1839.
Marshal Valée, notwithstanding his repeated failures, determined to make
one more effort to obtain Abdel Kader’s adhesion to the views taken by
his Government on the disputed article. In the month of February, 1839,
Commandant de Salles was sent on a mission to the head-quarters of the
Sultan, who was then at Miliana. The object of his mission was to induce
Abdel Kader to give his sanction and approval to the supplementary
treaty, which had been signed by his enemy, Miloud-ibn-Arasch.
Although a continuation of the peace was of vital importance to Abdel
Kader, in order to enable him to complete his work of organisation, yet
to yield the disputed territory was to him a moral and political
impossibility.
Politically it was impossible to him, because the territory in question,
once ceded to the French, would have given them free means of
communication between the provinces of Algiers and Constantine, and
would thereby have rendered their possessions more compact, and
proportionally augmented their aggresive power. Morally it was so also,
because, not only was it repugnant to his own sense of honour to yield
up tamely and submissively a point on which he felt himself to be in the
right, but the mainstay of his hourly-increasing influence, gained by
the almost magic success with which he had gradually circumscribed the
French to within little more than gunshot of their own fortresses, would
have been dangerously imperilled by any such concession.
He had already repeatedly pacified many anxious inquirers, by the
assurance that France would never dare to overstep the limits assigned
to her in the plain of Algiers. It was on the strength of this assurance
that the military and religious chiefs, convoked on the Habra, had
consented to the peace. Without their consent, whatever might have been
his own inclinations, he was precluded from listening to any
modification of the treaty.
Already, too, sinister reports and insinuations were circulated by the
fanatical party that he was secretly paying tribute to the French; that
the infidels had received his permission to settle on the sacred soil of
Islam, and that the tolerance of such a profanation was little
consistent with his lofty boast that he would, ere long, drive them all
into the sea.
Placed in this delicate position, Abdel Kader resolved on again
convoking all the principal personages in his kingdom, and again calling
on them to arbitrate on the differences existing between him and the
French Government. The French commissioner was informed of this
intention, and invited to attend the meeting, with full permission to
enounce his propositions. He accepted the invitation, though with small
hopes that he should be able to obtain from the Sultan’s council of war,
concessions which the pressure of his Government had failed to obtain
from the Sultan himself.
The course of action which Abdel Kader thus adopted was, however, the
only one which afforded any prospect for a peaceable adjustment of
affairs. Marshal Valée had always ascribed Abdel Kader’s pertinacity to
his individual pride and ambition. His feelings of irritation at the
manner in which all means of accommodation had been rejected, were
increased by the inward conviction that the obstacles raised were the
consequence of his adversary’s personal caprice. Abdel Kader counted on
his present proceeding to dispel the Marshal’s delusion, if not to
induce him to adopt a change of conduct. The Marshal would discover that
it was not the sentiments of an individual, but those of a whole people,
with which he was contending.
The council of war met. The French envoy spoke; but the decision was
unanimous: “War, rather than give up the disputed territory.” M. de
Salles returned to Algiers to state the result of his mission. Abdel
Kader, on his part, without waiting for further circumvolutions of
policy in that direction, appealed at once to a higher quarter, and
addressed the following letter to the King of the French:—
“Praise be to the One God!
“The servant of God, Il Hadj Abdel Kader, ibn Mehi-ed-deen, Commander of
the Faithful, to H.M. Louis Philippe, King of the French: may his reign
be long, happy, and full of glory.
“Since the foundation of Islamism, Mussulmans and Christians have been
at war. For ages this was a sacred obligation on both sects; but the
Christians, neglecting their religion and its precepts, have finished by
looking on war merely as a means of worldly aggrandisement.
“To the true Mussulman, on the contrary, war against the Christians is
merely a religious obligation; how much more so when Christians come to
invade Mussulman territory! According to this principle, I deviated from
the rules laid down in our sacred books, when, two years ago, I made
with you, King of the Christians, a treaty of peace; and more especially
when I endeavoured to consolidate this peace by every means in my power.
You know the duties imposed by the Koran on every Mussulman prince;
therefore you ought to give me credit for having taken upon myself to
relax, as regards you, the rigour of its precepts.
“But you now demand a sacrifice from me which is too formally in
contradiction with my religion to allow me to submit to it; and you are
too just to impose it on me as a necessity. You call upon me to abandon
tribes whose submission I have received; who came to me of themselves to
pay me the imposts prescribed by the Koran, and who beseeched me, and
still beseech me, to govern them. I have myself traversed their
territory, _which, moreover, is beyond the limits of that which the
treaty reserved to France_; and can you now wish, by another treaty,
that I should order those tribes to submit to the yoke of the
Christians?
