[140] “General England and his staff were dismounted, and standing in

conversation not far from where the light companies had rallied. I

joined them. It was useless to stand and lament over what could not be

recalled. A retreat was determined upon. I observed to the General that

the day might be retrieved, and offered to lead into the entrenched

position with a hundred men properly supported; and I am confident

that I should have succeeded. The men were in courage, and anxious

to recover the bodies of their comrades. The General replied, he had

not men. I proposed that the left hill should be attacked first, as

it commanded the smaller one. The enemy were certainly in strength,

and very bold, but our men burned with rage at seeing their comrades

cut up before their eyes. I think I pressed my offer three times, the

last time volunteering to lead with eighty men; but the General felt

he had too few, and that the stake was too great.”—[_Colonel Stacy’s

Narrative of Services in Beloochistan and Afghanistan in the Years

1840, 1841, 1842._]

[141] It appears to have been England’s intention, after the disaster

on the 28th, to have commenced his retreat on the same evening; but

Colonel Stacy persuaded him not to move until the following morning. On

the 29th he struck his camp and marched to Hykerzye, halted at Koochlag

on the 30th, and on the 31st reached Quettah.

[142] Hammersley complained that the General’s letter was so very

unsatisfactory, that if it had not been for some private letters, he

would have been left in ignorance of the real nature of the events that

had occurred. The original letter, now before me, is worth quoting.

England seems to have been so unwilling to state distinctly that he had

been defeated, that even when writing officially to General Nott on the

1st instant, he shrunk from a plain statement of the circumstances of

the case; so that Nott, writing to him on the 18th, could only say: “I

have been favoured with your letter of the 1st instant, &c.... I have

_also heard of the affair you had with the enemy on the 28th ult_.” The

letter to Nott is, however, less obscure than the letter to Hammersley,

which runs thus:

“Camp, three miles south of Hykulzye, 2 P.M.

“MY DEAR HAMMERSLEY,—I wish you would acquaint Colonel Marshall,

that as the insurgent force has been much reinforced from Candahar,

and have so strongly protected themselves with breastworks, &c., on

the ground commanding our line of route this side of Hykulzye, I

shall fall back to Hykerzye to-morrow, my presence here being now of

no use, and inviting their insults; and it is probable that as the

position at Hykerzye is not a good one, having much broken ground in

its rear, that I shall further fall back on Cutchlak. I have had so

many men killed and wounded by the enemy, that my baggage is increased

whilst my means of defending it is lessened. If Colonel Marshall,

through your information, thinks the Cutchlak Pass occupied, he may

make such efforts as his numbers will enable him to keep it open and

communicate with us; and as the enemy is a hundred to one stronger than

any one imagined, I must wait for the reinforcements till I try them

again. Meanwhile, the fortification of Quettah must be proceeded with

vigorously. Show this to Colonel Marshall and Major Waddington.

“Sincerely yours (in haste), “R. ENGLAND.”

[143] “_April 1._—The Douranees having received positive accounts from

Mahomed Sadig of the advance of Brigadier England with treasure, have

resolved to make an effort to intercept it. Saloo Khan accordingly,

with Mahomed Azim (Noorzye), Fyz Tullub, Hubeeboollah, Sooltan Mahomed

(Barukzye), &c., have gone off by the desert to the Kojuck Pass. The

body of horse with the chiefs is about 1000; but they expect to raise

some 4000 or 5000 of the Noorzye, Atchekzye, Barukzye, and Populzye

Ooloos to assist in holding the pass.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS.

Journal._]

[144] “You will understand the insinuation,” wrote one of the most

chivalrous of the many chivalrous officers who served beyond the

Indus (James Outram). “If he is ever heard to libel our Sepoys in

that manner, surely it will be noticed by our officers.”—[_MS.

Correspondence._]

[145] After adverting to the reported intention of England to leave

Quettah with a small supply of money and ammunition, but not to push

through the Kojuck, Nott goes on to say: “This I deeply regret;

firstly, because I cannot send a force to the southern side of the

pass; secondly, I require a large supply of ammunition, which I have

for two years been endeavouring to get, but without success; thirdly,

four lakhs of rupees will be of little use here—the troops and

establishments are going on for four months in arrears; fourthly,

your moving into Pisheen with a convoy, known by the whole country to

be intended for Candahar, and then halting or retiring to Quettah,

will have the very worst effects throughout Afghanistan, and will

be more injurious to my present position than 20,000 of the enemy

in the field. I sincerely hope that you have not moved, or that you

have determined to push across the Kojuck with all the force you

can muster.”—[_General Nott to General England: April 2, 1842. MS.

Records._]

[146] “I strongly advised Brigadier England, through Lieutenant

Hammersley, in letters I addressed to them both so long ago as the

10th ultimo (March), to await at Quettah the junction of the remainder

of his brigade, unless very urgent circumstances should require his

more immediate advance to meet an advance from Candahar. The latter,

so far from being the case, General Nott requested might not be

attempted.”—[_Major Outram to Captain Durand: April 3, 1842. MS.

Correspondence._]

[147] _General Nott to General England: April 2, 1842. MS. Records._

[148] _General England to General Nott: April 10, 1842. MS. Records._

[149] There is so fine a soldierly flavour about this letter, that I

give it entire in the Appendix.

[150] _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._

[151] _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._

[152] “These fine fellows had been led forward by Colonel Wymer, at

daybreak, to occupy the heights commanding the pass from Chummemo to

the western side, to secure General England’s party a safe passage.

I have never seen our Sepoys to such advantage. It was impossible to

climb the precipitous hills in pantaloons; this part of their dress

had, therefore, been discarded, and the men were in their doties. As

they showed on every accessible point, they were the admiration of

all. I can easily imagine how painful it must have been to the Bombay

regiments to find the Candahar troops in full possession of the pass

before they were allowed to enter it.”—[_Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._]

[153] “I have only,” wrote Nott, “to repeat my sentiments—namely,

that I will not sanction a rupee being given from the British treasury

to these people. I have for three years viewed with deep regret the

ruinous system of giving away large sums to the chiefs and Sirdars of

Afghanistan, which I sincerely believe has brought upon us all our

present difficulties in this country. I have offered to guarantee the

personal safety of Saloo Khan if he returns to his allegiance by a

certain day. If there are any other chiefs who can make it appear that

they are worthy of the indulgence of my guarantee for their personal

safety, I will take their wishes into consideration; but I will make

them no other promises. This does not apply to Mahomed Atta or to

Meerza Ahmed, as I will not receive these two men on any terms, without

the order of higher authority.”—[_General Nott to Major Rawlinson:

April 9, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[154] See _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative_, and his correspondence with

Major Rawlinson. Rawlinson, however, doubted whether the negotiations

with Saloo Khan would have a favourable result: “Had a long

conference,” he wrote on the 10th of May, “with Atta-oollah Khan,

who has come in to treat for his brother, Saloo; and the latter, if

his agent is to be believed, certainly desires to espouse our cause.

Knowing, however, as I do, Saloo’s ambition and avarice, I question

very much whether we shall come to any satisfactory arrangement

with him. We merely require Saloo Khan’s co-operation, in order to

facilitate the re-establishment of our dawk communication; but the Khan

talks of rank, power, and pay, as the return he has a right to expect

for joining us, and is not likely to be satisfied with any moderate

measure of conciliation.”—(_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._) Saloo

Khan, however, in the sequel rendered good service and proved his

fidelity in the face of strenuous opposition from some of the other

chiefs: “His falling off from the cause of Islam,” wrote Rawlinson in

his Journal, “has plunged him into personal difficulties. He has been

twice attacked by Mahomed Sadig and Meer Afzul, and has been wounded,

together with his brother and his nephew.”

[155] _MS. Correspondence._

[156] _MS. Correspondence._

[157] _MS. Correspondence._

[158] _MS. Correspondence._

[159] “Letters are said to have been received from the ex-Sirdars

announcing their intended journey to this place, according to Meerza

Ahmed’s invitation which was sent to them in January last. Mahomed Reza

Khan of Seistan is also said to have promised to assist them with 100

camels, and to send horsemen to escort them to this frontier. This news

appears to be _vraisemblable_ in the extreme. If the ex-Sirdars can

get away from Shuhur-i-Babek, either with or without the connivance of

the Persian Government, nothing is more likely than that they should

make an attempt to recover Candahar; and I should greatly dread their

appearance on this frontier, for we are enabled to keep up the form,

and something of the power of a local government, almost solely from

the adherence to us of the old Barukzye retainers—people on whose

fidelity we could not possibly depend if the Sirdars took the field

against us.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal: April 4, 1842._]

[160] “A messenger from Shah Persund Khan of Laush reports that two of

the horsemen sent down to Kohun-dil-Khan in January by Meerza Ahmed

returned lately, and gave out that they were only a few days in advance

of the Sirdars, who had left Shuhur-i-Babek secretly, and were coming

here _viâ_ Seistan.”—[_Major Rawlinson to General Nott: April 8, 1842.

MS. Correspondence._]

[161] Kohun-dil-Khan did not make his appearance in person in the

Candahar territory till the beginning of 1843, when we had announced

to the Persian Government that we had withdrawn behind the Sutlej, and

were indifferent as to what became of the Sirdars of Afghanistan.

[162] _Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: February 24, 1842. Published

Papers._

[163] “The information received with respect to the conduct of Shah

Soojah during the late transactions is necessarily imperfect, and,

moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable

that the insurrection against our troops should have originated

with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has

adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either

party, by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious

throne.”—[_Governor-General in Council to Sir Jasper Nicholls: March

15, 1842. Published Papers._]

[164] _Mr. Maddock to General Nott: April 19, 1842. Published Papers._

[165] This is not only a remarkable letter in itself. It is remarkable

for its misadventures. Its outer history is somewhat curious. It never

found its way into the published volume of correspondence, and its

existence was only to be inferred from the fact of a reference to it

in another letter. It was at last brought to light by the inquiries in

Parliament of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Palmerston. It was to be found

nowhere in England; but a copy was at last elicited from India. The

Governor-General then declared that “the original despatch of the 13th

of May never reached the office, and must have been lost in transit.

The duplicate was received and acknowledged on the 11th of July. It is

the practice of the Secretary’s office to keep the unreported papers on

all important subjects for each month together, and to forward copies

of them to the Secret Committee by the monthly Overland Mail. The

despatch in question was inadvertently put up in its proper place in

the May bundle of reported papers, instead of being left for a time, as

it should have been, among the unreported papers of July. Hence, when

the July papers were copied for transmission to the Secret Committee,

this despatch was omitted.” Nothing less explanatory than this was

ever offered in the way of explanation. It does not appear whether the

original letter miscarried altogether on its way to Lord Ellenborough,

or whether it miscarried only on its way to the office. There is an

equal obscurity about the history of the duplicate which was “received

and acknowledged on the 11th of July.” It might be inferred from this

that it was received on the 11th of July, and acknowledged on the same

day. But it happens that the duplicate was despatched on the 30th of

May—and ought surely to have come not among the July, but among the

June papers. In this letter of the 11th of July the Secretary says: “I

am directed to state that the original letter has never reached me, and

that the duplicate _has only lately been received_ and laid before the

Governor-General, whose previous instructions to you appeared to render

any special reply to this communication unnecessary.”—[_MS. Records._]

In the face of so distinct a denial as this, little can be said, except

that in a letter from Pollock of May 20th, which was duly acknowledged,

reference is made to the letter of the 13th. If that letter had not

been received, some allusion certainly ought to have been made by

Government to its non-receipt.

[166] There was no scarcity of provisions at Jellalabad at this

time. But, to secure a continued supply, Pollock was sensible of

the necessity of encouraging a belief throughout the country that

the intentions of the British Government inclined towards a forward

movement. “We are all quiet here,” he wrote on the 6th of May to Mr.

Clerk, “grain coming in in abundance; at least, in as great quantities

as we could expect after the dreadful alarm into which this force seems

to have put the whole country. Every village was deserted. I did my

utmost to protect them from plunder, and in most cases succeeded; and

the consequence is that we, in a measure, command the resources of

the country.” And on the 11th of the same month, writing again to Mr.

Clerk, he said: “While I remain here I can command supplies, and I have

no doubt that I shall be able to do so as long as the natives suppose

that we intend remaining in the country; but if they thought otherwise,

our supplies would be stopped.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[167] _Published Correspondence relating to Military Operations in

Afghanistan._

[168] _MS. Correspondence._ In his journal, too, Rawlinson wrote: “The

order to retire came upon us like a thunderbolt. We had not, from Lord

Ellenborough’s former letter, thought such a measure possible until

Caubul should be retaken. As there is no discretionary power, however,

vested in General Nott by the late letter, he has only had to consider

the best way of carrying the order into effect.”—[_MS. Journal._]

[169] The 2nd, 16th, and 38th.

[170] “In a late letter to government,” he wrote to the

Commander-in-Chief on the 24th of May, “you will have seen how

anxious I was that any proposed movement towards Peshawur should be

communicated to no one from whom it could be withheld. The moment such

a thing is known, it is probable supplies will cease to come in; we

should be in difficulty about forage; all who are now friendly would

be ready to oppose us; and if I had not time to secure the pass, the

consequences might be serious indeed.”—[_Published Papers relating to

Military Operations in Afghanistan._]

[171] In this letter of the 20th of May, Pollock says: “I have

already, in my letter dated the 13th inst., entered on the subject (of

withdrawing to Peshawur), and must receive a reply before I shall be

able to move.” If that letter of the 13th had not been received and

read, surely this allusion to it would have called forth a remark to

that effect.

