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=Yesterday and To-Day in India.= By SIDNEY LAMAN BLANCHARD. Post 8vo.

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CONTENTS.—Outward Bound.—The Old Times and the New.—Domestic

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A SELECTION FROM MESSRS. ALLEN’S CATALOGUE OF BOOKS IN THE EASTERN

LANGUAGES, &c.

HINDUSTANI, HINDI, &c.

[_Dr. Forbes’s Works are used as Class Books in the Colleges and

Schools in India._]

Forbes’s Hindustani-English Dictionary in the Persian Character, with

the Hindi words in Nagari also; and an English Hindustani Dictionary

in the English Character; both in one volume. By DUNCAN FORBES, LL.D.

Royal 8vo. 42s.

Forbes’s Hindustani Grammar, with Specimens of Writing in the Persian

and Nagari Characters, Reading Lessons, and Vocabulary. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Forbes’s Hindustani Manual, containing a Compendious Grammar, Exercises

for Translation, Dialogues, and Vocabulary, in the Roman Character. New

Edition, entirely revised. By J. T. PLATTS. 18mo. 3s. 6d.

Forbes’s Bagh o Bahar, in the Persian Character, with a complete

Vocabulary. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d.

Forbes’s Bagh o Bahar in English, with Explanatory Notes, illustrative

of Eastern Character. 8vo. 8s.

Eastwick (Edward B.) The Bagh-o-Bahar—literally translated into

English, with copious explanatory notes. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Forbes’s Tota Kahani; or, “Tales of a Parrot,” in the Persian

Character, with a complete Vocabulary. Royal 8vo. 8s.

Small’s (Rev. G.) Tota Kahani; or, “Tales of a Parrot.” Translated into

English. 8vo. 8s.

Forbes’s Baital Pachisi; or, “Twenty-five Tales of a Demon,” in the

Nagari Character, with a complete Vocabulary. Royal 8vo. 9s.

Platts’ J. T., Baital Pachisi; translated into English. 8vo. 8s.

Forbes’s Ikhwanu s Safa; or, “Brothers of Purity,” in the Persian

Character. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d.

[_For the higher standard for military officers’ examinations._]

Platts’ Ikhwanu S Safa; translated into English. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Platts’ Grammar of the Urdu or Hindustani-Language. 8vo. 12s.

Forbes’s Oriental Penmanship; a Guide to Writing Hindustani in the

Persian Character. 4to. 8s.

Forbes’s Hindustani-English and English-Hindustani Dictionary, in the

English Character. Royal 8vo. 36s.

Forbes’s Smaller Dictionary, Hindustani and English, in the English

Character. 12s.

Forbes’s Bagh o Bahar, with Vocaby., English Character. 5s.

Singhasan Battisi. Translated into Hindi from the Sanscrit. A New

Edition. Revised, Corrected, and Accompanied with Copious Notes. By

SYED ABDOOLAH. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d.

Robertson’s Hindustani Vocabulary. 3s. 6d.

Eastwick’s Prem Sagur. 4to. 30s.

Akhlaki Hindi, translated into Urdu, with an Introduction and Notes. By

SYED ABDOOLAH. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d.

Sakuntala. Translated into Hindi from the Sanskrit, by FREDERIC

PINCOTT. 4to. 12s. 6d.

SANSCRIT.

Haughton’s Sanscrit and Bengali Dictionary, in the Bengali Character,

with Index, serving as a reversed dictionary. 4to. 30s.

Williams’s English-Sanscrit Dictionary. 4to., cloth. £3. 3s.

Williams’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary. 4to. £4 14s. 6d.

Wilkin’s (Sir Charles) Sanscrit Grammar. 4to. 15s.

Williams’s (Monier) Sanscrit Grammar. 8vo. 15s.

Williams’s (Monier) Sanscrit Manual; to which is added, a Vocabulary,

by A. E. GOUGH. 18mo. 7s. 6d.

Gough’s (A. E.) Key to the Exercises in Williams’s Sanscrit Manual.

18mo. 4s.

Williams’s (Monier) Sakuntala, with Literal English Translation of all

the Metrical Passages, Schemes of the Metres, and copious Critical and

Explanatory Notes. Royal 8vo. 21s.

Williams’s (Monier) Sakuntala. Translated into English Prose and Verse.

Fourth Edition. 8s.

Williams’s (Monier) Vikramorvasi. The Text. 8vo. 5s.

Cowell’s (E. B.) Translation of the Vikramorvasi. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Thompson’s (J. C.) Bhagavat Gita. Sanscrit Text. 5s.

Haughton’s Menu, with English Translation. 2 vols. 4to. 24s.

Johnson’s Hitopadesa, with Vocabulary. 15s.

Hitopadesa, Sanscrit, with Bengali and English Trans. 10s. 6d.

Johnson’s Hitopadesa, English Translation of the. 4to. 5s.

Wilson’s Megha Duta, with Translation into English Verse, Notes,

Illustrations, and a Vocabulary. Royal 8vo. 6s.

PERSIAN.

Richardson’s Persian, Arabic, and English Dictionary. Edition of 1852.

By F. JOHNSON. 4to. £4.

Forbes’s Persian Grammar, Reading Lessons, and Vocabulary. Royal 8vo.

12s. 6d.

Ibraheem’s Persian Grammar, Dialogues, &c. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d.

Gulistan. Carefully collated with the original MS., with a full

Vocabulary. By JOHN PLATTS, late Inspector of Schools, Central

Provinces, India. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d.

Gulistan. Translated from a revised Text, with Copious Notes. By JOHN

PLATTS. 8vo. 12s. 6d.

Ouseley’s Anwari Soheili. 4to. 42s.

Wollaston’s (Arthur N.) Translation of the Anwari Soheili. Royal 8vo.

£2 2s.

Keene’s (Rev. H. G.) First Book of The Anwari Soheili. Persian Text.

8vo. 5s.

Ouseley’s (Col.) Akhlaki Mushini. Persian Text. 8vo. 5s.

Keene’s (Rev. H. G.) Akhlaki Mushini. Translated into English. 8vo. 3s.

6d.

A Manual of the Persian Language, based on “Forbes’s Hindustani

Manual.” By H. WILBERFORCE CLARKE, Captain R.E. 18mo. 7s. 6d.

A Translation of Robinson Crusoe into the Persian Language. Roman

Character. Edited by T. W. H. TOLBORT, Bengal Civil Service. (_In the

press_).

BENGALI.

Haughton’s Bengali, Sanscrit, and English Dictionary, adapted for

Students in either language; to which is added an Index, serving as a

reversed dictionary. 4to. 30s.

Forbes’s Bengali Grammar, with Phrases and dialogues. Royal 8vo. 12s.

6d.

Forbes’s Bengali Reader, with a Translation and Vocabulary. Royal 8vo.

12s. 6d.

Nabo Nari. 12mo. 7s.

ARABIC.

Richardson’s Arabic, Persian and English Dictionary. Edition of 1852.

By F. JOHNSON. 4to., cloth. £4.

Forbes’s Arabic Grammar, intended more especially for the use of young

men preparing for the East India Civil Service, and also for the use of

self instructing students in general. Royal 8vo., cloth. 18s.

Palmer’s Arabic Grammar 8vo. 18s.

Forbes’s Arabic Reading Lessons, consisting of Easy Extracts from the

best Authors, with Vocabulary. Royal 8vo., cloth. 15s.

Beresford Arabic Syntax. Royal 8vo. 6s.

Matthew’s Translation of the Mishkāt-ul-Masābih. 2 vols. in 1. By the

REV. T. P. HUGHES, Missionary to the Afghans at Peshawur. (In the

Press).

TELOOGOO.

Brown’s Dictionary, reversed; with a Dictionary of the Mixed Dialects

used in Teloogoo. 3 vols. in 2, royal 8vo. £5.

Campbell’s Dictionary. Royal 8vo. 30s.

Brown’s Reader. 8vo. 2 vols. 14s.

Brown’s Dialogues, Teloogoo and English. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

Pancha Tantra. 8s.

Percival’s English-Teloogoo Dictionary. 10s. 6d.

TAMIL.

Rottler’s Dictionary, Tamil and English. 4to. 42s.

Babington’s Grammar (High Dialect). 4to. 12s.

Percival’s Tamil Dictionary. 2 vols. 10s. 6d.

GUZRATTEE.

Mavor’s Spelling, Guzrattee and English. 7s, 6d.

Shapuaji Edalji’s Dictionary, Guzrattee and English. 21s.

MAHRATTA.

Molesworth’s Dictionary, Mahratta and English. 4to. 42s.

Molesworth’s Dictionary, English and Mahratta. 4to. 42s.

Stevenson’s Grammar. 8vo., cloth. 17s. 6d.

Esop’s Fables. 12mo. 2s. 6d.

Fifth Reading Book. 7s.

