1839.
Scarcely had the “Treaty of the Tafna” been signed, when its defects and
inconsistencies became apparent. It was impossible that a measure,
hurried on by General Bugeaud to a hasty and immature conclusion, solely
in order to enable him to send the troops under his command in the
province of Oran, that they might take part in the siege of Constantine,
could have had any other result.
The General, defending his act in the French Chamber, during the session
of 1838, thus expressed himself:—“Much has been said about the defects
in the details of the treaty. I frankly avow there were some, but I
think their importance has been exaggerated. There is only one of any
consequence, and that is the expression, ‘as far as the Wady Kuddra, and
_beyond_.’ This word may imply, as far as the province of Constantine.
The expression is certainly vague; but it must be remembered that I was
hard pushed for time. A steamer was waiting for my dispatch. It was
absolutely necessary that I should conclude for war or for peace.”
But it was precisely the doubt hanging over the proper interpretation of
this word as it stood in Arabic, which kept open the door for endless
disputes and misunderstandings, and ended by nullifying the treaty
altogether. So hastily and inconsiderately, indeed, had it been drawn
up, that a few days after the peace, when a French detachment had
occasion to go from Arzew to Mostaganem, Abdel Kader, without opposing
its march, sent to Bugeaud to remark that the French troops had violated
his territory. The complaint was perfectly just, inasmuch as no mention
had been made in the treaty of the right of passage.
The evils arising from incorrect translations are notorious. In the
diplomatic relations, between Abdel Kader and the French authorities,
more than one had occurred, which, had they been discovered by the
latter, might have entailed serious complications. But Abdel Kader was
satisfied, in general, with what he had written in Arabic, and the
French authorities with what they had written in French, and no more
questions were asked.
One instance may be given. The French had always placed at the head of
their treaties, that Abdel Kader acknowledged the sovereignty of France.
Abdel Kader never dreamed of making any such admission. It would have
cost him his throne. What he had written, in Arabic, in the article he
subscribed was, properly translated, “The Emir Abdel Kader acknowledges
that there is a French Sultan, and that he is great.” The difference is
wide.
In a matter of limits of territory, moreover, such matters become of
vital importance; and Abdel Kader was the last person to yield a point,
when he felt he was borne out by justice and common sense in maintaining
it.
By the French version of the 2nd article of the “Treaty of the Tafna,”
France is declared to possess, in the province of Algiers, “Algiers, the
Sahel, the plain of the Metija, extending to the east as far as the Wady
Kuddra, and _beyond_.” So the French chose to translate the Arabic word
“_fauk_,” which really means, “above.” The Gordian knot which the French
had made, and which they at last unscrupulously cut with the sword, was
this: they had given themselves a limit, and yet wanted to have no
limit. All their efforts to make Abdel Kader stultify himself, by
subscribing to this solecism, were unavailing.
Because the Arab Sultan maintained the absurdity of such a proceeding,
and finally threw down the gauntlet of defiance rather than sacrifice
the interests of his subjects and co-religionists, he was held up to
execration as a rebel, as a breaker of treaties, as a man of wild and
unprincipled ambition. He was treated as if he were contending with the
lawful possessors of the land; not fighting, as was truly the case,
against invaders, who had come to its shores denying all schemes of
aggrandisement, and pledged to achieve the single object for which they
came, and then withdraw.
In presence of a treaty, which each party read and construed after its
own fashion, political and commercial relations of any durable or
confidential nature were clearly impossible. An attempt, at least, to
come to some understanding was indispensable. The task of entering on a
discussion with Abdel Kader on the subject devolved on Marshal Valée,
who assumed the functions of Governor-General in Algiers, on November
30th, 1837.
The Marshal applied to the French Ministry for instructions. The reply
thus simply and categorically announces the doctrine of appropriation.
“By the words, ‘Wady Kuddra, and _beyond_,’ must be understood, all the
country in the province of Algiers which is beyond the Wady Kuddra, up
to the province of Constantine. The evidence of right, independent of
political considerations, permits no concession on that point. Since we
are masters of the province of Constantine, we cannot be without land
communication with it.”
The Marshal forwarded this view of the question to Abdel Kader, with his
own comments, as follows:—“France has ceded to you all the province of
Oran, less the reserved districts; all the ancient Beylik of Tittery,
without exception; lastly, all that part of the province of Algiers
situate to the west of the Chiffa. But you can have no pretension to any
part of that province which lies to the east of that river. As for the
Beylik of Constantine, about that there can be no misunderstanding, as
it is not even spoken of in the treaty; and, moreover, it was placed
under the rule of Achmet Bey when the treaty was signed.”