[172] It was outwardly only an acknowledgment of the General’s

inability to retire at an earlier period—but there was more meaning in

it than this, for on the same day the Chief Secretary wrote to Nott: “I

am directed to inform you that, in consequence of the very defective

state of the means of movement possessed by Major-General Pollock, it

appears to be out of his power to retire from Jellalabad until October,

when his retirement will certainly take place.”—[_Published Papers._]

[173] _Major Pottinger to General Pollock: Tezeen, April 20, 1842.

Published Papers._ Together with this letter from Pottinger came a

paper from Akbar Khan himself. It was without seal and signature, for

the Sirdar was fearful of compromising himself with his countrymen, and

the document might have fallen into their hands. After some allusions

to the painful past, and a declaration that he was unable to restrain

the disorganised mob of Afghans from attacking the English army, the

Sirdar went on to say: “If I allow the English, who are my guests, to

depart according to your suggestion; or according to Pottinger Sahib’s

advice, if I allow the English ladies to depart before the gentlemen,

in either case all Mahomedans will look upon me as their enemy, and

the whole multitude will be opposed to me. Under these circumstances

I beg you to reflect, that not having come to an understanding with

you, and having made enemies of them, how can I exist?... I prefer your

friendship to the throne of Caubul, because, if I was to go to Caubul

now, the men of Caubul would push me forward, and then it would be

difficult to release my guests and to be on friendly terms with you. On

this account I have written to show my friendship for your government.

Please God my services shall exceed the injuries I have done you.”

[174] _General Pollock to Major Pottinger: Jellalabad, April 26, 1842.

Published Papers._

[175] _General Pollock to Government: Jellalabad, April 28, 1842._ In

reply to this letter, the Chief Secretary wrote: “It is not consistent

with the honour of the British Government to enter into any terms for

the making of a provision for so great a criminal. We might engage to

spare his life if he were to fall into our hands, because it would be

difficult so to bring him to trial as to protect the government from a

colourable charge of violently prosecuting an unworthy revenge; but no

more than this can be done, and this only if he should promptly do all

he can to repair the crimes he has committed.”—[_Published Papers._]

[176] _Major Pottinger to General Pollock: May 3, 1842._ I have quoted

from the original in Pottinger’s hand-writing. But the letter is given

among the published papers, with the usual official emendations. Thus

the passage, “They have asked for the money, if it is paid, to be given

to Sir-Bolund Khan”—is printed, “They have asked for the money, &c.,

to be given to _his Colund Khan_.” It may puzzle the future historian

to discover who “his Colund Khan” may have been.

[177] _General Pollock to Major Pottinger: Jellalabad, May 10, 1842.

Published Papers._ Lord Ellenborough was unwilling that any money

should be paid for the release of the captives; but was inclined to

exchange Dost Mahomed and his family for the prisoners in the hands

of the Sirdar. “Undoubtedly,” he wrote, “on the 26th of April, you

remained authorised, by the instructions of the 24th of February,

to give money on the public account for the release of individual

prisoners; and if, previously to the receipt of my letter of the 25th

of April, you should have concluded a negotiation for the release of

any individual prisoners on that condition, the Governor-General would

feel himself under the necessity of sanctioning any payment of money

to which you may have then pledged yourself. After the receipt of that

letter, you will, of course, in any future negotiation, have adhered to

the instructions contained in it. It cannot but be a subject of much

regret that you should have considered it to be necessary, under any

circumstances, to have had any communication whatever of a diplomatic

nature with Mahomed Akbar Khan, in whom it must be impossible for

any one to place any trust.”—[_Published Papers._] Akbar Khan, at

this time, seems almost to have considered the release of his father

and family as hopeless; and Pollock did not think he was authorised

to propose an exchange of prisoners; for although, on the 24th of

February, Lord Auckland suggested that he “might speak of the release

of Dost Mahomed as an event which might not be altogether impossible,”

he did not know how far such a measure might be sanctioned by Lord

Ellenborough. Moreover, Pollock believed that the exchange had only

been authorised in the event of his being able to treat for the release

of the whole of the British prisoners; and they were not all in the

hands of Akbar Khan.

[178] The questions were—“1st, What were the terms negotiated by Sir

W. Macnaghten with the rebels? 2nd. What alteration was made by Major

Pottinger? 3rd. What does Major Pottinger allude to when he talks

of breach of faith? 4th. What were the manner and causes of Sir W.

Macnaghten’s murder?” I have found the information conveyed in Captain

Mackenzie’s answers of some use in the course of my narrative.

[179] On that day Akbar Khan sought an interview with Lady Macnaghten.

Painful as such a meeting must have been, the bereaved widow was not

in a position to refuse to see her husband’s murderer. He spoke very

kindly to her; and as she sat in silent sorrow before him, he declared

that he would give his right arm that the deed which he so much

regretted might be undone.

[180] _Captain Johnson’s Journal._ The writer adds: “At the

commencement of the defile, and for some considerable distance, passed

two or three hundreds of our poor miserable Hindostanees, who had

escaped up this unfrequented road from the massacre of the 12th. They

had not a rag to cover them, and were all more or less frost-bitten,

wounded, or starving. The poor wretches were huddled together in

thirties and forties, so as to impart to each other a little animal

heat, as other warmth was denied them by the barren, inhospitable

wilderness around them. We afterwards learnt that scarcely one of

these poor wretches escaped from the defile in which they had taken

shelter; and that, driven to the extremes of hunger, some of them had

for a few short hours sustained life by feeding on their dead comrades.

The wind was blowing bitterly cold at our bivouac. No shelter of any

kind for the ladies of our party during the whole night. Happiness is

comparative; and truly fortunate did General Elphinstone, Brigadier

Shelton, and myself consider ourselves when one of our Afghan

attendants told us to accompany him inside a miserable cow-shed, which

on our first entrance was so blackened with the dense smoke from a

good blazing fire in the centre of the hut, that we could see none of

the objects around us, until we had stretched ourselves at length on

the floor, and consequently out of the influence of the smoke, when we

perceived our companions to be three or four half-starved Hindostanees,

who had accompanied our party. Our attendant wished to eject them; but

we too truly sympathised with their sufferings to permit such an act

of tyranny. We shortly afterwards got an invitation from Mahomed Akbar

to join him and his party to dinner inside the fort. The room of our

reception was not much better than that we had left. We had, however,

a capital dinner, some cups of good tea, and a luxurious rest for the

night, the room having been heated with a good blazing fire and lots of

smoke, with no outlet for either, except the door and a small hole in

the roof.”—[_MS._]

[181] Captain Johnson says in his journal: “Both Mahomed Akbar and his

chiefs were most attentive in escorting over in safety the ladies and

their children and wounded Europeans.” There is other testimony to

the same effect: “Many of the ladies, being mounted on ponies, were

obliged to dismount and ride astride on the chargers of their Afghan

acquaintance, to avoid getting wet. Nothing could exceed the politeness

and attention of Mahomed Akbar on this occasion, who manifested the

greatest anxiety until all had crossed over in safety.”—[_Eyre’s Rough

Notes of Imprisonment in Afghanistan._] “The chiefs gave us every

assistance. Mahomed Akbar Khan carried Mrs. Waller over behind him

on his own horse. One rode by me to keep my horse’s head well up the

stream. The Afghans made great exertions to save both men and animals

struggling in the water.”—[_Lady Sale’s Journal._]

[182] “_Jan. 17, 1842._—Early in the morning we were, to our surprise,

told to prepare for a march higher up the valley, and further removed

from Jellalabad, from which place Tugree is about thirty miles

distant. All our hopes, which we had entertained hitherto of being

escorted to Jellalabad, are now blighted, and we see plainly that we

are nothing more nor less than prisoners, until such time as General

Sale shall evacuate Jellalabad, or Dost Mahomed Khan be permitted by

our government to return to the country. Started at nine, and arrived

at Budeeabad, almost at the top of the valley, and close to the first

range of hills towards Kafiristan. It belongs to Mahomed Shah Khan, is

nearly new, and has a deep ditch and _fausse-braie_ all round it. Our

abode consists of five rooms on two sides of a small square. This space

is to accommodate nine ladies, twenty gentlemen, and fourteen children,

and in the Tei-Khana are seventeen European soldiers and three European

women—all prisoners.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity.

MS._]

[183] _Lady Sale’s Journal._

[184] “Last night, Mahomed Akbar and I had a long conversation. He was

very anxious for the release of his father, and made many promises

in his name if we would release him. I pointed out that at least two

months must elapse before we could in any way have the instructions of

government regarding the release of the Ameer. I can see no objection

to the release of the Ameer, unless government intends making an

example of the city of Caubul. Our release and that of the hostages

at Caubul appears to depend upon his release. His family’s release

requires that of the women here. I wish for these last something could

be done; but I fear not. You must use your influence. They tell me we

shall be forwarded to Peshawur if you evacuate Jellalabad; and the

Sirdar begs me that I write you on the subject. I have explained that I

have no authority now, and said that I cannot promise anything of the

sort. I hope government will see nothing prejudicial to its interests

to release the Dost and family.”—[_Major Pottinger to Major Macgregor:

Lughman, January 18, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[185] “_January 19._—Changed my clothes for the first time since

leaving Caubul, January 6, and was fortunate enough to have a clean

shirt. My feet had become so swollen that I could not again put on my

boots when once pulled off. My eyes still very sore from the effects

of the snow on the march.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his

Captivity. MS._]

[186] Subsequently the materials were served out to the prisoners and

dressed by their own Hindostanee servants.

[187] “_January 29._—The Sirdar and Sooltan Jan came to see us. Made

a bet with the latter of 1000 rupees that Dost Mahomed Khan, the

ex-Ameer, will be released by the 30th of January, and will return to

Afghanistan. The former gave 1000 rupees to be distributed among us for

the purpose of purchasing sugar and other little luxuries. My share is

fifty rupees; which sum is very acceptable, as I have not had a pice

about me since leaving Caubul.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative. MS._]

[188] It was dangerous to send military or political news in the

ordinary form of epistolary correspondence. So the officers at

Jellalabad hit upon the expedient of dotting off letters in old

newspapers, so as to form words and sentences—“an easy mode of

carrying on secret correspondence not likely to be detected by an

Asiatic.” These dotted letters communicated to the prisoners the

tidings of Wild’s repulse in the Khybur Pass—the despatch of General

Pollock to Peshawur—and the arrival of Dr. Brydon at Jellalabad.

[189] The letter is given in the Appendix.

[190] See Appendix.

[191] The 1st of April was not forgotten. It is a curious proof of the

irrepressible love of practical joking which clings to our countrymen

in all places and in all situations, that the prisoners in Afghanistan,

on the 1st of April, turned their misfortunes into food for a joke.

Captain Johnson says: “_April 1, 1842._—Was awakened early by M——

telling me a letter had been received by L—— from Macgregor at

Jellalabad, informing him that our ransom had been effected for three

and a half lakhs of rupees, and that we were to start in five or six

days. Was up in an instant—off to L——; and heard the story confirmed

by him. The report spread through the whole fort, among our servants as

well as the Europeans, in less than a minute. All was intense delight;

when, on its being a little sobered down, to my horror, I was told that

the story was all fudge. I was half mad with rage at being made such

an April fool of, on a subject which, of all others in our situation,

should have been the last for any of our party to have expended his wit

upon.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._]

[192] “Up to this date, Mirza Báudín Khan (who had saved Captain

Mackenzie’s life on the assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, and

who had previously to the breaking out of the insurrection informed

that officer of the advent of Akbar Khan at Bámian) had been the keeper

of the prison. This man was secretly well affected to the English, and

professed an especial friendship for Troup and Mackenzie, to whom he

immediately confided his intention of marching out with the prisoners

and his garrison (the majority of whom he had gained over) to meet

Sale’s troops as soon as he should hear of their proximity; for he

naturally expected that the General would have followed up his decisive

victory over Akbar by marching direct upon Badeeabad, distant from

Jellalabad not forty miles. As evening drew on, he became very anxious,

frequently visited the ramparts to look out for the British force, and,

passing over Sale as of no account in the matter, grievously abused

Macgregor for not coming to the rescue. This might have been very

easily accomplished, not only without risk, but with an effect on the

fortunes of Akbar and his party, which might have saved much subsequent

misery to the captives; expense, and bloodshed, in the advance upon

Caubul; and vacillation and moral cowardice in the councils of the

supreme government. But Sale came not, although the road was quite

open; and the following morning the friendly gaoler was deposed, and

his place taken by the Nazir or chief-steward of Mahomed Shah Khan,

whose insolence and brutality contrasted disagreeably with the conduct

of Báudín Khan.”—[_MS. Memorandum._]

[193] “_April 9._—The whole of this day and yesterday passed in the

greatest suspense. Reports reached us to-day that the Sirdar and

Mahomed Shah Khan had arrived at the fort of the latter, about two

miles distant from us. The rout of the Afghan army appears to have been

perfect, and we hear that they have lost all their guns, camp-equipage,

and private property. All our guard appear very mysterious—group

together—and talk in whispers. The inhabitants of the fort have

removed their property and left their homes. Towards the afternoon,

several of our guard, with whom we had been in the habit of conversing,

and who had always been kind to us, on our asking them what would

become of us, would shake their heads and say, ‘You are in the hands

of God.’ A frightful stillness appeared to prevail. By degrees we

began to hear fearful rumours that we were all to be massacred at

sunset. Whether these first originated in the imaginations of some of

our party, or in those of the Afghans, I cannot say—but knowing the

revengeful temper of those in whose hands we were, nothing appeared

to us more probable; and our anxiety and suspense increased as the

day wore on. At about sunset a report was brought in that Mahomed

Shah Khan was on his way to visit us. Even this was a relief to us,

as we knew that what would happen to us must take place shortly. In

about ten minutes he arrived with a large party of his followers. On

coming up to us, our alarms were at an end as concerned our lives, as

he regarded us civilly, and shook hands with the whole of us. We all

sate down together. He entered slightly into the defeat of the day

before yesterday, and told us that we must be in readiness to leave

Budeeabad in the morning, without, however, giving us any hint as to

our destination; nor had any of us inclination to ask questions of him.