MALAY.

Marsden’s Dictionary. 4to. £3. 3s.

Marsden’s Grammar. 4to. £1 1s.

CHINESE.

Morrison’s Dictionary. 6 vols. 4to. £10.

Marshman’s—Clavis Sinica, a Chinese Grammar. 4to. £2 2s.

Morrison’s View of China, for Philological purposes; containing a

Sketch of Chinese Chronology, Geography, Government, Religion and

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] About the same time Lord Auckland wrote to Sir W. Macnaghten: “I

would have you share in the feeling which is growing strongly upon

me that the maintenance of the position, which we have attempted to

establish in Afghanistan, is no longer to be looked to. It will be for

you and for this government to consider in what manner all that belongs

to India may be most immediately and most honourably withdrawn from the

country.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[2] _MS. Correspondence._

[3] Mr. George Clerk at that time entertained very similar opinions

regarding the danger of sending more regiments away from the

North-Western Provinces. “Whatever may take place,” he wrote to

Lord Auckland on the 25th of November, “in regard to Caubul, and in

whatever degree our troops there may be reinforced, we should not

weaken this frontier. Any reduction of our military strength causes

some presumption or audacity in our native allies generally.” And on

the 29th he wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western

Provinces (Mr. Robertson): “I really do not see how our muster-roll

is to stand this draining of more troops—and probably many more,

west—whilst reinforcements are also proceeding eastward. Undoubtedly

the remainder will be inadequate to the due maintenance of our high

supremacy in India.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] There was, unquestionably,

a choice of evils at this time. But Sir Jasper Nicolls and Mr. George

Clerk differed in opinion as to which was the greater of the two.

[4] On the 27th of November he wrote to Lord Auckland from Mynpoorie:

“If it be decided that we are to support Shah Soojah under all

circumstances and difficulties, I must entreat your Lordship’s early

attention to the means of effecting this object, which may be a more

arduous undertaking than the occupation of the country in 1839.” And

again, in the same letter: “There is a dark, perhaps a random hint,

in one of these letters that the rebellion is instigated by the royal

family at Caubul. If so, I would advise the early abandonment of them,

their country, and their cause.” On the 28th he again wrote: “I really

would not advise our forcing either him or ourselves upon a nation

so distant, and in all respects so dissimilar both to our Sepoys and

ourselves, at an expense so decidedly ruinous.” And on the 30th, in

still more emphatic language, he said: “My opinion regarding a renewal

of our efforts to support Shah Soojah on his throne, and to establish a

permanent influence in Afghanistan, is without change or modification.

That we have no base of operations has been always clear; but now, were

we to march a reinforcement on the best horses, we could not be sure of

carrying the Khybur Pass, and if snow has fallen, the road to Caubul

would still be closed.”—[_MS. Correspondence of Sir J. Nicolls._]

[5] The 53rd and 64th Native Infantry.

[6] The 60th Native Infantry.

[7] Two days before, Captain (afterwards Sir Henry) Lawrence, Assistant

to Mr. Clerk, whose later career justified the high expectations

which were formed of him during his connexion with the North-Western

Agency, on his way out after a dacoity party, met the intelligence of

the Caubul outbreak, and immediately after forwarding it on to Mr.

Clerk went to Colonel Wild, to urge him to push on the 60th and 64th

Regiments, and to warn the Light Infantry Battalion and some details of

the 10th Cavalry, for service beyond the frontier.—[_Capt. Lawrence to

Mr. George Clerk: Nov. 14, 1841. MS. Records._]

[8] Mr. Clerk sent forward the 30th, which was Wild’s regiment, in

order that the colonel might take command of the brigade, General Boyd

having thrown out a hint that he was a more efficient officer than the

colonels of the other regiments.

[9] These artillerymen were on their way to Afghanistan to relieve the

company then in the country, serving with Abbott’s battery.

[10] Two nine-pounders and a howitzer.

[11] _Sir Jasper Nicolls to Government: January 24th, 1842._

[12] _Sir Jasper Nicolls to Government: January 23rd._ See also

private journal, “_Thanesur_, January 23rd.—Mr. C. joined us on the

ground. He is anxiously in favour of our sending forward more troops,

in view, I believe, to our undertaking the re-conquest of Caubul. To

this I decidedly object. We have neither funds nor men available,

without in the latter instance leaving India so bare as to risk its

safety.”—[_MS. Records._]

[13] _Supreme Government to Sir Jasper Nicolls: January 31,

1842._—[_Published Papers_.]

[14] _Papers relating to Military Operations in Afghanistan._ Lord

Auckland’s private letters were still more decided on these points.

“I should be glad,” he wrote to Sir Jasper Nicolls on the 10th of

February, “to hear that Sir R. Sale has been able to withdraw his

brigade from a position so perilous as to make me regard its possible

fate with extreme anxiety.” Two days afterwards he wrote to the same

correspondent: “I have from the beginning believed a second conquest

of Caubul with our present means to be absolutely impossible.”—[_MS.

Correspondence_.]

[15] It was, moreover, of great importance to accelerate the movement,

because it was believed that any day might witness the appearance of

the Barukzye horsemen on the road between Peshawur and Jellalabad.

“Time is most precious to us,” wrote Mackeson to Clerk; “a few days

more may see a party of the Barukzye troops in the plains of Ningrahar,

and then thousands will be required where hundreds now would do the

work.”

[16] Shere Singh despatched urgent purwannahs both to General Avitabile

and to Raee Kishen Chund, calling upon them to aid the British by every

means in their power. “You are a general of the Khalsa Government,” he

wrote to the former, “and noted for the confidence placed in you. This

is the time to serve the two allied powers; and you will, therefore,

unreservedly devote your attention to discharge your trust, so as to

please the two friendly governments, and to earn such a name that the

services performed shall be known in London.” To the latter he wrote,

“Orders have been issued to Koonwur Pertab Chund to march to Peshawur,

and the zeal of the Durbar will at once make itself manifest to Mr.

Clerk (as the sun suddenly shining forth from beneath a cloud) when

he is informed of all by the letters of Captain Mackeson.”—[_MS.

Records._] When Mackeson received from George Clerk a copy of the

purwannah to Avitabile he was in conference at that officer’s quarters

with the Sikh general, Mehtab Singh, and the commandants of all the

Sikh battalions. “I read out this purwannah,” says Mackeson, “but

was somewhat confounded to find at its conclusion that the Durbar

limited the operations of General Avitabile and the Sikh troops to

Futtehgurh—their own frontier post. It was fortunate that, before the

arrival of this _purwannah_, the commandants of the auxiliary Mussulman

troops had left the room, having previously engaged to march as far

as Ali-Musjid in support of our troops, and to move on again with

General Pollock’s brigade.”—[_Mackeson to Clerk: January, 1842. MS.

Records._] The passages referred to in the _purwannah_ might bear this

construction, but it is doubtful whether this was their intent. George

Clerk, in a marginal note to Mackeson’s letter, says: “The _purwannah_

did not limit it; but directed them to move on to Futtehgurh and act in

concert and by Captain Mackeson’s advice.”—[_MS. Records._]

[17] A cousin of Captain Mackeson. Holding no recognised place in the

army either of the Crown or the Company, his services were neither

fairly estimated nor adequately rewarded. But there were few more

gallant episodes in the war than his defence of Ali-Musjid. Mr.

Mackeson had been long disabled by extreme sickness, but was carried

about in a litter to superintend the defence.

[18] See _Mackeson to Government: January 27, 1842_. _Published papers._

[19] “The _Nujeebs_ struck their tents when we did, and moved back to

Peshawar, and the Sikhs made no demonstration, though twice we wrote to

General Avitabile during the night; and just before daylight I told him

they were not moving, and again at sunrise.”—[_Captain H. M. Lawrence

to Mr. Clerk: 19th January, 1842._] Lawrence adds: “I impute no blame

to General Avitabile for the man not telling us what we might expect

from his miscreant troops. His own intentions are kind and friendly to

our government and ourselves.” The misconduct of the Sikh troops was

rendered more atrocious, and our own mortification more bitter, by the

circumstance that Mackeson had advanced a lakh and a half of rupees

to the Sikh authorities, for the payment of the men whose services we

hoped to retain.

[20] “We have been disgracefully beaten back,” wrote Captain Lawrence

to Mr. Clerk. “Both our large guns broke down; one was on an elephant,

but was taken down to put together when the other failed, but its

carriage breaking too, the Sepoys lost all heart, and I grieve to say

that I could not get men to bring one off, though I tried for an hour,

and at last, finding we were only expending ammunition, we left it in

their hands, but it was broken completely down and spiked.”—[_MS.