“No. If the French are my friends, they can never desire to bring about
a state of things which would lower and degrade their ally in the eyes
of his people. They would not for the sake of a few miserable tribes, to
govern which, themselves, or leave to others to govern, can be of very
little moment to them, place me in the terrible alternative either of
breaking the law, or of renouncing a peace which is so desirable for us
both.
“But some may tell you that this consideration which forces me to
reclaim those tribes will oblige me to reclaim the Arabs of Metija, of
Oran, and of Constantine. No; for those have remained, and still remain,
with the French of their own free will; and I have reserved to myself
the right of giving an asylum to those amongst them who may become
disgusted with Christian dominion. Whereas, the tribes in question, who
are not nomad, but are attached to the soil, seek to be under my
government, and are too numerous to allow of my giving them grounds in
my territory equal to those they might wish to abandon.
“Great King of the French! God has appointed each of us to govern some
of his creatures. You are in a position far superior to mine, by the
number, power, and riches of your subjects; but on both of us he has
imposed the obligation of making our people happy. Examine, then, with
me our positions; and you will acknowledge that on you alone depends the
happiness of both people.
“‘Sign,’ I am told by your agents; ‘or if you do not sign, your refusal
will be war.’ Well, I will not sign; and yet I desire peace—nothing but
peace.
“In order that a treaty should be useful to your subjects, it is
necessary that I should be feared and respected by mine; for the moment
they see that, according to my good pleasure, I hand them over to the
administration of the Christians, they will no longer have any
confidence in me, and then it will be impossible for me to make them
observe the least clause in the treaty.
“How can you be compromised—you, Sultan of the French nation—by making
concessions to a young Emir, whose power is now beginning to be
strengthened and fortified under your shadow? Ought you not rather to
protect me, to be indulgent towards me—me, who have re-established order
amongst tribes which were slaying each other; who seek every day to
raise in them a taste for the arts and for liberal professions? Help me,
in the place of embarrassing me, and God will recompense you.
“If the war breaks out again, there will be no more commerce, which
might confer such inestimable advantages on the country, and no more
security for the colonists. There will be increased expenses, and
diminished productions. The blood of your soldiers will be uselessly
shed; it will be a partisan war to the death. I have not the folly to
suppose that I can openly make head against your troops; but I can
harass them without ceasing. I shall lose ground, no doubt; but then I
have on my side, knowledge of the country, the frugality and hardy
temperament of my Arabs, and, more than all, the arm of God, who
supports the oppressed.
“If, on the contrary, you wish for peace, our two countries will be as
one; the least of your subjects will enjoy the most perfect security
amongst the tribes; the two peoples will intermix more and more every
day; and you will have the glory of having introduced into our countries
that civilisation of which the Christians are the apostles.
“You will comprehend, I am sure, what I say; you will grant me what I
ask; and what I ask is this,—that you do not see in a refusal to sign a
new treaty, the desire of recommencing war, but rather the wish to
consolidate the basis of the old one, and to confirm a sincere
friendship between our nations.
“May God inspire you with an answer worthy of your power, and the
goodness of your heart.”
The almost supplicating earnestness of this simple and straightforward
letter fully evinces the anxiety entertained by Abdel Kader at the
aspect which affairs between himself and the French were now assuming,
and his sense of the vast importance to himself of a continuation of the
peace. On the 31st May, 1839, the ministry of M. Molé was overthrown. A
false report had reached Algiers, that he had been replaced by M.
Thiers, with Marshal Gerard as Minister of War.
Abdel Kader immediately wrote again to the king, and, at the same time,
addressed two letters to the said ministers, with a power of language
and a form of argument, which could only have emanated from a mind
consoled and supported by the rectitude of its intention, and a firm and
unshaken reliance in the justice of its cause.
LETTER TO THE KING.
“I have written you three letters, in which I gave you all my thoughts;
not one of them has been honoured with an answer. They have been,
doubtless, intercepted; for you are too kind and considerate not to have
given me the satisfaction of knowing what were your true feelings and
dispositions. May this, my last attempt, meet with better success! May
this exposition of what is passing in Africa attract and fix your
attention, and lead to a system which shall conduce to the welfare and
happiness of the two populations whom God has confided to your care and
solicitude!