His will is law to us. After sitting for some time he wished us ‘Good

evening,’ and withdrew. He slept in the fort that night, and we were

busy making preparations for the morrow’s march. These, however, were

shortly at an end. All my worldly goods and chattels might be stowed

away in a towel or a handkerchief.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of

his Captivity. MS._]

[194] “_April 10._—Up at daylight; had a cup of tea and was ready

for the march. Took out my saddle to put on my horse; found that some

rascal had stolen my stirrups. This was soon rectified by a piece of

rope. As I was about saddling my horse, which was a good Hissar-stud

animal, Mahomed Shah Khan sent a man to tell me that this was to be

his property, and that he would furnish me with some other beast, as

none of us were to be permitted to ride horses for fear of making our

escape.... In the mean time, Mahomed Shah Khan, having heard that

Lady Macnaghten was possessed of a great number of magnificent shawls

and valuable jewels, which she had been so lucky as to have saved up

to this time, went inside and coolly commanded her, without sending

any previous message, to open her boxes. These were all very soon

ransacked; and shawls and jewels to the amount of near two lakhs of

rupees were taken possession of by this chief of freebooters—politely

telling her ladyship that she might retain one or two shawls and any

particular jewel for which she might have more value than another.

Many of the little things were also taken possession of by a young

whelp—the worthy son of so worthy a sire. Remonstrance was useless.

About 9 A.M. we started; but still without the slightest knowledge of

where we were going.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity.

MS._]

[195] _Captain Johnson’s Narrative. MS._

[196] On the 20th, Mrs. Waller, who had been necessitated to perform

the dreadful march from Budeeabad on horseback, was delivered of a

daughter. She was allowed an interval of one day’s rest, and was then

hurried onwards by the same distressing mode of conveyance.

[197] General Elphinstone’s remains were sent by Akbar Khan, for

interment, to Jellalabad. The General’s faithful servant, Moore,

accompanied the body. “I have the honour to inform you,” wrote

Pottinger to Pollock, on the 26th of April, “that Mahomed Akbar

Khan yesterday despatched to you the body of the late Major-General

Elphinstone. It was, however, intercepted by a party of the Ghilzyes,

under the supposition that the Prince in Caubul had sent it, the party

made prisoners, and the European servant, who had been allowed to

accompany it, wounded. The savages, however, on hearing that Mahomed

Akbar Khan had sent it, deputed one of their number to learn the truth.

The Sirdar is much grieved at the accident, and now sends a party,

with Private Moore, the General’s servant, to replace the corpse and

forward it on. The Sirdar at present is unable to release the two

servants from the hostility of the intermediate clans; but he promises

to do so as soon as a person may arrive sufficiently powerful to

protect them.”—[_Major Pottinger to General Pollock: Castle of Afzool

Khan, Tezeen, April 26, 1842. MS. Records._] The General’s remains

subsequently reached Jellalabad, and were interred with military

honours.

[198] I am informed that one of Conolly’s inducements to visit Bokhara

was the hope of persuading Stoddart outwardly to recant his profession

of Mahomedanism. My informant, who was at this time at Caubul, writes:

“Arthur Conolly availed himself of a certain margin left him in his

instructions for visiting Kokund and Bokhara, to proceed to the latter

place, principally to obtain Stoddart’s release, and also with a

view to his restoration to that precious faith in a Divine Redeemer,

which he had outwardly denied. True it is, that He who cannot lie

has declared that whosoever denies Him before men, him will He deny

before God the Father; but, if ever an act of apostasy called for

tears of compassion, it is that of the martyr Stoddart, for he, too,

like Cranmer, died for the Faith which he once denied. Long before

Conolly’s arrival, the Ameer of Bokhara, who was accounted even by his

own countrymen an incarnation of perfidy and ferocity, had been led by

the contempt with which his letter to the Queen had been treated by

the Foreign Office, to wreak his vengeance on the only individual of

the offending nation in his power. By his order, Stoddart was kept in

a loathsome prison, frequently severely beaten, _which never extorted

a groan from him_, and starved into a state of pitiable weakness.

Meanwhile, he was repeatedly ordered to become a Mahomedan, which he

steadfastly refused to do. To conquer his obstinacy, the Ameer threw

him into the Chah-i-Seeah (or black pit), a place of torment for the

vilest criminals. It is such a pit as that into which Jeremiah was

cast, the bottom of it being composed of indescribable filth—men’s

bones, decomposed animal matter, &c. In it, amongst other vermin,

are large ticks, which bury themselves in the flesh of the victim,

producing noisome sores. Before life was extinct, Stoddart was drawn up

from this horrible dungeon, and, on reviving somewhat, was exposed in

one of the great gates of the city, all who entered being instructed

to spit in his face and buffet him. Still he refused to abjure

Christianity. The next day he was again severely beaten, his grave dug

before his face, and it was announced to him that, unless he pronounced

the Mahomedan confession of faith, in that very grave he would

forthwith be buried alive. Hitherto, this noble gentleman’s resolution

had not failed him; but in this fearful moment of temptation,

when _mere_ human nature could sustain no more, to use his own

expression,—‘The grating of the spades against the sides of the grave

jarred on his shattered nerves beyond endurance.’ Certain Mahomedans,

whose sympathy had been enlisted by his noble constancy, besought him

almost with tears to spare them the disgrace of his murder, and to

pronounce the confession as a mere matter of form; and thus, almost

unconsciously, he with his mouth owned the Arabian impostor as the true

Prophet of God. Arthur Conolly’s arrival, exhortations, and prayers

speedily produced the blessed effect aimed at. Stoddart renounced

Mahomedanism (having previously refused to live with the wife assigned

him as a new convert), and thus subjected himself to a new series of

cruelties and indignities which, as we have seen, ended in his and

Conolly’s public martyrdom.”—[_MS. Memorandum._]

[199] In July, Stoddart wrote to Major Rawlinson, saying: “Conolly is

not yet here from Kokund, nor have my messengers to him yet returned.

They conveyed the orders from Caubul, and an invitation from the Ameer

to return by this route.”—[_MS._]

[200] “The Ameer was very much enraged at finding that the Queen had

not answered his letter; but had referred Colonel Stoddart to the

Indian Government, for all matters connected with Bokhara. About five

days after this, intelligence was received that Sir Alexander Burnes

had been murdered at Caubul. On the receipt of this intelligence

a servant of the Ameer was sent to call the two gentlemen to his

presence. The Ameer asked Colonel Stoddart which road he could now

take, even supposing he (the Ameer) was willing to release him. The

Colonel said he could go either by Russia or Persia. The Ameer said he

would release him in seven or eight days, and keep Captain Conolly. A

few days afterwards the English gentlemen were sent for to the palace

and confined.”—[_Statement of Shah Mahomed, Populzye, one of Captain

Conolly’s attendants. MS. Records._] This part of the statement is

entirely confirmed by that of Saleh Mahomed, Akhondzadeh, as taken by

Colonel Sheil.

[201] Some of these papers, written closely on both sides, had been cut

into three pieces, and apparently sent by as many messengers.

[202] Allahdad Khan, the Afghan envoy, who accompanied Captain

Conolly, had been permitted to take his departure from Bokhara, but

was afterwards brought back and confined. He remained for some days

in the same apartment with Stoddart and Conolly, but was subsequently

removed to other quarters. The servants of the latter officer were also

thrown into prison—some of them into the well, or log-house, in which

Stoddart had been incarcerated.

[203] An Afghan over-coat.

[204] Saleh Mahomed, the Akhondzadeh, made a similar statement to

Colonel Sheil. I see no reason to doubt the statements of this man,

which are confirmed in many particulars by the accounts of other

witnesses.

[205] _Arthur Conolly’s MS. Journal._—A Russian Mission was then at

Bokhara, under the charge of Colonel Boutenoff, who seems to have been

in higher favour than the English gentlemen; and to have greatly pitied

their condition. On the 15th of February the prisoners despatched a

letter to him by the hands of one of their dependents known as Long

Joseph, whose exploits are thus recorded:

“_February 15._—This day Long Joseph gallantly darted into our room,

and carried off a note which we had written for Colonel Boutenoff, to

inform him of our situation.

“_February 16._—Long Joseph having won a servant of the

Topshee-Bashee’s, conveyed to us a note from the gaoler, and sent it to

him; Stoddart writing to government through Sir J. M’Neill.”

Colonel Stoddart had interchanged visits with the Russians before

Conolly’s arrival. Saleh Mahomed says: “There was an ambassador at this

time from the Russian Government who came twice to see the English

gentlemen, who also visited him.”—[_MS. Records._]

[206] Obscure in _MS._

[207] Obscure in _MS._

[208] _MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly._

[209] The men formerly in Dr. Gerrard’s service, enslaved fifteen years

ago, whom I had ransomed at Khiva by order of Government. A. C.

[210] _MS. Correspondence._—Arthur Conolly was painfully anxious to

remove from the minds of his friends the impression which might have

been produced upon them by his letter of the 11th of March. Again he

wrote in his journal-letter: “I take this opportunity of explaining

that my letter of the 11th of March was written when I was very ill

with fever. Thinking that he might forcibly be sent away from me on

the departure of the Russians (as they brought a request for his

dismissal), or that we might be otherwise separated, Stoddart had

begged me to give him a memorandum of my opinions regarding the policy

to be pursued towards these states; and I wrote off a hasty summary of

these notions, which were running in my head, with many things that I

was anxious to say about my unfortunate servants, and to my friends,

when under excitement, which must have made my expressions very wild

and incoherent. I hoped that the paper containing them remained in

the hands of Long Joseph; but he, misunderstanding our instructions,

instead of keeping it, gave it to Eusofee-i-Roomee (Augustin), who,

apparently, went off at once with it to Caubul. When I got better I

drew up for Stoddart the memorandum which he had asked for, and which

he now decides on forwarding. It is written in a more calm and less

indignant tone than the letter aforesaid, but allowance must be made

for the brevity and freedom of the propositions, for we were so liable

to be interrupted and discovered, that I could only pen my opinions by

snatches, and paper is a scarce article with us.”—[_Arthur Conolly’s

MS. Journal._]

[211] General Pollock exerted himself to obtain an adjustment of the

claims of Captain Conolly’s servants; and he succeeded. The letter

which was written in reply to Pollock’s application shows in what

light Lord Ellenborough regarded Conolly’s mission: “With reference,”

wrote the Chief Secretary, “to your letter of the 23rd ultimo, on the

subject of the remuneration applied for, on behalf of the servants

attached to the mission of Lieutenant A. Conolly to Kokund, I am

directed to inform you that the Governor-General has no knowledge of

Lieutenant A. Conolly’s mission to Kokund having been authorised. On

the contrary, his Lordship was informed, by the late President of the

Board of Control, that Lieutenant A. Conolly was expressly instructed

by him not to go to Kokund; and, in all probability, he owes all his

misfortunes to his direct transgression of that instruction. The

servants entertained by him, however, are not responsible for the

indiscretion of their master. They were in the service of an officer

apparently employed on a public mission by his government, and the

Governor-General is prepared to consider their position favourably. His

Lordship, therefore, authorises the disbursement of the sums stated

in the papers attached to your letter, under reply to be due to these

several persons; but the sums so paid on account of wages accruing to

these several persons, after they left Khiva (after deducting therefrom

the amount of wages which would have become due during a direct march

to Caubul) will be made a charge against Lieutenant A. Conolly, who

will be required to refund the amount, as well as all sums which may

have been drawn on account of such an unauthorised extension of his

mission.”—[_Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: Simlah, Nov. 3, 1842. MS.

Records._]

[212] An abstract of this letter was forwarded by another route, and

it reached John Conolly at Caubul on the 4th of July. In this letter,

Stoddart reports the success of the Ameer at Kokund. “The Ameer,”

he wrote, “entered Kokund on the 11th of May, and gave it up to

pillage—destroyed its rulers—unpeopled its capital, and is now on

his return, having distributed the different governments among his own

Bokharan chiefs. He is become master of immense treasure, and will now

probably march against Khiva, which, unless saved by some demonstration

from Persia or Afghanistan, must fall in August or September, after a

short campaign.” With reference to the efforts of the Russian Mission,

he says: “The Russian Mission left this towards the end of April. I

feel convinced that Colonel Boutenoff’s kind desire to procure our

release failed solely in consequence of the unreasonableness of the

Ameer.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[213] General Pollock officially reported Captain Conolly’s death

from Caubul, in a letter dated September 30; but he added: “The only

authority for the death of this very intelligent officer is conveyed

in a Persian letter from a native of Caubul, who writes from Bokhara

to Moollah Ahmed Khan, of this city, saying, ‘Tell Moostafah (Captain

A. C.’s servant) that his uncle, whom he left here sick, saying he

was a great traveller and had visited Kokund, was taken very ill,

and though we gave him medicine and did all in our power, it was of

no avail. It was the will of God that he should die.’ Moostafah and

Moollah Ahmed Khan are both of opinion that Captain A. Conolly is the

person alluded to, and as the letter proceeds to say that the effects

of the deceased are at Bokhara, and can be sent when required; and as

Moostafah had no uncle, to whom could the description apply? I fear

there can be no reason to doubt the death of the above-named officer.