Records._]

[21] “I confess,” wrote Captain Lawrence to Mr. Clerk, “that I never

heard any very heavy fire, or saw the enemy in any numbers. I was not

with the advance, and therefore may be mistaken; but was afterwards

within a hundred yards of the advanced gun for an hour or more, and

could see into the pass, but observed no breast-work, and but very few

of the enemy; certainly not above a thousand, and not half that number

of fire-arms.”—[_MS. Records._]

[22] The two detachments met at the mouth of the pass.

[23] _Mr. G. Clerk to Sir Jasper Nicolls: November 17, 1841._ I have

taken this passage from a MS. copy. It is quoted, however, in the Blue

Book, but with the usual fatality attending such compilations, there

are two errors in these few lines. Mr. Clerk is made to say that he had

called upon “the commanding officer of _Lahore_ and Ferozepore” to send

forward the regiments.

[24] It is not very clear, however, that Captain Lawrence actually

made any written requisition to the commanding officer at Ferozepore

(Colonel Wild) for the despatch of artillery details. He wrote a

private letter to Mr. Clerk, saying: “If four guns can be made

effective, they also shall be got ready.” In this letter he says that

he was about to call upon Colonel Wild; and he may orally have broached

the subject of the guns; but in his official letter, written on the

same day (November 14), there is no mention of artillery, although he

suggests the expediency of sending forward the 10th Cavalry without

delay.

[25] “Though I have not yet heard that any artillery is ordered up

to the frontier, I would beg leave to recommend, in anticipation of

the speedy arrival of reinforcements so necessary on the Sutlej, that

artillery should move forward from hence. I shall transmit a copy of

this letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Wild, in case he may think proper

to halt one of the regiments under his command, until the arrival of

such artillery as you consider can best be spared from Loodhianah or

Ferozepore; but the latter is, I believe, for want of horses, incapable

of moving; and this leaves an insufficiency for the due protection of

this border, during an unsettled state of parties at Lahore.”—[_Mr.

George Clerk to Major-General Boyd: November 27th, 1841. MS. Records._]

[26] “Having had the honour to receive from the acting Adjutant-General

a statement of the reinforcements which his Excellency the

Commander-in-Chief has ordered to be put in motion for the purpose of

forcing the Khybur, I beg leave to state to you that I would not now

wish that the 3rd troop, 2nd Brigade of Horse Artillery, should move

from the British frontier on my requisition, though I do not propose,

in consequence of this information, to request Lieutenant-Colonel

Rich to recall the order for the intended march hence of that

troop to-morrow in progress to Ferozepore.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to

Major-General Boyd: Loodhianah, December 2nd, 1841. MS. Records._]

[27] “Having heard that it is possible the guns which his Excellency

the Commander-in-Chief has directed to move across the frontier may not

be ready to move so immediately as the passage across the Sutlej of

your troop may be effected, I deem it to be advisable, adverting to the

emergency of the occasion, to recommend that you nevertheless proceed

on, in anticipation of the sanction of his Excellency to your doing

so, by orders of the Major-General commanding the division issued at

my request, provided that you can do so without crippling the means of

marching requisite for the artillery, which his Excellency has directed

to be put in motion for the frontier, and which should follow as

expeditiously as possible.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to Captain Alexander,

commanding 3rd troop, 2nd Brigade of Horse Artillery: December 4th,

1841. MS. Records._]

[28] “I do myself the honour to inform your Excellency that, in

consequence of my receipt of your Excellency’s letter of the

2nd instant, prohibiting the advance of horse artillery as a

reinforcement to proceed to Afghanistan, I have apprised Captain

Alexander, commanding the 3rd troop, 2nd brigade, now on its way to

Ferozepore, and Major Huish, commanding that station, that they are to

consider the request made by me, for the advance of that troop to be

withdrawn.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to Sir Jasper Nicolls: December 7th,

1841._]

[29] See Appendix.

[30] On the 29th of January, Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote to General

Pollock: “My dear General,—In some late letters Captain Lawrence has

expressed himself in a very decided manner touching the disheartened

and unguarded language held by officers belonging to the corps which

were beaten back in the Khybur Pass on the 19th instant. God forbid

that they should feel any panic, or even alarm; but if you observe it,

I rely on your addressing yourself to them in a very forcible manner,

and shaming them out of such very unbecoming, unmilitary, and dangerous

conduct. Their duty is obedience—prompt and energetic obedience—such

as executes without expression of doubt. If more has been said than the

case seemed to require, take no notice of this further than to warn

Captain L., if you think proper to do so.—Always yours faithfully, J.

NICOLLS.”

[_MS. Correspondence._]

[31] _Sir Jasper Nicolls to Lord Hill: Simlah, September 2nd,

1842._—[_MS. Correspondence._] In this letter, which will be

found entire in the Appendix, the Commander-in-Chief says: “When

Major-General Pollock arrived at Peshawur he found 1800 men of the

four regiments in hospital; the Sepoys declaring that they would not

again advance through the Khybur Pass; the Sikh troops spreading

alarm, and in all ways encouraging and screening their desertion,

which was considerable. It was well that a cautious, cool officer of

the Company’s army should have to deal with them in such a temper, 363

miles from our frontier. General Pollock managed them extremely well.”

[32] An intelligent and trustworthy officer of the 26th Native

Infantry, whose letter is now before me, writes: “In less than

forty-eight hours after our (the 9th Foot and 26th Native Infantry)

arrival, active emissaries, particularly from the 53rd and 60th

Regiments, were in our camp, using every effort to induce our men to

desert, and to refuse to enter the Khybur; and had actually gone the

length of sending Brahmins with the Gunga Jul to swear them in not

to advance; and did not desist until orders were given to seize the

first man caught in the lines under suspicious circumstances. This

information was several times communicated to me by old Sepoys and

non-commissioned officers, and the fact of the attempts made to seduce

the men from their allegiance is too well known to the officers of the

26th to admit of a moment’s doubt.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[33] _MS. Correspondence._ I need not say that these statements would

not be made except upon the testimony of officers who heard the

speeches to which I have referred.

[34] See Appendix.

[35] This and other letters of Shah Soojah will be found in the

Appendix. Macgregor’s answer to the private letter received on the 21st

was to the effect, that they had no fear of Mahomed Akbar, to whom,

please God, they would give a warm reception, if he ventured to attack

them.

[36] Colonel Dennie, commanding the 13th L.I.; Colonel Monteith,

commanding the 35th; Colonel Oldfield, commanding the Cavalry; Captain

Abbott, the Company’s Artillery; Captain Backhouse, the Shah’s

Artillery; and Captain George Broadfoot, the Sappers and Miners.

[37] The late Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.

[38] _Memorandum by Major George Broadfoot._—“Captain Macgregor

vehemently denied that we had ever received hostages at Tezeen. I

mentioned several things to show that we had; but, as he persisted in

his denial, I said that I had been under some extraordinary delusion,

and that, of course, any argument founded on it must fall to the

ground, but I still held hostages utterly worthless while the enemy

had our hostages and prisoners in their hands.” Again, Broadfoot says:

“Hostages were announced in General Sale’s orders, and reported to

General Elphinstone. I was blamed for opposing one of them in a fight

at the time; and afterwards met him in charge of Captain Mackenzie on

his mission to General Pollock, when he reminded me of having nearly

killed him when he was a hostage. There are many grounds for still

thinking that I was right.” _Both_ were, to a certain extent, right.

The men to whom Broadfoot referred were not actually hostages. They

were Afghan agents, sent into the British camp to re-establish our

thannahs, &c. So Macgregor describes them in his despatch. Macnaghten,

referring to them, in a letter dated October 27, says: “I explained to

his Majesty that these people were not sent as hostages, but merely to

assist our troops and be the medium of friendly communication.”

[39] It need scarcely be said that this account of the councils at

Jellalabad, which appears for the first time in the present edition,

is based upon what I conceive to be undeniable evidence, which has

come into my possession since the book was first published. No one

who peruses it should, for a moment, lose sight of the fact that the

responsibility was with Sale and Macgregor, who had to regard the

position in which they were placed with respect to Shah Soojah’s and

to their own government, both of which were, at that time, believed to

be anxious for the evacuation of Jellalabad. In circumstances similar

to those which surrounded Broadfoot and Backhouse, I do not doubt that

Sale and Macgregor would have counselled the same course of resistance.

We err greatly when we judge by the same standard men in supreme and

men in subordinate command. Apart even from the consideration of the

paralysing effects of a sense of responsibility, it is obvious that

what is a man’s duty in one case, is not his duty in another. There

were no braver spirits in the garrison than those of Sale and Macgregor.

[40] The requisition crossed a letter from Brigadier Anquetel,

censuring Broadfoot for taking with him an unnecessary supply of tools.

The requisition was complied with, and the censure withdrawn.