“The behaviour of your lieutenants is most unjust with regard to me; and
I cannot suppose that it is known to you; I have too much confidence in
your justice to suppose it. Endeavours are being made to induce you to
regard me as your enemy. You are imposed on; if I were your enemy, I
should already have found many causes for commencing hostilities.
“Since my refusal to sign the new treaty, presented to me by M. de
Salles on the part of Marshal Valée (my motives for which I have already
explained to you in one of my former letters), there is no kind of
injustice with which I have not been assailed by your representatives at
Algiers. My soldiers have been arrested and thrown into prison without
any legal cause; an order has been given not to allow the importation of
any more iron, or brass, or lead, into my country; my agents in Algiers
have been ill-treated by the authorities; my most important letters are
answered by a simple receipt, cavalierly handed to the horseman who
bears them; letters written to me from Algiers are intercepted.
“After such treatment they tell you I am your enemy. They say that I
want war at any price—I who desire, in every way, to follow the example
of your industrious nation—I, who in spite of these tokens of hostility,
facilitate the arrival of all the productions of my country into your
markets—I who surround myself with Europeans, in order to give an
impetus to industry, and who issue the most stringent orders that your
merchants, and even your men of science, should not only be allowed to
travel all over my country in perfect security, but be received and
treated with hospitality.
“But you may be told—‘The Emir has not yet fulfilled the first
conditions imposed on him by the treaty of the Tafna.’ To this I reply,
I have only postponed the execution of these clauses, because your
representative, Bugeaud, broke, in the first place, his engagements.
“Where are all the supplies of muskets, of powder, of lead, of sulphur,
which were promised to me? Why do I still see at Oran the chiefs of the
Douairs and Zmelas, whose removal to France was solemnly promised me?
Does Bugeaud think I have not yet in my possession the particular
treaty, the only one which interests me, written out entirely in his own
hand, and signed with his seal? Could I believe for an instant that
written promises from the representative of the King of the French could
possibly be invalid?
“I confess, I had so high an idea of the good faith of French
Christians, that I was scandalised by their want of good faith, and that
having had no direct communication with you, I refused to sign another
treaty.
“Yes, your military deputies only wish for new combats and fresh
conquests. I am certain this system is not yours. You have not descended
on the shores of Africa to exterminate its inhabitants, nor to drive
them from the country. You wished to bring them the benefits of
civilisation. You came not to make a nation of slaves, but rather to
implant amidst the people that spirit of liberty which is the most
powerful lever of your own nation, and with which it has dowried so many
other countries.
“Is it by the force of arms, is it by bad faith, that your agents will
accomplish this end? Should the Arabs be at last convinced that you have
come to attack their religion and conquer their country, their hatred
will grow stronger than ever. They will break away from my control and
authority, and our mutual prospects of civilisation will vanish away for
ever.
“I pray and entreat you then, in the name of God, who has created us
both, to try and understand a little better this young Arab, whom the
Most High has placed, despite himself, at the head of a simple and
ignorant people, and who is falsely represented to you as being an
ambitious chief. Make him acquainted with your intentions. Above all,
communicate with him directly, and his conduct will prove to you that he
has been badly appreciated.
“May God grant you the light necessary to govern your people wisely.”
The letter to M. Thiers was couched in the following terms:—
“I congratulate France on your return to the ministry. The important
labours which formerly signalised your presence in it, and the interest
you always bear towards Algiers, make me salute you with joy.
“Your countrymen who are about me have informed me that your post is
charged more especially with watching and superintending the prosperity
of France. A part of Africa is become French. In speaking to you of the
dangers which menace the prosperity of the two countries, I perform a
duty.
“Counsellor of the King of the French, it is for your enlightenment, it
is for your philanthropy, to strengthen and consolidate a peace which
France and Algiers both demand.
“The despotic caprices of the agents of an honoured Government, the
failures in the execution of a treaty on the one side, leading to
similar failures on the other; and the greedy and unprincipled ambitions
of some, who aim at new spheres of riches and emoluments, threaten to
mingle French and Arab blood, when, to my belief, the real truth is,
that we all long for a peace which will bring to the Arabs the precious
results of progress and civilisation, and to France the glory of having
conferred them.
“You are great for France—be so for Africa; and both countries will
bless you. Your influence with a king, whose minister you are, and your
counsels to a young Emir—entirely ignorant of the intricacies of
European politics—are the materials with which you might erect a
monument of glory for your own nation, and one of happiness and
gratitude for mine.