Colonel Stoddart is, from native report, said to be alive, and still

in confinement.”—[_MS. Records._] This is mere conjecture; and by no

means tallies with the more credible account of the execution of the

two prisoners. On the 3rd of November, 1842, the Supreme Government

assumed that Conolly was still alive. But the home authorities adopted

Saleh Mahomed’s story, and struck Stoddart’s name out of the army list,

from the 17th of June, 1842. I believe this really to have been the

date of their deaths. Major Rawlinson, on the morning of the 16th of

September, 1842, met one of Stoddart’s servants near Caubul, and the

man whom he knew, informed him that he had come direct from Bokhara,

having started immediately after the execution of his master.—[_MS.

Notes._] The reader may consult the works of Captain Grover and Dr.

Wolff.

[214] See the _Edinburgh Review, July, 1845_, for an account of these

efforts. The paper derives additional value from the assignment of its

authorship to Sir John M’Neill.

[215] _Colonel Stoddart to Major Rawlinson: Bokhara, July 7, 1841. MS.

Correspondence._ It may be gathered from this letter that Stoddart

had no intention of awaiting Conolly’s arrival at Bokhara; and that

Conolly proceeded thither under orders from Caubul, and an invitation

from the Ameer. An attempt has been made to control, in some measure,

the flood of sympathy which sets in so strongly towards Arthur Conolly,

by asserting that he was not authorised to proceed even as far as

Kokund, and that he therefore brought his misfortunes down upon his

own head. But I have before me the strongest proof that Conolly _was_

authorised by the Supreme Government to proceed to Kokund, and to use

his best endeavours to obtain the liberation of Colonel Stoddart.

In a letter, an official copy of which is now before me, the Chief

Secretary writes to the Envoy and Minister: “As in the present aspect

of affairs it does not seem necessary to continue the restriction

which had at first been imposed, his Lordship in Council authorises

you to permit Captain Conolly to proceed from Khiva to Kokund, if he

should think it expedient, and if he finds that he can do so without

exciting serious distrust and jealousy at the former place. In his

personal intercourse with the Khan of Kokund, he will be guided by the

instructions which have been issued, prescribing the purport of his

written communications. Captain Conolly may, in such a journey, find

increased means of using an useful influence at Bokhara for the release

of Colonel Stoddart; and his Lordship in Council need not add, that he

would wish every such means to be employed with the utmost earnestness

and diligence for that purpose.”—[_Mr. Maddock to Sir W. Macnaghten:

Dec. 28, 1840. MS. Records._]

[216] Two other notes were written by the prisoners on the back of

this paper: one to Miss Stoddart at Norwich, and the other to John

Conolly at Caubul. “Don’t believe all you hear or may hear,” wrote

Stoddart. “Keep all friends informed of my health, and don’t let them

be disturbed by rumours,” wrote Conolly.

[217] _MS. Correspondence._

[218] _MS. Records._

[219] Captain Grover.

[220] The extracts from Captain Conolly’s letters and journals in this

chapter are all made from the originals, and have, in some places, been

deciphered with much difficulty; the manuscript, written in very minute

characters, being greatly defaced by damp and attrition.

[221] On the 5th of May, Mohun Lal wrote: “The Prince (Futteh Jung) is

very, very anxious that the General should march to Caubul; he appears

now involved in difficulties, and undoubtedly is friendly to our

government. He says he would not allow Ameen-oollah and the Populzye

rebels to come into the palace, the evening they were obliged to leave

the city, but by allowing them to come in, he entertained two objects.

Firstly, to employ their services against the enemies of both states

(the Barukzyes, who murdered the Envoy and also his father, the King,

placed by the English Government on the throne) till the arrival of

General Pollock. Secondly, he may keep them quietly in his possession,

and catch them as rebels, when you approach.”—[_MS. Records._]

[222] “The Prince,” said Mohun Lal, “is of course very liberal to

those that espouse his cause, while the Barukzyes pay very little by

selling jewels and finery. The Kohistanees or disciples of Meer Hadjee

are towards the Barukzyes; but they groan to receive money lesser than

those who are with the Prince.”—[_MS. Records._]

[223] “Khan Shereen Khan,” wrote Mohun Lal, on the 9th of May, “came

last night to me and said, that the Barukzyes press upon him to side

with them to oppose the Prince; and if he does agree he is sure he

will be ruined. He says he is going to send his wives to some of the

country forts, and then either go into the Balla Hissar or wait upon

you at Jellalabad; and then he thinks that the whole of the Persians

will follow him.”—And again, on May 10th: “Yesterday, about noon, ...

Mahomed Akbar Khan came in person to Khan Shereen Khan, and persuaded

him, after a long talk, to side with him to oppose the Prince towards

Benee Hissar. When Mahomed Zemaun Khan heard this he got jealous,

and sent a message to Khan Shereen Khan, if he did not go himself or

send his son to assist Soojah-ool-Dowlah, as the Newab had requested

him, he had better not go, with Mahomed Akbar too. The latter at last

succeeded.”—[_MS. Records._]

[224] “When Mahomed Akbar,” wrote Mohun Lal, “appeared in the field

opposite the first or distant fort, Abdul Salem became traitor, and

waited on Mahomed Akbar, who gave him a horse and desired him to go to

his village. Upon this the people of the Prince, who were stationed

in the forts between the fort of Abdul Salem and Balla Hissar, became

disheartened and cowardly, obliged to desert the forts without

fighting, and fly to the Balla Hissar. Mahomed Akbar’s people followed

the fugitives to the very gates of the Balla Hissar, and possessed the

gun of the Prince. Mahomed Akbar had taken Major Pottinger also with

him to the fight.”—[_MS. Records._]

[225] “In consequence of establishing the British harmony.”—[_Mohun

Lal’s Translation._]

[226] _MS. Records._

[227] _MS. Records._

[228] _MS. Records._

[229] According, however, to our English notions, the contest was

very far from a vigorous one. John Conolly wrote from Caubul: “The

contending parties continue to amuse themselves with firing long shots

with their guns and jezails, and the Balla Boorj is attacked—that

is, fired at for three or four hours by one or two thousand men every

third night or so.”—[_MS. Correspondence._] Conolly says, in the same

letter: “There is an anecdote here, that three Feringhees arrived at

the Balla Hissar in disguise, and that on hearing this the Barukzyes

withdrew their outposts to a considerable distance.” In another letter

(May 26) he says: “The Prince holds out still in the citadel. The

Barukzyes have been battering at the Upper Boorj, and firing into the

Balla Hissar. According to our ideas, their efforts have been almost

harmless; but the garrison, I fear, have become alarmed, and would be

glad to see relief.”—[_MS. Records._]

[230] The Prince had no powder. Mohun Lal, however, contrived to

procure some and to convey it to the Balla Hissar, through the agency

of the Kuzzilbash chiefs.

[231] On the 5th of June, Mohun Lal wrote to Sir R. Shakespear,

Pollock’s military secretary: “If you will not march immediately, or

in four days, to Gundamuck, you will lose all your prisoners, and the

Barukzyes will possess the riches of the late Shah, as well as the

Balla Hissar and the artillery.”—[_MS. Records._] John Conolly’s

letters, written about this time, contain the same urgent exhortations

to advance, as the only means of saving the Balla Hissar and the

prisoners.

[232] The mine was altogether the merest bug-bear. It frightened the

Prince and the garrison; but Mohun Lal assured the former that it could

not by any possibility do him any harm, as it had not been properly

dug, nor run sufficiently far under the works to damage them, even if

the strength of the masonry were not such as to bid defiance to the

attempt.

[233] _Correspondence of Mohun Lal. MS. Records._ Futteh Jung continued

to write to the British authorities that he had little or no money; and

that if the British did not advance, the royal family would be ruined

and disgraced. “It is well known to you,” he wrote to General Pollock,

“that Mahomed Akbar has made peace, with the view to derive wealth from

me; but I know that I have none. If I could sell everything that I

possess, I should not be able to raise a lakh of rupees.”

[234] The Newab had little money; but the most valuable jewels of Shah

Soojah were in his possession. The Shah was wont to carry them about

with him in a bag; and he had them in his possession at the time of

his murder. “Mahomed Zemaun Khan,” wrote Mohun Lal to Sir Richmond

Shakespear, “has got hold of the most valuable jewels of the late King,

who, report said, had them thrown into a ditch when Soojah-ood-Dowlah

murdered him. This was seen by an Afghan at a distance, who after some

days went to the place and took out the small bag of jewels, which

he, being ignorant of their worth, sold them for 600 rupees. This was

reported to the Newab, who imprisoned the bidders and got all the

jewels from them. The bankers say that they are worth 50 lakhs of

rupees, but here are no men to purchase them.”—[_MS. Records._] Akbar

Khan had contrived to extract a considerable sum of money from the

Prince. On the 17th of June, Mohun Lal reported that the Sirdar had

received a lakh and a half of rupees from the royal treasury. On the

18th, John Conolly wrote that the Sirdar had drawn two lakhs, adding:

“He has taken an inventory of all the property and treasure in the

citadel; and has his own men there.” “It will be a great consolation

to us all,” he wrote in conclusion, “if you will tell us that no

negotiations beyond the ransom of the prisoners will ever be entered

into with Akbar. He is certainly the most uncompromising villain that

ever lived.”—[_Lieutenant Conolly to Captain Macgregor: Caubul, June

18, 1842. MS. Records._]

[235] “The Prince was seated on the throne on the 29th. Akbar

constituted himself prime minister of all Afghans. The Hindostanee

dependents on the Prince had been previously removed from the Balla

Hissar, and none but his immediate attendants were allowed to

remain—the garrison being composed of Akbar’s own soldiers. The

remnant of the royal jewels, treasure, and property, even to a few

silver cooking utensils, had been also made over to Akbar. It was

Akbar’s intention to have deposed the Prince; and several meetings

were convened to discuss the question. The resolution to crown the

Prince was sudden, and suggested by an idea that the Populzyes who

had connected themselves with Timour at Candahar might be induced to

recognise the present arrangements in a preference to a Suddozye King

under British auspices.”—[_Lieutenant J. B. Conolly to Sir Richmond

Shakespear: July 1, 1842. MS. Records._]

[236] All the circumstances attending their surrender ought to be

related. The incident is thus feelingly chronicled by Captain Johnson:

“Two days after the death of Shah Soojah, the people of Caubul demanded

that our hostages, who had been left under charge of Mahomed Zemaun

Khan, should be given up to the care of the son of the late High

Priest, Meer Hadjee. The former noble-hearted gentleman, than whom no

father could have behaved more tenderly to his children, begged and

entreated with tears that the separation should not take place—adding

that he was willing to give up his own family to the popular will,

but not the English gentlemen who had been entrusted to his care, and

who were his honoured guests—that he would, if the people so willed

it, make over to them his own son, with his sword round his neck, and

his turban for a winding-sheet, to be dealt with according to their

pleasure; but that force alone should deprive him of the society of his

friends. When all entreaties failed, he hoped to work upon the feelings

of the party at the conference by telling them that their chief and his

own sister and relations were in the hands of the British Government,

and that vengeance would assuredly be dealt upon them if the English

gentlemen sustained the slightest injury. On this, a grey-bearded

old gentleman told him and the rest that they might make their minds

perfectly easy as regarded the Afghan prisoners in India, as it was

contrary to the uses of Englishmen to hurt a hair of the heads of

their captives. The clamour of the people prevailed over all that the

Newab could urge, and with many a bitter feeling did this amiable man

make over the hostages to Meer Hadjee, with prayers and entreaties

to the latter that he would behave kindly to them; and at the same

time he sent with them to the latter’s house all the females of his

family, as the surest means of their protection; for however excited a

Mussulman population may be, it is seldom or ever that they violate a

harem.”—[_Captain Johnson’s MS. Journal._]

[237] Mohun Lal’s own account of his sufferings is worth quoting: “I

have the honour to address you, for the information of Major-General

Pollock, C.B., that Akbar Khan, on the night of the 11th inst. (July),

put me in charge of Moollah Said, Atchekzye, in whose house I was

forced to lay down, and a couch placed over me, on which the people

jumped, and are beating me with sticks in a very unmerciful manner.

Akbar wants 30,000 rupees from me—says, otherwise, that he will pull

out my eyes. All my body has been severely beaten. I cannot promise

anything without government’s order, but see myself destroyed.... All

my feet is wounded by bastinadoing.”—[_Mohun Lal to Sir R. Shakespear:

July 14, 1842. MS. Records._] “I suffer very much. Sometimes I am

pinioned and a heavy stone is placed on my back, whilst the red pepper

is burnt before my nose and eyes. Sometimes I am bastinadoed. In

short, I suffer every conceivable agony. He wants 30,000 rupees, out

of which he has hitherto got 12,000, after using me very rudely. The

remainder, if not paid in the course of ten days, he says he will pull

out my eyes, and burn my body with a hot iron.”—[_Mohun Lal to Sir R.

Shakespear: July 17. MS. Records._]

[238] The cause of this hasty removal is to be found in Akbar’s

suspicions that the Jabbar Khail, the most powerful of the western

Ghilzye clans, intended to carry off the prisoners and sell them to

General Pollock on their own account. This plot really existed, and had

been suggested to the chiefs of the Jabbar Khail by Captain Mackenzie

during his journeys to and from Jellalabad.

[239] They were turned out of the fort, indeed, to make room for the

prisoners, to the infinite annoyance of the unhappy chief, who made

every possible excuse for not receiving them, but was overruled by

Akbar Khan, who obtained admittance for them, in the first instance, on

the plea that he only required accommodation for the night, and then

urged that the fort would suit them better than any other place in the

neighbourhood. It was altogether a most unfortunate occurrence for Ali

Mahomed, as, subsequently, on the advance of the British, the fort was

levelled with the ground, and the garden destroyed.