[41] The work of the Jellalabad garrison was not confined to the

strengthening of their own defences. The destruction of all the

adjoining cover for the enemy was no small part of their labour. With

reference to these works, General Sale says, in his official report:

“Generally I may state that they consisted in the destruction of an

immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition

of forts and old walls, filling up ravines and destroying gardens,

and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet

high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions,

retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork,

and excavating a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width

round the whole of the walls. The place was thus secure against the

attacks of any Asiatic army not provided with siege artillery.” This

admirable report was written by Havelock, as were all Sale’s Jellalabad

despatches.

[42] “But it pleased Providence, on the 19th of February, to remove

in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake

shook down all our parapets, built up with so much labour, injured

several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses,

demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the

rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Caubul gate

to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but is a sober

fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little

more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks

of this terrific phenomenon of nature.”—[_Report of General Sale:

Jellalabad, April 16, 1842._] “On the 19th of February, an earthquake,

which nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of the

parapets, the Caubul gate with two adjoining bastions, and a part of

the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions were also nearly

destroyed, whilst several large breaches were made in the curtain, and

the Peshawur side, eighty feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch

being filled, and the descent easy. Thus in one moment the labours of

three months were in a great measure destroyed.”—[_Report of Captain

Broadfoot, Garrison Engineer._]

[43] See Appendix.

[44] “The officers of the garrison,” wrote Macgregor to Pollock on

the 21st of February, “came upon rations to-day. They are willing to

brave all difficulties and dangers, now that they feel certain that

government will resent the insult offered to our national honour by

these rascally Afghans.” And again, on the same day, writing to the

same correspondent, he said: “I am glad to find that government intend

to uphold the national honour by resenting the insults which have been

offered to it by the rascally Afghans; and I feel assured that this

garrison will continue to perform the part which has devolved upon

them at this crisis with credit to themselves and advantage to the

state. General Sale intends to publish in to-day’s garrison orders the

proclamation of the Indian Government, a copy of which you kindly sent

to me by Torabaz’s Sowars.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[45] The rescue of the Jellalabad garrison had in reality been the

primary—indeed, the sole acknowledged reason of the movement in

advance; but the Supreme Government, whilst by no means unmindful of

the claims of the Jellalabad garrison, long omitted to communicate with

Sale or Macgregor—to convey to them directly any instructions for

their guidance, or any expressions of approbation of their conduct.

[46] The correspondence which passed between Jellalabad and Peshawur at

this time unfolds the real nature of the respective positions of the

two generals. It will be found in the Appendix.

[47] _General Pollock to General Sale: March 27th, 1842. MS.

Correspondence._ Pollock did not exaggerate the backwardness of the

native regiments, or the importance of associating with them a larger

body of Europeans. Even the new corps which were moving up from the

provinces, and which the General believed to be “without a taint,”

were openly expressing their disinclination to advance. Shere Singh

mentioned this to Mr. Clerk. “Yesterday, early,” wrote the latter,

“the Maharajah, Rajah Dhyan Singh, and myself, being together for

a short time, quite unattended, they told me that Commandant Cheyt

Singh, who had come into Lahore for a day from Colonel Bolton’s camp,

to escort which from Ferozepore to Peshawur the Durbar had appointed

him, had mentioned that our Sepoys in that brigade did not like going

to the westward, and were sometimes grouped eight or ten together,

expressing their dissatisfaction; but that on the other hand the

Europeans (her Majesty’s 31st and artillery) were much delighted at the

prospect of fighting with the Afghans. The Maharajah added, ‘If you

could send two or three more European corps, they would penetrate the

Khybur or anywhere else so successfully against the Afghans, that the

Hindoos, who are now alarmed, would, after one action, all take heart

again.’”—[_Mr. Clerk to Government: Lahore, March 19th, 1842. MS.

Records._]

[48] Shere Singh was at this time a confirmed drunkard, and he thought

more of potations than of politics. When the first intelligence of our

Caubul disasters reached him, Mr. Clerk wrote: “The effect which these

events in Caubul will have on Lahore, will, I imagine, be as follows.

The Rajahs will inwardly rejoice thereat; the Khalsa will be vexed at

any Mahomedan exultation; and Shere Singh will congratulate himself

on the prospect this may open to him of drawing closer his relations

with us as a means of procuring good champagne.”—[_Mr. Clerk to Mr.

Robertson: Nov. 29th, 1841. MS. Records._]

[49] Their design was to arrest the progress of Gholab Singh’s force;

and some of our officers thought that the Rajah ought to have attacked

them. But Mr. Clerk was of opinion that his forbearance was a proof of

his friendship towards us. “In the same manner,” he wrote, “that the

reluctance of Rajah Gholab Sing to have recourse to measures of open

hostility towards the Mussulman battalions, when arrayed against him

across the Attock, was, I believe, in a great measure caused by his

apprehension of embarrassing the British brigade coming up and near

at hand, should he be found making of the high road an unseemly and

uncertain field of battle for the coercion of mutinous battalions, so I

conceive that he may very naturally feel disinclined hastily to pledge

himself to take as far as Jellalabad, or into any arduous service,

troops which for fourteen months past have generally assumed a tone of

defiance of the control of their appointed officers.”—[_Mr. George

Clerk to Government: February 13th, 1842. MS. Records._]

[50] Gholab Singh was employed in the Hazareh country in operations

against Poyndah Khan and a rebel force when he was summoned to proceed

to Peshawur. At this time, too, the Jummoo Rajah had an army in Ladakh

and Thibet engaged in active warfare with the Chinese, and it was

sustaining serious reverses at the time that Gholab Singh was called

upon to aid the British Government. “What with this reverse on the

eastern frontier of his possessions,” wrote Mr. Clerk to government,

“and the apprehension that in his absence his lately victorious

troops will lose ground in the Hazareh country, Rajah Gholab Singh

evinces little ardour to co-operate with the Sikh troops at Peshawur.

It is also probable that the Jummoo Rajah would rather contemplate

the difficulties of the British Government in that quarter, than be

instrumental in removing them.”—[_Mr. Clerk to Government: January 20,

1842._]

[51] See Appendix.

[52] “Lawrence is making out a digest of our conversation with the

Rajah yesterday. I should say that not even with Sultan Mahomed Khan

would the Sikhs hold Jellalabad with any advantage to themselves. If

we would bribe them with offers of territory, it must be in some other

direction. Would Shikarpoor do better!”—[_Mackeson to Clerk: Feb. 21,

1842. MS. Records._]

[53] “My course, I think, is clear—to get what I can out of the Sikhs,

and, if to my mind that is anything like substantial co-operation

in advancing or even securing support in the rear, to accept it for

General Pollock if he will use it, and officially to recommend to him

that, if it proves serviceable, he should, contrary to the orders of

government, continue to maintain Jellalabad, whilst awaiting further

orders from government on the subject.”—[_Mr. Clerk to Mr. Robertson:

Umritsur, March 4, 1842._]

[54] This was merely an echo of what Gholab Singh had been recommending

by letter to the Maharajah.

[55] There were more than enough, the minister said, to beat all

Afghanistan on the plains, but it was a different thing to convey

supplies through the defiles of the Khybur.

[56] “The aversion which the Sikhs have to penetrate the Khybur is

not more inconvenient to the British Government than it is alarming

to the Maharajah; for their resentment against the government, which

has imposed upon them the arduous duty, will be enhanced, should they

suffer from the swords of the Afghans. Nor can any thinking person in

this Durbar fail to apprehend that by proceeding to invade Afghanistan

in support of its ally, whilst deprived by the circumstances of the

alliance of all latitude of securing parties among the Afghans, such as

it would create and turn to advantage in aid of its encroachments, if

acting on its own account, it may be raising a hornet’s nest which may

involve the Khalsa in long wars for the preservation of its territories

on the Indus.”—[_Mr. George Clerk to Government: Lahore, April 5th,

1842. MS. Records._]

[57] The same year (1857) witnessed the death of Gholab Singh, and,

alas! of Henry Lawrence, one of the best of men.

[58] See Appendix.

[59] Pollock had reduced his own baggage-cattle to one camel and two

mules.

