replace them from Egypt and elsewhere. At a
subsequent interview I had with him four months later he put this very
forcibly and gave his reasons, as I shall tell.
The months of January and February had passed in what were called quiet
conditions, and during the first days of March we were full of
preparations for the coming battle before Neuve Chapelle. Previous to
this battle, in conjunction with all my Generals and my own Staff, I had
very carefully considered the question of man-power in the Indian Corps,
and I feel justified in stating at some length the conclusions we had
arrived at, and the many battles royal that they raised. I am convinced
I was right, but I was accused by the highest authorities at the time of
a lack of appreciation of the situation as it existed.
In order to explain myself I will not only state what actually occurred
early in March but will carry on the story to its final solution in
August 1915, when, to my surprise, I was summoned to England only to be
told that certain propositions were before the Government, which I found
if adopted would entirely coincide with my own made five months
previously, and would in point of time be exactly what I had
recommended. I am writing from my diary kept up daily and make no error
in details. To those who were associated with me in the task of
commanding the Corps it will be as plain as it was at that time, that it
indeed needed patience of a degree with which nature had perhaps
insufficiently endowed me, but which perforce I had to adopt; and a
spirit that refused to be subdued even when opposed to the highest
military and political authorities in the field and at home. Even if I
am considered egoistic, I must again say that I had one great advantage,
and that was I knew what I was talking about.
Armageddon has shown up the impossibility of attempting to rule the East
under purely Western methods, and has plainly manifested the need of
first acquiring some knowledge of what you are undertaking, before you
rush things to a hopeless standstill.
The many causes I have stated had by March 1915 told so severely on the
Corps that on 8th March I summoned a Conference of all my Generals and
their senior Staff officers as well as my own Army Corps Staff. On this
occasion the whole question was gone into and discussed, and it was
unanimously agreed that I should represent to the Commander-in-Chief
that it would be wise to relieve the Indian battalions then in France as
soon as this could be conveniently done, but in any case before another
winter set in. I knew that our reinforcements would dwindle, and later
on I had it on the authority of the Government of India itself that
there might be a considerable break in our receiving any at all.
Accordingly I made my recommendations, and at the same time told the
Brigadiers to inform their C.O.’s that I had done so. It was the eve of
Neuve Chapelle, and from many trusted Indian officers I learned that
they had been much impressed by the news that they were anxious to join
in the coming battle and ready to remain on, but they plainly saw they
would lose their good repute unless reinforcements were sent in large
numbers, and one officer put it, “These miserable reservists were sent
away from India so as not to frighten the young recruits.” The truth was
that every officer and man saw clearly that the Corps would soon dwindle
to a mere handful of men, and they also knew that, under the system then
prevailing, it was impossible to maintain their numbers at anything
approaching efficient fighting strength.
All kinds of remedies were already being adopted, and occasionally
complete companies from other battalions in India were sent to us and
these were generally good. Of course I knew the times were pressing, the
need great, and the arrangements for reinforcing us _nil_, but that is
just why I felt convinced the game would very soon not be worth the
candle. We had held our trenches for five months, we were on the eve of
a big battle in which I was sure the Indians would give a good account
of themselves, and our Territorial and New Armies were lining up and
would, by the time we could be relieved, have arrived in thousands, with
more ready to follow. Then, again, it was plain that the Indians would
be sadly needed in other parts of the world, where they would prove
invaluable and be nearer their own natural bases. Moreover, in France
there could be no chance of leave or relaxation for them under any
circumstances, whereas in Egypt they could quickly be re-formed,
strengthened, and again made fit for service under more congenial skies,
and at the same time others who had not then had the good fortune to see
fighting would welcome the opportunity.
It was also an important consideration they should be given to
understand that the transfer was in no way intended as a slight on them,
but was being carried out on sound principles and with the object of
making the best use of them in the many theatres of war. A hint that
this was the intention of Government would have been welcomed by all
ranks, whereas to do it suddenly for any cause would rankle in their
minds and never be understood. Everything pointed to the wisdom of
allowing them to leave France as soon as the gap they had filled was
completed by Britishers. This was my conviction and is stronger to-day
than it even then was.
However that may be, I had indeed fallen on a hornet’s nest. G.H.Q., of
course, had other expert advisers to assist them in their decisions, but
experience gained in India was somewhat discounted when the game was
being played for the first time in Europe, and only those who were
actually playing it could give practical advice.
My papers teem with suggestions for remedying the shortage of men in the
Indian battalions. Over and over again did I adjust the Brigades, mix up
units, reduce the strength of Brigades, and use every device to still
retain the name of the Corps as “The Indian Corps.” In June I received
an order by telegram to proceed to London where I again saw Lord
Kitchener. On this occasion he said to me, “I will never allow the
Indian Corps to lose its designation; it would be a disgrace to India.”
Time soothes all things, and as the months passed the battles of Second
Ypres, April 1915, and Festubert, 15th May, were fought, and in both the
Indian Divisions largely shared. I had made up my mind that the same
Army Corps was to remain in France. I had no illusion as to my own
future; after 8th June I saw it must come to an end, how or when I could
not guess, but I believed I had the confidence of Lord Kitchener and
that was my bulwark. To my surprise, in August I was summoned to London
and told to go straight to see him before seeing several other
notabilities. He informed me that the Cabinet had decided to send the
whole Indian Corps to Egypt and elsewhere and that he did not wish it.
He asked me my opinion and I reiterated my previous recommendation, but
added that if he could replace our old units by fresh ones and complete
our numbers the Indians could certainly remain. He again impressed on me
the necessity of keeping an Indian Corps in Europe; said that India
would never forgive us if we removed the Corps as a body, and asked me
to state my opinions to all whom I interviewed.
Now if there was one man for whom I would do anything in my capacity as
Corps Commander that man was Lord Kitchener. In any circumstances,
moreover, it was better to stick to a decision once made than to go on
vacillating and thus disconcerting and needlessly annoying brave men,
who cannot understand being made the shuttlecock of politicians. I will
not go into further details. I had several other interviews during my
short stay. I was once more in the Maelstrom of Scylla and Charybdis and
went back impressed by two things: one was that if the Indian Corps
remained it would be at Lord Kitchener’s wish alone; and if it left it
would be for reasons other than those I had gathered at my various
interviews. However events followed rapidly; Mesopotamia, Palestine, and
East Africa swallowed up the two Divisions, but not before my own tenure
of command had abruptly terminated.