Abdel Kader replied;—“As regards the Beylik of Constantine, there can be
no difficulty: on that point we are agreed. But it is not so as regards
the province of Algiers. Remember what happened at the time of the
treaty. I wished to limit you to the plain of Algiers. General Bugeaud
begged me to extend this limit, and I consented. I ceded the country as
far as the Wady Kuddra towards the east, and as far as Blidah,
inclusively, towards the south. The expression, ‘as far as the Wady
Kuddra and above,’ must have a value. If not, why was it inserted in the
treaty? If it signifies anything, it must mean that you are limited to
the east, as you are to the west.
“To justify your interpretation, you base your reasoning on the
necessity there is for you to have a land communication between
Constantine and Algiers. But you admit, in the same breath, that
Constantine was not yours when the treaty was signed. Consequently, you
clearly could not have reserved for yourself a tract of country in
anticipation of an event which had not yet happened. Besides, is it
anything extraordinary, that you should have done towards the east, what
you have done towards the west?
“Arzew and Mostaganem belong to you; yet you have not claimed or
appropriated the tract of country which lies between those two towns. Do
not let us fling ourselves into interpretations. Let us keep to the
text; and let us frankly say, that all that portion of the province of
Algiers which is not included between the Chiffa on the west, and Wady
Kuddra on the east, and the first chain of mountains on the south,
belongs to me.”
“But,” answered the Marshal, “your interpretation is erroneous; for you
forget the word _beyond_, which is also in the treaty. ‘As far as Wady
Kuddra, and _beyond_’—which evidently meant, at the signing of the
treaty, up to the very limits of the province of Algiers in that
direction. But since that time we have taken Constantine. It means now,
therefore, as far as the _frontiers of Tunis_.”
Nowithstanding this pat of the lion’s paw, Abdel Kader retorted with the
coolness of a logician.
“The word _beyond_,” he wrote, “signifies something; but the Arab word
_fauk_ translated as you translate it—_beyond_—means nothing at all. Let
us make an experiment. Take any twenty Arabs you choose to select, and
ask them the meaning of the word _fauk_. If they say that the natural
interpretation of this word can, by any twisting of meaning, be made to
signify ‘_beyond_,’ I will accept your interpretation. Take all the
territory between Wady Kuddra and the province of Constantine. But if,
on the other hand, they all decide that the word, what you translate
‘_beyond_,’ really and strictly means _above_, accept the proposal I
make you. This proposal is to give over to you, as a limit towards the
east, the first crest of mountains which rises _above_ the Wady Kuddra.”
The Marshal prudently declined the test. He might have declared war at
once; but war with Abdel Kader was not so enticing as to be lightly
undertaken. A better mode of getting over the difficulty suggested
itself. Abdel Kader was ardently engaged in the task of organisation.
Peace was indispensable to him. Attentions, flatteries, cajolements—or,
these failing, petty annoyances and harassing vexations—might mollify or
weary out his tenacious spirit. Both were tried; but both ineffectually.
In the mean time Abdel Kader was firmly establishing himself in all the
districts to the south of Tittery. With a boldness and rapidity of
movement, which paralysed and subdued, he laid his iron hand on all the
tribes on the borders of the province of Constantine, who were known or
even suspected of intriguing with the French. He boldly occupied the
disputed territory beyond the Wady Kuddra. More than that, he made it
the scene of one of those acts of uncompromising severity, with which he
visited all traitors to the faith.
A colony of Kolouglis had lately settled there, trusting for their
security to French protection. Their kaid, a Turk, had received French
investiture. Abdel Kader summoned them to break off their treasonable
connection. They refused. The French supplied them with arms and
ammunition to resist. Abdel Kader swept down on them, crushed them, and
cut off the Frenchified kaid’s head. All the tribes of the vast district
of Sebaou instantly sent in their adhesion; and the Sultan appointed
Achmet Ibn Salem to be his Khalifa over them.
In the midst of these successes, Abdel Kader was threatened with a
rival. Achmet Bey, when turned out of Constantine, had taken refuge in
Mount Aures. He had commenced agitating amongst the tribes of the
district of Zab. Biskara, its capital, was in the possession of his most
implacable enemy, Farhat-ibn-Said. This chief applied to the French for
assistance to defend the country against the Bey, promising that, in
case of success, it should be made to submit to French domination. The
French were lukewarm; and so he turned to Abdel Kader.
Before entering the Zab country by force of arms, Abdel Kader considered
it expedient to inform the French Governor at Constantine of his
intention. As the friend and ally of France, he said, he was going to
quell the disturbances which had arisen there, and save it from anarchy.
Since agitation so near a French province might prove contagious, he
considered it was in the interest of France that he undertook the
expedition.