[60] “My detention here has been most annoying. We have had heavy rain,

and the Sikhs begged that I would wait till to-morrow. I have consented

to this, because the troops of both powers advancing simultaneously for

the same purpose ought to produce a good effect. I should have been

better pleased had Mahomed Akbar not sent the last reinforcement—save

the guns, which I hope we shall be able to give a good account of. The

pluck of the Sepoys is doubtful; but I hope when we carry the mouth

of the pass, they will feel confidence. The 9th are most anxious to

be let loose, and—please God! by to-morrow, we shall be well into

the pass... I still much regret that I have not the 31st; but after

Sir Robert Sale’s letter received some time back, I consider that

he has put it out of my power to wait longer, although I am quite

sure that the addition of 900 Europeans would have operated very

favorably for the prisoners. I, however, hope that you will be able,

through the Ghilzyes, to pave the way for their release when we reach

you.”—[_General Pollock to Captain Macgregor: Jumrood, April 3rd,

1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[61] The negotiations, indeed, failed altogether. The chiefs had given

hostages, and were to have received 50,000 rupees, for the safe conduct

of the force from Jumrood to Dhaka—one moiety to be paid in advance,

and the other on the army reaching the latter place. “They were to

clear the pass for us to Dhaka, and make arrangements for guarding it

afterwards. They engaged to remove all hostile Afreedis from the pass,

as far as Ali-Musjid, and then we were to repel any troops of Mahomed

Akbar Khan sent to oppose us.”—[_Captain Mackeson to General Pollock:

April 2, 1842. MS. Records._] Mackeson adds: “Yesterday the Afreedis

in our pay proposed to seize on the mouth of the pass; but as the

Sikhs were not ready to move on, and they promised to be ready on the

following day, the movement was postponed. To-day the Afreedis of our

party have pleaded that Mahomed Akbar’s troops have come down to the

mouth of the pass, and that they can no longer perform their agreement.

They offer to return the money that has been given to them.”—[_MS.

Records._]

[62] Four horse-artillery guns, two guns of the mountain-train, and

three foot-artillery guns.

[63] See Appendix.

[64] See Appendix, vol. ii.

[65] “The Sepoys behaved nobly,” wrote General Pollock, on the

day after the action. “They merely required a trial in which they

should find that they were not sacrificed. There were, however, many

desertions before we advanced. Now they are in the highest spirits,

and have a thorough contempt for the enemy. This is a great point

gained. You are aware that Mahomed Akbar sent a party, about 800,

with one or two guns, to oppose us; but they thought better of it,

and abandoned the fort of Ali-Musjid this morning. I have accordingly

taken possession. The Sikhs are encamped near us, and are much more

respectful and civil since our operations of yesterday.”—[_MS.

Correspondence._]

[66] Pollock saw nothing of the Sikhs till the afternoon of the 6th.

They doubted his success, and held discreetly back until they found

that he had made good his way to Ali-Musjid.

[67] “I have been given to understand that, on the advance of our army

to Jellalabad, the Sikh authorities at Peshawur, without intimating

their intentions to Captain Lawrence, and without reference to

any engagements between the Afreedis and ourselves, entered into

arrangements with the Afreedis to purchase, for the sum of 6000 rupees

or 4000 rupees, the security of that portion of the pass they have

engaged to protect for a period of two months. The parties they agreed

to pay were Abdul Rahman Khan, Kooki Kheil, Mahomed Jalim Sipa, and

Alia Dad Malik, Din Kheil, son of Khan Bahadur, all of whom were at

that time hostile to us, although Abdul Rahman Khan has since come

over. There could have been no objection to the Sikhs entering into

an arrangement with the Afreedis; but it should have been done in

communication with us, and without imparting to the Afreedis the term

for which the Sikhs were bound to hold the pass.”—[_Mackeson to

Pollock: May 6, 1842. MS. Records._]

[68] “I regret to have to report that the Sikh regiments posted at

Ali-Musjid, yesterday left their post, and returned to Jumrood; on

their way throwing the loads off some of our mules and bullocks that

they met, and employing the animals to carry their own baggage.

My letter to Koonwur Pertab Singh, and his answer, are herewith

enclosed. You will observe that the whole Sikh regiment was actually

recalled by order, without notice being given to me, or without

their being relieved, although four regiments were within a mile of

them.”—[_Captain Lawrence to Mr. Clerk: May 9, 1849. MS. Records._]

“I waited on Koonwur Pertab Singh yesterday. I spoke strongly on the

outrage of the morning, and on the necessity of a severe example

being made of the offenders.... I repeatedly returned to the subject,

declaring the necessity of punishing the offenders, whom, I said, there

could be no difficulty in recognising, as they were for hours in the

heart of the town, and had been seen by General Avitabile himself, as

well as by Captains Lane and Johnstone, and by many of the Commissariat

agents. It was not denied that the men could be recognised; but I much

fear that no punishment will be inflicted on them.”—[_Lawrence to

Pollock: May 8, 1849. MS. Records._]

[69] Mr. Gleig says that the band of the 13th went out to play them in;

and that the relieving force marched the two or three last miles to the

tune, “Oh, but ye’ve been lang o’ coming.”

[70] Mr. Gleig says: “On the 2nd, Sir Robert Sale proceeded to

distribute the captured sheep among the corps and departments

composing his garrison. The 25th declined to accept the boon. They

sent a deputation to the General, which respectfully acquainted him

that animal food was less necessary for them than for Europeans, and

besought him to give their portion of the booty to their gallant

comrades of the 13th. No wonder that between these two corps there

should have sprung up a romantic friendship, which, though the

accidents of service have parted them, probably for ever, neither is

likely to forget, at all events as a tradition, while they keep their

places respectively in the armies of the Queen and of the East India

Company.”

[71] _MS. Correspondence._

[72] _General Sale’s Public Despatch._

[73] Mr. Gleig gives the following account of Dennie’s end: “With

undaunted resolution the 13th rushed at the fort, Colonel Dennie nobly

leading; and finding the aperture sufficiently large to admit of it,

they rushed through the outer wall—only to find themselves exposed

to a murderous fire from the untouched defences of the inner keep.

Here Dennie received, just as he approached the breach, his mortal

wound. A ball entered the side, passing through the sword-belt; and

he bent forward upon his horse. Lieutenant and Adjutant (now Captain)

Wood instantly rode up to him, and expressed a hope that the hurt was

not serious. But it was more than serious; it was fatal. A couple

of orderlies, by Captain Wood’s direction, turned his horse’s head

homewards, and leading it by the bridle, endeavoured to guide him to

the town. But he never reached it alive. He died with the sound of

battle in his ears, hoping, but not living to be assured, that it would

end triumphantly.”

[74] See Appendix.

[75] A letter to General Pollock, written on the 18th of March, says:

“Affairs here are as unsettled as they can possibly be. The day before

yesterday the commandant of the Newab’s regiment was bribed by his

Majesty to desert to the Balla Hissar with all his soldiers. The

Newab demanded their restoration, but was refused. Yesterday, after

much dispute, his Majesty sent a message to our host, saying that the

commandant should be sent to Ameen-oollah’s house if we were delivered

over to the same authority. Fortunately for us the Newab refused to

give us up. This proposition was made through jealousy of the Newab,

and with the view to conciliate Ameen-oollah, by whom it had been

represented to his Majesty that we were supplying our host with money,

&c. Ameen-oollah had been for many days trying to get possession of

our persons with a view to try and extort money from us. His Majesty’s

proposition nearly cost us our lives.... Since the desertion of the

commandant the whole city has been in an uproar. The shops are all

closed, and every man has armed himself. The feeling against us is

reawakened. The gates of the Balla Hissar are half shut; and each chief

has collected his followers. Three or four thousand men have flocked

round our host. The Barukzye’s and Suddozye’s party-spirit bids fair

to be renewed with all its rancour.... The King has, however, now but

few friends, and his parsimony is as a proverb; and his suspected

connexion with us adds to his unpopularity.... The Naib has written

for the Kohistanees to accompany him on a crusade, and unless some

accommodation is made with his Majesty, the Balla Hissar will in all

probability be the first point of attack. It will be a popular cause,

as there are hopes of plunder.”

[76] See Appendix for translations of Shah Soojah’s letters.

[77] On the 2nd of April Mohun Lal wrote from Caubul: “A letter has

been received by Mahomed Akbar Khan, which was carried by Ameen-oollah

Khan and read by the Shah. It also passed under my sight through

the kindness of the Persian chiefs. It contained that Mahomed Akbar

has been always writing to send the troops to assist him against

Jellalabad, but nobody has heard him. Now he has been informed by

his trusty men at Peshawur that five battalions of the English have

reached Hussna Abdal, and when they join the forces at Peshawur they,

in company with the battalions of the Najeebs of the Sikhs, will force

their march through Khaibur, though he has sent Sultan Jan with a few

hundred men to reinforce the people of Khaibur; but if the English

enter and pass the Khaibur once, no one shall be able to oppose

them. Therefore the chiefs, as well as the Shah, at Caubul, should

not quarrel for the distribution of the money and ranks, but exert

themselves to come down immediately to Jellalabad and reduce it before

the English should pass Khaibur; otherwise he (Akbar) is risking and

ending his life for the faith of Mahomed, and will continue to exert

himself as long as he lives.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[78] “The Shah, I am told, has made up his mind again to proceed

in person to Jellalabad; but I scarcely believe that he will ever

march, and if he does he will either be murdered or made blind by the

Barukzyes.”—[_Letter of Mohun Lal: MS. Correspondence._]

[79] The murderer was a godson of the Shah, who had shown great

personal kindness to the youth. It is said that his evil passions had

been greatly excited, not only by the disappointment spoken of in the

text, but by the fact also that when he went to remonstrate, the King

caused the purdah or curtain of his Durbar tent to be let down, and so

denied ingress to the remonstrant.