[240] “I attach much weight,” wrote Lord Ellenborough, at the end of

May, “to what Major Sleeman says of the disposition of the Mahomedans;

but I am surprised that it has not occurred to him and to others, that

whatever may be the disposition of the Mahomedans, it is the absence,

not the presence of our troops, of whom more than three-fourths are

Hindoos, that alone can lead the Mahomedans to act against us. The

danger is in the position of the army, almost without communication

with India, too far off to return quickly at any season, unable

from the season to return now, without adequate supplies of food or

carriage. This is the danger which all the great statesmen in India

would perpetuate if they could, and while they maintain it, destroy

the confidence of the Sepoy and ruin our finances. _If I save this

country, I shall save it in spite of every man in it who ought to

give me support, but I will save it in spite of them all._”—[_MS.

Correspondence._]

[241] Some readers, not having maps before them, will better understand

the nature of this retirement if I liken it to the case of a man

wishing to retire from Reigate to London, and taking Dover and

Canterbury in his way.

[242] The services rendered by Mr. Robertson to his country, at this

time, have never been adequately acknowledged, except by General

Pollock himself, who never lost an opportunity of expressing his

gratitude for the assistance he had derived from the exertions of the

Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces. Mr. Robertson,

aware of the difficulty of collecting camels in sufficient number

for the purposes of the army, ordered letters to be addressed to the

principal collectors in Upper India, calling upon them to purchase

as many ponies and mules as they could get together in their several

districts. And it was in no small measure owing to these exertions that

Pollock was at length enabled to advance.

[243] _Mr. Maddock to General Pollock: July 4, 1842. Published Papers._

[244] _Mr. Maddock to General Nott: July 4, 1842, and Lord

Ellenborough, same date. Published Papers._

[245] “If I have not,” wrote Pollock, “lived long enough to judge

of the propriety of an act for which I alone am responsible, the

sooner I resign the command as unfit the better. I assure you that I

feel the full benefit of being unshackled and allowed to judge for

myself.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[246] A letter, too, was sent by Captain Troup to Akbar Khan with

a request that he would forward it to Nott. A few harmless lines

were written in ink; and much important matter in rice-water, to be

brought out by the application of iodine. The employment of Akbar Khan

himself, as the medium of communication between the two Generals, who

were contemplating his destruction, is not one of the least amusing

incidents of the war.

[247] Pollock was afraid that Nott would have commenced his retreat

before the receipt of the despatch of July 4. “My movement will of

course depend,” he wrote in a confidential letter to Mr. Robertson on

the 10th of August, “on General Nott’s ability to meet me. Our late

accounts from that quarter are not favourable. They say that General

Nott is bent on retiring, and I very much fear that he will have made

several marches to the rear before the government despatch can reach

him.... I ought by this time to have heard from General Nott, in reply

to my letter by the first of the five messengers. If he is not coming

on, my negotiations for the prisoners will be a very simple affair;

but it must ever be a subject of regret that he should so hastily

retire, and at such a time, while he commands an army in every respect

efficient, and amounting to about 15,000 men.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[248] It was reported in camp, and subsequently set forth in the local

journals, that some women had been violated by our soldiery. “But,”

says Captain Macgregor, “I made the strictest inquiry into the matter,

both from the Afghan chiefs who were with me, and from the inhabitants

of the village, but could not trace in the slightest degree any just

foundation for the report in question. Had there been any, it would

doubtless have formed a subject of great grievance to the people,

who are so very jealous of the honour of their women.”—[_Captain

Macgregor’s Report on the Operations in the Shinwarree districts. MS.

Records._]

[249] _Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records._

[250] There was no need to cut them down. It was sufficient to cut

deep rings through the bark to the heart of the tree; for they seldom

survived the operation. There is something in this so repugnant to our

civilised and Christian ideas of righteous retribution, that it is

only just that I should give in this place the explanation of an act,

perpetrated, indeed, upon other occasions, in the words of an officer

equally gallant and humane. “All the injury,” said Captain Macgregor,

“that we could do to their forts and houses could, with facility, in

a short time be repaired by them. From their proximity to the hills,

they could always obtain timber in abundance; and where water is

plentiful they could rebuild easily the bastions we might blow up;

and therefore a greater degree of punishment than this seemed to be

necessary, and was completely within our power, if we destroyed their

trees—a measure which seems barbarous to a civilised mind; but in no

other way can the Afghans be made to feel equally the weight of our

power, for they delight in the shade of their trees. They are to be

seen under them in groups, during the summer, all day long, talking,

reading, weaving, and sleeping. Even women and children seek the shade

of their trees. The Afghan mountaineer is not tangible to us in any

other way. He removes his herds, flocks, and property to the hills on

the shortest notice; and flies before our troops to places where he is

inaccessible to them. The Goolai people, moreover, were deserving of

no mercy. The amount of treasure they had plundered (viz., 18,000 or

20,000 rupees) was considerable. They had been very pertinacious in

attacking Captain Ferris’s cantonment; and equally so, subsequently,

our troops at Jellalabad. Therefore the Brigadier determined at once

to commence the work of destruction, desired that neither fort, house,

tree, grain, nor _boosa_ should be spared to them. This assuredly was

the best plan for preventing the necessity of harsh measures in future.

Working parties from the brigade were accordingly appointed for this

purpose.”—[_Captain Macgregor’s Report. MS. Records._]

[251] _Report of Brigadier Monteith: July 27, 1842. Published Papers._

[252] “It is impossible,” wrote General Pollock, “to guess how this

mission may succeed, because, in dealing with Afghans, you deal

with treachery and deceit; but appearances are as fair as they can

be for the release of the prisoners. Captain Troup says that if it

had depended on Mahomed Akbar alone, some of the ladies would have

been sent with him; but Mahomed Shah appears to be a bitter enemy

of ours—much more so than I had reason to suppose. The man who has

come with Captain Troup was selected in opposition to the wish of

Mahomed Akbar, who wished to send Dost Mahomed Khan, a brother of

Mahomed Shah. Dost Mahomed was objected to by the chiefs as being too

bigoted to his own party, whereas Hadjee Buktear Khan was considered

neutral. He is a Candahar man—has been at Bombay and others of our

settlements, and is better acquainted with the European character than

the other.”—[_Jellalabad, July 15. MS. Correspondence._]

[253] “Captain Troup,” wrote General Pollock, “is still here. I am

glad that, in proposing terms, I insisted on having the guns, for I

think there is almost a certainty of an objection being made to that,

in which case, of course, I can back out.... On this occasion I have

written nothing.”—[_Jellalabad, July 18. MS. Correspondence._]

[254] “I have my camp in two lines,” he wrote a few days afterwards

to Pollock, “the cavalry facing the river, and rear to the water—the

front of our encampment an open stony plain—_a good place for a

fight_. The left of our line rests on a small hill that commands a view

all round.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[255] The Governor-General, however, seems to have considered it not

wholly improbable that the contemplated military movement upon Caubul

would be suspended by the favourable conclusion of the negotiations

with the enemy; and actually authorised Pollock to exercise his

discretion in ordering Nott to retire by Quettah, even though the march

upon Ghuznee and Caubul had been commenced.—[_Lord Ellenborough to

General Pollock: July 29, 1842._] Subsequently the Governor-General

seemed to awaken to a sense of the extraordinary character of this

suggestion, for he wrote to General Pollock to say that he “could

hardly imagine the existence of circumstances which could justify the

diversion of Major-General Nott’s army from the route of Ghuznee and

of Caubul, when his intention of marching by that route shall have

been once clearly indicated.”—[_Lord Ellenborough to General Pollock:

August 26, 1842._]

[256] _MS. Correspondence._

[257] Nott’s letter was despatched on the 27th of July. It comprised

but a few lines:

“Candahar, July 27, 1842.

“MY DEAR GENERAL,—You will have received a copy of a letter from the

Governor-General under date the 4th instant, to my address, giving me

the option of retiring a part of my force to India _viâ_ Caubul and

Jellalabad. I have determined to take that route, and will write to

you fully on the subject as soon as I have arranged for carriage and

supplies.—Yours truly, W. NOTT.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[258] The force consisted of the 3rd Dragoons; the 1st Native Cavalry;

a squadron of the 5th and of the 10th ditto, with the head-quarters;

600 Sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry; her Majesty’s 31st Regiment;

the 33rd Regiment of Native Infantry; the whole of Sir Robert Sale’s

and of Colonel Tulloch’s brigades; with seventeen guns, a company of

Sappers and Miners, and a regiment of Bildars (Pioneers) under Mr.

Mackeson. A small force was left (chiefly for want of carriage) at

Gundamuck, and the rest remained in garrison at Jellalabad.

[259] In this affair we lost seven men killed, and about fifty

wounded. Among the latter were four officers, Major Huish (26th

Native Infantry), Captain Edwards (9th Foot), Captain Tait (Irregular

Cavalry), Ensign Robertson (37th Native Infantry).

[260] With regard to the destruction committed at Mammoo Khail, see

Appendix.

[261] “Hurrah!” he wrote; “this is good news. _All_ here are prepared

to meet your wishes to march as light as possible. _I_ take no carriage

from the Commissariat; and our officers are doubling up _four_ in a

small hill tent, and are sending all to the rear that they can dispense

with.... _I am so excited that I can scarce write._”—[_General Sale to

General Pollock: Futtehabad, August 16, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[262] _General Sale to General Pollock: August 18, 1842. MS.

Correspondence._

[263] Pollock had received no later intelligence from Nott’s camp than

that contained in the brief letter of July 27, though he had despatched

ten messengers to the westward. It was not until midnight of the

6th-7th of September that letters from Nott’s camp were received by

Pollock at Gundamuck.

[264] To many of his letters to General Pollock, Futteh Jung signed his

name in English characters.

[265] Akbar Khan compelled the Prince to write to Pollock: “I have

given to Sirdar Mahomed Akbar the full and entire management of all my

property and affairs of every description, and have resigned to him in

perpetuity full power to judge and settle all questions on all points.

Whatever arrangement he may make with the English Government I agree to

confirm, and no alteration shall be made.” And again: “The arrangements

which have been made with Captain Troup and Hadjee Buktear have been

all approved of by me. I have delegated all powers over my country and

wealth to the Wuzeer, Mahomed Akbar Khan, Barukzye!” But the Prince

took the first opportunity to write privately to the General: “My

friend, it will have been evident to you that in this matter I have

been compelled to act thus. I did not even know that Captain Troup and

Hadjee Buktear had been sent, and I had not the slightest knowledge

of the proposals made by them. Captain Troup is well aware of this,

since we had never met, nor had any of my confidential people been

employed between us.”—[_Futteh Jung to General Pollock: Translation.

July 21, 1842. MS. Records._] This letter was evidently written in a

state of painful alarm. It concludes with the words: “You must be very

careful not to let it be known that I have written to you; since,

should these villains hear of it, they would put me and my family

to death.” In reply to this letter, Pollock expressed his surprise

that, “notwithstanding his Majesty’s friendship, the good-will of the

chiefs, and the unanimity of the people at Caubul, still they cannot

prevent the treachery of one man from causing dissension between the

two governments, and that they are unable to show their good-will to

us by releasing our prisoners.” To this, on the 1st of August, Futteh

Jung replied: “You express surprise at my many well-wishers not being

able to find a remedy for one evil-disposed person. You write: ‘If this

could be effected, a great object would be obtained.’ Eminent in rank!

You write truly. But in a religious war, a father cannot trust his

son—a son, his father.”

[266] In consequence of this act, Aga Mahomed became a marked man.

His father was assassinated, and he and his brother cut down by order

of Akbar. Being ruined, he found his way to Hindostan, and became the

guest of an English officer, who obtained from the Government a pension

of twelve rupees a month for him. He served on the late expedition to

Bushire, and died leaving a helpless widow, like himself, a convert to

Christianity.

[267] A squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry; a squadron, and the

head-quarters of the 10th Light Cavalry; the left wings of the 33rd

and 60th N.I., with two guns of the 3rd troop 2nd brigade of Horse

Artillery, were left at Gundamuck.

[268] They, however, diverted themselves with a little internal

mutiny—rising up against the Sikh general, Gholab Singh Provindea, and

burning his tent. The poor old man, in an extremity of terror, sought

refuge under Pollock’s skirts.

[269] _General Pollock’s Report._

[270] _General Pollock’s Report._

[271] For an account of the operations of the second division of

Pollock’s army, see Lieutenant Greenwood’s “Narrative of the late

Victorious Campaign in Afghanistan, under General Pollock.”

[272] Captains Troup and Bygrave, when the other prisoners were sent

to Bameean, had been taken by Akbar Khan to the Balla Hissar—but had

subsequently been permitted to remove themselves to Ali Mahomed’s

force, where Captain and Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Trevor, with their

children, had been left, on account of sickness, under charge of Dr.

Campbell.

[273] They required Troup, however, to write a letter to General

Pollock making known Akbar Khan’s wishes, and inclosing one from the

Sirdar himself. The letters were sent, but the messengers returned some

days afterwards, declaring that they had not been able to penetrate the

British camp.—[_Captain Troup to General Pollock. MS. Correspondence._]

[274] Bygrave had before gone on to Tezeen with Sir-Bolund Khan.

[275] _Captain Troup to General Pollock. MS. Correspondence._ See

Appendix.

[276] Nothing could have been better than the conduct of the troops

throughout the whole of these operations. “I think no officer,” wrote

Pollock, in a private letter, on the 23rd of September, “could possibly

have had finer regiments under his command than I have had, and to

them do I owe all my success, which, as far as I am able to judge, has

been so far complete. I hope the Governor-General may think so, and

I shall be satisfied.” In this letter, the difficulties with which

Pollock had to contend, from the scarcity of cattle, are thus detailed.