Having sent this communication, Abdel Kader ordered Ibn Berkani, his
Khalifa at Miliana, to collect his forces, and march on Biskara. Farhat
received him with open arms. A combined attack was made on Achmet Bey,
who was defeated, and hid himself in the Sahara. Farhat expected to be
named the Sultan’s Khalifa over the Zab. To his disgust, the latter
appointed one of his own chiefs, Ben Azouz, to that post. In revenge, he
immediately began to correspond with the French. The correspondence was
intercepted. Of his treason there could be no doubt. He was seized, and
sent in chains to Tekedemt.
Abdel Kader was now absolute sovereign of two-thirds of Algeria. The
country which he had newly occupied, to the south-east of the province
of Algeria, was one of the greatest utility to the French, since the
garrison of Constantine drew from it its provisions, and they could not
but feel that Abdel Kader could now at any moment stop the supply.
Well aware that all those movements would awaken the jealousy, if not
excite the alarm, of the French authorities in the regency, Abdel Kader
made a step towards setting himself right with the French Government at
home. After the treaty of the Tafna, Louis Philippe had sent him a
magnificent present of costly arms. These gifts Abdel Kader had
forwarded, as usual, to the Sultan of Morocco. The arms he prized but
little; but they enabled him to pay a graceful tribute to one, on whose
friendship and assistance he greatly relied.
Miloud-ibn-Arasch and Durand, the Jew, were now sent to Paris to return
the compliment. They took with them six splendid Arab horses, as a gift
to the King of the French. The presentation of this complimentary peace-
offering was the ostensible object of their mission. But their secret
instructions were to soften down any acrimonious feeling which might
exist on the part of the French Government towards their master—to
explain away his recent conduct in such a manner as to leave a
favourable impression—and to procure, if possible, a confirmation of his
reading of the disputed article in the Treaty of the Tafna.
Marshal Valée was fully cognisant of the whole of this proceeding. In
fact, he had contrived to see Ibn Arasch for a short half-hour, on his
way, at Algiers; and during this interview he had immediately began to
argue about the true meaning of the article. Divining the real object of
the ostentatious embassy, he had written to his Government, warning it
against making any concessions which might interfere with his own course
of negotiation. The Arab envoys, consequently, were graciously received;
their horses were admired and praised. They themselves were brilliantly
entertained. All the sights of Paris were shown them; and, in the French
phrase of the time, they were the “lions” of the day. But when they
broached the subject of the disputed article, their mouths were stopped
with an evasion or a compliment.
On their return to Algiers, after their fruitless mission, the envoys
were summoned by the Marshal to an interview. He drew out of his pocket
an amended version of the treaty, in which the ground contested was
given over to the French, Abdel Kader receiving in exchange the
districts of the Beni Djead, Hamza, and Oranougla; whilst, at the same
time, the measures of corn and barley which by the treaty he had engaged
to furnish, were remitted to him. Ibn Arasch declared he was not
authorised to negotiate.
The envoy was still further pressed, and he at last offered to affix his
own seal to the document, to show that personally he acceded to the
stipulation. But he positively refused to be answerable for his master’s
approval. The perplexity of the affair was mitigated by a proposal on
the part of the French to send a commission to the Sultan, and
accordingly a commission started. On reaching Miliana, the Khalifa there
refused to allow the French commissioners to proceed, without
instructions from the Sultan. Ibn Arasch feigned illness, and escaped to
Mascara.
The Marshal was again thrown on his own resources. He propitiated the
Emir by friendly offices. He sent him cannon and ammunition to assist
him in the siege of Ain Maadi. These timely succours arrived there most
opportunely; in fact they turned the scale of fortune, then trembling in
the balance. But no concession was obtained. Abdel Kader felt himself in
the right. He would not be put in the wrong.
He returned to Tekedemt, January 10th, 1839. His envoy, trembling and
doubtful as to the reception he should receive, presented himself, to
give an account of his late proceedings. When Abdel Kader learnt that he
had affixed his seal to a document which gave away all for which he had
been so long and so persistently contending, he was almost beside
himself with vexation and anger. “Never,” he exclaimed, “never will I
ratify a convention which gives the French a land communication between
Constantine and Algiers, and thus lose all the advantages I have gained
by their oversight in circumscribing Algiers within a circle formed by
the sea, the Chiffa, and the summits of the lesser Atlas, immediately
above the Wady Kuddra.”
The vacillating policy of the French Government had hitherto prevented
it from taking any decisive step for the settlement of this interminable
dispute. Now, it talked of confining the French occupation to Bona,
Algiers, and Oran. Anon, it announced its intention of asserting its
rights in the interior by force of arms. In the meantime Abdel Kader was
hourly extending his dominion. Where was all this to end? The momentous
question could no longer be avoided, and the French Government at last
determined to act. Abdel Kader it could not reach. But his agents were
within its grasp. It determined to operate on him through them.