“May God assist and enlighten you, and maintain you in the high position
of which you are so worthy!”
The letter to Marshal Gerard was not less admirably conceived. It ran as
follows:—
“As soon as I was informed that the powerful King of the French had made
you Minister of War, I had reason to be rejoiced. I felt that one who
has nothing to add to his military glory, could never look to the French
occupation in Africa as his sole field for military distinction. One
who, like you, knows how to make war, must also know how to make peace,
and to enjoy its fruits.
“This peace is menaced; and wherefore? For the sake of a few leagues of
ground, and a road impracticable from its natural difficulties. Has not
France sufficient military glory—has it not space enough—that it should
seek to acquire more at the expense of my influence over Arabs, whom I
have bound myself to keep in submission?
“My religion prevents me from violating my engagements. Why, then, seek,
without any necessity, to lower me in the eyes of my co-religionists by
calling on me to give over and place under French administration
populations, to whom it is my duty, by the injunctions of our law, to
preach the holy war? Let those who would compel me to do so try to
understand my religion, and the obligations which it imposes upon me;
and then, perhaps, they may be inclined to give me credit for the
sacrifices I am making.
“I approach you, then, to call your attention to the exactments of a
local administration, which I refuse to believe can be guided in its
acts by the wishes of France and of its chief. The French are too great
to inspire the vexatious meannesses to which my subjects are constantly
exposed in their relations with your representatives at Algiers. My
dignity has obliged me to suspend these relations in part. When I saw
that they were anxious enough to take the produce of our soil, but
refused to supply the iron necessary for cultivating it, I said to them,
‘Sell, but buy no more; God who has given us land has also placed in our
mountains all the metals which our pretended civilisers refuse us.’
“I pray to God, that your powerful influence with the king may be
employed in seconding my pacific views; and that you and his noble son
may, for the sake of self-information, come and visit this country, and
meet with him whom you wrongly look upon as your enemy. Then your
penetration and your genius, finding in me only sincerity and the desire
of doing good, will assist me in moderating, either by civilisation or
by arms, the fanaticism of populations who are only just beginning to
appreciate the advantages of peace and industry.
“May God make your armies victorious so long as they fight in the true
cause.”
These were noble words—words well worthy of being recorded. They were
noble in the grandeur of their appeal—noble, as indicating the heroic
struggle which rent and lacerated the breast of one conscious of his
powers, burning with great designs, and painfully oscillating between a
nervous anxiety to prolong a peace which would have enabled him to
exhibit before the world a Mohammedan kingdom at its highest possible
pitch of progress and development, and the lofty determination to
abandon even this his heart’s desire, and to waive the brilliant future,
if such objects could only be attained by a craven submission, however
temporary, to the imperious dictates of an overbearing and unprincipled
ambition.
Such appeals, it may be well imagined, were entirely thrown away on a
government which, finding itself entangled in a labyrinth, and thus
fettered in the realisation of its secret views, was bent on adopting
any measures likely to deliver it from its embarrassing position,
however inconsistent they might be with good faith.
Thus, whilst Abdel Kader was still fondly dreaming over the possible
fulfilment of plans and projects, meant to harmonise and combine the
requirements of Mohammedanism with the advantages of European
intercourse, and the fruits of European civilisation, the subtle and
powerful enemy with whom he was coping was already meditating a line of
action which was destined, before long, to scatter those plans and
projects to the winds.
Both parties, it is true, wished for peace; but whereas the one sought
for it as a temporary expedient, the other clung to it as a vital
principle. Both were bound to their respective people by pledges and
obligations, from which they could not recede. Abdel Kader had vowed to
keep the French at his sword’s point, in every case of unjustifiable
aggression. His attitude was clear and unequivocal; it embodied the
strength and the simplicity of truth.
The French Government, on the other hand, had officially and falsely
declared to the Chambers, that the difficulties which had been raised
about the Treaty of the Tafna had been explained to the advantage of
France, and that the possession of the disputed territory was henceforth
assured. The pen had easily traced such words, and the mouth had freely
spoken them. But it required the sword to make good and establish this
foregone conclusion.
The state of doubt and uncertainty had now reached its utmost limit. The
period of compliments, of evasions, of hollow friendship, of
hypocritical alliance, had passed away. The co-existence of Abdel Kader
and France on the soil of Algeria was henceforth impossible. Freed from
the entanglements of diplomatic garniture, the gladiators again stood
face to face, ready to descend into the arena.