“I have had,” he wrote, “great difficulties to contend against even

to the last, from the great want of carriage-cattle. At Gundamuck,

after my first engagement with the enemy, I found myself so reduced in

cattle, that, to enable me to take on only fourteen days’ supplies,

I was obliged to leave at that place two horse-artillery guns, two

squadrons of cavalry, and two wings of Native infantry; and yet with

all this, all the camp-followers, public and private, were compelled

to carry eight days’ supplies. The fighting men carried three. The

1st Cavalry carried eight days’ supplies on their horses. The rest of

the cavalry carried three or four days’. In this way we were enabled

to move.... The night before I left Gundamuck, I received an official

letter and a survey report, setting forth that the whole of the camels

of one regiment were unserviceable, and that they could not get up even

without their loads. This was rather provoking, for I have only three

Native regiments with me. My answer was short. ‘Tell the commanding

officer, that if his regiment can’t march, he will relieve the two

wings ordered to remain behind, and who are willing to go forward on

any terms.’ The regiment marched, and I heard no more about their

camels. After our last engagement with the enemy (it was a severe

struggle) we had 160 killed and wounded; and again carriage was in

requisition. The spare horses of the cavalry were had recourse to; and

I lent my own riding-horse to one poor fellow.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[277] “The view from the look-out in the city,” wrote Rawlinson in his

journal, “was now very fine. The hillocks on the right were crowned

with masses of horsemen, numbering apparently about 1500—a crowd of

footmen occupied the rocky heights in front of our line and beyond,

the shoulder of the Peer-Paee-Mal hill was covered with human beings

thick as a flight of locusts, bodies of horse continually debouching

round the shoulder and pushing on to join their comrades on the

right.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[278] Nott, in his public despatches, was always somewhat chary of

his praise, but in his private letters he delighted to dwell upon

the achievements of his Sepoy regiments. Writing to Hammersley about

this affair of the 29th of May, he said: “You will hear enough of our

affair of the 29th with the enemy. The troops behaved well, and I am

really surprised that our loss was so trifling; but I have remarked

that the Afghans fire high. Our Sepoys are noble fellows—1000 are

fully equal to 5000 Afghans or more. A detail of the 1st Cavalry,

under Chamberlaine, behaved very well indeed. The enemy had 8000 men

in position and 2000 in reserve. We had 1500 of all arms in the field.

The enemy have broken up. I expect Wymer back in a day or two, when I

will drive the rebels out of the Candahar district. How I should like

to go to Caubul! It is wonderful that the people in Hindostan should be

so panic-struck; and they seem to believe that our Sepoys cannot stand

the Afghans. Now, I am quite sure, and should like to try it to-morrow,

that 5000 Bengal Sepoys would lick 25,000 Afghans.”—[_General Nott to

Lieutenant Hammersley: June 2, 1842. MS. Correspondence._]

[279] It is said that the widow of Akrum Khan, who was executed

at Candahar in the preceding autumn, was in the field, riding her

husband’s charger, and bearing a Ghazee standard. Lieutenant Rattray

writes: “As the enemy drew near, a white object was observed in the

centre of their front ranks, which seemed the rallying-point for the

Ghazees, chieftains, Moollahs, kettle-drums, and standard-bearers.

This proved to be no less a personage than the heroic widow of the

slaughtered Akrum Khan. Throwing aside her timid nature with her

‘Boorkha,’ she had left the sacred privacy of the Zenana for the

foremost rank in the battle-field, had bestrode her husband’s charger,

and with his standard in her hand had assembled the tribes.”

[280] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._ It appears that early in June

the enemy’s suspicions of our intended withdrawal were confirmed in a

curious manner, and that they seemed then to think of terms. Rawlinson

says: “It appears that when the entire party of the Douranee chiefs

were on the point of dissolution, a Hindostanee deserter joined the

camp from the town, saying that he and his comrades had received

letters from India, stating positively that orders had been sent up

for our retirement. The man, in fact, explained in detail all our

plans—the abandonment and destruction of Khelat—the march of the

brigade to bring up camels from Quettah—and he even asserted that we

were preparing to destroy the four corner bastions of the city and the

gateways, and that we should leave in a month hence. This decided the

chiefs on dropping their offers of accommodation, and holding on until

events became more developed.”

[281] It is to be borne in mind that the supreme political authority

had been vested by the Indian Government in the General. Nott, however,

was not inclined to interfere in the political management of affairs,

and Rawlinson continued to conduct them very much as he had done before

the order was issued; but he referred all important questions to the

General, who, for the most part, deferred to the opinions of his more

experienced political associate.

[282] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._

[283] “The particular object to be gained by adopting this latter route

it was difficult to divine, and the generally-received impression

among the officers—perhaps because the one most desired—was that our

General was to lead us on to Caubul, and that the mention of Dehra

Ismael Khan was merely to throw dust in the eyes of the natives.

Indeed, it was afterwards accounted for, whether justly or not, by

this fact, that if the Lohaunies, upon whom we were dependent for a

large proportion of our camels, had had an idea that our intention

was to have marched on Ghuznee and Caubul, they would have declined

accompanying our army.”—[_Neill’s Recollections._]

[284] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: Ghuznee, September 7. MS.

Correspondence._

[285] “We accordingly marched on unmolested to our encamping-ground,

and as we passed the source of the Turnuck, with the precipitous

hill on our left, and the strong grounds intersected with bogs and

canals, and supported by forts upon our right, every one acknowledged

that there was no better defensible position on the entire road from

Candahar to Caubul.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[286] “The General first learnt of what was going on about two o’clock,

when an orderly came back from Captain Delamain reporting that no

enemy was in sight, and asking for orders. The General immediately

ordered the troops back. Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Brett galloped

in, saying that about 2000 of the enemy had appeared in front of

Captain Delamain, and were too strongly posted on some rising ground

to be attacked. The General again ordered the troops back. A third

orderly came galloping, to say the cavalry were engaged; and very

shortly afterwards other men came from the field, declaring our Horse

to be annihilated. The General now went out with all the troops, for

the enemy’s force was reported to be above 7000, and we expected

them to be flushed with their success. The horse artillery reached

first, and Leslie took the command. We came up shortly afterwards, and

found the cavalry still in a body, but having evidently suffered a

defeat.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[287] “The General now turned down to some forts, from which some shots

were reported to have been fired. The villagers all came out with

Korans and ropes round their necks, praying for quarter. The General

granted quarter, but sent in the light company of the 40th to search

the houses. A shot was fired from some Ghazee in the place, and orders

were then given for an indiscriminate massacre. The women and children

were spared, but I suppose 100 of the villagers were butchered. I

do not think the men were to blame—had they supposed themselves

committed, they would have fled to the hills before the troops moved

out, but no doubt there were _Ghazees_ in the place, desperate men

who had no wish to save their own lives, provided they could destroy

an infidel, and to the infatuation of these few men were the others

sacrificed. Five Commissariat camels were found inside, so that parties

in the fort had certainly been plundering; and as we approached

the place, I remarked a Moollah from one of the Boorjes, evidently

haranguing the people and urging them to die as Ghazees. It has been a

most unsatisfactory business altogether, and a few more such affairs

will compromise us seriously.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[288] Reeves and Bury—“Reeves was shot. Bury was cut down. Mackenzie

received a severe sabre-wound in the elbow joint of his right arm....

Ravenscroft had been shot before the charge; but the wound turns out

not to be dangerous. Malet had a very narrow escape. His hunting-cap

(round which a shawl was wound) saved him, but he was slightly

wounded in the face. Christie was ridden over in the confusion and

lost his horse, but was remounted by one of his Native officers and

saved.”—[_Major Rawlinson to Major Outram Ghuznee, September 7, 1842.

MS. Records._]

[289] He declared that one of them was Nott’s.

[290] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: September 7, 1842. MS.

Correspondence._

[291] Fired, however, from a height, the balls never ricocheted, and

did but little mischief.

[292] _Major Rawlinson to Major Outram: September 7, 1842. MS. Records._

[293] _Colonel Stacy’s Narrative._

[294] _General Nott’s Official Despatch._

[295] “The extensive village or town of Roza is situated about two

miles from Ghuznee, and is lovely to behold. When this city was taken

by the force under my command, Roza was full of inhabitants—men,

women, and children. My troops were encamped close to its walls. Its

gardens and its houses were full of property; its barns and farmyards

were well stored; its orchards were loaded with fruit; its vineyards

bent beneath a rich and ripe vintage; the property taken from our

murdered soldiers of the Ghuznee garrison were seen piled in its

dwellings.... Four days the victorious Candahar army remained encamped

close to this village, with all these temptations before it, and at

its mercy; but not a particle of anything was taken from the Afghans.

The fruit brought for sale was paid for at a rate far above its

value. No man nor living thing was injured.”—[_General Nott to the

Adjutant-General: Lucknow, April 4, 1843._]

[296] “An active and spirited enemy might have annoyed us exceedingly

during this movement; but the Afghans appeared to have lost all heart

from the affair of the morning, and a little cavalry skirmishing was

all that occurred.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[297] “The enemy appear to have been unable to traverse their big gun

sufficiently to bring it to bear on our new position; and I suspect,

also, they must have expended their shot, for the last two rounds which

were fired as we were changing ground, and which fell short, were old

shells of ours filled with earth.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[298] Colonel Palmer and the other British officers had been carried to

Caubul.

[299] The engineer officers fathomed the great well in the citadel, and

found fifty-one feet of water in it. The bottom of the well is believed

to be below the level of the river, so that it could not be drained.

The fear of a failure of water ought not, therefore, to have driven

Palmer to surrender. He might easily have secured the possession of the

well by running a covered way from it, and protecting it with his guns.

[300] “I visited Roza in the evening, took another copy of the Cufic

inscription upon Mahmoud’s tomb, and had a long conversation with the

Moollahs of the shrine. They assert that the tomb was constructed in

its present state immediately after Mahmoud’s death; that it remained

intact during the Ghuzneevide and Ghooride dynasties, but that when

Ghenghiz Khan, in his pursuit of Jellaladeen, threatened Ghuznee, the

inhabitants heaped the tomb over with earth and ruins to preserve it

from desecration, and deserted the place. They further pretend that the

tomb thus remained buried until the time of Sultan Abdool Rizak, the

grandson or great-grandson of Timour, to whom the spot was revealed

in a vision, and who excavated and repaired the place, and dedicated

to it rich endowments of lands. The endowments remained, they say,

till the time of Nadir, when they were resumed by the government, and

since that time the establishment at the tomb has been dependent for

support upon a few gardens attached to the village, and the voluntary

offerings of devotees. The Moollahs uphold that the gates are really

those of Somnauth, and that the inscriptions on the tomb date from the

time of the son of Mahmoud; but this I hold to be morally impossible,

for although the Cufic may possibly be of the form used in that age

(which, however, I doubt), the inscription in the Nuskh character

on the reverse of the sarcophagus, which details the precise date

of the Sultan’s death, is obviously of a much later age. From many

circumstances, I feel positively certain that the tomb does not boast

a higher antiquity than that of Sultan Abdool Rizak, who built the

present walls of Ghuznee, and who is himself buried in a rude mausoleum

on the outskirts of the village of Roza. The gates, therefore, are

certainly not those of Somnauth; but it is of course the interest of

the Moollahs to keep up the delusion, and to affect for the spot the

odour both of sandal and sanctity. I was much struck by the crowds

of pilgrims, Mussulman officers in our ranks, who thronged the tomb

during my visit there to make the _Ziarut_.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS.

Journal._]

[301] Major Rawlinson’s account of the removal of the gates is very

interesting. “We moved our camp,” he writes, “this morning from the

west to the east of Roza, preparatory to fairly setting out on the

march to Caubul; and during the day the measure was carried into effect

of removing the gates of Mahmoud’s tomb. The work was performed by

Europeans, and all possible delicacy was observed in not desecrating

the shrine further than was absolutely necessary. The guardians of the

tomb, when they perceived our object, retired to one corner of the

court and wept bitterly; and when the removal was effected, they again

prostrated themselves before the shrine and uttered loud lamentations.

Their only remark was: ‘You are lords of the country, and can of

course work your will on us; but why this sacrilege? Of what value can

these old timbers be to you; while to us they are as the breath of our

nostrils?’ The reply was: ‘The gates are the property of India—taken

from it by one conqueror, they are restored to it by another. We leave

the shrine undesecrated, and merely take our own.’ The sensation is

less than might have been expected; and no doubt the Moollahs, who

have had the guardianship of the tomb for generations in their family,

will be the chief sufferers by the measure. I doubt if the Afghan

tribes lately risen from obscurity to power, and holding the country

rather as conquerors than citizens, possess that feeling of unity

with each other, and identity with the interests they are supposed to

protect, to view the abduction of the gates as a material outrage.

The act may be made use of by the priesthood to excite fanaticism

against us; but if the Barukzye chiefs could only retain their darling

plaything, power, they would care little about the gates of Somnauth.