[80] Mohun Lal, in a letter to Captain Mackeson, Caubul, April 10,

1842, says: “Prince Futteh Jung was taken prisoner in the fort of

Mahomed Khan, Bayat, and at even released by force of Ameen-oollah and

the Populzyes. As soon as he reached the palace he opened the treasury

hoarded up with great pains by his father, the King. He spends a good

deal of it, to employ the people and make his party strong.... It is

estimated to be twenty lakhs in cash and a considerable quantity of

jewels.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[81] I utterly repudiate the cant which fixes the stigma of ingratitude

on the character of Shah Soojah. No one knew better than the Shah that

we had carried him back to Caubul, and kept him there not for his

purposes but for our own.

[82] _MS. Correspondence._

[83] Macgregor was of opinion that after the departure of the British

from Caubul, the conduct of the Shah indicated a friendly feeling

towards us. “The Shah is, I believe, acting in a friendly manner

towards us,” he wrote to General Pollock; “and will, if he has the

power, prevent the march of an army from Caubul. He knows that whilst

Dost Mahomed is in our possession we can make use of him as a powerful

weapon against his Majesty, and this is the great hold we have upon his

friendship.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[84] _MS. Correspondence._

[85] _MS. Memorandum._

[86] _MS. Correspondence._

[87] _Major Rawlinson to Government: March 6, 1842._ This important

despatch was published by Lord Ellenborough in the Government Gazette,

and subsequently appeared in the Blue Book. To an unpublished letter,

written by Major Rawlinson to Mr. Colvin, on the 13th of December, I am

indebted for the information contained in the earlier portion of this

chapter.

[88] He was connected with our postal establishment.

[89] The letter to General Nott was worded as follows:

“Assistant Quarter-Master-General’s Office, Head Quarters, Caubul,

November 3, 1841.

“SIR,—I have the honour, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone,

commanding in Afghanistan, to request that you will immediately direct

the whole of the troops under orders to return to Hindostan from

Candahar to march upon Caubul instead of Shikarpore, excepting any that

shall have got beyond the Khojuck Pass, and that you will instruct the

officers who may command to use the utmost practicable expedition.

You are requested to attach a troop of his Majesty the Shah’s Horse

Artillery to the above force, and likewise half the first regiment of

cavalry.

“I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

“J. PATON, Capt. A. Q. M. G.

“To Major-General Nott, Commanding at Candahar.”

This letter was sent, under a flying seal, through Colonel Palmer,

at Ghuznee, and Major Leech, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye—Palmer sent it on

with this indorsement: “The country getting more disturbed every day.

Burnett came in yesterday after being attacked on the road. He was

pursued, when he fortunately fell in with some horsemen I had sent

after the fifty-two camels from Candahar, which have been taken off. No

tidings of Crawford.” Leech wrote:—

“Khelat, Nov. 12, 1841.

“The whole of the Ghilzye prisoners escaped from Caubul, and the family

of Husan Khan from this neighbourhood. Khaker Khan and Munsoor Khan in

custody, and all the other families expected by this evening to be safe

at this place.——What are we to say to the appearance _en route_ to

Candahar at this crisis of Saifadeen, nephew of Atta Mahomed Khan. He

was here on the evening of the 8th.”

Macnaghten’s letter was addressed to Rawlinson, and it ran in the

following words:—

“Caubul, Nov. 3, 1842.

“MY DEAR RAWLINSON,—We have a very serious insurrection in the city

just now, and from the elements of which it is composed, I apprehend

much disturbance in the surrounding country for some time to come.

It would be only prudent, therefore, that the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd,

with a troop of horse artillery and some cavalry, should come here

immediately. General Nott will be written to officially in this

respect. We have been shelling the city all day, but apparently with

little effect. I hope there will be no difficulty about supplies. Your

writing to Leech will obviate this. On second thoughts I shall forward

this letter under a flying seal through Palmer and Leech. Unless you

send up this reinforcement there will be a probability of our supplies

being cut off.

“W. H. MACNAGHTEN.”

A line from Captain Lawrence to Colonel Palmer requested him to send on

the letter express through Leech. Leech forwarded it with a few words

to Rawlinson, saying, “What think you of a Prince and some treasure

with the brigade? Please reinforce this post (Khelat-i-Ghilzye) by

160, or if possible, 200 men—infantry.” Another indorsement stated,

“There are nearly 100 maunds of atta here, belonging to the Bengal

commissariat, disposable for the brigade proceeding towards Caubul. We

have six months supply for the garrison.

“H. MILNE.”

—[_MS. Records._]

[90] It does not appear that the conduct of Lieutenant Crawford was,

in any way, open to censure. He was the bearer, as has been shown,

of written instructions, authorising him to destroy the prisoners if

they attempted to escape, but there seems to have been no connivance

between them and the party who attacked the escort. Crawford himself

says, in a narrative which he drew up, and which was subsequently

published in a Bombay paper: “One prisoner was cut down by a horseman

of the enemy (plainly showing there was no collusion between them),

two others rolled over in a ditch, where, with their horse a top of

them, and their legs chained under his belly, I left them; indeed, I

now found it was impossible I could ever get my charge into Ghuznee

alive, and I had only to decide on putting them to death or setting

them at liberty. My instructions would have justified my pursuing

the former course, but the poor wretches had clearly made no attempt

to escape; they were in no way answerable for the attack made on my

party, as was evident from one of their number falling by the sword of

our adversaries; and I conceived then, and do now conceive, that in

letting these men go with their lives, I was not only acting according

to the strict letter of my instructions, but that justice and humanity

required I should not slay them in cold blood. Had I put them to death,

then Shumshoodeen or Mahomed Akbar would have been equally justified

in taking our lives (the lives of all their prisoners) on the advance

of Pollock and Nott on Caubul. I may add that the Court of Inquiry,

which I called for, after investigating all the circumstances, decided

that I had acted perfectly right.” These escaped prisoners, however,

subsequently became the most active of our enemies.

[91] He died, after much suffering, in March.

[92] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._

[93] “The mutineers moved down to the Barukzye villages in apparent

expectation of being joined by the Ooloos, but wherever they went they

received neither support nor encouragement, notwithstanding that they

gave out our troops were on the march to destroy the Douranee villages.

The Janbaz at last took up a position at Chuplanee, a village about

twelve miles off, where our cavalry came up with them; Captain Leeson

had to file his men across a difficult canal, and had only just formed

line when the enemy charged in a body. Our men charged at the same time

in line, and the flanks swept round the Janbaz horse, who were probably

not above 150 strong—numbers having left the rebel standard before

reaching Chuplanee. For about five minutes a splendid fight took place,

hand-to-hand, when the Janbaz broke and fled, pursued by our cavalry.

Of the enemy, about thirty were killed and fifty wounded in the flight

and pursuit. Our loss was trifling.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[94] _Major Rawlinson to Major-General Nott: January 7th, 1842. MS.

Correspondence._ as end ref

[95] _General Nott to Major Rawlinson: January 8th, 1842. MS.

Correspondence._ There is a characteristic passage in this letter which

is worthy of quotation. “I have no right to interfere with the affairs

of the government of this country, and I never do—but in reference to

that part of your note where you speak of political influence, I will

candidly tell you that these are not times for mere ceremony, and that

under present circumstances, and at a distance of 2000 miles from the

seat of the Supreme Government, I throw responsibility to the winds,

and tell you that, in my opinion, you have not had for some time past,

nor have you at present, one particle of political influence in this

country.”

[96] Her Majesty’s 40th Regiment; the 2nd, 16th, 38th, and a wing of

the 42nd Native Infantry; the Shah’s 5th Infantry; Anderson’s two

troops of Horse Artillery (Shah’s); Blood’s Battery (Bombay Artillery);

Leeson’s and Haldane’s Horse.

[97] The number of the enemy has been variously stated at all sorts of

amounts, from 5000 to 20,000. General Nott, in his official despatch

addressed to the Military Secretary, says: “After a march of four hours

over a very difficult country, I came in sight of the rebel army, from

fifteen to twenty thousand men, drawn up in a strong position on the

right bank of the Urghundab.” Major Rawlinson says: “From what I myself

saw, as well as from information I have received from parties in the

enemy’s camp, I should estimate their entire force at 5000-3000 of

which accompanied the chiefs from Sir-a-bund, whilst the other 2000

joined from the Alekozye villages.”—[_MS. Journal._] There is nothing

of which the historian ought to speak with less confidence than the

“number of the enemy.” There is nothing more difficult to determine

than the fact; and nothing more likely to draw upon him a large amount

of acrimonious criticism, than his manner of stating it. As a general

proposition, I think it may be laid down that military commanders

seldom under-state the number of the enemy they have beaten.