By the treaty of the Tafna, Abdel Kader was clearly entitled to nominate
what agents he pleased, to reside near the French authorities in all
places occupied by French garrisons. These agents were now, under
various pretences, arbitrarily ignored, or assailed with studied
affronts. Some inoffensive Moors who wanted to go and settle on Abdel
Kader’s territory—a privilege which the treaty had secured to all
Mussulmans—were rudely treated and violently detained within the French
lines. A wheelwright whom Abdel Kader had long been in the habit of
employing to make gun-carriages for him in Algiers, had his shop closed
and was expelled the town.
By the 7th Article, Abdel Kader was entitled to be furnished with
whatever arms or ammunition, or materials for war, he might require, by
the French authorities, at cost price. His agent at Algiers was
expressly instructed to facilitate such a transaction. He had been
further useful in procuring for his master French mechanics from Paris,
to superintend his various internal improvements, in strict conformity
with the 10th Article. The agent was now suddenly arrested, put into
chains, and sent to France. Abdel Kader appealed to Marshal Valée
against such monstrous infringements of his rights. He was told the
Marshal had unlimited authority, and could do what he pleased.
His consul at Algiers was a certain Italian, named Garavini, who was
also consular agent for the United States of America. For nearly two
years this agent had exercised this double function without molestation.
He was now informed that the French Government refused to acknowledge
him in the first capacity. Abdel Kader had just returned from Ain Maadi
when he received this notification. He immediately penned the following
letter to Marshal Valée:—
“The Prince of the Faithful, who defends by arms the cause of God, Il
Hadj Abdel Kader, son of Mehi-ed-deen (whom God preserve in his holy
keeping), to the Governor of Algiers. Grace be to those who conform
themselves to the will of God.
“Our consul, Garavini, has informed us that he is no longer allowed to
occupy himself with our affairs. You have written him a letter, of which
he has sent me a copy. This letter we have read, and we have understood
it. It prescribes to him to leave our service, and announces that you
wish his place to be supplied by an Arab.
“In the first place, we cannot find any Arab who could perform his
functions in such a manner as to give satisfaction to our two nations,
and promote their reciprocal interests. Garavini is a wise and discreet
man, who only upholds what may be advantageous to both parties. In the
next place, France has no right to force us to take a consul against our
will and inclination. It is for us to judge what is best for us to do.
If you wish to name an Arab as your consul with us, do so. We shall
offer no objection. Why do you interfere with our choice of agents? Do
we interfere with yours? Your way of acting violates the sacred
principles of honour which ought to animate our respective modes of
proceeding.
“It would almost seem that you were desirous of seeing disorders once
more prevail in the districts of Algiers and Oran. Individuals wishing
to come and reside on our territory have not only been arbitrarily
prevented, but have been fined, and thrown into prison. When our consul,
Garavini, protested against such proceedings, you disdained to reply to
him; you would have nothing to say to him. Such conduct denotes violence
of character. It shows that you desire to provoke misunderstandings
between us and the French Government. We have chosen a Christian out of
your own town, and you reject him!
“However, since usages are thus violated, since we are thwarted in what
regards the good of our service, since there is evidently a design to
lower us, we are ready for a rupture as soon as it may please you. All
the world knows that we have chosen Garavini. We shall choose no other.
Write to your ministry, therefore, that we mean to keep our consul
Garavini. We expect an immediate answer.
“We hope France will send a more moderate man to command in Algiers, a
man who will let us enjoy the fruits of peace, a man who will do what is
just and reasonable. We had hoped that your mode of acting would not
have been like that of some of those erring men who have preceded you.
But if you choose to tread in the steps of such persons, God, be
assured, will make us victorious over our enemies, over those who
unjustly seek to molest us. God has said, ‘Let injustice fall on the
head of its author;’ He has also said, ‘It is better to be the oppressed
than the oppressor.’ As for us, we will not deviate an inch from the
treaty, if you will only abide by it.”
All the satisfaction Abdel Kader could obtain in reply to this able and
spirited remonstrance, was that the French Government understood the
15th Article to mean that the consuls named by the Emir should be taken
from amongst the Arabs, in the same way as the consuls named by the
French Government were taken from amongst the French.
The extensile qualities of the Treaty of the Tafna seemed, in the eyes
of the French authorities, to be as illimitable as their own powers of
constructive reasoning. But they were, as yet, as far from their object
as ever. Abdel Kader would neither be cajoled nor bullied. All their
devices had failed. Matters had come to a dead lock.