With Shah Soojah the case was different. As the representative of the

Suddozye family, aiming at the reconsolidation of monarchical power,

he could not but view the demand of Runjeet Singh for the gates as a

national indignity, powerfully affecting his own personal and political

interests. At present, religious excitement is alone to be apprehended

from our carrying off these trophies. I call them trophies, although

assured that they are spurious, for the belief in their genuineness is,

politically considered, the same as if they really were so.”—[_Major

Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[302] The enemy harassed our camp at night, firing on our picquets,

and working us other annoyance. “I doubt the policy,” wrote Rawlinson,

“of our firing a few forts and going no further. It exasperates the

Afghans without intimidating them. I believe that we should either have

abstained altogether from retribution, or have carried fire and sword

before us.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[303] “The attack upon the heights and their subsequent abandonment,”

says Major Rawlinson, “might have led to unpleasant consequences,

had not the news of Akbar’s defeat arrived just in time to prevent

Shumshoodeen from availing himself of this advantage. We were all

most anxious to have gone straight on to Mydan, and to have attacked

Shumshoodeen in his position, throwing the light companies along the

heights to the left, which were already in our possession, the whole

way down to the Mydan gorge; but the General would not stir beyond the

place he had first marked out for his encampment, for fear of harassing

the cattle.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[304] _MS. Notes._—See also the following from Rawlinson’s Journal:

“As it appeared desirable that a direct communication should be

established between the camps as soon as possible, I proposed to the

General, on arriving at Urghundeh, that I should ride in and see

General Pollock. My offer was accepted, and I immediately put on an

Afghan dress, and escorted by the Parsewans who had come out to the

camp, rode in through the town to the race-course, where I found the

Jellalabad force encamped. I experienced no sort of difficulty or

inconvenience on the road, being generally taken for an Afghan. I now

learnt from General Pollock that there were no fresh orders from Lord

Ellenborough regarding the establishment of an Afghan Government; in

fact, that he was prohibited from pledging the government to recognise

any one, but that still, as Futteh Jung had thrown himself on our

protection, and that as it was absolutely necessary something like

a government should be established, in order to enable us to obtain

supplies (the Jellalabad Commissariat being entirely exhausted) as

well as to facilitate our subsequent departure, General Pollock had

resolved to give Futteh Jung such indirect assistance as he was able.

In this view he had recommended the Kuzzilbash and Douranee chiefs

to tender their allegiance to him, and he had so far given him his

countenance as to accompany him to the Balla Hissar in the morning, and

even, as the Shah elect took his seat on the throne, to fire a royal

salute, ostensibly for the remounting of the British colours on the

citadel of Caubul, but of course, in the apprehension of the Afghans,

as an honorary recognition by us of the new monarch’s accession. I met

Macgregor in my way to the camp, coming into the Balla Hissar with

all the chiefs to make their salaam to Shah Futteh Jung as he is now

called, and I now hear that Macgregor, who conducts all the political

duties of General Pollock’s camp, endeavoured, in a private audience

which he had of his Majesty after the Durbar, to come to an explanation

with him regarding our inability to support him with men, money, or

arms, and the necessity, in consequence, of his relying entirely on his

own resources. At first sight, it appears to me out of the question

that Futteh Jung should be able to hold his own after our departure,

and I see no great object even in making the attempt, but I cannot yet

form a proper judgment.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[305] Shakespear, with characteristic gallantry, had volunteered for

this service. The Kuzzilbashes had tendered their services to Pollock.

[306] “_September 14._—As we find that the prisoners have certainly

been carried off to Bameean, and the Kuzzilbashes are disposed to

assist us in their recovery, while General Pollock is not likely to

encounter further opposition on his march upon Caubul, it was suggested

to the General to-day that he should despatch a brigade from Urghundeh,

where the Bameean road strikes off, to form a support for our party,

assisted by the Hazarehs, to fall back upon. He would not, however,

listen to this proposal, declaring that he had only one object in view,

that of marching his force to India _viâ_ Caubul, without turning to

the right or left; and that he considered, from the tenor of all Lord

Ellenborough’s despatches, the recovery of the prisoners to be a matter

of indifference to government.”

“_September 15._—It was again to-day urged upon the General to send

a brigade to Bameean, or in that direction, to assist in the rescue

of the prisoners, but he seems to have made up his mind that he will

not separate his force unless positively ordered to do so by higher

authority.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[307] _Statement of Lieutenant Mayne—MS. Correspondence of Officers

on the Staff of General Nott._—The only apologetic explanation of

this which has yet reached me is to be found in the assertion, that

Mayne’s escort crowded on Nott’s staff. Mayne posted his horsemen on

the reverse flank, and it is his belief that they were not in the way

of the staff.

[308] _MS. Correspondence._

[309] They had been joined by their fellow-captives from Ghuznee. See

note in the Appendix. It may be mentioned that John Conolly, the last

of three ill-fated brothers, had died at Caubul on the 7th of August,

deeply deplored by all who had served with him in Afghanistan.

[310] “_August 28._—Every hamlet and fort we passed after daybreak

poured forth its inhabitants to stare and wonder at the Feringhee

prisoners. Not an uncivil word or gesture have I ever heard or seen in

all our wanderings; but, on the contrary, many a sympathising word and

look has been expressed, and especially by people who had previously

any knowledge of us.”

“_August 29._—On passing the above fort (of Mustapha Khan,

Kuzzilbash), where Saleh Mahomed and I were the first to arrive, I

was most agreeably surprised by the owner bringing out two or three

large trays full of excellent cakes and sweetmeats, and begging I

would distribute them among the ladies and children—expressing at the

same time the most unfeigned sympathy for all of us. To people in our

unfortunate situation, a civil word even is well appreciated, but such

a mark of kindness as this worthy Persian showed us, is not easily

forgotten. His very look bespoke him a man of generous and kindly

feeling. Our little fellow-prisoners—both boys and girls—had such a

feast as they have not had for many a day. On arriving at our bivouac,

another Kuzzilbash, who had a fort close by, hearing from Ahmed Khan

that I wanted to buy a horse, brought me one for sale. As I was,

however, afraid of running out of funds, I told him my fears. His reply

was, ‘I know you, and I will be satisfied with your note of hand. I am

a relation of Naib Sheriff Khan.’ This was a mark of confidence I could

not have expected in such dangerous times, when my life is not worth

twenty-four hours’ purchase. I did not take the animal.”—[_Captain

Johnson’s Narrative. MS._]

[311] “The commandant of our guard appears very civil and inclined to

oblige us in every possible way—at any rate he is so to me. I was

quite delighted to hear him talk in such enthusiastic terms of my

deceased and lamented friend Hopkins (his former commanding officer).

On asking him why he deserted with his company to Dost Mahomed in

September, 1840, his reply was, that he was disgusted with the abusive

language used towards him by the European non-commissioned officers;

and I do not doubt that this had a great effect in alienating him

from our service, although certainly not the immediate cause of his

desertion. Saleh Mahomed is a good-humoured, jolly fellow, and without

any prejudices against us Kaffirs. He is a soldier of fortune, cares

little whom he serves, has been to Bokhara, Yarkund, and was at the

taking of Kokund a few months ago. Rode with him the whole march, and

was much amused at his traveller’s tales. He is the greatest hero in

his own estimation I ever came across. There is no end to his feats of

valour, to which I am a ready listener, for two reasons: _firstly_,

that I am amused; _secondly_, that he is flattered by my being so good

a listener—by which I hope to turn him to good account.”—[_Captain

Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._]

[312] The words of the bond may be thus translated:—

“We gentlemen, Pottinger, Johnson, Mackenzie, and Lawrence, in the

presence of God and Jesus Christ, do enter into the following agreement

with Saleh Mahomed Khan:—Whenever Saleh Mahomed Khan shall free us

from the power of Mahomed Akbar Khan, we agree to make him (Saleh

Mahomed Khan) a present of 20,000 rupees, and to pay him monthly

the sum of 1000 rupees; likewise to obtain for him the command

of a regiment in the government service; and we attest that this

agreement is not false; and should we have spoken falsely then will we

acknowledge ourselves to be false men, even in the presence of Kings.

“E. POTTINGER, C. MACKENZIE,

“H. JOHNSON, G. ST. P. LAWRENCE.”

—[_Translated from the counterpart of the Agreement given by Saleh

Mahomed to Captain Johnson._]

[313] The agreement is thus worded:—“We, whose signatures are hereunto

attached, do bind ourselves to pay into the hands of Major Pottinger

and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, on condition of our release being

effected by an arrangement with Saleh Mahomed Khan, such a number of

months’ pay and allowances as they shall demand from us—such pay and

allowances to be rated by the scale at which we shall find ourselves

entitled to draw from the date of our release from captivity. We, who

are married, do further agree to pay the same amount for our wives and

families as for ourselves. We, whose husbands are absent, do pledge

ourselves in proportion to our husbands’ allowances.” The agreement

is drawn up on half-a-sheet of foolscap paper, in the hand-writing of

Captain Johnson. The names of all the prisoners (officers and ladies)

are attached to it; the first being that of Brigadier Shelton. There

is a codicil to it, signed by Lady Macnaghten and Mrs. Sturt, in these

words:—“We, who are widows, do pledge ourselves to pay such sums as

may be demanded from us by Major Pottinger and Captains Lawrence and

Johnson in furtherance of the above scheme”—“In our prison at Bameean:

11th September, 1842.”—[_MS. Records._]

[314] The European soldiers at Bameean were so reduced by sickness as

to be scarcely able to hold a musket. And they had lost all heart.

[315] “In order,” says Captain Johnson, from whose Narrative these

details are taken, “to show as imposing a front as possible, there was

no rear rank.”

[316] Seeing that Saleh’s Mahomed’s men wore our English belts and

pouches, the soldiers of Nott’s division were disposed to fall upon

them. It was intimated to the commandant that it would be expedient to

remove them out of the way of danger.

[317] “On passing the corner of the street where I formerly lived,

I could not forego the desire of looking on the ruins of a house

in which I had passed a period of two years of happiness. Although

I had expected to see the whole place unroofed, I was not prepared

for such a scene of desolation. Not one brick was left standing on

another in either my house or that of Sir Alexander Burnes (the

adjoining one). They were nothing but a heap of dirt, covering the

mouldering remains of our unfortunate people. A spot was pointed out

to me in Sir Alexander’s garden as that in which his body had been

interred.”—[_Captain Johnson’s Narrative of his Captivity. MS._]

[318] “_September 19._—Our Sepoys and camp-followers, taking their

cue, I fancy, from their officers, are very unruly, and commit

extensive depredations on the lands and villages near our camp; and

as the property thus plundered chiefly belongs to the Kuzzilbash

chiefs, General Pollock, who relies mainly on these people for the

consolidation of the new government, is subject to great embarrassment.

I have a sort of misgiving that Caubul will, after all, be destroyed.

In the present state of feeling, any accidental quarrel would lead to

a general rush upon the town, and the Sepoys once there, massacre and

conflagration would assuredly follow. General Pollock, by proclamations

of encouragement, has been endeavouring to persuade the Caubullees to

return to their houses and re-open their shops; but, after all that has

happened, it is difficult to persuade the townspeople that we do not

aim at retribution, and the proceedings about our camp at Char Deh are

anything but calculated to allay their suspicions; the city continues,

therefore, more than half closed, and supplies are procurable with

difficulty.”

“_September 20._—Our men have been plundering to-day as usual about

the camp, and in some scuffle which took place at Deh Afshur, four of

the Kuzzilbashes, with Khassim Khan, a chief, were slain by the Sepoys.”

“_September 21._—The fort of Mahomed Meerza, one of our worst enemies,

was given up to plunder, and we did not even respect the property at

Aliabad, which belongs to Gholam Mahomed Khan, the lately appointed

minister.... The townspeople had returned in small numbers to the town,

and had re-opened their shops; but owing to the affair at Deh Afshur, I

believe, a panic seized the people, and every one fled, believing that

orders had been issued for a general massacre.”

“_September 22._—The depredations of the Sepoys and followers from

this camp continue, notwithstanding all the efforts that are made to

repress them. The Kuzzilbashes cannot help believing that we encourage

these excesses, and in consequence they are not half satisfied of

General Pollock’s sincerity.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[319] The General forwarded a translation of the letter to Nott, who

sent it back with his comments. The charges and the denials appear in

the Appendix as they were forwarded to Pollock’s camp.

[320] He asked Mayne, on the 17th, when that officer appeared in his

camp, as mentioned at page 347, how many days’ supplies General Pollock

had with him? and when Mayne replied that he believed the General had

about a week’s supplies for his troops, “What business, then,” asked

Nott, “has General Pollock up at Caubul with only a week’s supplies?”

Mayne, of course, made no answer.

[321] A considerable body of Kuzzilbashes, under the command of

Shah-zadah Shahpoor and Khan Shereen Khan, the whole in charge of

Captain Colin Mackenzie, had accompanied M’Caskill’s force, and

co-operated with much effect, especially in rescuing a number of

sepoys and camp-followers of Elphinstone’s force from slavery. General

Pollock had appointed Captain Mackenzie to this important duty in

consequence of Lord Ellenborough’s request that he would select that

officer or John Conolly, if within his reach, for any political mission

that might be called for, even to the important duty of accompanying

General Nott’s force, if it were expedient for that officer to return

by a different route from Pollock’s. On reaching Hindostan, however,

Mackenzie met with the same neglect and injustice as the other

“children of another Government.”

[322] See Papers in the Appendix.

[323] _Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._

[324] “On the 9th our engineers set to work to blow up and destroy

the _Char Chutta_. The cry went forth that Caubul was given up to

plunder. Both camps rushed into the city, and the consequence has

been the almost total destruction of all parts of the town, except

the Gholam-Khana quarter and the Balla Hissar.... Numbers of people

(about 4000 or 5000) had returned to Caubul, relying on our promises

of protection—rendered confident by the comparative immunity they

had enjoyed during the early part of our sojourn here, and by the

appearance, ostentatiously put forth, of an Afghan Government. They had

many of them re-opened their shops. These people have been now reduced

to utter ruin. Their goods have been plundered, and their houses burnt

over their heads. The Hindoos in particular, whose numbers amount to

some 500 families, have lost everything they possess, and they will

have to beg their way to India in rear of our columns. The Chundarwal

has had a narrow escape. Safeguards have been placed at the different

gates; but I doubt not if our parties of plunderers would not have

forced an entrance had not the Gholam Khana stood to their arms, and

showed and expressed a determination to defend their property to the

last.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[325] Captain G. St. P. Lawrence, Sir W. Macnaghten’s Military

Secretary, who had been present at his murder, and had subsequently

shared the perils of the captivity.