[98] “Two canals in advance of the village were lined by matchlock

men—the horse crowded the slope of the tuppa upon which Killa-chuk is

built, and occupied the entire space intervening between that village

and Kohuck, the hillocks adjoining which latter place were covered by

large masses of footmen collected from the neighbouring villages to

witness rather than to participate in the combat.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s

MS. Journal._]

[99] Major Rawlinson, in his despatch of the 6th of March, describes

this affair as a “brief skirmish.” General Nott has described the

action in a few pregnant sentences. A graphic account of it is to be

found in Captain Neill’s _Recollections of Four Years’ Service in the

East_. Captain Neill was present as Adjutant of her Majesty’s 40th

Regiment. He speaks of the affair as the “Battle of Urghundab.”—“the

first success after our recent disasters at Caubul,” as it was. He

adds: “The victory having been obtained over a force so immensely

superior to that which was opposed to it by the British, most

effectually damped the spirit of our enemies in that part of the

country.” As Nott’s force had sixteen guns, it can hardly be said that

the enemy’s force was immensely superior.

[100] The Prince seems to have been inclined to desert to the British

in the course of the action. He and Tej Mahomed (the Sirdar of the

recreant Janbaz, who had been forced to accompany the mutineers after

their attack on their British officers) had been in consultation in

the morning about going over to the British camp. The chiefs had some

suspicion of this, and “when they saw Tej Mahomed detach himself, they

immediately accused the Prince of treachery. They talked, indeed, of

seizing him; upon which the boy, with his immediate followers, galloped

off the field.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._] Tej Mahomed would

have come in; but an inopportune shower of grape from Blood’s battery

kept him at a discreet distance.

[101] The Douranee chiefs were irritated against Atta Mahomed for

precipitating the conflict with the British. They had been anxious to

stand aloof until the issue of the Caubul contest could be more clearly

seen by them.

[102] On the 8th of January, the General wrote to Rawlinson: “I am

sorry that I have not the same confidence in Meerza Ahmed which you

appear to have. The force under this man has been in the immediate

vicinity of Candahar for the last month. Why this has been permitted I

know not. He has a very considerable body of men with him, both horse

and foot; and my information tells me that they are increasing daily

and hourly.... You ought to be the best judge of this man’s fidelity;

but I believe him to be a traitor; and I should not be surprised to

hear of his being joined by his expected confederates, and before

twenty-four hours marching off and forcing the young Prince Sekunder to

accompany him. Yet he is on the watch, and will play his game according

to circumstances.”—[_General Nott to Major Rawlinson: January 8th,

1842. MS. Correspondence._] The position of Meerza Ahmed, and the near

prospect of his defection, were among the reasons urged by the General

in support of his refusal to quit the near neighbourhood of Candahar.

[103] _Neill’s Recollections._ There was, however, comparatively little

snow at Candahar. It seldom lies there long upon the ground.

[104] He was not, however, completely successful. It would have been

a miracle if he had been. “_February 4._—There have been several

squabbles in the Douranee camp already: 1stly. A quarrel took place

between the Janbaz and Populzyes regarding _bhoosa_; 2ndly. Sufder Jung

fell out with Meerza Ahmed, and abused him for not spending his money

freely on the Ghazees; and 3rdly. The Janbaz have regularly cleaned

out an Ishakzye Khail in another dispute about supplies.”—[_Major

Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[105] Major Rawlinson, preparatory to the commencement of the work

of disarming, took a census of the inhabitants of the city, which

greatly alarmed the people, as it was believed to be our intention to

expel them. When it was found that they were only to be disarmed, they

recovered their serenity, and submitted very patiently to the ordeal.

[106] “_February 11._—I am becoming seriously alarmed about money.

A lakh is the utmost that I shall be able to raise from the Candahar

merchants, and with the most rigid economy this will hardly last us

to the end of March—the godowns at the same time being opened to

supply the troops. It seems, therefore, absolutely indispensable

that the road should be opened from the south, either by Outram or

ourselves.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[107] “_February 21._—Two Cossids reached me to-day from Leech, one

with letters of the 13th and 15th, the other with letters of the 17th.

Enclosed was a copy of a letter addressed to me by Major-General

Elphinstone and Major Pottinger, requesting me to intimate to

Major-General Nott their wish that he would evacuate Candahar and

Khelat-i-Ghilzye, in pursuance of the agreement entered into at

Caubul for the return of our troops to India. This letter appears

to be genuine, but I cannot consider it in any way binding on us;

and for the reasons stated in my letter to General Nott of the 1st

instant, I still conceive that we are best consulting the interests

of government in maintaining our position pending the receipt of

further instructions from Calcutta.... The question regarding Shah

Soojah is very perplexing. He is certainly nominally at the head of

the government, and we can no longer be supposed to be here in support

of his authority. Still, however, a month sooner or later in retiring

can make little difference, and it seems to me indispensable that some

definite arrangements, approved of by government, should be entered

into for the future administration of the province before we withdraw

our troops.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[108] It ran thus: “_Caubul, 25th December, 1841._—SIR,—It having

been found necessary to conclude an arrangement, founded on that of the

late Sir W. H. Macnaghten, for the evacuation of Afghanistan by our

troops, we have the honour to request that you will intimate to the

officer commanding at Candahar our wish that the troops now at that

place and at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, together with the British authorities

and troops within your jurisdiction, should return to India at the

earliest convenient season. Newab Jubbar Khan, who is the bearer of

this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He

has been appointed Governor of Candahar on the part of the existing

government.

”E. POTTINGER. “W. K. ELPHINSTONE, M.-G.

“P.S.—If you require two or three days to make your preparations, you

must not remain in the city, but proceed to your cantonment. Whatever

you are obliged to leave behind, you will make over to the Newab Jubbar

Khan.”

[109] “I have only to repeat,” wrote General Nott, on the 23rd of

February, in reply to Major Rawlinson’s official letter on the subject

of the evacuation orders received from Caubul, “that I will not treat

with any person whatever for the retirement of the British troops

from Afghanistan, until I shall have received instructions from the

Supreme Government. The letter signed ‘Eldred Pottinger’ and ‘W. K.

Elphinstone’ may, or may not, be a forgery. I conceive that these

officers were not free agents at Caubul; and therefore their letter or

order can have no weight with me.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[110] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._

[111] February 28.

[112] “I have been for some days past in communication with the

Barukzye tribe, and have, I believe, succeeded in detaching them

from the Douranee confederacy. They had deserted their villages and

gone off to the desert; but, on a promise of protection, have now

returned, and bound themselves to admit none of the enemy’s horse

within their borders. The Alekozyes of the Urghundab also propose to

enter into the same engagements; and if we can fairly detach these

two powerful tribes, the Douranee cause must, I should think, expire

of an atrophy.... Timour suggests that he should endeavour to get the

Douranee chiefs to march on Caubul, in order to release the Shah from

the Barukzyes, feigning that he has received his father’s instructions

to this effect; and I see no objection to such an attempt being made.

I also hear that the Caubul Janbaz insist on proceeding to the north,

and that Meerza Ahmed has the greatest difficulty in restraining

them.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[113] “_March 1._—The General now has made up his mind to take the

field; and, after considering the case fully, I have determined that

the Afghans must be turned out of the city. It is not as if the

present affair were a mere transient disturbance. We are engaged in a

regular national war, and Outram does not anticipate that we shall be

able to take the field in sufficient force to put down all opposition

before next winter. We must, therefore, look forward to a protracted

struggle at Candahar all through the summer; and the security of the

city appears to me, under such circumstances, indispensable.”—[_Major

Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[114] A week before, a strong conviction of the necessity of the

measure had forced itself upon his mind. But he was only too willing

to postpone the execution of it. On the 22nd of February he wrote:

“The Moollahs are now again stirring themselves, and I have very

good grounds for supposing a large quantity of arms to be concealed.

I almost fear that affairs are approaching that state when, for our

immediate safety, we shall be obliged to incur the odium of expelling

the Moollahs and Afghans from the city. It is not that these people

can do us any serious injury within the city; but the probability of

an insurrection inside the walls simultaneously with the disturbances

outside, gives confidence to Meerza Ahmed’s party and dispirits our

Parsewan adherents. It is to be considered, however, that if we expel

the Afghans and retain the Parsewans, we shall embitter the national

feeling against us with the rumour of sectarian animosity, and shall,

moreover, sacrifice the Sheeah party in the event of our retirement.

The most obvious necessity of self-preservation could alone, I think,

warrant such a course, and I cannot doubt but that it is my duty to

temporise as long as prudence will admit.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS.