[326] “Futteh Jung had urged his people to set fire to the palace as

he came out, observing that Shahpoor’s rule would be a brief one, and

that his own feelings revolted at the idea of the Suddozye seraglio

falling to the lot of either Mahomed Akbar or the Ghilzyes. Some

attempts were in consequence made at incendiarism, but the flames did

not spread.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[327] They seem to have been admitted by Pollock, but to have been

expelled by Nott. “General Pollock’s camp,” wrote Rawlinson in his

journal, “is crowded with hangers-on, imperfectly provided with

carriage or supplies, and he necessarily experiences much inconvenience

in consequence. General Nott has positively refused to permit his force

to be encumbered in the same way, and yesterday evening a general

clearance of our camp took place, preparatory to the march. About 500

men were expelled from the Bazaar of the 16th Regiment alone, where

they had taken refuge. Most of these people were the destitute Hindoos

of Caubul and Ghuznee. They had hoped to have found means of returning

to Hindostan with our column; but have been now obliged to go back to

Caubul and bide their fate among the Afghans.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS.

Journal._]

[328] Pollock took forty-four guns and a large quantity of ordnance

stores; but not the least of his trophies were a large number of

miserable mutilated natives of India, crippled by wounds or by the

frost, who had escaped with their lives from the great wreck of

Elphinstone’s army. Pollock now provided them with carriage, appointed

two officers to the charge of them, and conveyed them to Hindostan.

[329] Major Rawlinson says: “It is whispered that the recognition of

Shahpoor on the part of the Gholam-Khana has been a mere _ruse_ to

save the Balla Hissar, and that the chiefs hope to make use of this

successful manœuvre to propitiate Mahomed Akbar. The Kuzzilbash,

however, if they do meditate anything of this sort, will assuredly

overreach themselves, for if any _bonâ fide_ Afghan Government succeeds

in establishing itself at Caubul, the Gholam-Khana, after what has

happened, will certainly be extirpated, root and branch.”—[_Major

Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[330] The late Colonel Sutherland. “It is, indeed,” he wrote, “a

comfort to be able to look a native in the face again with confidence;

for although there was in reality no change that one could see in their

bearing towards us in this region, yet one could not help feeling that

we had fallen from our high position; and they would have felt this

too, and in the end, perhaps, shown that they did, had not the noble

resolution been taken of moving forward to retrieve our tarnished

reputation. Now all is right. How easily achieved! And we stand on

surer ground now in all quarters than we ever did at any former period

of our Indian history.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[331] See letter, _ante_, page 284, _note_.

[332] “_October 1._—The Governor-General brought me some papers to

consult me upon. Among others, a proclamation announcing that we retire

from Afghanistan, leaving to the Afghans the choice of their sovereign.

It was on this day, four years ago, that Lord Auckland issued the

proclamation announcing the grounds of his interference; and on the

same day, _in the same room_, Lord Ellenborough signed his notification

of altered intentions, in a clear, short, decided paper, which I much

approve. He could not avoid avowing some of his predecessor’s military

errors; but he has not touched at any length on the political, further

than that we lost our name and an army by neglect on the part of our

agents.”—[_Sir Jasper Nicholls’s MS. Journal._]

[333] Lord Ellenborough’s explanations on this subject are to be found

in the following letter to General Pollock, which calls for no comment:

“Simlah, Oct. 12, 1842.

“GENERAL,—I enclose for your information a copy of a proclamation,

signed by me here on the 1st of this month, but withheld from immediate

publication, with the view to the having previously made and circulated

to the Native Courts, and amongst the natives generally, a correct

translation which might be the official document in the native

language, and prevent any misrepresentation, or misapprehension of

the intentions of the government. I further wished not to make known

here the intention of withdrawing the army, until I knew that you had

actually the prisoners in your hands, and had made arrangements for

leaving Caubul. Your letter received here on the 5th removed every

ground for withholding the publication of the proclamation, had the

translation been prepared; but in consequence of the absence of Mr.

Clerk on duty in the plains, no such translation had been made as I

could fully rely upon.

“In the mean time, by a combination of accidents, and some irregularity

in the transaction of business in the Secretary’s office, the printed

copies of the proclamation were, without my knowledge, or that of

the Secretary himself, transmitted to the presidencies and the

political officers generally. There is no object in your publishing

the proclamation in your camp. Mr. Clerk returned last night, and the

translation will hardly be ready for transmission before to-morrow.

“I have, &c. “ELLENBOROUGH.”

—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[334] “_October 5._—His Lordship sent me the draft of his letter to

the Hindoo chiefs, relating to the gates of the Somnauth temple; and

invited remarks on it, which I freely gave; and he took them in good

part, adopting some of them.”—[_Sir Jasper Nicholls’s MS. Journal._]

[335] The Governor-General, when he first drafted the proclamation,

only knew that Nott had reached Caubul with the gates. He may have

thought it expedient to withhold the issue of it, lest by some untoward

accident the gates might be lost on their journey through the passes of

Afghanistan.

[336] We have no word very fitly to represent the character of the

affair. The French would have called it a _bêtise_. It was a _bêtise_

of the first magnitude.

[337] _Memorandum, by Captain Peter Nicolson, of a Conversation with

Dost Mahomed Khan: February 13, 1842. MS. Records._

[338] He was candid enough, too, at one time, to acknowledge that,

after the expulsion of the British from Caubul, the only chance of

establishing a settled government was through the agency of Shah

Soojah. “The Ameer concluded,” says Captain Nicolson, in the memorandum

cited above, “by using an expression exactly the same as one Shah

Soojah uses in his letter to Captain Macgregor.” He said: “The people

cannot now do without the King, for there is no one else who could

carry on the government.”—[_MS. Records._]

[339] Mr. Clerk was despatched to Lahore with an invitation from the

Governor-General; and Shere Singh was inclined to accept it, but he

was overruled in Durbar. The Crown Prince, Pertab Singh, and Dhyan

Singh, the minister, were sent to represent the Maharajah at for

Governor-General’s Court.

[340] A smart skirmish between Nott’s division and the enemy, on the

Huft-Kotul, may, perhaps, be considered as an exception. Colonel Stacy

describes it as “a severe affair;” and Nott, who was not inclined

to write lengthy despatches, or to exaggerate the importance of his

engagements, thought it worthy of a brief despatch. In _Colonel Stacy’s

Narrative_ and _Captain Neill’s Recollections of Service_, the reader

will find ample details of all the operations of the rear division.

_Lieutenant Greenwood’s Narrative_ may also be consulted for some

particulars of the movements of M’Caskill’s division.

[341] Lieut. Christie, of the Artillery; and Ensign Nicholson, of the

30th Native Infantry.

[342] “It was a night attack of some plunderers to obtain baggage. There

appears to have been sad confusion. The two officers were about that

time killed. But the guns were not, I believe, even attempted to be

carried off; otherwise we certainly never should have seen anything of

them again, whereas, the next day, the mountain howitzer and carriage

were found in _statu quo_, and the carriage of the three-pounder;

and were brought in. I dare say the three-pounder was not far. It in

all probability upset, and parted from the carriage; but if an enemy

(so usually termed) had made the attack, it is very improbable that

either guns or carriage would have been left, for a very few men

could carry gun, carriage, and all.”—[_MS. Correspondence of General

Pollock: Camp near Ali-Musjid, Nov. 1, 1842._] Of this unfortunate

business, another officer writes: “Night overtook our unfortunate 3rd

Brigade. The enemy, emboldened by the darkness, came down upon them

in strength. Some of our men were _cut off in the column_. Numbers

of them were hit by stones, which were flying in all directions. The

confusion must have been great. The Irregular Cavalry rode right over

the infantry, knocking down several of the officers. Christie and his

two mountain-guns were lost sight of in the dark, and are lost, himself

killed. Young Nicholson, of the 30th, is killed. As to the number of

men killed, nothing is yet known; but the whole of the Gholundauz that

were with Christie are missing.”—[_MS. Correspondence._]

[343] Pollock, determined to give the robber tribes as little

opportunity as possible of plundering his baggage, ordered that every

camel that could not come on should be shot, and that his load, if it

could not be brought on, should be immediately burnt.

[344] One more glimpse at Afghan politics from Major Rawlinson’s

interesting journal, may be afforded before we finally close it: “A

messenger arrived to-day from Caubul with letters from the Kuzzilbash

party, inviting the Nizam-ood-Dowlah to return, as Gholam Mahomed Khan

had already given offence by endeavouring to re-establish an exclusive

Douranee influence round the puppet King. At present, Khan Shereen is,

as far as real power is concerned, paramount, and he seems determined

to carry things with a high hand, having given out that if Shapoor

lends himself to Douranee intrigue he will force him to abdicate in

favour of another Prince. A strong Kuzzilbash detachment has at the

same time been sent to Ghuznee under Mahomed Hussein Khan, to occupy

that place, and in conjunction with the Hazarehs to hold in check any

possible movement of Ghilzyes or Douranees from the westward. Prince

Hyder, with another party of the Gholam Khana, has gone to Bameean,

and expects to secure the passes during the winter against the return

of the Barukzyes. Mahomed Akbar’s force, which remained for some time

at Khanjan, is said to have completely dispersed, the Sirdar himself,

with Ameen-oollah, having gone to Tash Noorghan, and the men having

all returned to their homes at Caubul. Newab Zemaun Khan, Jubbar Khan,

Oosman Khan, and Meer Hadjee, are said to be at Khooloom. The people of

Caubul have nearly all returned to the city, and are busy re-opening

their houses against the winter. Many of the Kohistan chiefs, Gool

Mahomed and Khoda Buksh, Ghilzyes, have also paid their respects to

Shahpoor, and Ameen-oollah was expected shortly to return. Mahomed

Akbar either really fears for his personal safety, now that a party

with which accommodation is impossible has come into power, or he

thinks it better policy to allow dissension to fructify in the capital

before he makes his reappearance on the scene. The Douranees are in

a large minority at Caubul, and must necessarily give way before the

Gholam Khana, if Khan Shereen acts with any energy. I look to Candahar

as their natural and necessary retreat, and no doubt at that place

Suddozye royalty, supported by their influence, will continue to

glimmer on, until Persia turns her attention to her eastern frontier,

and pushes forward the Barukzye Sirdars to play a game for her. The

Kuzzilbashes at the same time, cannot expect to hold their ground at

Caubul for any length of time.”—[_Major Rawlinson’s MS. Journal._]

[345] Lord Ellenborough had determined to bestow exclusive honours

upon Sale’s brigade; but Sir Jasper Nicolls desired to receive both

Pollock and Nott with the same military distinctions. “I wished,” he

wrote in his journal, “to have one of the reserve divisions to receive

each of the divisions as it came, but he (Lord Ellenborough) did not

desire that the honours paid to the garrison should be extended to any

other part of the army. This I regret, for they have all seen hard

work, great exposure, and some arduous days of service.”—[_Sir Jasper

Nicolls’s MS. Journal._]

[346] The rejoicings, in the opinions of many, were very much marred

by the prejudiced exclusiveness of the Governor-General, who seems to

have set his face very strenuously against the political officers, no

matter what their services. With all his admiration of the illustrious

garrison, Lord Ellenborough slighted Macgregor, who was its very life

and soul; and with all his appreciation of gallantry, he seemed unable

to appreciate the services of Eldred Pottinger.

[347] I wish it to be distinctly understood, that I have neither

censured nor ridiculed the assembling of the army of reserve at

Ferozepore. I believe it to have been a very politic movement.

[348] Pollock and Nott received most deservedly the distinction of

the Grand Cross of the Bath; and Lord Ellenborough, who was created

an Earl, formally invested them at Agra, and delivered some flowery

speeches upon the occasion. It may be mentioned here that the gates of

Somnauth, which had been brought up from Ferozepore on a triumphal car,

were deposited in the magazine of Agra.

[349] In confirming the acquittal of Colonel Palmer, Sir Jasper Nicolls

wrote that “the circumstances under which Colonel Palmer surrendered

Ghuznee to the Afghans, were such as he could neither control, alter,

nor alleviate.”

[350] And afterwards became again pensioners at Loodhianah, where

several members of the family have died since the original edition of

this work was published.

[351] It has now, however (1858), become a fact of some historical

importance. The Captain Havelock to whom allusion is here made, is the

late Sir Henry Havelock of Lucknow.

[352] _MS. Correspondence._

[353] _MS. Correspondence._

[354] _MS. Records._

[355] _MS. Records._

[356] Alluding to his Majesty’s dismissing the troops at Sir William

Macnaghten’s request from the Balla Hissar.

[357] Mahomed Akbar.

[358] _MS. Correspondence._

[359] _MS. Correspondence._

[360] H.M. 1st Cavalry:—captain, 1; lieutenant, 1; resaldars, 2;

rescudars, 2; naibs, 4; duffadars, 20; sowars, 220; trumpeters, 2;

nishan burdurs, 5; and about 150 of the 2nd Jan Baz.

[361] _MS. Records._

[362] Extract letter from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee,

No 26, dated 6th April, 1843.

Letter from Major-General M’Caskill to Military Secretary to

Government, 2nd April, 1843.

Letter to Adjutant-General Lumley, 2nd April, 1843, with enclosure.

Major-General Pollock to Lord Ellenborough, 2nd April, 1843.

Major-General Pollock to Lord Ellenborough, 16th April, 1843.

Major-General Nott to Military Secretary to Government of India, 4th

April, 1843.

Major-General Nott to Adjutant-General Lumley, 4th April, 1843.

[363] Sir W. Nott’s letter is to be found in Captain M’Neill’s

narrative, in the _Quarterly Review_ (July, 1845), and elsewhere.

* * * * * *

Transcriber’s note:

—Obvious errors were corrected.