Journal._]

[115] “No doubt much property has been sacrificed in carrying the

measure into effect; but we have done all in our power to alleviate

the evil. Valuable property, which the people were unable to take away

with them, has been transferred to the safe keeping of the Hindoos and

merchants who have remained, and the grain is to be all taken charge

of by the commissariat, receipts in money being granted by us to the

owners.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[116] _Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service in the East._

[117] “The plan of enticing the General to Telookham, delaying him

there by keeping a body of horse in his vicinity, and then doubling

back on the town, was all preconcerted by Meerza Ahmed; and on the

night of the attack every chief in the country was present except the

Noorzyes.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[118] The gate had been closed for the night. Lieutenant Cooke was on

guard, and was endeavouring to trace the movements of the enemy in the

distance, when a villager drove his donkey, loaded with brushwood,

over the bridge and demanded admission. He was told the gate would be

opened for no one; upon which he growled out a malediction, and tossing

the brushwood on the ground, said he would leave it there for the

night, and take it into the town in the morning. The villager, having

recrossed the bridge with his donkey, dived among the ruined huts

opposite the Herat gate, and was out of shot in a moment. At the same

instant flames burst forth from the brushwood, and the gate was fired.

[119] See the letter-press to Lieut. Rattray’s admirable drawings of

the Scenery and Costumes of Afghanistan.

[120] The Ghazees had so damaged the canal banks, that the irrigation

was destroyed, and there was every prospect of a failure of the crops;

but through Rawlinson’s agency the people of the Urghundab were induced

to labour at their repair, and in a short time the waters began again

to flow in their accustomed course.

[121] _General Nott to Major Rawlinson: March 25, 1842._ [_MS.

Correspondence._]

[122] “In the charge of the horse under Saloo Khan, when after driving

back our cavalry they were stopped by the fire of the guns and the

light company of the 38th, which had been thrown out in advance, Yar

Mahomed of Dehrawat, who was Saloo’s nephew, fell, and in another part

of the field, Hubeeboollah, Akhondzadeh, and Mahomed Raheen, Noorzye,

were wounded. The total loss of the enemy in killed and wounded I

estimate, from all I could learn on the field and from the villagers,

at about 150. We had a few men killed and some forty wounded. Amongst

the latter are two cavalry officers, Chamberlaine, and Travers of the

2nd. The Douranee horse came on more boldly on this occasion than they

had ever been seen to do before. Some of the 38th Sepoys, indeed,

received sabre-cuts from our horsemen; but they cannot stand our

artillery or musketry fire. They had been so taunted with cowardice,

that they resolved to have one conflict with us before they quitted the

vicinity of Candahar, and had not reinforcements gone out, they would

have sustained, I doubt not, a much heavier loss, by making repeated

charges on different parts of the camp during the afternoon.”—[_Major

Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[123] _Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service._

[124] Captain Neill.

[125] “A few squadrons of dragoons,” wrote Rawlinson in his journal,

“would have swept the Douranee horse from the field; as it was, they

were permitted to re-cross the river almost unmolested.”

[126] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ Rawlinson adds: “Our own

camp-followers, I also found, had committed extensive ravages, and when

I endeavoured to persuade the people that our troops were there for

their protection, they uniformly answered that they knew not whether

they had most to fear from their friends or their enemies.”

[127] _Major Leech to General Nott: Khelat-i-Ghilzye, March 9, 1842.

MS._

[128] Two pounds.

[129] Shah Soojah claimed credit for having delayed his march.

[130] If there had been any one in Ghuznee acquainted with the use and

practice of artillery, the garrison might have held out till April.

[131] “On the morning of the 10th, Poett and Davis were obliged to

retire from their posts, and the survivors here now assembled in the

two houses held by Colonel Palmer and the head-quarters of the corps.

You cannot picture to yourself the scene these two houses presented;

every room was crammed not only with Sepoys, but camp-followers, men,

women, and children, and it is astonishing the slaughter among them

was not greater, seeing that the guns of the citadel sent round-shot

crashing through and through the walls. I saw high-caste men groping

in the mud, endeavouring to discover pieces of unmelted ice, that

by sucking them they might relieve the thirst that tormented them.

Certainly, when that morning dawned, I thought it was the last I

should see on this earth, and so did we all, and proceeded to make a

few little arrangements ere the final attack on us took place. The

regimental colours were burned, to prevent their falling into the hands

of the enemy; I destroyed my watch, and flung it, and what money I had,

over the wall of the ditch; I also burnt my poor wife’s miniature,

first cramming the gold frame of it into a musket, being determined

that one of the Ghazees should have his bellyful of gold ere I died.

Hour after hour passed on, and still we sate expecting every minute to

hear the shout of the final attack; but it came not. From our loopholes

we saw the enemy swarming all around us—in every lane and house, and

on the hill of the citadel—the place was black with their masses;

and as they themselves afterwards told us, there were not less than

ten thousand men thirsting for our blood.”—[_Lieutenant Crawford’s

Narrative._]

[132] Lieutenant Crawford says: “During the three preceding days’

fighting, Shumshoodeen had repeatedly offered us terms; but they were

such as we could not accede to, inasmuch as they commenced by desiring

we would surrender ourselves to him and abandon the Sepoys to the fury

of the Ghazees. The Sepoys, it appears, had held a consultation among

themselves, and believing they had no chance of their lives, determined

on forcing their way out of the town and endeavour to get to Peshawur.

When we first heard of this mad design and spoke to the men about it,

they denied it; but, on the 10th, two Native officers came forward

and told us they had made up their minds to go off that night—that

if we chose to accompany them they would be exceedingly glad, but, if

otherwise, they would go alone.”

[133] It is pleasant to record any act of individual heroism. The

late Brigadier Nicholson, who fell at Delhi, in 1857, “then quite a

stripling, when the enemy entered Ghuznee, drove them thrice back

beyond the walls at the point of the bayonet before he would listen

to the order given him to make his company lay down their arms. He at

length obeyed, gave up his sword with bitter tears, and accompanied his

comrades to an almost hopeless imprisonment.”—[_Rattray._]

[134] How strongly Outram felt on the subject of the withdrawal

policy may be gathered from the following passage in a letter to

Sir Richmond Shakespear: “As this is not a time to mince matters,

no sooner did I see the orders of government to General Pollock to

withdraw the Jellalabad garrison, and to retire to India under any

circumstances (except the Sikhs rising against us, which, by-the-by,

that measure would have brought about most probably), than I wrote,

in the most earnest manner I was capable of, pointing out that our

bitterest foe could not have devised a more injurious measure,

whether viewed politically or in a military light; but expressing my

trust that Mr. Clerk would act on the responsibility vested in him

to prevent so ruinous a step. My mind is now set at rest by General

Pollock’s determination, now gleaned from your letters. I honour the

General, therefore; and should he be allowed to carry out his views,

we shall have mainly to thank him, not only for retrieving our honour

in Afghanistan, but for saving India to us, the loss of which would

ultimately result from disgracefully succumbing to the Afghans now....

Nothing is easier than to retrieve our honour in Afghanistan previously

to finally withdrawing, should the government so determine; and I pray

God, Lord Ellenborough may at once see the damnable consequences of

shirking the undertaking, and order accordingly; otherwise the disaster

of Caubul will be but the commencement of our misfortunes.”—[_Major

Outram to Sir Richmond Shakespear: March 15, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[135] _Major Outram to Sir Richmond Shakespear: March 15, 1842. MS.

Correspondence._

[136] “There are some officers in camp who think that Brigadier

England’s detachment will be sacrificed between this and the Kojuck;

but with such fine examples as those set by Woodburn on the Helmund,

Anderson at Tazee, and Wymer at Assyai, surely there ought to be no

doubt of success between this and the Kojuck, when no natural obstacles

to signify intervene.”—[_Lieutenant Hammersley to Major Outram: March

18, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[137] _Major-General England to Government: April 2, 1842. Published

Papers._

[138] Nott had resolutely refused to send any troops to meet England’s

detachment, though earnestly pressed by Rawlinson to do so. The General

urged that he could not afford to send troops to the Kojuck, whilst he

was liable at any time to be called upon to proceed to the relief of

Khelat-i-Ghilzye. Rawlinson pointed out the immense evils attending

a total deprivation of treasure, and said that even the compulsory

abandonment of Candahar might follow the failure of General England

to effect the passage of the Kojuck. Nott, however, was obdurate. The

detachment was not sent. Wymer’s brigade, however, was then out to

the southward of Candahar, and it was believed that the object of the

movement was to support the party advancing through the Kojuck. Nott

withdrew the brigade to Candahar, and an impression gained ground among

the enemy that we had endeavoured to open our communications with the

troops below, but had drawn back in despair.

[139] Of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry. He was greatly esteemed as a

gallant and good soldier. “They have a fine fellow at the head of the

light battalion,” wrote Hammersley to Outram, a few days before the

brigade left Quettah, “and it is to be hoped that he will inspire the

crest-fallen with a little ardour.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]